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INTRODUCTION
Baseball and Antitrust:
The Legislative History of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
In 1998, the 105th Congress passed legislation to address the
exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball from the nation's antitrust laws
which were created in 1922 by the United States Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball

Clubs. The Curt Flood Act of 1998 (Public Law Number 105-297) was named
for former Major League outfielder Curtis Charles Flood. The Supreme Court's
decision in 1972 in Flood's case against Commissioner Bowie Kuhn solidified
the exemption and served as the backdrop for a turbulent period in labor
relations between players and owners that resulted in the establishment of free
agency for certain players, the escalation of salaries, and the substantial
movement of players to different Major League teams.
The action by Congress was predicated upon Article XXVIII of the
Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and Major League Baseball Players Association that became effective on
January 1, 1997. Ownership and the Players Association were united in
petitioning Congress to allow players the same rights as other professional
athletes to use antitrust laws as potential leverage against owners in the
collective bargaining process. The passage of the act was the end result of over
forty years of consideration of Major League Baseball's special antitrust status.
The legislative history contained in this set covers the activities of four
Congresses during the 1990s that considered this long established peculiarity.
The set features an article by Ed Edmonds detailing the components of
the act, the history of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption, the
development of the nonstatutory labor exemption by the Supreme Court in the
overall context of labor-antitrust relations and within the specific context of the
sports arena. The article concludes that the legislation will have a limited impact
upon the labor relations between the two parties because Supreme Court
jurisprudence leaves little use for antitrust leverage whenever a collective
bargaining relationship exists.
The set contains all of the relevant Congressional debate, the major
hearing and report from 1997, the presidential statement, various versions of the
legislation considered throughout the 1990s, and related hearings from 1992 to
1995. These documents will provide the reader with the final chapter in the long
struggle by Congress to address the antitrust status of Major League Baseball.
xiii

These volumes are the first in a series of legislative histories on sports
topics that will present not only the remaining chapters of this story but also the
documentary history of Congressional activity concerning boxing in the United
States, franchise relocation, the broadcasting of professional sports, and other
selected topics.
Edmund P. Edmonds
Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law
University of St. Thomas School of Law
May 2001

xiv

LEGISLATIVE CHRONOLOGY
January 21, 1997

-

Introduced by Sen. Hatch

October 29, 1997 - Reported to Senate from the Committee on the
Judiciary with amendment
July 30, 1998 - Passed Senate, as amended
July 30, 1998 - Considered in Senate

July 31, 1998 - Referred to House Committee on the Judiciary
October 7, 1998 - Measure considered and passed in House
October 14, 1998 - Enrolled Measure signed in House
October 15, 1998 - Enrolled Measure signed in Senate; presented
to President
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PART I

The Curt Flood Act of 1998:
A Congressional Response to
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption

THE CURT FLOOD.ACT OF 1998:
A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Edmund P. Edmonds'
In 1998, Congress passed legislation ostensibly designed to provide major
league baseball players with narrowly fashioned relief from three United States
Supreme Court decisions3 that gave Major League Baseball an exemption from
antitrust laws. The act was named in honor of Curtis Charles Flood,4 a courageous 5
IDirector of the Law Library and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of
Law, B.A., 1973, University of Notre Dame, M.L.S., 1974, University of Maryland, J.D., 1978,
University of Toledo. A version of this article was first published as The Curt FloodAct of 1998:
A Hollow Gesture AfterAll These Years? at 9 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 315 (1999). The article was part

of a symposium that Included numerous discussions of the Act and the history of labor
relations InMajor League Baseball. Permission to create a revision of that article to serve as
an introduction to this legislative history of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 was granted by Paul M.
Anderson, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the National Sports Law
Institute at Marquette University School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation
to Paul Anderson, Associate Professor J. Gordon Hylton and Matthew Mitten, Professor of Law
and Director of the National Sports Law Institute of the Marquette University School of Law for
their encouragement throughout this project. I also wish to thank Nancy L. Strohmeyer,
Associate Law Librarian for Public Services, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, for her
expert editorial assistance, and William Manz, Executive Law Librarian, St. John's University Law
School Library, for his steadfast loyalty towards the completion of this project.
2
Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L.No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824. The passage of the
Curt Flood Act of 1998 came after nearly fifty years of Congressional consideration of
baseballs antitrust exemption. For more details, see, e.g., Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty
Years Inthe On-Deck Circle: Congress and the BaseballAntitrust Exemption, 1994 T.Marshall
L.Rev. 627; Stephen R. Lowe, THE IDON THE
SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTs, 19101992, 15-60 (1995).
3
See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4

Curt Flood died on January 20, 1997, at the UCLA Medical Center after a
prolonged fight against throat cancer. See, e.g., Murray Chass, On Baseball: Flood Was a
Mon for Every Season, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997; BaseballPioneerDies at 59: Flood Led Fight
for Player Free Agency, SEATRTE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1997, at DI; Baseball: Outfielders
Unsuccessful Challenge of Reserve System In 1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1997, at Cl; 1.J. Rosenberg, Baseball Notebook: Players Owe a Tip of the Cop, and Much
More, to Flood, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSmUrLON, Jan. 26, 1997, at F02; Ross Newhan, Player
Champion Flood Dead at 59; Baseball: Outfielder's Unsuccessful Challenge of Reserve
System In 1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at Cl; Bob Broeg, Flood Fell a

1

baseball player who filed suit in 1969 against Major League Baseball's reserve
clause after being traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies.
Flood was so incensed at the treatment accorded to him by his employers that he
wrote to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn demanding:
After twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of
property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I believe that
any system which produces that result violates my basic rights as a citizen
and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States and of the several
States.
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970, and I am capable of playing. I
have received a contract offer from the Philadelphia club, but I believe I
have the right to consider offers from others clubs before making any
decisions. I, therefore, request that you make known to all Major League
clubs my feelings in this matter, and advise them of my availability for the
1970 season.
Flood would ultimately lose his case before the Supreme Court. However, less than
five years later, arbitrator Peter Seitz would award free agency status to pitchers
Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally.7 The availability of free agency in
professional baseball has resulted in over two decades of phenomenal salary
growth.8 In addition to the escalation of salaries, the Major League Baseball
Few Singles Short of Fame and Riches, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1997, at CI; Richard
Reeves, Editorial, The Inglorious Undoing of a Proud, AngryMon, SEATrLE
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at
B4. For an interesting website highlighting Flood's life and legal legacy see
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-CLASS/am483_97/projects/brady/flood.html (visited on Feb. 10,
2001)
5

Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) Identified Flood as a courageous and beautiful
athlete during the Congressional discussion of the Curt Flood Act of 1998. 144 Cong. Rec.
H9942-03, H9944 (Oct. 7, 1998).
6

CuRT FLOOD, THEWAY IT Is 194-195 (1971). See also BOWIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE
EDUCATION OF ABASEBALL
COMMISSIONER 83 (1987); MARVIN MILLER, AWHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE
SPORT AND BUSINESS
OF BASEBALL
190-191 (1991); LEELOWENFISH, THEIMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF
BASEBALL's LABOR WARS 207 (Revised Edition 1991).
7

National and American League Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976). See also Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
8
See, e.g., MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMEST. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 437-442 (2nd Ed.
1998); ANDREW ZMBAUST, BASEBALL
AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE
BIG BUSINESS
OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME 112-113 (1992).

2

Players Association has become a formidable force in negotiating collective
bargaining agreements with the owners.
The passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 by the 105th Congress came
over seventy-five years after the Supreme Court ruled in FederalBaseballClub of

Baltimore, Inc. v. NationalLeague ofProfessionalBaseballClubs9 that baseball

was not involved in interstate commerce or trade as customarily defined within the
context of sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 In taking this
action, Congress finally responded to the Supreme Court's plea in Toolson v. New
York Yankees" and Floodv.Kuhn' 2 to seek a legislative solution to the exemption
created in FederalBaseball. The legislation further reacted to ajoint agreement
between Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players
Association embodied in their most recent collective bargaining agreement to
appeal to Congress for a legislative change to the "anomaly" and "aberration"
3
recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Flood.1
Although the
legislation was hailed as significant by numerous Congressmen,14 one must ask
9259 U.S. 200 (1922).

1015 U.S.C. " 1-2 (1994).
11346 U.S. 356 (1953).

12407 U.S. 258 (1972).

"See Id. of 282. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-III.) noted In his Congressional testimony that
"(g]iven the agreement of the parties, Congress has now decided to legislate Inthis area, but
we do so only In an extremely narrow manner." 144 Cong. Rec. H9942-03 (1998 WL 694709
(Cong. Rec.)). Article X(VIll of the Basic Agreement Between the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major
League Baseball Players Association (effective Jan. 1, 1997), reprinted in GARY A. UBERS11NE,
editor, LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 5-149 (1988), provided that Major League
Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association would both lobby Congress for
legislation to "clarify that Major League Baseball Players are covered under the antitrust laws"
with the same rights as football and basketball players. Article )OXVII also stressed that the act
should not change antitrust laws in any other ways concerning the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. Furthermore, if legislation was not passed by December 31,
1998, the collective bargaining agreement would be terminated cn December 31, 2000,
rather than on October 31, 2000, or one day after the last game of the World Series in 2000,
as provided In Article XXVIl of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 5-148. The Major
League Baseball Players Association was granted the right to exercise an extension option
under Articles XVii and XXVIll to push the agreement through the 2001 season. Id. at 5-1485-149.
14
Rep. Mike Billrakis (R-Fla.), Rep. Jim Bunning (R-Ky), Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (DMich.), Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Rep. Henry Hyde (R-lit), Sen. Pat Leahy (D-Vt.).

3

whether this act is anything more than a hollow gesture to the memory of Curt
Flood. Although baseball players nowjoin basketball and football players in their
ability potentially to wage antitrust war against management, a series of cases 5
culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.16
insures that the nonstatutory labor law exemption will nearly always trump a
complaint predicated upon antitrust grounds.
This introduction to the legislative history of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
will first outline the provisions ofthe Act and recent decisions discussing the reach
of baseball's antitrust exemption. Second, Congressional commentary will be
discussed. Third, the development of the nonstatutory labor exemption by the
Supreme Court will be outlined followed by a discussion of its application to sports.
The article will conclude with an expression of the likely impact of the act on the
rights of players or management to use antitrust laws effectively against the other
party.
The Curt Flood Act of 1998

The purpose of the act as outlined in section two is "to state that major
league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws."' 7 Section two further
notes that major league baseball players are granted the same antitrust rights as
basketball and football players.' The United States Supreme Court held in

Radovich v. NationalFootballLeague9 that the National Football League did not

enjoy the same antitrust exemption that the Court had granted to baseball in
Federal Baseball and Toolson.20 Fourteen years later, the Court held that
i'See Mackeyv. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McCourtv.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F.Supp.
738 (D.D.C. 1976), affdin part, reVdin part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F.
Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Powell v. National Football League, 678 F.Supp. 777 (D.Minn. 1988);
Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D.Minn. 1988); Powell v. National
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Powell v. National Football League, 764 F.
Supp. 1351 (D.Minn. 1991); McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.Supp. 871 (D.Minn.
1982); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
16518 U.S. 231 (1996).

"Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, ' 2, 112 Stat. 2824.
18

See id.

19352 U.S. 445 (1957).
20

1d. at 447-448.
4

professional basketball was similarly not exempt from antitrust assault in Haywood
i NationalBasketballAssociation.2 1 The final clause of section two declares that
the act "does not change the application ofthe antitrust laws in any other context or
with respect to any other person or entity."22 The clause appears to assure the
owners and commissioner of Major League Baseball that all other aspects of the
business of baseball will remain free from antitrust challenge.
Section three declares that the legislation involves "the business of
organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting

employment of major league baseball players."2 Furthermore, subsection (b)
reiterates that the act only relates to employment of players.24 The drafters of the
act have taken great pains to reinforce in numerous ways the extremely narrow
grant accorded in section two.
Subsection (b)then lists six instances in which the act does not change the
existing jurisprudence concerning baseball's antitrust exemption.2 First, the act
does not grant any rights to minor league players, including "any reserve clause as
applied to minor league players."2 Fearful that minor league players might employ
the act to rid themselves of the burden of the minor league reserve system, minor
league baseball owners petitioned their Congressmen to refrain from changing the
delicate balance that exists between major league and minor league baseball.
Minor league baseball has seen a significant resurgence in the past twenty-five
years in fan interest resulting in an increased financial value for franchise owners
and a greater rationale for cities to try to attract and keep minor league teams.27
Many cities with minor league teams have responded by investing millions of
dollars in new state-of-the-art facilities. A change in the employment conditions of
minor league players wouldjeopardize these expenditures. The second enumerated
item under subsection (b) underscores the act's grant of antitrust rights only to
21401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971). See also, Flood, 407 U.S. at 280; Denver Rockets v.
All- Pro Management, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1049, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
22

Pub. L.No. 105-297, '2.

23

1d. at '3(a)(emphasis added).

24See

Id. at ' 3(b).

25

See Id.

26

1d.

at '3(b)(1).

27

See, e.g., Zimbalst, supra note 8, at 112-113; NEIL J. SULUVAN, THE
MINORS: THE

STRUGGLESAND THE
TRIUMPH OF BASEBALL'S
POOR RELATION FROM 1876 TO THEPRESENT
256-273 (1990).
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major league players by disallowing any claim based upon the Professional
Baseball Agreement between Major League Baseball and the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body of minor league baseball. 28
Franchise Relocation
The third feature of baseball specifically identified by the act as continuing
to enjoy protection from any antitrust action concerns "franchise expansion,
location or relocation, franchise ownership issues," and "the relationship between
the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners." 29 Furtlermore, the
marketing or sales of baseball or the licensing of intellectual property rights cannot
be challenged.30 The Commissioner and the owners in baseball have not been
subjected to antitrust liability regarding franchise relocation as the National
Football League was in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League.
In fact, in Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,32 the

Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the viability ofthe baseball exemption respecting
franchise relocation of the Braves from Milwaukee to Atlanta. The decision was
rendered in a suit claiming a violation of state antitrust law. Because the structure
of league was at issue, the court ruled against the state. However, the court stated
(w)e venture to guess that this exemption does not cover every type of
business activity to which a baseball club or league might be a party and
does not protect clubs or leagues from application of the federal acts to
activities which are not incidental to the maintenance of the league
structure ....

Furthermore, the drafters of the legislation appear to establish that the decisions in
Piazzav. MajorLeague Baseball3 4 and Butterworth v. NationalLeague,35 should
"Pub. L.No. 105-297, '3(b)(2).
29

ld. at '3(b)(3).

3

See id.

31726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (antitrust liability Issue) & 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986) (damages issue).
32144
3

N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).

Id at 15.

34831

F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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not be relied upon. Rather, the drafters prefer the analysis found in New Orleans
PelicansBaseball,Inc. v. NationalAssociation ofProfessionalBaseballLeagues,
Inc.36 and Minnesota Twins Partnershipv. State" determining that the entire

business of baseball is covered by the antitrust exemption.
In Piazza, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered claims by Vincent M. Piazza, Vincent N. Tirendi and PT Baseball, Inc.
that Major League Baseball had interfered illegally in their efforts to purchase the
San Francisco Giants and relocate the team to Tampa Bay, Florida." Plaintiffs
asserted numerous claims under the United States Constitution, federal antitrust
laws, and certain state laws.
Judge John Padova's thorough and analytical
decision40 discussed the standard of review, 41federal Constitutional claims, 42 a civil
rights claim, the relevant market for antitrust analysis," and standing 45 before
turning to a consideration of baseball's antitrust exemption claim. Judge Padova
noted that each of the three cases involved the reserve clause.46 Major League
35644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
'1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994).
31592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999).
38

Plazza, 831 F.Supp. at 421.

3

See Id.

40Gary Roberts InThe Curt FloodAct: A Brief Appralsal of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
from the Minor League Perspective, 9 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 413 (1999) noted the "extraordinary
efforts" employed by Judge Padova. Professor Roberts also stated that "[t]his decision might
be dismissed as the bizarre and aberrational effort of one Italian-Arnerican judge to give
redress to two fellow Italian-American plaintiffs whom some National League owners had
allegedly defamed Inconnection with their purported efforts to buy a part interest in the San
Francisco Giants." Id. at 422.

41See Id. at 424-425.
2

4

See Id. at 425-426.

43See Id. at 426-429.
"See Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 429-431.
45See Id. at 431-433.
'6See Id. at 435.
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Baseball argued that the exemption extended to the "business of baseball"
generally, while the plaintiffs asserted that the exemption was limited to the reserve
clause. Judge Padova asserted that "the Court in Floodv. Kuhn stripped from
FederalBaseballand Toolson any precedential value that those cases may have had
beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause." 48 Judge Padova
concluded that the exemption was properly limited to the reserve system, a nonissue in the case, and "rejected Baseball's argument that it is exempt from antitrust
liability in this case." 49 In finding a narrow application for baseball's exemption,
Judge Padova distinguished Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,5 0 a case involving
the power of the Commissioner to disapprove the sale for three baseball players
from the Oakland As to other teams. 51 Judge Padova cited the finding of the court
in HendersonBroadcastingCorp. v. Houston SportsAssociation5 2 which stated

that the exemption did not cover the broadcasting of games.
Butterworth5 3 involved the same factual context as Piazza. Florida
Attorney General Robert Butterworth issued antitrust civil investigative demands
against the National League and its president, Bill White, involving the GiantsTampa Bay situation.5 4 The Circuit Court ofFlorida's Ninth Judicial Circuit issued
an order quashing the Attorney General's investigation and civil investigative
demands and determined that the antitrust exemption applied.ss The Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision,s6 and certified a question to the
Florida Supreme Court requesting its determination as to the applicability of
baseball's exemption to the sale and relocation of franchises under federal and state
4

1See id.

48

Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 436.

49

Id. at 438.

50569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
51831 F. Supp. 436-437.
52541 F.Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
5644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
"See Id. at 1022.

"See Id.
5622 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
8

antitrust laws. The court ruled against Major League Baseball citing favorably the
decision in Piazzabecause of its thorough analysis of the issues and the case law.s7
Like Piazza, the Butterworth Court refused to extend the antitrust exemption
beyond the reserve clause.58
Despite the imaginative attempts to narrow the scope ofbaseball's historic
exemption by the courts in Piazza and Butterworth, a federal court in Louisiana and
the Minnesota Supreme Court found the arguments unpersuasive. In New Orleans
PelicansBaseball,Inc. v. NationalAssociationofProfessionalBaseballLeagues,

Inc.,59 Judge Martin Feldman found that the exemption did indeed extend to the
entire business of baseball. The Pelicans case involved a dispute between two
rivals attempting to relocate minor league teams to the New Orleans market.
Groups representing both the AAA Denver Zephyrs franchise and the AA Charlotte
Knights were looking for a new home location after Major League expansion added
the Colorado Rockies and the Florida Marlins to the National League displacing
both minor league teams from their markets.60 According to the rules of the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body of
Minor League Baseball, a league in a higher classification can control the territory
by submitting a notice in response to the request by a team from a lower
classification to relocate into that market. 61 In turning aside plaintiffs arguments
that Piazza should control on a summary judgment motion, Judge Feldman noted
that "[a]lthough Piazza presents an impressive dissent from precedent, this Court
associates itself with the weight of authority."62
The Minnesota Supreme Court also refused to accept the rationale of

Piazzaand Butterworthin Minnesota Twins Partnershipv. State.63 The Minnesota

Attorney General's Office had requested compliance with civil investigative
demands concerning the possible sale and relocation of the Minnesota Twins
51644 So. 2d at 1025.
saSee id.
591994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994).
60

1d. at *3.

61ld. at *14-16.
62

1d. at *25.

6592

N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denIed, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999).
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franchise." Major League Baseball argued that its antitrust exemption protected it
from compliance with the request. In reversing the decision of a Minnesota district
court ordering compliance, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the historic
trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases as well asJudge Padova's analysis in
Piazza." The court decided:
"to follow the lead of those courts that conclude the business of
professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust laws. Further, we
conclude that the sale and relocation of a baseball franchise, like the
reserve clause discussed in Flood is an integral part of the business of
professional baseball and falls within the exemption."67
The decisions in Pelicansand Twins undercut any attempts to rely upon
Piazza, Butterworth and Postema v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball

Clubs. 8 Congress has tried to foreclose any reliance on these three decisions
attempting to narrow the scope of the exemption and to reinforce the analysis
presented in Pelicans and Twins. However, the nature of the language of the Act
provides a slight crack in the otherwise air-tight nature of the legislation for an
imaginative judge like John Padova to argue that the language of the statute most
conform with the reality that the exemption has already been reduced to covering
only the reserve clause. Major League Baseball and its supporters will certainly
argue that such a reading goes against the meaning and intent of the legislators
passing this statute. Furthermore, such a reading would defeat the meaning ofall of
the language in section three of the act. However, the language allows for an
argument over the meaning of these cases within the context of the Act.
The fourth listed aspect of the business of baseball maintaining protection
under subsection 3(b) 69 is the right to pool the league's transfer of broadcast rights
in "sponsored telecasts" under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 196 1.70 The great
4592 N.W.2d at 849.
65d. at 852-854.
6Id. at 855.
67

1d.

6799 F.Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), reVdIn porton other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1993). See Infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
69

Pub. L.No. 105-297, § 3 (b)(4).

70See

5 U.S.C. §9 1291-1295 (1994).
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disparity between the broadcast rights of teams in large markets versus small
markets is probably the greatest challenge to the financial viability ofMajor League
Baseball because of the impact on salaries. In 1999, the New York Yankees
averaged over $3.6 million in salaries. 1 Los Angeles, Atlanta, and the New York
Mets all exceeded $3 million.72 By contrast, the Minnesota Twins took the honors
of the lowest average at slightly over $601,000 while Montreal and Kansas City
averaged below $800,000.73 This trend will only increase after the recordshattering ten-year, $252 million deal between the Texas Rangers and Alex
Rodriquez.74
The fifth item listed under subsection (b) is the relationship between
organized professional baseball and umpires or other employees of organized
professional baseball. The most likely reason for this statutory language involves
litigation between umpires and Major League Baseball.
In Salerno v. American League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs, 5 the

plaintiffs, umpires fired by the president ofthe American League, filed an antitrust
claim against the league. The umpires claimed that they were not discharged for
incompetence as claimed by the American League, but, rather, because of their
attempts to organize the umpires for collective bargaining with the league. The
case was decided two years prior to Flood. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to rule for the umpires feeling that serious doubt existed
as to whether or not a claim for breach of contract or tort would provide a basis for
an antitrust claim even if the exemption did not exempt Major League Baseball.
Judge Friendly deferred to the Supreme Court's rulings in FederalBaseball and
Toolson while offering his view about the vitality of the exemption.
71
Ronald Blum, Average Baseball Solary up 18 Percent, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Dec. 21, 2000 at 4B.
72

1d.

73

1d.

74

1d

75429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
7

6See Id. at 1004.

77

1n one of the more eloquent statements regarding baseball's exemption prior to
Flood, Judge Friendly asserted:
[Wie continue to believe that the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive
privilege of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already
11

Nine years ago, the National League defended an employment
discrimination and a common law restraint of trade case in Postema v. National
League ofProfessionalBaseballClubs. Pam Postema, the first female to umpire

above the Class A level,79 argued that her termination by AAA Baseball on
November 6, 1989, was the result of gender-based discrimination.80 In refusing to
dismiss the common law restraint of trade claim, the court noted that "the
exemption does not provide baseball with blanket immunity for anti-competitive
behavior in every context in which it operates."8 1 In another blow to Major League
Baseball's desire to extend its exemption to the entire business ofbaseball, the court
concluded
that Defendants have not shown any reason why the baseball exemption
should apply to baseball's employment relations with its umpires. Unlike
the league structure or the reserve system, baseball's relations with nonplayers are not a unique characteristic or need of the game. Anticompetitive conduct toward umpires is not an essential part of baseball
and in no way enhances its vitality or viability. 82
Certainly, the drafters of the legislation are insisting that, notwithstanding the
language of Postema, the relationship between Major League Baseball and its
umpires should not be subjected to antitrust liability after the passage of act. Major
League Baseball's contentious relationship with the players was no less
delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for
pronouncement of the doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs with surprise
at the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are not at
all certain the Court is ready to give them a happy despatch (sic).
Id. at 1005.
78799

F.Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), reVdin parton other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d

Cir. 1993).
79799 F. Supp. at 1478.
"For a discussion of Postema's career as a minor league umpire, see PAM POSTEMA &
GENE WOJCIECHOWSKI, YouVE GOT To HAVE B*LLs TO MAKE ITINTHIS
LEAGUE: My LIFE
As AN UMPIRE (1992).
For an analysis of Postema's lawsuit, see, e.g., Sharene A. McEvoy, The Umpire Strikes Out:
Posternav. National League: Major League GenderDiscriminalion, 11 U.MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REv. 1 (1993).
81799 F. Supp. at 1489.
82

Id.
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acrimonious than its relationship with the Major League Umpires Association, the
union headed by chief legal counsel Richie Phillips.83 In July 1999, Phillips badly
miscalculated appropriate strategy in negotiations with Major League Baseball
when union membership all offered resignations to force the hand of Major League
Baseball and the two leagues.84
The final listing under subsection (b) is an additional statement to ensure
that courts will not use the act to change preexisting antitrust laws beyond the scope
of the employment relationship of major league baseball players. The act
specifically excludes "any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in
the business of organized professional major league baseball"8 5 from coverage
under the statute.
Subsection (c) provides that only "a major league baseball player has
standing to sue."86 Four definitions are provided for what constitutes a "major
league baseball player" for the purposes ofthis subsection. The first definition is
any "party to a major league player's contract" or one who "is playing baseball at
the major league level."88 The second listed definition is one "who was aparty to a
major league player's contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint."89 The third definition allows
a claim for a former major league player or a former party to a major league
contract who alleges an antitrust violation for one "injured in his efforts to secure a

MSee Sean McAdam, The Day is Coming When Umps Won't Be Above the Law:
After Years of Increasing Power and Decreasing Performance By Umpires, Baseball Officials
are Tackling the Problem, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1998, at D1; Ross Newhan,

Budding Leader Bud Selig, Who Used to SoyHe Didn't Want to be Commissioner, isEpected
to be Near-Unanimous Choice Today Because He's aKnown Quanfi, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1998,
at C1.
84
LiMn, Blumberg, Matusow and Young Files Lawsuit Against Commissioner Of
Baseball Bud Selg, Major League Baseball, and National American Leagues On Behalf of
Richle Philips, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan 3. 2001.

"Pub L.No. 105-297, § 3(b)(6).
86
1d. at § 3(c). This section created some concern for the Department of Justice
because It deprives them of standing.
7

1d. at § 3(c)(1)-3(c)(4).

88

Id. at § 3(c)(1).

89

1d. at § 3(c)(2).
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subsequent major league player's contract."90 There is a provision within the
subsection, however, asserting that no claim can relate to employment "at the minor
league level, including any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year
player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players." 9' The final
definition provides relief for:
a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or who was
playing baseball at the major league level at the conclusion of the last full
championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the last
collective bargaining agreement between persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players. 92
Three particular provisions under subsection (d) bear mentioning. The first is
contained within subsection (d)(2) reiterating that only employment issues within
Major League Baseball are subject to subsection (a).93 This provision presumably
limits the impact of decisions like Piazza and Butterworth that tried to alter the
long-standing position that the exemption applied to all aspects of the business of
baseball.
The second important provision within subsection (d), (d)(4), presents
perhaps the most significant limitation on the reach ofthe new act: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the application to organized professional
baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws."9 4 This
subsection, the focus of the majority of the rest of this article, effectively precludes
the use of the antitrust leverage provided by the act within the context of a labor
relationship.
Finally, subsection (d)(5) states that "(t)he scope of the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly
construed."9 5 This pro-management component ofthe act was written so that major
lId. at § 3(c)(3).
91

ld.

9Id.
93

See id, at § 3(d)(2).

9ld. at

§ 3(d)(4).

95

Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(d)(5).
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league ownership could assert to a court any additional set of factors necessary to
insure the strict construction of subsection (a) limiting the antitrust implications of
the act solely to employment issues. This subsection seems to assure by
redundancy the unequivocal desire of the drafters not to allow a court any opening
to assert that antitrust law can be used in a non-labor area.
Congressional Commentary
Congressional concern over baseball's special treatment under the nations
antitrust law spanned five decades,96 including numerous hearings and the
introduction of a significant number of bills that never reached the floor of
Congress. However, the 1994 strike by players, highlighted by the cancellation of
the World Series, increased Congressional interest. Furthermore, the inclusion of
Article XXVII7 in the collective bargaining agreement that ended the labor
discord pushed both ownership and the MLBPA towards a real Congressional
consideration ofthe antitrust exemption. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) responded by the introduction of the Curt Flood Act of 1997, S.
53. The legislation simply declared that "the antitrust laws shall apply to the
business of professional major league baseball"99 while listing that the act would
not affect the existing applicability or nonapplicability of antitrust laws to certain
aspects ofminor league baseball, franchise relocation, and the Sports Broadcasting
Act.'" Despite the listed assurances to minor league baseball, the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body ofminor leagues
was not satisfied. The NAPBL quickly marshaled its significant political clout
based upon the great number of Congressional members with minor league baseball
in their district.
Hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 17, 1997.
Donald Fehr, Executive Director ofthe Major League Baseball Players Association,
and Dan Peltier, a former player at nearly every level of minor and major league
baseball testified.o'0 Although Stanley Brand had been invited to testify on behalf
96

See Edmonds, supra note 2 and Lowe, supra note 2.

97

See supra note 13.

98S. 53, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. (1997).

"l9d.
100ld.
i"iMajorLeague Baseball Antitrust Reform: Hearings on S. 53 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
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of the NAPBL, he did not appear after requesting a delay in the hearing. Further,
Allan H. "Bud" Selig, chairman of the Major League Executive Council, declined
to appear.
On October 29, 1997, Senate Report 105-118,102 was issued
recommending the passage of a significantly amended S. 53. In revising the
language relating to the minor league, the Report noted that "[t]he Committee has
consistently sought not to adversely affect the legal status of the minor leagues or
minor league players." 0 3 The final vote of the Judiciary Committee was eleven
yeas to six nays with one recusal. 0 4
In the discussion on the floor of Congress, Representative Henry Hyde (RIL) urged passage of the bill noting: "(a)fter years of disagreement, the baseball
players, the baseball owners, and the minor leagues have reached an historic
agreement on the application of the antitrust laws to labor relations in baseball." 05
After listing the trilogy of Supreme Court cases establishing baseball's exemption,
Representative Hyde stated "(g)iven the agreement ofthe parties, Congress has now
decided to legislate in this area, but we do so only in an extremely narrow
manner." 06 After discussing the collective bargaining agreement clause requiring
Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association to
petition Congress for legislative action, Representative Hyde stressed the
importance of the nonstatutory labor exemption:
I want to note that nothing in this bill will affect in any way the
protections afforded to the major league clubs by the nonstatutory labor
exemption .... (B)oth the players and the owners were willing to support
the repeal of the specific and narrow portion of the baseball exemption
covering labor relations between major league players and major league
clubs. The bill was carefully drafted, however, to leave the remainder of
the exemption intact. 07
1

S. Rep. 105-118, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).

10 31d. at 4.
1

"Id. at 5.

105144 Cong. Rec. H9943 (Oct. 7, 1998).
0

1 6Id.
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Representative Hyde next turned his attention to issues raised by minor league
owners by asserting that the act would not provide any relief to one trying to attack
any aspect of minor league employment.' 08 Before turning over the discussion to
Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), Representative Hyde supported the
narrow construction of the legislation by noting that "this bill does not affect the
application of the antitrust laws to anyone outside the business of baseball."'
Representative Conyers opened by asserting that "professional baseball is
the only industry in the United States exempt from the antitrust laws without being
subject to regulatory supervision.'o Representative Conyers stressed that
baseball's numerous work stoppages begged for a Congressional response in order
to bring baseball within the same antitrust purview as other professional sports."
The commentary offered by Jim Bunning (R-KY) was particularly
interesting because he is a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame and a former
member of the Executive Board ofthe Major League Baseball Players Association.
He threw his "strong support" behind the legislation,"l 2 while stating that
"personally, I think this exemption should be repealed altogether."" 3
Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY), the chairman of the Minor League
Baseball Caucus," 4 after naming some baseball luminaries, pointed out the
importance of the legislation's maintenance of the antitrust exemption for minor
league baseball and its 35 million fans." 5
10OSee Id.
'eld.
noCong. Rec. H49942-03, H9943 (1998).

nISee Id.
12

Id.

" 144 Cong. Rec. at H9945.
"1 For a discussion of Representative Boehlert and the Minor League Baseball
Caucus, see, e.g., Robert Gavin, Boehlerts Hardball Politics May Be His Calling, But Baseball is
a Passion for Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al; Paul
White, Will Antitrust Fight Wreck the Minors, BASEBALL
WEEKLY, Mar. 5, 1997, at 2; Jonathan D.
Salant, Minor Leagues Find Backing In Congress, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 1993, at
10A; Penny Bender, New Caucus Enters Froy Over Baseball Exemption, Gannett News Service,
Aug.20, 1993.
" 5See 144 Cong. Rec, at H9945.
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The Congressional commentary on the Curt Flood Act of 1998
underscored the narrow scope ofthe legislation. Although heralded as an important
step forward in providing major league baseball players with similar antitrust rights
as basketball and football players, the nonstatutory labor exemption far
overshadows the value of antitrust rights in the professional sports context.
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
To gauge the value of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 for major league
baseball players, one must discuss the development of the nonstatutory labor
exemption alluded to in section 3(d)(4) of the act."' 6 The development of this
exemption during the past three decades has left most professional team sports'
athletes in a position where collective bargaining and the policy of federal labor
laws will nearly always trump antitrust claims.
Prior to addressing the nonstatutory labor exemption in the sports context,
it is important to consider the development of the relationship between antitrust
laws and labor laws in Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout the past century.
The early relationship between antitrust laws and labor laws tilted strongly towards
the preeminance of antitrust laws. In 1908 the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawlor
17 decided that union collective activity violated the Sherman Act."' 8 The lawsuit
focused on the actions of United Hatters of North America, a member of the
American Federation of Labor, against the co-partners, owners of Loewe &
Company, a Danbury, Connecticut hat-making factory. Congress ultimately
responded by creating a statutory exemption"'9 for labor law which provided that
labor unions were not illegal combinations in restraint of trade and limited federal
courts in their injunctive powers in the area of labor law.
In 1940 the Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 20 considered
the antitrust liability of a union, the American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery
16

Pub. L.No. 105-297, § 3(d)(4).

i"208 U.S. 274 (1908).
" 8See id. at 292-297.
119
The statutory exemption is based on sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1994).

120310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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Workers, involved in a sit-down strike against the Apex Hosiery Company. 121 The
purpose of the strike was to force Apex to recognize the union.'22 The Court held
that the strike was not a restraint directed at the product market of Apex's business
' and did not produce effects which the Sherman Act proscribed.124 The statutory
exemption was determined to insulate legitimate collective bargaining activity.125
The following year in UnitedStates v. Hutcheson,1 2 6 the Supreme Court
considered a charge of a Sherman Act violation against a carpenter's union, the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and its officials.' 27 This
was based upon the union's nationwide picketing and boycotting of AnheuserBusch.128 The union was involved in a jurisdictional dispute between itself and a
machinists' union, the International Association of Machinists, working for
Busch. 29 The court determined that the statutory exemption immunized union
activity "(s)o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with nonlabor groups." 30
In 1945 the Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union 13,

IBEWas rendered its first decision expanding the statutory exemption to include
agreements between management and labor.132 The focus of the Court's inquiry
"'See Id. at 480-481.

"See Id. at 481-482.
"'SeeId. at 501.
4
12
See Id at 502-503.
i,'See Apex Hoslery, 310

U.S. at 503.

126312 U.S. 219 (1941).

1"See Id. at 228.
'"See Id.
'"See Id.
'"ld.at 232.

'3i325 U.S. 797 (1945).
'"See Id. at 798.
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was the activity of Local No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers towards electrical equipment manufacturers and contractors trying to enter
the New York City market.133 Under the agreement, contractors were required to
purchase equipment only from manufacturers employing union members, and
manufacturers could sell equipment only to contractors using union employees. 34
The effects were to increase profits for participating companies, force union wages
higher, and shorten hours.135 Justice Black's opinion established a balancing of
Congressional antitrust policy with the goal of preserving the right of labor to
organize and gain better working conditions.' 36 Justice Black determined that the
exemption would not protect this activity because the labor group participated with
management in activities that the Court characterized as a conspiracy to
monopolize. 1
The next major Supreme Court decision involving the nonstatutory
38
exemption was UnitedMine Workers v. Pennington.1
The labor exemption claim
arose from a cross-claim filed by Phillips Brothers Coal Company against the
United Mine Workers alleging a Sherman Act violation. 39 The company claimed
that the union had conspired with larger coal companies to eliminate small
producers.140 This was effectuated by imposing a prior wage agreement on all
operators.' 4 1 The small operators were caught between the union's demand for a
higher wages package and the ability of the larger companies to cut prices. 42 The
action was held not to be immune from application of the antitrust law solely
i33See id. at 798-799.
i34See id. at 799-800.
i35See id. at 799.
36

1

See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806.

137See id. at 811.

i'381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'39See id. at 659.
40

See Id. at 660.

i41See id.
142See id. at 660-661.
20

because of union involvement. 43 A critical factor was the presence of the unionemployer conspiracy to control conditions beyond their immediate bargaining
concerns. 44
On the same day, in Local Union 189, AmalgamatedMeat Cuttersv. Jewel

Tea Co., 45 the Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between a
butchers' union and food stores forbidding the sale of meat before 9:00 a.m. and
after 6:00 p.m. in both service and self-service markets.1 46 The Court established a
balancing test regarding the antitrust and labor law policies.147 This policy
established that the union's activities were exempt from antitrust liability because
the marketing-hours restriction was the product of ann's-length bargaining and was
not at the behest of a nonlabor group. 48
Ten years later in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers &

Steamfitters Local 100,149 the Supreme Court was concerned with an attempt by a
union to force a general contractor to agree to sub-contract mechanical work only to
fimns which were parties to the union's current collective bargaining agreement.'
The Court concluded that the agreement involved was not within the exemption
because it restrained the business market to a much greater extent than necessary in
the pursuit of better wages and working conditions.' 5 The Court determined that
the agreement
which is outside the context of a collective-bargaining relationship and not
restricted to a particular jobsite ...may be the basis of a federal antitrust
suit because it has a potential for restraining competition in the business
141See United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 662-663.
144See Id. at 665-666.
'4381 U.S. 676 (1965).
i'See Id. at 680.
47

1

See Id. at 688-689.

'14 See Id. at 689-690.
149421 U.S. 616 (1975).
'"See Id. at 618-619.
i5iSee Id. at 625-626.
21

market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of
competition over wages and working conditions. 152
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the Sports Context

Three years prior to Connell, the importance of the nonstatutory labor
exemption in the sports area was noted by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dissent
in Flood.153 Justice Marshall noted that "It is apparent that none of the prior cases
is precisely in point. They involve union-management agreements that work to the
detriment of management's competitors. In this case, petitioner [Flood] urges that
the reserve system works to the detriment of labor."154 Justice Marshall noted that
the Court had "rejected a claim that federal labor statutes governed the relationship
between a professional athlete and the professional sport"'ss in Radovich v.
NationalFootballLeague.1' Justice Marshall pointed out, however, "that the issue
was not squarely faced"157 in Radovich nor in Flood Justice Marshall wished to
remand the case to the district court "for consideration of whether petitioner can
state a claim under the antitrust laws despite the collective-bargaining agreement,
and, if so, for a determination of whether there has been an antitrust violation in this
case."s58

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals squarely addressed the nonstatutory
exemption four years later in Mackey v. NationalFootballLeague.'59 The court
affirmed the decision of the District Court of Minnesota160 holding that the "Rozelle
Rule"' 6 ' violated section one of the Sherman Act. In reaching this decision, the
152

1d.

"'See407 U.S. 258, 293-294 (1972).
'-'id. at 295.
15

51d.

156352 U.S. 445 (1957).
157407 U.S. at 296.
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81d.

159543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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See 407 F.Supp. 1000 (D.Minn. 1975).
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The "Rozelle Rule," named for the Commissioner of the NFL, allowed the
22

Eighth Circuit established a three-prong test for determining the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption:
We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy favoring
collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties
to the collective bargaining relationship.... Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining....
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree
necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought
to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. 62
After determining that the Rozelle Rule only affected the parties to the
agreement and that the restraint involved mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining,163 the court found that the National Football League had imposed the
rule upon a union "in a relatively weak bargaining position."'1
The court
concluded, therefore, that the NFL's Rozelle Rule was not protected by the labor
exemption.1
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.," the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that the NFL's draft violated the Sherman Act. 67 The action
was brought by James "Yazoo" Smith, the first round draft choice of the
Washington Redskins in 1968.168 Smith's initial NFL season ended with him
Commissioner to award "one or more players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List
(including future selection choices)" of a team who signed a free agent formerly under
contract to another NFL team If the two teams could not arrive at an agreement over the
appropriate compensation to the team losing its free agent. 543 F.2d at 611.
12543 F.22d at 614.

'6See Id. at 615.
164Id. at 615-616.
1

6See Id. at 616.

i6593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
'67See Id. at 1175.
"'SeeId. at 1176.
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suffering a serious neck injury in the Redskins' final game.169 The District Court
for the District of Columbia decided that the nonstatutory labor exemption was
inapplicable to the draft and Pro Football did not appeal that ruling. 170 The court
went on to consider the facts under both a per se17 1 and a rule of reason'72 analysis
before concluding that the restraint was unreasonable and a violation of the
Sherman Act. The court felt that the appropriate standard was the rule of reason
and pointed out that this decision was in line with other courts and commentators
considering player restraints in professional sports. 73
Nine years later, in Wood v. NationalBasketball Association,'7 Judge

Ralph Winter ofthe Second Circuit Court ofAppeals strongly advanced his opinion
that player/management issues should be decided by labor law policies and not
antitrust law. 75 Leon Wood,' 76 the first round draft choice of the Philadelphia
76ers, brought an action against the National Basketball Association asserting that
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, including the salary cap, the
college draft, and prohibitions against player corporations, violated section one of
the Sherman Act. '" Wood further contended that the nonstatutory exemption did
not cover these league practices. Wood was initially offered a one-year contract for
$75,000.00 because the 76ers' payroll exceeded the salary cap. Judge Winter
decided that Wood's claim that provisions of the agreement constituted a per se
violation ofthe Sherman Act was a "wholesale subversion" ofnational labor policy
169See Id.
170

See id. at 1177, n. 11.

171See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1177-1182.
"21d at 1183-1189.
173

See Id. at 1182.

174890 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
175

Judge Winter was the coauthor with Michael S.Jacobs of an Influential article In
the 1971 Yale Law Journal, Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and
Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
7

6Wood iscurrently a referee in the National Basketball Association. See, e.g., Ed
Sherman, Michael Jordan: He Was No Bowie (Ihankfully), CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 24, 1999, at 4, Janis
Carr, County Takes Time to Honor its Own Hall of Fame: Seven Who Made Their Name In
Sports Are Honored at Induction Ceremony, ORANGE CouNTY REG., May 1, 1998, at D2.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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which "must be rejected out of hand."s78 Judge Winter also rejected Wood's
arguments that the agreements prevented him from achieving his full-market
potential' 79 and that future employees should not be subject to the exemption
because they were outside of the bargaining unit. 80
The Effect of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Upon the National
Football League Players Association's 1987 Strike and Its Aftermath

On August 31, 1987, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed on
December 11, 1982, between the National Football League and the National
Football League Players Association expired.18 ' The 1982 Agreement came after a
57-day strike by the players.'8 A point of significant conflict between the players
and owners was the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system established in
March 1, 1977, after the demise of the Rozelle Rule. During the five years that the
1982 Agreement was in effect, not a single veteran NFL player switched teams. 83
When negotiations failed to produce an agreement after the beginning of the 1987
season, the players went on strike on September 22, 1987.184 The NFL responded
by using substitute players in regularly scheduled games. The union concluded the
strike on October 15, 1987.1s
On the same day that the strike ended, a group of players led by named

plaintiff Marvin Powell' 8 filed suit in the United States District Court ofMinnesota
alleging that the compensation system violated the Sherman Act. The case was
178890 F.2d at 959.
'9 See Id. at 960.
'"See Id. at 960-961.
is'See Powell,

678 F. Supp. 781.

1 2

' See Id. at 780.
'8See Id. at 781.

'84See Id.
' 85See Id.
86

Other named plaintiffs were Brian Holloway, Michael Kenn, Michael Davis, James
Lofton, Michael Luckhurst, Dan Marino, George Martin, Steve Jordan and the National Football
League Players Association.

assigned to Judge David S. Doty. The NFL argued that the nonstatutory labor
exemption protected the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system under two
theories, the absolute immunity theory187 and the labor law "survival" doctrine. 88
Judge Doty dismissed the absolute immunity doctrine'89 deciding that the NFL
relied too heavily upon Justice Arthur Goldberg's' 90 concurring and dissenting
opinions in Jewel Tea'9' and Pennington.12 Judge Doty pointed out that "granting
a labor practice complete insulation from antitrust scrutiny merely because the
activity concerns a subject of mandatory bargaining does not strike the proper
accommodation between labor and antitrust laws."' 93 Turning next to consideration
of the NFL's survival doctrine theory, Judge Doty concluded that the Mackey threeprong test had been satisfied. In finding that the nonstatutory labor exemption
survived the expiration ofthe collective bargaining agreement, Judge Doty decided
that "parties to an expired agreement have an obligation to maintain the status quo
as to these provisions until a new agreement is concluded or until the parties reach

'impasse'."l94
Judge Doty then turned his attention to a discussion ofthe duration during
which the exemption remains in effect. The court rejected the players' contention
that protections dissolve once the employees make it "unequivocally clear" that
they no longer assent to terms or practices because such an application would
subject employers to "instant" antitrust liability and treble damages.' 9s Judge Doty
also pointed out that the players' position would not foster the national labor policy
favoring good faith bargaining. 6
"'See 678 F.Supp. at 783.
' 88See Id. at 783-784.

ta9See id. at 783.
9
i' Former Justice Arthur Goldberg argued on behalf of Curt Flood before the
Supreme Court inFlood, 407 U.S. 258.

191381 U.S. 676 (1965).
192381 U.S. 657 (1965).

193678 F.Supp. at 783.
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The court also rejected the position reached in Bridgeman v. National
BasketballAssociation,9 7 a parallel case involving the breakdown of the collective
bargaining process between the National Basketball Association and National
Basketball Players Association. Judge Doty quoted the standard created in
Bridgenan:

I find that the exemption for a particular practice survives only as long as
the employer continues to impose that restriction unchanged, and
reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it will be
incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement. When the
employer no longer has such a reasonable belief, it is then unilaterally
imposing the restriction on its employees, and the restraint can no longer
be deemed the product of arm's length negotiation between the union and
the employer.
Judge Doty rejected this test deciding that "the standard does not give
proper regard to the strong labor policy promoting the collective bargaining
process."' 99 Judge Doty also rejected the owners' position that the exemption
survived indefinitely concerning mandatory subjects of collective bargaining or,
alternatively, for the duration ofthe bargaining relationship. The court rejected this
position because the "proposed standards would lead to the anomalous result that
illegal provisions exempted from antitrust scrutiny would continue in force longer
than lawful terms and conditions."2 Judge Doty concluded that the
proper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires that a labor
exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to
that issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs the risk that
continued imposition of the condition will subject the employer to
liability. 20

'19675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
' 98Powell, 678 F.Supp. at 787 (quoting Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967).
1'678 F.Supp. at 787.
2

00d. at 788.

20 Id. at 788.
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Judge Doty also defined the court's test for impasse as "whether, following intense,
good faith negotiations, the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an
agreement." 202 Judge Doty concluded that the exemption would trump any
challenged restraint until impasse was reached on that issue, and he stayed certain
motions until the issue of impasse could be determined.203
Judge Doty subsequently granted summary judgment to the players on
June 17, 1988, finding that impasse had been reached as to the free agency issue.
Turning to an analysis of jurisdiction to grant an injunction under the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 205 Judge Doty declared that granting the injunction would "subvert
the collective bargaining process and ... offend a central purpose of the ... Act." 206
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge John R. Gibson
reversed Judge Doty207 and sided with the NFL. Judge Gibson recounted the
analysis of the Eighth Circuit's prior decision in Mackey.208 Finding that the
decision was not controlling because the restraint in question here was the result of
collective bargaining, the court decided, however, that the analytical structure for
the nonstatutory labor exemption fashioned in Mackey must be used.209 The court
considered the impasse test adopted by the district court and analyzed the
Bridgeman decision.210 The court decided that the parties "have not reached the
point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action under the
Sherman Act.' 2 11 Noting that the labor laws permit numerous remedies to both

202

1d. (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)).

2

mSee Id. at 789.

204

See 690 F.Supp. at 812.

20

5See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).

206690 F. Supp. at 817.
2

"See 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
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8See id. at 1297.
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mSee Id. at 1298.
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oSee Id. at 1299-1300.
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management and labor after impasse,m the court pushed the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse.213
As a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Executive Committee of
the NFLPA met on November 3, 1989,214 and considered withdrawing as the
collective bargaining agent for all NFL players. Three days later the Executive
Committee notified the NFL Management Council that it would abandon its rights
to bargain on behalf of the players.
The decision of the NFLPA Executive
Committee was supported by over sixty percent of the players.216 The NFLPA
asserted that its status had changed from a labor union to a voluntary professional
association and that this decertification reestablished the right to assert antitrust
claims because the nonstatutory exemption certainly could not insulate the NFL's
newly imposed Plan B.217 Judge Doty found that
because no 'ongoing collective bargaining relationship' exists, the court
determines that nonstatutory labor exemption has ended.... In the absence
of continued union representation, the Eighth Circuit's rationale for the
exemption no longer applies because the parties may not invoke any
remedy under the labor laws, whether it be collective bargaining,
instituting an NLRB proceeding for failure to bargain in good faith or
resorting to a strike.218
The judge offered four orders to conclude his decision in McNeil, including striking
the NFL's labor exemption defenses.219
In September 1992, a jury finally received an opportunity to consider
whether or not the NFL's Plan B violated antitrust laws. 22 0 The jury found in favor
2

nSee 930 F.2d at 1302.

213

1d. at 1304.

2'4McNell, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354.
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See Id.

2n6See Id.
21

See Id.

1

2nid, at

1359.

219

See 764 F. Supp. at 1360.
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of the players, paving the way for more litigation2' and the ultimate resolution of
the litigation with the signing of a new collective bargaining agreement.2 2
However, the last chapter of this volume between the NFL and the NFLPA over the
nonstatutory labor exemption was just beginning to unfold in the District of
Columbia. 22
Brown v. Pro Football,Inc.
The culmination of the twenty year judicial consideration of the
nonstatutory labor exemption in the sports area was the decision in Brown v. Pro
Football,Inc.224 At issue was the imposition by the NFL of Resolution G-2. 22 In
1989 the NFL created a new Developmental Squad of up to six rookie or first year
players.226 The crux of the concern to the NFLPA was the NFL's decision to create
a fixed salary. 227 On May 17, 1989, the NFL's management committee proposed a
uniform salary of $1,000.00 per week for all Developmental Squad players.
Prior to the suggestion of a new Developmental Squad salary cap, such players had
been able to negotiate their own salary and benefits. 229 Although the NFLPA
disputed the fixed salary aspect of the proposal, the NFL unilaterally imposed the
23 0
plan.
220

See Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F.Supp. 226, 229 (D.Minn. 1992).

221See White v. National Football League, 822 F.Supp. 1389 (D.Minn. 1993).
222

See id. at 1395.
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During the ongoing litigation surrounding the fractured relationship between the
NFL and the NFLPA, Judge Winter had another opportunity to comment upon the relationship
between labor laws and antitrust laws in Williams v. National Basketball Ass'n, 45 F.3d 684 (2d
Cir. 1995). Judge Winter again determined that the nonstatutory labor exemption triumphed
over an attempt to bring antitrust laws back to the forefront.
224821 F.Supp. 20, rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041, offd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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In May 1990, 235 Developmental Squad players, led by named plaintiff
Antony Brown, filed suit claiming that the agreement to fix salaries at $1,000.00
per week violated the Sherman Act.231 The district court ruled that the actions of
the NFL were not insulated by the nonstatutory labor exemption, and the case went
to trial.Y The jury award after treble damages exceeded $30 million.Y
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the lower court decision in a split two to one vote.2 Judge Harry T.
Edwards, writing for the majority, ruled
(a)fter reviewing relevant Supreme Court precedent and the policies
underlying both the NLRA and the Sherman Act, we conclude that the
nonstatutory labor exemption shields from antitrust challenge alleged
restraints on competition imposed through the collective bargaining
process, so long as the challenged actions are lawful under the labor laws
and primarily affect only a labor market organized around a collective
bargaining relationship. Because the fixed salary for Developmental
Squad players is such an action, we hold that the exemption shields the
clubs and the NFL from liability in this case.Y
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Patricia Wald argued that the majority opinion
granted the NFL total immunity from antitrust liability as long as the league and the
employee players had engaged in a collective bargaining relationship regarding the
Developmental Squad issues. 6 Judge Wald also asserted that
the majority insists its ruling does no more than maintain a level playing
field in employer-employee relations and carry out the congressional
mandate favoring collective bargaining as the primary means ofresolving
labor disputes. I do not think so. The reality is that today's decision

131See Id.

at 1047.
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sharply tilts the playing field in employers' favor, and because ofthat, will
erode the vitality of collective bargaining itself. 237
The players appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Stephen
Breyer wrote the opinion affirming the circuit court's ruling. After carefully
considering prior precedent, Justice Breyer queried "If the antitrust laws apply,
what are employers to do once impasse is reached?" 8 Justice Breyer's
consideration of a number of alternatives led him to conclude that potential antitrust
liability could create an unstable collective bargaining process.2 9 Justice Breyer
determined that the appropriate deference to the collective bargaining process
required the disallowance of the use of antitrust laws.240 Justice Breyer next
discounted "several suggestions for drawing the exemption boundary line short of
this case," 241 before finally holding
that the implicit ("nonstatutory") antitrust exemption applies to the
employer conduct at issue here.... Our holding is not intended to insulate
from antitrust review everyjoint imposition of terms by employers, for an
agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in
circumstances from the collective-bargaining process that a rule
permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that
process.... We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within
these extreme outer boundaries to draw that line.242
Conclusion
In analyzing Justice Breyer's decision in Brown, Michael J. Cozzillio and
Mark S. Levinstein 243 argued that:
237

d. at 1058-1059.
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It is now inevitable that unionized professional athletes who seek to
challenge restraints upon player mobility (or similar restraints) through
antitrust will have no alternative but to decertify their bargaining
representative and terminate the collective bargaining relationship.244
This position is certainly correct. Justice Breyer's decision plainly reduces the
potential value of the antitrust weapon from a treble damage bomb to a child's pop
gun that will necessarily remain predominantly at the bottom of the toy chest.
Justice Breyer has solidified Judge Winter's argument from Wood that any
disagreement between a union and management must be decided at the bargaining
table devoid of any antitrust leverage. This leaves all unions in the undesirable
position of committing organizational suicide in order to bring their strongest legal
weapon to the fore. Does the specter of decertification and a protracted and
expensive trial strike fear in the hearts of management? It would hardly seem so.
Although management needs the insulation from possible antitrust liability that the
nonstatutory labor exemption supplies, the odds that a union will resort to this
strategy seem increasingly remote.
The National Basketball Association's recent player lockout provided
management with the tactical advantage of placing the issues squarely in the labor
realm. Any thought of decertification had to be considered within the context of
the Brown decision. What amount of time would satisfy Judge Breyer's position?
Union decertification creates the possibility of stripping away all benefits contained
in the collective bargaining agreement. How many players would be willing to risk
the loss of significant wages and benefits for the uncertainty of reentering the
judicial system to ascertain if they have been without a collective bargaining
representative for the necessary time to satisfy a court construing the Brown
decision? In each case where a players association has successfully orchestrated
and financed antitrust litigation since the advent of the collective bargaining era, the
result has been a monetary settlement and/or a quick return to the bargaining table
to hammer out a new agreement. Union self-preservation has mandated this result.
The only alternative would be the chaos of individual negotiation. Cozzillio and
Levinstein's additional observation and metaphor would also appear to be accurate:
If Brown functionally forecloses player restraint issues from antitrust
review, then the removal of the baseball exemption in this area may be a
toothless advance for the players. In essence, they have left the frying pan

244

Id.
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of the baseball exemption to the fire of Brown and its 'decertify or forget
the Sherman Act' mandate.245
Over twenty-five years after the Supreme Court's decision in Flood, Congress
finally enacted legislation named to honor the memory of the former Cardinals
player who refused to accept a trade and, instead, attempted to use the power
created by Congress in 1890 when it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to free
himself from the impact of the reserve clause. Baseball players would have to wait
for an arbitrator's decision growing out of a collective bargaining agreement to rid
themselves of the reserve clause. Despite Congressional action in 1998, baseball
players will assuredly need to continue to resort to collective bargaining rather than
antitrust laws to establish their employment relationship with the owners of major
league baseball clubs. The language of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 and the
legislative intent argue strongly for the narrowest use of antitrust laws in
furtherance of the goals of major league baseball players. With the widening gap
between large market and small market teams in baseball, the prospect of labor
peace in Major League Baseball has not been significantly advanced by the passage
of the Curt Flood Act of 1998.

245
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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST
REFORM
TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1997
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Specter, DeWine, and Leahy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

The CHAIRMAN. We will call this hearing to order.
Clarifying that antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball is
something that will benefit sports fans across the country, young
and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican. As evidenced by
the interleague play, agreements being reached on long-term player
and minor league contracts, and the continuing on-field heroics of
players like Cal Ripken and Ken Griffey, Jr., we are witnessing a
historical period for Major League Baseball. I have only mentioned
a few of them, as you know, of the great heroes.
Senator Leahy and I believe that we should take advantage of
this opportunity' to ensure that the coming years will indeed be
among baseball's finest by doing all we can to minimize the potential for more of the bitter labor disputes which have plagued Major
League Baseball.
Baseball has witnessed more work stoppages than all other professional sports combined, capped by the devastating 1995 strike
which led to the cancellation of the World Series and dealt a blow
to the hearts and loyalty of baseball fans from which the sport is
only now beginning to recover.
While there are, of course, different factors contributing to baseball's recently tumultuous labor relations, there is one root cause
about which we in Congress can do something. With their current
antitrust status, Major League Baseball owners can, unlike the
owners in any other professional sport, conspire and collude without restraint-the precise practices the antitrust laws were designed to prohibit. They can take advantage of this unique legal position to gain leverage in their negotiations with the players and
their representatives.
Making it clear to the players, owners, and courts that the antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball therefore will not only
put baseball on a level playing field with the other professional
(1)
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sports, but will also put the owners on a more level playing field
with the players, and will thereby bring stability to labor relations
in this area. Players, fans, investors, municipalities, and ultimately
the owners themselves will benefit.
Thus, on the first day of this Congress, I, along with Senators
Leahy, Thurmond, and Moynihan, introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood
Act of 1997, which, like its predecessor, S. 627, simply makes clear
that Major League Baseball, like all other professional sports, is
subject to our Nation's antitrust laws, except with regard to team
relocation, the minor leagues, and sports broadcasting. It overturns
the Court's mistaken premise that baseball is not a business involved in interstate commerce, and it eliminates the unjustifiable
legal precedent that individuals who play professional baseball
should be treated differently from those who participate in other
professional sports. Perhaps most importantly, it helps ensure that
the 1995 labor dispute and the consequent cancellation of the 1995
World Series will never happen again.
[A copy of S. 53 follows:]
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105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S.53

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF TEE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEARY, Mr. THMusoND, and Mr. MoYNmAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to

major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of

5 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO7
8

FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

4
2"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

1

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

4
5 feet6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional

8

baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-

9

ment between professional major league baseball

10

teams and teams of the National Association of

11

Baseball, commonly known as the 'Professional

12

Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to

13

the minor leagues;

14

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

15

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

16

ball on franchise relocation; or

17

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

18

T.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

19

'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
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When I first sponsored similar legislation in the 103d Congress,
Congress was told that baseball owners would never support it.
Today, for the first time, I am pleased to report that the owners
have not only pledged in the new collective bargaining agreement
to work with the players to pass legislation clarifying that professional baseball is subject to the antitrust laws with regard to labor
relations, but just last week reached agreement with the players on
specific language that would accomplish this objective.
While I and the members of this committee would like to examine this proposed alternative to S. 53, I think it is safe to say that
the most important impediment to passage of baseball antitrust reform has been eliminated, and that it is truly a momentous occasion when Major League Baseball owners have aligned in support
of such reform.
Given this recent positive development, I must say that I am surprised that the owners were unable to send a representative to testify at this hearing. We invited them and we expected them to be
here. I should note that on the basis of repeated assurances that
such an agreement between the players and owners was imminent,
I have, since the beginning of this Congress, repeatedly agreed at
the owners' request to postpone this hearing and committee consideration of S. 53.
I will not repeat the numerous such requests for more time to
which I have agreed, but I will insert for the record a chronology
of the relevant requests and delays at the owners' behest.
[The chronology follows:]
CHRONOLOGY OF EvENTs
December 7, 1996-The owners and the players sign a memorandum of understanding, which deals with time-sensitive provisions to be included in the collective
bargaining agreement. A section of the memorandum calls for both the players and
the owners to work together to pass legislation that would give players the same
antitrust rights as other professional athletes at the major league level but that
would not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context.
January 21, 1997-Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduce
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997.
February 6, 1997-Representatives from the owners and the players meet with
Senator Hatch's staff to discuss the ongoing negotiations and the legislation. Senator Hatch's staff indicates that the Senator would like to place the bill on the calendar for the mark-up scheduled for February 13, 1997, recognizing that it will be
held over. The owners make clear that a final agreement is near completion, that
both sides are moving "expeditiously," and that legislative language reflecting the
memorandum of understanding would be drafted if the mark-up is scheduled. They
also indicate that agreement on language should be relatively easy. They ask that
Senator Hatch postpone mark-up until after the collective bargaining agreement is
finalized. The players' representatives indicate that they will be sending draft language to the owners and were ready to share these drafts with Committee staff.
February 7, 1997-The players' first draft is sent to the owners through their
Washington lobbyists and their negotiating team.
A Few Days Later in February, 1997-The owners indicate that there will be no
work on legislative language until the rest of the contract is completed and signed,
but completion will occur before the end of February.
Middle of February, 1997-Senator Hatch agrees to the owner request to delay
mark-up and a hearing for a few weeks, until the collective bargaining agreement
is completed.

February 20, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff meets with Stanley Brand, representative for Minor League Baseball, requesting that he communicate any proposed
changes to S. 53 either at the meeting or subsequent to it. Brand refuses to offer
any suggestions at that time or thereafter, and refuses to return staff phone calls
for over 3 months.
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February 28, 1997-Senators Hatch and Leahy send out a Dear Colleague letter
announcing their intention to move the legislation quickly.
March 11, 1997-A second meeting between representatives from the players and
the owners is held with Senator Hatch's staff. The owners' representative indicates
that pressure from Senator Hatch has helped to move the negotiating process along,
that neither side wants Congress to act on the legislation until the contract is completed and signed. The players state that since they have no idea when the contract
will be finalized, they will defer to Senator Hatch on timing, even if that means
moving the legislation before the contract is signed. They also offer two new versions of the legislation for the owners' review.
March 13, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee mark-up, with S. 53 on the
agenda, is postponed due to lack of a quorum.
March 14, 1997-The collective bargaining agreement is completed and signed.
March 20, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee holds a mark-up, at which time
both Senators Hatch and Leahy make it clear that they are tired of waiting and
want the promised language from the parties. Senator Hatch announces that the
Committee would mark-up the baseball bill after the Easter recess, and that he has
circulated a draft substitute amendment taken directly from the language of the collective bargaining agreement. He stated that the players support the amendment,
but the owners would not take a position on his draft.
March 28, 1997-Notwithstanding his refusal to work with Senator Hatch's staff,
Stanley Brand writes letter to Senator Biden, requesting his help in defeating S. 53,
and stating that he was "surprised to be asked to cure the bil's defects before Congress has conducted any study or review on its impact on grassroots baseball."
April 14, 1997-The owners and the players meet with Senator Hatch. The owners' chief negotiator asks for more time to resolve this issue and asks Senator Hatch
to delay Committee consideration at this time. When pressed on how long he needs,
he subsequently indicates four weeks. As a result, Senator Hatch announces that
he will move the bill to mark-up on May 14, 1997.
May 8, 1997-Owners agree to meet with the players in New York. Drafts are
exchanged.
May 14, 1997-This latest deadline is missed.
May 16, 1997-The players agree to language offered by the owners' representatives. After the players' acceptance, the owners negotiators indicate that this language will have to be taken to the owners to see if they can accept it.
Early June, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff repeatedly requests hearing dates from
owners, players, and minor league representatives. Stanley Brand agrees to testify
at June 17, 1997 hearing.
June 10, 1997-Senator Hatch announces that a hearing on S. 53 will be held on
June 17, 1997.
June 12, 1997-Owners sign new 10 year agreement with minor leagues and ratify agreement with players regarding legislative language on antitrust reform.
June 13, 1997-Senator Hatch sends formal invitation letters for June 17 hearing.
Stanley Brand fails to appear at scheduled meeting with Senator Hatch's staff. The
owners indicate that they will refuse to attend the hearing or any subsequent hearing until George Steinbrenner's suit against the owners for antitrust violations is
resolved.
June 16, 1997-Bud Selig and Stanley Brand write Senator Hatch. Selig indicates
he will not attend June 17 hearing. Brand requests that the hearing be postponed
so that he can have an opportunity to draft proposed amendments. At 6 p.m., Brand
meets with Senator Hatch's staff indicating that, contrary to his position 1 week
earlier, he will not testify at June 17 hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Selig has written me indicating that because
of a conflict, he is unable to attend today. I understand and appreciate his conflict, but one would expect that the owners could have
sent another representative in his stead, as we had requested.
Mr. Stanley Brand, representing the minor leagues, has also
written me requesting that this hearing be delayed, although assuring me that he would be prepared to provide specific legislative
suggestions later this week. I had intended to meet with him yesterday, but he was unable to meet with me. I had hoped that by
meeting with him, we might even have avoided this hearing, but
for some reason I couldn't get with him.
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Now, while I look forward to finally receiving Mr. Brand's comments, I must say that I fail to see why he cannot present them
today, especially given the fact that we asked for his views in February and that Mr. Brand specifically told the committee just last
week that he would attend today's hearing.
Moreover, given Mr. Brand's statement in a March 28, 1997, letter to Senator Biden that he was "surprised" to be asked for legislative input before the committee had conducted any study or review on its impact on the minor leagues, it now seems odd that he
is asking the committee to postpone a hearing until he has had an
opportunity to draft legislation.
That being said, it is, as I have indicated from the outset, my
sincere intent that any legislation we enact have no negative impact on the current law governing the minor leagues, and I truly
do look forward to hearing from Mr. Brand within the next week.
I would note that this legislation has always been aimed at
Major League Baseball labor relations, not at addressing any issue
regarding the minor leagues, and that S. 53 even states in express
terms that it shall have no effect whatsoever on the minor leagues.
To the extent that minor leagues believe this language unintentionally changes the law as it applies to the minor leagues, I will certainly consider their views. This is perhaps a subject on which we
will hear more from our witnesses.
Present with us today are Don Fehr, executive director and general counsel of the Major League Players Association, and Dan
Pelter, a former minor league player. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for making the effort to be with us here
today. I would also like to thank Senator Leahy, our cosponsors
Senator Thurmond and Moynihan, and Senator DeWine and other
members of this committee for their continued assistance in this
important issue.
This is an important hearing. This will be the one time we will
listen, and I have to say that we will listen to input from both the
owners and the minor leagues, hopefully, by the end of this week
one way or the other. But if not, we are going to proceed as best
we can, and so we will just see what happens from here.
There is nobody from the minority here, so I think what we will
do is begin with you, Mr. Fehr, and then turn to you, Mr.-am I
pronouncing it right, Peltier.
Mr. PELTIER. Peltier.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. I appreciate having both of you here
and we will look forward to your testimony at this time.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DONALD A. FEIR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK,
NY; AND DAN PELTIER, FORMER MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
PLAYER, HASTINGS, MN
STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEHR
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator DeWine. My
name, as you know, is Donald Fehr, and for more than a decade
now I have been privileged to serve as the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association. The Players Association, of course, is the labor organization that represents all major
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league players with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
and also, interestingly enough, managers, coaches, and trainers
with respect to some.
Before making my brief comments here this morning, I do want
to take a moment to thank and express the appreciation of all
major league players to the chairman and to the ranking member
for the interest that they have shown in this issue, the steadfastness with which they have pursued it during the tumultuous years
which have preceded 1997, the careful attention they have given
the various matters which have come into play, and perhaps most
of all to the chairman for his patience, especially over the last 6
months or so.
In November 1996, after just about 4 years of very difficult negotiations, including a very long strike, to which the chairman has
alluded, and a long period of negotiations after that strike ended
following an injunction issued pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act against the owners, we were finally able
to reach a collective bargaining agreement. It is comprehensive. It
is long-term. It will expire most likely at the end of the 2001 season, and it has built into it a number of provisions, the object and
purpose of which is to cause the players and the owners to work
together on a day-by-day basis to operate the game, to rebuild the
game, to reach out to the fans, one result of which, we hope, will
be that the next time we negotiate, the relationship between the
two parties will be fundamentally different than it has been at any
time in the past.
That is the hope, and we certainly have a large task in front of
us. There have been in Major League Baseball eight work stoppages in the last eight negotiations, dating back to 1972, a fair
amount of strikes and a fair amount of lockouts. There has not
been a settlement without a work stoppage since 1970. Our task
for the next go-around is to make sure that that record is broken,
and broken with as loud a thump as we can manage.
In this new agreement, we have, to which the chairman referred,
also reached, in principle, an agreement on the antitrust laws. As
I think everyone knows, the major league owners have believed
that, at least with respect to player relations issues, they have had
a total exemption to the antitrust laws. And we have believed, and
I have testified on many occasions here, that that has been a principal cause of our ongoing disputes.
Simply put, what it does is give the owners an incentive not
present in the other professional team sports to attempt to effectively break the union. The reason that they could do that is that
if they would accomplish that, they then could set the terms and
conditions free of any restraint that would otherwise be imposed by
the antitrust laws. That is not the case and has not been the case
in the other professional team sports, and whatever else we can say
about those sports, they have had far fewer disruptions on the field
and the difficulty that such disruptions cause the fans have been
more often avoided than it has been in baseball.
I will not make an attempt to read my statement that has been
prepared for the record, nor to otherwise indicate my views on antitrust and sports, and baseball in particular. I think those views are
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well-known from my prior testimony. I will, of course, be pleased
to answer any questions about it.
Let me then turn briefly to the nature of the legislation at hand,
and in particular to the agreement that was reached between the
players and the owners. Last November when we were concluding
the agreement, the players made it clear that they wished, at last,
to be treated under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes similarly situated, basketball and football players in the NFL
and the NBA being the most obvious examples.
The owners wanted some things, too, and eventually we reached
a compromise which is reflected in article XXVIII of the collective
bargaining agreement. It is a very carefully drawn provision and
it says that the players and the owners will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that
major league players are covered under the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes similarly situated, along
with a second provision and that second provision being one which
hopefully will obviate any concerns that third parties have, and
that is that whatever the application of the antitrust laws is in any
other context or circumstance or with respect to any other third
party or parties that the passage of such legislation would not
change the application of the antitrust laws. It has the benefit of
not attempting to specifically define how the antitrust laws would
apply in any particular circumstance, that being left to such legislation that becomes law to interpretation in the event that there
is a dispute.
We then had a second round of negotiations which was conducted
sporadically, essentially, between March and late May, and the
purpose of that round of negotiations conducted principally between myself on behalf of the players and Randy Levine, who is the
owners' chief negotiator, on behalf of the major league owners, was
to see if we could agree on specific language that we could suggest
to the Congress be considered in order to effectuate the collective
bargaining provision to which we had agreed.
We were able to reach agreement. The players have adopted it,
and as the chairman indicated, we have been advised by Mr. Selig
that the owners have also agreed to the negotiated provision, and
I believe a copy of it has already been submitted to the committee.
I think if you review it, you will find that it is a very carefully
drafted provision.
The "Purpose" section simply replicates the language of the collective bargaining agreement. The substantive sections provide that
the antitrust laws will apply to the business of organized professional major league baseball acts, practices, or agreements relating
to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league
level, or, in other words, as the chairman summarized, labor relations at the major league level.
The remainder of the suggested language makes it clear that
whatever the law otherwise is in any context is not affected one
way or another by the passage of this legislation. We borrowed liberally, I think it is fair to say, from the provisions of S. 53 and
some of the other bills that were submitted by the chairman and
other Senators in the prior Congress to make certain as best we
could that we were accomplishing that goal.
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I do believe that a fair reading of this suggested language should
reassure any third party, be they the minor leagues or otherwise,
that the passage of this legislation would have no effect one way
or another on their rights under law as existed otherwise with respect to this legislation. It does carry a specific provision that says
that more specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section
shall not be deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
players, or the various agreements between the major leagues and
the minor leagues, as well as other exceptions relating to franchise
location, relocation, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and so on.
With that, I think I am prepared to conclude the remarks I
would like to give this morning, other than to say that the Players
Association and the major league players supported S. 53 and the
similar bills offered in prior Congresses, and still do. We have seen
a copy of at least one narrow amendment that was being circulated
to S. 53 which we also think is sound public policy and we support.
But what we are asking the Congress to do now, and all that we
are asking the Congress to do now is to enact legislation that will
effectively give major league players the equal protection of the
antitrust laws, and to do so in a way which will avoid, if the Congress so chooses, any of the other issues that swirl around antitrust
in sports and antitrust in baseball that can and have been the subject of so much contention.
I, of course, will be pleased to answer any questions that any of
the members have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fehr follows:]
FEHR
Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy and members of the Committee, my name is
Donald Fehr, and I serve as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today.
This Committee has spent considerable time in the last four years studying antitrust issues as they relate to baseball. On behalf of all major league players, I want
to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Leahy for their interest in and attention to
these issues. My views on these matters are well known from my previous testimony
before this and other committees, and need no repetition here.
As has been often noted, over the last 25 years, there have been eight consecutive
work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) in major league baseball, more than in the
other three major team sports (football, basketball and hockey) combined. We believe that this results, in significant part, from the belief of the major league owners
that major league players, unlike their counterparts in basketball, football and
hockey, have no rights under the antitrust laws. Major league players have sought,
and continue to seek, the same rights under the antitrust laws as other professional
athletes similarly situated, no more but no less.
The importance of the antitrust laws to the collective bargaining process inprofessional sports is often misunderstood. It is not necessarily the use the reedy that
is important; rather, it is the opportunity to resort to the remedy that matters. It
has been the desire to have an alternative course of action available to them, an
alternative course which would have a moderating influence on the bargaining process, that has been at the heart of the players' efforts in the antitrust area. As we
learned too well in 1994, the players effectively had only one choice: accept the owners unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment, or strike.' Unlike
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD A.

"It is, of course, possible that the Courts would now hold, as we would argue, that in the
current circumstances, major leaue players do have the protection of the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professiona atletes. However, it is extremely unlikely that players would
forego their right to strike against the possibility of such a ruling.
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other similarly situated athletes, baseball players have no other alternative. And
unlike other professional sports team owners, who know that their players are protected by the antitrust laws, baseball owners have believed that major league players do not have such protection, and therefore believe that if they can break the
union, the players have no recourse, and the owners can im ose whatever conditions
they choose. That does not foster labor peace. Accordingly, major league players
have petitioned Congress to ensure that they have the same rights and protections
under law as do other similarly situated athletes. We are prepared to continue that
effort in order to avoid in the future what has been the seemingly inevitable disruption in the game every time we negotiate.
THE NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Many people were surprised to learn that there was any mention of antitrust legislation n the new collective bargaining agreement. With both sides knowing that
this effort would continue until either a bil was passed or the next work stoppage
was upon us, the parties chose to address this issue in the recently signed collective
bargamnig agreement. Let me explain how Article XXVIII came to be.
The collective bargaining agreements in professional football, basketball and hockey typically expire at the end of the month of the championship season, which
means that bargaining may typically commence some weeks prior thereto. In baseball, however, the collective bargaining agreements have expired on December 31
of the final year of the contract. As a practical matter, this means that individual
player contract negotiations for the next season begin before the contract. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that negotiations have not yet resulted in a new collective bargaining agreement, new individual baseball contracts for the following season are
signed under the terms of the expired contract.
This time around, the baseball owners sought the players' agreement to change
the expiration date of our collective bargaining agreement to October 31 of the last
year of the agreement, just after the end of the World Series. They believe that by
doing'so, their negotiating position may be enhanced. Owners believe that an earlier
expiration date would give them time to commence negotiations and, if necessary,
declare an impasse and impose new terms and conditions of employment for new
individual contracts for the following season. In the end, the players were prepared
to accommodate the owners' request, but only on the condition that they have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do the athletes in the other sports.
As a result, Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement was drafted. Article
XXVIII provides that the expiration date of the contract will move to October 31,
if legislation clarifying that baseball players have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do basketball and football players is enacted by the end of the 105th
Congess. If legislation providing that clarification is not enacted by the end of the
105th Congress, the expiration date reverts to December 31 of the final year of the
agreement. The players and owners were very careful to make certain that the bill
they would jointly support would deal only with major league player issues; the
scope and effect of the antitrust laws is not changed in any other respect. In other
words, whatever the law is with respect to other issues or third parties, it will continue to be-this legislation will do nothing to change it.
The relevant portion of Article XXVIII reads as follows:
"the Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying
the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
passage of that bill does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or entity."
Simply put, the owners and the players reached an agreement to resolve their differences on the expiration date of the contract in conjunction with resolving their
differences on the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball players.
No other parties or issues are affected or implicated by this agreement.
LEGISLATION

Early in this Congress, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduced S. 53. That bill constitutes a much broader clarification of the application of
the antitrust laws to major league baseball than the bill contemplated in the collective bargaining agreement. As was the case in prior bills, however, S. 53 made clear
that it was not to affect the application of the antitrust laws with respect to franchise relocation issues or the Sports Broadcasting Act, nor was it to affect "the ap-
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plicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agreement between professional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of
Baseball (sic), commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball Agreement', or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues."
We fully supported that bill, and continue to believe it to be wise public policy.
But the hope was, and continues to be, that the collective bargaining agreement recently signed will lead to the enactment of legislation relating only to major league
players quickly and cleanly, so that the owners and players can put this issue behind them and set their sights squarely on working together to repair and improve
the game.
I have been advised that a substitute amendment recently circulated to S. 53, apparently in anticipation of an early agreement to legislative language effectuating
the collective bargaining agreement, and to keep the process moving forward. That
amendment was taken virtually verbatim from Article XXVIII of the new Basic
Agreement. As such, we had no objection to it when it was originally offered, nor
do we now. It was the Association's hope, however, that to the extent the owners
and players could agree to legislative language that accurately reflected the intent
of that amendment, and which the parties felt comfortable supporting, the legislative process would be further facilitated.
To that end, and at the strong urging of Senators Hatch and Leahy, the Association has attempted to develop with the owners an acceptable alternative to that
amendment. On 16 May, 1997 representatives of the Players Association reached an
agreement with representatives of Major League Baseball on language that the
MLB representatives would take to the MLB owners for approval. My understanding is that they did so last week. Hopefully, by today, the Chairman has been advised of the owners' actions on this suggested language.
THE MINOR LEAGUES

In the past, the minor leagues have opposed all legislation to bring increased stability to the relationship between major league owners and major league players,
notwithstanding express language in each such bill stating that the bil did not affect the application of the antitrust laws as applied to the minor leagues. Although
never articulated in a manner that made sense to me, the argument seems to have
been, that if the antitrust laws applied to major league player relations, that would
somehow result in a reduction of the number of minor league teams that the major
league owners would siipport. This assertion is particularly hard to understand because major league players were essentially granted free agency by an arbitrator in
1975, interpreting the language of the standard player contract. Player-owner talks
have centered on free agency in each negotiation since that time. Every round of
collective bargaining since 1976 has been a battle by the owners to reduce players'
free agency, and by the players to keep it. It is not the protection of the antitrust
laws that matter, it is whether or not the players can be free agents. The position
of the minor league owners seems to me to be beside the point.
In any event, of course, the sponsors of S. 53 have gone out of their way to indlude
plain language in the bill insulating the minor leagues from the application of the
bill and thus giving more than adequate protection to the minor leagues. Stated otherwise, it preserves the status quo. To do nothing to address the continuous instability and disruptions in play in major league baseball in the face of such clear language protecting the minor leagues is illogical and ignores the interests of the cities,
millions of fans, and other workers in uninterrupted play.
Likewise, the agreed upon language considered by the major league owners last
week to effectuate Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement protects the minor
leagues because the language makes clear that, other than as concerns major league
players, the application of the antitrust laws is not changed. Whatever the law otherwise is, it remains. Thus, under both the express language of both S. 53 and the
language agreed to by player and owner negotiators, whatever the law is today with
respect to the affiliated minor leagues and their relationship with the major leagues
and minor league players will continue to be the law after either S. 53 or the proposed agreement is enacted.
The language of both these versions of legislation preserves the status quo to the
extent that existing law would otherwise allow. These proposals do nothing to
threaten the minor leagues. They deal strictly with the relationship between major
league owners and major league players. To paraphrase a famous former member
of tis body, minor league owners 'ain't got no dog m this fight."
Recently, however, I have seen correspondence in which Stan Brand, lobbyist for
the minor leagues, accuses me of seeking the legislation in order to attack the ama-
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teur draft. If fact, he claims that I threatened to sue to overturn the amateur draft
when I was testifying some time ago on the House side. I would like to clarify the
record on this issue in three respects.
First, I do not believe that Mr. Brand's comments were addressing the actual language that became part of the signed collective bargaining agreement, and certainly
were not addressing the specific language we have recently agreed upon. Second,
the question I was asked by a member of the House Judiciary Committee, well before the strike ended, much less the new agreement was reached, was whether I
thought someone would challenge the draft. I responded that I believed someone
would eventually do so, but clearly I was indicating that such a challenge would be
brought under existing law. This was neither a threat nor was it any great insight
on my part. Consider only that aspect of a system that requires that a young man
from Cleveland must enter baseball through the draft and negotiate the terms of
his employment with only one team, but permits a Cuban, who defects to the Dominican Republic, for example, to negotiate with any team. One cannot expect
American young men to ignore that situation. However, third, and most important,
this legislation does not affect the status of the amateur draft. If existing law protects the draft, it remains protected even after the passage of this legislation. If existing law permits a challenge to the draft today, that right is unchanged by this
bill. itigation as to the amateur draft would not be affected by the passage of S. 53
or the player-owner agreed upon proposal.
Moreover, my understanding is that the major leagues and the minor leagues recently reached an agreement on a new 10-year Professional Baseball Agreement
that would guarantee 158 minor league teams in 1998, and 160 teams thereafter.
In other words, the major league teams would be contractually bound to continue
to support all existing minor league teams.
CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by again expressing the appreciation of all major league players
to the members of this Committee for their consideration of this legislation, legislation that we strongly believe is in the interest not only of the players and owners,
but also of the fans. We continue to support and are committed to seeking legislation to clarify that major league baseball players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other athletes. Hopefully you will shortly have before you language agreed upon by the players and owners, which we urge you to act upon favorably in the near future. And, in any event, I want the Committee to know that the
Players Association strongly supports both S. 53 and the more narrow amendment
pending before the committee.
Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peltier, we will take your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAN PELTIER
Mr. PELTIER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my
name is Dan Peltier. I had the opportunity and the pleasure to
play professional baseball at all possible levels for 8 years. I played
rookie ball with the Butte Copper Kings in the Pioneer League,
double A with the Tulsa Drillers, triple A level with the Oklahoma
City 89ers and the Phoenix Fire Birds, and I also played with the
Texas Rangers and the San Francisco Giants at the major league
level. I also had the opportunity to play in the independent Northern League with the St. Paul Saints. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to talk about my experiences and about the realities of
baseball in the minors from the players' perspective.
Before beginning, I would like to point out that I recognize that
I am one of the lucky ones. Unlike most professional players, I got
the chance to play in the majors. Currently, there are approximately 4,500 active minor league players on affiliated minor league
teams. Every year, the major league teams draft more than 1,200
new players, more than 1,600 players this year in 1997. So the
turnover rate is very high.
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As I understand it, only 1 out of every 10 players drafted even
gets 1 day in the major leagues. Only 1 out of every 100 actually
has a career in the majors. Moreover, when I retired, I had my college degree, a degree in accounting from the University of Notre
Dame. Many players are out of the game by their mid- to late 20's,
with a high school degree, a wife, children, and no marketable
skills.
There are a lot of myths about playing in the minors. People
think that it is the last bastion of professional sports where winning is all that matters, that economics are not as important as talent and the fun of the game. In reality, minor league baseball is
a tough business where failure is the norm and success is the rare
exception. Here are some basic facts.
First, the primary objective of every player in the minors is not
to have a winning season, to have the best team, or to be the
league champion. It is to play well enough to get off the team and
play in the major leagues. It is better to have a good season for a
losing team than to have average statistics for a winner. Rosters
are constantly changing and there is little chance to build team
chemistry or unity. Everyone in the minors-players, coaches, and
managers-have one thing in common; that is, to be in the big
leagues.
Second, no one gets wealthy in the minors. Most baseball players
do not make in a year as much as Cal Ripken makes for one game.
In fact, most minor league players would love to make what I understand you pay your entry-level staffers. When I played rookie
ball, although I was under contract for a year, I made $850 a
month for 22 months. In double A, I made $1,350 a month, and
in triple A I made $1,850 a month for 5 months. Club house dues
and tips cost roughly $1,500 for the season, leaving me about
$7,500 before taxes. I have no idea how some of my friends who
were married and had kids were able to make ends meet.
Third, a minor league baseball players has very few rights. Baseball's reserve clause is very much like the indentured servitude of
the 1700's. When you first sign, you are owned by that team for
basically 7 seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to another country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you
if you get hurt.
A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for someone.else.
He can't try out for his home team. You have to play for the team
that drafted you even if they are loaded at your position. I got
drafted by the Texas Rangers after my junior year of college as an
outfielder. I also played some first base. When I was ready for the
majors, the Texas outfield included superstars such as Juan Gonzalez in left, Ruben Sierra in right, and Raphael Palmeiro at first.
I got the chance to play when Ruben Sierra got hurt, but was sent
back to the minors when he came back, even though at the time
I was hitting .385.
Under the standard minor league contract, a player is required
to waive all rights to appeal any action by the team in State or
Federal court. You can appeal to the commissioner of baseball, except there has been no commissioner for almost 5 years. In addition, you are pushed to leave college or not to attend in the first
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place and play in the minors, even though the chances are that you
will never have a career in the major leagues.
Oddly, if you are an American citizen, you have less bargaining
power than kids from other countries. Players in the United States
can only play for the team that drafts them. The only bargaining
power that some have is to stay in college. Players from other countries, such as the Dominican Republic or Cuba, are not subject to
the draft. They are free agents and can choose to play for the team
that makes the best offer. Because of this fact, teams from the
United States and Japan are signing players from Latin and South
American countries at an increasingly young age.
Perhaps most important, there is the mind set of the minors
which at best is a bit unrealistic. The longer you stay in, the fewer
options you have and more desperate you seem to get. You know
you are playing against a stacked deck, but in your heart you
firmly believe you are different, that you are going to be the exception. One's perspective of reality at 18 tends to be a little different
than one's perspective at 28 or 38.
Moreover, there is an incredible pressure to perform. You are always a day from being let go and there are hundreds of other guys
ready to take your place if you have a problem. At times, the minors seem to be a series of acts of desperation.
Given these facts, I think you can understand my surprise that
some want to stack the deck even further and create a new Federal
law exempting the owners' actions in the minors from the antitrust
laws. Quite frankly, what else do the owners need than what they
have already? What are the laws they must be able to break in
order to run minor league teams? How much more power do they
need when bargaining with an 18-year-old kid whom they own for
7 years, and what minor league player is going to jeopardize his
career by challenging the system? If you believe a player would do
that, then you really don't understand the mind set of a minor
league player.
Having played in an independent league, there are even some
differences between these two types of minor leagues. The Northern League was very similar to double A ball in terms of pay and
playing conditions, but there is a different atmosphere between the
team and the fans. The primary purpose of the St. Paul Saints,
which is the team that I played for, was to entertain the fans, and
that commitment by the team was mirrored by the commitment
from the community. Every game was a sellout. People came hours
ahead of the game for tailgate parties even though there was a
major league team literally only 10 miles away. The games were
more fun.
Despite these observations, I would not give up my experience in
playing baseball for anything. There is no greater feeling in the
world than the first time you get called up to the majors, and there
is also no greater low than the day that you get sent back down.
Knowing what I know, I would still do it all over again. The basic
fact is that you don't have to sign if you don't want to. However,
this obsession with making the majors should not be a justification
for the current treatment of minor league players, and I certainly
hope it would not be used as an excuse to give major league and
minor league owners a legal blank check.
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I understand that the legislation before this committee does not
address the minor leagues, however. It does not create any new
rights or delete any existing ones. It is only about the relationship
between the major league owners and the major league players.
Consequently, it should not be changed to award the owners with
even more power.
Before giving the owners an exemption for all of their activities
in the minors, I hope Congress will take the time to learn more
about the legal and economic realities of the minors, and not simply rely upon some of the current myths. Professional baseball
owners already have more power than they need, and certainly
more than they deserve.
Thank you for this opportunity and I will be happy to answer
any questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Peltier.
Let me make it clear that I said that Mr. Brand-I tried to meet
with him yesterday. He had an appointment with our staff yesterday and I asked the staff to bring him over to the office so we could
chat with him because I had chatted with some friends who felt
that I should meet with Mr. Brand. He never showed up, so the
staff tried to get a hold of him all day long. Finally, just to note
for the record, Mr. Brand did express a willingness and desire to
meet last evening, but our staff wasn't in the office at the time, but
he did meet with some committee staff. So I wanted to make that
clear. I wasn't aware of that at the time.
Let me also put in the record a statement by Senator Charles
Grassley, and also an opening statement by Senator Jeff Sessions,
as well.
[The prepared statements of Senators Grassley and Sessions follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLEs E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA

Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my voice to this debate to emphasize the importance of Minor League Baseball.
As everyone knows, baseball is not just a favorite American pastime-it is part
of our American culture. We grew up admiring the accomplishments of our favorite
players and rooting for our favorite teams. We grew up perfecting our curve balls
and sliders, and wondering why our fast balls were never as fast as our heroes' fast
balls. I want my grandkids and their children to enjoy the same outing to the ballpark that I did.
But baseball wouldn't be baseball without the Minor Leagues. The Major League
teams would not have the pool of talent to draw from, and wouldn't have the training ground for promising players if it were not for the Minor Leagues. And, in my
part of the world, the Minor Leagues fill another very important role. The Minor
Leagues brings baseball to the towns and small cities. They bring baseball to my
state of Iowa, and to other states that do not have Major League teams. It doesn't
take a Cal Ripkin or a George Brett to make a city loyal to a baseball club. If you've
never been to a Burlington Bees game or a Des Moines Cubs game, you're really
missing something. And you haven't seen fan loyalty until you've gone to a Minor
League game where so much of the town turns out for a game.
These are the reasons that I will continue to work to protect Minor League baseball. It is vital that any legislation passed by this Committee and by the full Senate
be in the best interest of the Minor Leagues. I commend the Chairman for his efforts in this regard, and sincerely hope he continues to work with the Minor
Leagues. For small town America, the Minor Leagues are baseball.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF ALABAMA

I would like to begin by thanking Senator Hatch for calling this hearing to discuss
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which, if enacted, would repeal professional baseball's 75-year-old antitrust exemption. I commend Senator Hatch for recognizing
that the legislation which we will be discussing today seeks to significantly change
the basic operating structure of "America's pastime", and for giving this committee
the opportunity to fully and fairly consider this issue. I would also like to thank
the witnesses assembled here today for their willingness to come before this committee to help us develop a clear understanding of the potential implications that could
result from any changes made to existing law.
Mr. Chairman, my home state of Alabama has a rich baseball tradition. On the
collegiate level one need only look as far as this spring's College World Series to
see that teams from University of Alabama and Auburn University were among the
participants. A third school, the University of South Alabama, came within one
game of being the third Alabama team in the College World Series, losing to eventual national champion Louisiana State University in the regional finals.
Many major league legends come from Alabama, and my hometown of Mobile has
an extraordinary record. Three of the greatest homerun hitters of all time, Hank
Aaron, Willie McCovey and Billy Williams were all from Mobile.
More than that, Satchel Paige, one of the game's legends, came from Mobile, and
as you recall those "Miracle Mets" please note that two of their outfielders, Cleon
Jones and Tommy Agee, were both Mobilians. These are just some of the many
major leaguers our state has produced.
Still, although Alabama has never had a Major League team, the minor leagues
have always been important. Mobilians still fondly recall "the Rifleman", Chuck
Connors, who played for the old Mobile Bears. And Birmingham hosted the entire
career of the most famous minor league player of all-time, the most well known athlete in the world-Michael Jordan. To most he is a Chicago Bull, but to us he is
known as a Birmingham Baron.
Minor League activity continues to grow within our state. Alabama currently has
three minor league teams, the Birmingham Barons, Huntsville Stars and the Mobile
BayBears, which have all made tremendous contributions to the communities that
support them. Alabama's affection for minor league baseball has been reflected in
our teams attendance records as well, with Birmingham drawing 296,000 fans last
year while Huntsville attracted 255,000 fans. The new Mobile BayBears, in this,

their first full season of play, have already drawn 137,160 fans in only 31 home
dates. This support for these minor league teams has made itself known through
the mail and other communications that I have received in my office from individuals in the state who are concerned about this issue.
Repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is an issue of tremendous significance to
the minor leagues, and the potential impacts of this legislation on these teams
should not be overlooked. The importance of minor league baseball to small towns
and communities throughout America cannot be overstated. Many of these minor
league teams are located in states, such as Alabama, that have never hosted a
Major League franchise, and they provide their communities with unique social and
economic benefits that would not otherwise exist. My interest in this hearing is to
ensure that the concerns raised by these teams are fairly addressed and that the
actions we take do not unfairly damage minor league baseball and the communities
that support it. To this end, I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses
on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fehr, could you share with us your views on
how repealing Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption will
improve labor relations between the players and the owners, and
what broader benefits do you think that this might lead to?
Mr. FEHR. I think there are a couple of things. Essentially, the
circumstances that when it comes to player relations at the major
league level, as well as at the minor league level-the owners are
organized in such a way so as to deprive players of any meaningful
bargaining power on their individual contracts. Their object is to do
that. The union's job is to try and negotiate a better system.
When we have a circumstance in which the antitrust laws are
not there as a safety valve in the background if collective bargain-
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ing breaks down, what we have is a set of circumstances in which
it makes it much more likely that the owners will be interested in
pushing that forward, as we have seen in the past, so that hopefully they can get to the point where they can determine without
any restraint whatever the conditions are. If they know that there
is a safety valve that, come what may, they can't act in a way
which would otherwise be deemed to violate the Sherman Act, we
think that that will temper bargaining positions, as it has in the
other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the players and the owners
have agreed upon specific language as an alternative to S. 53 as
currently drafted that both sides support. Can you summarize the
extent to which this language substantively differs from S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. I think the principal difference is this. S. 53 is a blanket statement making it clear that the antitrust laws apply except
where otherwise noted, and there are a number of exceptions to
which you referred at the beginning of this hearing. The language
that we are suggesting is much more narrow than that. It is an affirmative statement that the antitrust laws apply to labor relations
at the major league level without making any comment whatsoever
on the state of the law otherwise.
The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, can you tell us what the advantages
would be for the committee to proceed with your proposed substitute language as opposed to S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. Hopefully, what that would do is allow the committee
to proceed to consider legislation in a much more simple manner
with a much reduced range of issues that are there, thereby allowing for a lot less controversy and hopefully a bill which can be
acted with broad support from all parties.
The CHAIRMAN. So I assume then, based upon your negotiations
with the owners, that you think it is fair to say that they would
support this language?
Mr. FEHR. Certainly, Randy Levine supports it. I understand
that the owners have agreed to support it, also. That certainly was
the intent of the collective bargaining agreement which they ratified.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you agree with me that the owners'
support is rather significant, and that that is, as far as I can see,
a momentous development?
Mr. FEHR. I think it is a very significant development. I agree
with you, Senator. It indicates at long last that they are prepared
to treat major league players the same way their counterparts do
in other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will put a letter in the record sent to me
by Bud Selig, dated June 16, 1997. Let me just read one sentence
in the letter. It says, "First, the language negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball Players Association and the
Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the executive
council meeting and the legislative committee meeting."
He does say, "Our support is only tempered by the fact that our
business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, has concern as to whether the proposed legislation adequately protects their interests," and then mentions that "they
have contacted our office."
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I will put that in the record to express their concerns, and certainly we are interested in their concerns.
[The letter referred to follows:]
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER,
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,

New York, NY, June 16, 1997.
Hon. ORRIN HATCH, Chairman,
Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN: I am writing to acknowledge your June 13, 1997, letter of invitation to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, June 17, 1997,
at 10:00 a.m. Unfortunately, I will be unable to attend due to a previous long-term
commitment to the Boys & Girls Club of America. However, I would like to make
a couple of comments with respect to our recent meetings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, last week.
First, the language negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the Executive Council meeting and the Legislative Committee meeting. Our support is
only tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), has concern as to whether the proposed
legislation adequately protects their interests. I understand that representatives of
the NAPBL have contacted your office to arrange a meeting to discuss those concerns.
Second, we announced on June 12, 1997, a ten-year agreement with the Minor
Leagues effective October 1, 1997. The Professional Baseball Agreement sets forth
a spirit of cooperation and commitment between the Major and Minor Leagues.
Third, we are reviewing our concerns about appearing to testify given that we
have been sued by one of our own member clubs in an antitrust lawsuit.
We look forward to working with you and your staff as the process moves forward.
Sincerely,
ALLAN H. SELIG,
Chairman,Major League Executive Council.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Mr. Fehr, your proposed language only addresses labor relations at the major league level, is
that correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the proposed legislation give anyone a right
to challenge the minor league draft or reserve clause?
Mr. FEHR. In my view, this is carefully drafted so that if this legislation passes, it would be irrelevant to considerations about the
status of the draft or the minor league reserve clause.
The CHAIRMAN. Does it address the minor leagues at all?
Mr. FEHR. It only addressed it to say that whatever the status
of the law is, this doesn't change it. Otherwise, it does not.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, do you believe that the minor league
draft or reserve clause under current law are exempt from the antitrust laws?
Mr. FEHR. That is an interesting question. It has never been tested. I don't know whatThe CHAIRMAN. Do you think they should be?
Mr. FEHR. Personally, do I think they should be?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. FEHR. No, I don't think they should be.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not?
Mr. FEHR. Major League Baseball operating the amateur draftand make no mistake, it is operated by Major League Baseball, not
by the minor leagues; as a matter of fact, all the minor league contracts are now signed by the major league clubs; they are not even
signed by the minor league clubs-effectively prevents any poten-
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tial baseball player from bargaining with more than one potential
employer.
It is not even like the Federal Government where you can apply
to a number of different agencies in a number of different locations.
You have one choice, and one choice only. We think that is fundamentally discriminatory. We don't know of any other place in
America in which we tolerate it. The amateur draft came in in the
mid-1960's. I know of no case in which it has been examined under
the antitrust laws. I can make the arguments as to how that would
come out either way. For purposes of this legislation, though, I do
want to emphasize that this legislation would not affect that one
way or another.
The CHAIRMAN. OK Now, Mr. Peltier, let me just take a second
with you and then I will turn to Senator DeWine. You have given
us some very helpful insight into life in the minor leagues and this
will, I am sure, prove helpful as we consider further legislation.
As I have stated earlier, our pending bill does not in any way affect the applicability of the antitrust laws to the minor leagues
and, as I understand it, nor does the proposal agreed upon by the
owners and the players, as articulated by Mr. Fehr. But I suspect
that this is an issue that at some point is going to surface, and I
take it from your testimony that you would advise against changing the bill to insulate the minor league system from the antitrust
laws. Am I right in that?
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any minor league player or agent
who has challenged the legality of the minor league system?
Mr. PELTIER. Not off the top of my head, no, I don't.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that that hasn't occurred, why
no player has actually challenged this system?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think, you know, what you have to realize
here is that minor league players that aren't part of the 40-man
roster which is protected by the Major League Players Association
basically have no rights in terms of voicing their opinion. You
know, the thing that you have to remember here is that the urgency to get from a minor league level to a big-league level necessitates the fact that you have to first perform well. And, second,
you have to, you know, perform in the bounds of what the major
league team wants you to perform in.
The CHAIRMAN. So, don't cause any trouble, is what you are saying?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly, you know, and that is a big thing.
You know, you look at some of the players today, you know, and
you can cite numerous cases where they do cause trouble, butThe CHAIRMAN. And even though they are great players, they
never make it to the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely, absolutely, and one of the things
that you have to look at is, as I mentioned in my testimony, you
have to be in the right place at the right time. That not only means
talentwise, but also your personality has to fit that of the bigleague club that you are trying to make. And if that is not a perfect
fit, then, you know, you end up with the short side of the stick.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, assume for the moment that the antitrust
laws ultimately would be applied to the minor leagues either by the
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courts or the Congress. Were this to happen, do you believe that
minor league baseball would be destroyed, as some have suggested?
Mr. PELTIER. No, absolutely not. You know, one of the things
that I don't think people understand is that minor league owners
aren't the ones that pay the salaries for the minor league players.
As Don sort of alluded to, the fact that when you sign a contract,
you are signing a contract of the major league parent club-because of that, you know, I think that minor league owners tend to
feel that, you know, they are not operating on fair grounds. But
they have to realize that what they get out of their investment in
minor league baseball is not something that is construed as bigleague baseball, major league baseball. It is an entirely different
market.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are no longer playing professional
baseball, right?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have tried to have a current minor
league player come and testify, but we couldn't get anybody to do
it. Can you tell us any reason why?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that speaks volumes in itself that, you
know, I think guys are afraid to come out here and speak against,
you know, the people that are deciding their fate.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they don't want to rock the boat?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly. They don't want to rock the boat.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difference for the players and the fans
between the affiliated minor leagues and the independent league?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely. You know, one of the things that
I had the opportunity to do was to play for the St. Paul Saints in
1995 because I didn't cross the line and be a replacement player,
and what I noticed was that their whole existence is based on the
fact that the fans take part, you know, in the game itself. The way
that they have organized their organization was to make it more
of a family atmosphere and have the fans be part of the game.
As a result, you know, I saw things that I haven't seen since I
was a student at Notre Dame. The people were tailgating before
games on weekdays at 4:30 in the afternoon. We would have a
packed house. People really enjoyed going to the game not only because of the product that was on the field, but because of the entertainment that they witnessed.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Peltier, based on your experiences as
a minor league player, can you tell us what happens to a minor
league player if he has a career-shortening injury, such as torn ligaments or a torn rotator cuff or a knee or a shoulder that can't be
fully repaired? Can he be cut after sustaining the injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, he can. What the teams are bound to do is pay
for their medical bills, you know, in the event that the injury occurred while he was playing for that team. Beyond that, there is
no legal responsibility for the team to continue to pay him and give
him the opportunity to make it to the major leagues. You know,
there again, that ties in with the fact that minor league players
really do have no rights and they are not bound byThe CHAIRMAN. So, basically, he is dead as far as baseball is concerned if he has a career-shortening injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Right, and that is a very real possibility.
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The CHAIRMAN. And there is no real help for him?
Mr. PELTIER. No, and that is what separates the major leagues
from the minor leagues. Don Fehr and the Major League Players
Association represent the players such that they are treated fairly,
and the minor leagues really have no governing body to that extent.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. I understand that you were let go by the
Texas Rangers after you refused to cross the picket line and be a
replacement player during the labor dispute in 1995.
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you please explain what happened, why
you refused to play?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, the reason why I refused to play is that I had
just been part of the Major League Players Association and felt a
responsibility to support the union. I realized that had I crossed
the line, I, in essence, would be admitting to myself that I don't
think that I could make it back to the major leagues on my own
volition. And, you know, as a result, I felt that it was an easy decision for me to make in terms of not becoming a replacement player
because of the fact that I did support the union and wanted to get
back to the big leagues, you know, on my own.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, were any threats made to you?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, one of the things that happened in spring
training was they had all of the players that weren't on the 40-man
roster at the time-and a lot of the teams did this; some of the
teams didn't participate, such as the Baltimore Orioles. But at the
time when I was with the Texas Rangers, they had everybody come
down early from minor league camp in February and play together.
There were a lot of players there on the field and, you know, we
had normal workouts for, you know, approximately 3 weeks or a
month-actually, around 3 weeks.
Then our general manager, who was Doug Melvin, called us all
on the field, with the exception of around 10 youn prospects who
they felt would make it to the big leagues eventually on their own.
He called everybody over onto this one field and said, you know,
verbatim, "Either you stay and play or you go home. We are not
going to pay for your hotel. We are not going to pay for your ride
home. We want you to be a replacement player because this is
where the game is right now." So, around 10 of us got up and left.
You know, it was clearly evident as to what they were trying to
do, you know, just given the fact that they had these 10 prospects,
these 10 young prospects, separated from the mass so that they
wouldn't be affected by this and had to make that decision because
I think in their minds they knew that this would definitely have
some repercussions on the players who did decide to cross.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think that most players who are
drafted enter the minor leagues fully understanding what they are
getting into and have been given an accurate representation of
their chances of making the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, I think that as a scout or as an
organization as a whole, they try to paint a rosy picture and try
to make it sound as if everybody has a real good chance to make
it to the major leagues. In reality, that is not the case, as is evident
by the numbers that I had mentioned. But, you know, I think that
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they do try to make it-baseball is different from other sports, too.
Baseball does not use college as their minor leagues, whereas basketball and football basically do. So right from the start, there is
a pressure to enter the minor league level at a younger age so that
they can-you know, they can bring you along in their process as
they would have it. So this is a difference from these sports.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, could you just describe maybe in a little
more detail the kind of pressure placed on high school and college
students to leave school and play minor league baseball by the
team that drafts them?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that the pressure exists in the factyou know, I can speak from my experience where, as a junior, in
going through the negotiating process once I was drafted, obviously
their desire was to have me sign and play professional ball right
away at the youngest possible age, OK, for the least amount of
money. So they used their tactics to try to get me to sign for as
little amount of money as possible.
Now, my feeling was that because I was a junior, I had an opportunity to play for Team USA. I had an opportunity to finish my degree on time. I felt it was important for me to make sure that playing professional baseball at that time was going to be the best possible scenario for me because I was putting a lot at stake, you
know, and the methods that they used to try to make me sign at
an earlier time for a lesser amount of money were such that the
scout came and said, you weren't picked until the 65th pick and
you want such and such for your signing.
So then my response was, so what you are saying is that you
view me as a number and not as a person. And, in turn, he said,
no, that is not the case, and then he said something as if, if you
don't sign, I am going to lose my job. Now I am a 20-year-old kid
and he is trying to use all these tactics to try to get me to sign.
Then there were comments made in my local newspaper as to I
would be crazy if I didn't sign, comments made by a scout who was
a national scout for the Rangers at that time, you know, therefore
putting more pressure on me by my peers and my family and everyone in the area.
So, you know, there are definitely tactics that are used to try to
force kids to sign at a younger age. You know, they are trying to
do their job and stay within their budget, but, you know, only I
think to put a feather in their cap if they can sign the diamonds
in the rough.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. I think both of your testimonies
have been very interesting here today. Again, I would note that I
would have preferred to have had representatives of the minor and
major leagues here to respond and testify. It is unfortunate for
them that they aren't here represented, but we certainly did everything in our power to try and get them here.
So I wish we had some of their responses to some of this, but I
am not without some understanding of this myself. Having been
born and raised in Pittsburgh, PA, and watching the Pirates and
having been a Pirate fan all those years, I saw a lot of things happen that concerned me.
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Senator Specter would like to make a statement and then ask a
question or two of you, Mr. Fehr, and Senator DeWine has graciously agreed to allow that to happen, and I certainly agree.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator DeWine, for yielding to me for a few moments.
The issue of the antitrust exemption has been before this committee repeatedly during my tenure in the Senate, and we are
searching for a way that there can be fairness to all sides and baseball can be preserved as the great American pastime. My own basic
view is that the antitrust laws ought to apply to everybody, and I
have stayed with the baseball antitrust exemption really because
of an effort to preserve the small-market teams, one of which is
Pittsburgh. The Pirates have stayed in Pittsburgh, at least up to
the present time, and they are doing very, very well this season
with a very small budget, but their future is obviously precarious,
as are other small-market teams.
It has been my hope that in the controversy around baseball that
somehow the participants, the owners and the players, would come
to some sort of an agreement or understanding to preserve the
game. I think that necessarily involves revenue-sharing and salary
caps, or perhaps I shouldn't say "necessarily." Perhaps it can be
preserved without revenue-sharing and salary caps, but I do not
know how it can be done without those two features, and perhaps
more.
The Congress of the United States is not in a very good position
to tell people what to do about anything, and we like, in our free
enterprise society, for people to make their own judgments and the
market to prevail. However, baseball does have this great exemption, which is historical, but they have it, and it has seemed to me
that the Congress might be in the position to exercise some leverage on the owners and on the players to work out some arrangement where the game could be preserved.
I personally still resent the moving of the Dodgers from Brooklyn
in 1958, and the Giants, and that fabulous baseball series on public
television was on again last night and talked about that again. I
think that there are major problems with the move of the football
franchises around, like the Cleveland Browns moving to Baltimore.
That is slightly different, but it is still in the same line. That draws
a response from Senator DeWine.
A few years ago, the Eagles were on their way to Phoenix and
that was stopped, and we had some really tough hearings here in
1982 with Pete Rozelle and Al Davis at the witness table when we
were trying to find some sense out of the move of the Raiders.
I read in the press last week, and I have yet to confirm the accuracy, that the "baseball commissioner," wants a new stadium in
Philadelphia for the Phils. Well, I didn't know baseball had a commissioner until I read it in the paper. I thought that they had an
acting commissioner, and there is a big difference between a commissioner and an acting commissioner. The paper said that permission had been given for the Minnesota team to look for new owner-
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ship and a possible move, and that might be in the offing for the
Phils.
I have a lot of admiration for Bill Giles and the Phils organization, but I am not too anxious to see the taxpayers pick up the big
tab on a new stadium. Our very distinguished Governor, Tom
Ridge, is looking at that with a commission, and Pittsburgh is involved and so are the Eagles and so are the Steelers, and who
knows what comes next?
However, it seems to me that in a sport which is as lucrative as
baseball, where there is as much money as baseball has, that someone there ought to be making arrangements where baseball would
pay for its own stadiums. I think that the kind of salaries commanded in a free enterprise system is wonderful, although we took
an initial step a few years back in denying deductibility for athletes' salaries over $1 million. We could do things like that under
our taxing power which would have a very profound effect.
I am not in favor of that, necessarily, but there is just a search
here as to what can be done to stabilize the game, something that
I have worked on for a long time. I recently retained special counsel in the field, Gilbert Stein, who is here today-he was one of my
top deputies when I was district attorney, and later president of
the National Hockey League, and very, very well-informed on
sports-to try to take a fresh look to see if we can be of some help.
So the question I have, Mr. Fehr, after that relatively brief statement, is what suggestion would you have, if any, as to some overarching principles that we might bring to baseball so that-when
I turn on the radio and listen to the Phillies, I can't tell who is at
bat because the players have moved around so much. I was at the
Phillies game on Sunday, a beautiful day and a big crowd, and the
Blue Jays were in town. We hadn't seen the Blue Jays since we lost
the Series to them in 1993.
What could be done to stabilize the game and perhaps provide
revenue-sharing, perhaps provide salary caps or, if those two factors are not to be done, to stabilize so that the small-market teams
stay and there is some continuity? This moves over into television
where we do have some greater authority with the Braves and
their television network and Ted Turner's big question, who wants
Rupert Murdoch to buy the Dodgers, and what that implies.
It is a very, very tangled web, and you have been in this a long
time, Mr. Fehr, and you are a very astute lawyer and pragmatist
and have a lot of experience. That is not a very concise question.
I feel a little like some of my colleagues, but what suggestions
would you have-to make it specific, what suggestions would you
have to stabilize the game?
Mr. FEHR. I will just open by noting that some people are hesitant to ask me open-ended questions, but let me try and respond
as concisely as I can. You have raised a number of issues.
I remember those hearings in 1982, to which you referred. I am
reasonably certain that I testified in one segment of them, and my
own views on generalized number and location and relocation and
franchise issues and funding of stadiums, which is directly related
to that, are well-documented in testimony going back at regular intervals over the 15 years. I will only respond to that issue by saying that so long as we permit effective cartel-like organizations
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that can control the number and location of franchises, it is not unreasonable to expect that they will act like cartels and utilize whatever leverage they have. The only way that is going to change is
if you have teams competing for cities, rather than the other way
around.
Second, and much more directly related to the focus of your question, the issues swirling around small-market clubs were in large
part responsible for the dispute that we had with the owners. It is
not, I think, an oversimplification to suggest that, fundamentally,
you had revenue-sharing rules in Major League Baseball which
were outdated by decades that the small-market clubs felt worked
to their peculiar disadvantage.
There was a generalized desire to reach a conclusion by which
they would be helped, but the question came down, where would
the help come. Our view was that how money is shared among
management is, if not anything else, perhaps the most traditional
management function there is. Ordinarily, when people come up
with a joint venture, they tend to write the rules as to how the
money flows as between the joint venture members, and as long as
they didn't rewrite those rules in a way which effectively destroyed
competition for players, they were going to be able to do that.
The owners as a group didn't want to do that because the largemarket owners' initial position in the bargaining, as is well-documented, was essentially that they would share, but only if player
salaries were reduced by amounts greater than the amount they
would have to share. Then they would do so. I would just refer you
to a congressional Research Service report in January 1995 which
documents what the positions of the parties were.
Having said that preliminarily-and I indicated in my prior testimony before you were able to come into the hearing that the new
collective bargaining agreement we reached last November, which
was finally drafted and signed in March, has quite a number of
new provisions in it. Principal among those, and to which I did not
earlier refer, are provisions relating to increased revenue-sharing
and certain restrictions on the payments of players.
I will be glad to provide you with whatever level of detail you
want on this. Essentially, it comes down to the following. Over the
next 5 years, the level of revenue-sharing from large- to small-market clubs-or rather small-income clubs-it is defined in terms of
income rather than market size-will go very substantially in
phases. In the initial years, there are certain taxes that would
apply to certain clubs if they spend over a certain amount on players. Those eventually go away as the revenue-sharing becomes
much more substantial.
In addition to that, in a gesture of what I consider, at least, to
be consummate good faith in an effort to rebuild the game, the
players have agreed on their own to kick into revenue-sharing in
1998 and 1999 exactly 2.2 percent of what their total salaries are,
which we expect to be several million north of $40 million. Virtually all of that will go to small-market clubs.
In the end, baseball has to have a system which provides adequate resources to the various teams. The definition of what is adequate and the determination as to who pays that bill were the primary subjects of our collective bargaining negotiation and, if the
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provisions we put in place are successful, hopefully will pave the
way for the future. If not, we will have that issue again the next
time.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr, for that answer, and we will be pursuing it. I appreciate your allowing me the
deference here. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine and Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Leahy, our ranking member.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being late, but I have been tied up with the land mine issue
on the floor, and I guess you have been discussing the land mines
of this whole baseball situation.
You know, Senator Hatch and I as sponsors of this legislation
have shown an awful lot of patience in affording the Major League
Baseball owners some opportunity to implement the agreement
they reached with the Major League Baseball Players Association
8 months ago and to support legislation to end what I believe is
baseball's unjustified exemption from Federal antitrust laws.
I am sorry that Senator Hatch's efforts have been taken for
granted. I regret that the baseball team owners have responded to
his courtesies by refusing to appear here today. Frankly, the baseball owners are still in hiding in refusing to appear before the U.S.
Senate. Mr. Selig is the seemingly permanent acting commissioner.
He has been commissioner longer than most I have known.
If he were here, we could ask him what about the unsettling authorization of the Minnesota Twins to negotiate to abandon the
team's fans in the Twin Cities? What about questions surrounding
demands for publicly-financed facilities in Seattle, Milwaukee, and
a number of other cities? We might ask him what about the Yankees' lawsuit against the other major league baseball teams which
implicates the applicability of Federal antitrust laws to the business of Major League Baseball?
We might ask him what is going on with the search for a strong,
independent baseball commissioner? It is sort of like "Waiting for
Godot" around here as we wait for a new baseball commissioner.
I am 57 years old. I would like to live long enough-and I come
from a family of long-lived people-I would like to live long enough
to see one. Then we would like to ask him questions about realignment of teams among baseball's division, or the question of revenue-sharing with small-market teams.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you have the patience of Job. Actually,
you have to to be chairman of this committee.
The CHARMAN. I am glad you recognize that. [Laughter.]
Senator LEAHY. I want to give you credit, but not so much credit
that it hurts you back home.
There is strong public interest in baseball. In Vermont when I
was growing up, you were automatically, or you weren't allowed to
live in the State, a Red Sox fan. But now, of course, loyalties are
split among teams, among various sports. We have a successful
minor league team, the Vermont Expos, the champions of the New
York-Penn League. They begin their new season later this week.
We have a lot of businesses and jobs that depend on baseball, and
we have baseball fans.
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I just worry that the public is being short-changed here, Mr.
Chairman. The first legislative day of this session, you and I and
Senator Thurmond and Senator Moynihan cosponsored a consensus
antitrust repeal measure. Instead of prompt action and agreement,
we have been stalled by these people for 6 months.
I would just ask this one question of Don Fehr, who is here. You
remember when some Senators argued over the past several years
that we should not proceed to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption
during a labor-management dispute. Well, now, you have a 5-year
contract. That contract included provision for the players and owners to lobby for the antitrust laws to apply to labor relations in
Major League Baseball. Wouldn't this be the perfect time to pass
the legislation to repeal the antitrust exemption?
Mr. FEHR. As I indicated, Senator, before you came in, my views
on the exemption generally, what the effect has been, and how the
law should be in a perfect world are well-known. I have testified
to that many times and I don't have occasion to change those views
at all today. Simply put, the antitrust laws ought to apply universally, and I certainly don't want to presume to suggest to this committee or to the Senate or the Congress as a whole that with respect to matters other than those covered by our agreement with
the owners that they should refrain from considering whatever
measures that you deem appropriate, especially given all that you
have learned.
I can say for my own part that after these many years of difficulty and trial and tribulation, we have reached an agreement
with the owners in the specific area which applies directly to my
membership and people that I represent, and that is the measure
that we hope that you will act on favorably and act on quickly. As
has been the case in the past, I will be glad to provide you or any
other member of the committee or the Senate any other assistance
with respect to other questions that you might find helpful.
Senator LEAHY. I appreciate that.
I see Mr. Peltier here. I commend him for his courage in being
here because he may want to go back and play at this level. I think
the Blue Jays released Ruben Sierra this week. You look in pretty
good shape. They may be looking for somebody who used to hit
.385.
Mr. PELTIER. Hopefully, for more than a couple weeks.
Senator LEAHY. Well, I think you would do OK. Certainly, you
are better prepared to do that than anybody on this panel, with the
exception of Senator Thurmond. He has got his new baseball bat
from Chairman Hatch.
Let me ask you one question, and this doesn't necessarily have
anything to do with this particular hearing, but I am just curious
to hear your thoughts. We have the tremendous growth and success of women's sports following the college programs through title
IX. We have women's Olympic team victories, girls and young
women getting involved in soccer and baseball and basketball and
other sports. We have the Silver Bullets. We have stories about
women pitching in minor leagues.
Do you see a time when women will be playing or coaching or
umpiring in the major leagues?
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Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, physically that may be the case
some day, but I think that the way that the minor leagues or the
major leagues exist today, I think it would be difficult, you know,
in the sense that the way that things have been established would
have to be changed to accommodate those needs because, obviously,
there would be different needs for club houses or showering facilities or things of that nature.
You know, if you are asking me a question of talent, you know,
who knows what could happen in the future? But I think thatSenator LEAHY. It is more a question of talent. I mean, all the
other things can be worked out.
Mr. PELTIER. Yes. I think in the future, I don't see why, you
know, you couldn't say if there is a woman that throws 95 miles
per hour and can get batters out, then she would be as deserving
as anyone else.
Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for doing this,
and again I commend your patience. You are truly a Latter Day
Saint.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is better than being a latter day liberal,
is all I can say.
Senator LEAHY. Oh, come now. Some of them are saints, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to the chairman of our Antitrust
Subcommittee, who has been very patient here, and I also want to
say that Senator DeWine has been a leader in this area, as well,
and we are looking forward to his work with us on this matter.
So, Senator DeWine, we will turn to you and I am sorry it has
taken so long to get to you.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank
you for holding the hearing and congratulate you for introduction
of the bill. I supported a similar bill, as you know, in the last Congress. Quite frankly, it is hard to come up with any logical or rational basis why baseball should stand alone with the antitrust exemption, and for that reason I supported its abolition in the last
Congress.
Let me turn to the issue of the minor leagues, which I think is
a troubling issue. First, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am also sorry
that Mr. Brand is not here today. We have in the State of Ohio
three minor league teams. We plan to have a fourth within the
next year or two in Dayton. We obviously have two major league
teams in Ohio. So this issue holds more than academic interest for
me.
I have listened over the last few months to repeated statements
about what this bill or similar bills would do in regard to the minor
leagues, and people have told me that even though this bill is very
specific and says it will not impact the minor leagues, there still
have been a lot of comments that have been made about the fact
that it will have unintended consequences in regard to the minor
leagues. So I am sorry that he is not here today, Mr. Chairman,
to talk about it. I think it is very difficult, frankly, to approach this
issue without a representative of the minor leagues here.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do, too.
Senator DEWINE. I just think it is just a real shame. This is not
a new issue. This is not something that they have not had the opportunity to think about for a long, long time, and I don't know
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how we really approach this issue without a thorough discussion
about the minor leagues. I am going to have a couple of questions
for our witnesses in regard to that.
Let me also state, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is a shame that
the major leagues are not represented here. Bud Selig is not here;
the acting commissioner is not here. Again, I think it makes it difficult.to address this issue in his absence.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Senator DEWINE. I certainly will, and I understand you have
been very plain, Mr. Chairman, that you extended the invitation
and these issues have been out there in the open for a long, long
time. There is nothing new, but I think that for neither of them
to be here creates a problem for us.
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator would yield, I think it is a problem. But on the other hand, what we are trying to do is resolve the
major league problems at this point and leave the minor leagues
alone. Now, if, in the future, we find that there is a disadvantage
or some major problem, we can work on that.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly understand that,
and I don't quarrel with that and I don't disagree with you. I don't
think you are wrong.
The CHAIRMAN. No. I know you don't.
Senator DEWINE. But we are still left, and I am still left with
statements that have been made by minor league teams, statements that have been made by representatives of the minor
leagues, that even this bill leaves this open and that there are
going to be unintended consequences. I think it is very difficult for
me as a member of the Senate to deal with it. It is not the chairman's fault, but when people say there is going to be a problem
and then they don't come in and testify, I think that is just a real
problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree. If the Senator would just yield again, I
understand that, but again I want to just resolve this problem. I
was hopeful that Mr. Brand would be here with suggestions that
he would like to have.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I have also, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
asked for specific suggestions from Mr. Brand and we have not
been able to get any specific suggestions.
The CHAIRMAN. I know. We are in agreement. What I want to do
is turn the rest of the hearing over to you as the chairman of the
Antitrust Subcommittee because I need to get to Finance. That is
what I am trying to do.
Senator DEWINE. I will continue, then, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If you will, and if you will forgive me for leaving.
I want to thank you both for coming. I think your testimony has
been very accurate, very good, and very helpful to the committee.
We will just move ahead and see what we can do here. I want to
be fair to all people here, but it seems to me the major league problem is solved. There. should be no griping about that.
With the minor leagues, we are happy to work with Mr. Brand.
I just don't want it to tie up the solution to the major league problems. And if there is an attempt to do that, then I have to say I
am going to be pretty irritated because I am willing to work to try
and resolve those problems in the future. But this is something I
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would like to get done today, since the major league owners and
players have basically agreed. It seems to me there is no reason not
to at least pursue and complete that aspect of this whole set of
problems, and then to the extent that we have other problems with
the minors, we will be happy to work with them, and even hold
hearings and do other things that may be helpful there. But right
now, I would like to get this problem solved.
Thank you, and if you don't mind finishing, I would appreciate
it.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be more than
happy to.
The CHAIRMAN. Good to see you.

Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DEWINE [presiding]. Let me make a couple more statements and then I will turn to questions. As I was saying, I think
it is a shame that the acting commissioner of baseball is not here.
You know, some people may say, well, what in the world does the
U.S. Senate care about whether there is an acting commissioner or
a permanent commissioner, and what should our involvement be?
I think it is obvious that when we deal with antitrust, we have to
be directly involved. We have to be involved in resolving this issue.
I think, also, though, it needs to be pointed out that the public
has some interest in what goes on in baseball, not just as fans, but
we are seeing hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayers' money
put directly into stadiums today, into ballparks today. So it is not
out of line for Congress to ask questions about the health of organized baseball. I don't think it is out of line for any member of the
public or a Senator or a Representative to wonder, as we continue
to, why in the world the owners do not want a permanent commissioner, why they do not want a powerful commissioner, why they
do not want a commissioner with any power at all.
I think the answer is clear. The answer simply has to be that
they don't want anybody with that kind of authority. They want to
be able to control whoever the commissioner is. They do not want,
apparently, or think it is in the best interests of baseball to have
a commissioner who has the moral authority of an independent
commissioner and someone who can make decisions in the best interests of baseball.
When Mr. Selig was testifying in front of this committee several
years ago, he told us that the commissioner would be imminent,
would be very shortly appointed, and we are still here today several years later and obviously there is no commissioner. Now, I am
not going to spend a lot of time today talking about the problems
that that has created, but I think it has created a great deal of
problems with the public perception of organized baseball.
Let me, if I could, turn to the issue of the minor leagues. Mr.
Peltier, you have raised some very interesting issues in regard to
that, and I think for me, as I was telling the chairman, it really
is two questions or two issues, and they are separate and distinct
in a sense. First, what are the unintended consequences going to
be of this piece of legislation, where we state that it is going to
have no consequences, but there is a nagging feeling that it may.
Second, maybe the bigger question, is what you have brought out
as to whether or not we should look at the whole antitrust issue
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in regard to minor league baseball. I think that is probably something that this committee should look at. We have a merger here
of labor law and antitrust law and a few other things, but it seems
to me that one of the kind of interesting things that we may end
up with is that we pass this piece of legislation and we may have
ended the antitrust exemption for the major leagues and we may
still have an antitrust exemption for the minor leagues, which I
find to be a little odd, that in all of professional sports we may
have one small class of individuals, and that would be minor
league players, who now we have exemptioned from the antitrust
laws.
I understand some of the practical reasons that are given for
doing that, but I just wonder as a matter of public policy whether
that is good or not. But I think those are issues probably for another day when we have the opportunity to have additional witnesses on this subject.
Mr. Fehr, educate me a little bit in regard to your union. My understanding is that a professional baseball team has a roster of 25,
but they have contracts for, what, 40? You have 40 major league
contracts on a team. Is that how that works?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. The system can be easily described in the following way. Each major league club can hold title to up to 40 player
contracts in its own name, and those are major league contracts.
We negotiate the form of those, and so on. They then can hold a
virtually unlimited number, subject to the number of minor league
teams they have, of minor league contracts, and those contracts are
now held in the name of the major league team, not the minor
league team.
Senator DEWINE. But you would represent only the 40, is that
right?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and there are certainSenator DEWINE. The 40 who would have signed a "major league
contract?"
Mr. FEHR. Yes, although there are certain terms and conditions
of employment when they are assigned to the minor leagues outside the bargaining unit for which we do not represent them.
Senator DEWINE. But, in general, it is basically 40 people?
Mr. FEHR. Right.
Senator DEWINE. So if I go to a Toledo Mud Hens game and look
out on the field, there may be some players out there who have a
major league contract, correct?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. Some of them may have a minor league contract. The rest of them would have a minor league contract?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. But they are all contracts with the parent club.
Would that be correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is the case now, yes.
Senator DEWINE. That is the case. So when I look out on the
field at the Akron Arrows, as I did the other day with my son,
when we watched a game-if I look at some of the players, some
of them you may represent and some of them you may not represent?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
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Mr. PELTIER. If I may say something?

Senator DEWINE. Yes, jump in. Please, jump right in.
Mr. PELTIER. One of the things, though, is that the players that
are on the 40-man roster that are playing in the minor leagues are
not bound by the terms of the major league minimum salary. So
even though the minor league players that are on the 40-man that
are playing in the minor leagues are represented by the Players
Association, some of the rules don't apply.
Senator DEWINE. When does the minimum salary kick in? Educate me further on that.
Mr. PELTIER. As soon as they make the major league team on the
active 25-man roster.
Senator DEWINE. So when you were brought up, though-and
you played, what, several weeks? Is that what I heard you say?
Mr. PELTIER. When I first got called up, yes.
Senator DEWINE. OK
Mr. PELTIER. So my salary was prorated each day that I was up
there based on the minimum salary.
Senator DEWINE. So once you were called up-let us say the
Reds call up somebody from Indianapolis, for example. Once they
walked on the field, that is a day. That is prorated, then. Is that
how that works?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct, and then when they get sent back down,
their pay scale goes up, as well, to a minor league minimum.
Mr. FEHR. Let me perhaps explain it in a slightly different way.
There is a minimum salary which applies to play at the major
league level, meaning each day that you are eligible to participate
in a major league game, you are on that particular roster. If you
are on the 40-man roster, but not assigned to the major league
team-you are assigned optionally to the minor leagues-you have
what is known as a split contract as a generalized term, a minor
league contract and a major league contract. If it is your second
year or later on a major league contract, there is a separate, much
lower minimum salary that applies to your play in the minor
leagues. In your first year on a 40-man roster, there isn't.
Senator DEWINE. That gives me a general feel without taking it
further. But that has been good. I thank you both very much.
Mr. Fehr, one of the allegations that has been made, or statements that I have heard as I have talked to people about the agreement that you have reached, and subsequently this bill, is that
there will be a suit brought challenging the reserve clause in the
minor leagues and that your Players Association will make an attempt to represent the minor league players.
Now, I am not saying whether that is good or bad. I am just curious to know maybe what some of the unintended consequences
might be of this legislation. So I guess my question is, what is your
interest in the minor league players? There are an awful lot of
them out there.
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and a number of them will eventually become
major league players; by definition, the best of them, although, you
know, there are some players that fall through the cracks because
of the system.
Senator DEWINE. Right.
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Mr. FEHR. The short answer is this. I have long believed and still
believe that, sooner or later, some player or players will challenge
the amateur draft because it operates in an unfair and discriminatory manner and deprives opportunity that everyone else takes for
granted to, in essence, look for a better job, try and apply somewhere where your talents may match what the need of the employer is, and there are a lot of specific examples of that.
Whether we would help or support any such legislation would depend on how the Players Association executive board viewed it at
the time. I would tell you that we never have and there are no such
suggestions under consideration or have been. For purposes of this
legislation, however, I think both S. 53 and the suggested language
that we have negotiated with the major league owners-there is
one thing that ought to be made clear. We do not have an agreement on the amateur draft or anything like that, but what we have
agreed specifically is that we would ask the Congress to consider
legislation that would solve the major league problem and leave the
application of the antitrust laws otherwise, including to the minor
leagues and the amateur draft, to whatever they would otherwise
be, so that this legislation would not affect that judgment at all.
As a matter of fact, it would be irrelevant to consideration.
Senator DEWINE. Well, do you find it a little strange that we
would be in the situation-I mean, we all know the historical background of the antitrust exemption for organized baseball. Then we
are coming along here-and I am not saying I am not going to support this. I think this is the logical thing to do, but isn't there
something a little ironic about going in and saying, well, we are
going to remove the exemption for major league baseball, but minor
league baseball-we are going to almost carve out an exception
within an exception?
Mr. FEHR. I think the reason that I wasSenator DEWINE. I understand as a practical matter, that is why
it is happening. I understand that. I get that.
Mr. FEHR. As a matter of public policy, it has always been more
than difficult, virtually impossible, for me to rationalize the baseball exemption to the extent it applies other than by reason of historical accident for whatever that has been. I think the short answer is why the narrow bill that we are supporting-it is that, A,
those are the clients that I represent. B, that is what we were able
to get agreement on, and collective bargaining and politics both
deal with the possible. It is very difficult for me to make a logical
distinction as to why should have one and the other. I don't think
one can reasonably be made.
Senator DEWINE. Well, let me ask both of you a question, and
I am not proposing that we do this, but I am again just trying to
get some facts out here, or at least get some opinions out here from
the two of you anyway.
What happens if tomorrow, overnight, the whole antitrust exemption was gone for all of baseball? What happens to the minor
leagues? I mean, the statement is made by many of the minor
league owners that if that occurs, the minor leagues as we know
them will be gone, that they will not exist, that we will not have
as many teams as we have, that communities that have invested
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money in teams and have now built some ballparks and stadiums
with public funds will totally change. The numbers will change.
Mr. FEHR. The reason I was shaking my head a little bit is I get
wistful sometimes. I have heard such statements, too. Whenever
we have made inquiry, what is the mechanism by which these bad
results will become accomplished, there is no mechanism which is
ever articulated. I recall Bowie Kuhn, who was then commissioner,
testifying in 1976 in the original free agency proceedings that the
American League would collapse and the National League would be
down to six teams if we had free agency in Major League Baseball.
Instead, what has happened is you have had the greatest period of
prosperity ever.
In addition to that, we have a new professional baseball agreement which guarantees for somewhere between 7 and 10 years, as
I understand it, although I haven't seen it, at least 160 minor
league teams. I think the principal effect of your question on the
minor leagues, however, would be as follows. There would be a lawsuit brought somewhere and Major League Baseball would be
asked to defend that the minor league draft and the minor league
reserve system was a reasonable restraint, given the nature of the
industry. If they can do that, it will survive. If they can't, it will
change. To what degree, I think, is unknown.
But in any event, you have to have very large numbers of minor
league teams by which the talent progresses until it is capable of
playing at the major league level, unless and until the colleges are
prepared to substitute wholesale for it, and that is at the very least
some substantial period of time away.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Peltier, do you want to comment on my hypothetical, which is only a hypothetical, that if you would do away
with the whole antitrust exemption for all of baseball, including
minor leagues, what would I see in 10 years in the minor leagues?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think one of the things that you have to realize, too, is that each player that goes through the minor league
organizations is paid by the parent club. So to the extent that the
minor league owner has an interest in the team itself or in the individual players, it is only to the extent that it helps the team win
so that they can increase their bottom line.
I think what people fail to realize is that from a minor league
perspective, your major goal as a player is to get to the big-league
level. Especially at the triple A level, it is difficult in the sense that
you have no sense of team unity because everyone is trying to get
to the ultimate goal of playing in the big leagues. So to say that
it would destroy minor league baseball, you know, in its present
form, I think, is stretching it, you know, to the extent that minor
league baseball exists now for the fans because they want to have
some feeling of belonging to the major league club that their team
is affiliated with. But I don't think that-you know, with the
present scenario, I don't think that the antitrust laws would have
any effect in terms of destroying the minor leagues in their entirety
right now.
Mr. FEHR. I just might add I think the figures are that last
year-and I think the projections are for this year upwards of 30
million-33 million sticks in my mind-fans will attend minor
league games in organized professional baseball. That is a large7
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consumer base. One would think that that audience will be served
especially if you had a more free market. It is difficult for me to
imagine people walking away from the fans.
Mr. PELTIER. Something else, too. I played with the St. Paul
Saints, and the difference between the St. Paul Saints and any of
the minor league teams that I played for before is the fact that the
team, the Saints, own the rights to that player because that team
individually-the owner of the St. Paul Saints pays the salaries, so
they have more of a vested interest in the players themselves. You
know, I think that scenario works best in the sense that, you know,
now they have a vested interest and they are going to promote
their players as best they can, which in turn will help the team
and the bottom line and the community.
Senator DEWINE. That team has been very, very successful.
Mr. PELTIER. Absolutely. I mean, the profit that they have
made
Senator DEWINE. They sell out, don't they?
Mr. PELTIER. I would say 95 percent of the time it is a sellout,
and I think it is a reflection of how the team is structured and
what the purpose of that team is. You know, not disregarding the
fact that every player on that team wants to get back to organized
baseball, but the way that that team is run has definitely been a
successful way of doing things.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I appreciate the testimony from both of
you very much. It has been very helpful, and we will conclude the
hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1998".
15 USC 27a note.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league
baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that
major league baseball players will have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear
that the passage of this Act does not change the application of
the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.
15 USC 27a.

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as
a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth
in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply
a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws,
or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices,
or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level, including but not limited to"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized
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professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the
'Professional Baseball Agreement', the relationship between
organized professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues,
including ownership transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing
or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned
or held by organized professional baseball teams individually
or collectively;
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected
by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.) (commonly
known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(5) the relationship between persons in the business of
organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons; or
"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball.
"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue
under this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league
baseball player is"(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's
contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level; or
"(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or
"(3) a person who has been a party to a major league
player's contract or who has played baseball at the major league
level, and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to
secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an
alleged violation of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball
at the minor league level, including any organized professional
baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve
clause as applied to minor league players; or
"(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or who was playing baseball at the major league level
at the conclusion of the last full championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining
agreement between persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.
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"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated
association or any combination or association thereof. As used in
this section, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are
not 'in the business of organized professional major league baseball'.
"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
that directly relate to or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level and
also relate to or affect any other aspect of organized professional
baseball, including but not limited to employment to play baseball
at the minor league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
(b), only those components, portions or aspects of such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect
employment of major league players to play baseball at the major
league level may be challenged under subsection (a) and then only
to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level.
"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term
'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation of section
151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as amended).
"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly construed.".
Approved October 27, 1998.
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Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

REPORT
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 53]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill
(S. 53) to require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes, having considered
the same and amendments thereto, reports favorably thereon, with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and recommends that
the bill, as amended, do pass.
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The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1997".
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that major league baseball players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league players will have the
59-010
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same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage
of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context
or with respect to any other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICAION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment
to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall
be construed as providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the caselaw
concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
"(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to change
the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
by, between, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating in the business of organized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More specifically, but not
by way of limitation, this section shall not be deemed to change the application of
the antitrust laws to:
"(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the reserve clause as
applied to minor league players, the agreement between organized professional
major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball
Agreement', the relationship between organized professional major league baseball and organized professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating to professional organized baseball's minor leagues;
"(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by Public Law 87331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961'); or
"(4) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional
baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of
organized professional baseball by such persons.
"(c) As used in this section, 'persons' means any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association or any combination or association thereof.".

I. PURPOSE
The purpose of S. 53 is to clarify that major league baseball players and owners have the same legal rights, and are subject to the
same restrictions, under the antitrust laws as the players and owners in other professional sports leagues. As the bill expressly provides, it is not intended to affect the applicability or inapplicability
of the antitrust laws in any other manner or context.
As set forth in the S. Rept. 104-231, accompanying S. 627, the
"Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995," a bill that
was reported out of the Judiciary Committee but not enacted during the 104th Congress, the unfortunate baseball strike of 1994-95
reemphasized the need for Congress to clarify its intent to apply
to professional baseball the same rules of fair and open competition
that are followed by all other unregulated business enterprises in
this country, including other sports leagues. In short, other professional athletes and similarly situated employees have alternatives
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to striking specifically because of the antitrust laws.' It is the Committee's belief that the applicability of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball player-owner employment relations will significantly reduce the likelihood of future baseball strikes.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION OF S. 53
Many bills have been introduced over the decades addressing the
subject of baseball's antitrust exemption. During the 104th Congress, this Committee reported out S. 627, a bill intended to affirm
that major league baseball's owners and players were subject to the
Nation's antitrust laws. This bill, however, was not considered by
the full Senate during the 104th Congress.
On January 21, 1997, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond, and
Moynihan introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which was
virtually identical to S. 627 from the 104th Congress. On June 17,
1997, this Committee held a hearing on S. 53. The witnesses were
Donald A. Fehr, executive director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, and Dan Peltier, a former minor league baseball player. Mr. Allan H. Selig, chairman of the Major League Executive Council, and Mr. Stanley Brand, vice president of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., were also
invited to testify at the hearing, but did not attend.
B. THE

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

1. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS AND

PLAYERS TO SEEK ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

The 1990 collective-bargaining agreement between the major
league baseball players union and major league owners ("Basic
Agreement") expired in December 1993, subsequent to which the
industry, and the Nation, suffered through the unfortunate strike
that suspended portions of the 1994 and 1995 seasons, including
the 1994 World Series. After protracted negotiations, a new Basic
Agreement was finally signed in March 1997. As part of this new

agreement, the owners and players reached what was described by
both sides as a landmark pact regarding the applicability of the

antitrust laws to major league baseball. The parties memorialized
this agreement in article XXVIII of the Basic Agreement, which
reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and

cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will

clarify that Major League Baseball players are covered
under the antitrust laws (i.e. that Major League Players
have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other
professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players),
1As described in S. Rept. 104-231, the courts have developed a "nonstatutory"
labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football,Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996). Although courts and academics have disagreed on the precise extent and scope of this exemption,
it is clear that, at some point, the nonstatutory labor exemption ends and employees have a
right to invoke the antitrust laws. Like its predecessor S. 627, S. 53 is intended to clarify the
applicability of the antitrust laws in those contexts where the nonstatutory labor exemption does
not apply, and is not intended to affect the scope or extent of that exemption.
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along with a provision that makes it clear that passage of
that bill does not change the application of the antitrust
laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or entity.
2. THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

The sponsors of S. 53 continue to support it as introduced. After
introduction, however, the owners and players reached the abovereferenced agreement regarding the applicability of the antitrust
laws to major league baseball. Senators Hatch and Leahy subsequently made clear their willingness to substitute language designed to implement the intent of the owners' and players' agreement, believing that a bill which enjoyed both the owners' and
players' support would be passed expeditiously.
After considerable prodding from Senator Hatch, on June 12,
1997, the owners ratified specific legislative language, earlier
agreed to by representatives of the owners and the players, intended to clarify that major league baseball players have the same
rights under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes. This
language provided the basis for the amendment in the nature of a
substitute to S. 53, offered by Senator Hatch at the Committee's
Executive Business Meeting on July 31, 1997.
C. THE MINOR LEAGUES AND SENATOR HATCH'S AMENDMENT

The Committee has consistently sought not to adversely affect
the legal status of the minor leagues or minor league players.
Thus, S. 53 (much like its predecessor, S. 627) expressly states
that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect * * *
the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft of professional baseball, the minor
league reserve clause, the agreement between professional
major league baseball teams and teams of the National Association of Baseball, commonly known as the "Professional Baseball Agreement", or any other matter relating
to the minor leagues.
Notwithstanding this relatively clear language, Mr. Stanley
Brand indicated to the Committee that he still had concerns. As a
consequence, Mr. Selig stated in a June 16, 1997, letter to the
Chairman that, although the owners' Executive Council had formally approved the legislative language which ultimately became
the amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 53, their "support was tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL) has
concern as to whether the proposed legislation adequately protects
their interests."
Responding to this concern, when the amendment in the nature
of a substitute to S. 53 was marked up at the Committee's July 31,
1997, Executive Business Meeting, Senator Hatch offered an
amendment intended to clarify even further that S. 53 would have
no impact on the legal status of the minor leagues. This amendment stated that "nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
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providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the
caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor
league baseball," and was incorporated by voice vote.
III. VOTE OF THE COVMITTEE
On July 31, 1997, with a quorum present, the Committee on the
Judiciary ordered S. 53 favorably reported by a vote of 11 yeas to
6 nays, with Senator Kohl having recused himself. In compliance
with paragraph 7 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
the members of the Committee voted as follows on S. 53:
YEAS

NAYS

Hatch
Grassley
Thurmond
Sessions
Specter (proxy)
Biden
Thompson (proxy)
Feinstein
Kyl (proxy)
Durbin
DeWine
Torricelli
Ashcroft (proxy)
Abraham
Leahy
Kennedy
Feingold
Senator Hatch, together with Senator Leahy, offered a substitute
amendment to reflect the agreement that had been reached between major league baseball owners and players. This amendment
was agreed to by unanimous consent.
Senator Hatch offered an amendment to the substitute, to further clarify that this bill shall not be construed to affect the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote, with Senators Biden and Feinstein noted as having voted nay.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1 states the bill's short title, the "Curt Flood Act of
1997."
Section 2 states that the bill's purpose is to clarify that major
league professional baseball players have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to add a new section 27. New
subsection 27(a) states that the antitrust laws apply to actions relating to professional baseball players' employment to play baseball
at the major league level. Reflecting the Committee's interest in reporting a bill enjoying the support of both the owners and players,
subsection 27(a) implements the owners' and players' agreement
that major league baseball players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as, for example, do professional football and basketball players. The phrase "the antitrust laws shall apply" is intended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust
laws, as it now exists and as it may develop. Subsection 27(a) also
specifies that nothing within the subsection provides a basis for
any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
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S. 53 was specifically drafted so that it would not implicate issues or actions other than those specified in subsection 27(a). Thus,
subsection 27(b) makes explicit the Committee's intent that the
passage of this bill does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws in any other context beyond that
specified in subsection 27(a). With regard to contexts, actions or issues outside the scope of subsection 27(a) (that is, not constituting
"conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league level"), the
law as it exists today is not changed by this bill. The specific areas
listed in the four subparts of new subsection 27(b) are intended to
be merely illustrative of the areas and/or issues as to which the law
remains unchanged by this bill. The specific reference to the minor
leagues in subsection 27(a) is only intended to clarify that the passage of the bill will have no impact on the law, or the future development of the law, governing the applicability of the antitrust laws
to the minor leagues. This reference is not intended to provide any
inference or limitation regarding the scope of other issues and/or
areas as to which the law remains unchanged by this bill.
V. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. CONGRESS,

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1997.

Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has pre-

pared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of
1997.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be please to
provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Susanne S. Mehlman (for
federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector impact).
Sincerely,
JUNE E. O'NEILL, Director.
Enclosure.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
S. 53-CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997; AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON JULY 31, 1997

S. 53 would remove major league baseball's current exemption
from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and for decisions regarding
league expansion, franchise location, the amateur draft and broadcast rights, and employment relations with nonplayers, such as
umpires. By removing the antitrust exemption under these limited
circumstances, S. 53 would allow the players to challenge in federal
court certain conduct by the team owners. Therefore, enacting S.
53 would impose additional costs on the U.S. court system to the
extent that additional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does
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not expect any resulting increase in case load or court costs to be
significant.
Because enactment of S. 53 would not affect direct spending or
receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to the bill. S. 53
contains no intergovernment mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
S. 53 would impose a new private-sector mandate as defined in
UMRA by applying the antitrust laws to the conduct of owners of
major league baseball teams in employment relations with major
league players. As a result, the owners would be prohibited from
engaging in anticompetitive employment-related activities that are
now permissible under their judicially-created exemption from the
antitrust laws. Thus, if enacted, S. 53 would place owners of major
league baseball teams in the same position as owners in the other
major professional sports leagues by making their actions subject
to judicial review. In most lawsuits alleging an antitrust violation,
federal courts would review the conduct of owners under the "rule
of reason" standard and examine the economic consequences of the
action for its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Some conduct, such as collusion, would be per se violations of antitrust law.
Owners found to be in violation would be subject to treble monetary damages.
If enacted, S. 53 would represent an explicit reversal by the Congress of a portion of baseball's 75-year-old exemption from the antitrust laws created by the Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In that case, the Court determined that
baseball was not a business involved in interstate commerce and,
therefore, was not subject to the antitrust laws, which prohibit
anticompetitive behavior and unreasonable restraint of trade. In
subsequent legal challenges to the ruling in Federal Baseball, the
most noteworthy being Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court acknowledged that its 1922 decision was flawed, yet
it declined to overturn baseball's antitrust exemption on the
grounds that this anomaly should be rectified by the Congress.
Thus, the bill would impose a new legislatively-crafted enforceable
duty on the business of baseball, which fits the definition of a private-sector mandate in UMRA.
CBO estimates that the direct cost, as defined in UMRA, of the
private-sector mandate in S. 53 would not likely exceed the $100
million statutory threshold. Direct costs would be imposed on owners to the extent that they would have to employ counsel to defend
their actions against antitrust suits from which they are now immune. Moreover, baseball operates under a collective bargaining
agreement that runs through the 2000 season, and players have
the option to extend the current agreement through the 2001 season. Under that agreement players have recourse against owners
who engage in collusion on the terms of player contracts and can
recover treble damages through a process of binding arbitration.
Consequently, S. 53 would probably impose no direct costs from
1998 through 2000 or 2001 because no antitrust suits would be initiated while the collective bargaining agreement is in effect. Costs
in subsequent years are not likely to exceed the $100 million statu-
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tory threshold. CBO does not count possible monetary damages
that may be assessed against owners for antitrust infractions a cost
of complying with a private-sector mandate because CBO assumes
that owners would comply with the law's prohibition against anticompetitive behavior.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Susanne S.
Mehiman (for federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector
impact). This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VI. REGULATORY TVIPACT STATEMENT
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no significant
additional regulatory impact or impact on personal privacy would
be incurred in carrying out the provisions of this legislation. After
due consideration, the Committee concluded that enactment of the
Act would not create any significant additional paperwork.

VII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GRASSLEY, BIDEN,
FEINSTEIN, AND DURBIN
We oppose passage of this legislation for a number of reasons.
We advocate a comprehensive approach, from the fans' perspective,
to examining the problems in professional baseball. Most of these
problems would exist regardless of antitrust liability. Indeed, in attempting to solve baseball's labor relations difficulties by modifying
the antitrust laws, we run too great a risk of creating more problems than we solve.
Unfortunately, as reported by this Committee, S. 53, "The Curt
Flood Act of 1997," takes the potentially counterproductive step of
engaging in a piecemeal approach to the issues confronting baseball by addressing only the application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball labor relations. What is more, it is far from
clear that S. 53 even adequately addresses the labor relations
issue. Under current law, major league owners can unilaterally impose new labor conditions on players following the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Players then have two choices: (1)
accept the unilateral terms and "play ball" or (2) go on strike. This
bill is designed to give the players a third option. It would allow
players to sue the owners under the antitrust laws for unilaterally
imposing collusive and unfair labor conditions. We support the goal
of encouraging the owners and the players to resolve their differences at the bargaining table prior to Opening Day. But, it is far
from clear that S. 53 will generate the promised benefit of
strengthening the players' hand and reducing the likelihood of future strikes. For one thing, the bill says nothing about the nonstatutory labor exemption, which removes union members engaged
in collective bargaining from the reach of applicable antitrust laws.
In other words, if S. 53 became law in its current form, the players
may not be able to sue without decertifying their union.
We also believe that the ability of the players to sue the owners
is not the only issue in professional sports today. Other important
issues include league expansion and franchise movement, taxpayerfinanced stadiums, revenue sharing, player salaries, and fan access
to television coverage. Despite the Committee's efforts, we have not
addressed these issues, other than to say that this legislation will
not affect the current system in these areas. This legislation continues to leave fans vulnerable to major league franchise relocations
and broadcasting decisions. In short, S. 53 in our view attempts a
simple fix to a complex problem and risks further alienating the
fans and irreparably harming the national pastime.
We are particularly concerned about the consequences of this bill
for minor league baseball. The minor leagues legitimately fear that
if S. 53 becomes law without being modified to protect them, the
major league teams will discontinue their financing of the minor
leagues and look for an alternative to the minors for developing
(9)
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players. Minor league teams in our home States promote community-based and affordable events for citizens who for financial or
geographic reasons cannot attend major league games. Destruction
of minor league baseball, the sport for the fans in towns and small
cities across America, cannot be the effect of any bill we pass.
The proponents of this legislation argue that the current language adequately protects the minor leagues. The limited evidence
before the Committee does not support their argument. At a February 15, 1995, Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, the former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice, James F. Rill, testifying on behalf of
the owners, expressed the minor leagues' fears that removal of the
antitrust exemption, even on a limited basis, threatens to end the
major league funding upon which the minor leagues' viability depends. The reason is clear: the majors pay 100 percent of the salaries of all minor league players, managers, coaches, and trainersand supply five dozen baseballs per game-in return for the prospect of major league talent someday down the line. Without the
ability to reserve their players, major league teams will no longer
have assurance that they can realize their investment in minor
league players. Moreover, the current major and minor league systems are inextricably intertwined. Attempting to address the major
league separately in this bill may lead to extensive litigation and
ultimately prove unworkable.
This Committee needs to understand the relationship between
minor league baseball and major league baseball's antitrust exemption more fully before we pass this bill. Left unresolved, this issue
may generate more litigation, more lawyers' fees, and more uncertainty than we already have today. We hope that future consideration of this issue will explore more fully the intended and unintended consequences of congressional action in this area. And, most
important, we urge our colleagues to focus on how repeal of the
antitrust exemption for major league baseball would affect fans of
both the minor and the major leagues.
CHUCK GRASSLEY.
JOE BIDEN.

DIANNE FEINSTEIN.
DICK DuRBiN.

VIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 53, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law which would be omitted
is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman type):

UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 15-COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 1-MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 12. Definitions; short title
(a) "Antitrust laws," as used herein, includes the Act entitled "An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an Act entitled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes," of August twenty-seventh, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four; an Act entitled "An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes,"' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
and also this Act.
(11)
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SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing the basis
for any negative inference regardingthe caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrustlaws to minor league baseball.
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements by, between, or among persons
engaging in, conducting, or participatingin the business of organized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More
specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
deemed to change the applicationof the antitrustlaws to:
(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league players, the agreement
between organized professional major league baseball teams
and the teams of the National Association of ProfessionalBaseball Leagues, commonly known as the "ProfessionalBaseball
Agreement" the relationship between organized professional
major league baseball and organized professional minor league
baseball, or any other matter relating to professional organized
baseball's minor leagues;
(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
the business of organized professional baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or relocation,franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the relationship between the Office of the Commissionerand franchise owners;
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by
Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the "Sports BroadcastingAct of 1961"); or
(4) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals
who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons.
(c) As used in this section, 'persons" means any individual,partnership, corporation,or unincorporatedassociationor any combination or associationthereof
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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST
REFORM
TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1997

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Specter, DeWine, and Leahy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH
The CHmRMAN. We will call this hearing to order.
Clarifying that antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball is
something that will benefit sports fans across the country, young
and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican. As evidenced by
the interleague play, agreements being reached on long-term player
and minor league contracts, and the continuing on-field heroics of
players like Cal Ripken and Ken Griffey, Jr., we are witnessing a
historical period for Major League Baseball. I have only mentioned
a few of them, as you know, of the great heroes.
Senator Leahy and I believe that we should take advantage of
this opportunity to ensure that the coming years will indeed be
among baseball's finest by doing all we can to minimize the potential for more of the bitter labor disputes which have plagued Major
League Baseball.
Baseball has witnessed more work stoppages than all other professional sports combined, capped by the devastating 1995 strike
which led to the cancellation of the World Series and dealt a blow
to the hearts and loyalty of baseball fans from which the sport is
only now beginning to recover.
While there are, of course, different factors contributing to baseball's recently tumultuous labor relations, there is one root cause
about which we in Congress can do something. With their current
antitrust status, Major League -Baseball owners can, unlike the
owners in any other professional sport, conspire and collude without restraint-the precise practices the antitrust laws were designed to prohibit. They can take advantage of this unique legal position to gain leverage in their negotiations with the players and
their representatives.
Making it clear to the players, owners, and courts that the antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball therefore will not only
put baseball on a level playing field with the other professional
(1)
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sports, but will also put the owners on a more level playing field
with the players, and will thereby bring stability to labor relations
in this area. Players, fans, investors, municipalities, and ultimately
the owners themselves will benefit.
Thus, on the first day of this Congress, I, along with Senators
Leahy, Thurmond, and Moynihan, introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood
Act of 1997, which, like its predecessor, S. 627, simply makes clear
that Major League Baseball, like all other professional sports, is
subject to our Nation's antitrust laws, except with regard to team
relocation, the minor leagues, and sports broadcasting. It overturns
the Court's mistaken premise that baseball is not a business involved in interstate commerce, and it eliminates the unjustifiable
legal precedent that individuals who play professional baseball
should be treated differently from those who participate in other
professional sports. Perhaps most importantly, it helps ensure that
the 1995 labor dispute and the consequent cancellation of the 1995
World Series will never happen again.
[A copy of S. 53 follows:]
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major lague
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEANY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MoYNmIAN)
introduced the following bill, which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3

4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of

5 1997".
6
7

8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

4
2
1

"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 feet6

"(1)

the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional

R

baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-

9

ment between professional

major league baseball

10

teams and teams of the National Association of

11

Baseball,

12

Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to

13

the minor leagues;

commonly known

as the 'Professional

14

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

15

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

16

ball on franchise relocation; or

17

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

18

U.S.C.

19

'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
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et seq.)

(commonly known

as the
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When I first sponsored similar legislation in the 103d Congress,
Congress was told that baseball owners would never support it.
Today, for the first time, I am pleased to report that the owners
have not only pledged in the new collective bargaining agreement
to work with the players to pass legislation clarifying that professional baseball is subject to the antitrust laws with regard to labor
relations, but just last week reached agreement with the players on
specific language that would accomplish this objective.
While I and the members of this committee would like to examine this proposed alternative to S. 53, I think it is safe to say that
the most important impediment to passage of baseball antitrust reform has been eliminated, and that it is truly a momentous occasion when Major League Baseball owners have aligned in support
of such reform.
Given this recent positive development, I must say that I am surprised that the owners were unable to send a representative to testify at this hearing. We invited them and we expected them to be
here. I should note that on the basis of repeated assurances that
such an agreement between the players and owners was imminent,
I have, since the beginning of this Congress, repeatedly agreed at
the owners' request to postpone this hearing and committee consideration of S. 53.
I will not repeat the numerous such requests for more time to
which I have agreed, but I will insert for the record a chronology
of the relevant requests and delays at the owners' behest.
[The chronology follows:]
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

December 7, 1996-The owners and the players sign a memorandum of understanding, which deals with time-sensitive provisions to be included in the collective
bargaining agreement. A section of the memorandum calls for both the players and
the owners to work together to pass legislation that would give players the same
antitrust rights as other professional athletes at the major league level but that
would not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context.
January 21, 1997-Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduce
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997.
February 6, 1997-Representatives from the owners and the players meet with
Senator Hatch's staff to discuss the ongoing negotiations and the legislation. Senator Hatch's staff indicates that the Senator would like to place the bill on the calendar for the mark-up scheduled for February 13, 1997, recognizing that it will be
held over. The owners make clear that a final agreement is near completion, that
both sides are moving "expeditiously," and that legislative language reflecting the
memorandum of understanding would be drafted if the mark-up is scheduled. They
also indicate that agreement on language should be relatively easy. They ask that
Senator Hatch postpone mark-up until after the collective bargaining agreement is
finalized. The players' representatives indicate that they will be sending draft language to the owners and were ready to share these drafts with Committee staff.
February 7, 1997-The players' first draft is sent to the Gwners through their
Washington lobbyists and their negotiating team.
A Few Days Later in February, 1997-The owners indicate that there will be no
work on legislative language until the rest of the contract is completed and signed,
but completion will occur before the end of February.
Middle of February, 1997-Senator Hatch agrees to the owner request to delay
mark-up and a hearing for a few weeks, until the collective bargaining agreement
is completed.
February 20, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff meets with Stanley Brand, representative for Minor League Baseball, requesting that he communicate any proposed
changes to S. 53 either at the meeting or subsequent to it. Brand refuses to offer
any suggestions at that time or thereafter, and refuses to return staff phone calls
for over 3 months.
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February 28, 1997-Senators Hatch and Leahy send out a Dear Colleague letter
announcing their intention to move the legislation quickly.
March 11, 1997-A second meeting between representatives from the players and
the owners is held with Senator Hatch's staff. The owners' representative indicates
that pressure from Senator Hatch has helped to move the negotiating process along,
that neither side wants Congress to act on the legislation until the contract is completed and signed. The players state that since they have no idea when the contract
will be finalized, they will defer to Senator Hatch on timing, even if that means
moving the legislation before the contract is signed. They also offer two new versions of the legislation for the owners' review.
March 13, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee mark-up, with S. 53 on the
agenda, is postponed due to lack of a quorum.
March 14, 1997-The collective bargaining agreement is completed and signed.
March 20, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee holds a mark-up, at which time
both Senators Hatch and Leahy make it clear that they are tired of waiting and
want the promised language from the parties. Senator Hatch announces that the
Committee would mark-up the baseball bill after the Easter recess, and that he has
circulated a draft substitute amendment taken directly from the language of the collective bargaining agreement. He stated that the players support the amendment,
but the owners would not take a position on his draft.
March 28, 1997-Notwithstanding his refusal to work with Senator Hatch's staff.
Stanley Brand writes letter to Senator Biden, reqiesting his help in defeating S. 53.
and stating that he was "surprised to be asked to cure the bill's defects before Congress has conducted any study or review on its impact on grassroots baseball."
April 14, 1997-The owners and the players meet with Senator Hatch. The owners' chief negotiator asks for more time to resolve this issue and asks Senator Hatch
to delay Committee consideration at this time. When pressed on how long he needs,
he subsequently indicates four weeks. As a result, Senator Hatch announces that
he will move the bill to mark-up on May 14, 1997.
May 8, 1997-Owners agree to meet with the players in New York. Drafts are
exchanged.
May 14, 1997-This latest deadline is missed.
May 16, 1997-The players agree to language offered by the owners' representatives. After the players' acceptance, the owners negotiators indicate that this language will have to be taken to the owners to see if they can accept itEarly June, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff repeatedly requests-hearing dates from
owners, players, and minor league representatives. Stanley Brand agrees to testify
at June 17, 1997 hearing.
June 10, 1997-Senator Hatch announces that a hearing on S. 53 will be held on
June 17, 1997.
June 12, 1997-Owners sign new 10 year agreement with minor leagues and ratify agreement with players regarding legislative language on antitrust reform.
June 13, 1997-Senator Hatch sends formal invitation letters for June 17 hearing.
Stanley Brand fails to appear at scheduled meeting with Senator Hatch's staff. The
owners indicate that they will refuse to attend the hearing or any subsequent hearing until George Steinbrenner's suit against the owners for antitrust violations is
resolved.
June 16, 1997-Bud Selig and Stanley Brand write Senator Hatch Selig indicates
he will not attend June 17 hearing. Brand requests that the hearing be postponed
so that he can have an opportunity to draft proposed amendments. At 6 p.m.. Brand
meets with Senator Hatch's staff indicating that, contrary to his position 1 week
earlier, he will not testify at June 17 hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Selig has written me indicating that because

of a conflict, he is unable to attend today. I understand and appreciate his conflict, but one would expect that the owners could have
sent another representative in his stead, as we had requested.
Mr. Stanley Brand, representing the minor leagues, has also
written me requesting that this hearing be delayed, although assuring me that he would be prepared to provide specific legislative
suggestions later this week. I had intended to meet with him yesterday, but he was unable to meet with me. I had hoped that by
meeting with him, we might even have avoided this hearing, but
for some reason I couldn't get with him.
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Now, while I look forward to finally receiving Mr. Brand's comments, I must say that I fail to see why he cannot present them
today, especially given the fact that we asked for his views in February and that Mr. Brand specifically told the committee just last
week that he would attend today's hearing.
Moreover, given Mr. Brand's statement in a March 28, 1997, letter to Senator Biden that he was "surprised" to be asked for legislative input before the committee had conducted any study or review on its impact on the minor leagues, it now seems odd that he
is asking the committee to postpone a hearing until he has had an
opportunity to draft legislation.
That being said, it is, as I have indicated from the outset, my
sincere intent that any legislation we enact have no negative impact on the current law governing the minor leagues, and I truly
do look forward to hearing from Mr. Brand within the next week.
I would note that this legislation has always been aimed at
Major League Baseball labor relations, not at addressing any issue
regarding the minor leagues, and that S. 53 even states in express
terms that it shall have no effect whatsoever on the minor leagues.
To the extent that minor leagues believe this language unintentionally changes the law as it applies to the minor leagues, I will certainly consider their views. This is perhaps a subject on which we
will hear more from our witnesses.
Present with us today are Don Fehr, executive director and general counsel of the Major League Players Association, and Dan
Pelter, a former minor league player. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for making the effort to be with us here
today. I would also like to thank Senator Leahy, our cosponsors
Senator Thurmond and Moynihan, and Senator DeWine and other
members of this committee for their continued assistance in this
important issue.
This is an important hearing. This will be the one time we will
listen, and I have to say that we will listen to input from both the
owners and the minor leagues, hopefully, by the end of this week
one way or the other. But if not, we are going to proceed as best
we can, and so we will just see what happens from here.
There is nobody from the minority here, so I think what we will
do is begin with you, Mr. Fehr, and then turn to you, Mr.-am I
pronouncing it right, Peltier.
Mr. PELTIER. Peltier.

The CHAIRmAN. You bet. I appreciate having both of you here
and we will look forward to your testimony at this time.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DONALD A. FEHR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTORI MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK,
NY; AND DAN PELTIER, FORMER MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
PLAYER, HASTINGS, MN
STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEHR
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator DeWine. My
name, as you know, is Donald Fehr, and for more than a decade
now I have been privileged to serve as the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association. The Players Association, of course, is the labor organization that represents all major
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league players with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
and also, interestingly enough, managers, coaches, and trainers
with respect to some.
Before making my brief comments here this morning, I do want
to take a moment to thank and express the appreciation of all
major league players to the chairman and to the ranking member
for the interest that they have shown in this issue, the steadfastness with which they have pursued it during the tumultuous years
which have preceded 1997, the careful attention they have given
the various matters which have come into play, and perhaps most
of all to the chairman for his patience, especially over the last 6
months or so.
In November 1996, after just about 4 years of very difficult negotiations, including a very long strike, to which the chairman has
alluded, and a long period of negotiations after that strike ended
following an injunction issued pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act against the owners, we were finally able
to reach a collective bargaining agreement. It is comprehensive. It
is long-term. It will expire most likely at the end of the 2001 season, and it has built into it a number of provisions, the object and
purpose of which is to cause the players and the owners to work
together on a day-by-day basis to operate the game, to rebuild the
game, to reach out to the fans, one result of which, we hope, will
be that the next time we negotiate, the relationship between the
two parties will be fundamentally different than it has been at any
time in the past.
That is the hope, and we certainly have a large task in front of
us. There have been in Major League Baseball eight work stoppages in the last eight negotiations, dating back to 1972, a fair
amount of strikes and a fair amount. of lockouts. There has not
been a settlement without a work stoppage since 1970. Our task
for the next go-around is to make sure that that record is broken,
and broken with as loud a thump as we can manage.
In this new agreement, we have, to which the chairman referred,
also reached, in principle, an agreement on the antitrust laws. As
I think everyone knows, the major league owners have believed
that, at least with respect to player relations issues, they have had
a total exemption to the antitrust laws. And we have believed, and
I have testified on many occasions here, that that has been a principal cause of our ongoing disputes.
Simply put, what it does is give the owners an incentive not
present in the other professional team sports to attempt to effectively break the union. The reason that they could do that is that
if they would accomplish that, they then could set the terms and
conditions free of any restraint that would otherwise be imposed by
the antitrust laws. That is not the case and has not been the case
in the other professional team sports, and whatever else we can say
about those sports, they have had far fewer disruptions on the field
and the difficulty that such disruptions cause the fans have been
more often avoided than it has been in baseball.
I will not make an attempt to read my statement that has been
prepared for the record, nor to otherwise indicate my views on antitrust and sports, and baseball in particular. I think those views are
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well-known from my prior testimony. I will, of course, be pleased
to answer any questions about it.
Let me then turn briefly to the nature of the legislation at hand,
and in particular to the agreement that was reached between, the
players and the owners. Last November when we were concluding
the agreement, the players made it clear that they wished, at last,
to be treated under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes similarly situated, basketball and football players in the NFL
and the NBA being the most obvious examples.
The owners wanted some things, too, and-eventually we reached
a compromise which is reflected in article XXVIII of the collective
bargaining agreement. It is a very carefully drawn provision and
it says that the players and the owners will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that
major league players are covered under the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes similarly situated, along
with a second provision and that second provision being one which
hopefully will obviate any concerns that third parties have, and
that is that whatever the application of the antitrust laws is in any
other context or circumstance or with respect to any other third
party or parties that the passage of such legislation would not
change the application of the antitrust laws. It has the benefit of
not attempting to specifically define how the antitrust laws would
apply in any particular circumstance, that being left to such legislation that becomes law to interpretation in the event that there
is a dispute.
We then had a second round of negotiations which was conducted
sporadically, essentially, between March and late May, and the
purpose of that round of negotiations conducted principally between myself on behalf of the players and Randy Levine, who is the
owners' chief negotiator, on behalf of the major league owners, was
to see if we could agree on specific language that we could suggest
to the Congress be considered in order to effectuate the collective
bargaining provision to which we had agreed.
We were able to reach agreement. The players have adopted it,
and as the chairman indicated, we have been advised by Mr. Selig
that the owners have also agreed to the negotiated provision, and
I believe a copy of it has already been submitted to the committee.
I think if you review it, you will find that it is a very carefully
drafted provision.
The "Purpose" section simply replicates the language of the collective bargaining agreement. The substantive sections provide that
the antitrust laws will apply to the business of organized professional major league baseball acts, practices, or agreements relating
to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league
level, or, in other words, as the chairman summarized, labor relations at the major league level.
The remainder of the suggested language makes it clear that
whatever the law otherwise is in any context is not affected one
way or another by the passage of this legislation. We borrowed liberally, I think it is fair to say, from the provisions of S. 53 and
some of the other bills that were submitted by the chairman and
other Senators in the prior Congress to make certain as best we
could that we were accomplishing that goal.
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I do believe that a fair reading of this suggested language should
reassure any third party, be they the minor leagues or otherwise,
that the passage of this legislation would have no effect one way
or another on their rights under law as existed otherwise with respect to this legislation. It does carry a specific provision that says
that more specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section
shall not be deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
players, or the various agreements between the major leagues and
the minor leagues, as well as other exceptions relating to franchise
location, relocation, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and so on.
With that, I think I am prepared to conclude the remarks I
would like to give this morning, other than to say that the Players
Association and the major league players supported S. 53 and the
similar bills offered in prior Congresses, and still do. We have seen
a copy of at least one narrow amendment that was being circulated
to S. 53 which we also think is sound public policy and we support.
But what we are asking the Congress to do now, and all that we
are asking the Congress to do now is to enact legislation that will
effectively give major league players the equal protection of the
antitrust laws, and to do so in a way which will avoid, if the Congress so chooses, any of the other issues that swirl around antitrust
in sports and antitrust in baseball that can and have been the subject of so much contention.
I, of course, will be pleased to answer any questions that any of
the members have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fehr follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEIIR

Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy and members of the Committee, my name is
Donald Fehr, and I serve as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today.
This Committee has spent considerable time in the last four years studying antitrust issues as they relate to baseball. On behalf of all major league players, I want
to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Leahy for their interest in and attention to
these issues. My views on these matters are well known from my previous testimony
before this and other committees, and need no repetition here.
As has been often noted, over the last 25 years, there have been eight consecutive
work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) in major league baseball, more than in the
other three major team sports (football, basketball and hockey) combined. We believe that this results, in significant part, from the belief of the major league owners
that major league players, unlike their counterparts in basketball, football and
hockey, have no rights under the antitrust laws. Major league players have sought,
and continue to seek, the same rights under the antitrust laws as other professional
athletes similarly sitigated, no more but no less.
The importance of the antitrust laws to the collective bargaining process in professional sports is often misunderstood. It is not necessarily the use of the remedy that
is important; rather, it is the opportunity to resort to the remedy that matters. It
has been the desire to have an alternative course of action available to them, an
alternative course which would have a moderating influence on the bargaining process, that has been at the heart of the players' efforts in the antitrust area. As we
learned too well in 1994, the players effectively had only one choice: accept the owners unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment, or strike.i Unlike
IIt is, of course, possible that the Courts would now hold, as we would argue, that in the
current circumstances, major leaue players do have the protection of the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes. However, it is extremely unlikely that players would
forego their right to strike against the possibility of such a ruling.
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other similarly situated athletes, baseball players have no other alternative. And
unlike other professional sports team owner-, who know that their players are protected by the antitrust laws, baseball owners have believed that major league players do not have such protection, and therefore believe that if they can break the
union, the players have no recourse, and the owners can impose whatever conditions
they choose. That does not foster labor peace. Accordingly, major league players
have petitioned Congress to ensure that they have the same rights and protections
under law as do other similarly situated athletes. We are prepared to continue that
effort in order to avoid in the future what has been the seemingly inevitable disruption in the game every time we negotiate.
THE NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Many people were surprised to learn that there was any mention of antitrust legislation in e new collective bargaining agreement. With both sides knowing that
this effort would continue until either a bill was passed or the next work stoppage
was upon us, the parties chose to address this issue in the recently signed collective
bargaining agreement. Let me explain how Article XXVIII came to be.
The collective bargaining agreements in professional football, basketball and hockey typically expire at the end of the month of the championship season, which
means that bargining may typically commence some weeks prior thereto. In baseball, however, the collective bargaining agreements have expired on December 31
of the final year of the contract. As a practical matter, this means that individual
player contract negotiations for the next season begin before the contract. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that negotiations have not yet resulted in a new collective bargaining agreement, new individual baseball contracts for the following season are
signed under the terms of the expired contract.
This time around, the baseball owners sought the players' agreement to change
the expiration date of our collective bargaining agreement to October 31 of the last
year of the agreement, just after the end of the World Series. They believe that by
doing so, their negotiating position may be enhanced. Owners believe that an earlier
expiration date would give them time to.commence negotiations and, if necessary,
declare an impasse and impose new terms and conditions of employment for new
individual contracts for the following season. In the end, the players were prepared
to accommodate the owners' request, but only on the condition that they have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do the athletes in the other sports.
As a result, Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement was drafted. Article
XXVIII provides that the expiration date of the contract will move to October 31,
if legislation clarifying that baseball players have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do basketball and football players is enacted by the end of the 105th
Congress. If legislation providing that clarification is not enacted by the end of the
105th Congress, the expiration date reverts to December 31 of the final year of the
agreement. The players and owners were very careful to make certain that the bill
they would jointly support would deal only with major league player issues; the
scope and effect of the antitrust laws is not changed in any other respect In other
words, whatever the law is with respect to other issues or third parties, it will continue to be-this legislation will do nothing to change it.
The relevant portion of Article XXVIII reads as follows:
"the Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying
the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
passage of that bill does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or entity."
Simply put, the owners and the players reached an agreement to resolve their differences on the expiration date of the contract in conjunction with resolving their
differences on the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball players.
No other parties or issues are affected or implicated by this agreement.
LEGISLATION

Early in this Congress, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduced S. 53. That bill constitutes a much broader clarification of the application of
the antitrust laws to major league baseball than the bil contemplated in the collective bargaining agreement As was the case in prior bills, however, S. 53 made clear
that it was not to affect the application of the antitrust laws with respect to franchise relocation issues or the Sports Broadcasting Act, nor was it to affect "the ap-
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plicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agreement between professional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of
Baseball (sic), commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball Agreement', or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues."
We fully supported that bill, and continue to believe it to be wise public policy.
But the hope was, and continues to be, that the collective bargaining agreement recently signed will lead to the enactment of legislation relating only to major league
players quickly and cleanly, so that the owners and players can put this issue behind them and set their sights squarely on working together to repair and improve
the game.
I have been advised that a substitute amendment recently circulated to S. 53, apparently in anticipation of an early agreement to legislative language effectuating
the collective bargaining agreement, and to keep the process moving forward. That
amendment was taken virtually verbatim from Article XXVIII of the new Basic
Agreement. As such, we had no objection to it when it was originally offered, nor
do we now. It was the Association's hope, however, that to the extent the owners
and players could agree to legislative language that accurately reflected the intent
of that amendment, and which the parties felt comfortable supporting, the legislative process would be further facilitated.
To that end, and at the strong urging of Senators Hatch and Leahy, the Association has attempted to develop with the owners an acceptable alternative to that
amendment. On 16 May, 1997 representatives of the Players Association reached an
agreement with representatives of Major League Baseball on language that the
MLB representatives would take to the MLB owners for approval. My understanding is that they did so last week. Hopefully, by today, the Chairman has been advised of the owners' actions on this suggested language.
THE MINOR LEAGUES

In the past, the minor leagues have opposed all legislation to bring increased stability to the relationship between major league owners and major league players,
notwithstanding express language in each such bill stating that the bill did not affect the application of the antitrust laws as applied to the minor leagues. Although
never articulated in a manner that made sense to me, the argument seems to have
been, that if the antitrust laws applied to major league player relations, that would
somehow result in a reduction of the number of minor league teams that the major
league owners would siipport. This assertion is particularly hard to understand because major league players were essentially granted free agency by an arbitrator in
1975, interpreting the language of the standard player contract Player-owner talks
have centered on free agency in each negotiation since that time. Every round of
collective bargaining since 1976 has been a battle by the owners to reduce players'
free agency, and by the players to keep it It is not the protection of the antitrust
laws that matter, it is whether or not the players can be free agents. The position
of the minor league owners seems to me to be beside the point.
In any event, of course, the sponsors of S. 53 have gone out of their way to inaude
plain language in the bill insulating the minor leagues from the application of the
bill and thus giving more than adequate protection to the minor leagues. Stated otherwise, it preserves the status quo. To do nothing to address the continuous instability and disruptions in play in major league baseball in the face of such clear language protecting the minor leagues is illogical and ignores the interests of the cities,
millions of fans, and other workers in uninterrupted play.
Likewise, the agreed upon language considered by the major league owners last
week to effectuate Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement protects the minor
leagues because the language makes clear that, other than as concerns major league
players, the application of the antitrust laws is not changed. Whatever the law otherwise is, it remains. Thus, under both the express language of both S. 53 and the
language agreed to by player and owner negotiators, whatever the law is today with
respect to the affiliated minor leagues and their relationship with the major leagues
and minor league players will continue to be the law after either S. 53 or the proposed agreement is enacted.
The language of both these versions of legislation preserves the status quo to the
extent that existing law would otherwise allow. These proposals do nothing to
threaten the minor leagues. They deal strictly with the relationship between major
league owners and major league players. To paraphrase a famous former member
of this body, minor league owners 'ain't got no dog in this fight."
Recently, however, I have seen correspondence in which Stan Brand, lobbyist for
the minor leagues, accuses me of seeking the legislation in order to attack the ama-
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teur draft. If fact, he claims that I threatened to sue to overturn the amateur draft
when I was testifying some time ago on the House side. I would like to clarify the
record on this issue in three respects.
First, I do not believe that Mr. Brand's comments were addressing the actual language that became part of the signed collective bargaining agreement, and certainly
were not addressing the specific language we have recently agreed upon. Second
the question I was asked by a member of the House Judiciary Committee, well before the strike ended, much less the new agreement was reached, was whether I
thought someone would challenge the draft. I responded that I believed someone
would eventually do so, but clearly I was indicating that such a challenge would be
brought under existing law. This was neither a threat nor was it any great insight
on my part. Consider only that aspect of a system that requires that a young man
from Cleveland must enter baseball through the draft and negotiate the terms of
his employment with only one team, but permits a Cuban, who defects to the Dominican Republic, for example, to negotiate with any team. One cannot expect
American young men to ignore that situation. However, third, and most important,
this legislation does not affect the status of the amateur draft. If existing law protects the draft, it remAins protected even after the passage of this legislation. If existing law permits a challenge to the draft today, that right is unchanged by this
bill. Litigation as to the amateur draft would not be affected by the passage of S. 53
or the player-owner agreed upon proposal.
Moreover, my understanding is that the major leagues and the minor leagues recently reached an agreement on a new 10-year Professional Baseball Agreement
that would guarantee 158 minor league teams in 1998, and 160 teams thereafter.
In other words, the major league teams would be contractually bound to continue
to support all existing minor league teams.
CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by again expressing the appreciation of all major league players
to theF members of this Committee for their consideration of this legislation, legislation that we strongly believe is in the interest not only of the players and owners,
but also of the fans. We continue to support and are committed to seeking legislation to clarify that major league baseball players have the same -rights under the
antitrust laws as do other athletes. Hopefully you will shortly have before you language agreed upon by the players and owners, which we urge you to act upon favorably in the near future. And, in any event, I want the Committee to know that the
Players Association strongly supports both S. 53 and the more narrow amendment
pending before the committee.
Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peltier, we will take your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAN PELTIER
Mr. PELTIER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my
name is Dan Peltier. I had the opportunity and the pleasure to
play professional baseball at all possible levels for 8 years. I played
rookie ball with the Butte Copper Kings in the Pioneer League,
double A with the Tulsa Drillers, triple A level with the Oklahoma
City 89ers and the Phoenix Fire Birds, and I also played with the
Texas Rangers and the San Francisco Giants at the major league
level. I also had the opportunity to play in the independent Northern League with the St. Paul Saints. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to talk about my experiences and about the realities of
baseball in the minors from the players' perspective.
Before beginning, I would like to point out that I recognize that
I am one of the lucky ones. Unlike most professional players, I got
the chance to play in the majors. Currently, there are approximately 4,500 active minor league players on affiliated minor league
teams. Every year, the major league teams draft more than 1,200
new players, more than 1,600 players this year in 1997. So the
turnover rate is very high.
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As I understand it, only 1 out of every 10 players drafted even
gets 1 day in the major leagues. Only 1 out of every 100 actually
has a career in the majors. Moreover, when I retired, I had my college degree, a degree in accounting from the University of Notre
Dame. Many players are out of the game by their mid- to late 20's,
with a high school degree, a wife, children, and no marketable
skills.
There are a lot of myths about playing in the minors. People
think that it is the last bastion of professional sports where winning is all that matters, that economics are not as important as talent and the fun of the game. In reality, minor league baseball is
a tough business where failure is the norm and success is the rare
exception. Here are some basic facts.
First, the primary objective of every player in the minors is not
to have a winning season, to have the best team, or to be the
league champion. It is to play well enough to get off the team and
play in the major leagues. It is better to have a good season for a
losing team than to have average statistics for a winner. Rosters
are constantly changing and there is little chance to build team
chemistry or unity. Everyone in the minors--players, coaches, and
managers-have one thing in common; that is, to be in the big
leagues.
Second, no one gets -wealthy in the minors. Most baseball players
do not make in a year as much as Cal Ripken makes for one game.
In fact, most minor league players would love to make what I understand you pay your entry-level staffers. When I played rookie
ball, although I was under contract for a year, I made $850 a
month for 2V2 months. In double A, I made $1,350 a month, and
in triple A I made $1,850 a month for 5 months. Club house dues
and tips cost roughly $1,500 for the season, leaving me about
$7,500 before taxes. I have no idea how some of my friends who
were married and had kids were able to make ends meet.
Third, a minor league baseball players has very few rights. Baseball's reserve clause is very much like the indentured servitude of
the 1700's. When you first sign, you are owned by that team for
basically 7 seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to another country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you
if you get hurt.
A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for someone.else.
He can't try out for his home team. You have to play for the team
that drafted you even if they are loaded at your position. I got
drafted by the Texas Rangers after my junior year of college as an
outfielder. I also played some first base. When I was ready for the
majors, the Texas outfield included superstars such as Juan Gonzalez in left, Ruben Sierra in right, and Raphael Palmeiro at first.
I got the chance to play when Ruben Sierra got hurt, but was sent
back to the minors when he came back, even though at the time
I was hitting .385.
Under the standard minor league contract, a player is required
to waive all rights to appeal any action by the team in State or
Federal court. You can appeal to the commissioner of baseball, except there has been no commissioner for almost 5 years. In addition, you are pushed to leave college or not to attend in the first
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place and play in the minors, even though the chances are that you
will never have a career in the major leagues.
Oddly, if you are an American citizen, you have less bargaining
power than kids from other countries. Players in the United States
can only play for the team that drafts them. The only bargaining
power that some have is to stay in college. Players from other countries, such as the Dominican Republic or Cuba, are not subject to
the draft. They are free agents and can choose to play for the team
that makes the best offer. Because of this fact, teams from the
United States and Japan are signing players from Latin and South
American countries at an increasingly young age.
Perhaps most important, there is the mind set of the minors
which at best is a bit unrealistic. The longer you stay in, the fewer
options you have and more desperate you seem to get. You know
you are playing against a stacked deck, but in your heart you
firmly believe you are different, that you are going to be the exception. One's perspective of reality at 18 tends to be a little different
than one's perspective at 28 or 38.
Moreover, there is an incredible pressure to perform. You are always a day from being let go and there are hundreds of other guys
ready to take your place if you have a problem. At times, the minors seem to be a series of acts of desperation.
Given these facts, I think you can understand my surprise that
some want to stack the deck even further and create a new Federal
law exempting the owners' actions in the minors from the antitrust
laws. Quite frankly, what else do the owners need than what they
have already? What are the laws they must be able to break in
order to run minor league teams? How much more power do they
need when bargaining with an 18-year-old kid whom they own for
7 years, and what minor league player is going to jeopardize his
career by challenging the system? If you believe a player would do
that, then you really don't understand the mind set of a minor
league player.
Having played in an independent league, there are even some
differences between these two types of minor leagues. The Northern League was very similar to double A ball in terms of pay and
playing conditions, but there is a different atmosphere between the
team and the fans. The primary purpose of the St. Paul Saints,
which is the team that I played for, was to entertain the fans, and
that commitment by the team was mirrored by the commitment
from the community. Every game was a sellout. People came hours
ahead of the game for tailgate parties even though there was a
major league team literally only 10 miles away. The games were
more fun.
Despite these observations, I would not give up my experience in
playing baseball for anything. There is no greater feeling in the
world than the first time you get called up to the majors, and there
is also no greater low than the day that you get sent back down.
Knowing what I know, I would still do it all over again. The basic
fact is that you don't have to sign if you don't want to. However,
this obsession with making the majors should not be a justification
for the current treatment of minor league players, and I certainly
hope it would not be used as an excuse to give major league and
minor league owners a legal blank check.
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I understand that the legislation before this committee does not
address the minor leagues, however. It does not create any new
rights or delete any existing ones. It is only about the relationship
between the major league owners and the major league players.
Consequently, it should not be changed to award the owners with
even more power.
Before giving the owners an exemption for all of their activities
in the minors, I hope Congress will take the time to learn more
about the legal and economic realities of the minors, and not simply rely upon some of the current myths. Professional baseball
owners already have more power than they need, and certainly
more than they deserve.
Thank you for this opportunity and I will be happy to answer
any questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Peltier.

Let me make it clear that I said that Mr. Brand-I tried to meet
with him yesterday. He had an appointment with our staff yesterday and I asked the stAff to bring him over to the office so we could
chat with him because I had chatted with some friends who felt
that I should meet with Mr. Brand. He never showed up, so the
staff tried to get a hold of him all day long. Finally, just to note
for the record, Mr. Brand did express a willingness and desire to
meet last evening, but our staff wasn't in the office at the time, but
he did meet with some committee staff. So I wanted to make that
clear. I wasn't aware of that at the time.
Let me also put in the record a statement by Senator Charles
Grassley, and also an opening statement by Senator Jeff Sessions,
as well.
[The prepared statements of Senators Grassley and Sessions follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLEs E. GRAssLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA

Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my voice to this debate to emphasize the importance of Minor League Baseball.
As everyone knows, baseball is not just a favorite American pastime-it is part
of our American culture. We grew up admiring the accomplishments of our favorite
players and rooting for our favorite teams. We grew up perfecting our curve balls
and sliders, and wondering why our fast balls were never as fast as our heroes' fast
balls. I want my grandkids and their children to enjoy the same outing to the ballpark that I did.
But baseball wouldn't be basebal without the Minor Leagues. The Major League
teams would not have the pool of talent to draw from, and wouldn't have the training ground for promising players if it were not for the Minor Leagues. And, in my
part of the world, the Minor Leagues fill another very important role. The Minor
Leagues brings baseball to the towns and small cities. They bring baseball to my
state of Iowa, and to other states that do not have Major League teams. It doesn't
take a Cal Ripkin or a George Brett to make a city loyal to a baseball club. If you've
never been to a Burlington Bees game-or a Des Moines Cubs game, you're really
missing something. And you haven't seen fan loyalty until you've gone to a Minor
League game where so much of the town turns out for a game.
These are the reasons that I will continue to work to protect Minor League baseball. It is vital that any legislation passed by this Committee and by the full Senate
be in the best interest of the Minor Leagues. I commend the Chairman for his efforts in this regard, and sincerely hope he continues to work with the Minor
Leagues. For small town America, the Minor Leagues are baseball.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONs, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF ALABAMA

I would like to begin by thanking Senator Hatch for calling this hearing to discuss
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which, if enacted, would repeal professional baseball's 75-year-old antitrust exemption. I commend Senator Hatch for recognizing
that the legislation which we will be discussing today seeks to significantly change
the basic operating structure of "America's pastime", and for giving this committee
the opportunity to fully and fairly consider this issue. I would also like to thank
the witnesses assembled here today for their willingness to come before this committee to help us develop a clear understanding of the potential implications that could
result from any changes made to existing law.
Mr. Chairman, my home state of Alabama has a rich baseball tradition. On the
collegiate level one need only look as far as this spring's College World Series to
see that teams from University of Alabama and Auburn University were among the
participants. A third school, the University of South Alabama, came within one
game of being the third Alabama team in the College World Series, losing to eventual national champion Louisiana State University in the regional finals.
Many major league legends come from Alabama, and my hometown of Mobile has
an extraordinary record. Three of the greatest homerun hitters of all time, Hank
Aaron, Willie McCovey and Billy Williams were all from Mobile.
More than that, Satchel Paige, one of the game's legends, came from Mobile, and
as you recall those "Miracle Mets" please note that two of their outfielders, Cleon
Jones and Tommy Agee, were both Mobilians. These are just some of the many
major leaguers our state has produced.
Still, although Alabama has never had a Major League team, the minor leagues
have always been important. Mobilians still fondly recall "the Rifleman", Chuck
Connors, who played for the old Mobile Bears. And Birmingham hosted the entire
career of the most famous minor league player of all-time, the most well known athlete in the world-Michael Jordan. To most he is a Chicago Bull, but to us he is
known as a Birmingham Baron.
Minor League activity continues to grow within our state. Alabama currently has
three minor league teams, the Birmingham Barons,,Huntsville Stars and the Mobile
BayBears, which have all made tremendous contributions to the communities that
support them. Alabama's affection for minor league baseball has been reflected in
our teams attendance records as well, with Birmingham drawing 296,000 fans last
year while Huntsville attracted 255,000 fans. The new Mobile BayBears, in this,
their first full season of play, have already drawn 137,160 fans in only 31 home
dates. This support for these minor league teams has made itself known through
the mail and other communications that I have received in my office from individuals in the state who are concerned about this issue.
Repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is an issue of tremendous significance to
the minor leagues, and the potential impacts of this legislation on these teams
should not be overlooked. The importance of minor league baseball to small towns
and communities throughout America cannot be overstated. Many of these minor
league teams are located in states, such as Alabama, that have never hosted a
Major League franchise, and they provide their communities with unique social and
economic benefits that would not otherwise exist. My interest in this hearing is to
ensure that the concerns raised by these teams are fairly addressed and that the
actions we take do not unfairly damage minor league baseball and the communities
that support it. To this end, I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses
on this issue.

The CHAIRliAN. Mr. Fehr, could you share with us your views on
how repealing Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption will
improve labor relations between the players and the owners, and
what broader benefits do you think that this might lead to?
Mr, FEHR. I think there are a couple of things. Essentially, the
circumstances that when it comes to player relations at the major
league level, as well as at the minor league level-the owners are
organized in such a way so as to deprive players of any meaningful
bargaining power on their individual contracts. Their object is to do
that. The union's job is to try and negotiate a better system.
When we have a circumstance in which the antitrust laws are
not there as a safety valve in the background if collective bargain-
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ing breaks down, what we have is a set of circumstances in which
it makes it much more likely that the owners will be interested in
pushing that forward, as we have seen in the past, so that hopefully they can get to the point where they can determine without
any restraint whatever the conditions are. If they know that there
is a safety valve that, come what may, they can't act in a way
which would otherwise be deemed to violate the Sherman Act, we
think that that will temper bargaining positions, as it has in the
other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the players and the owners
have agreed upon specific language as an alternative to S. 53 as
currently drafted that both sides support. Can you summarize the
extent to which this language substantively differs from S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. I think the principal difference is this. S. 53 is a blanket statement making it clear that the antitrust laws apply except
where otherwise noted, and there are a number of exceptions to
which you referred at the beginning of this hearing. The language
that we are suggesting is much more narrow than that. It is an affirmative statement that the antitrust laws apply to labor relations
at the major league level without making any comment whatsoever
on the state of the law otherwise.
The CHAIRmAN. OK. Well, can you tell us what the advantages
would be for the committee to proceed with your proposed substitute language as opposed to S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. Hopefully, what that would do is allow the committee
to proceed to consider legislation in a much more simple manner
with a much reduced range of issues that are there, thereby allowing for a lot less controversy and hopefully a bill which can be
acted with broad support from all parties.
The CHAIRmAN. So I assume then; based upon your negotiations
with the owners, that you think it is fair to say that they would
support this language?
Mr. FEHR. Certainly, Randy Levine supports it. I understand
that the owners have agreed to support it, also. That certainly was
the intent of the collective bargaining agreement which they ratified.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you agree with me that the owners'
support is rather significant, and that that is, as far as I can see,
a momentous development?
Mr. FEHR. I think it is a very significant development. I agree
with you, Senator. It indicates at long last that they are prepared
to treat major league players the same way their counterparts do
in other sports.
The CHAiRMAN. Well, I will put a letter in the record sent to me
by Bud Selig, dated June 16, 1997. Let me just read one sentence
in the letter. It says, "First, the language negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball Players Association and the
Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the executive
council meeting and the legislative committee meeting."
He does say, "Our support is only tempered by the fact that our
business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, has concern as to whether the proposed legislation adequately protects their interests," and then mentions that "they
have contacted our office."
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I will put that in the record to express their concerns, and certainly we are interested in their concerns.
[The letter referred to follows:]
OFFICE OF THE COMM ISSIONER,

MA.Jon LEAGUE BASEBALL,
New York, AY, June 16, 1997.

Hon. OmuN HATCH, Chairman,

JudiciaryCommittee, U S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN: I am wnting to acknowledge your June 13, 1997. letter of invita.
tion to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, June 17, 1997,
at 10:00 a.m. Unfortunately, I will be unable to attend due to a previous long-term
commitment to the Boys & Girls Club of America. However, I would like to make
a couple of comments with respect to our recent meetings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, last week.
First, the lanplage negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the Executive Council meeting and the Legislative Committee meeting. Our support is
only tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), has concern as to whether the proposed
legislation adequately protects their interests. I understand that representatives of
the NAPBL have contacted your office to arrange a meeting to discuss those concerns.
Second, we announced on June 12, 1997, a ten-year agreement with the Minor
Leavues effective October 1, 1997. The Professional Baseball Agreement sets forth
a spirit of cooperation and commitment between the Major and Minor Leagues.
Third, we are reviewing our concerns about appearing to testify given that we
have been sued by one of our own member clubs in an antitrust lawsuit.
We look forward to working with you and your staff as the process moves forward.
Sincerely,
ALLAN H. SELIG,
Chairman,Major League Executive Council.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Mr. Fehr, your proposed language only addresses labor relations at the major league level, is
that correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the proposed legislation give anyone a right
to challenge the minor league draft or reserve clause?
Mr. FEHR. In my vi'ew, this is carefully drafted so that if this legislation passes, it would be irrelevant to considerations about the
status of the draft or the minor league reserve clause.
The CHAIRMAN. Does it address the minor leagues at all?
Mr. FEHR. It only addressed it to say that whatever the status
of the law is, this doesn't change it. Otherwise, it does not.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, do you believe that the minor league
draft or-reserve clause under current law are exempt from the antitrust laws?
Mr. FEHR. That is an interesting question. It has never been tested. I don't know whatThe CHAIRMAN. Do you think they should be?
Mr. FEHR. Personally, do I think they should be?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. FEHR. No, I don't think they should be.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Mr. FEHR. Major League Baseball operating the amateur draftand make no mistake, it is operated by Major League Baseball, not
by the minor leagues; as a matter of fact, all the minor league contracts are now signed by the major league clubs; they are not even
signed by the minor league clubs-effectively prevents any poten-
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tial baseball player from bargaining with more than one potential
employer.
It is not even like the Federal Government where you can apply
to a number of different agencies in a number of different locations.
You have one choice, and one choice only. We think that is fundamentally discriminatory. We don't know of any other place in
America in which we tolerate it. The amateur draft came in in the
mid-1960's. I know of no case in which it has been examined under
the antitrust laws. I can make the arguments as to how that would
come out either way. For purposes of this legislation, though, I do
want to emphasize that this legislation would not affect that one
way or another.
The CHAIR N. OK. Now, Mr. Peltier, let me just take a second
with you and then I will turn to Senator DeWine. You have given
us some very helpful insight into life in the minor leagues and this
will, I am sure, prove helpful as we consider further legislation.
As I have stated earlier, our pending bill does not in any way affect the applicability of the antitrust laws to the minor leagues
and, as I understand it, nor does the proposal agreed upon by the
owners and the players, as articulated by Mr. Fehr. But I suspect
that this is an issue that at some point is going to surface, and I
take it from your testimony that you would advise against changing the bill to insulate the minor league system from the antitrust
laws. Am I right in that?
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any minor league player or agent
who has challenged the legality of the minor league system?
Mr. PELTIER. Not off the top of my head, no, I don't. .
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that that hasn't occurred, why
no player has actually challenged this system?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think, you know, what you have to realize
here is that minor league players that aren't part of the 40-man
roster which is protected by the Major League Players Association
basically have no rights in terms of voicing their opinion. You
know, the thing that you have to remember here is that the urgency to get from a minor league level to a big-league level necessitates the fact that you have to first perform well. And, second,
you have to, you know, perform in the bounds of what the major
league team wants you to perform in.
The CHAIRMAN. So, don't cause any trouble, is what you are saying?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly, you know, and that is a big thing.
You know, you look at some of the players today, you know, and
you can cite numerous cases where they do cause trouble, butThe CHAiRMAN. And even though they are great players, they
never make it to the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely, absolutely, and one of the things
that you have to look at is, as I mentioned in my testimony, you
have to be in the right place at the right time. That not only means
talentwise, but also your personality has to fit that of the bigleague club that you are trying to make. And if that is not a perfect
fit, then, you know, you end up with the short side of the stick.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, assume for the moment that the antitrust
laws ultimately would be applied to the minor leagues either by the
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courts or the Congress. Were this to happen, do you believe that
minor league baseball would be destroyed, as some have suggested?
Mr. PELTIER. No, absolutely not. You know, one of the things
that I don't think people understand is that minor league owners
aren't the ones that pay the salaries for .he minor league players.
As Don sort of alluded to, the fact that when you sign a contract,
you are signing a contract of the major league parent club-because of that, you know, I think that minor league owners tend to
feel that, you know, they are not operating on fair grounds. But
they have to realize that what they get out of their investment in
minor league baseball is not something that is construed as bigleague baseball, major league baseball. It is an entirely different
market.
The CHARMAN. Well, you are no longer playing professional
baseball, right?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct.

The CHAIRmAN. Well, we have tried to have a current minor
league player come and testify, but we couldn't get anybody to do
it. Can you tell us any reason why?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that speaks volumes in itself that, you
know, I think guys are afraid to come out here and speak against;
you know, the people that are deciding their fate.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they don't want to rock the boat?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly. They don't want to rock the boat.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difference for the players and the fans
between the affiliated minor leagues and the independent league?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely. You know, one of the things that
I had the opportunity to do was to play for the St. Paul Saints in
1995 because I didn't cross the line and be a replacement player,
and what I noticed was that their whole existence is based on the
fact that the fans take part, you know, in the game itself. The way
that they have organized their organization was to make it more
of a family atmosphere and have the fans be part of the game.
As a result, yodi know, I saw things that I haven't seen since I
was a student at Notre Dame. The people were tailgating before
games on weekdays at 4:30 in the afternoon. We would have a
packed house. People really enjoyed going to the game not only because of the product that was on the field, but because of the entertainment that they witnessed.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Peltier, based on your experiences as
a minor league player, can you tell us what happens to a minor
league player if he has a career-shortening injury, such as torn ligaments or a torn rotator cuff or a knee or a shoulder that can't be
fully repaired? Can he be cut after sustaining the injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, he can. What the teams are bound to do is pay
for their medical bills, you know, in the event that the injury occurred while he was playing for that team. Beyond that, there is
no legal responsibility for the team to continue to pay him and give
him the opportunity to make it to the major leagues. You know,
there again, that ties in with the fact that minor league players
really do have no rights and they are not bound byThe CHAIMAN. So, basically, he is dead as far as baseball is concerned if he his a career-shortening injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Right, and that is a very real possibility.
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The CHAiRMAN. And there is no real help for him?
Mr. PELTIER. No, and that is what separates the major leagues
from the minor leagues. Don Fehr and the Major League Players
Association represent the players such that they are treated fairly,
and the minor leagues really have no governing body to that extent.
The CHAiRMAN. I see. I understand that you were let go by the
Texas Rangers after you refused to cross the picket line and be a
replacement player during the labor dispute in 1995.
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you please explain what happened, why
you refused to play?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, the reason why I refused to play is that I had
just been part of the Major League Players Association and felt a
responsibility to support the union. I realized that had I crossed
the line, I, in essence, would be admitting to myself that I don't
think that I could make it back to the major leagues on my own
volition. And, you know, as a result, I felt that it was an easy decision for me to make in terms of not becoming a replacement player
because of the fact that I did support the union and wanted to get
'back to the big leagues, you know, on my own.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, were any threats made to you?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, one of the things that happened in spring
training was they had all of the players that weren't on the 40-man
roster at the time-and a lot of the teams did this; some of the
teams didn't participate, such as the Baltimore Orioles. But at the
time when I was with the Texas Rangers, they had everybody come
down early from minor league camp in February and play together.
There were a lot of players there on the field and, you know, we
had normal workouts for, you know, approximately 3 weeks or a
month-actually, Around 3 weeks.
Then our general manager, who was Doug Melvin, called us all
on the field, with the exception of around 10 young prospects who
they felt would make it to the big leagues eventually on their own.
He called everybody over onto this one field and said, you know,
verbatim, "Either you stay and play or you go home. We are not
going to pay for your hotel. We are not going to pay for your ride
home. We want you to be a replacement player because this is
where the game is right now." So, around 10 of us got up and left.
You know, it was clearly evident as to what they were trying to
do, you know, just given the fact that they had these 10 prospects,
these 10 young prospects, separated from the mass so that they
wouldn't be affected by this and had to make that decision because
I think in their minds they knew that this would definitely have
some repercussions on the players who did decide to cross.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think that most players who are
drafted enter the minor leagues fully understanding what they are
getting into and have been given an accurate representation of
their chances of making the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, I think that as a scout or as an

organization as a whole, they try to paint a rosy picture and try
to make it sound as if everybody has a real good chance to make
it to the major leagues. In reality, that is not the case, as is evident
by the numbers that I had mentioned. But, you know, I think that
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they do try to make it-baseball is different from other sports, too.
Baseball does not use college as their minor leagues, whereas basketball and football basically do. So right from the start, there is
a pressure to enter the minor league level at a younger age so that
they can-you know, they can bring you along in their process as
they would have it. So this is a difference from these sports.
The CHAIRMA. Well, could you just describe maybe in a little
more detail the kind of pressure placed on high school and college
students to leave school and play minor league baseball by the
team that drafts them?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that the pressure exists in the factyou know, I can speak from my experience where, as a junior, in
going through the negotiating process once I was drafted, obviously
their desire was to have me sign and play professional ball right
away at the youngest possible age, OK, for the least amount of
money. So they used their tactics to try to get me to sign for as
little amount of money as possible.
Now, my feeling was that because I was a junior, I had an opportunity to play for Team USA. I had an opportunity to finish my degree on time. I felt it was important for me to make sure that playing professional baseball at that time was going to be the best possible scenario for me because I was putting a lot at stake, you
know, and the methods that they used to try to make me sign at
an earlier time for a lesser amount of money were such that the
scout came and said, you weren't picked until the 65th pick and
you want such and such for your signing.
So then my response was, so what you are saying is that you
view me as a number and not as a person. And, in turn, he said,
no, that is not the case, and then he said something as if, if you
don't sign, I am going to lose my job. Now I am a 20-year-old kid
and he is trying to use all these tactics to try to get me to sign.
Then there were comments made in my local newspaper as to I
would be crazy if I didn't sign, comments made by a scout who was
a national scout for the Rangers at that time, you know, therefore
putting more pressure on me by my peers and my family and everyone in the area.
So, you-know, there are definitely tactics that are used to try to
force kids to sign at a younger age. You know, they are trying to
do their job and stay within their budget, but, you know, only I
think to put a feather in their cap if they can sign the diamonds
in the rough.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. I think both of your testimonies
have been very interesting here today. Again, I would note that I
would have preferred to have had representatives of the minor and
major leagues here to respond and testify. It is unfortunate for
them that they aren't here represented, but we certainly did everything in our power to try and get them here.
So I wish we had some of their responses to some of this, but I
am not without some understanding of this myself. Having been
born and raised in Pittsburgh, PA, and watching the Pirates and
having been a Pirate fan all those years, I saw a lot of things happen that concerned me.
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Senator Specter would like to make a statement and then ask a
question or two of you, Mr. Fehr, and Senator DeWine has graciously agreed to allow that to happen, and I certainly agree.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator DeWine, for yielding to me for a few moments.
The issue of the antitrust exemption has been before this committee repeatedly during my tenure in the Senate, and we are
searching for a way that there can be fairness to all sides and baseball can be preserved as the great American pastime. My own basic
view is that the antitrust laws ought to apply to everybody, and I
have stayed with the baseball antitrust exemption really because
of an effort to preserve the small-market teams, one of which is
Pittsburgh. The Pirates have stayed in Pittsburgh, at least up to
the present time, and they are doing very, very well this season
with a very small budget, but their future is obviously precarious,
as are other small-market teams.
It has been my hope that in the controversy around baseball that
somehow the participants, the owners and the players, would come
to some sort of an agreement or understanding to preserve the
game. I think that necessarily involves revenue-sharing and salary
caps, or perhaps I shouldn't say "necessarily." Perhaps it can be
preserved without revenue-sharing and salary caps, but I do not
know how it can be done without those two features, and perhaps
more.
The Congress of the United States is not in a very good position
to tell people what to do about anything, and we like, in our free
enterprise society, for people to make their own judgments and the
market to prevail. However, baseball does have this great exerhption, which is historical, but they have it, and it has seemed to me
that the Congress might be in the position to exercise some leverage on the owners and on the players to work out some arrangement where the game could be preserved.
I personally still resent the moving of the Dodgers from Brooklyn
in 1958, and the Giants, and that fabulous baseball series on public
television was on again last night and talked about that again. I
think that there are major problems with the move of the football
franchises around, like the Cleveland Browns moving to Baltimore.
That is slightly different, but it is still in the same line. That draws
a response from Senator DeWine.
A few years ago, the Eagles were on their way to Phoenix and
that was stopped, and we had some really tough hearings here in
1982 with Pete Rozelle and Al Davis at the witness table when we
were trying to find some sense out of the move of the Raiders.
I read in the press last week, and I have yet to confirm the accuracy, that the "baseball commissioner," wants a new stadium in
Philadelphia for the Phils. Well, I didn't know baseball had a commissioner until I read it in the paper. I thought that they had an
acting commissioner, and there is a big difference between a commissioner and an acting commissioner. The paper said that permission had been given for the Minnesota team to look for new owner-
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ship and a possible move, and that might be in the offing for the
Phils.
I have a lot of admiration for Bill Giles and the Phils organization, but I am not too anxious to see the taxpayers pick up the big
tab on a new stadium. Our very distinguished Governor, Tom
Ridge, is looking at that with a commission, and Pittsburgh is involved and so are the Eagles and so are the Steelers, and who
knows what comes next?
However, it seems to me that in a sport which is as lucrative as
baseball, where there is as much money as baseball has, that someone there ought to be making arrangements where baseball would
pay for its own stadiums. I think that the kind of salaries commanded in a free enterprise system is wonderful, although we took
an initial step a few years back in denying deductibility for athletes' salaries over $1 million. We could do things like that under
our taxing power which would have a very profound effect.
I am not in favor of that, necessarily, but there is just a search
here as to what can be done to stabilize the game, something that
I have worked on for a long time. I recently retained special counsel in the field, Gilbert Stein, who is here today-he was one of my
top deputies when I was district attorney, and later president of
the National Hockey League, and very, very well-informed on
sports-to try to take a fresh look to see if we can be of some help.
So the question I have, Mr. Fehr, after that relatively brief statement, is what suggestion would you have, if any, as to some overarching principles that we might bring to baseball so that-when
I turn on the radio and listen to the Phillies, I can't tell who is at
bat because the players have moved around so much. I was at the
Phillies game on Sunday, a beautiful day and a big crowd, and the
Blue Jays were in town. We hadn't seen the Blue Jays since we lost
the Series to them in 1993.
What could be done to stabilize the game and perhaps provide
revenue-sharing, perhaps provide salary caps or, if those two factors are not to be done, to stabilize so that the small-market teams
stay and there is some continuity? This moves over into television
where we do have some greater authority with the Braves and
their television network and Ted Turner's big question, who wants
Rupnrt Murdoch to buy the Dodgers, and what that implies.
It is a very, very tangled web, and you have been in this a long
time, Mr. Fehr, and you are a very astute lawyer and pragmatist
and have a lot of experience. That is not a very concise question.
I feel a little like some of my colleagues, but what suggestions
would you have-to make it specific, what suggestions would you
have to stabilize the game?
Mr. FEHR. I will just open by noting that some people are hesitant to ask me open-ended questions, but let me try and respond
as concisely as I can. You have raised a number of issues.
I remember those hearings in 1982, to which you referred. I am
reasonably certain that I testified in one segment of them, and my
own views on generalized number and location and relocation and
franchise issues and funding of stadiums, which is directly related
to that, are well-documented in testimony going back at regular intervals over the 15 years. I will only respond to that issue by saying that so long as we permit effective cartel-like organizations
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that can control the number and location of franchises, it is not unreasonable to expect that they will act like cartels and utilize whatever leverage they have. The only way that is going to change is
if you have teams competing for cities, rather than the other way
around.
Second, and much more directly related to the focus of your question, the issues swirling around small-market clubs were in large
part responsible for the dispute that we had with the owners. It is
not, I think, an oversimplification to suggest that, fundamentally,
you had revenue-sharing rules in Major League Baseball which
were outdated by decades that the small-market clubs felt worked
to their peculiar disadvantage.
There was a generalized desire to reach a conclusion by which
they would be helped, but the question came down, where would
the help come. Our view was that how money is shared among
management is, if not anything else, perhaps the most traditional
management function there is. Ordinarily, when people come up
with a joint venture, they tend to write the rules as to how the
money flows as between the joint venture members, and as long as
they didn't rewrite those rules in a way which effectively destroyed
competition for players, they were going to be able to do that.
The owners as a group didn't want to do that because the largemarket owners' initial position in the bargaining, as is well-documented, was essentially that they would share, but only if player
salaries were reduced by amounts reater than the amount they
would have to share. Then they would do so. I would just refer you
to a congressional Research Service report in January 1995 which
documents what the positions of the parties were.
Having said that preliminarily-and I indicated in my prior testimony before you were able to come into the hearing that the new
collective bargaining agreement we reached last November, which
was finally drafted and signed in March, has quite a number of
new provisions in it. Principal among those, and to which I did not
earlier refer, are provisions relating to increased revenue-sharing
and certain restrictions on the payments of players.
I will be glad to provide you with whatever level of detail you
want on this. Essentially, it comes down to the following. Over the
next 5 years, the level of revenue-sharing from large- to small-market clubs--or rather small-income clubs-it is defined in terms of
income rather than market size-will go very substantially in
phases. In the initial years, there are certain taxes that would
apply to certain clubs if they spend over a certain amount on players. Those eventually go away as the revenue-sharing becomes
much more substantial.
In addition to that, in a gesture of what I consider, at least, to
be consummate good faith in an effort to rebuild the game, the
players have agreed on their own to kick into revenue-sharing in
1998 and 1999 exactly 2.2 percent of what their total salaries are,
which we expect to be several million north of $40 million. Virtually all of that will go to small-market clubs.
In the end, baseball has to have a system which provides adequate resources to the various teams. The definition of what is adequate and the determination as to who pays that bill were the primary subjects of our collective bargaining negotiation and, if the
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provisions we put in place are successful, hopefully will pave the
way for the future. If not, we will have that issue again the next
time.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr, for that answer, and we will be pursuing it. I appreciate your allowing me the
deference here. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine and Mr.
Chairman.
The CHARMAN. Senator Leahy, our ranking member.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being late, but I have been tied up with the land mine issue
on the floor, and I guess you have been discussing the land mines
of this whole baseball situation.
You know, Senator Hatch and I as sponsors of this legislation
have shown an awful lot of patience in affording the Major League
Baseball owners some opportunity to implement the agreement
they reached with the Major League Baseball Players Association
8 months ago and to support legislation to end what I believe is
baseball's unjustified exemption from Federal antitrust laws.
I am sorry that Senator Hatch's efforts have been taken for
granted. I regret that the baseball team owners have responded to
his courtesies by refusing to appear here today. Frankly, the baseball owners are still in hiding in refusing to appear before the U.S.
Senate. Mr. Selig is the seemingly permanent acting commissioner.
He has been commissioner longer than most I have known.
If he were here, we could ask him what about the unsettling authorization of the Minnesota Twins to negotiate to abandon the
team's fans in the Twin Cities? What about questions surrounding
demands for publicly-financed facilities in Seattle, Milwaukee, and
a number of other cities? We might ask him what about the Yankees' lawsuit against the other major league baseball teams which
implicates the applicability of Federal antitrust laws to the business of Major League Baseball?
We might ask him what is going on with the search for a strong,
independent baseball commissioner? It is sort of like "Waiting for
Godot" around here as we wait for a new baseball commissioner.
I am 57 years old. I would like to live long enough-and I come
from a family of long-lived people-I would like to live long enough
to see one. Then we would like to ask him questions about realignment of teams among baseball's division, or the question of revenue-sharing with small-market teams.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you have the patience of Job. Actually,
you have to to be chairman of this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you recognize that. [Laughter.]
Senator LEAHY. I want to give you credit, but not so much credit
that it hurts you back home.
There is strong public interest in baseball. In Vermont when I
was growing up, you were automatically, or you weren't allowed to
live in the State, a Red Sox fan. But now, of course, loyalties are
split among teams, among various sports. We have a successful
minor league team, the Vermont Expos, the champions of the New
York-Penn League. They begin their new season later this week.
We have a lot of businesses and jobs that depend on baseball, and
we have baseball fans.
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I just worry that the public is being short-changed here, Mr.
Chairman. The first legislative day of this session, you and I and
Senator Thurmond and Senator Moynihan cosponsored a consensus
antitrust repeal measure. Instead of prompt action and agreement,
we have been stalled by these people for 6 months.
I would just ask this one question of Don Fehr, who is here. You
remember when some Senators argued over the past several years
that we should not proceed to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption
during a labor-management dispute. Well, now, you have a 5-year
contract. That contract included provision for the players and owners to lobby for the antitrust laws to apply to labor relations in
Major League Baseball. Wouldn't this be the perfect time to pass
the legislation to repeal the antitrust exemption?
Mr. FEHR. As I indicated, Senator, before you came in, my views
on the exemption generally, what the effect has been, and how the
law should be in a perfect world are well-known. I have testified
to that many times and I don't have occasion to change those views
at all today. Simply put, the antitrust laws ought to apply universally, and I certainly don't want to presume to suggest to this committee or to the Senate or the Congress as a whole that with respect to matters other than those covered by our agreement with
the owners that they should refrain from considering whatever
measures that you deem appropriate, especially given all that you
have learned.
I can say for my own part that after these many years of difficulty and trial and tribulation, we have reached an agreement
with the owners in the specific area which applies directly to my
membership and people that I represent, and that is the measure
that we hope that you will act on favorably and act on quickly. As
has been the case in the past, I will be glad to provide you or any
other member of the committee or the Senate any other assistance
with respect to other questions that you might find helpful.
Senator LEAHY. I appreciate that.
I see Mr. Peltier here. I commend him for his courage in being
here because he may want to go back and play at this level. I think
the Blue Jays released Ruben Sierra this week. You look in pretty
good shape. They may be looking for somebody who used to hit
.385.
Mr. PELTIER. Hopefully, for more than a couple weeks.
Senator LEAHY. Well, I think you would do OK. Certainly, you
are better prepared to do that than anybody on this panel, with the
exception of Senator Thurmond. He has got his new baseball bat
from Chairman Hatch.
Let me ask you one question, and this doesn't necessarily have
anything to do with this particular hearing, but I am just curious
to hear your thoughts. We have the tremendous growth and success of women's sports following the college programs through title
IX. We have women's Olympic team victories, girls and young
women getting involved in soccer and baseball and basketball and
other sports. We have the Silver Bullets. We have stories about
women pitching in minor leagues.
Do -you see a time when women will be playing or coaching or
umpiring in the major leagues?
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Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, physically that may be the case
some day, but I think that the way that the minor leagues or the
major leagues exist today, I think it would be difficult, you know,
in the sense that the way that things have been established would
have to be changed to accommodate those needs because, obviously,
there would be different needs for club houses or showering facilities or things of that nature.
You know, if you are asking me a question of talent, you know,
who knows what could happen in the future? But I think thatSenator LEAHY. It is more a question of talent. I mean, all the
other things can be worked out.
Mr. PELTIER. Yes. I think in the future, I don't see why, you
know, you couldn't say if there is a woman that throws 95 miles
per hour and can get batters out, then she would be as deserving
as anyone else.
Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for doing this,
and again I commend your patience. You are truly a Latter Day
Saint.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is better than being a latter day liberal,
is all I can say.
Senator LEAHY. Oh, come now. Some of them are saints, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to the chairman of our Antitrust
Subcommittee, who has been very patient here, and I also want to
say that Senator DeWine has been a leader in this area, as well,
and we are looking forward to his work with us on this matter.
So, Senator DeWine, we will turn to you and I am sorry it has
taken so long to get to you.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank
you for holding the hearing and congratulate you for introduction
of the bill. I supported a similar bill, as you know, in the last Congress. Quite frankly, it is hard to come up with any logical or rational basis why baseball should stand alone with the antitrust exemption, and for that reason I supported its abolition in the last
Congress.
Let me turn to the issue of the minor leagues, which I think is
a troubling issue. First, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am also sorry
that Mr. Brand is not here today. We have in the State of Ohio
three minor league teams. We plan to have a fourth within the
next year or two in Dayton. We-obviously have two major league
teams in Ohio. So this issue holds more than academic interest for
me.
I have listened over the last few months to repeated statements
about what this bill or similar bills would do in regard to the minor
leagues, and people have told me that even though this bill is very
specific and says it will not impact the minor leagues, there still
have been a lot of comments that have been made about the fact
that it will have unintended consequences in regard to the minor
leagues. So I am sor that he is not here today, Mr. Chairman,
to talk about it. I think it is very difficult, frankly, to approach this
issue without a representative of the minor leagues here.
The CHmRMAN. Well, I do, too.
Senator DEWINE. I just think it is just a real shame. This is not
a new issue. This is not something that they have not had the opportunity to think about for a long, long time, and I don't know
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now we really approach this issue without a thorough discussion
about the minor leagues. I am going to have a couple of questions
for our witnesses in regard to that.
Let me also state, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is a shame that
the major leagues are not represented here. Bud Selig is not here;
the acting commissioner is not here. Again, I think it makes it difficult-to address this issue in his absence.
The CHARmAN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Senator DEWINE. I certainly will, and I understand you have
been very plain, Mr. Chairman, that you extended the invitation
and these issues have been out there in the open for a long, long
time. There is nothing new, but I think that for neither of them
to be here creates a problem for us.
The CHAiRmAN. If the Senator would yield, I think it is a problem. But on the other hand, what we are tying to do is resolve the
major league problems at this point and leave the minor leagues
alone. Now, if, in the future, we find that there is a disadvantage
or some major problem, we can work on that.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly understand that,
and I don't quarrel with that and I don't disagree with you. I don't
think you are wrong.
The CHAIRMAN. No. I know you don't.
S
a DEWINE. But we are still left, and I am still left with
statements chat have been made by minor league teams, statements that have been made by representatives of the minor
leagues, that even this bill leaves this open and that there are
going to be unintended consequences. I think it is very difficult for
me as a member of the Senate to deal with it. It is not the chairman's fault, but when people say there is going to be a problem
and then they don't come in and testify, I think that is just a real
problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree. If the Senator would just yield again, I
understand that, but again I want to just resolve this problem. I
was hopeful that Mr. Brand would be here with suggestions that
he would like to have.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I have also, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
asked for specific suggestions from Mr. Brand and we have not
been able to get any specific suggestions.
The CHAIRMAN. I know. We are in agreement. What I want to do
is turn the rest of the hearing over to you as the chairman of the
Antitrust Subcommittee because I need to get to Finance. That is
what I am trying to do.
Senator DEWIE. I will continue, then, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If you will, and if you will forgive me for leaving.
I want to thank you both for coming. I think your testimony has
been very accurate, very good, and very helpful to the committee.
We will just move ahead and see what we can do here. I want to
be fair to all people here, but it seems to me the major league problem is solved. There should be no griping about that.
With the minor leagues, we are happy to work with Mr. Brand.
I just don't want it to tie up the solution to the major league problems. And if there is an attempt to do that, then I have to say I
am going to be pretty irritated because I am willing to work to try
and resolve those problems in .the future. But this is something I
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would like to get done today, since the major league owners and
players have basically agreed. It seems to me there is no reason not
to at least pursue and complete that aspect of this whole set of
problems, and then to the extent that we have other problems with
the minors, we will be happy to work with them, and even hold
hearings and do other things that may be helpful there. But right
now, I would like to get this problem solved.
Thank you, and if you don't mind finishing, I would appreciate
it

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be more than
happy to.
The CHAIRMAN. Good to see you.
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DEWINE [presiding). Let me make a couple more statements and then I will turn to questions. As I was saying, I think
it is a shame that the acting commissioner of baseball is not here.
You know, some people may say, well, what in the world does the
U.S. Senate care about whether there is an acting commissioner or
a permanent commissioner, and what should our involvement be?
I think it is obvious that when we deal with antitrust, we have to
be directly involved. We have to be involved in resolving this issue.
I think, also, though, it needs to be pointed out that the public
has some interest in what goes on in baseball, not just as fans, but
we are seeing hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayers' money
put directly into stadiums today, into ballparks today. So it is not
out of line for Congress to ask questions about the health of organized baseball. I don't think it is out of line for any member of the
public or a Senator or a Representative to wonder, as we continue
to, why in the world the owners do not want a permanent commissioner, why they do not want a powerful commissioner, why they
do not want a commissioner with any power at all.
I think the answer is clear. The answer simply has to be that
they don't want anybody with that kind of authority. They want to
be able to control whoever the cominissioner is. They do not want,
apparently, or think it is in the best interests of baseball to have
a commissioner who has the moral authority of an independent
commissioner and someone who can make decisions in the best interests of baseball.

When Mr. Selig was testifying in front of this committee several
years ago, he told us that the commissioner would be imminent,
would be very shortly appointed, and we are still here today several years later and obviously there is no commissioner. Now, I am
not going to spend a lot of time today talking about the problems
that that has created, but I think it has created a great deal of
problems with the public perception of organized baseball.
Let me, if I could, turn to the issue of the minor leagues. Mr.
Peltier, you have raised some very interesting issues in regard to
that, and I think for me, as I was telling the chairman, it really
is two questions or two issues, and they are separate and distinct

in a sense. First, what are the unintended consequences going to
be of this piece of legislation, where we state that it is going to

have no consequences, but there is a nagging feeling that it may.
Second, maybe the bigger question, is what you have brought out
as to whether or not we should look at the whole antitrust issue
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in regard to minor league baseball. I think that is probably something that this committee should look at. We have a merger here
of labor law and antitrust law and a few other things, but it seems
to me that one of the kind of interesting things that we may end
up with is that we pass this piece of legislation and we may have
ended the antitrust exemption for the major leagues and we may
still have an antitrust exemption for the minor leagues, which I
find to be a little odd, that in all of professional sports we may
have one small class of individuals, and that would be minor
league players, who now we have exemptioned from the antitrust
laws.
I understand some of the practical reasons that are given for
doing that, but I just wonder as a matter of public policy whether
that is good or not. But I think those are issues probably for another day when we have the opportunity to have additional witnesses on this subject.
Mr. Fehr, educate me a little bit in regard to your union. My understanding is that a professional baseball team has a roster of 25,
but they have contracts for, what, 40? You have 40 major league
contracts on a team. Is that how that works?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. The system can be easily described in the following way. Each major league club can hold title to up to 40 player
contracts in its own name, and those are major league contracts.
We negotiate the form of those, and so on. They then can hold a
virtually unlimited number, subject to the number of minor league
teams they have, of minor league contracts, and those contracts are
now held in the name of the major league team, not the minor
league team.
Senator DEWINE. But you would represent only the 40, is that
right?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and there are certainSenator DEWINE. The 40 who would have signed a "major league
contract?"
Mr. FEHR. Yes, although there are certain terms and conditions
of employment when they are assigned to the minor leagues outside the bargaining unit for which we do not represent them.
Senator DEWINE. But, in general, it is basically 40 people?
Mr. FEHR. Right.
Senator DEWINE. So if I go to a Toledo Mud Hens game and look
out on the field, there may be some players out there who have a
major league contract, correct?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. Some of them may have a minor league contract. The rest of them would have a minor league contract?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. But they are all contracts with the parent club.
Would that be correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is the case now, yes.
Senator DEWINE. That is the case. So when I look out on the
field at the Akron Arrows, as I did the other day with my son,
when we watched a game-if I look at some of the players, some
of them you may represent and some of them you may not represent?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
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Mr. PELTIER. If I may say something?

Senator DEWINE. Yes, jump in. Please, jump right in.
Mr. PELTIER. One of the things, though, is that the players that
are on the 40-man roster that are playing in the minor leagues are
not bound by the terms of the major league minimum salary. So
even though the minor league players that are on the 40-man that
are playing in the minor leagues are represented by the Players
Association, some of the rules don't apply.
Senator DEWINE. When does the minimum salary kick in? Educate me further on that.
Mr. PELTIER. As soon as they make the major league team on the
active 25-man roster.
Senator DEWINE. So when you were brought up, though-and
you played, what, several weeks? Is that what I heard you say?
Mr. PELTIER. When I first got called up, yes.

Senator DEWINE. OK.
Mr. PELTIER. So my salary was prorated each day that I was up
there based on the minimum salary.
Senator DEWINE. So once you were called up-let us say the
Reds call up somebody from Indianapolis, for example. Once they
walked on the field, that is a day. That is prorated, then. Is that
how that works?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct, and then when they get sent back down,
their pay scale goes up, as well, to a minor league minimum.
Mr. FEHR. Let me perhaps explain it in a slightly different way.
There is a minimum salary which applies to play at the major
league level, meaning each day that you are eligible to participate
in a major league game, you are on that particular roster. If you
are on the 40-man roster, but not assigned to the major league
team-you are assigned optionally to the minor leagues-you have
what is known as a split contract as a generalized term, a minor
league contract and a major league contract. If it is your second
year or later on a major league contract, there is a separate, much
lower minimum salary that applies to your play in the minor
leagues. In your first year on a 40-man roster, there isn't.
Senator DEWINE. That gives me a general feel without taking it
further. But that has been good. I thank you both very much.
Mr. Fehr, one of the allegations that has been made, or statements that I have heard as I have talked to people about the agreement that you have reached, and subsequently this bill, is that
there will be a suit brought challenging the reserve clause in the
minor leagues and that your Players Association will make an attempt to represent the minor league players.
Now, I am not saying whether that is good or bad. I am just curious to know maybe what some of the unintended consequences
might be of this legislation. So I guess my question is, what is your
interest in the minor league players? There are an awful lot of
them out there.
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and a number of them will eventually become
major league players: by definition, the best of them, although, you
know, there are some players that fall through the cracks because
of the system.
Senator DEWINE. Right.
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Mr. FEHR. The short answer is this. I have long believed and still
believe that, sooner or later, some player or players will challenge
the amateur draft because it operates in an unfair and discriminatory manner and deprives opportunity that everyone else takes for
granted to, in essence, look for a better job, try and apply somewhere where your talents may match what the need of the employer is, and there are a lot of specific examples of that.
Whether we would help or support any such legislation would depend on how the Players Association executive board viewed it at
the time. I would tell you that we never have and there are no such
suggestions under consideration or have been. For purposes of this
legislation, however, I think both S. 53 and the suggested language
that we have negotiated with the major league owners-there is
one thing that ought to be made clear. We do not have an agreement on the amateur draft or anything like that, but what we have
agreed specifically is that we would ask the Congress to consider
legislation that would solve the major league problem and leave the
application of the antitrust laws otherwise, including to the minor
leagues and the amateur draft, to whatever they would otherwise
be, so that this legislation would not affect that judgment at all.
As a matter of fact, it would be irrelevant to consideration.
Senator DEWINE. Well, do you find it a little strange that we
would be in the situation-I mean, we all know the historical background of the antitrust exemption for organized baseball. Then we
are coming along here-and I am not saying I am not going to support this. I think this is the logical thing to do, but isn't there
something a little ironic about going in and saying, well, we are
going to remove the exemption for major league baseball, but minor
league baseball-we are going to almost carve out an exception
within an exception?
Mr. FEHR. I think the reason that I was
Senator DEWINE. I understand as a practical matter, that is why
it is happening. I understand that. I get that.
Mr. FEHR. As a matter of public policy, it has always been more
than difficult, virtually impossible, for me to rationalize the baseball exemption to the extent it applies other than by reason of historical accident for whatever that has been. I think the short answer is why the narrow bill that we are supporting-it is that, A,
those are the clients that I represent. B, that is what we were able
to get agreement on, and collective bargaining and politics both
deal with the possible. It is very difficult for me to make a logical
distinction as to why should have one and the other. I don't think
one can reasonably be made.
Senator DEWINE. Well, let me ask both of you a question, and
I am not proposing that we do this, but I am again just trying to
get some facts out here, or at least get somie opinions out here from
the two of you anyway.
What happens if tomiorrow, overnight, the whole antitrust exemption was gone for all of baseball? What happens to the minor
leagues? I mean, the statement is made by many of the minor
league owners that if that occurs, the minor leagues as we know
them will be gone, that they will not exist, that we will not have
as many teams as we have, that communities that have invested
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money in teams and have now built some ballparks and stadiums
with public funds will totally change. The numbers will change.
Mr. FEHR. The reason I was shaking my head a little bit is I get
wistful sometimes. I have heard such statements, too. Whenever
we have made inquiry, what is the mechanism by which these bad
results will become accomplished, there is no mechanism which is
ever articulated. I recall Bowie Kuhn, who was then commissioner,
testifying in 1976 in the original free agency proceedings that the
American League would collapse and the National League would be
down to six teams if we had free agency in Major League Baseball.
Instead, what has happened is you have had the greatest period of
prosperity ever.
In addition to that, we have a new professional baseball agreement which guarantees for somewhere between 7 and 10 years, as
I understand it, although I haven't seen it, at least 160 minor
league teams. I think the principal effect of your question on the
minor leagues, however, would be as follows. There would be a lawsuit brought somewhere and Major League Baseball would be
asked to defend that the minor league draft and the minor league
reserve system was a reasonable restraint, given the nature of the
industry. If they can do that, it will survive. If they can't, it will
change. To what degree, I think, is unknown.
But in any event, you have to have very large numbers of minor
league teams by which the talent progresses until it is capable of
playing at the major league level, unless and until the colleges are
prepared to substitute wholesale for it, and that is at the very least
some substantial period of time away.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Peltier, do you want to comment on my hypothetical, which is only a hypothetical, that if you would do away
with the whole antitrust exemption for all of baseball, including
minor leagues, what would I see in 10 years in the minor leagues.
Mr.-PELTIER. Well, I think one of the things that you have to realize, too, is that each player that goes through the minor league
organizations is paid by the parent club. So to the extent that the
minor league owner has an interest in the team itself or in the individual players, it is only to the extent that it helps the team win
so that they can increase their bottom line.
I think what people fail to realize is that from a minor league
perspective, your major goal as a player is to get to the big-league
level. Especially at the triple A level, it is difficult in the sense that
you have no sense of team unity because everyone is trying to get
to the ultimate goal of playing in the big leagues. So to say that
it would destroy minor league baseball, you know, in its present
form, I think, is stretching it, you know, to the extent that minor
league baseball exists now for the fans because they want to have
some feeling of belonging to the major league club that their team
is affiliated with. But I don't think that-you know, with the
present scenario, I don't think that the antitrust laws would have
any effect in terms of destroying the minor leagues in their entirety
right now.
Mr. FEHR. I just might add I think the figures are that last
year-and I think the projections are for this year upwards of 30
million-33 million sticks in my mind-fans will attend minor
league games in organized professional baseball. That is a large
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consumer base. One would think that that audience will be served
especially if you had a more free market. It is difficult for me to
imagine people walking away from the fans.
Mr. PELTIER. Something else, too. I played with the St. Paul
Saints, and the difference between the St. Paul Saints and any of
the minor league teams that 1 played for before is the fact that the
team, the Saints, own the rights to that player because that team
individually-the owner of the St. Paul Saints pays the salaries, so
they have more of a vested interest in the players themselves. You
know, I think that scenario works best in the sense that, you know,
now they have a vested interest and they are going to promote
their players as best they can, which in turn will help the team
and the bottom line and the community.
Senator DEWINE. That team has been very, very successful.
Mr. PELTIER. Absolutely. I mean, the profit that they have
made
Senator DEWINE. They sell out, don't they?
Mr. PELTIER. I would say 95 ercent of the time it is a sellout,
and I think it is a reflection of how the team is structured and
what the purpose of that team is. You know, not disregarding the
fact that every player on that team wants to get back to organized
baseball, but the way that that team is run has definitely been a
successful way of doing things.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I appreciate the testimony from both of
you very much. It has been very helpful, and we will conclude the
hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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Urd Stot

ectilest ecaclicable date. prociding

such

that ae
704'as) of the Ethics in Government Act findiogs of fast and conin
tf 1970 2 USC. 248Na) and 288r'tae1), the suffcient to inform the Cngress of the
Seiate may dir--ct Its counsel to defend the
Senate a civil actions relating to its official

pay cable channel. Former Basubali

Code,and report backto the Senate,at the Cossioncr

ature. exteni, cud ciirc
ages refereed to In such biii

Ueberrut

reportedly

abed cable operators If they would be

Interetted In exclusice rights to the
eitochampionshipscrie.

of the dama

The sports franchne ocners argue It

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin by
of aueh damages.
__________reason
RESLUTIO
SENAT;
SENATE RESOLUTION 169-FOR- r
MALIZING
MEMBERSHIP
ON 'SENATE
RESOLUTION
172-RE-

Special pric.ego In boing exempt from
the antitrust lawa. Baseball wan that
exemption in 1922 because it was then
regarded as a sport and not a business.
Although no one today doubts that big

a legal or co' is their buolneas what thy charge for
otble claim ogoinaf the United States or a the pricilege of watching their trais.
Resofred, That the Senate Legal Counel gratuity, ad the ount. If uy, legally ar
is directed to represent the Senate in the euitably doe from the United Statento the However those entrepreneurs enjoy a

responsibilities: Now,therefore, be it

case of Perkins v. United States Senate.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
LATIHO TO THE ANTITRUST
ETHICS
EXEMPTION NOW ACCORDED
AND
FOOTBALL.
BASEBAT.
Mr. WIRTH (fur Mr. MITCHEu., for
HOCKEY
himself and Mr. DoLu) submitted the
Mr. SPECTER submittcd the fellowfollowing resolution; which was conlog resolution: which was referred to
sidered and agreed to:
the Committee on the Judiciary.
8. Rs. 169
S. Rto. 171
Resolved,
Whereas basbal has enjoyed an anttrust
Serero 1. For purpose of matters relating
to the preliminary inquiries into the non- esemption aince 1922 when the Supreme

league spsrting events are a businessand big business at that-thc Congress
and the courts continue to allow the
sports entrepreneurs special exeinptions from the antitrust laws which
govern all other businesses In America.
Simply stated. if the spoots entropreneurs want to ron their businesses
without the special privilege of anti-

trust exemption, then let them do so.
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If. on the other hand, they want to
enjoy the benefits of antitrust exemplion, then, in my opinion, they should
show more concern for the public interest without extracting every last
dollar through pay TV and limitation
of franchises.
Baseball's indifference to Its fans
was demonstrated In 1958 when the
Dodgers deserted Brooklyn and the
Giants abandoned New York for Callfornia's megabucks When professional football teams like the Dallas Cowboys sell for $140 million and expansion baseball teams cost $175 million,
which includes the expansion fee of
$95 million plus estimated startup
costs of $80 Million. the focus of the
future becomes clearer More pay television is coming closer and closer into
view.
In addition to special consideration
which franchise owners owe fans arIsing from the antitrust exemption, in
my judgment sports teams are affected with a public interest, There is
something unique about teams for
hometown fans which has created
America's love affair with sports. My
own views have been molded by being
an enthusiastic sports fan as well as
my appreclation, as a lawyer, S)r the
property rights of sports entrepreneurs.

My personal perspective developed
from living in Kansas as a youngster
where the sports ticker tape each half
Inning and the morning box scores relieved the solitude of rural life. As a
city resident. I now regularly attend
sporting events and have been a
season ticket holder since the mid1950's. Anyone who sees the frenzy of
60,000 fans in an NFL stadium or the
passion of spectators for baseball, basketball, or hockey games knows that
the fan deeply feels a keen emotional
interest-arguably as important as a
proprietary interest-even though not
equally assertable in courts.
My populist views on Congress' role
in protecting America's sports fans did
not arise as a volunteer. In the
summer of 1982, Mr. Dan Rooney of
the Pittsburgh Steelers and then-Commissioner Pete Roselle asked for assistance in arranging hearings by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the
prospective move of the Oakland Ralders to Los Angeles. Senator SRson
THu ons. chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, promptly honored my reQuest and those hearings were held
within a few days.
Legislation was introduced to grant
the NFL authority to limit franchise
moves without violating the antitrust
laws. The NFL ultimately solved the
problem without the necessity for
such legislation but those hearings
opened a broader inqub y by the Judiclary Committee into professional
sports. When the Philadelphia Eagles
contemplated a move to Phoenix in
1984. Judiciary Committee hearings
contributed to abandonment of that
proposaL Later Judiciary Committee
bearings extracted a commitment

from then-Commissioner Rozelle and
the NF's current Commissioner Tagliabue not to have pay-per-view for the
Super Bowl until at least the year
2000.
Evidence Is mounting, however, that
the NFL is moving toward telecasts on
a pay-per-view basis. First there was
the NFL's decision in 1987 to take
some 13 games off ABC-TV and move
them to ESPN on cable, although It
did require ESPN to sell broadcast
rights to the game in the markets of
the teams involved in each game. Now
there are press reports, in particular a
February 24, 1991 article in the New
York Times entitled 'NFL Planning to
Add Pay TV to Its Package" in which
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
was quoted as saying that the NFL
was considering putting some games
on pay-per-view because "It's a fact of
life now."
These reports are disturbing because
the NFL has publicly guaranteed no
move to pay-per view for t)se Super
Bowl until at least the year 2000. If
ever, At a May 9, 1989, hearing before
the Judiciary Committee, then-Commissioner Pete Roxelle confirmed that
"the National Football League will not
embrace pay television before 2000, If
then." (Tr. at 73). Commissioner Tagliabue confirmed this commitment at a
November 14, 1989, hearing before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies. and Business Rights (S. Erg. 1011209 at p. 93).
According to media expert Jay
Blumer. the $100 million pay-per-view
business is projected to be a $6 billion
business by the end of the 1990's. The
NFL obviously wants a piece of this
action. While the recent actions by the
NFL are not an explicit breach of its
public promises, they Indicate the direction the league is moving and are
contrary to the spirit of their prior assurances.
Sports franchises are money-making
businesses and muc. of their value is
derived from the monopoly position of
the leagues, as evidenced by major
league baseball's expansion, franchise
price of $95 million. The June 19 Issue
of Financial World pegged the value of
the New York Yankees at $225 million, the Miami Dolphins at $205 million, and the Green Bay Packers, LA.
Dodgers, L.A. Lakers all at $200 million. Financial World reported also
that professional sports franchises
averaged o ; 2 percent in annual
appreciation -s .c-,t years, grossing
a total of receipts topping $3.7 billion
each year, $1.7 billion of which comes
from broadcasting fees.
Only 2 years ago, the Baltimore Ortoles team was sold for $70 million and
today Financial World estimates the
Orioles' value at $200 million. Other
recent sales show that limiting team
expansions can up the price of existing
franchises
The Montreal Expos
agreed to a sale in November 1990 for
a reported figure of $86 million; the
San Diego Padres were sold last year
for $75 million: the Seattle Mariners

A ugus t 2, 1991

were sold in 1989 for $16 million, the
Dallas Cowboys sold for an estimated
$140 million In 1989; the Denver Nuggets for $55 million in 1988; the
Denver Broncos for $75 million in
1984; the New Orleans Saints for $70.2
million in 1985; and the New England
Patriots for $85 million in 1988.
What is clear In all this is the harm
that the public will suffer if professional football games are available on
cable only. Apart from the extra cost
of pay-per-view on cable, there is the
simple matter of access to cable. According to Broadcast magazine and the
Televison and Cable Factboolk (198990 ed.), only 77.4 percent of households with televisons nationwide can
obtain cable if they want It. Only 58.6
percent have chosen to purchase cable
service. In Pennsylvania, 81.5 percent
of households with televisions could
get cable If they want It, but again
only 63.5 percent have chosen to sign
up for it. In other words, even if all
those who could get cable purchased
It, over 20 mIllion households with
TV's nationwide and some 1 million in
Pennsylvania would still be locked out
of viewing sports If this trend toward
cable continues. And then there is the
very real fact that, for many people,
cable and in particular, pay-per-view is
simply too expensive.
Most recently, professional basketball has joined the march toward payper-view. The Philadelphia 78'ers have
concluded a contract to have almost
all of their games broadcast by a premium cable network. Prism. Prism had
been broadcasting 76ers home games,
while channel 17 had been broadcasting away games. Thus, except for a
relatively few games, the 76'ers Will be
available only on premium cable eryice. Only 16 percent of the homes in
the Philadelphia market subscribe at
additional cost to Prism. Moreover, it
is estimated that one-third of the
homes in the Philadelphia television
market will be unable to see any 76'ers
games on TV. even if they could pay
for them.
On the issue of baseball, population
statistics decislvely show the Americans in 1901, when the American
League was fIrst formed, had greater
access to watching a baseball game in
the stands than they do today. In
1901. the population of our country
was approximately 78,212.168 and
there were 16 major league baseball
teams. In the National League in 1901,
there were franchises in Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia, Brooklyn. St Louis.
Boston. Chicago, New York, and Cincinnati. In the American League, there
were franchises in Chicago, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington.
Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia. In
all, in 1901. there were 16 teams for a
per capita of 4.763,298 people for every
team. If that per capita were projected
against the population today, the
United States, with a 1990 population
of 248,709.873. should have approximately 52 teams, nearly twice the 28
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baseball teams that the latest expandon would allow. Put another way,
today there are 8,882,495 people for
every team, in sharp contrast with the
figures of 1901.
Similarly. we can compare the population of a city with an American
Leage franchise in 1901 with cities
today. The population of Milwuakee In
1901 was 285,315. As the U.S. popula-

tion has increased approximately 3.3
sino
comparable
city
times since 1901, a times
today would he one with a population
of 941.539. By that test, every city that
was turned down for an expansion
team would have gotten a team In
1901: Washington. DC, with a metroPolitan area population of 3.923,574;
Tampa/St. Petersburg with a metropolitan area population of 2,067,959;
Buffalo with a metropolitan area pop:
ulation of 968,532; and Orlando with
1,072,748 people in its metropolitan
area. Included also would be such metropolitan areas as Phoenix, Portland,
Vancouver. Norfolk. Sacramento, New
Orleans, Indianapolis, Buffalo, Provideance. Charlotte, Hartford, and Salt
Lake City.
Some suggest

that having

many
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ed like any other business and bear
the full fore of the antitrust laws.
There Is obviously no way that Con
gress could or should regulate probessbus] sports However, a display of
congressional terest and the posolbility of our action to limit or rescind
exemption is likely to
antitrust
produce restraint by franchise owners
In moving to pay TV or otherwise
abusing the public interest. Last year,
a few congressional inquiries led to
settlement Of a dispute between the
nor league
Major Leagues and
owners. Hearing by the Senate JudicrY Commttee on the resolution to
limit or rescind antitrust exemptions
will provide guidance on the proper
congressional course on this Important
subJect It Is recognized that In addressing this Issue, there ace many.
many other matters of overriding us,
lions] and International concern, but
the American people have a love affair
with sprts and the American people
have contributed greatly to t
rea of sports franchises. At the
ther is a relatively limited
Public reaction to the moves to pay
TV. but tht will expand exponentialy if. as and when the World Series or
the Super Howl move to pay-per-vie.
In my Judgment. we have come to a
Point where It is worth the time o the
Congress to consider the implications
of Pay television and the limitations
franchises in proferaonal
new
iebsbl.Iand

more teams would diminish competition because It would bring in less
qualifIed players. I think people overestimate the effect that new teams
would have on the quality of players
just as some overestimate the effect
higher salaries
hihe would have on the
quality players baseball could atract.
Back in the "good old days," when sal173-ESthe multi-millionwad-frExelec,
mutlmuion- SENATE RESOLUTION
Inth
in
arisnotereno
aries were
Atio
S
T
dollar range, you had some of the alltime greats: Cy Young Pitching 7.377A
PEt,
STEIN CONGRESSIONAL
Innings and winning 511 game 'ogsttl(o
Walter Johnson pitching 5.924 innIngsP
(for Mr. HAm ) subMr. SMI
and winning 416 games and Christy
Mathewson pitching 4.789 innings and mitted the following resolution: which
winning 373 games. The skyroeleting %Vsconsdered and agreed toS. s. ill
increase in salaries has not attracted
n
ff
any greater talent these days: Pitchers
are still trying to break those old stading, communimtion, and coperaton
education
records. An Increase in the number of betweeo Congress and the Ie
teams should not have a negative mmmssty
Wharam5the scien ectou community
effect on the Quality of baseball any
i
ncludes a cadre of natmonalle
more than salaries have had a positive
secondary school scmmo, and
isIn
effet. Q~liY
effect. Quality
is in te
the idiviualoutstandIng
individual mathemativs teaches and
Whe-seadary arhool science and
player-it does not matter how much
he is paid or how many there are. maeasim teachers cn provide Insight
Indeed, a contrary argument can be into euetlan ograms tlot work efeche it
made that the addition of new teams Iheip So. tharer.
lts&-d.
would allow new talented balplayers
to come up who would not otherwise 8vM04,.nn~oenraoosAx
President pro lessrThe
(a) IN G
have a chance at the big leagues.
For many years, we on the Judiciary pore Of the Senate ar asthorised to estcr
Committee concerned about this issue into a ageenvet with the Triangle Coalland Technolo Education
have been assured that professional too for Scen
sports will act responsibly, that it willto establish an Albert Elatein Cos
not go the way of Day TV and that il t Feowthip Program referred to in dhe
fscal
fth
oid
Nill respond responsibly on the issue prorcent r
of expansion of sports franchises. But Year, beginning with fisca year 1N91 three
the evidence of the last decade, and in llmahipa within the Seate (refrred to Is
partieular the ctions of this year. thi cnncrent resolution an the insta
have convinced me that professional fellowships").
The President V
tb) roasmssports is bent on elevating their fluanof the Senate may enter ito the
ofthetempo",
exens of
Iat th
ci~lIntresz
rial interests
the expense
theand
Public's interests. If that is their atti- und fellowshipa as apecified in sectio 4(.
tude, and professional sports wants to onl ii th Trisic Coan
fo science
reuion l
be a. business, then it should be treat- and Technology Edu

(1) undertakes the application reoponlbil
ies refered to In sectio 2(.);
(2) partiiates to the vlati.. refenred
to In maotion3: and
( provide the fundiss for adminicirs
tion and evaluation coots referred to is
tin 4(h).
aC a 555.oO P5O"S
.-The Triangle Colitio
( Aec
Eduos
for Sence and Techoogy
hall pubicizetesot
-hpporn
t2) delop and administer an aPorlLO
process and
(31conduct an initlal screening of woOoant, for the fellowsip p arn.
.fhi Sso
The President pro temnare and the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of
the Senate. in onsultation with tbe chaimen and ranking minority parsy mees
of the Committee so Labor and Huma Baamoes Of the Senate and the Coittee ow
mmece Science. and Trasortation of
te Senate, shaB each select o of the Ic)
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t
n
e
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efrred
lbs oer
in esitlnt
lace referred
t
ma
anhoeerln.
It
shiP reripient on the staff of the Committee
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rient on the staff of the Committee on
Commerce. Science. and Transportation.
and om recipient may senseso the personal
staff of a membe of the Senate.
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Cdi acsa R
55mghe seleted from a pool of natlenoly
dce
Ostanding seodary school
)rd
The pool bh.ll
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lIr
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The Chairmen of each ommittee and
meme of the Senate referred to In sectios

20(h) and the Execue Direor o the Trangle Coslition for Science and Technolosl
calr, shal sbmit to the President o
trepore of the Senate an annua report
evaluating

the fellowship progras.
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the contineation of the progr
c

.

and
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vo.c,

(.) Psswa.
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under this subsection wfth respect to that
person.
"(C) Worm or necoer Awraonrr.Notwithstanding the Drevious provisions of
this paragraph. a court may walve exclusIve
authority to naturallse a person under this
subsection If the Adorney General has not
provided the court with notice of the approval of the person's application for natu.
rallsation within a reasonable time before
the date scheduled by the court for such
naturalisation.
"(4) issuance or
e
sEach
court exercising naturalization authority
under this subseetion shall provide for the
asuance of certificates of naturalization at
the time of administration of the oath of allegianoe.
(5) ELsasata oovars-For purposes of
this section, the term 'eligible court'

adding at the end the followng,
rtificate of otralizaton received by
any ek of court whiob may be defaced or
Injured In Such manner as to prevent Its
as herein provided shal In any moo be destrayed, but mcl certificate all be mturned to the Attorney GeeraV
14) Feet-Section 344 of Such Art'10
PRO. 1455) IS amened by-adding at the
end the following new Subsection
-M The Attorney General hal pay over
to courts atrlo
pe
uder this
e one-half of all fee, up to the sum of
$40,00. described in Subsection ast) collected by the Attorney General aIth respot
to persons naturalized by the repetive
coti during each fiscal year
(c) Errrva Oe-The amendmenis
made by this Act shall take effect on Ottoher 151
7
me!ants'
(for his
By Mr.
"(A) a Distriot Court of the United States
In any State, or
and Mr ADAw)'
"(B) any court of record In any State
& 172. A bill to snow Major League
having a seal, a clerk. and jurisdiction in ne- Bebal tems i smaller markets to
tlionsin law or equity, or law and equty, In
which the amount in controversy is unlimit- compete financially with teams in
ed,'%
larger markets: to the Conictee on
(b) Coroaxxx A
rs
s.the Judiciary.
(11 foa caanxa,-leton 33$(e) of such
so u
_cm,
on suosar
Act Is U.SC. 1447(s)) is amended by strik
.
today,
ing "as part of the administration by a court alonG
of the oath of allegiance under section
with Senator AII I amIntro337(la"and inserting "as part of the natu- ducist a bill designed to ensure comrallastion of any person by a court under petitive major league baseball actoo
section 510(b".
the country for many yews to come.
(2) Csrrstaam or IoTAzow-See
This bll will benefit tho smaller
uos 336 of Such Act 10 USC. 1449) IS market teams of major league baIso
amendedballl
of
are
a
(A) by inserting "(or. in the case of natuthese teams
facing a
rallsation under section 310(b), from the coot spiral that consists of okyrocketclerk of the naturalization court)" after log Salaries and ramnant free agency;
"Attorney General' the first place It ap. however larger market teams are able
Dea
illbyinsrtng'(o eer
to controt these cost spirals because of
(Bt by inserting "(or te
the clerk of e
their local broadcast revenues
court)" after "of an knmigration officer",
NwYr
ptmzsti
oi
ad
NwYr
eptmrsti
do
I
(C) by inserting "(or the court)" at
nance; the Yankees have a local cable
"Department of Justice".
television contract that will pay them
(3) Poerons or cnaas-Section 339(a)
5 m
a yea. Marge Schott,
of Such Act (8 U.S.C. 1450(a) is amended- owner of the Cincinnati Redo, recently
(Al in the matter before paragraph (1), by said, "We will not have baseball In
striking "that administers oaths of alle- small towns like Cincinnati. We can't
under section 337" and inserting compete with what New Yetk gets
"that naturalizes Demons under set oone from cable. Is going to be that base310(b)".
is only going to be In the big
) o eda ball
a
(B)byamoiaisrsasoi
cities."
15
follows
"(1) I-ue to each person admitted by the
Baseball in the national pastime, it
court to citizenship a certificate of natural- brings together the entire country.
zation and to forward to the Attorney Gen- Baseball allows Seattle to relate to Aeral within 30 days after the close of the lington.
, Kans
City. MO, and
month in which mc certificate was issued, New York, NY-three entirely
fer
tc
a duplicate thereof, and to make and retain
in the clerk's office a record for each certificate so Issued of all the essential facts set
Baseball is not only a unifying vleforth In Such certificate, and to forward a ment for the Nation, it in a benefit to
duplicate of each such record to the Attor- each community that has a major
ney Geneva) within 21 days after the rioss lague baseball team o- exampleo
of the month In which
certificate was Seattle the Mariners donate almost $1
Issued."
million in charitable contributions
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking "such an ouch as collectibles for auction$. free
oath is administered' and "oath was admin- tickets for Seattea schools, ant
latered" and inserting "such a certificate is
asued" or "certificate was Iasued". respecaking tours, This is not to mention
lively.
the additional countless hours that In(D) by striking "and" at the end of part dividual team members end with the
graph (3),
commIty's youth and participating
(E) by redesnating paragraph (4) a In charity events.
Paragraph (5),
Currentiy. the Seattle Mariners are
(F) by insertIng after paragraph (3) the In dire financial straits. This bill, howfollowing
new paragraphw
"aberpnobeforloallgblankparagtapwill not
4) be responsible for all blank certiff- ever,
the short
runsolvo
In their problems in
ca of naturaliastion received by them
from time to time from the Attorney Gene' Mariners In Seattle. the local busine
al and shall secount to the Attorney Gener- community and lust governmental
al for them whenever required to do as-", leaders must put together a combined
and
effort to save the Mariners It IS a

~
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local challenge which can only be met
in Seattle.
major league baseball is the only
mao
esonal spot league that
does not have a plan to Combat the
coot spiral, mentioned earlier, or this
economic sratIfIcation. The NFL
shar
all broadcast revenue equally.
and the NBA han a players',slary cap,
'Tis legislation Is necenanry became
larger and smaller market teams In
major league baseball. It sets out a
plan to rectify this stratification. This
plan Will redistribute local broadcast
revenue. Currently, each team is free
to negotiate its own local broadcating
contract and keep 100 petcent of the
Tll plan would uivide local
broadcst revenues of home games. 80
percent to the team negotiating the
contract and 20 percent to the league
te
iste
egu; amn the
tieam Incathedas
leag
endeIt wul
d
ca
t re
neo
games. 20 er
t to
ating the contract and 80 percent to
the league to be ditributed-equally
among the teams in the league In adetion, thin bi would require all
broadcast revenue gained from national cable bi-adcasts, be equally divided
the teams in the league.
mll
od
threesball
fallvt
ropy th is redtut
of revbe subject to the Soue antitrust laws
as the NFL and NBA
Mr-. President, I ask unanimous conSent thst a text of the bin be printed
n the Macnn following my remarks.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in the
an an follows:
Be If -acted by ft Sencis and Hoose of
eescfffe Or f~e Unted Sfoe of
Ascerfci is
o ooehit
Suc..s 1. This Act may be cited an the
"Major League Baseball Equity Act.
Sm 2. the Congress find thatlit Major League Baseball is becoming Ineonmi pwrf in temso
(2) the current tractice of gale eelpt
revenue sharing In both the American
Legue and National League also works in
the antitiv
ad
the
arge
ea and
the lrr
markets hate a competitive ad'
vantage over ether Major League Bseball
teams In their ability to negotiate favorable
Isdependent broadmoting cotracta
morrarrcos
Sm. 3. to tiis Act the tem() "antitrust Ia" has the meaning given
Sash term onder uretion 4 of the Federal
Trade Commssion Act Ill USC. 441:
(21 "Independent broadcasting contract"
means
entered
tlybyany'
orcontract,
on behalf
of a Into
MajorindependLeague
team for the transmission of one
ar mor games of that Major League Bae
ball team by means of television breadcaot,
cable television tlmlowfor
or radio
broadcast
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(3) "League" means the league of profes- Europe, the United States, ind to Stiner will Increase by at least one-third, and
aonal baseball teasmaknown as the Amercan Leazue or the league of professional
baseball teams known as the National

degce In jpM A major. if not the only to- possibility by as much as 35 percent.
c
In man S
I
plicalln Is aa ceedatock Inthe production Family
h
ao repot hg prieI
ofsecondarybutyilithinn
n
rc
eotdhg
aeas
T
g
planning
aily
large
One
creases.
ppicatos
(4)A
clinic in Massachuisetts reports that
ooabt-Ap~sie
14
Le
rLsseBsbl'
tsW~s.
sucoseSecondary
butyilithhico haa several limit- one manufacturer has Increased. in
5pupoc
4 Th o ths
ed sasplications, which ar sensitive in world price for a widely, Used antifungal
S 4. The purpose of this Act Is to Createythetic
ec rubber
ond btollrthum.wigtad
uh
is catalyzed And, secondary
cream by 01 percent The director of
equity within Major League Baseball, by of
butyl
the
opbutyllIthiet A major outlet fur this special reproductive health for the Mississippi
in
smaller
markets
providing teams
Department of Public Health etportunity to compete financially with the rubber is In shoe salesI
teas in the largermarkets.
.
dOther markets for these special purpose mates that the price hikD* will cost
scOuscusrusa sane-us
seancu
synthetic butyl robbers Include inection her program an additlonat$250,000 for
Bar. S. (al Any revenue generated Purse- molded parts, fur examople-aulomuobil trim oral Contraceptives atone.
ant in an independent broadlcasting contract IeUIcs desgediY
reduce eigtudtIU
cuh-em National Association of State
shauld be shared In accordance with thene- Ion im spacoeciltoy asiveftrou
anA
quire-enta of this setiti
butylrelitou
ss,srl
andScdr
drug
drgatins
wol
to
arsen
whc
eEdptDeconditions.
of
in the
r t ground
cls
ports that methadone Prices have douce
tsaeultofnthoaalry tansmtted
The polyethylene
indstry Inuergoing bledthinyear. These increases follow
that in party in such contract seen receice- mor changes a new highl strength, tear on the heels of normal increases jast
(1) as percent of the revenue fram the rsistant
tul1near w density polyethylene year of 40 percent for this essential
transmission of the home gnamesof that sn. Te
dru. A White House official Dr.Herteam and
their specially engintere properties t
bert Kiebar. Deputy National Drug
(21 20 percnt of the revenue from the ldrd fur serialapplications.Acommon e- Control Policy Director, has Warned
trasmission or gainea in which thot team in ample Is tear resistant twashbos which can that "This could eat up millions In
the vln
teenm.
be produced thinr, y
t
new treatment money a a35 An int) All other rocenue generated Puruant bos produced with polyethylene coh crease of this magnitude could have a
inseachcontract. Including all revenue from po
sp
lmaly
nationaytransmitted
cable tetevil, si
- major is
Impact onthe number of tiabe divided equallyamong the other
I Ofne seodry op hing a
a- tiente that could be treated."
the eague of which the contracting team Is
cPublic
Health Service Act clinics
ambee, Each League, hall establish - pcrted from Europe displacing nil, pero have the Worst Of both Worlds. They
rthe
deposit of revenue in which doed secondary butyllithu. This con- are notvable tohreceive the Sise din
this subsection appica and shalt' at reguiar potitive Catalyst systemco i mported wills count prices as Medicaid payers, and
Intervals, distribute the correct shares of 3.7%tariff duty,.
hyaebigfocdt
cetmc esti
Publcet
sDchreveoue.f
forNesY sfor himself lmager than normal price Increases for
eBy Mr.
recth
Mr. SimoN, Ms. Mcmutsr, andi Prescription drugs. Even these normal
Sec" 6. Ulss Major League BaseOil1has.
Increases for drugs have been
Mr. PRYnR): ,price
prior in the beginning cf the loss basebsall
rsuon,
establihed an Implemented a pro- m. 1729. A bill to amend the Public mo r than twie the rate of general in.
grass Under which any rerenue generated Health Service Act to require drug flatim-l
pusoans to independent broadcastingcon
manufactures to provide affordable
Thin bill will extend the Medicaid
tracts is shared inaccordance with setine 5 prices for drugs purchased by certain discount prices to Public Health Nersthe antitnst lows shall apply n Major
Act clinics. In addition, the bill atIce
public
entitles funded under the
League Baseball each Leugur, and i1
tempts to relieve excessive price in
Health Service Act. and for Other pauf
b1) teams
seball
t
i
of- te h e apome
to the Committee on Labor and eruses on the clinics by authorizing
By Mr. HELS
H1man Resources.
the Secretory Of I
to attempt to
S.1728 A bill to suspend untl teamsiistasis
ensl
e
tash r a wr
negotiate with the drug Companies to
try 1, 1905, the duty on secondarya
rAudcaCnUedAC o
u voluntarily restore the prices in effect
butyl chloride; to the Committee on
r KENNEDY, Mr. Presidents last before passage of the Medicaid drug
Finance.
Year, Congress required that dicount provision, indexed for Inflation.
ausrmmeaEacLaus
or.
shall establish
drug price made available by pharmaI want to
ke ofear that this legisreutiral manufacturco to certain fa- lation extends the discount drug prices
Mr. BHMS, Mr. President, today
purchasers ohould only to a short lint of grantet who
am Introducing legislation to extend cored large volu
through 1994 the duty suspension for elan be madc available to State Medic- purchase and dispense drugs to low
is
now Income individuals. net to all grantees
a substance called secondary butyleh- aid Programs. This initiative
Providing much needed financial relief Under the Public Health Service Act.
rride. Congrenian Cans BEenr
has likewise introduced a Companion to Medicaid white at the sae time Im- The Cngreswional Budget Office has
. 1is0 In the Houseon behalf proing access of our met vulnerable estiutecthat the rebate program will
bill t
save these clinics $0 milltion each
Citinens to needed drug therapies,
of MC Littco In sltonia NC.
Lat Years legi ation however, did year, This i real money to these probI . President, I ask unanimous con
sent that a facinheet explaining the not extend the discount to othcr grains that ae caught by rising health
nature and Uses of secondary butyl groups of purchasers who deserve It Care cost, but it is only a drop In the
chlord be Printed in the Relan at Public Hesth Service Act ciinin, uch bucket for the phrnaceutical indes
the conclusion of my remarc.
as Community and migrant heslth c - try, In a hearing before the Senate
There being no objection, the fact- Zera, drug treatment centers, family Committee on Labor and Human Reestimated that
sheet was ordered to be printed in the Planning clinics, and Ryan WiteI sources last year, It w Ms
RECss, as followa:
AIDS grantees, which also serve the the indstry spends over $5 billion
and
year
on
advertising
each
citizens
most
v
ailnrable
Nation's
FoccAnooo
oe
oteepomarketer
hsiea
con
Las ye
leisltion, hyowee mr im
Mr.Presient,"Ias unniou
Ufortunately to offset the os of ing alone.
Product name: Secondary Butyl Chloride.
The bill does net technically require
prof its from avileald drug manufac
Alternate19r4: 2Chutbutspen
Cham al formulc
a
secoa
turer have incresed their prices to drug manufacturers to offer discount
Impert
tariff
ciasoiniratlon:
m-ng uther purehaaera
drug prices to the clinics. Rather, the
2r.C.oW tariff r
Ct-assI
As a result. many Public Healthell slo of drugs to
Public Health
ServeCABregistry number 7 -coan
Service Act wlinice have reported l- Ice Act grantees is conditioned on the
b 10)ARy sorthe Cusen
nlfi nt price Increases In recent signing of a rebate agreement to proseoMdary butyl chloride has NIt
ciths
Community Health Centers vide discounts to the clinics. This is
plentisa and Ifnot considered widely used in Texn
hae een
to
o
te gr ame apprach taken by the md
commodity Wrld demand in primaily In fRDturer that prices foe their drugs icd rebate program
League and

~Is ~
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8. 500. A bill to provide that protsesioal baseball teamn and legues

slne
exetto
resolutionsge e
remov te
tem llb sbjecAtoteatitrbsif The oB. Ra .Alu ti
to the Committee
the
antitrust
L snd Senate resolutions were md. in
tt . Anit Mr.GAXoN. r.
Ths
lgt
o r. thOesadAt. or. refered (or acted upon). as inoitaeeb
.m.
WARPO
rWna
r to NS (fu r. M (fo i- P*O7OIA, RA1L AM, A
.
Bibl
dnd n
Lont. M. XIhl.
r. to utho s. ri . test
so e.
8. elf. 77.
OU
)
Wd.
r. President. I
e.Mr. iTn dnAU
DOT.
A G NS. MOr. INOCA.
B. M0LA bill b0 amnd theat mioftraa

laws;

nt

b

segos coaeposed of
bseebeLlWeax
noot
teand oalt Ae t to the sti

y. M olt (o hn

a

, r the J
AMuLm c

.dis rca
o

Mr.Buzues))t rise today to Introduce legislaion that
ei tReS O T sIbOS would remove the blanket wxemicoe
from the antitrust laws that major
aalo
gst a
rolutot on league baseali currently enjoys a
enlikeseedby
This
o Cbe ied and A. a

each inMueei, and
w
ls . SM. 7I . A soITion
I
Comtse of tne tited Natir.

Rameogr,

rtig p to
m. U.
eisl
1. Ui A ell to repeal the madealty 2 Ineru r
pertIs- t
a vithholding
dn eigible to.
N
i
toHoos dletrlbelScs e50ah are not felled
BY W0. IOOSEIZY-RliO
(for Mr.
0 t MeC en Mee
M ilrosime. prblem. (for biel
sa
BY Mr. liOCKZZMRm
(fer ehbuef
'.D")
. A resoltlo to
MadMr. wAbloathe od Rtet
o. 1t0 A bill to ad Ute ari A t of in y sod to aitbnrle- resentatlon b the
Seosts Lefal CO-5esi ooealdr~d and areed
th. esta.Mog amd 0105 e beero,.
w
i tr
for otser;
tUoaoe dsty proeioa and
reed
fSpeci
tot
poees; te the Committe Mraoe.

tors MA,
GeAA1o wllA , WA
lmt.
wu..
.,
tAMI
Hove i,=
d
r atd misy of Nebosia-i long overue

htIh

o

.ee

ttt-

The game of baseball has been a am
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&II this. it Is so Inconsistency and ii- have threatened to leave -their home
logic of long standing that Is to he cities and desert their loyal fans, onremedied by the Congress sod not by lea the pubhic subsidized the costs of
new tadlums. The players-especlally
the Court."
The bottom line is this: As a legal the minor league players-have been
matter, tho basis for baseball's anti- forced to accept restrictions on their
trust exemption is insupportable. The mobility as a condition of employment.
question is whether there is some over- Fans in some cities cannot follow their
riding policy reason to continue to teams closely unless they are willing
allow baseball to be totally exempt to pay for expensive cable TV channels.
from the antitrust laws. At a hearing And some baseball owners use accountin December held by my antitrust sub- ing gimmicks and transfer-pricing
committee on this lsce, former base- schemes to understate their profits in
ball Commissioner Pay Vincent stated order to increase their leverage in nethat baseball'd antitrust exemption gotiations with the players, the cities
should be retained only if "the owners and. ultimately, the fans.
Clearly, the baseball, owners do not
can justify the privilege of the special
shrink from playing the kind of tanstatus the exemption affords,
frmball you see in other busI agree with Mr. Vincent that base- cial
aseblis nth sow
estie That
els
h
bail
owuer mustis
by the
be m nd t na
uinterest
And I at
erption Is in the
t
ule
o thh
have come to
antitrust rules that apply to
"e
hncshocuso that te
I
businesses,
matt atthat
b oo m mite. ; F ay Vne nt
3
Aa ttust
tue bur- cother
one beow
m to sh w
l' e er fple
e
Baseball's owners will try to g
e
tatn
er a
as
en
will
hexemption
lk that removal of the
otui
h
telrlst owners
naialeg
cial status under the law to protect the throw the sport into chaos. Do not beInterert of the fans and preserve the leve it. At the hearings held by the
Antitrust Subcommittee. Fays Vincent
vitalty of our national onstier ste
they are acting more like selfsh tbsstid that, Baseball not eribuoly
std
erones of a billion-dollr business dependent on the continoation of the
which they believe belong to them ex antitrust exemption." He stated that,
e antitrust immunity baseball enluively.
For example, the ouster of Fay Vin- joys ts not essential'elther to the sonnomic health or the legal integrity of
cent was a ulear signal that any 1
bell com eissoner who placed the best the game."
interest of the sport ahead of tbe mt- No other professional sport ha a
nanclal interests of the owners would blanket exemption from the antitrs t
be out of a job. Chicago White eox laws. For example. both pro football
pro basketballsr subject to the
benodorf,
one of the key and
owner Jerry
Participante to Vincent's ostar, stated antitrust laws. Each Of those sports
that the Job of the next baseball com- currently enjoy better labor relations
missioner will be to 'run the business sind greater economo stability than
for the Owners, not the playars or the baseball, The Irony is that In bath Inetances, Improved stability and better
e w
umpires or the fans,
There the issue is summarised en- labor relations came about as a result
tirly. Baseball wants to be exempt of antitrut lawsuits filed okalnet the
frdomthe laws, They want to be exempt leagues by the players. The antitrust
from the ediclt of their own commis- suts forced the leaders of football and
basketball to restructure their labor
aloner.
The owners now tall us that they relations end financial arrangements
want a strong commissioner- Sure, be- In a manner that worked in the benefit
cause they hera that thee may be of the fans and the longterh Interest
some action In the Congress with re- of thoee sports.
That is a crucal point The baseball
spent to their antitrust exemption. But
their actions speak louder than their owners are a legly-soantioned cartel
words, Although they said they would which cannot be held accountable for
move Asickly to pick a new cmmls- conduct which hurts consumers or
"Ther, they ate nowhere close to pick- harms co petition. Giving the baseball
Ita replacement for Fay Vincent, Al- owners free rein to decide what is in
though they said that by November 1 of the beet interests of the game is like
Last ye-r they would redefine the do- giving the members of OPEC free rein
ties and powers of the commissioner's to st worid energy polcy.
g isome form of accountUnless there
os. they still have not met that
deadline. He It Is critical to watch ability, the interests of the crtel will
what the owners do, and ot what they aiweys take precedonce over the public
say, As one sportewriter commented: Interest.
I believe the time has come for the
"roton an the owners don't havea
strong commissioner now-or any oin- public to take back Its national pamissione-i because they fired the time. And the first step toward doing
last one because he was acting too that Is to put major league baseball on
the same iegal footing as other professtrong...
Vincent's Ouster was the latest In a slonai sports and other billion-dollar
series of events signaling that the dl- businesses. Subjecting baseball to the
and pro-consmer
moction sod fuoture of major league pro-comp,,titive
baseball are going to be dictated solely tests of our antitrust laws will impose
by the business interests of the owners. true accountability on baseball's ownIn recent years, a number of owners er.
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Let me address the chief argument
which basehall makes In support of the
exemption. At the Antitrust Subcommittee bearing. Bud Salig, who is
the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers
and the chairman of basehall's exeOtive council, testified that application
of the antitrust law would render
baseball impotent to stop franchise relocations. In other words, baseball argoes that the exemption promotes
franchise stability. but that lifting It
would prompt team owners to desrt
their loyal fans and move to greener
Pastures for bluer bucks and better
stadium deals. This argument distorts
both the fucts and the law, It really is
but an overblown sarestactic.
nothi
Look at the factse. HIesnt doss not
suggest that bseasl'eanlltrust exemption leads to greater frsnph eretbtility. Basebelln overall record on
fmnchis migration Is no better than
compled by
record
the
n
ct three
n the
n e fother
inuase
exbp
major sport-football, basketball; and
hackey, all of which are subject to the
have
tams
Many
laws.
antitrust
moved during the 70 yen in which the
been in eret, and a
exetptton baa
number of other teias have threatened
to move, Taxpayers in a number of
cities. Ave bean forced to cough up
millions of dollars in public subsidies
In order to keep their team from inovIg
The owners also have distorted'the
law
i by agsesting that the antitrust
laws do cat permit a aprte le ap to
impose reasonable restrictionsonriThey point to the
chlse relotionsi
fact that the Oakland Raiders brought
successful antitrust challenge
a
against the NFL' effort to stop their
movement to Los Angles But the
baseball owners have mIspresented
the oidra cae. The court which decded that case has made it clear that
the antitrust laws do permit s sports
league to impose reasonable restrioe on franchise relocation. Even Far
Vincent admitted that If the antitrust
law applied, the owners "could construct approval conditions and terms
nder which baseball could prevent mlgration [in a manner that would be egaly validm"
n
Moreover, the evidence suggest that
basbas antitrust exemption actually
promoes franchise Instaeblity. A nure
bar of witnaest who testified before
the Antitrust Subcommittee stated
that the baseball owners deliberately
mantin an artifical scarcity of franteam ravechises it order to mais
noes and maintain their leverage with
the citis. A scarcity of franchises inGlates the resale value of existing
teams and Increases each owanr's har,
of baseball's national broadcasting refenue.-It also enables owners to squeeze
concessions and subsidies from their
home clties by threatening relocation
to another city which In eager for a
franchise.
Fans In Tampa, Bay, Washington, DC.
Phoenlx, and other compunities. are
eager to have the national pastime
played in their city. But It is more
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To gle a little history. Mr. PreeiThe San Francisco community has and nake progress In one of its weakdent, In 1M22,in a case entitled Federal been asked on fou occasions to build a eat Ares." But the Owners blew It.
Beaseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. versus new stadium to replace what, by all
As Boswell pointed out, "a reel comNational League of Professional Base- standards. is the least adequate najor missioner would have known It." But
ball Clubs, the Supreme Court ruled league baseball park in Amerlot On the owners wore too arrogant to want a
that major league baseball was not four occasions, voters In the San Fran- real coumisloner. They are not interinterstate commerce and therefore was Oeco Bay area have aid, no, they sated In the beat interets of baseball.
exempt from the Sherman Antitrust would not support the building of a They are Interested in the beet InterAct At that time, baseball was consid- new stadium. S= Franciso's attend- eats of themselves.
erd a game, not a business.
floe answer baa dropped by 25 percent
Mr. President, major league baseball
This court-created
exemption was since IM. Last year it had the second haa bad at lest three strikes It has
t
never pu into law by Congress or ax- lowest attendance per game to the Ba- nised the ball. For the" reasons, our
of the ex.
legislation revisits the Is
panded to other professional sports. tional League.
The 1922decision on baseball Is part of
In that context, the Tampa Say coremptiun. Our bill reverses the Supreme
the American psyche. It is just like munity has sold more than 31.00 sa- Court decision, and in doing so. the logapple pie. Baseball holds a uniQue pub- ann tickets for their new te
in a islatlon which we am Introducing
le trust, and since the ruling, has been medern stadium. In spite of that, today applies the Federal antitrust law
untouched by Federal antimonopoly major league baseball rejected Tampa in organised professional baseball.
laws.
Bays higher offer, using Its antitrust
It Is Interesting that Justice Holmee,
Mr. President. the rationale for base- exemption as the oasis of oing so.
In a law review article which preceded
ball's antitrust exemption is gone. to
But the treatment of Communities the baseball decision, speaking on the
1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that am able and desirous of having general principle of jurloprudecs. araid baseball games were "purely State major league franchisee is not the only ticulated the boot rason for our loglaaffair"-teams traveled to other rason why the antitrust exemption lation when he mid:
States for games, but this was not has become an Anachronism.
It Is revlng to bs so beter reamocfor
enough to equal interstate commerce.
The pour handling of baseball Cor- a mis than In Wesld downis the time of
Fifty years later, however, the Su- znlelocer Fay Vincent als disqualifies Henry IV. It 1s still more roilo If the
preme Court ruled that professional the owner from its antitrust exemp- ercands
which it w laid dows he
baseball Is a business engaged in inter- ton. I think It is significant tha
Ong loe and the rol simply perstate commerce, but upheld the ant-i-a the time Oliver Wendell Holmes was slte for
o
s
trust exemption.
ruling that major league baseball was
That Is what we have-blind units
Today, major league baseball is a exempt from the antitrust exemption MOn Of the past In a sport which no
vast, complex organization of multi- was auo the time baseball was going longer needs or justifies the antitrust
million dollar franchises, broadcast thrugh its greatest oriole-the Black exemptionrights, and concession deals. If 1t talks, Box scandal of toil. As a result of that
Mr. President, I am pleased to loin
walks, and looks like interstate corn- scandal, major lesgue baseball estab- Senator.MxrxXNxuw and others, inmerce, then It must be interstate com- lised a strong Independent commis- cluding my colleague Senator MAc, In
merce.
abner's office,
this legislation which wili repeal this
Professional baseball, the great
Mr. Preodent, installed In that pool- anachroniem.
American pastime, no longer deserves a ton, was probably the strongest corMr. President, I ask unanimous con
place on the legal pedestal for the fol- mleor
any professional sport has sent to print In the RECORDan Item
lowing reasons:
had in the history of American athiet- from the New York Times of today and
The arrogant and self-serving manner lra, Judgs Keneaw Mountain Lndis. the article referred to In my statement
In which major league baseball has It was in that context of a strong lode- from the Washington Post of February
handled expansion and relocation dIs- pendant commissioner who wan rep- 4.
Qualifles the owners from special ex- reveting the public interest that OiTher being no objection, the mateemption.
ver Wendell Holmes ruled tit baseball rial Was ordered to be printed to the
Many communities. Mr. President, was not subject to the normal roles of REORD. as follows:
can cite their own example-this com- commorce.
Cotr Or CO- tuenoMOVES
TOBA
munity, the District of Columbia.
Well, today, that commissioners ofPhoenix. and Buffalo, to mention floe has been largely eviscerated. The
(ByMdcocyChaos)
three. I want to talk about the experi- commissioner who most recently atPe . Moocht-BIa months to the day
ones of the community that I know tempted to make strong decisions. FAY alter they asked Pay Vincent in resign as
well: Tampa Bay.
Vincent, was fired, because he wa cormlo.er. mao leans rio ce
gatocred today amid a growing mosent
Major league baseball has continued found to be not making decisions
to shun, to tease, and to lead the were In the best Interest of the ow
among them to asti
delaythey
On selection
nra.sew
ecommissioner
bass cegotiated
Tampa Bay ares to believe a major even though they were In the best to cew labor and television ootracte.
leagne baseball team Is on the way. tenet of the sport of baseball.
The owners did appea to be
The baseball-hungry Tampa Bay areIn the meantime, the owners have procreas coat leat e frost Ata joint seaProbably the Nation's most attractive continued to stall In the appointment ales of 5ll 28 ownsre Traday. they ware
market without a team-played by the of a new Commissioner. I will submit scheduled in discuss a woc
hy Richad
rules to get a franchise. Tampa Bay for the Rtnoce a sews Item from to- Rvtch. their chief labor execuive. to sha
was jiltqt.
day's New York Time about an even anOther
Owners of the San Francisco Giants, further delay to the appointment of a
IfOtoee..hi
the expe
it wosark a Igfrustrated by setbacks. put the fran- major egue commiesiocer.
chise up for se. Baseball's commisThird, Mr. president, the executive set
ste
to da.It eort to a
a
stoner sent signals that the Glants committee's handling of the Marge malr revense haro agreement among On
could be relocated.
Schott incident Is a glaring indication clubs. Ravitch has told the owners that the
Investors from the Tampa Bay area of the owner's inability to police them- plays olon Willaever saM to On salary
offered Slit million for the Giants. A elves without a strong commission. n50 the ownersWant to implement if they
California group offered 3100million, a One of the moat respected sport ml don't increse the amocot of ms they
sharamongthemslese,
group which wAs largely put together umniece In AmerIca, Tom Boswell, I
A tow-nY D55Mg
by the current owners of major league an article entitled "Crime and No Punbaseball. Major league baseball forced ishment, written for the WA
tumetabis for the selection efa moLaoser
baa sot
a topic
of discussion
at
the owner of the Giant to reject the Post, February 4 1991, thoughtfullyWahigtn
re- any
or th
.s bean
owners
ees
un last
higher offer from Tampa Bay and aso- viewed this incident According to Bet. onste The debate baa been conducted
cept the lower offer from the San Fran- well, "She (Marge Schott) handed bon an Informal, low-kay bas bese &0
disco group,
ball a Perfect chance to taket stand owner Wants to be on ecord a post -far
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OVraselr wouldb..

known IL
The antitrust eximptto.
represents MOr
would have gone on an r rticl
iea frameork which the

fans-It if the best thing for
Major league baseball.
show to trampt his atud- Courts have set p around major league
Mr. President, I have
long family
*Mareg Sebott Is the past This Is we
baseball to protect it. The exmtio
tradItion In the game of baseball. I love
baeball Ia going ta the
21st
Century."
of their the game. I believe this legislation will
owner' pursuit
bae made the inconsiatent
tOelnt
aUOe
Yes
the
with
the
be
a
poeltive
step
toward
bringing
self-interest
ee.r
-0
Otro. be
ca..ner
There used to ho one.
basic Interests of baseball fans. This is public Interest book Into the decisionThe PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
the opptete of what happens when making process of major league basejunior Senator from Florida [Mr. frskt competition is allowed to hall.
Mr. Preeident, I ask unanimous Coo.
MACxIs recognized for not to exceed 5 work. Why will not the owners accept
toinwote
the system which lhes brought so conch sent to print the following article In
the Reono.
wod to every other industry In t
Mr. MACK. Mr. President I thank
Senator MzrzzNxAUM for his leadership
coontry?
Ther being no objeotion. the article
n was ordered in
be printed in the
Istead their eystem is a frud
on the Iseue of revoking the antitrust
status for major league baseball. The emotionally wrenchig fraud. The pea_ Rtoon. a foilowee
(From the New York 'imes. mar. 4.1m]
barons of baseball have treated the p1. of TampSt. Petersburg were used,
C8Wf5 or OOM)UM ss MCIV9s 70 BACK
people of the Tampa Bay area with dis- demeand, and Insulted. Owner, should
dan, utterly disregardir their hopes be Athamed of what they did, but they
(
Narraythss)
and dreams for a future with a baseball are not. Since our hearing, the Owners
team.
have done ittle
to address any connot. M
c 3.-Oin m the to the day
Benator MrrzzNAAUM
was keen to see Ceru
Senators have expresed. Expan- a
ye
ione
r.
the abuse of this special privilege and alon. league finance,, the Commis- gathered
aj
la ng
ownes
he acted quickly with a hearing in his eloner's office, a potential iabor lock- a the
today ths eeladino ofeaent
subcommittee last fall. I was pleased to out and minor league disputes are all oommlsuccer ntil they have neotiated
be a participant at the December hear- on the table. unaddresed.
and unow labor en television oroicis.
Ing.
solved.
The owns. did apper in
ma
Those involved learned a great deal
Bsebsll's blundering of the location Proreee on at least 0 front. At a ot
from the testimony presented. Three
of a tea In Taml3-St. Petersburg i
.100 of al 2 Owners Thursday. they we
p-op..sI by Richerd
toexecutie,.
discussto a
the scheduled
inexcusable. On "ven occasions inI~altch.
months later, the baseball owners have
their Chief labor
stare
done nothing to mitigate the damage
last 8 Year', Tampa-St. Petersburg has all of their fmanooal information with ons
of their onerous actions which are
tried unocesafully to secure a team
sooth.
shielded by the exemption they, and
through expaneion hor by
. We If the owners approve the proposal. w
ucaebc they Sre exipectedis do.
lydb yt
awy
theyalon, enoy.alwae plyed
esle. Weu made
It would Marka sigthey alone, enjoy.
oem Ohio [Mr.step in avits effort in achi
The
Senator
We a Commitments promises, and moras reee
shiareemet
the
BAu] was correct to introduce this
the
er that amo
told the
leglation and I am proud to be theRavitch
nion will aevlr lgres to the salary
bePayb
now
Perhaps,
lea
cosponsor.
coposor Febae,
owbaseball
The good people of the Tampa, Bay Cep the owners
lead
want to implemenotIf they
will come to terms with the many cri- area built a stadium: 30,000seaon tick- dont increase the account of reveone thoy
ses it face, and come to know th ets wr sold. In the end, nothin
snare amog thomseles
central force which
can save the
And when the Cities
in Florida
A Wwgsy DZRAT
*Dort-the free-market system.
cried to "dross
their rievancOZ
A timetable for the selection of a coomloof discs
oer has nt be a top
oldand sbpoesing their tiredt
The owners wil
sy of the seven ownec. meting in the lst
Bill
President
needwe National
baseball
and claim
sonho
that sin mOotha- The debate bee been omnsis
were inld oeag-e
by the courte
poicyofold
White.
5It acted
clai uholeding
Loogfand
tact fans by upholding its policy of the antitrust exemption pot Mr. White o, so Informal, low-key heas becus
no
locking tefms into their prsment hoes out of the homeh of
soen, i
Owner we to ho on record s pushing for
wheo it refused the legitimate sole andOneos00.t5Lecf
movement of the Giants to the ampa
hort. major legue baseball is above
staun
Fay area- Well, there are at least 1.2
Bud Balig of tbs Muiwaakee Brewer the
million households In the Tampa-t.
Major league baseball has Used Us
man arIn
place of a ommissioner. mid
Petersburg metropolitan area filled a Pawn. Owners hold St. Petersburgas today that "thor, sre people who have didwith brokenhearted fans whose Inter- If It were their market, not our,. Then fereot oPlalone' on tke selection of a soceseats major league baseball did not pro-they
use It for leverage on the current,
to Vincen. but ho declined in elaborate.
P
O-bst cities, and fans in extrat new at&-. "We have a b ommiteesInplae that
tact.
In fact, major league baseball showed is g
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ftA re-l
A real eo
every TV
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Another dlb officIal who spoke on the
in, while everybody else lose
noreet that baseball has tund Its p
that ho nt be Identified. sa sd
i enough.
El ough
people.
bac bsebserving
onthee dser~ngpeole.
back on thes
1il- M Since
the Courts
refuse to act end the thinking Codition
of the owners
who favor a
lions, of fans deserve to be a purt of our major league baseball is Committed to delay. A Commisioner. ho sod, Could only
national pastime, instead they have
Its present cooree the exemption from Impede th olub' efforts to achier, in, kind
been unfairly left out.
the antitrust laws must be removed
of labor agmat they wat sod also inter
They merely want the thrill of catch- the Congress costant.
fare wit the work of th thremao Owners
Ing a foal ball, getting an autograph.
I urge my Colleagues to cosponsor the oommltee ootiatinw
telelon n.
hollering at the ump calling a play, but bitoebauonrdck
leglaion
to Me
tMor
d
e
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1.
m
ca convinced
no. amconincd
this oo-"MMad
hisoc-nave fsas players, and ultimately the this," the official 'ad.
I am
they can not.the
curred because baseball alone has en
ownere from
the undue burden the arnmao rioacrme ermr
antitrust exemption and that exempantitrust exemption has pot on them.
Itavitch doo't havs a vo on On sele
tion had some bearing on the owners'
A commonquestion asked about the
c. of a commieloner hot he baa bee
curious behavior,
ant
itrust exemption In: Will removing oted by Owoere s toling them that they
It really solv the problems of major he to deermn
their triorilie. If thir
league
baseball? I believe it wil. And first priority Is is gain tbs kind of labor
in the end ther will be mese player,
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thy think is neother
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But this law t entrap yo. hr creating a
son might have 30,000 saved in his r
st. Zvee
ompany will ta libty wher ore had to
was the tirement plan. EIs now
ill-Inthat accept the entir, amount in rollovert hoa, it rae" money only besth
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exaption.
trust
fro) -h. -It -7rto.Mt o
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plen. this delivecyman
wrnspelItl
bends position wa that -'basell shouldtofvanOUPD
his to come up with 10,0rc of ie own that ou have 20,000 in your 401(k)
Play by the samelsws all other should
d lee your t coopuy fore now Ioh
la e
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the cable channel that is Owned by Ted
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a Imposed lo their naees
Mr. Speaker. on Monday, November 15, we
regardless of what they while mate
t-nce or close to
actually did and what their backgrounds and by their voiten that art entirely at odds were successful. Marine M4 Leo Mencado,
may be. The members of Cones, who of n- with whit ].tios ant booic otliyy and eq- rresenting the President of the United
ty reeuire.
ceaty deal only in general principles, can-.
States, presented the Medal of Freedom to
the DaOo intl word. In mny OunmO,
not be expected to be familiar with the disrqir
ets will Mo. Martha Raye God ble you. Colonl
alanaory tenee
noctiens that should. to equity and fairnee.
Maggie.
their ow
n
be made, based on facts as distinguished he oounterprodootive.
f
d
Jur are tot etpid
from broad genraltitor
It would seem that the judges who will I- and theyby and large have
TRIBUTE TO CURT FLOOD
timately be nalied upon to implement the of basic fairnes When they learn, as they
sentencing lawn enucted by Congress. and will, what wll happen upon onviction inder
who have wreatled with sentencing problems the mandatory sentence regime to those who
day-la and day-out. thus have a contribution by any rational otandard are not really
OFMISlOt
to teak at the take-off, so he spoak not major offenders. they will eften engag In
IfE
HOUSE OF R9POESlmrAMVnS
only at the crash landing. The Judges. After the practice of toililnnon: They will
do know from experlence. not from philo- rhoose to exercise their ability to find the
Monday. Novemeber22. 1993
sophlest o ether general writings that an detoant or defend-.toat guilty, an matMr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker Curt Flood, a riend
er what the evidence.
Individual who is a conler carrying a small
amoount ef cocaine la
n bus from one city to
In soon notwithstanding their popul
- of mine, was not only a great athlete and
another. enticed to do so by a relatively peal ad the undoubted need for inugh.ete great individual, but also a better than average
doey
oes net deserve the on crm ani criminl, mandatory sea
small -um of m
artist. I shall never forget the night I was presme lined sentenca as a drug kingpin who tonces are likely very cftn be inoompt- paring to open a cockig lounge in St. Louis.
hoperts and diatributes drugs on
a
thie with the relaniremeot of jtco.
The MycousinArthur,
another betterthanaverage
atio shoeld be now cud carefl before emscale. They aiso know from exerien
hrlist, and Flood started painting caricatures
violent crimes may differ greatly with re- harking on u rodal . depsrttre from traon the walls and ceiling to be higtighted by
epect
to such
factors
as
Intent, total ntrmu.
the black lights of my Glow Worm lounge. At
premoditatin, provocation, brutality and
Many Others. All of the perpetrators of such
6 o'clock the next morning Flood left, wend
crimes desere punishmet, but srely ot
PRESIDENTIAL MEDAL OF FRE
home, and preparod for a daytime game
Identical pernishment.
where he started on usual.
M FOR "COLONEL MAGIE"
Judges also know,. having seen the eamI would like to share the following article
ples many times, that a grnulely contrite
about Curt Flood with mycolleagues.
Theart
distinguished war
offender. perhaps with
cie appeared in the November21, 1993,edior pw -oog
record ora reord of service he the commntion of the Washingon Post.
nity before becomig addicted and thereafter
IN THE HOUS oynyagSsrAvnS
enmeshed in the drug trade. should not be
A BASEBALLLESSONi FRE.o.
Moeruele, Nooember 23,1993
punished to the goa extent as an antisocial
(By George F. Will)
defendant who bas ne-er done productive
Mr. WcRULTY. Mr. Speaker. ou Tuesday,
Now
Yor.--Curt Flood, a 165-poundwhipwork. does ot support hit family and 1 o
Noonree 2, Preodeet Bil Cleton awarded in
pet of a centerfieldar, could outrun meet fly
likely for a long time. if ever, to be anything
balo, but it took him 24 years to catch up to
but a leach on soolety. Yet under the leglila- M
Cogres may be about to decree. the F dthighest codan award of the his 199 Gold Clove award. is stary Is rich
with lesons about courage. freedom and the
practical effect would be that the sentencing U.S. Oveent
isuing bin 19d5 Executboe oder. Fei- coacelt that we can predict freedom's conludges must treat them all alike. That is not
tted thatrho Me" of sequences.
deeruy S. T u
Justice.
He has a career btung average of .2B3in 15
It is probably for these reasons that the Freedoechal beawatded to any peroo
federal judges of this country, apparently non perforned a ontroi act or sesons. 12 with the Cndinals. But nothing
with few exceptions. regard the floed, man- ctice micai lio
ed tho tited Staten i. so became him In baseball as his manner of
leaving it. Although he played 13 games with
datory aentenclng laws as njust and on afe proeecurioe of a marogaiust an eeuy or the 1971Senators, he really left after the 1969
front to conecnce. That revulsion is not
- Throgtou Word War 11 seson when the Cardinals traded him to
limited to the usual specto-the eo-cAlled eroem
bleeding heart liberals. It extends from the Korea, and \ieheoie. Martha Rope did jut Philadelphia and be said. bell on, I wont go.
Black ballplayers have donemuch to move
udictal appointees of President Carer to that
freedom forward. 10 1944. 11 years before
those appointed by President Seasan and
'Colooel Maggio,"as the became knowe t
Bush. And the members of the latter grouD
e U.S. Monee ted Spetl Foes rute Ros- Parks refusedto mov to the back of a
at least. may safely be assumedto have been w co4sn-o
he anhorry
liettnan bus in Montgomery Ala., a lieutenantin
Texas faced a court-martIal for a similar renomlated, at least in part, on account of
tht
at hog le 10 fusal on an Army bu- Li. Jackle Robinson.
their known or expected toughness with re- olotel cletlonted maty
nSring abroad during toes mors. A elmilar epiritedness made Flood help win
our
spectto crime.
wmob
although
strihen
for players the elemental right to negotiate
Why. then, are the judges of this view? Dining Word Wor I1.
Cynic might surmisethat this is so because yellowrfteer. Ms. Rayenterti
an a U.S. with employers their terms of employment,.
the mandatory sentonces and the related tionper She rsed dne wounded in Korea an
He was bo rIn NHouston in1938and played
guideliaes Issued by the United Staten Son- wel yet never tught ecognion ho bee toll- his way up through minor leagues in the
t.ncing Commiselot deprive them of their loo no
South in the 1950s. beforepublic accommoda'
unrestrained sentenoing powerand the pleastions were desegregated.He recelved food at
e ent 3 to 6 the back door of restaurants that served his
Ding tne Vtnar,
am that presumably come from the ability
monthe eachyaarwith or ervice ten aed white teammates. and be relieved himself beto exercise that power. The cycens a
wrong. Loft to his or her own devices. each women. Sie truoeled ro remotecamps, ndor brad the bus on the shoulder of the highway.
coancentions judge spends a great deal of etem ho, to enteotain tne soldiers nd t
In the 1950sand 19e. pitchers were drivee
time, energy and moral capital attemrpting care for the n ed.
to distraction by black players such as
to fashion a just sentenet. Balancing the
Veteroun groupsnfhoo ul one te country Henry Aaron and Frank Robinson who
competleg forces of deterrence and retribu- coopeeuted ln on ott ueogeize Murtha played with an implacable intensity that
ino. the aoods of socirty. the Injury to the Raye' dedicut
to her cottby. The
nggested the controlled venting of Indignavictim and the personal cireumstances of the
clon stored up during many minor league and
e
Mt
T
m d
defendant is a complex and daunting task.
spring training experience. in a South In
the Purple Heart, nd the American Legion transition. The Cardinals of the 1960s were
taking much time and thought.
schedule and Auoihey, 0110owhom rerentored her service fueled partly by the fierce pride of our black
It is far easier on the
the judgea caonacenceto issue a flat aren- and wishd in honorhe accordingly
men who were taking out their anger on the
tence In accordance with
congressionally
However, n group word horder in litune ball and on opponents-Plood. Bill White
Imposed mandate. Such a sentence requires tIM toonol Maggie-be recognized ho her (no president of the National League) and
neither deliberation nor the balancing of wook than theMecluloforMoggteC itee. two Hall of Famers. Lou Brock and Bob Gibcompeting considerations: It is simply anmyiood in Atany NY.in my congres- eon, the take no-Drlsones pitcher who once
nounced. Under that system. when condrlled the ribe of a rookie who had the Imaetne nails it can be stilled by the words
pertinence to hit a long foul off him.
that others have used when required to per- aid Ms. Belle Pellegrno. both Vtet-ora
When the CardInals traded Flood, be chal"I are just carrying out or- veleroom, wete deoted sod tiring in their et- leoged baseballsa
form najust.
reserve clause, which bound
ders." Yet most judgesfeel a profound sense on t achueve is mel-detesoed tecogri
a player to a team until that tearn traded or
of wrongwhoa they have
it by, pimproe
Muesn
Raaem
io
releserd him. Seeking to win for players the
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right to sell their labor io free mearket. he oraints they wil he bener prepared to make
Robert Codson joined the American Arbitrauha.itasand haseballte sattret eaewouidn. a jxsth Imipactan this counitry.
fkonAssociation in 1963. The AAA was foundHe Lost the 17 seasonand test In he Su_
I tadroctorty coaed Pepresentaties ta
ed in 1926 by leaders in the fbursiness
and
preme Court., but he had 11t a n.
legal conimunities and has become the stand
In 175 the clause was overturned by 0n arbrosr Lod were the lamrene
the idea of commre-ty developreeni end the ardtseing iristitutino for aterriative dspute
eesolution with more than 7,000 members, and
its
of
oomyrclsir
ptsitriv bal-kg
hut Bant Enterprise Aa
dicting thernd of baseballe cmsd
nce- few rich
would buy the best hardeactivepar
s in corsnsrty denet- more than 52,000 panelists who work on
opent Their support madein bi work fin cases involving billions of dollrs each year.
d a drelne of atendance. Well.
play-a
The desede 118-8 was the first In baseball as of m.
Mr. Coulson explained AAA's growth an the
history In mhieh t ditferent teams won the
Mr. Speaker. t hose dedicated a great deaf occasion of its 65th birthday several yearsago
World Sere. Until
sM
there had been so
my life to
was no a reflection of the fact that arbiteration rad
"worst-to-first"
voltilty
this ecuynotram
lc yranstlty
dI In
yeas
no tesm won a pennant the
year ura
after neh
finish- osocstut in part hecause of the participation mediation are favored by business executives
costly, less time-corIng last. The Twins and Brvem did in 1991, of mairtars financial instifotiono tn 1978. 1 and their lawyers as
and the Phillies did i 19G3.The 1993A's
arrived i Queens, NY to a coeunity which sumringand more rahonal ways of setling diswhen the courtsystemis
putes.particularly
t media coged -A Oerity In dire
the frst team since 1915--the As PhiladePhil ancesrsfinish
In test place
Today, Queens is bouncrg heidi Therm are
with cases
the year after osthing flet.
strefront shopping districts, deces and atRobert Couson's passionfor reformhas atIn 199Sthe team with the or
attend- fordle housing toe to- a
inre-oae
fected every activity in which he is involved.
anc-the Padres with L.75.32-drewr mer
moorenty
tmOwonec and most
despaHe has beenactivein the Association of the
ans than the St Loi Bron drew I the
t
Sn ard stagnation hove hewn replaced hy Barof tho City of New York arid the Amerkcan
entire 1930s(1184.435).The Ortoles
Bar Association,
servingas chairmanof the
tandance for two consecutive regularly hopeand pos
ArbitrationCommittee
of the corHope exists because of the hard work of Corrmrercial
scheuled-games was 833Y-re than the
sectionof theABAand cochairman
of
Bowes echo
(b
becme the Orioles Is 19u4 community organzaons nod residents who poration
dree to alt of 1935.
hse foughtbk
is the face of adversty. ttheCollechie Bargainingand ArbitrationComIn 1964. the year JtcquesmBrn
wrote tot is
ard thei nefticas has at- mitiee of.the laborsection.He servesonthe
shat nyne who would know Americs meet tened them to sea the ht at the end of a board of the FundforModernCourtsand is
know haseball. th ner-age ettendaace
as r t
an HonoraryFellowof theArbhatoreInstitute
1.000. This year the Pade
veraged 17.191.
estenof Canada.He haswrnitenand enctured
ad the rajor eaue aerage was 31.37. The
Rockles drew 4,83.350, mare people than lIne coniitentn o the oretmren where they smelyon management-abior relationsanddispute resolution. Mr. Coulson is the author of
In Minheseot or 31 other stases. major take deposits.
Mr. Speaker, when I hogan to develop the 'How to Stay Out of Court" -Fanly Medation
Leagoe
attendance was 70.257.93. more than
the comhined population of 32 etes.
conity
areud my dearth in 1977, t won WillWork for You," -The Termination
HandBut no one last year brought a ticket to unabe to gel baoks to peiticipote ta ther po- book, tBusiness
Araitration"'LaborArbitraseean owner. Because of what Flood stareid. Leati.
Theirinpaiticlpoh
19T7
woudd have tion,' 'Arbitratironin the Schools,'Alcohotl
sucesfu
par becaus inofr
the. par4cpaio
the players. who largely create baseball Irsed
my deaths ability to create the 700 Drugs and Arbitration." -Empowered at 40.'
eale. 0w receIv their share of that
How to Stay Out of Cort,' published in
In 1990 the players' averaei
salary a
s
w
2.90". In tos3It was $1.1 maillon, much more comnity. I would hose made it easier to 198, sold more than 100,000 coples, atthan Flaa
redsot
Is ti entire carer.
ild decent attordehosing srts for him- traced mainstrearn media atention, and
Rawlints Gold Glles are awarded annard loderafO-eitni
residents in Oieens. brought attematrve dispute resoltion to the atally to the ns players In each lease voted Their patwipehon would have ade the fention of the counity. The Arbitration Journal,
best defensively at their positions. Flood greunds of my coenaty nore eriields of published by the AAA, corntinues as a
won I 19. when this could have been said tOfger economic growth which.idatefy preemmineit publication in its field.
of him Two-tthirds of too plant le srd
crates a sotn andhealiorer place to fee.
Robert Coulson is a graduate of Yale Uniby water and the met is covered by Flood."
reBut is the turbalence of his rebellon he
S
e
g
ni
r versity and Harvard Law School. He
from Bryart Cole g an tatacooitale nociahanetre pro- calvedhonorarydoctorates
oever colted his idoe. He got it here last
gr.
instead, thin egisotiot Is about lege and Holstra University. He ismarded to
week at this yeare awaed ceremony.
He once aid, I am pleased that God made naissteoorirg peOPtOwho Otheie might Cynthia CenneighamrCoulson, has five chilmy skin black, but I wish He had made It nat ha.e accessto needed capital and meait. dres, andlives with his family in Connecit.
Friesito of basebl. and of free4
Aginl would ito o press ay appeeciadom. are Pleasedthat He idnt.
l
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GREGORY LEWIS HONORED BY
leaTote Rboo arid their statfs arid to a
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the
Bat
Enof
the
Mao-ter
who
nopported
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Lterpo Act amendment
the Banitmg eone

tearns

less

alone

flooded

value.

in

has

Lcohier

HON.GEORGE
J. HOCHBRUECKNER

Mr. Speaker.I urgemy coteaguesto sdpIN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, November 22. 1993

OFNowYORK

IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESElerATIVEs
Monday, November 22,1993

OFNEWe
YORK

AAA PRESIDENT HONORED

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNEFL
Mr. Speaker,
I -ise

today to recognize one of my constituents, an
exceptional young man from Kings Park, NY.
In December. Gregory Lewis will be one of 10
OF.e Yeas
young adults honored by the Caring Institoue
M THE HOUSEOF iZPHFlCAfl
S
for selftessness. compassion, and caring.
Gregory has been a leader among Long isand pressing concems-America's econi,
Meoay,
ernher 22, 2993
land chapters of Students Against Drunk Drivcallyunderserved communites.I commend Mr SCHUMER.
Mr. Speaker,
on Deceor ing [SADD). During his 3-year tenure as the
the President
andmycolleagues
on theBarnk- 9. 1993,the NewYorkCountyLarss Asso- president of Kings Pad High Schoots Staing Cormritee for moving tis legislation with cation wilt hor RobedCoson, Presient of dents Against DnrunkDriving. Mr. Lewis formed

Mr. FLAKE.Mr. Speaker.H.R. 3474is the
productof biparisanship-both onthe House
Banking.Finance.
and UrbanAffairsConmittee and in the House as a whole. H.R. 3474
addressesoe of the Nations most urgent

HON.
CHARLES
L SCHUMER

suchsoeedanddecision.
TheNationcoo he the AmericanAbitrhon Association nce a coaliton composed
of SADDstudentsfrom
proud of its House todayas westriveto make 1972,with theWilliamNelsonCroorweg
Award every school district in Suffolk County. Long
economicopportunity
a realityformoreAmeri- toeUsetulend outstanding
serice to the pro- Island. Among the group's activities was a
cans.
feosion aod the commuity. I join in otterng workshop dealing with drug holnes. drunk
Mr. Speaker,H.R. 3474 removesburden- ;W coogratoann to henandry appreciaton driving, alcoholism, and govemmern relations.
some, regulationsfrom financialinstions fortheenergyenditelct he ts oughto
In additin to his work with Students Against
whitlenot jeopardzing thei safety andsound- or, profession.todeed,his workhas affected Drunk Driving,Gregoryestablisheda drug
nessor their abilityto servetheir customers. of cr Was and montdirectlyt cases ofat- awareness reading program and founded the
By hreerogbankcs
at theseunnecessary coo- tereationdisputetesoltion arid legal reform. Athletes Detest Drugs Organization
in the

Document No. 9

March 17, 1994
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
Second, the comI think we passed a good bill here. I models for the children, and Symbols local communities.
needs to consider a set of gradthink it will help the country when f- around which to rally civic spirit. I mittee step-ther
elimithan
uated
naly enacted, coming back from the know frm my Ownpersonal experience nating baseball's antitrustsimply
exemptionconference committee and put into with the Wlington Bins Rocks Sin- that Congress might take to
guarantee
and
cities
that
team
baseball
gin-A
Implewritten, law and then folly
that all professional sports meet their
towns with a sports team eon
mented-.the
to fans and taxpayers.
So 1 thank all invoived and m very wealthier for having a place to coin obligations
Because Senator MnrxnnBAUM's hearfor
poil
to
community
a
an
together
gratefal for that support.
place during major league
With that, ]dadam President. I yield the hnie team. In exchange, the fans Ing will take
no
not only bays paid admission to attend baseball's spring training, I have
back the floor.
attention will be
ample
that
doubt
rions
provided
he
hot
ganies.
the
let
Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President,
to the issues involving the antime Jnst take several seconds to com- other finacial and legal Incentives not given
exemption and the recent remend the distinguished chairman of normnliy available to other businesses. trst
structuring of the still racant commisRegrettably. Mr. President. the owthe committee, Senator RIEGL. to
office. As I pointed out last
commend his staff, and to commend e and players of professional sports sioner'scertainly
do not dispute that
the staff on the minority aide for an today have forgotten that In return for fall. I
anbaseball receives special
been
have
league
they
status
major
special
the
Members
many
outstanding job. So
under the antitrust laws,
have worked to bring this bill to a corded, they have obligations to their treatment
I think the assertion of some peopoint where we are really. I think, on a commnitiea that are more than mak- and
including that of former Commisthreshold of accomplishing unusual lug a profit OrsIning a ralti-million ple,
things; 'hecurization" in the area of dollar contract. The fans are Owed sioner Fay Vincent from the SeptemNew York Times, that
small business loans, making commer- more because the fans have been anked ber 26, 199,
"baseball deserves its immunity from
cial loans hopefully morn accessible. to do morn.
-Fans en taxpayers" provide their f- the antitrust laws" should be reconsidproviding capital for the loans, and seeered in light of recent eventa. These
ing to it that we have sound flood in- nanelal support for the often massive
events suggest that the Judiciary ComInfrastructure that is needed by a pr
surance program.
and financial
None of this was accomplished with a fessional tear-whlch ran Include the mittee examine the legal
upon baseball and
great deal of ease. It was lot of hard construction and maintenances! a eta- advantages bestowedsports
by the citIotiiprofessional
sewers,
other
roads,
lots.
parking
d~s,
bipartvery
a
say
work, and I might
zens of this country.
tie, ad public transportaion.
san effort.
The failure of the owners to hins a
-Fans a voter"provide exemptions
So, may I start by again thanking
In the
the staff, both on the Republican aide and exceptions in their laws, municipal commissioner Is disappointing.
conlnisand on the Democratic side, and com- regulations and soning requIrements past, an independent baseball
health and
mending the chairman and all of our that rotate to teievision contract sloner has maintained the
colleagnes who participated in putting rights, neighborhood curfews, and integrity of the sport by balancing the
interests of the fans with the concerns,
forth a bill that I believe Is going to variances.
"Fana an fan." after Providing sop- of the players and the owners. The
help put people to work.
by the
I believe you are going to see a great port a taxpayers end voters, are re- owners' omission is exacerbated
the fans' repdeal of capital that otberwise would quired to pay more far parking, pay fact that a commissioner,
to
not be made available to the little peo- morn for tickets, pay more for hot dogs resentative, will not be available
watch their help resolve the remaining and potenpie, small businesses, and entro- and pretsels, pay mor toeleon,
over
lasnes
labor
contentions
tially
and
pay
on
team
prensers. They in turn will be able to favorite
League Baseball Playput their expertise to use, move this even then, Alter "Paying," ere some- which the Majorbas
threatened a strike
country forward, and in the truest times faced with threats by their teem em Asuocintion
summer.
later
this
eity.
to
another
wave
It
will
that
sense provide real Jobs and job opportuThese issues are important and I look
Mr. President, clearly, the present
nities.
4ues- forward to reviewing the hearing
I just went to take this opportunity state of Affairs mnst change. TheAum-a
record- As the committee carries out
to thank the chairman again and all lion is how. Senator lDI
focus in the past has been baseball's this examination. the focus must be on
those who participated,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- antitrust exemption He Introduced a the issues that affect the fans. I am
ator from Kentucky. the majority bill a year ago that would repeal major specifically concerned about the potenleague baseball's anitrust exemption. tial effect the proposed repeal of base;
whip.
fali, 1. along with many of the ball's antitrust exemption on minor
__________Lest.
league baseball, and Issues that exist
of the Judiciary Co
BUSINSSeme
MORNING
itten, asked him to conduct a broader regardless of the antitrust exemption
SISINSS
Mflhli~lO
Mr. FORD. Madam President. I ask examination of professional sporta The related to league expansion and franunanimous consent that there now be complaints often directed a major chise movement. taxpayer financed
period for morning business with Sen- league baseballs antitrust exemption stadiums, television rights, and salary
ators allowed to speak therein for up to related to stadium financing, league caps, revenue sharing and player salaexpansion, franchise movement tale- ricm.
5 inntes each.
nights and salaries have also cm
The dependence of minor league baseThe PRESIDIIN 0 OPWICREtWithout vision
curred Or presenlly exist in profes- ball on major league baseball's antiojection. It is soaordered.
be
needs to
exemption
glo-A bsors tado not enoy an anti- trust
ascertained. Minor league teanmeexist
across
IlN-sTeJdcayCmiteseala
=RES
150
communities
than
CObtfl
in
more
TH
UICIARY
proceed
ill
al
sports
proe
of
tion
FROFESSIOAL
Y
INTO
the country, including Wilmington,
along two tracks to determine the DE the home of the Blue Rooks. As
SPORTS
Mr. BIDEN. l&. President. On Non- proper extent of congressional involve- many of us are aware, on March 3, 1994,
day. March 21. 104, Senator NETEN- ment Firt. the committee needs to the Nations.Association of.Profeedetermine ten role Congress should sional Baseball Leagues held a "ConJudiciary Commit- the
nAUM will open
Education Day" that
tee's broad inquiry into profehsavnal take to deal with the ompisints frm gressional
sports; when he convenes a fid hearing the public involving stadium financing, brought representatives fror. more
pay than 100 minor league baseball teams
in Tamopa lSy, FU. Professional spurts broadcasting rights, the move to cou
to Capitol Bill offices, These minor
leagues in the United States are so- telegiin, and owner and player
corded specia treatment-a treatment duct. Conflicts in these areas have league teams oppose repealing the exthat is cot neceesatllY undeserved raised Issues as to the "public minded- emption because they contend that
Spectator spurts have provided fans nes" and responsibilities of profs-t most minor league clubs do not have
with entertainment for the faily, rain ional sporte leagnes and toeas to the financial resources to Identify
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players and negotiate salaries Presently. major league baseball provides
the players and pays all the salaries for
minor league clube, in addition to paying expenses for uniforms, equipment.
and travel. The importance of the
minor leagues to the more than 30 raillion fana that attended games last year
is undoubted. Before taking steps to repeal the exemption, the Judiciary
Committee needs to explore the historIcal relationship between major league
baseball and the minor leagues to determine whether alternatives exist to
support minor league baseball from the
largest to the smallest communities.
Issues with regard to league expan.on and franchise movement exist In
all professional sports leagues. Increasingly, stadium finacing and revenues
have been tied to whether a league will
grant a city a new franchise or whether
an existing franchise will remain. Because this problem exists in all sports.
It is not necessarily tied to the antitrust exemption.
Recently. major league baseball announced the possibility of expanding
the league by creating two additional
teams. No doubt, the announceoment
will inspire a flury of activity and expenditures on the part of a number of
cities in order to attract a team. Such
activity is not unique to baseball, however, as recently evidenced by the bidding for two new NFL franchises on the
part of Memphis, St. Louis, Charlotte.
Baltimore. and Jacksonville. In order
to gain Its franchise. Jacksonville cormitted to a 121million renovation of
the Gator Bowl. St. Louis has started
construction of a 3258 million domed
stadium in the belief it will get an NFL
franchise eventually. All of the cities
spent significant amounts of money
merely to be considered as a viable 10atio
Recently, mavny football and baseball
teams have threatened to leave for
other cities unless the city builds a
new stadium or provides favorable orrangemsents on concesaions each as
parking and sky bos. Locally. Jack
Ite.t Cooke. owner of the Washington
Redskioa. is In the proess of trying to
move his team out of Washingten if he
can find a municipal or State govermust to finance a stadiu. Thencitd
Buffto recently announced it will
spend = million on the Bills' a
dium-4 mullion on the largest scorehoard in the country and an. undisclosed amount on new private suitea.
The Bills organization Indicated that
any seeded additional revenue would
be covered by increased ticket price..
The Judiciary Committee should conalder whether the taxpayers' retumn on
these stadium improvements amecompearasle to their investments.
Purportedly, there Is a movement to
pay television among the profesioal
spos'ts leagues. The recent television
contract major league baseball signed
has raised concerns because it could
mean that playoffs are not on network
television for the fst time ever. CertaInly. o step the comittee should
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take is a review of the aw that pro- he went to Harvard College where he
vides a limited antitrust exemption for graduated corn laude. After graduation
al profesonal aportsleuee to nego- he spent a year in the Sudan and Nigetints television contracts. The law was na as a Rockefeller fellow. Upon com,
letlon of ie fellowship he returned to
passed in 196 and has not heen amended sinc that time even though tele- Harvard for law school, where he had
the great distinction of winnin the
csting has changed radically. Th
original purpose and foundation for the Ame. Moot Court Competition.
After coming i law degree, Doyal
law should be examined in light of the
expanded use and availablity of cahle Patrick clerked for Judge inhardt on
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He
television and pay per-view,
Normally. Congress would ndt take then joined the NAACP Legl Defense
and Educational Fund as a staff attor
an interest in the calaries or finaci
arrangements of a private business. In soy. In thin position, he defended death
the tas of professional sports, how- row inmates and litigated many voting
ever, the many Instancee Is which mu- rights cases.
Even after leaving the NAACP Legal
ololitie. and Staten provides funds
for facilities create a public Interest in Defense and Educational Fund. ir.
the fiscal health of a team. The cem- Patrick remained active In civil sights
Me has devoted approximately
mIttee has an obligation at least to isu.
highlight the different option avail- 30 percent of his time since joining the
able to ssure that teems remain via- Boston law firm of Bill and Barlow to
his and community mossy is sot wast- pro bonn work. most of which ware
e ohtained a landed. The owners of major league hose- civil rightsces.
hail have recommended a salary cap to mark settlement on hehalf of a large
he Imposed on each team. Presently. number of African-American burrower.
the National Basketball Association who were victims of a lending scam. He
has a salary cap, and the National also drafted an aricua brief in a sooFootball League will have one In pince cosfal Supreme Court challenge to the
racially motivated se sf preemptory
next season,
In addition, the abilty of team In challenges in a civil cas.
Ther is a seed to America and in the
small media markets to exist and remain competitive becomes lens certain Jutice Department for lawyers like
as team alaries ris. A city's signhfl- Mr. Patrick. Last year. the civil rights
cast investment In stadism Infrastruc- division filed a record number of cases
tore Is threatened when a team falls, and launched a record number sf love.Baseball has a revenue shoring pro- tigatione. Under the leadership of Atpena under negotiation to attempt a torney General Janet teno and Deval
more equitable distribution of money Patrick, I amcertain the Civil Righte
among teams from large and all Division wil continue to eradicate diemedia markets. The commitee seeds to criminatlen in America. In addition. I
consider whether mesures such an a believe Mr. Patrick serve as an imporsalary cap and revenue snaring will tent role model to or yung people
help to stabilize cubs fnancially in teday. Me has dedicated his life and
small media markets and protect the committed his work and talents to the
struggle of overcoming racism and preinvestment of the local community,
Mr. President. the Judiciary Coi- serving he basic concepts of fair powy
and due proces inner society.
mattee has undertakes a held epamin
Mr. Patrick'a background clealy
tin as part of Its obligation to address
the probles. facing sports fans. I look demonstrates his commitment to civil
confident that Mr. Patrick
of rghts. I
forward to reviewing the proceedings as,
Senator Mn'EiiWASIm'8 next hearing -Ml continue In the strsglile in uphold
by protecting ear chvti
and those to the future. tama copfident our freedo
that in the end, the committee will de-rights He has cy strongest support for
velop a comprehensive and effective ap- this nomination, and I also urge my
proach to retore the Impotince of the colleague. to lend their support w this
fan In the scheme f profesltn outstandingcandidate.
ort
aii
DOgENrdE OF
VERONA
CNIoELYn
o
CHARLESTON VOLUNTAISM
aN iPPORT OF DEVAL PATRICK
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President. next
TO HEAD TEE3CIVIL RlIGHTS DIE- week tha family and ends of Verona
VIBION nTICE
OF THE Jg
gather to celebrate her
sill
PcasEN pnIrsys
Mr. DRCONCINI. Mr. President, I dese M0thbirthday. Of course, this will be
in strong support of the President's much mor than a birthday party. ft
nomination of Dove] Patrick to head will beea celebration of&alife exceptionthe Civi ights Division of the Jtiece ally well lived, a life dedicated to vol
Department. Mr. Patrick Is an acom- untarlarn and counity service.
plihed lawyer, with experience in both 'Mr. President. to outiders. the city
civl rights litigation and private prac- of Charleston is defined by Its culture
tih. Throughout his legal careerhe and aonitecture. But to us native
has demonstrated a pasonate com- Charlestonis. the city Is dfined fIrst
and foremost by the specisl people who
mitment to civil rights.
is one of
tlnselylive there. Verona
bis personal and professional backtense special people.
ground Is impressive. Mr. Patrick hai
Verona estabished herself an an envlfroman impoverished neighborhood on
mental activist long befor mont
the smoth side of Chicago. lrom there.
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Ther have beer discussions - the
statatics of Ty CobbWsbatting average
flor of th Sea, since the anand Bab. Ruth*. batting averge.
nounosineet was mad about the inAs a youngster. I Sound it
ticeal to study the baseball players pending strike onAsgoat I that perand see the tenacity and discipline and hays the Congresa naght to enador
their chracter, and I think it has had some actin. to take away the antitrust
a propound effect on Americans, and exemption,
I he hoen nilling to do that, Mr
really worldwide in many, many ways.
an example and providieg a Presient. hecas ff1 were to support
In
tremendous thrill when people would the antitrust exemption and taking
go to the park or listen on the radio,a away the antitust exemption, and It
iled to the committee moat recently
I did as a yonngater. or in the basemeet of the Wheeler Kelly Eagoer by only a singl vote, or if we were to
Building. watch the scores on the big take away the antitruat exemption
haseball enloys more laoadly. there
hosrd,
There may be sore wagering, per- would he a real threat that the Pitthaps In violation of Kansas law. AdI burgh Pirates would leave the city of
gh, and that would he dsvPit
would see the squares o
when someone would hit home run, astalg for Plttshurgh, Night now, the
an extra square, double square, or tri- representations are maria that the PIa month, and
pe qare, on rare occasion when
coining
group of
heeothe
a city
hasover
there
-m ocasornthee
ee anto
the
hre wrue
three
reetedto
take
ownerahip
the Piia
hoesrunsan inning.
All of that is now threatened by the rates to keep the Pirates in Pittsburgh.
So with concern for the Interests of
baseball strike. I think it is especially
and the city of PittroublesomePensyania
fbraned burgh. I cannot Join in en effort to retrosies
eMr.Presden.
baseball has a Unique and a ireferredmove the anlitrut exemption hecase
status in America because It is a busi- of the risk that It would pass for the
neas which is not subject to America's Pirates leaving the city. Bot from
antirst laws. Every other bustness many points of slew, the Pirates have
which exists in America bas to no- left the city, in a sense, when free
tion in a competitive way, and ther agency bee taken away Dry Bonds to
may not be agreemente in violation of San PI-ssco end Bob Bonin. to Nw
on competition. Baseball is the one York and other starplayers so that the
business. the only business, which does Pirates, whiebad enovins talent,
not have to abide by the antitrust laws end had those players stayed there the
of this country.
Pirates would he hero a pennant con,
It came about in a curious way whoa tender and would have been a much.
Jast.ce Oliver Wendell Holmes many mash stranger te
Mr. President. I think that all paryears ago said that baseball was a
sport and not-a businesa. When Justice ties to the dispote. the owners and the
Holmest decision was tested many dec- playera ought io
aware of the con,
ades later, the Supreme Court said, core which exists In the Congress stout
well. it is a businees now, but we are the Impeodlcgstrike and the conc
not galig to change its exemption from that exitas to whether we ought in
the antitrust laws because if tXagress continue the attrust exemptio
had wanted to do so, Congress con.1A It may well he that Congress will sot
bave dose so. We are going to leave if ther in a strike, I think that there
public raci going to he eorus
baseball in an exempt states
C the Judiciary Committee, I have lbs. Right nan. it In just speculative
considered the tas of taking away as howhether the strike will take place
beball's antitrust exemption and for on Aogust 12 Rot sin the strike was
nd,
thaws ontacted represeot. t4e cnaldered taking away foot- s
bank limited antitrust exemption.
atives of the Players and reorereotaUnlike baseball, procednzally foot- livns of the owners in an effort in se
ball has a lindted satitrat exemption if I could be helpful in settling the
which applies only to poollag receipts strike, or If ther in aything that the
on bhedlso. I was concerned about Judiciary Committee could do, or eththat when the Balders moved from en intieSent culddtosettlethe
Oakland t Los Angelea. I was con- trike
corned shout that when there was a
I am advised ther inotking that we
threatened move of the Phillies from could do. and from the discussins
Philadelphia to Phoenix in aboot 1984. which I have bed over the coos of the
We have never changed the antitrust past Idays, It moms in me thatware
exemption for many, many reasons, headed for a baeball stzike and for a
but there has long been a cocers in disruption which may nd the rest of
the Congress about whether baseball the seson and may eliminate the
oaght to continue to have that anti- leogos
oship playoff games and
trust exeraption.
the World Series.
Just a few weeks ago in the Judiciary
I think. M. President, that the parCommittee, we took up the lene of tier may wel I the goose that Lays
taking away the satitrust exemption the golden egg If we were to elimiate
as it related to labor negotiations be- the antitrust exemption. I do net know
case the representation was made at what would happen. I do not know if
that time that if we took that
baseball could survive in ita present
perhaps the Iaeball strike would not form even if the players art the owners
sgot together- There onv eeoror
ocur,

fuepira-

being

a

ation,

810501

ries. end a key point of diagreement is
whether ther shoold he a salary sap.
The players nake gigantic some of
money. millon of dollas a year. and
the own havs tremendous revenues.
although the owners claIm that ther
are some I tees which a on the
verge of bankruptcy and then is a dipote e to whether those financial figores a aecurate becase It Is corn
pieeer
are may third-party conTher
tracts, where the Atlanta Braves have
an agreement with the television network and the Chicago Cua similarly
have an agreement And I do sot koow,
r- President. whole right and who Is
It may be that both parties are
wru.
wrong In shlecttng the fk- to the
threat of tis kind of a strikeI a
long
leed, Mr President.
unique, and that basethat is
sports ame with
hell
a public Interest
and that football is affected with a
pohic hnterest.
Some he nalged sport i sblic otlitiesoed that may he going a
strike,
title f.- If you have ailod
the Congress a intervene al stop
the s1rke Nobody is saggesting that
the natue of bawbal reaches the lovel
of a railroad era publ utility, to that
extent
But it in my hope that the players
and the ownes will find an agreement.
When you talk shoot free market, you
talk about the very basis America atlitde, al It l.s principl of slowing
people in earn a moch money a the
market wil permit.
But I would suggest that ther may
he -me cuter limits of public tolerance. amd Puhic tolernce in reflected
In the unique special position which
baseball has asaresult of the antitrust
exemption. And If the puhlic cisunse in
sufficiet ad the oemeosiscal outsage Is ssfflcient we may find that
antitrust compensation removedt And
then we would in fot hase a situation
where the parties who benefited from
the goose which ld
the golden egg
would have in fact killed the goo&e.
So I hope te
will he a co-nderalen and I have taken the initiative
in talking to representatives of the
playem and repreoenhativee of baseball.
beaue the gm aught to be preered, at perhaps arbitration would
be the way. But ths partis oswht in
some together and realise the public
Interest and the puhic concem and
acert the strike.
-1thank the Chair end yld the fler.
The PRSIDING OFPICER. The Sonator from Pennsylvania yields the
floo.
The Senator frm few Jersey, [.%fr
Lentssma in rcegosest
Mr. IAtTENBEBD. Mr. President. I
ask nanimous consent that I may
speak as if In morning husiness.
The FRESINi OFyICi Wil the
Senatrindicatthe length of time?
Mr. LAMTEEG. Probably less
theninlnntft.
The PRFSfIiG OFPICEI. Without
ohjection, il s so ordered.
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thin a real problem?
The Senator is recognized for 15Imifortuis
nateiy, It In. I have Article alter Article
,,,'.,Jidentifying incident after incident of
________
sexual Abuseof Pupils by their school
bus driver. I would be happy to make
CHILD ABUSE
Member who is
to sny
available
Mr. President. thene
Mr. AUTEBERG
Mr
Mr.
Interested
In seeing
them,
an
The ustion arises whether or not
yesterday the Senate accepted
the m-Fderal
Imto th
that I proposed torta~
Amendment
background checks work. I beaedeta!prooe
proving America's School Ant of 1993
which is designed to protect the chil
ove they will. My Amendment would
whihes
fetin
oontrwotechi
toe
losAlao
require-and
there may be some
drenInconvenience
here-the ingerprnting
from school on a schoolbus.
of prospective driverso their true
Mr. President,
woeful truth is
can not be hidden,
id.te the weltuhIidentity
During the 2 months after California
need protection
that thesePech
children
from
who drive
their schoolFedlerai criminal hackjiti
school- uto
ive theifr
peopeo
inn people
from the
bus. We all recognised the unfortunate ground chocks in IM, it screened nut
ttrace to
0 convicted sex offenders, child mofact that some people ae
the teaching profession ecauseigv
lenters and violent criminals who tried
to drive choolbuse.
them easy access to the chidrenperits
are the focus of their sexual desire. That falls us smething. This is chockdo not recogniz-r take Pro- Ing and my amendment vwill address
we
What
Wat
wdostrcgi-rtaei
cautions againsf-is the fact that some thin problem
on any given'school
Mr.
people drive schoolbases for the same
to children.
very
schoolride in Of
milion
day, 25For
Children-access
Chilrenwhorid
no cbnlboeo.bunco.
the children
vast nmajority
these
particularly those in their early years. children, the trip will be ae and unthe elementary sebool years. are ex- eventful. Unfortunately, for coma it
tremely vulnerable to physical abuse w
They are too young to comprehend
what is being done to them and they them for the test of their lives. SO
are too small to physically defend when that amendment Passed yeSterthemselves from an attack. Therefore day. Mr. President, I was relieved,
I appreciate the fact that y eolIt Is the responsibility of society t
offer as much protection as possible to leagues support this Amendment in
Protect children on their ride to and
this vulnerable population.
woring
o school. I look forward
My amendment recognes that reoerees o the lmproving
sponslbility by requiring all States to
do a Federal background check on po- America's Schools Act in order to entential schoolbus drivers before they sure that Federal background checks
are allowed to be alone with our chil- for sebonihus drivers remins in the
bill after conference,
down,
School boa drivers are unique. They
Amealune with students off school prup'RE DY DN NEW JESE
erty. often for extended periods of
time.
Mr. f.AiITSiBESi. Mr. Predideft. I
Mr. Presldent, we know that must of have another statement, Unfortothese People, by far, Are good. law-abid nately. It deals with not too dissimilar
log citizes, often Parents themselves, a subject, and that In Attacks on chilwbs hav, so intentions In molest or at- dren.
tack children, But them Are the others,
Mr. President. last week in New nosodws have to guard against them
soy, a terrible tragedy took place, a
I believe As I hape do many of my tragedy us recent that the child who
colleagues, that parents deserve to wan killed has rot yethd
A funera
know who i Alone with their children, service foerer burial.
At prascot, Ii States already conduct
A 7-year-old girl, Megan anks, wan
sate And Federal background checks sexually cesaaltid first and then brou
on theIr driven. My Amendment would t1aly murdered. It was a despicable and
not effect how these Btates administer horrifying crime that shocked people
their programs.
throeghout my State and throughout
There are 14 States which currently the Nation. Or hearte go out to her
selF do Stats background checks. My parents and her family. We can only
bill wold require those Staten to redi imagine the pan that they am going
ret the resourcs they am, putting through. We ali prcy that we will never
into tese background checks towards have in endure that hind of feeling
A Federal p
. While tha Intent of
Mr. President. the mantwho has conthes State programs are good, they fesoed Wothis ouimgpeou hilling alsoewflawed. A convicted sexual deviant ready bad been convicted of sexually
cn eslly move to one of these States,' related offenses. Be spent a lsrg time
receive a clean background check, and in confinement, Yet when be moved
begin driving his Prey to and from Into Megan's community, nobody In
school.
.
the neighborhood wan notified of his
Then there are the iS States which criminal history. So thin convicted sex
have no background checks for their offender was free to mingle freely with
school bus drivens. Theme s no rational the neighborhood children and to gain
reason for the lack of responsibility their trust. Meanwhile, the children's
these States Are demonstrating In this parents had no Idea who he wan or in.
Area,extreme danger he por.d.
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This hind of oituation is intolerable.
Mr. Presidest. Something is terribly
wrong when a dangerous sex: offender
can, move into a community filled with
young children, without any of the
neighbors even being notified of hia
presce.
It Io time we did something about
this, Mr. President- It Is long post
time.
In fart, lust year. the Senate adopted
As part of the crime bill a provision an
thored by the diatinguished Senator
fvrm Washington [Mr. ioiRreJIiwhich
would have conditioned Fedenl funds
on a State adopting a registry of sexual
predators, and providing for commaity notification when a sea Offender
esahiished a now residegie
Senator GoToN's Amendment was an
por t addon
il
rm
t h opparently
Iora
Unfortunately, iithe proposal
In cnene
hs ben w ane
I Am wrong I hae
hope
able,
heard and
thatI the
conference report does
not.prsvde for community notification
when A dangerous se Offender gets out
That to disturbing to me, Mr- Slmoldent, In oy view, when you're talking
about dangerous sexual offenders moving into A community, the neighboring
Parents have a right to know. And we
should use whatever resources w have
to encourage States to Provide fr such
notification
Mr. president, I know ther are se
who feel that once someone ha served
his or her sentence, they've repaid
their debt In ociety and that's the end
of it. But Mr. President, It to lust not
that simple. Yes, even convicted people
have rights. But comnmunities have
right. too. Parents have rights Young
children have rights.
And th bottom line far me,
President, is that the rights of chlodren
like Megan ank simply must come
first, In fact, for me, it is not even a
close call Beus, when you get right
down to It, nothing In more importnt
than protecting cur children. Nothing.
Be I look forward to worlng with
Senator (brS
to continue the pooh
fr a comunity notification requiremast, which already Is now widely
knows In Nfew Jersey An a Megan law.
Because, at a minimum, parents have
a right to know when their hide ae
going to be expo edti a dangerus eo
offender.
w
And we have a Moral responsibility to help pco
ide
them with that
Iyformatiln
Mr. President I hope we will pass toe
Megan law, and dolIt soos.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence o a Quorum.
The P SeDING OFFICES. The
clerk will coil the roll.
The assistant legislative edek proceeded to call the roil.
Ms. Mt LS
Mr. Preident. Io k
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum Call e rescinde,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It isso ordered
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Why do I bring this up? Because. It
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I
First. coverage might he lost for
bears upon the leader's amendment to move to rcossider the vote by which some Federal employees
clarify what was done on page 1432.see- the Amendment sAS agreed to.
Second, snlbs wor~e in the Privte
tion 1013. lines 21 through 24. And I
Mr DASCHLE. I move to lay that sector. Federal employees could not
understand his clarificatlon.
motion on the table,
get a Supplemestal besefit package to
But I must say. when it comes to a
The motion to lay o the table was Close the gap between what they get In
issue. that is as important to the agreed to
the standard package. Because the Ofhealth and welfare of every American
esios so cn
fine of Personnel Management Is nt
sad every tkmnily as health reform. we
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President. I regret required to offer Supplemental plans to
should not be thrust in a position, ny that earlier today a medical aanioyt- Federal employees they could end up
of us, where we are reading through most Prevented me from noting en a with 1em than they have sow.
this voluminous document in this maAmendmont
offered
by
Scooter
. I Worhed With Senator Hrny
ner
toASciwn which sought to expand an- in the Labor Commiottee markup to reI do not lay blame upon anyone In ness to health care in raral Areas. Rep- snivL these lsses. I offered an Amendtis Chamber for our finding ourselves resesting a rural State like iaine.
meat that woo Accepted that achieved
in ths circumstance. But I do think we Am cell aware of the speeial problems the following goals.
do ourselves and the people great harm thatroral Ara face Is fact, the first
First the Federal employees health
if we attempt to proceed and enact leg- comprehensive health care bill I itr
beneit program must offer a supplellation in this manner
mental benefit package:
It Allows Federal employee
Second
of
nealti
idcrudc
10
didi
And I think the reasons come down
My efforts with respect organiatious to Meet and confer with
We find that it is important politi- of rural caly I think we do damage to the po- to health care hare rautiely included O.P.M for thes policies and agree
li.al process-the governmental proc- particular focus on the seed to expand
uon ant
es-i we Insist on pursuing this ocality health care snrvices in Maine Third it aliens any American torcoUrse
.
and other ru States. Accordingly. ered by a health plan offered by
I beliete the Whole health care issue had I been able to vote, I wouid hare FEHRP to
has been moved forward in a masner joined my other colleagues in onani mes plan
whi h has already resulted in some mously supporting the Dasahie AmendThis p
s-bis-tial improvements. which has meet
field. Federal employees would hav
already focused attention on some ir-e--L
_ptavrs
a,,,orr i.s5
access to supplemental benefit Packpirtastc issues,
his. MIKUtLSEI. Mr. President, I rise oges, that many private sector employI
the President credit for that, I today to speak to the importance of 0es sow hav acess to and would congive 1Ms Clinton credit for that. We opening up the Federal Employees tinue to have Access to through nego
Lve sees greater cost containment in Health Benefit Plan to all Americans tiations with their employers
cer'aIn areas. In the private sector, we and to explain what this decision will
We seeded to correct ths situation
.a, seen hospitals. drug manufactur- mean to Federal employees. I would and this Anendmnt allowed that. This
ros and others undertake certain o- also like to respond to Comments made Is the proison that Senator MroCHti.
t:ns tihat probably never would have by the sesior Seator from Alaska who agreed to include In his bill and this is
b.n
were it not for the serious- said too things that concern me:
the Understanding of the Federal emness of purpose that hls arisen around
First, that Federal employees get pisyos Unions.
ad-e-s:rg this important national less on the standard benefit package.
It doesn't mean that the
i
and
Government will necessarily pay for
But I
my friends and coSec . that they gets supplemeetal the supplemental beneft
l.agues in this body. Democrats and benefit packae not available to 0th- Federal employees. Nor doss it ca
Repblticans. to take a step back now ern.
that them will be a Federal contribuand let us see if we cannot continue the
Opening up FEidP isa wise decision, ties to non Federal SEP
enrollees
process of narrowIng our differences. It allows Americans to have Access to who want to puhase a supplemntal
ard atter.pting to come up with a bill the very noun choice of health boor- package.
that Will do the job and not one which ante plans that we have, that the
It simply means that Federal cmis driven by time or by elections: one President lan, that Fedeeal employees pisyces. like workers in private ladenI-i allch we come together and do the have.
.
try. c negotiate With their employers
ho-esu of the people the right way.
FEllS? enrolls ever 9 millio em- to receive a contribution toward a sopThat
the nature of the calls which ployees and their families. It isa struc- piemeotal benefit. Federal employees
I am getting from my constituents- tur that exists everywhere In the are just being treated fairiy-jest like
n. lobbyists. but New Yorkers. And by country. You nan go to Frederick. bID many other Americans.
as oterwheming margin. about 3.1 to and there am FEIBP enrollees er you
I hope this clarifies the record. I be1. th calls that come in are saying. can go to Fairbanks. AE and there will lieve that we should have a health core
-Ye,. ce know there is a need for
be FEHBS enrollees. It Is a system system for oh Americans-that in anh.a!th care. Plea,.e don't rush to judg- which is in place sd it works fer its ceSible, affordable, rewards people
:71.t
enrollees. I amnAn FEHSP enrollee. I who ploy by the rules, and lets people
r:k is a rush to judgment
a a Sine CrossBlue Shield standard choose their own peovidern. That is
I lcfor
a
olption songle nly. I like my coverage what this Provision does. That Is why
And I thank my distioguished friend and I think that it is only right that opening up FEBP isa good idea.
aI clleague for setting me straight Americans have Ammo to the name
o *hs 1080tote
health insurance plans.
FE
r
B
S
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The maBut While are Am openl
p
ES,
T
B
L
tority leader is recognized
I have worked hard to make sure that
Mr. hETEENBAUM. Md. President.
.Mr MITCHELL. Mr. President. we we arc not taking anything away from ther are a lot of games being played
are prepared to proceed to have the the Federal employees. When concerns here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
am-edment adopted.
were raised during the Labor Commit- but ther are not many games being
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there tee markup. I Worked with the Federal played en the baseball fields In Amerforther debate?
employee cos
t meet those con- ins. Ther just 'Ain't no baseball being
If not, the question is on agreeing to corns. They Said that the bill treated played in the majer leagues these
the amensdment offered by the majority them differently free other Americans days."
leader.
and foe what I could se they were
The strike in major league baseball
The amendment (No. 2569)was agreed right.
Is now 1 week old. Ther lane sign that
to.
Why wts that?
millions of baseball fans are likely to

to.

give

taken

implore

is

thi
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reiw. Hsebslo
tot11n
o
ar sohjct
our bill
In One-toning
play any time Intered
se their favors toI
own have n such .orea
that we con move quicy.
In the near future.
neder no
to the ordinar
Frankly, thin i. the hunt hope te
Aa a Matter of fact. the rest of the
d aoor nenng fief
e
n
seson. the playoffs. and the World Se- runo hove to prenrve the reniindor oi
la hutog. suiaali 110
meno
the bnorhll soccus, the playoffs, and
in serions jeopardy.
rio are
unploln
rgronins
c
Wemust bring this strike to a speedy t
position- Should that
ent with is huresi
relution. Last week, Senator iATCli lon.
. the employees io strikeen, f the
o
tr. President. I nob ananleoon coand I introduced legislation to do just
Ithe
toms would othrWIe violateThd
sont that the Incter from Mr. Fehr be
that. As you would expoCt, the owners
laws. eek Court review. In the eiittan
told the media that the Metoznasen- printed In the RECORD.
ds It olcr that
hale
1lur, the se
Tre being no Objectinn. the letter
Halc bill would not do any good. But
rar Cap Is the
pose their
tony iatend
the
In
to be printed
ordered
wno
the players said nothing. So I called
tssoola-o aP, the piers ca
Don Fehr. head of the players
i Noeme oureou the
neither tre
M-. L
tion, and asked him what be thought.
as no
Vr AssoCIo
na cede
the ostitrolws.
OA-Act l'
Iast night I received Fehr'e response.
str.
u A
,
N
rk, iY
The way I read this letter it repreents
HadS 200 becowe Inn prior to the trihe.
Ilonoap
a strong indication that this strike
It would boos bees . major top fortard. tonact. Wnilstos. DC
U.
Could be brought to an early concluwith ded It might well hae had a heucil efIt
R
Mvti
Dan p
sion, and the season Could get underS. fact on the negotiatios bemuse thu owners
that I reviewed the hill.
great lotert
way very shortly after we act.
Act uf would hue sederteod that they mold cot
nel Face Protecto
238. the
Here Ia what be said:
impes the salary aP fre from
Ietroduced by yoularally
which w= wetly
ItadS. 230, the Mtsenbaume.atch bill,.
Mormoer. the players
sod Suracor Hatch loneffet to hring b antitous r-tiny.
boee law prior to the strike, It would have
woald hcve sotiocs to mansder other than
and sa this wsen
tc theletfield,More
bach the
ih hail for
tpfrad ido.I
beenhrsain
A maor atep frwad.
Indeed. It raight
than anyone. the players goinou strike.
Aishoegh
e manco knew
well have had a benefletaleffect on the negothat bad
for cornie. It is my beet Judent
regret that the uwue-s left then n oice
tlations because the owners would have on
aS. moo baen las-, It isn meh iron likely thct
to Intoerpt .a- cron
anddisappointing
derstood that they could n dostn
rom thttehclncneiteiy1.bt
ale se
grat ten scrike,
thre one,
fans eleayplayers cow Would be on strike. Ithe owners
pais hoesh sa
the plafr o frss
up wher. and.uenrtsstolc. affectieg ludiold- had aces equired to mnnudes the ntirrut
MAoreover,the pl-ae wouldave oyPppsai to
their
toswhntey fsrulateti
thn onlegon
Inmsederothe
clueother
tions to conalder
tha goin
stie ee ucle employed atI or seond roalor league r'
that
players hod k
The layers ander- teslo
one cannot snow forer-a.. ij dims during the s-uaii
Alth
,rle
thy had protectin under the antitrust
stood and appreia very much the=
Is my beat Judgment that had S. 2= been
ws the reent might well noew bees err
Htch t
by you end Sennoow
- lles
law, it ia much loss rikely that players
.
this
matter in resruatin us ines .pomabke.
would ben strihe,
ever, not at that poles. S. em
d that I
You hansk
The same letter, I believe, wan sent
snernti to the
nwoere
te rswtt
to Senator HATCH.
olrion owith
.e.Meorsalary
cap. end clearly Intend to ImPees It
The players believe that the Metsenwhat li
o
u
s
a
the su; ani a spike has begun.
baun-Hatch bill provides the key ele- the players to mushie
ending the strike
Even were S em to he ne e ted, it wd
. -ir
play- to end the
be very inct
a new mummie hargsin/pg
mets to end this strike. What the bill wlthoorahicg
strihe
withut an egreemess. That would
agreentwithewuers.
lanks i.a way to protect the more than
the salary rp
stoke or
a
n hns.there hs hes
SO major league players who could
!1.e .. with the players' ny r
Ironse bas/all overy time Is
imbout rn m
have their pay cut arbitrarily because
te
owers
with
hau
negotiated
MLPA
the
they do nut have
whichatery ben ap ws Iof ed inello in elsyThe strike
aet 22 ym,b
lIxZ
the
Ilesue
d.ri
g
sa
Fd
12 Auust I the eighth nt the top
season while the players hallene the
the pendec
ct
munecotins work toppage Is that periotr
owners In Court. The Players have a
they determined to
he lgation (calm
h
it
am frank to say, we em In sieslilcans,
good point which, l
did not conalder when crafting this leg- dreseos the ralatiouslip between the senes'
e us s lket aontracIs th
e oisa
islation. I do not se any reason why
antlmsot eesrytics ant their
coletive ro- ofste ce phe mcir
uldte scwe Conid not amend our bill to protect gaining relationship with
are more than see major
Pomd rules. %
ot qurotin. th uique =emptin fro N%
players from these arbitrary salary rednot ave te lar
ets
eat
rocts
d:r
ductions while their labor dispute is
to put themseles In that eceloan Meruse to he. amajor monributing factor to this
worked cut In court. According to.the
merest
Ouer S 28 wcu/t apply only to this
ns lega
history. The OWe
players, if Congress passes the Mesten-sy
tha fthe placer-end
spate, leang
e
It Iso surpris that they not like one.
banns-Hatch bill with this alight Modia -t time.
lath e
Simply pat, the owus position in thi
flation they are likely to go back to
ant findarnenal
honmer. thes critical
if.
ory argalung
no It Is in
years raito.
work. Peh- promised that:
prhlems can be addressed. we would serrd. Is to eist that tpt
d
r
l e m
king the players to t
ta
er
a
ed ayer wo
cne
o
I negotiations continue. Ai
emplunt cf players, dclgae
the player to whil
ctopcnsdee ning
e of thaomuswl
to the "eld while urgotiaono uco
.
prayer, freedomn to seek employment anti to sahteaseneta
pior
sged under toe previsions
oodnew.Te badartificially depress the free Msarket valrue ofh
Imly
Thi
agrem
t, rather than under ay sla
iis
use
Th/a is clearly good news. The headowaen
ally Impod terms end renditions, the Playd
t
U thy are moore In the kn
Of the players asoeciation /a
laws, su will cut give ur, eves temporarily, the
enorpon fro the anttrust
to their
that if we pass a bill that applies the
antitrust laws when any unilateral no terms or conditions of employment that only recurse that the Congess has provded
. And the layers me als repared
for t
can tome pn thy player or us/laterconditions are imposed, and prteeth
to sray esdtuckts nolong no io nsaary to
inspuan followin an Impose In hagsn
against automatic nnal
ailenit.
rate
new
an
apP1
seomr
the
antitrust
undier
be
obalisogod
eg.mey
lwsut.
b
m~ht
anitrot
durig
a
during all antitrust lasut, he might
0nomte
o
raubifslinya
oetht
r.fll
d
ial./cto
ho andorseahyattake keth
thelasnunte com isptt
players
reommoend
Conditiuns may cOnsusoemr
g-r-esuchhtsvrlfnad
asen Sput. Faan/itrCMand that
ta the the
saesn
tomse terms
end toe Cunosmer 3etoatino
field s
nd complete
the season.ed
neca
aga
ladihave
today
among ethers)
fredum frm the atitmet lawsIt Is this
Our task Is obvious. at the approshea/t
Is plans everywhers sated their vlew that toe Cnnee
priate point in time, the Senate should the atinrnot laws a
vise azeept in hirhy regulated odusmino- ant to eliminate toe oemo' etitean
set aside the health care bill Just for a
view. toe emp.
a- which gives the owe toe Inmetive to me- eseptius. nd that be their
few hour--because certa/ply the
In the
Major Contributing ses
tiunal health care bill has far more /p- tines to -L no they hans. They haie m-uop- tIes Is
esemberlng
worth
Is
Is
spike.
enrant
tom
.
u.
b
m
w
Ma
this
than
priority
portance and
ther Industris, and In pr tha
t
tee-but for a few hours to move a bidl 01
group takes a iffrenet
Other is-ProfessIonsa teanhepoeto, or tPuhli Interest
thatsanis end
that would put
to the baseball this Is set the moe. Rather, n these owners de.

all

tiny.

telling

strike, I wills continue work/pg with
know. ad ind. no the NFL sens.e
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arid any other Seator
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and.se

work with you and Senator Hatchon fiottin in the appointment of non- ,January 30. 197.ns modified by the order of
res in the conforosne on the die April 11. 1976. to the Committee On Approthe precise details of any sncb leislation.
Siseerely.
'
eing votes of the two Houses on priations. to the Committee on Budget and
to the Committee on Arred Services.
D .D M. Fam.
the endmet of the House to tie ll
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President. I IS. 1681) entitled "An Act to r-ise and
say to my colleague and friend
treamine the acquisition lawe of the
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
New York, I am very grateful for him Federal oen
ent. and for other perThe following reports of committees
permitting me to have
few minutes ponee:
II
for the interruption of a more imporAn additional cooferees from the were submitted
By Mr. INOUYE. -from the Committee on
taut debate on the health care bill. ,
Committee on Energy ad Commerce.
Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. President. I sufor cosideration of sections 4024(g) Indian Affais, with an amendment in the
of &substitute:
gest the absence of a quorum.
6nS? (s)i4) and (b)(). and 8005(o)i6) of nature
HR 4229.A bill th extend Federal recogr.iThe PESIDING OFFICER. The ma- the Senate bill. and modificatios eam
tien to the United Auburn Indlan Commurity lead.- uggeste the absence of
mitted to conference: Mr DInEtLL. Scr. nity of the Auburn Rancheria of California
qofrm
SwifTr ted Mr. MOORHEcAD.
(Rept No.
The cierk will call the roil.resnh
ofec
By Mr. PELL from the Committee on For.
The
legislative clerk promaseitant
eign Relations. without amendment and with
a preamble:
ceeded to call the roll.
SILLS SIGNED
AENROLLED
H. Co, Re. 215. A concurrent resolution
Mr. FORD. Mr. Pesideut. I ok uniai'
At
i:09p.m.. a message from the
mos csent
that the order for tire Hode of Reprosetat es. delivered by honoring Jaies Norman Hall and rcognizIng his oo-ecanding concributions to the
.ri
all berescinlded.
Mr. Hays, no f its reading clerks, to- United States and the South Pcfic.
ThePRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutj conc d that the Speaker bus signed
By Mr. PELL, from the Commctoee o For
ebleatios. it toentordered.
the folowieng enrolled bills:
eign Relations. without amendment:
olum
S. 129. A bill to provide for an investiga_
IP. 2947. Ans o to eAtsnd
. for no di
tine of the whereabouts of the United States
tihne l to yetrs the Aothoriotin of tbe citizens and others who have been missing
MORNIND BUSINESS
frem Cyprus sActe :s74.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President. I ask unan- tin to ertablish a wemorial; sod
Imous consent that there now be a peHiE. 4970. As tot t desigsate the United
riod for morning business, with Sen- States coershous undersestnotios In St
EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF
sil.
s the Thnnns F Eagiet..
ators permitted to speak therein for up Los
COMMITTEES
United States Courthouse.
to 5 mint"0"
The following esecutive reports of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
committees were submitted:
objection. It is so ordered.
MEASURES REFERRED
By ir NUNN. trow the Con.i':-e on
Armed Serices:
The following bill wus read the first
Jadith A. Miller, of Oh. to be General
MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE
and send times by unanimous con
Counset of the Department of Defense
At 2 23 pm. a message from the Sent and referred as indicated:
Walter Beaker Siocornbe.of ste District of
e Coeces. Columbiac to be Under Secretacy of Defse
Hft 4". Ac at to
House of Representatives, delivered by
Coet Aer for Policy;
Ms. ontz. one of its reading clerks, as-s
nounced that the House has passed the Of 1974 to limit cossideratios of one
Sandra Kapan Stuart of North Caroina.
emergeny lrgislation. to Sean Asrtant Secretary of Defense
emergency matom
following bill. In which it requestse
to he oer o
Senate.rrsuant
of the
Jan Lodal. of Virginl. to be Deputy Unde.
concurrence
r~oourreosof
ireSente.gen
4. M,17to t~ ouitos
ansth conot
Secretary
of Defensefor Poiicy.
H
490 L An Act to ameed the Congres- td to the Cmmitre on orerentai AfJosephNye. of Massachusetts. to be
Asa onal Budret ad Impoundment CoentrolAct fntrs
sistant Secretary of Defene; and
of 197 to limit consideration of nonPhrlip Edward Coyle. III. of the District of
emergency matten in emergency legislation.
Columbia. to be Director of OperaNionalTest
The message also announced that the
MEASURES PLACED ON THE
and Evaluation. Department of Defense.
House insists upon its amendments to
CALEDAR
(The above nominations were rethe bill (S. 1485), a bill to extend cerThe following Slls wore read the net- ported with the recommendation
that
tars satellite carrier compulsory 11, nd time ond planed os tie caleodan
they be confirmed. Subject to the nomiceoses. and for other purposes, and
nees commitment to respond to reSeros
Seashel
th
e
on
to
hetnebl
the
Senate
ask a conference with
quests to appear and testify before any
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses ployrm tadtheownersof
r ler
duly constituted committee of the Senthereon, and appoints Mr. BROOKS, Mr,
ail In order to Intent 0 te
bytoe
ate.)
HGE. Mr SYNNAR.
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. er or n loot
by the eners so that
By Mr. PELL. from the Camittee on F..FRANrK of Massachusetts. Mr. MOOR- fant will he able t enjoy the minder ci
Relationsthe basebaliceason. the playoffs. cr5 he oegn
HAD. Mr, COBLE.and Mr. FInH as e
Neil H. Offen. of the District of Columbia.
Series.
part
World
managers of the conference on the
the &eretaryof to he a Member of the Board of Directors of
to reqire
Of the Hoe.Airt the Sisuor
sod bil
liomn
heonstv
rsd
the Inter -American Foundation for a term
expiring October 6. 1908;
goida
n
At 352 p m.. a message from thy health care fraed nn
Ralph Earle. II. of the District of Colum
Hnuse of Reprsentatives. delivered by- f
Abl
b!,. to te Deputy Director of the Uiled
thee.
Ms Goetz, one of its reading clerks. an- Heslth Core Roe Act.
States Arms Control and D:sarmament
Agenacy;
ortced that the House agrees to the
Richard Holbrooke. of New York, to he an
r'port of the committee of confrence
Assistant Secretary of State:
on the disagreing votes of the two
EXECUTIVE AND OTHER
Richard L. Greene. of Maryland. to be
Horoe on the amendments of the SenCOMMUNICATIONS
Chief Financtal Officer. Departmet of
ate to the bill (RR.
4603). making apcommunicatiess were State.
follr wing
Thebefore
of laid
the Departments
i for
propriat
the Senate. together with
Phyllas E. Oakley. of Louisiana. to be an
Dertrtea
fo th
propmrito
Csmmerce. Justice. and State. the Ju- accompanying papers. reports, aod doe- AssIstant Secretary of State; and
dinary. and related agencies progra.
Brady Anderson. of Arkansas. to be Ambase
d
w
for the fiscal Fear ending September 30cot
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
the United States of America to the Unitod
1995.and making supplemental approRepublic
of Tanania.
E
and
prlations for these departments
NomisneeBrady Arderson.
agencies for the fecal year ending SepEoie Olor of tirerent
norBdit.
Post: Ambassadorto Tanzania.
rento tonmite
Orsoe o
tember 30, 1994. and for other purposes. tin.
The following is a list of oil member of
The message also announced, that tery persoel accosnts for sol year 15; my immediate
and their spouses. I
tire Spetker makns the fellowingiodi- refTerud jointly. prsast to the ordsr of have asked eachfamily
of these persons to inform

ftrom

a

13-340).

L

n

~leth
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,a
uiiseu Incest and Sexual Abuse dramati lucre,ase fromPremiu-s lirstyear o
I
to
in
1969.
Salesat S75*
PANS AND COMMUNITIES PRO- Heit, Day.
Premiumha s become an integralpart ofthe
As the co Hg hus doanaed oat altos
TECTION ACT
ties his week. I think it is Important to retied bsiniress cas minity of Cicero, prouidingemO why t is so iportant tat aiti-caimelegis- playmesttar hundreds of Ilinois residents
HON.MIE SYNAR
tuon Stronglyaddress tie probtemat sealt Ittugiiat its history. On August 26. 1994.
ira.,sa
celebrate theiranniverus Stresgthei- Premiumwill officially
abuse thrugh such measures
!. THt, HOUSEOF EPRESENTATIVS
ietiary mss te th prosecutus of sry at a rbecue with their current and
Augg
Thursday.Tiirada.
caild swislatrs and naotying Communities farmer emyloy ees.
tasutI.199
Mr. Speaker , I am proud to recognize PreMrSYNAR. Mr. Speaker, t is a sad and when sexual predators are presest.
The Statistics on child abase end sexual mici Markeing Systems on their 25th annunfortunate fact that throughout our greatNaas at chiidren are grim In t992, 2.9 miliss nersary. Its nontributionsto the busrness cortien this summer baseball tens from Little
Leaguers to the President are sorely dis- chid Cases were reportd to child pratecas mushy, as wet l as its Seravice
and dedication to
Cloom. ant eserving of recognition. I uge
appointed mat tor the eighth timein eight ne- Set-iwe [CPS] agencies. This represents a 50
gotiations majorleague players we on stnke. percentirease Is tetwaredchildabuse Cases my Colleague
s to paricipale in this worthy
WhileHansare disapponted. many others feel hetween t9a5 and 1992. Bid despite this in- celnti n.
a real ecoaommimpact of the strike. Those crsase in the repothng at Cases, there rain
that host major league teams theusands ofchildrenwhose cros go unheard
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To ma matters worse, is the 2 weeks averge at aser three childdeaths a day. Atsice the stike began, tide progress in resolv- mat 84 parcent those ctildren mareunder
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needs to make good on his pledge of as-

lons wsith Sinn Fie s leader Gerry
Adams It was those Hume-Adams

sistance. More important. in the long
run. Is the increased interest of the
United States private sector in making
job-creating investments in Northern
Ireland. Without increased employment and economic growth to build
upon a political settlement. the permsnence of peace is in serious question: in
my opinion.
We wait the next steps In the Northern Ireland peace initiative. I am convinced that the moment has arrived to
begin the final march toward resolving
the troubles so neighbors can live in
peace and harmony. without the bullet
and the bomb.
Perhaps the historian J. Bowyer Bell
stated it best in the concluding sentences of 'The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence." He wrote.
It is such a small. lovely island and they
are such a grand people* '- Great issues

talks that prodded Irish and British
leaders Into more active efforts to

reach agreement on a framework for
the peace process-eocompassed in the
Downing Street Declaration of December 15

1993. The Hume-Adams talks

also helped to create the political climate that enabled the IRA to decide to
foressear violence as an instrument for

ending British rule. And knowing John
Hume as I do. I'am confident that he
will continue to play a pivotal role as

the

newly

energized

peace

process

gains steam.
British Prime Minieer John Major

also deselves special Congratulations.

as well. for making a solution to the
crisis in Ulster a priority for his ad-

ministration. Although he has sought

additional clarifications from the IRA
concerning its August 31 declaration.
he has take some very constructive
stps to further the process, I applaud.

for example. his gesture of instructing

that British troops in Northern Ireland
replace combat helmets with berets-a
signal that
symbolic bat
Britain does have some measure of

important

faith in the IRA's declaration
Prime Minister Major s continued
participation in the peace efforts is
.cretical Only he can persuade the
Unionists that It is in their interest to
sit down at the negotiating sable and
find a political solution to their diffecces with Ulster's Nationalist
Catholic pol:tical leaders Only he is in
a position to respond to events as they

unfold with gestures designed to build
confidence and trust in the negotiating
track Such actions as lifting the
broadcast ban on members of Sinn Fein
would serve to do so; and in any event.
the continuation of the broadcast ban
with an open political
is
dialog Returning Republican prisoners
currently held in Irish or British jails

inmpatible

to Beifast. and downsizing the deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland are also likely to reassure ele-

meets of the IRA that there truly is a
peace dit:dend in laying down their
arms
There are those in the United States
and particularly in the Irish-American
who are already asking.
'What can the United States Governmen and the American people do to
further the peace initiative and end the
troubles?' The most important contribution that the United States can

community

make is to assist in the rebuilding of

an Ulster economy that has been devastased by decades of conflict and neglect. In the end. peace will be fleeting
if there continues to be significant unemployment and economic decay in
Belfast,
Both the U.S. public and private seetor have roles to play in revitalizing
the Ulster economy. President Clinton
has already pledged to provide financial assistance in support of the peace
process. I hope that before Congress adjourns next month, we will have given
that President whatever authority he

r

Il compas bus
have been fought ou ina
not to resolution or exhaustion. And so for
the Irish troubles a generation is gone and a
censury is running out, but not Irish pprsistence The Irish. whatever else, are indomisable.
Ultimately. It is that indomitable
spirit that will produce the peace that
all the men, women. and children of
Ireland have long sought and have so
long prayed for.
My sincere hope is that they will not
be disappointed as this process unfolds.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Ohio is recognized for 15 minutes.

THE BASEBALL STRIKE
Mr. METZENBAM. Madam President. I am about to ask unanimous
consent to bring up S. 2380. a bill sponsored by Senator HATCH and myself
that is designed to end the baseball
strike. Because I do not want to disrupt the Senate's business, I would be
happy to limit debate on this bill to I
hour equally divided. I am willing to
take this unusual step because I have
no alternative. There are no amendable
items currently before the Senate. or I
would offer the bill as an amendment
to another pending piece of legislation.
But the baseball bill cannot wait any
longer. If we do not act immediately to
end the baseball strike, the owners
have threatened to declare the season
over as early as tomorrow. No more
season. no playoffs, no woe Id series, unles we act immediately.
with Don Fehr. head of
Today I
the Baset'1 Players' Association. He
stated that if we pass S. 2380, with a
few minor clarifications. he will recommend that the players call off their
strike immediately and resume the
baseball season. I want to repeat that
Madam President. Today I spoke with
Don Fehr. and he said inunequivocal
language that if we pass S. 2380. with a
few minor clarilications. he will reeommend that the players call off the
strike immediately and resume the
baseball season,
. .

spoke
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What that means is quite simple: If
we act quickly to pass this bill, the
baseball players are willing to complete this season, the playoffs. and the
World Series. It is only fair to point
out that Don Fehr cannot speak for all
of the players. but as the leader of that
organization, he is in a position to reeommend it. and I have every reason to
believe that his recommendation would
be accepted.
It Is very simple- If we pass this bill.
I believe the baseball season will be
salvaged. That is why it is so important that we pass this strike-ending
baseball legislation immediately-not
tomorrow. not the next day, not next
week. not after the baseball season is
closed. although it is only fair to say
that I will not give up in my effort
even if the baseball season should be
shut down.
Our bill is very simple. It does not
eliminate the players' right to strike
or the owner's right to loch them out.
It is not a blanket repeal of baseball's
antitrust immunity-an effort that I
have made over a period of many years.
but I have not been successful. In the
committee it was voted down 10 to 7. I
did not have the votes to get it out of
committee. But this is a much mere
limited version. This is a totally knew
bill. very limited in its impact. The bill
allows the antitrust laws to be invoked
only if the owners impose a salary cap
or any other terms and conditions on
the players. This should take away the
owners' incentive to play hard ball and
impose unilateral conditions on the
players. It should also relieve the players fear that they need to maintain
their strike in order to prevent a salary cap from being shoved down their
throats when the season ends.
As everyone knows. I fought hard for
years to lift that very exemption that
baseball enjoys. It was not a congressional enactment that gave it to baseball. It was the decision by the very
distinguished Supreme Court Justice.
Oliver Wendell Holmes. who determined that baseball was a sport and
not a business. I think the American
people now know that it is very much
a business-not a small business. a big
business. The antitrust laws should be
applicable to baseball as it Is to football, hockey. soccer, and every other
sport in this country.

I believe that revoking the owner's
antitrust immunity is the best longterm solution to the mess that the
owners and the players have made of
major league baseball. However. I decided to offer this compromise bill,
with Senator HATCHas a cosponsor. so
that we could bring this strike to an
end quickly.
The fact is that this legislation has

only one purpose: To protect the season for all the fans. It is not for or
against a salary cap; it is not for or
against revenue sharing; it is not for or
against any other proposal the owners
have made.to the players, and it does.
not tip the balance of ongoing labor ne-
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gotiations in favor of the owners or the
players.
The fact is I really do not have any
special sympathy for the overprivileged owners nor for the very highly
paid Dlayers, but I care about the fans.
This strike is ruining the season for
the fans. Rlht now the big league
players cannot use the antitrust lass.
If they could, the owners would have to
deal with them fairly or face the cansequsces In a court of law. In other
words, what this bill does is it gives
the players another tool they can use
to avoid striking. go back to work, to
bring the strike to a quick end.
The last seven times the baseball
players and owners have met at the
bargaining table there has been a work
stoppage. Seven times across the bargaining table resulted in a work stoppage: a strike or a lockout.
This has not happened in other professional sports because those players
could use the antitrust laws to settle
labor disputes. Professional basketball
players have avoided a strike for 24
years by using antitrust laws. Professional football players have not struck
since 1987because they were able to se
the antitrust laws to settle their differences. There has never been a strike
in professional hockey over labor Issues.

If the antitrust laws applied to baseball, the owners could not fores the
players to accept unreasonable terms
and canditions if their labor negotitions hit an Impasse. The players could
challenge the owners' unreasonable demands by launching an antitrust uit
instead of shutting down the season.
Wonid that not be a better resolutin? Would it not be better to have
this matter In the courts rather than
have it where it is at the moment with
no games being played and nothing
happening in baseball? I think that
would be a much better deal for the
fans, and, frankly, I think it would be
a mach better deal for the owners as
well as the players.
Passing this compromise legislation
is the only bope we have of saving the
seas for the fans and maybe next
year s season as well. But it Is up to
the players and the owners to come to
the bargaining table and work out
their differences, We, in Congress, cannot make them do that. All we can do
is level the playing field so that the
owners do not have an unfair advantage over the players because they are
immune from our fair competition
laws. I. like every other fan in America, want the players to play ball and
the owners to play fair. I believe our
bill can do just that.
I hope there will be no objection to
my unanimous-consent request, but I
recognize the roles in the Senate and
recognise the right of any Member to
object.Madam President, I ask unanimous
consent to bring up S. 23B0for immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
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position we permitted the owners to
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Madam President. resery- take.
I respect the fact that the objection
ing the right to object, I do not suppose
there Is a person in this body that is has been made, and I yield the floor.

more of a baseball fan from longstand-

Ing than Is the Senator from Nebska.
I an so discouraged and so distraught
as a fan that the owners and the playem-and they are jointly responsible It
seems to mo-have brought upon themselves a pattern of these strikes that
my long-time friend and colleague
from Ohio has brought out with his remarks
marks.
However. I have to feel that It would
be a bad precedent indeed for the U.S.
Senate in the middle of this kind of a
strike or strife, as much as I would like
to see the season continued and as
much. as a fan, as I would like to see
the World Series come about for the
annual fall clssic, I think that the
measure that the Senator from Ohio
has authored Is something that should
be considered, but I think it is an Illcoosidered move for us as the U.S. Senate to try to step into the breech at
this particular point in time. I think it
would set a bad precedent. I think it Is
not essential.
It is very essential for a baseball fan
like myself and other fans similarly
situated. Certainly it is critical to the
interest of the baseball playera and the
owners of the baseball teams-.
I simply will objnct to this unanimanus-consent request because I think a
bad precedent indeed would be set here.
and I belleve that this Is not the proper
time or action for the U.S. Senate to
become involved in the matter of profeasional baseball.
With those remarks then and auing my friend from Ohio that I feel and
share some of his concerns, I wish to
work forward and look forward to
working on this again in the future and
although the distinguished Senator
from Ohio will not be with us next year
when we come back and, therefore, will
not be able to lead the charge, I will assore him that this is a matter that as
one Member of the Senate I will give
additional consideration to at the proper time.
But for the reasons that I have expressed, I feel compelled to object to
the unanimous-consent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
MATHEws). Objection is heard.
The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I
expected the objection and I respect
the rights of my good dear friend and
colleague from Nebraska. and, indeed. I
agree with him that there is no greater
enthusiastic fan of baseball than is he.
He is within his rights in making the
objection.
I intend to keep trying to pass thin
bill to the last moment that I am in
this body. Even if we cainno longer salvage the season, I want to try to save
spring training and next season. I am
concerned that tere just may not be a
next season if we here in the Senate do
not do something aboot the e-sided

MORNING BUSINESS
ISRAEL AND TEE PAtESTINIANSONE YEAR LATER
r
today. SopMr PELL
. 1994.Is the anniversary of a
hsr
hismoricoccasion Is the march toward
peace in the Middl
a
e
es
lav
Sahie and PO
Miite
Yltk
some
Ratit
Mhaistea Yasir
gentle prodding from President lintos-osk handa to connlode the signlog ceremony for their agreement n
mutual recegnitin. That handshake
set is motion a ehain of events seer
the sect 12 months that led to the estabisinnt of Palestioian self-governmost Is Jericho and Gaza, and to an
agreement for mor limited Palcotisian autonomy-known as the "Early
Empowerment" of the Palestinans-in
moat of the remainder of the West
Bank
Today's anniversary Provides in op.
portuolty to refict on the landmark
signing ceremny, to see whether
the agreement ha lived up to is itial promise, and to ponder what lies
ahed in the coming yesr.
ring my time in the Senate, I have
attended many functions and ceremonies at the White Rose. Few Of
these, however, he been a moving or
memorable en the Iocael-PLU signing
ceremony. Never have I witoesed such
a discernible range of emotions and
seotimeote In a public setting. Ther
was hope that the agreement would
bring to a close decades of conflict,
mistrust and hatred. Ther wes oadness
in the slemn remembhences of lost torH and Palestinian non and danghte. There ws an undercurrent of reo
oncllltlon in the act of mutual mcogmitin. Ahove all, ther was a sense
of certitude among the participants
and crowd that history was In the makIng
Since the ceremonies and celebratins, however, the terelis and Palestiniano have encountered a great deal
or difficulty in Implementing the peace
agreement. Ther have Seen charges of
bad faith on both sides, and continoing
acts of terrism-the homhings of inoent Israeli$ at Mule and Hedeira,
and the murder of scores of ncent
Palestinians at the Hebron Mosquehave threatened to undermine the
process at variou limes.
I know that many toraeils, and for
that matter, many Americans. remain
distrustful of the PLO and Chairman
Arafat. While 1, toe, continue to harbor
some reservatine about Arafat, I
think If the lst year has proven anything, it is that Arafat and the PLOds
represent the will of Palestinian pepie. Notwithstanding our doubts, we
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It s not fair to say that, The polls keep perhaps 11 billion. In the last several ligh -and one of those is the American Unisaying that Americans want universal care.
ar,
communities in Florida have vers ty of Armenia.
They even say health care is a human right, made substantial invmtments in n
TOnight I want to tell you some of my nxwhich of course It isnt isIs, at best, an ins
enc as the first Ambassador of the
plied right the way privacy is.
ed States to the Republic of Arenoia. I
There's a dialectic to being one's brother's very clubs that will not be able to play.
t to tell you something about what the
This crisis has hurt Ploroda and Unit ed States Government is doing in Armekeeper It isn't simply. "Christ asserted it
and therefore it's right." It's a living thing. America. Clearly, it is time to subject via. And I want to tell you why I believe in
I don't have the credentials to be theo- Mor
League Baseball to the name the utum of Armenia.
logical, but I do think that the act of taking laws of competition chat apply to the
o, r Embassy in Yerevan, the first foreign
care of everybody in ott health cae system rest of business in our
unt
No Emb assy in Armenia, opened In Februry
will make us out brother's keeper. It will
in the Brazdan Hotel Now we are In the
emancipate as to attack the other enormoos o
f
rh
ding that once was home of the Young
problems that we mass solve We can't have trust enemption.
Cemmunist League. We have about fifteen
people hungry every night. We cant have
Major League Baseball has used it
cicaneswating in our Embassy from the
children uneducated. But we do. We have Cu
op antitrust oxemption to prevent fratn
rtment of State, USAID, USIA and the
stop that We won't survive otherwise. And ehine migration ta areas mor willing Po e Corps, and about sixty Armenin emnowhere is it written that every society sur- to support teams, A fonsequence of ploy es. Plus there are 25 Peace Corps Volunvives' It's written somewhere that they al
hi failure to allow che market to de
toot In Armenia. with more to come in July.
perish. Ad
peih wevgaalsh
eve
'n got all the centals
credentiast Cu temrine franchise location in a wide
As you may know, in August 1992 I was
go down the road to oblivion-not tomorrow
nominated to be Ambassador by Presior the next day, but not necessarily very disparity between franchises. This, in frrst Bush. After the 1992elections, President
dens
turn, had led to the revenue-sharing
much later. Time is running out.
You are patting heath care reform in the proposal to be financed by a ceiling on Clint on re-nominated me. I was finally conby the Senate in May 1993. I arrived
context of a much larger moral crisis.
players' salaries. Thus, the issue which InIi ed
erevan with my wife Carol that same
I do see health care reform as crucial to is at the heart of the current conth, o year ago.
national civic surival. Consider some of the
und
our diplomats in Yerevan mute livhuge pr have: air pollution, waste
Ing, much like the residents of Yerean, frea misuse of the
is attributble
m e antitrust
lse,
he,
schools. hmeso.
failed schank
disposalb
en-gon
nxemption. toAdditionally
tre
Isel
feled
tly without electricity, heat, or water.
in the streets, hunger. The common denomi
nator is that there are no resure available moval of the antitrust exemption The e was, and often still is, only about one
ould be an incentive to the players to Or t wohours of electricity each day. During
to solve these problems beyond what's a
ready out there. Then consider health care, go back to work and continue negutia' th first winter, our diplomats often wrote
thei r cables by the light of butane lanterns.
which is the biggest problem, and one that t
affects everybody. Homelessness affects
I urge my
in the name of De diplomat found that his laptop computer
do t start unless he heated it up first on
those who thoa
have
to
live around the homele,
our
national
pastime-to
cootop f his wood stove.
avetort
wo
restoring
chis
miraton
o
aras
orewil
is
and it affects some sensitive people, but othw we are fortunate to have generators
erwise the problem belongs to the people who
and kerosene heaters in our homes and at
are homeless-and so on with all the prob-'ve baseball's antitrst nnemption..
Embossy. Most Aroenians are not so
-he
lemes I mentioned. But when you get to
luck] y. Nuclear physicists are working by
health. it's everybody's problem-if not
cand lelight. A factory that used to produce
SPEECH BY U.S. AMBASSADUR TO
today. then tomorrow And it's the only somit oprocessors is making kerosene stoves.
ARMENIA
cial problem that we can fix using the edaily newspaper, The Voice of Armenia
sorces-manpower
facilities,
expendieing printed on ice-cream wrapping
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President. recently, is
turns-we already have in place.
I don's want tube apoalyptc, bus I think I ead in the news of the Armenian pope r. The winter before I arrived. the temtrovesy-aceilng
o
plaers'sala
che ease c
he made in terms of the no
General Benevolent
Union,
a eptech by pe tore inside school classrooms was often
Iea. moo-the pnlarm n.the haere ee Ambansador Harry Gfilmore, the U.S he
w freezing. Some classes consisted of litdespair, the dissatisfaction with]thr
Ambassador
cu
to Armenia.
tineolimo thanjumping up and down to stay
petesa-thos health cure reform offers us
Becau.eit har insights into the prtb- mom
nor last best chance to rLseorea
oft
Bssnse
eided from the beginning thee or Emam nsking tO bass3 should have three goals: first, to help
cii iadcivic
rnpmirit.
lemrs
fated
Armenia.
awinsert
it ininto
the ICONGESSIONAL
A enia survive, emphasizing humanitarian
RECORD at the end of these brief nastir tance; second. to try to help Armenia
ankle eve peace, and an end to its economic
GF THEACT
marks,
COSPONSORSHIP
BASEBALL
PRESERVATION
The United States must eert ever
lion, and third, to help Armenia build a
ocratis government and new free market
hoedm
aMr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I lend effort to see chat Armenia and can
teofl- omy that will allow Arnenians to sonAnerbaijan,
y support to the Rational Pastime neighborsTurkey and
their own destiny, and guarantee their
Preservation Act submitted to the new lv toge ftr in peace.
awnwi
future.
This Is in the best anceests of Arme
Congress by Senator DANIEL PATRICK
LPN AR NIASURVIVE:HTIMAUrARIAN
and cosponsored by Senator olr and is in the best interests of Tur
MGOYIHo'IAN
MSSIS" CE
key and Anerbaijan.
JOpN WARNER.
O r first job has been to help provide huBut there n e emotional barriers to
Ote again, Major League Baseball
tartian
aid,
so
Armenia can survive the
mom
this,
achieving
an
warrant
not
it
does
that
shown
has
omic crises caused by the collapse of the
exemption from or antitrust laws. Our
While those emotional barriers re- S
et Umon and the war. The Armeniannational pesciase has been silenced, main, the people of Armenia struggle.
Am r Iean community, the Armenian Church
ith little or no immediate prospect of 1This speech was given in Las Ange- and other private donor organizations have
a resumption in play.
les, son Jose d. 1ll4, to guests attend- been extremely active in these efforts. Soon
Mr. President. today is perhaps the ing a fundraiSing banquet fur the after the Embassy opened, the U.S. Agency
coldest day of the winter so far thin American
University
of Armenia. for Itnternational Development located its rewhir I have had the privilege of visit- gi n al office for the Coueasus in Yerevan,
season, On these chilly days, our Na
and or government got involved in a major
tion shoeuld be on the verge of antici- inn in Armenia.
way.
The speech follows:
patiog the annual ritual that signals
M.isch of our time has been taken up by the
Hann GicoeancUtoTno SEA-s
hope of warmer weather on the way;
tics of getting wheat and fuel moving to
the crack of bats at spring training.
SEP
A
SSeAmaORo
B TOc rYC
OUAMA
ISS
OA
T
Are nia. I now know more about the Geor
But spring training could ho lost. The
Distinguished friends and guests of the gan railway system than I ever wanted to
possibility-which would compound the Amerian Uniereity of Armenia, I brag you know . When U.S. government wheat was
loss of part of the in9 regular season a otry tonight of darknms and light. The stna- ded in Batumi, in Georgia, because
and the World Serieszunderscores the darkes you know, Armesia as going ther was no electricity to run the Georgian
ays, we chartered diesel locomotives,
mosgb perhaps the most duffsuls period It ri
uf prompt consideration ofrsthe
urgesy
ohas
red since the end of first Republic of and rovided fuel for them. When there was
Nat
Armenia be 190AThe people of Armeni have
sh rtage of wheat in Armenia, because the
ar Florida, the loss of spring train- been living wtiouc heat and light. binot by train in Georgia weren't running. we obmould result in an estimated lass in war end economie hardship. Sot in the mid
Caine d money to buy kerosene and diesel fuel
tourism dollars of at least 111 million, R of the darkness
tle
thor are some islands of in trrade to the Armenian farmers for wheat.
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State assembly,I can personally
vouchfor the rASEBALL FANS AND COMMJ
town's embodiment
of all of those smailtown NITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1995
virtues,the hardwork,thepatriotism,thespirit
of volunteerism
andhelpingone'sneighbor.
HON.
BARBARA
F. VUCANOVICH
HON.
JOHN CONYERS,
JR.
Notwithstanding my newdutiesas chairman
OFMcmCAN
of the HouseRulesCommittee,Mr. Speaker
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
IN
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
I still intend to retun homeas manyweekWednesday, January4, 1995
Wednesday, January4, 1995
endsas possibleto visit the goodpeopleof
Mrs. VUCANOVICH.
Mr- Speaker,States Schodackandallthe othersmallcommunities Mr. CONYERS.
Mr. Speaker,
todayI am inwith a sourcetaxlevy a tax on the retirementthat will alwaysreflectthe tre heartandtrue troducing
the Baseball Fans andCommunities
incomeof retireeswhono longerresidein the character
of America.
ProtectionAct of 1995. It is time that ConState.Thousandsof seniorsacrossthecoun- Mr. Speaker,
I askyou and otherMembers
finallysteps up to the plateand ends
try receivetax bills fromStateseventhough to join me in congratulatingthe town of gress
whichis at the
antitrustexemption
many of these retireeshavenot livedin that Schodackon this occasionof its 200thbirth- baseball's
mot of the current strikeand whichhas hiStateforyears.In everyCongress
since1988, day.
away from the
jacked
the
national
pastime
I have introducedlegislationto prohibitthe
that havesupportedit
fans and communities
sourceis
for so long.
I was very pleasedlast spring,when the
baseballis the onlyindustryin
Professional
EMPLOYEE COMMUTE OPTION
Senate unanimously passed a sourcetax bill.
the UnitedStatesthatis exemptfromthe antiI was even more pleasedwhen,in the final
being subjectto alternative
trust
laws
without
weekof the 103d Congress,the Housealso
A.MANZULLO regulatorysupervision.
HON.
DONALD
Theremay havebeen
passeda bit to prohibitthe sourcetax. UnforOFIU-Nols
a time whenthis uniquetreatmentunderour
tunately,theSenateandHouse versionswere
antitrust
laws
was
a
source
of prideand disIN
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
notIdenticalandtherewas no timefor a conlinctionfor the many wholovedthe game.But
ference,
Wednesday,January4, 1995
thattime has ended.Thecontinuingbaseball
to
TodayI am againIntroducinga proposal
MANZULLO.
Mr. Speaker,todayis truly strikeof 1994-whch endedthe regularseaprohibitthe source tax The bill I am introduc- a Mr.
landmarkday in the historyof this country.
which endedthe possibilityof a World
ing will exempt all retirementincome trom On November8, the eitizens spoke out son,
for thefirst timein 90 yearsandwhich
Stateincometax if the individual
receivingthe againstbiggovemmentand unfundedman- Series
has
very
nearly ended the loveaffair of the
incomeis not a residentof the State.This leg- dates.
Americanpeoplewith their nationalpastimeislatis will notplaceany cost on the Federal
now
became
the Baseballstrikeof 1995.
We
have
a
unique
opportunity
to
curtail
has
Govemment and may evencausea modest many,if not all, unfunded mandates
this Con- If Congressfails to take swift actionin the
increasein Federal revenues.
gress.Onekey mandateis the employee
this
lingeringstrike has the
trip
104th
Congress,
This measurediffersIn two ways from the reduction containedin the Clean Air Act of strongpotentialto destroy
yet anotherseason;
bill I sponsored
in the 103dCongress.
Thatbill
andI, for one,am notgoingto stand bypasincludeda capon the amountof lump-sum 1990.
If
you
thought
the
electorate
was
angry
in
sively and watch that happen.
distributions exemptedfrom the sourcetax. November,
wait untiltheyhear about this reI am proudthat the HouseJudiciaryComMy new bill Willhaveno caps. Also,for the strictionon their abilityto drivetheir own car mitteeat the closeof the last Congress
voted
104thCongress the measurecoversall retire- to work. The employeetrip reduction, known to repealthe nonstatutory
antitrust exemption
mentplans,not just thosethatqualifyfor spe- also as the employeecommuteoption, re- createdbyan anomalous
SupremeCourtdecial taxtreatmentbythe FederalGovemment quiresbusinesses Withover 100employees
in cisionin 1922.Thatdecisioncreatedthe noThesechanges,whichextend the measureto certainareasto forcetheir employees
to car- tion that baseballsomehowdid not involve
all retirementincome,makethe billmore fair pool to work. Thus,the employeecommute
"interstate commerce"and thus was beyond
becauseit willtreatall retireesequally.
a misnomer,becauseif the the reach of the Federal Antitrust laws.The
Mr. Speaker,I urge mycolleaguesto sup- optionisdoreally
not enforcethis mandate,they committee actedto endthisillusion,whichhas
port we in this cause.Retireesacrossthe Na- States
standto losemuch neededhighwayfunding. nowspawnedvery real anddevastatingecotionwill thankyou.
for ourcitizens.
in myown Stateof Illinois,thatis $700 million nomicconsequences
in the balance.
The bill I am introducingrespondsto the
In other words, implementmandatedcar- current phaseof the recurringlabor crisisin
TOWN OF SCHODACK CELEBRATES
pooling, or else.That'snotmuchof an option. baseballin a verylimited,yet crucial,way: By
BICENTENNIAL IN 1995
Affectedareas are designated"severe" subjecting the players'union andthe owners
regionsbasedon 1987-1988- to the Nation'santitrustlawsin the eventone
HON.
GERALD
R.H. SOLOMON nonattainment
1989 statistics, even though recent data party unilaterally imposesan anticompetitive
OFNEW
YORK
shows
these
regions
have cleaned-up
their air termor conditionof employment
on the other.
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
beforethesemandates
take effect
As introduced,the bill exemptsminorleague
Wednesday, January4, 1995
The bill I am introducingtoday allowsthe baseballfromthe scope of its coverage.It
to be maybe that the currentsituation will demand
Mr. SOLOMON.
Mr. Speaker,it's been my Statesto decideif theywant carpooling
privilegesinceenteringCongressin 1979 to part of their cleanair plan.It will not change an evenstrangerresponseanda broaderrethe goalsof theCleanAirAct but simplygives peal.But, in my judgment, this is an approreturnhomenearlyeveryweekend.
a bipartisan
That'snot only a wise policyfor a Member States the optionto utilizecarpoolingas a tool priate startingpointfor developing
of Congress.its good for a Members peace to helpcleantheair in theirspecific region.
consensus
on the Issuein the committeeand
Mylegislationsendsa message to the EPA in the full house.
of mind. It's necessaryto get awayfromthis
artificialworld of Washington,DC, and get that the voters voicedbackin November-we
The end result of basebal's specialtreatof a closed,
backto the realworldwhererealpeoplehave needcommonsenseand flexibilityin the law. menthas been the perpetuation
In Illinois,it Is estimatedthat this mandate cartelizedindustryin whichthefew, incumbent
realjobs andraise real families.
Our 22ddistrictis a largely ruralarea, and alonewill onlyreduceair pollutionlevels byan club owners possess inordinate economic
it Is the tried and true virtuesof our small averageof 1 percent.Thatsmallpercentage powerand every other party-players, fans,
towns andvillagesthat havemadethis coun- has a pricetag estimatedat $200 millionfor municipalities, minorleague clubOwners,potry great,as recognized
as earlyas the 1830s businesses to enforce.This is a huge price tentialexpansioninvestors-remain economiIn a very real sense,the
by French visitorAlexisde Tocqueville.
And tag, fora verysmallbenefit.Thereare cheap- cally marginalized.
landscape of majorleague basetoday I'd liketo singleout oneof those com- er andbetter waysto achievethe samegoals, competitive
to fig- ball in 1995 resemblesthe verytype of busimunifies, the RensselaerCounty town of but the Statesshouldhavethe flexibility
ure thatout.
that spurredCongressto
Schodack.
ness arrangements
in
who enactthe antitrustlawsin the 1890's.
Schodackwill celebrateits bicentennial
Please join meand the manyMembers
my bill in givingthe States I am gratifiedbythe bipartisansupportre1995, a celebrationthat will culminatein a havecosponsored
back the authorityto improvetheir own air ceivedfor this legislationin the last Congress,
gala-dinner
danceon March 18.
HavingvisitedSchodackmanytimesduring quality.Cosponsorandpass my billto make and the prospectthatboth sidesof the aisle
commuteoptiontruly an option. can work productively
togetherto haveswift
my 16 years of Congressand 6 yearsin the the employee
LEGISLATION TO ELIMINATE THE
SOURCE TAX

January5, 1995

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-

E 43

Exteins of Remarks

enactmentof my legislation.While I realize three major credit bureaus-TRW, Equifax, musical spoof of politico,over which Mr.
that thereare somewhowish to concentrateand Trans-Union.With this informationap- Emorywill presideon March25.
solely on the provisions
of the so-called"con- pearingon credit reports,individuallenders
Mr. Speaker,
AlanEmoryhascrooed many
tract with America"in the first 31Ymonthsof will know on a monthlybasiswhetherparents nable milestonesin his career-roolint nf
the new session,I wouldurge all of mycol- owecourt-ordered
childsupportand whether the ThomasL. Stokesprze for conservtion
leaguesto join with me in movingthis to a they are fulfillingthis mostbasic obligations. reporting,electionto the Societyof Profes
high prioritystatusso thatspringtrainingand Afterall, is a parent'sobligationto pay court- sionalJournalists,
Fresideot
of itsWashington
the regulatorseason are not lost to the Amer orderedchildsupportany less important
than Professional Chapterand memberof the
icanpeople,
thatparents obligationtomakea car payment Chapter'sHall of Fame-hot he is prohably
We have the opportunityand abilityto res- or paytheir creditcardbills?
mast gratifed at his elenationto the presicue the nationalpastimefrom its current
Last year, I asked the GAOto survey 16 dencyof Grdiron. He has twice beenmusic
dispiritingcondition,Let'snotallow thisoppor- States,creditbureaus,and some lenderse- chairmanof their springshow,a producerten
tunityto passbyor be deferred.
gardingthisproposal.I introduced my billafter timesant alwaysoneof the Club' mostpm
L I urge all colleaguestojoin in the effort. 3 receiving the favorableGAO report,entitled Oicwrter of lydic. As a membersince 197
"Child Support Enforcement-Credit Bureau

adms

eetyisvc

rsdnh

ilb

CREDIT BUREAU REPORTING OF Reporting
ShowsPremise,"on Juno3, 1994. a mostcapableleader.
e GA foundthat my proposal Coeg Washingtonplitc for morethan
COURT-ORDEREDnerlly.
a joualis knowas
Mr. Emory
decdes
it in for
spport coBlecLGos,
cooincreasechild
HLDSS
POR OBIGTIOSadministratively
PORT ORDRDA
feasible,
sod, mostthat
imporlot with
thn highest
of standards.
He
con be

HON.
SANDER
M.LEVIN
tany,
it canor
beFederal
implemented
with liletncast
to touti
o newsmaker
hotouold
is an
fair
thny
eitherState
gtovenments.
short,
came.What
poblicotficial
ash
foras
more?
OFMICHICAN
overtime,mybillwill helpsoonmoneyandin- And whohonorto be chief lampooner
at the
INTHEHOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES creasecort-ordered childsupportcollections. Gridiron?
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
Mr. Speaker,we boon done nearlyall we
Mr. Speaher,I join his fouth estate colMr LEVIN.Mr. Speaker,as this historic an Inthe way of Federalstatute; we already leagues,his family, particularlyhis beloved
104th Congressconvenes,I am reintroducingmandatetax-refund
istercopto,
lbs withholdingWife,Nancy,andhis CapitolHill trends in conthe ChildSupportCreditBureau Reporting
Act Ofcourt-ordnrnd
supportfromre , lienson gratating Mr. Emoryon his assumption
of
cannot theGridironClubpresidency
andlashforward
of 1995,to requireall Statesto participatein property,end so on. But govomment
throughthe oew
a simplified,nationallyuniform child-supportdo thisalone.The ptivatesectormustalsore- to his continuingsuccesses
credit-bureau
reportingsystem.
intorcethe pdncipleof parentalresponsiility. year.
I firstintroduced
this billin 1994. It is aimed Mybill will provideprvate-sector bas, credit
at combatting the woeftlly low rate of child card agencies,mercants. andbusinesses
the
CENTRALIZED AUTOMOBILE
in the UnitedStates,without informationthey shouldweigh when making
supportpayments
EMtSSIONS tNSPECTION
creatinga newFederalGovemment program loondecisos. Privatnsectorlotors should
to do it Creditbureausand, throughthem,in- attac at leastas machimportanceto a par
dividuallenderswill knowon a monthlybasis at's Each recordfar paying court-ordorod
HON.
GEORGE
W. GEKAS
whether or not parentsare fulfillingthis most child supportan they do to credit cord bat
basi obligation.
Withnegligible
Federalcosts, ancesand loon payments.
And failureIs pay
OFPESrvu
IN THOHOUSE
OPREPRESENTATIVS
childsupport shoutdcarrygrave
this billwill beginto get the privatesectorin- court-ordored
amouncsnsnsatt
ttr those adultswho don't consequence.
imemywon'twll eopaaveaoneyand ir
nrwt-egr
sarqirmn
4,15 htE
volvedin addressing
Wediesday, January
pay theircout-ordered childsupport.
Mr. Speaker,if we support family values, Mr. GEIAS. Mr. Speakert introducetoday
Childrenare createdby two people,and en urely this is a sensibleand necessary legislationto hdnga commonsense
approach
both of themmustacceptpersonalandfinan- step. Those in the private sector-banks, t implerntation of the 1990CleanAir Act
cial responsibility
for raisingtheir children.In creditcoot agencies,andhavinesses-should amendments.
Mylegislationis designed1000'
broken,or never-formed
families, financial re- put court-ordered
child supporton the scale complishthree goals: Rrst, to detay tar 2
sponsibilityis often definedby court-orderedrhes weighing e decisionto wokea loon, yearnthe implementaton
of the enhanced
vochild support payments.Unfortunately,too We mostsend e message thatboth parents bide inspectioncod muintnnce program:
manynoncustodial
parentstoil to complywith ar responsibte
for supportingtheir children second to requirethe Enviromentol Protocthe court orders.
nd thatchildsupportisa dohtparentscannot ConAgency[EPA]to reissueregulations
for
A year ago, I rnceiveda letter from a con- aford to ignore.
stiuent of minein Warren,Mi. This motherof
Mr. Speaker,I s Eat a copyof the bill he thigam od tr
d
odfrte re
two ran awayfromher husband,and moved insertedin theRORD atthis point
nonnooloment
areas,
into a shelterfor absed women,She wRtes:
Thin legislationIs in respon to a consistI havebeenworking as a sereaary for atd
cirst
ent trend by the EPAof regilaning aud
manneight years now and it sftill seemsthut ALAN EMORY ASSUMES GRIDIRON askingquestionslater.As far hackas April2,
there is nevereenoughseocy. My e-husband
PRESIDENCY
1993,l1
cynracted EPAAdmiistratnr Cmroo
M.
beithe
esat
S
onerFora gtovrnpr
shyort
Little Leagueregstraiona--and If t
Or NoW
vOnic
ceraeclizeot
ve-icl inspection
program.
WhileI
soundery yenny, it wouldn't
pot thew hoEf
IN TE HOUSE
k
OFREPEENTATIVES
hovemrny concewnwith the EPASContrlwaythrough college. Winydam be do this?
lzedVehicleEmisusions
Inspectison
Programas
Beaa heoets becanget away with t
cand
Wednesday, Janaey 4, 1w5
a meansof actally improvingair quality,my
Isy hesrtght.
Mr, McHUGH.
Mr. Spaker, I wantto recdga matnconcxf is overthe Agency'sOzoneNa.
Unfortunately,
she'snot alone.TheOfficenf nizethe achieve entt of a distinguished
jour tonal AmbientAir QoalityStandardsReport
ChildSuport Enforcement
in the Deartment nalist who has
Th been covedng Washingtn which found
of the 99 prsoioeslydenof Health nd HumanServicesreportsthatof since the dap of PresidentTrman. This gnated ronottolowentregions rerieotedtg
$35 billionof cumalativecoMrt-ordered
child week, as we seek a ne- directionfor Coo- oone ateaement for the years 1991through
support od through1992. $27 billion re gress andthecountry,no taoWilla new
ne voice 1993. Additionally,according to asailhe
mainsuncollected. Is 1992,nearlysic million gide Ie well knownGddironClb. Alas S oose air studiesthose regionswill agah
absenteeparentsmodeso childsupportpop- Emory,Washington
corespondenforthe Wa- reachagainment
in 1994,Hodit not ee for
meetsatoll.
tertowne(Nal Yorkn
p aio
y ins, assumedthe the iclusion of 19CC,
0 climatological
anom
This in simplywrongond my childs
presidency
cpport
of the Club Jonury . He ban oiy, is the Epve 2-yearoverageof ozone
as
Harrisburg
such
regions
ocottalonment
been that noespaper'sWashington carcredit bureaureportingbill will help to change resodentosince
this.
1951,
nd Lancaster,PA, woald neverhae been
Very simply.Stateagencies responsible
for
Gdidirn is an organization
i sf C0journalists caughtin thisbreaucras webof renelcsioss.
childsupportenforcement
will reportthestatus coveringthe Nation'sCapital.They are well In myopinion.the EFAin lookingfor a probot alt childsupportacounts to tho Notion's recognizedfor their annualgala dither sca
and emIs regulatewhichdoes exist
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I urgemycolleagues to cosponsor the Gun to the YMCA,GroonpointVolunteerAnbu- day endencourageher to cootinunin allher
lanceCorys,LittleLeue, PolishNeliont Al- endeovors.With best wishes t hope thut
Ban RepealAct.
cburches, Scouts nd the local police Rosa'slife continues to he eu edventureend
__________liunce,
Othersin otfersher manymornpleasuntmemorien.
dnparm
trn, yarhsandplaygrounds.
need onlyhovetouch.
HONORING DR. STEPHEN K.
The Cluhbs recnly sponuored the Toys
ROBINSON
ForTotsprogram,presidinggills, clothingne~dRMAKE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
toys t holidaysthroughoutthe Greenpeint SUBJECT TO THE ANTITRUST
BARER
HON.
BILL
In additin, old eye glasncullec- LAWS
ommounity.
OFcronnramny time, ddOF PEfilled
INTHEHOUSE
ingIn the club'ssphit of corniceBothe needy.
HE G REROENTATS
IN OUE
JAM A.'RAFCANT, JR.
HON.
contue to growh
MelvinJonesFellowships
Wednesday, January4, 1995
OFOHIO
Mr. BAKERof California.Mr. Speaker,re- ause ot its onding ntributions, enpemarkable Americansdeserverecognitionby daily to "Campoign
SightFirst
THEROUSE
OP EORERTATOES
the Congres,whichis why I am gladto honor I ask that mycolleagues join me in salutig
Wednesday January4. 1995
Dr. StephenK.Robinsonfor his recent selec- thn Grenpeint LionsClb end end Mudden
Mr. Speaher.thegameof
worktheydo. Their Mr. TRAFICANT.
lion as a missionspecialist forfutureflightsof foroilthe ofthe wonderful
spirit nd effortsto !m bunebullhas pmoidedAmericansof all ages
community
the SpaceShuttleby the NationalAeronautic nomnodous
pmvethe linenof thosein needin on Inspira with a neuronof entnment sincethe first
and Spae Administration.
gamewas playedin 1g6g. It holy
professional
Dr. Robinsonis a 1973 graduate of lien toun ol,
is the Amediuapest-time.But's reont peers
whichis
Campolindo HighSchoolin Moraga,
hovetarished the game
ugly
tuber
disputes
TO
ROSE
WHtTE
TRIBUTE
area
of
the
East
Bay
in
my
District
in
located
nd hurl hanebultfens. One of the reasons
Califoia. Currentlya researchscientist in the
whythe playershanefeltcompelledto go n
WILM 0. UPINSKI
HON.
Fluid Mechanicsand AcousticsDivisionof
ntrih-incodrng the presentstrike aulins
NASAsLangleyResearchCenterin Hampton,
frn U.S.
thutthehaseball oers urn euempt
up ILiois
VA, Dr.Robinsonwill serve as oneof several
antitmst lawn.
INTtE ROUSEOF PSFRTATTVES
missionspecialists on future SpaceShuttle
As a formerathletetwin the Universityof
Wednesday, January4. 1995
flights.He mil relocateto Houstonin Marchof
Mr. SpoakerI rise todayto Pitsburgh, end a staunchsupportenof ol
Mn.LIPINSKI.
next year to begin I year of trainingat the
JohnsonSpaceCenter,during whichhe will pay tributeto Mm. RoseWhite,a prominent working people.I helienethat this is a delto the greatgameofhusali The antDistrictof nimant
the dozens memberof the ThirdCongressional
teamhowto operateand integrate
her B0th birthdayen host exemptionhas deniadthe plaper the
Illinois,who celehrated
used on the Shutte.
of systems
toos andlevage currently
graduatedfromthe University DecemberB.1994.I mouldliketo shur with someburgaining
Dr. Robinson
athletes.WhileI
of Califomia,Davis in 1978with a degreein my calnagnes the notableao pyishments enjoyadbyetherprofesninnal
won't eues atempt to charactenieathletes
Mrs.White'slife,
He went that havehighlighted
engineering.
machanicallaeronautical
RuseWhie was bur of Immigrnt parents whoseaverage salaty Is well over$5g0.00ga
degreesin
on to obtainmastersand doctorate
fromStanfordUniver- in Chicgo, IL on December 9,1914. Growing peonus nictims,they shuld be affordedthe
engineering
mechanical
sity. Dr. Robinson'sparents, William andu p as oneof ninebrothersnd sistemdaring some rights and bargainingopportunities as
Roseteemedthecome otherprefessionl aletes.
JoyceRobinson,
continueto residein Moraga. the GreatDepression,
Cleady,the Americanpeoplearen't conMr. Speaker,Dr. Robinsondeserveshigh of bondwork nd familp unity. She remto work andfamily cemedwith the detals of the dinpute.They
praisefor being chosenin a very competitive onstratedhoncommitment
His appointment is testimony to his duringthe SecondWorldWanwhen she jug don'tcore aboutsalarycaps.tine ageny on
process.
and glad both a factoryjob nd three youngchil- arhitrabon.All they want in funthe bickedig
excellence,
diligentpursuitof professional
I am pleasedto commendthis outstanding din while her husbandfought the wonover- and postudig to end, andfor the umpiresto
to our seas.Aher the mar,is 1947,Roseand her pelt "Flay Bull" Since the player went en
East Bay native for his contributions
husbandbecome homeownerand settled stake last August all etfors to mediut the
country.
the owners bane
their fourchildrn is the GarfieldRidge disputehonefoiled.Cleardy,
__________with
that theyno longerhavethe bentinindicated
oie.
us thesouthwest
community
In additionto heisg a mel homemaker tnrnstaof baueball is mindand theyhoveInst
HONORING THE GREENPOINT
andmother,Rosehoc alwaysbeenon active the Irst Congresnplaced in them buck in
LIONS CLUB AND BUD MADDEN
memberof the GorfioldRidgocommunity.Her 1022 when they moved to exempt Mujur
B. MALONEY membershipin the Democrati Club of Gut- LeagueBanehatlfromU.S.anti-truntlawo.Re
CAROLYN
HON.
field Ridgeled to her cYrORras Judgefur movingthin xemption mop he theoslyway to
OFew YeM
andsanethe1o95 season.
ord of Bloctionsot the23dWord,a pu- andthestrike
OF REPRESENTATIVES the
INTHEHOUSE
tke Pro,
Thnt'swhy today I am introducing
siion she hacheldfer 35 yars. Ronein also
Wednesday, January4, Joys
a memberof othervariouscommunity
organi- PassionalBaseballAn1i99stReform Act of
baseMr. Speaker,I rise today caress. For example,Re is a memberof 190. Thisbill providesthatpmfesnional
Mrs. MALONEY.
to pay tribute to the GreenpointLions Club, the GarfieldRidgeCivicLague andhas held bail teams end leagues composedof such
andits newestMelvinJonesFellow,BudMad- the othies of Traurer and Membemhipteamsshall he subjectto all anitrust laws.
findsthe
us treasurerof Thebillalsostatesthatthe Congress
She bunsawved
Chairperson.
den,
The GreenpointLions Clubwas organized the GarfieldRidge Conult of Organizatins businessof organizedprofessinl babll In
Sheis a wet- in, or affcts intemtatecommerce,endthere
bythe duringhenIl-penn membership.
on December1, 1939.and sponsored
BrooklynLions Club.Past presidentsof the me memberof the AmericanLegionAuxil- fore the existing antitmut town uhouldbe
Is inversethe resellof the decios
LionsClubare practicallya Who's iary and local VFW. In the post she has amended
Greenpoint
of of the SupremeCourt of the UnitedSte,
eed as on adviserto theJuniorAuoiliary
Whoof Greenpoint
TheGmenpoint Clubis oneof mornthan60 thn AmericanLngiononewonon unduemew- whichexemptedbasall fromcoverageunder
area clubs. comprisinga district which in- ban of the hymn end Kiozie Elmentary thoselaws
I ow nnt pmIn introducig this leginlatios,
ciudes Brooklynand Queens. This districtis SchoolParentTeacherOrganiztion. Plan, in
part of a larger districtcoveringNew York har spurnlime, Rosereles withthe Garfield flssing to lake sidesin the dispute.I believe
State and Bermuda.The local districtjoins RidgeGordonClub nd volonteersat the Re- hulk partiessharesome of the bla for the
seny stateof the gameof buseball.Mydenire
Administratin Hospital.
with other clubs in 178 countriesand geo- gionulVeterans
graphicareas, makingthe GreenpointLions Rosabus filed her 90yeaw of life with tar- is to fume the union and the ownemto si
Cluba memberof the largestserviceorgani- lp, friends,hardwork,dedication,nd newice rows, segotiatein goodfuith,asd nomeIn an
to her contry and ommunity.Sheis a model agreementthatboth sidescan livewith. Frzabon in theworld.
are bothsobforher feSionut fuotball nd baskethall
Every year the Clubraises moneyand Citizenanddeseres Is ha commended
laws. Interentingly
I ur sure that jeot to U.S. osil
accomplishments.
namesa MelvinJonesFellowto help fulfillits outstanding
wall
doing
extremely
are
bulk
spurts
enough,
me
is
conto
join
mould
like
colleaguen
my
have
they
And
who
Serve."
motto, "We
Mrs RoseWhiteen her 80th birth- finuncilly, both sorts havesalary cops-and
sewed?The Lionsgivetheirsteadfastsupport grotniating
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wouldbe allowedif
expenses,and retirement
the moneyis heldin the accountfor at least
5 years.
HON.
JOHN D.DINGEL
Mr. Speaker,it comes as no surpriseto
OF WCHrmAN
Americantaxpayersto find that when you
tional Hockey League owners locking the playI THE HOUSEOF REPRESNTATIVES
their Federal,State,and localtaxes,
combine
Wednesday, Januy4,1495
em out there's not much else for them to
they are currentlybeing taxed at alltime
watch)
Mr. Speaker,halt a century record high levels.Tax relief for American
of mylegisia- Mr. DINGELL.
Ownerstakeheed:enactment
lets the Hausea bill familiesis long overdue. Witha newmajority
tion won't bankrupt thegamenor would it pre- ag, myTamerintroduced
we nowhavethe opportunity to
in Congress,
ventyou fromimposinga salarycap.Players: providingfor a prvgramat nabonalhealthin- changedirection.Indeed,we havea mandate
I
fvr rncen Inueeachat thepast 19 Cangresses
dont thinkthat this billwillbe a panacea
to dramatically
changedireafrom
the
voters
a
testament
as
Ibis bill,hoth
ora onleoad
eagi inigsdtthad
good faith and
prbes Bargain
allalyour problems.
tion. This is a mandatethat no one can igrememberthat most Americanswould give I th wisdomof the 1943 Muray-Wagner- nore. I lookforwardto workingwith my coltheir right arm to be a benchwarmerfor a Dingellbill aod as a bopetalharbingerof an leagues,both Democrats
toandRepublicans,
approach wardthe goal of makingtheAmericanDream
MajorLeagueteam and ears $150,000 for 6enlightened change a our Naien's
everydecadesine,
In almost
care
health
month
might
a
prograw
such
Restoration
Act
a
reality.
that
high
mere
hopes
mth aIo.Tikcati
Mr. Speaker,I urgeall of mycolleaguesto be enacted.
I wouldliketo closethis statement
on a perTh ill containe the seedsat the essial sonal note. In the yearsthatI haveserved in
BaseballAntitrus
co-sponsor the Professional
eementsof a viable nationalplan:Universal Congress, I havefought for tax relief,only to
jReform Actof 1995,
re- see it thwartedor reversedat a later date.I
cst containment.malpractice
_________ovuerage,
torm,and a fair financiog systemthat puts have been true to my philosophyof less
spendingandlower taxes,onlyto see themafirst.
compebtiveness
HONORING THE LIFE OF
year
jority in Congressrejectthis philosophy
the introduction at this bill afteryear. I cannotpossibly
Parfolly40 years,
ELIZABETH GLASER
conveyto mycolad
misdam,
at
the
justice,
as
has reminded
neceutity of nationalhealth insuranca.The leagueswhat it is Ike for me,after25 years
miot ear inacton are apparent. in whichmy politicalviewshave beenthe
B. MALONEY consequences
CAROLYN
HON.
to now
Na marefamiliesneedbemined,nor marein- norityin the Houseof Representatives,
OFNEW
YORK
dueldesdestroyed,
far our imperaties to he havethis opportunity to changethe directon
Congresshasbeenon a course
with the lessonsof of Congress.
OFREPRESENTATIVES dear. Let us mostforward,
INTHEHOUSE
kistoryas our guide,to finallyenact rational that has been destroyingthe economicwellcritical
healthinsurance.
1995
beingof the familyand it is absolutely
Wednesday, January 4W
to serve
thatwe changecourse.I am honored
Mr. Speaker, I rise today
Mr. MALONEY.
in this Congressand playa part in the effort
to pay tribute to one of the mostIncredible AMERICAN DREAM RESTORATION
to makea change.
women I have ever known;andto moun her
ACT
premature
death.
4, Elizabeth Glasers lifewas
On December
HONORING THE ST. NICHOLAS
HON.
PHILIP M.CRANE
from the AIDS
cut short by complications
NEtGHBOHOOD PRESERVATION
- ROFcsrs
Elizavirus. Infectedfrom a bloodtransfusion,
CORPORATION
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
beth dedicatedthe last years of her life to
Wednesday,
January
4,
1995
HON.
CAROLYN
B.MALONEY
our awareness of thishorrible disheightening
ease. Elizabethinspiredus all when she
svscmYoRK
Mr. CRANE.Mr. Speaker,todayI havethe
spokeat the 1992Democratic nationalcon- distinct honor of introducingthe American
IN TE ROUSEOF EPFSENTATIVnS
In a speech DreamRestorationAct as the bill's principle
vention about her experiences.
whichmovedall thosewho sawit, she plead- sponsor.
I rite tadayin
Mr. Speaker,
ed with the world not to forget aboutthe As 1 of 10 bills derivedfrom the Contract Mrs.MALONEY.
youngest victimsof AIDS, includingher two With America, this legislationwill enable recapnitianof the 19th anniversaryot the
Americanfamiliesto use more of their hard Saint Nicholas NeighhorhoodPresnrvation
children.
Struck bythe lack ofattentionto childrenaf- earsed incometo save,to invest,to pay for Carp.
known,came
St. Nicks, as it is commonly
fected by the HIV virus, Elizabethhelped their children'seducation,to buy a home, to
found the PediatricAIDS Foundation. Dedi- pay for medicalexpenses,or to use in what- into existece in resyonseto a catautrophin
Through
homeless.
19
families
which
InS
tine
Dream
The
American
so
desire.
way
they
ever
daughter
cated to the memoryof her first
Act is dividedinto three sections, the spiritot vunteerism, the familieswerereraisedmillionsof dollars Restoration
Aiel, this foundation
andtbe graspbeganlaking at rebsildfor pediatricAIDSresearch, and has provided andI wouldliketo brieflyexplaineachprovi- veted
leg en the vacantlot endrehabilitang an adsupport to dozensof childrenand familiesaf- sion for mycolleagues.
The first sectionprovidesfor a $500 per jacast building Pramthat point is 1975,SL
fected bythedisease.
the
age
Niks has flourishedend grwn coderthe
under
for
dependents
child
tax
credit
But morethan anything,Elizabethtaughtus
18. The full credit would be availableto guidanceat the Prll Centerfur Community
that life's joy does not have to end, even of
gross incomesunder and Eviromental Development intoan era
with
adjusted
families
under the mosthorribleof circumstances. Try $200.000.
nizatin thatprovidescomprehensive servicen
as it might,AIDSnever robbedElizabethof
The bill's secondprovisioneliminateswhat Is revitalizeandredeveloptheGreenpsinE'illove for life, nor her desireto help those in is referredto as the marriagepenalty.Under liamsbcrgareasof Brooklyn.
need.Speakingabouther daughter,Elizabeth thecurrentIntemalRevenue
Code,manymar- Its 19 years af expedene with Brooktyn's
once said,"She taught me to love whenall I ried couplespay highertaxes thantheywould hausing mues has aoed SL NicksIs anwantedto do was hate. Shetaughtmeto help byfilingtwo Individualretuns. In orderto end camptshsomeholy amazini feats, It bas inothers whenall I wantedto do was helpmy- this inequity,familiescurrentlysubjectto the develoyed
ever26 antsof lawor cansbunted
self."
marriage penallywould be entitledto a tax and mudemlescamshousing.intoring seeI would askthat myfellowco- credit.
Mr. Speaker,
ior busing, hausingfur homelessfamilies,
leaguesnot forget the lessons of Elizabeth
The finalprovisionof the bill is referredto and two-familyhames.St Riots als assists
eachyear
Glaser,and to join me in sendingour deepest as the Americandream savings[ADSJaccount aver 3ea familiesend individuals
condolences to her husbandPaul and son andwouldestablisha newback-ended individ- with tenant advocacyservies and bameless
programs.
to fight this ual retirementaount [IRA].The ADS ac- neo prevention
Jake. We have a responsibility
d
horrible diseaseon all fronts, and to never count would allow a nondeductible contribu- In addition,St Rinksprovideseconomin
abandon its victims.ElizabethGlaser helped tions of up to $4,000 for a marriedcoupleil- velaymestprogramsin an effortto revtalize
baseof the Grenpaint andWi
on realizethis fact, and nowit is our job to ing a joint return-2,000 for an individual- the ecanomin
Theservies pmfor iamsburgawas yf Brooklyn.
beginningin 1996.Tax free distributions
carryher legacyforward.
fiout-limehoe purchases,education,medical videdbySt. Nicksincludejabtrainieg,security
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playerincomehas neverbeenhigher.Professional baseballplayersand owners should
stop posturingand take a lookat basketball
and football(it's not hardto do-with the Na-
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House of Representatives
ex
lion dollars. And it is also true that the
ttd
the eliuce
of the antitrt
baseball players union has been very
emption.
I thought it was time that you heard effective 1n the past several decades
and has been able to win-through cel.
other side of the story.
___________the
hoc. Selig. In hie letter. Islsted that lective bargaining-ome of the rights
DEMIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO
major league baseball don not operate that other American workers have
TEMPORE
as an eceomic tartel,
been guaranteed by law.
But the antitrust exemption does
- Major league basebal
That 10 ao
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before obe House the following commn- Operates u a cartel in c1ass1c manop- hurt players. It Is a constant threat
oly fashion. The owners, ot market hanging over their heads. The owners
nication from the Speaker
know-chat because of the exemptionforces, dictate how the supply of
WsnNoox.DC.
that if they are able to break the
uay
product will be allocated. Te atitrt
unio. the players have no place to
I heby dsinate the Honoaable BIL exemption shields maoar league base
Boarrr to act as Speaker Pompare n ball from market fore and makes turn.
th.. dy
competition lesposelble-sThat sounS
Mr. Selfg. in his letter, Insisted that
llike
a monopoly to me.
repealing the exemption would hurt
Speaker of the House ofR-eota
Mr. Selig also inslote that repeal of baseball, fans, and communities that
the antitrut exemption would set end have franchles.
He is wrong again. The other major
the baseball stike. Wrong again. All
USIESS
MORNIG
MORNING BUSINESS
sig
point
ther way. o Fer.
professional sports do not have an antiThe SPEAKER pro tempoes. Pursu- the hea of the Major League Baseball trust exemption bat franchse moveat to the Order of the House of Janu- Players Asocation. has pulily
at- ment has been slight.
ary 4, 1995. the Chair will new zecogd many times that If the exemption
After eight work stoppages in the
alse Members from lists submitted by were repealed, be would stronglypurge last 24 years, and the current strike
the majority and minority leaders for the players to ead the staiks.
that has destroyed one season and
morning oor
t
Mr. Selig insisted that the players threatens another, It In hard to imagThe Chair will alternate recognltion should agree to a salary cap because 15 ine anyone suggesting that the antibetween the parties, with eacb party is good and because it has worked for trust exemption is good for the fans.
limited to 30 minutes and each Member football and basketball.
And then Mr. Selig dredged up the
other than the majority and minority
Wrong Yet again. Football and bus- old trusty line that repealing and antileaders limited to 5 minutes.
trust exemption would destroy the
hroughbt tel- minor leagues.
ae
The Chair recognzels the gentleman caps e
from Kentucky [Mr. BUNNIo] for 5 lectte bagainn
Process. The bassThis is a very effective line becausd
min ute.
05t0.
bal owerswant to Impose the cap minor league teams are scattered
(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given
around the country and touch the lives
permission to revise and extend his rebs a problem because the and economies of small towns throughBaseball
marks)
marks)oweners
have been unable to roeh
out the Nation.
But the plain truth of the matter is
agremento how to share revenues
Iml
market teams and laoge major league baseball has to have the
bete
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
The House met at 9:30 a.m. and was
called to order by the Speaker pro tempore Mr. BARerr of Nebraska].

But, Instead of hammerig out a
Mrh BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, last
week. the owners of major league base- agreement. they a
now trying to
ball vited Capitol 11111to urge Mem- arbtrarly impese a aary cap on the
bers of Congress to leave their exemplayers to forte the players to seine
Lon from the antitrust laws alone.
the owners'problem for them.
Many of you may also have seen a
Mr. Selig mid that the antitrust ex-

letter which went out last week from emplie ha not hurt the players. That
Acting Major League Baseball Commie is as wrong
wrong can be. I know it
sloner Bod Selig. which outlined a in bard to feel sorry for baseball play
number of reasons that he felt viodc- ers with median salaries of ntuhalf a

minor leagues. It traditionally takes
longer to develop professional baseball
players than football or basketball
players.
If the minor leagues were done away
with. the decline in quality would be
devastating to the integrity of the
game and destroy baseball. The owners
are smart enough not to jeopardize
their investments in their teams by
letting that happen.
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The minor leagues are Indispensable
to the future of major league baseball.
Repeal of the exemption does not
threaten them in any way. That's a
smoke screen.
Through it all. 1 can understand
where Mr. Selig Is coming from.
Major league honeball has Wohave
this exemption removed for the good of
fans, the game, and anybody else
thatwants a seson In 1h.

Lhe

wonot permitted to ask questions.
Our sidewan not permitted t offer Its
own witnoss, if snobh the cone, ifphat
be a proper desoription of what the
gentleman testifying won doing,
We were told It wonot a hearing,
Sot at the Smte time we could net
bring our fslde In. At that point then
we nked soot the, whether we would
hae a
opr unity to n
qoetions
tuho.
e
would, except then we
learned uaeeuently every aendent
wan limited to 0 minutes for the prposes. 5 minutes for the oppestoh
It did not step there An we were
going through the hill. looking forward
to offerisg some ameodments at eetalc parts certain sections. home of
those sectono wore removed from our
comitten's jurisdictin. It prbahiy
won the moot extraordinary procedure
that 1 have noes,
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As far as the unfunded mandates bill.
I have so problem with requiring that
thore be an analysis of what the cost in
to State end local goverents I have
no prohlem with greater consideration
being given to those Issues I have o
problem with saying that Cansreks. hefore yen pits something onto homebody else. erery one ought to know
hew much it costs and he able to orsluate.
What I do haoe a prohref with is
per
whe to
we have as opportunity
tulphteo folly sod to explore thin hill

THE LEGISLATIVE SEASON
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
the Speaker's announced policy of January 4. 1995.the gentleman from West
Virginia [Mr. WISE] Is recogized durRECESS
in, morning business for 5 minutes.
The SPEARER pro tempere 'fre
Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, the genbeing so further reqoests for morning
tieman before me spoke about the
busns. pursuant to clause 12. role 1,
baseball seson. I want to speak some
the House will stand in recse until 11
sheet the legIslative eono It has bad
itas
eiits
ayan
s es
I have
great respect
the on
Chair
of
.m.
dy
perdng
ad no
goe ItIn he
oarh
committee,
who Infor
known
both
Accordiogly
9 O'clock
misirst games of the season. The first sides of the aisle for heing eminently
utes a-m.i thefatHouse
stoodand
ln43rcese
game, obviously, beIng thin Thursday
and Friday as I enderstand it, the un- fair. I have great respect for oar oem- usi11 am.
funded mandates bill that will be on ieve, i empe on orbod o ahthe floor of the House.
I hase no problems with voting on partisan basis. I have heensured that
this Issue. I have no problems with vot- thin Inot going to be the usual ran or
lgn on any of the issues that are In the henes. Yet It sets a very disturbing
The recese having expired, the House
so-called Contract With America that tons.
won called to order by the Speaker at
the Republican Party is bringing forth.
Cld the
ot have been a hearing, 11a.
Indeed. I think that the debate is I day? We have hoeisseveral days new
wholesome and worthwhile to have on waiting to get this hill to the floor. We
many of these issues"
are going to be her ontil Thureday
To debate though means debate. It
nd then take the bill and the rule up
means having the opportunity. It Thoroday, as I understand IL and begin
The Chaplain, Ree. James David
means being able to play. using the the amendment process Os Friday. Ford, 0.0.. offered the following praybaseball analogy. it means being able Could ther not have been a I day's er:
to play a full nine innings. But what delay so that there could have been a
Our heart. sr grateful. 0 loving
does not help this House is when you go hearing so the propones and oppo. God, that we are surrounded by ethers
immediately from the opening ball to seet could have bad their chance? One who support w in our worries, who eelthe ninth inning. That Is what is hap- of things, for Instance, that concers ebmte with on in our victories, and
pening in the unfunded mandates bill. me Is what happens to coal mine Safety whos prence Is ever with on At or
That is my concern about what is hap- laws? I am told, 'Don't worry. Bob, bent memento we anowledge that we
pening with the important balanced they won't be affected, particularly do net walk alone or possess all the
budget amendment and others. Let me those that are paused before thin bill strengths or energy or coage to fare
explain.
becomes law." Well, perhaps.
the opportunities sod the challenges of
As a member of the Committee on
What happens to occupational Safety each day. With appreciation nd with
Overnment Reform and Oversight, and health? What happens to repels- thanksgiving. we remember those
which has the unfunded mandates bill, ties of hacking industry and the fleas whos liven are 0ousd with our and
I had the chance to participate last cal Indstries? What happens to all of whose grace in ever with us Io Yoer
week In an extraordinary process, a thin Important area
rssene Wepray. Am.
process by which the committee. which
So that Is why I think It wnuld have
had not met previously, suddenly bees wise and appropriate to at leant
comes into session In Its opening ses- hld a hearing. Balanced bodget
sion. which is traditionally known AS amendment will come op amendments
THE JOURNAL
its organioing meeting, that iSwhere were cut off by 6 the previous. In the
The SPEAKER The Chair has coasyou go through the amenities and an- committee markup then. And so I hope
ied the Journal of the lent days pro
nounce who is on what comittee. and and urge the Republican majority to ceedis and announces to the Mouse
then launched from the point into tak- recognozc the Importance of the proce- his approval thereof
Ing up the unfunded mandates bill dare here.
Pursuant to clause 1, rule L the Jour
without a hearing, without a hearing.
We want to. we all wont to play in sal stands approved.
That Is right. A bill which is going to this haseball gase, but we want to
rewrite the relationship between Fed- make sur there are equal times at bat.
eral. State. and local governoents and. equal opportunitieo to pitch. equal op,
indeed, in some cases the private sector portonities to folly participate in this
PLEDGE OF ALLEGINCE
won takes up without s hearing.
game and that we do net run, go immeThe SPEAKER. The gentleman from
There was a hearing of sorts. The diacely from opening pitch to the ninth Nebraska (Mr. CISbrNSo] will lead
gentleman from the Republican side inning sod then the game Is called,
the House In the Pledge of Allegiance.
was permitted, who is not a member of
So if the Americas people ar going
Mt. CHRISTENSEN led the Pledge of
the committee but is a sponsor of the to truly have faith is thin process. and Allegiance as follows:
bill, was permitted to address the com- In this contract, which the majority
I Pledge alice
to the Fleg of the
mittee for a number of minutes about ban vowed to have voted on by the 100 United Stots of Americad to the Reput
the reasons he thought It was a good days, then it must know that there has iecforubiehitsande.oneononderid
bill, describing what wan is It. Oar side beena fll profess there .Indivisible.
Aithsiberty
wed
eoral,
Joseer

Document No. 18

January18, 1995

CO NGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN ATE

Mr. President, now that we have both
managers on this bill, I would like to
proceed and lay out what course of action we would like to follow. What I
will be doing is seeking a unanimousconsent agreement so that the pending
amendment before us can be laid aside.
The reason that I will make that request is because a motion to table that
last night was not successful. During
the hours since then, different concerned Senators have been discussing
what sort of modifications might be
made to that amendment language.
Since there has been no agreement at
this time, it will be my request that we
lay that aside so we can then take up
the next pending committee amendment which would be before us. We
would dispense with that committee
amendment so that we can keep moving So that is going to be my intent.
Again, as I just confer with the other
manager, I would again suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested.
The clerk will call the roll,
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Pennsylvania be allowed to
make remarks as though in morning
business for approximately 10 minutes,
and that following his comments I reserve the right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it Is so
ordered.
The Senator from Pennsylvania is
recognized for 10minutes.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I
thank the Chair. I thank my colleague
from Idaho.

THE BASEBALL STRIKE
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have
sought recognition while there is a lull
in the action on the pending legislation
to talk for a few minutes about the
pending issues before the Judiciary
Committee on possible legislation regarding the antitrust exception which
might have an impact on the current
baseball strike.
I believe that it is highly unlikelyvirtually impossible-for the Congress
of the United States to act on an antitrust exemption to have any meaningful impact on the pending strike and,
therefore, urge in the strongest possible terms that both parties return to
the negotiating table to work in a collective bargaining sense to end the
strike and bring baseball to the playing
field this spring,
I have had long reservations about
the antitrust exemption as it applies to
baseball, as it applies to other major
sports, like football, which has an anti-

trust exemption for revenue sharing,
and participated more than a decade
ago, in 1982,in extensive hearings when
the Los Angeles Raiders, then the Oakland Raiders, were proposing a move.
And those hearings were very important and raised some of the same considerations which are now pending on
the baseball strike.
As we have moved forward in the
consideration of the complex issues on
the antitrust exemption, my view has
been to retain the exemption as it impacts on the Pirates, which are a major
factor in Pittsburgh, and a major constituent interest of mine. If we eliminate the antitrust exemption, we will
have bedlam with respect to franchise
changes. I notice my colleague Senator
GoRTONnodding in agreement because
of the impact on the Seattle baseball
team.
One thing is certain, Mr. President,
and that is that it is highly unlikely, I
am almost certain, that Congress is
going to act with any speed, and I
think that Congress should not act,
should not get involved in the midst of
a labor dispute, where there are very,
very serious issues, to try to affect the
outcome of that labor dispute. At the
present time, the Judiciary Committee
is totally involved in the consideration
of the constitutional amendment for a
balanced budget. And on the Senate
floor we are involved in very complex
legislation on taking away mandates
by the Federal Government which are
not paid for. There is a very, very
heavy agenda on economic issues,
budget issues, trying to reduce the size
of Government, trying to reduce spending, and the consideration of tax cuts,
so that far behind on the back burner
is this issue of changing the antitrust
exemption.
My comments this morning are
prompted, in part, by this banner headline in the Philadelphia Inquirer this
morning: "Phillies President Blasts
Union, Hinting at Player Defections."
Bill Giles is president of the Philadelphia Phillies, and he is a very, very
mild-mannered man. I cannot remember a headline on Bill Giles speaking
out in such emphatic terms. What he is
saying bears directly on my comments,
where he makes the statement that
"The union has spent most of their energy in Washington trying to do away
with our antitrust exemption instead
of negotiating and trying to grow the
game."
I have been in frequent contact with
Mr. Don Fehr, head of the union, askIng him what help I could be or what
help the Senate could be in a constructive way in trying to bring the strike
to a close. I first made that contact
with Mr. Fehr last summer before the
strike started on August 12. And at the
same time period, I talked to the acting commissioner, Bud Selig. and the
officials of both the Philadelphia Phillies and Pittsburgh Pirates, my two
home State teams, to see what help we
could be. The antitrust exemption
came up briefly last fall on the Judiciary Committee calendar, and it was
voted down, I think, largely because of
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a sense that the Congress and the Senate should not get involved in a pending labor dispute. The issue in Pittsburgh is especially touchy at the
present time because the Pittsburgh
Pirates are up for sale, and the Pirates
have been kept in Pittsburgh by a consortium of hometown business people
who have bought the Pirates, to keep it
in Pittsburgh. That is a difficult matter because the Pirates are losing so
much money, which is a source of the
controversy today which has led to the
strike. The Pirates have had a prospective buyer, John Rigas. of Coudersport,
PA. I have been trying to be helpful in
meeting with officials of the Pittsburgh Pirates to see if that sale could
be effectuated. That sale Is going to be
held up because of the uncertainty of
what is going to happen in the strike
and to the antitrust exemption.
Obviously, I speak as only one Senator, one member of the Judiciary
Committee. I think that given the
complexity of the Judiciary Committee
calendar, and given the complexity of
the Senate calendar, and the complexity of the House calendar, it is as close
to a certainty as anything can be that
there is not going to be legislation
coming out of the Congress between
now and April on the antitrust exemption. There are too many things ahead
of it. If it did come to the floor, I think
many would agree with my position
that the Congress ought not to intervene to try to alter-ought not to
change the level playing field. That is
an expression we use very frequently
about our debates on many subjects,
but it is certainly applicable not to
change the level playing field when we
talk to the baseball effort.
What the Phillies' president has had
to say on one end of my State. and
what is happening with the Pirates at
the other end of my State, trying to
sell the team to keep it in Pittsburgh.
I hope that the parties will go back to
the bargaining table and will settle the
dispute so that we can have baseball
this spring, and not to look to the Congress to try to intervene, which is not
our place and is so highly unlikely on
the current state of the record. I thank
the Chair.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.

L

J
UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM
ACT

(Purpose: To prevent the adoption of certain
national history standards)
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have
an amendment at the desk and I ask
that it be read.
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by the
we of SantaClr County.andfor binextnole the press as bigbusinessdominated
HonorableEd Madigan.In the Congress,
interestsof obstinateteamownersand overusethe term 'honorable"as a matterof deco- workwithhis church.
Despitethe water worntet ragedin or paid players.But baseballhas always been
rum and protocol;but when I think of my
friend and colleagueEd Madigan,the word Statefor years,Ron Esaa has beena coice morn than just a business.Last years PBS
of reasonwith an eye tothe tte for howwe special on the history of baseballby Ken
"honorable" is trulyappropriate.
Havingserved withEd since comingtoCon- work welt to developa reliablewatersuppty Burs offereda timely reminderthat baseball
gress,I invariablyfoundhim to be a shining for Santa ClamCounty.One of the greatest is an importantAmedcaninstitutionand an
example of decencyandcivilityin an environ- strengthsMr. Ena broughtto our valleywas historicnationaltreasure.For morethan 100
and the needto expand the diversityof or water years, baseballhas beenone of thefew conment that,all toooften,canbe adversarial
contentious. He was a consensusbuilder- nuppiyhoseto deaf with the growthof our stants in a changingAmericansociety. It has
onewho warrantedrespecton both sidesof county and the realities of drought His been the measure by which generationsof
the aisleas a reliable,sincere,and extremely thoughtfulapproachof developinga win of Americanshave recalledtheir past,identified
capablestatesman who stood tall and proud waternupplieoled thio coontythroughthe r- their heros anddefinedtheir values andaspivalues, his con- ontcrdticul droughtexpenence relativelyon- rations.
on behalfof his fundamental
cated in a much stroger pogitionthan Today,the values andtraditions
andhis country.
stituents,
of baseball
As a fellow memberof the House Agri- manyareas oroandon.This feat in a testo are at risk for futuregenerations.
Inthe stugandvision.
Ed was a joy to workwith wentto binteodership
cultureCommittee,
gle for financialdominancebetweenmajor
RonEu in a pdncipledand honet leader leagueowners and plays, nowhereare the
our Nation's g
anddeliberating
in developing
riculturepolicy.He workedtirelesslyon behalf and a denotedfather nd hunband.I know interestsof baseballfans represented
in any
of farmersand ranchersand all that rural that whateveranonof endeavorhe chooses negotiation.
pricesare
Ticket and concession
Americarepresents.Having earned the re- nex, he will ecn. I wont to wish Ron and nowso highthat theNations pastime,if availsped and admiration for his years of service Connieandthe ret of his familyall the best able at all locally,is pricedout of the reachof
to the In the tte, andthankhim fur the wonderful growingnumbers of Americanfamilies.Even
he was suitably appointed
in Congress,
and progressbe ban leftfor no watchingbaseballon commercialtelevision,
Cabinetas this Nation's24thSec- achievewents
President's
him by.
retary of Agiculture, wherehe againserved to remember
the only way manyfamiliesnow enjoymajor
with dignityandhonoron behalfof the agrileague games,could be eliminatedif broadof foodand
andconsumers
culture community
television.
castrights are sold to pay-per-view
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
fiber Withoutquestion, Edhas leftan indelible
It is clear that baseballownersandplayers
legacyandhighstandard forwhichallof us
will continueto look out only for their own
shouldstrive to follow.
needs.But thereis a cryingneedfor someone
on NNSvv
AlthoughI join the countlessmany in exto look out for the interestsof fans,of taxIN THE HOUSEOFEEPRESENTATIVES
pressing regret and sorrow for a tremendous
in whichboth
payers andof the communities
Janary
30,
1995
Monday.
blessed
loss' I considerus allto be extremely
majorleagueand minorleaguebaseballIs
with the oppotunity to have known and Mn.CLINGER.Mr. Speaker,official bust- played.It is timefor Congressto take stepsto
worked with theHonorableEdMadigan.
ness kept me frumthe Cfamber durng the returnbaseballto theAmericanpeople.
note on the amendmentoffered by my cot- The legislationI am introducing
todayseeks
thisbycreatingan independent
league from Pennsylnia, Mr. KANionogi.to accomplish
ESAU
RON
TO
TRIBUTE
BaseHodI beenpresnt, I wouldbanevoted"no" NationalCommissionon Professional
ball.The Commission
wouldserve as a temon rolcall No.ha.
Y.MINETA
NORMAN
HON.
poraryregulatorybodyandimpartialarbitrator
OFCAACFORNIA
baseto overseethe conductof professional
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
ball until the legal status of majorleague
baseballcan be redefinedeitherbynegotiaMonday, January 30, 1995
tion or by congressional legislation. Its purMr MINETA.Mr. Speaker,I rise today in
HON.
JOHN J. LaFAICE
poseis simple-to providea measure of prouF NEW
YOne
tribute to a dedicatedpublic servantand a
tection for the interestsof baseballfans and
OFBEPRESErTATVES
INTHEHOUSE
personalfriend.As RonEsauretiresfromhis
taxpayersagainst the near absolutecontrol
Santa
the
of
manager
general
as
position
over baseball exercisedbythe majorleague
3,
1335
January
Monday,
Clara WaterDistrict,in San Jose, CA, this
Mr. Speaker,I owtnday in- baseballowners.
Mr. LAFALCE.
month,he caps a remarkablecareeras a
Majorleaguebaseballis unique amongproProfes
gn
Commission
the
National
trodung
Clar
in
Santa
major water resourcesforce
County,Thisis a manwhoseinterestin public sional Baseball Ad of 1h95. The legislation fessionalsportsandAmericanbusinessin the
serviceis so importantto him thathe made it centen a temporaryregolatmyauthodty to broadexemptionit enjoys fromlegalchallenge
overseethe conductof professiral baseball underthe Nation'santitrust laws.Majorleague
his dutyfor morethan halfof his life.
Since1957,RonEsau has beenservingthe to assure thatour nationalpastimewillremain teamownershave,in effect, the abilityto write
pub- all their own rules and to imposetheseroles
to the American
availableendresponsive
joined
citizensof SantaClaraCounty.He first
on the public.No outside regulatoryauthority,
the SantaClam ValleyWaterDistrictas an lo.
control,
assistant civil engineerand has heldvarious Like all baseballfans, I bae foundthe nor any formof internalself-regulatory
nowexiststo checkthis exerciseof take-it orpots, includingassistant general manager, eventsof the pastpooredromely dishearten-leave-itmarketpowerbymajor leaguebasethatfoto his presentpositionas ig. We witnessedoboenegotiations
until appointment
coed mor on otlandish demandsby both ball.
manager.
general
During his 37 years of dedicatedservice, ownersand playersthat on tangibleobjec- Thecurrentplayerstrike is themostobvious
Ron Esau has been appointedto numerous tines,a baseballstike that haltedall major result of this unchecked exerciseof market
on waterboards acrossthe State leagueplay nfon August12 and, for the frst power.Where once basebati'santitrustexdirectorships
in allowingbaseball
including the State Water Contractors,the time in 0 years,the cancellatioof a Wold emptionwas instrumental
it
the majorleagueteamown- to expand andcreateplayingopportunities,
the Sedie. Recentlp.
CentralValleyProjectWaterAssociation,
labor disputesanddeadlock.
the em collaterallyimposeda capon playersole- nowencourages
CalifomiaWaterResourcesAssociation,
In
every
renegotiation
of
the
major
league
banethe
1995
also
jeopardize
den
that
could
the
Western
Agencies,
Urban
Water
Califomnia
UrbanWaterCoalition,the Bay PolicyBoard, bollseason. Allthese evuotshavatabooplace playersagreement since1972-in eightsepain 22 years-agreement was
behindcloed doom, in anoint cegotiation ratenegotiations
andothers.
Asidefrom his prestigeas a high-rankingwithoutroprentation ot and lisle apparent not reachedwithouteithera strike or a lockwater resourcesand communityofficial,Mr. regardfor, tho interestsof thosowho payIhn out.
Esau has alsobeenpraisedforthe substantial cost of professionalbaseball-bseball fans But the problemscreatedby the major
league'sexemptionfrom legal challengego
contributions he has madeas a hard-workingandtaxpayers
volunteerHe is knownfor the work he has These events tode to confionthe moot beyondthe labor disputesit fostersbetween
of majorleaguebaneballin ownersand playersandits exclusiveness
wagoe
donean a cabinetmemberof the UnitedWay negtie
and
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expensefor consumers.
Thereare equallyad- with representatives
at all the prncipal parties and players.It could also providefor mediverseconsequences
for minorleaguebaseball ie prafassional
baseball,
togetherwith a chair- alion or arbitrationof disputesbetweenthe
the gee- majorleaguesandminorleagueteamsownman and two members
representing
teams,localgovernments
andtaxpayers.
mouldseve as a ers. In these areas, the legislationaacords
betweenmajorleagueand era public.TheCommission
The relationship
minorleague baseballteamshas becomeex- temporaryoversightandmediationbodythat playersandminorleagueteamOwners
an optremelyimbalanced,
to the extent that minor Couldact immediately
to help resolveas Irs portunityto resolvedisputes
with majorleague
leagueteams appear analogousto closely passebetweenbaseballOwnersand players team ownerswhereno meansof viable recontrelledfranchiseswith little independentand also protectthe rightsand interestsof courseare currentlyavailable.
controlor discretion.
The key assetsof minor baseballfans,minorleagueteams,localgas- A key powerof the commission
wouldbe its
league teams-their players,managers,and emmeotsand taxpayers.It mouldalso tact- authority to hold publichearings andto obtain,
coaches-are ownedandcontrolledbymajor tale a longerterm, marethoughtfuland hot- if necessarythrough courtaction,all relevant
leagueteams,leavingminorleagueowners ancedapproechto resolving
thebrooderprob information
and documents neededforits pubwith authorityto undertake largely financial lins createdby baseball antitrustexerp ic investigations.
Majordecisions in baseball
management
andmarketing
responsibilities
for tioe.
thataffectbaseballfans,teams,andtaxpayers
their team. Rightsto operate as a minor The legislatonries notlobea defntive Pu- are maderoutinelyin completesecrecywithleagueteam,together
with playersandcoach- sitionon the repealof the antitrustexemption. out any public representation
or disclosure.
would be Is Majorleaguebaseball'sfinancialstatements
as,can be revokedfor almostanyreason,and A majordalyof tha commission
with littleor no recourse.
undertahe a multisoar studyof the anthrust are accordedthe statusof Statesecrets.And
Majorleagueowners have alsolearned that exemption, taking into accountnil interests secrecy and distrust betweenowners and
bythreatening
to movea teamto anothercity and perpectives, andto submitto Congress playershave createdmajorbarriersto settletheycan extracthundreds
of millionsof dollars its indis nd any recommendations
for leg- mentof labordisputes. Thecommission
would
from local govemmentsto renovateexisting islativeremedies.The commissionwould be liftthis veil of secrecyIn baseballand permit
ballparksor buildextravagant
new stadiums. requiredto analyze the majorprnpnsalsInn public disclosureof all relevantInformation
Teamshaveattractednewfansandgenerated modifyingbaseball'santitrustexemptin, in- pertaining to actionsthat affectthepubllc
substantial windfallsin thefirst few yearsafter during tntal repealo1the exemption, partial
The commissionwouldalso haveauthority
moving into new stadiums.Local taxpayers repeal for purposesof subjectinglabor ritend up payingmostof the costs.The major lins issuesto anbtust jurisdictin, andrepeal to issue orders,and to obtaininjunctionsif
necessary,
to delayor halt actions or policies
leagueshavealso required smallercommu- at the exemptionwith protectionsto exempt
nitiesto invest substantialsumsto renovate lnng-standingcontractualarrangements
hr bymajorleagueteamownersuntil it has had
opportunity
to hold publichearings
sufficient
playingfacilitiesin orderto retaintheir minor twen majorleagueand minorleagueteams
andobtainrelevantinformation.
leagueteams,offeringfew,if any, guaranteesfromthe ntrs laws.
that theseteamswill not be movedin future My legislationdos lobe the positionthat Finally,the legislationrequiresthatthecomyears.In my own State of NewYork,for ex- baseball' antitrostexemptionis, is effct, a missionbe seffunding throughpaymentof
ample,the cost imposedon smallertowns to gonemment-granted
monoy in mucb the fees by the major leaguebaseballowners.
meetthesefacilityrequirements
has amounted samemnner as a localpublicutilityor tress- Major leaguebaseballhas reapedenormous
marketstato nearly$30 million. Once again,the tax- portotionauthority.Andlike anyotherpublicly benefits as a resultof itsprotected
payerspaythe bill.
sanctionedmonopoly,my bill would iquire tus underFederalantitrustlawandhas an obIt has becomeclear that we really need publicoversightIn assurethat self-teremt is ligationto pay mostof the costof regulating
Federallegislation
to solvesomeof the major not put abovethe interestsof the publicand this marketto protectthe public'sinterests.
Funding wouldbe in the formof annualfees
problemsfacedbybaseballSincebaseballis consumers.
as a
a nationalsportand, indeed,is knownas our
In this regard,the propoted commission paidbymajorleaguebaseballcalculated
percent-of
nationalpastime,I believeFederallegislation wouldbe similarto thn FeduralCummunico fraction-of-a-percentage-.002
annualteam revenues.
Themanner
Is the bestway to address
this need.
lions Commission,
or any other pubic body combined
Proposalshave been Introducedin the with oversightover a restrictedindnstry or andallocationof these fee paymentsamong
by
Houseby Representatives
MICHAEL
BILlRAKIS
market,An importnt difference.howener,is majorleagueteamswouldbe determined
with major
and JiMTRAFICANT,
andin the SenatebySen- the act that the authorityof the proposed the commissionafter consultation
ator DANIEL
PATRICK
MOYNIHAN,
to repeal commission
is intendedIs be tempary dun leagueteamowners.
baseball's antitrustexemption.I fear this may ieg a periodof deregulation
o1baseballbum Mr. Speaker,the single most important
be too simplistican answer that does not the current market rentrictionsimposedby issue of economicpolicyand legal principle
of Congressmustconsider
conieto gripswith the totalityof the problems baseball'scurrentantitrus exemption.Since thatevery Member
of professionalbaseball.Repealwould cer- Federallur has permitted
a restrictednatonal is whetherbaseballownersshouldretaintheir
to write allthe rulesof our
tainlybenefitmajorleagueplayers,and per- marketfor majorleaguebaseballthe Federul uniqueprerogative
The events of
haps evenconsumers.
if it resultsin teamex- Govemnt baa both the rght and the re- Nation'spastimethemselves.
pansion andlower ticketcosts.But it couldbe sponsiblity to regate Ibis market,just us we the past year, and the cancellationof the
extremely disruptiveof baseballoperations regulateothermonopoies, to assurethatthe World Seriesfor the first time in 90 years,
stronglysuggestthat majorchangesare needgenerallyand potentially
devastating
for many pubi's interestsare protested.
minorleagueteams.To resumeplay for fans The primarypurposeof lbs commission
is ed.
in 28 majorleaguecitiescouldmeanlosing far to providea fom fsr publicsutiny over the I am particularlypleasedaboutthe recent
byboth President
ClintonandSenmoreaffordable
accessto baseballfor fans in Conductof professioal baseballat both the statements
manyof the 170 minorleague parksacroas majorleag e andminorleague levels.It would ate MajorityLeaderDOLEurgingthe players
NorthAmerica.
havethe sulbontyto investigate
manyaspects andownersto reachagreement
as quicklyas
Themajoraltemative
to thisapproachis in- ot basebll, Includingthe setting of tioket possible.I hope that theseand other efforts
corporated
in billssponsoredby Representa-pricos,expansion or relocationof teamtrun- am successful,
andthat the strikeendsforthtivesJimBUNNING
andCHeALES
SCHUMER
and chises, terms and Conditionof motor and with. But that aloneis not enough,or should
seeksonly pardalrepealof baseballs exemp- minor leagueplayer contracts,relatonships not be, becausehistory shows that further
tion to subjectlabor issuesandnegotiations
to betweenmajorandminorleagueteams,utrur- work stoppagesin the future are highlylikely
Federalantitrustlaw. Theseproposalssuffer teral requirements
and fnancing for stadiums, to occur. So Congressshould act on this
fromthe opposite problemof addressingonp televisionbroadcastrights,and licensingand whetheror not a settlementis reached.
impediments
Everyoneinvolvedin seekinga solution to
to resolution
of the currentplay- marketingof baseballmercandise. Tbs em strikewhile offeringlittle to addressthe misso couldinterveneis theseareas upon a this is doing so principallyfor emotionalreabroaderproblemsfor baseballfans. localgov- determination
thatan actionor poicy Is pnten sons-reviving our nationalpastime.But as
emmentsand taxpayers,and minor league tly harmfulto the publics interestsor the the Presidentpointedout, thnre are serious
teams.
hst Interests
of baseball.
economicconsequences
as well.SpringtrainThe legislation I amintroducing todayoffers The commissin alsowouldhave authority ing communities
will lose$1 millionfor each
a middlegroundbetweenthesealternatives.
If to conduct bindingurbitration
in the eventof a canceledgame; majorleagueCitieswill lose
createsa seven-member nationalcommission labor impassebetweenmajorlegue owner $1.2 millionand some 2,000jobs for each
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canceled game, accordingto the U.S. Con- In tier, the Choir Academy of Harlem, a PROPOSING A BALANCED BUDGET
forence of Mayor. Thismeansthatthe strike ontettite or Community School Diotric 5, AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
some $2 billion. was hon. Today, the acadomyteachm
hasalreadycostour economy
Wemustnot forget thatit isn't just the owners yacagoeo acm8 o 18aod offer a Regeots
OF
SPEECH
andplayerswhoare losingmoneyin this dis- high chootprogram.
Mcm chana year ago the academy moved
pute-we are all losing, one way or another.
A.MANZULLO
DONAID
HON.
The many bills that havebeen introduced from a smatterbuldina in Harlemto it first
OFILiNeOls
demonstratethe wide ideologicaland geo- peanent hom-the former termediate
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
graphicextentof the interestin dealingwith School201buidiog at Madisan Ave. and
the baseball crisis. But the complete or partial12tS.
keep
Friday,
January27, 1995
critics,
tself'to
Aside from proving
is too simplisthe antitrust exemption
of
repeal
othaolstepinitasitin
reea
tic an answer and will not get to the nub of the
problem, which is to protect fans, taxpayers,
and communities. My proposal offers a broader altemative. Under my bill, we will have the
equivalent of compulsory arbitration to resolve
the short-term problems and get major league
baseball on the fields once again, followed by
an ia-depth study of how we can best organize baseball at al levels under conditions that
provide futern stability for all concerned: playem, owners, fans, communities and taxpayers
throughout the United States.
I think this is good tegislation and sound
public policy. I do not expect baseball owners
ajr
to support my pposal; I do not expec
league players to support it: but I do hope that
fans and taxpayers across America will support it. for it is the only proposal designed first
and foremost for baseball fans and taxpayers.
I urge the Congress to consider this legislation,
at the earliest opportunity.

lg rho echont finoancially stable tterough the
years hasbn a challenge Ta resid.
e far myatoy and
Perform
atone dost cover the nosesof trs. pianos
nd more than t0t wortdwide cn each
year. Ticket revennes cocer only hal its 02.7
mitton hudget.
Despite generous pors. cothacks In city
and orporate funding he mode tome tour
Impoesible.
evehetes. as fuodiot thrinks. the oryng people who auditinone
so grow. Last yea 2,00 hopefuls tried oat for
eta seats to music. dance and drama.
The schoo popnletion ato is growing.
reinsttoted its pre
S years ag the

The House in Committee of the Whole
House en the State of the Union had under
consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res.
1) proposing a balanced budget amendment
to the Constitution of the United States:
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, a balanced
budget Is the best way to ensure the future
economic prosperity of the United States. It is
a long-term solution to a long-term problem.
Congress, over the past 40 years, has been
full of big spenders who couldn't restrain their
proclivity to spend. A balanced budget limits
the powers of Govemnment and brings stability

to the budget-making process.
Deficitsam not a short-termtrend.The Fed-

eral Govemment has run a deficit for 56 of the
gr
f
64 years, and the last 24 years in a row.
the1top
Congresshas tried to change its free-spendthe
t5t
memher
conchoir ace chases from
ing ways, but countless budget deals have
cft choir on a rotating his.
done very little. Inthe 1920's, FederalspendAlthnnghmnre thee 90 of the students an
of GNPwas 3 percent;in
ingas a percentage
oto
cottege, Turnbsll said, ae yon
reches gradniacin day. Ho loses sme ste- 1940 it was 10 percent;and in 1992it was
___________
22.4 percent. Eliminating the deficit is one of
ders to the tare of the screern.
"It's hard," the director seid. "Some yes the most urgent priorities facing the country.
BOYS CHOIR OF HARLEM: DOING
We can't begin to tackle our near $5 trillion
cast reach."
IT RIGHT FOR 25 YEARS
Bat for maty. like tO year-ntd Hiletfih national debt untilthe Federalbudget runs a
Scott, the Boys Choir or Harlem Is a sen- surplus. And unless we begin to repay our
B. RANGEL
HON.CHARLES
debt soon, this country will be headed for a
iNOF
Thh
HOUSryO
a pt:;e to get itot mic and nffte
NEW
YORKtees
deep and prolonged economic crisis.
IN
HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVESfriends
When it comes to balancing the budget, the
geccing iecn trohbe. I just come here after defict is a convenient target for election year
Monday, January30, 1995
Mr. RANGEL. Mr Speaker, I would like to schoot and go en rehearsal," said Scott. a attacks. But when it comes to getting reteran soprano and en aspiring en elected, deficit spending is the key. Why?
bring to your attention and to the attention of twoyear
ocntant. "!Wheo yea araduate firomnhere. First, intense pressure for spending tends to
my colleagues here in the House, a group of
Osman Armstrong, td, sings first atto. A override a generalized preference for fiscal reyoung men who have been doing it right for
the past 25 years.
choir momber since age , Is favorite sng straint and balancedbudgets. Inthe short run,
deficitspending Is the most painlesspolitical
An outstanding article which appeared in the en the program Is Haydn "To De."
"My mocher lovm t then t'i her hecause option and the path of least resistance. In
Daily News, December 11, 1994, speaks of
the choir's humble beginnings to the cole- t get to trse," said Armstrong. "And I'm otherwords,wastefulspending has a curious
whenit is
constituents
appealto deficit-hostile
brated musical success they take pride in gettiog away fram the city."
Some gredaom, like Wiltiam Byrd, re in their owndistrict.Second,Intensepressure
today
tnrn.
forspendingtendsto overridethe general,difPlease enjoy.
A Boys Choir assistant conductor and fused targetsof mosttax increases.Tax inm= s Cnm.
waste theory teacher, Byrd, 26, graduoted to creases are purposelyspread out enoughso
(By Sharline Chiang)
has cnmputer science do- they don't spark a Boston tea party. For Contots0.Amterieaurnino
chor ddi-grefa
burl chair
th
It,
-Guys
HotrClgeemsieyd
the
hurly
"Gays. it's pianissimo,'
gress, its easy to tax and easier to spend,
n
ter C
harige
fho
rector bellowed. Then, clapping twice, he ormaking It almost impossible to balance the
d
"on't
Ired half do it. It must be rightl"
In Prineton, H.J.
budget.
Doing it right. That s what the Boys Choir
"The school hel
pod me homein no mycon
of Harlem has been specializing in for the
Mr. Chairman, a long-term, structural repast 25 years.
sponse is needed to reverse a long-term,
my ownperson.
It hasnt always been easy.
structural problem. The solution is a balanced
Lookig ahead, Turnbull drams ofhelping
been a long process of convincing penk"Its
p similar choir schos Is major budget amendment to the Constitution. I don't
et
pte-tlassical purists-that we wee rea."
take this step lightly, but it's one that Thomas
said Walter Turnbull. choir founder and di- U.S. citie. Mast teachers (rem Houston and
Jeffersonendorsed.An amendment
reestabhate expresed interest.
Ott
metr.
creatint an endowment lishes a level playing field, forcing Congress to
n,
But fr
Evidence of mat musicianhlip and diversity can be found on the choir's first solo tirogh (sod-raising and corporate projers place higher priority on balancing the budget
album, "The Sound of Hope," which cele- is the Boys Chir's main goal. Turnhutl said. rather than spending and taxing. It restores
brates the group'ssilver anniversary.
Ho said an eedswmat will allow the Boys the Constitution's
goal of limitedgovemment.
The album. released in October by Choir of Hartem tn celehrate the tradion of
Somecritics of this legislation contendthat
EastWest Records America, offers everything "dotng it right" for anther 25years.
Impact
SocialSecurity.Nothing
it
will
unfairly
from pop and R&B toJa and gospel.
"It's not jut
about the their, it's aot
critics
In 25 years, the choir has been turned from disctptine," ho said. "It's ahnos feeling gnod could be furtherfrom the truth.These
say thatSocialSecurityis not partof thedefia group of rambunctious boys in the base- ehont yaarseir that's hope"
SecuSocial
completely.
I
agree
cit
problem.
ment of Ephesus Church in Central Harlem
S
tla major iCteroutinni attraction.
rity is soundly financed and runs a surplus
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force are unacceptable. The military actions
in Chechnya shake the confidence in the democratization process of the Russian Federation.
The Cerman Bundestag deplores the ppalling loss of human lives, the sacrifice and
the suffering of the civilian population
caused by the armed conflict in Chechoya.
The German Bundestag supports alt eorts
mGPRoEas.
to call on Russia emphatically to continue
(at IN CEEe.-Subject to subsections (b) the intensive dialogue
started within the
ar (c), she Secretary of the Treasury shall OSCE andto use all posslblitles of the OSCE
make payments to States and units of geto solve the crisis.
eral tocat govetnment in ascordance wick
The Geroan Bundoestag calls on the Rusthe provisions of chapter 67 of title t, .nitslan Government and the Chechenfighters to
ed States Code (formerly known as the "Rev- sop the fighting Immediately
and uncondieaue Sharing Act"I. as in effect on April 6, cionally, to endthe bloodshed
a o sdeeka
1986 (in this section referred to as "chapter political solution of the conflict which takes
into account the legitimate Interests of Rs(b) ENTUrEr)tEN PROD DErNED.-Not- sia as well as those of the Chechenpopuwithstanding section 6701(a)(1) of chapter 67. lation.
for porposes of this section the teres "entiOnly such a solution can exclode dangers
tement period" (as used in chapter 67) for the reform process, democratzation
and
meam each fiscal year after fiscal year 199S. the stability of the whole region; only a
(c) ATIORIZTION OF ArPROPRIATIS.Russia will be able to remain a
Notwiothstanding section e6703(b)
() and (2)of democratic
close partner of Germany, the EU and NATO.
chapter67. there are authorized to be approThe Goan Bundestag reaffirms Ionsuppriated to the Secretary of the Tmeasuryto port for the Ressia
democrats who chamcarry not this section t5,000,00000o.
For perhuman rihts and the role of law.
poses of this section, amounts appropriated pion
Cermany wants to remaln Rusta's partner
under this subsecttio shatt be treated as and friend.
amounts In the Trust Fund {asthat term Is
End informal translation.
used in chapter
Adopted unanimously by the Bundstag on
SEC3, REDUMONOFAMOUNOO
AUTHORImED
January 20,test.
n BE APPOPRoOO
D) FOR FORHR. Be it enacted by the Senate andHoueseof Rpmsetatre of the United Scaresof Aaerica In
Congressasembled,
SECONI.SHORTHnE
This Act may be cited as the "Revenue
Sharing Reestablishment Act of 1995.
5EC. 2.
OF REVNUE SHAR-

REHAUSMAE

67).

Theamout auhorized so beappropriated rE GISLATION TO REPEAL
ANT
fr aid to foeign governmentsfor fitocat
years after fiscal year 1995Is reducedby TRUST EXEMPTION REGARDING
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
$5,000.000,000.

ofRemarks

January31, 1995

business in professional
baseball,
the owners
will discover they candisciplinetheir business
practicesand the playerswill discovertheir
realvalue on the open market
We must recognizeonce and for all that
a bigbusiprofessional
baseballis a business,
ness. And if we can bring baseball'sfiscal
house in order,I have no doubtwe can bring
back fans to ballparksacrossthe countryand
restorethe gameof baseball,not the business
of baseball,
and America's
nationalpastime.
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HON.
KWEISI
MFUME
OFMNARYLAND
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 31, 1995
Mr. MFUME.Mr. Speaker,I was, unfortunately, detainedin mycongressional
districtin
Baltimore
earliertodayandthus forcedto miss
a recordvote. Specifically,I was not present
to recordmy vote on rollcallvote No. 75, on
the amendment offeredby Mr.COOLEY
of Oregon.
HadI beenhere I wouldhave voted "no."
$20,571.48
A YEAR FOR AN INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY

HON.
FORTNEY
PETE
STARK

OFCALIFORNIA
INTHEHOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVSS
HON.
ESTEBAN
EDWARD
TORES
Tuesday,January31, 1995
GERMAN
PARLIAMENT
DEOrCALRNIA
NOUNCES
SITUATION
IN
INTHE HOUSE
OPSEPSmnTATtVFS
Mr. STARK.Mr. Speaker,I have just reCHECHNYA
ceiveda letter from a 59 year old self-emTuesday Janurary31 1,995
ployed realtorin Caifomia-a man whohas
Mr. TORRES.Mr. Speaker,today I am lo- no seriousmedicalconditions.Severalyears
HON.
TOM LANTOS
lrodooinglegislationto reptealthe antitrustex- ago, he was divorced and used COBRAto
OnCAIFOeRNA~s
grouprate policyof
IN THEHOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES emptoounderwhisk MajorLeagseBaseball keephis wife's Prudential
henoperatedsisce 1922.
$275.96 per month.At the endof his COBRA
Tuesday, January31, 1995
1 am doing this for o rasons. For the healthcontinuation
period,he askedPrudenMr. LANTOS.
Mr. Speaker,I would liketo shortterm,I believe repealingthe esttrut ex- tial to convertto an individualpolicy.As the
sham with my colleaguesa very important empgoowill accelerate
the andofthe baseball gentlemanwrote me, theta when Prudential
documentbroughtto myattentionby myvery shotdown, which threatensthe ivelihoodsof "droppeda piece of the Rock" on him. The
good friend, Dr.Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Belowis thosonds of Americans
andthe Economies
of monthly cost of a $100deductiblepolicywas
thetext of a resolution
unanimously passedby cites aedtownsacrossthe cutry.
$1,714.29-or $20,571a year. For a $1,000
the Bundestegin Germanyon January20,
For the long tem. I bolieverepeehigthe deductible, the monthly premium was
1995, regarding the Russian debacle is antitrut exemptios wilt restorefaimessto the $1,030-or $12,360 per year.
Chechnya. I commend
the GermanParliament fragilerelotioship of labor and masogement To help stoptheseoutrageous
overcharges,
for its pincipled stand and I urge my col- is professioat baseball.And is doingthatwe I urge the Congressto simply extend the
leaguesto careftlly considerit as a modelfor will help presetnethe institstionof beboll COBRAhealth continuation
time periodsinour ownpolicy.
und protectthe liselioods of Americassfor definitely.Onceyou are in a grouppolicy,you
Thearticlefollows:
generotiono
to come.
should be able to stay in at the group rate
administiative fee.
Althoughmy ems backgONund
bo deep plus an appropriate
GERANPARUAsMuENTsotus oe
CHECUNYA.
JANUARY
20,995
rootsis the labormovemeni,
I do not measto
Begin tnformal trasation
takesdes is the currantstrugglebetweenthe
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
The German Bundestag is deeply
concerned playersandmaement. All I want to do is
and dismayedat thedangerous
development restorefaimesoto the negotiating procesoand
of the situation in Chechnya.It doesnot allow the coedsto help acceleratethe sage
HON.
PHILIP
M.CRANE
contest the right of the Russian federatio
aoes wherenecessary.
OF .ulsIS
to preserve its territorial integrity Wi.tthin
IN THEHOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES
the legal framework provided for by the Frtoe
exemption from the ntitrst statntet, masage
stan constitution and in observanc
Tuesday January31, 1995
national law and human rights, as welt as ment can impose its owe solory otructure free
Mr. CRANE.Mr. Speaker,after receiving
OSCE principles and other rules with which fromconstrns of the cods or theopenmar
it (the Russian Federation) had agreed to bet t baseno doubtthot removingthe anu- assurancesthat we wouldnot be voting on
comply under a binding obligation. The Rus- trust ecemptin woulddrmotically altar the en- final passage of the UnfundedMandateResian ations in Cheshnya constitute, ht- caling rate of ticket phwceswhich eam nr- form Act tonight,I am keeping a commitment
ever. a graveviolation of the principtes of renty set byen unfettred cartelof 28 teem I mademanymonthsagoto travelbackto Illithe OSCE. the provisions of the 1992/199 Vinois to speak beforethe Barrington
Chamber
wers.
enas Document on confidence and serity
I regretthatI maymissa numRemoing the antitrut eoempton wuld put of Commerce.
buiding measures. and of the U.N. Huan
ber of votes relatingto amendments to this
Rights Coventions. The acts of violence. the profecsioal baseball in the reel wod ot cr
it has bedisregard of homan rights, and the Indis- pomb Aerica where it betongs. If we allow legislation. H-owever,regrettably,
trimnte and eareoratad oneof miittary the free marketto determinethe costof doing come clearfrom the proceedingsof recent
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been a single effort by any of the legis-

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the

laturs to repeal the line-item veto au- Senator from Vermont would like 10
thority. In fact, It works so well that minutes to discuss end discourse on
there lea consenus i the States that what wee the ce end possibly future
it sould be left in place so that they national pastime. I yield those 10rinmight continue to provide a foundation utes to the Senator.
for the financial Integrity of the NaThe PRESIDING OF'ICEJl The Senator fr-omVeroent is recognIsed,
tio.
Someone came to me recently and
said, 'Jo-N, there is a State that hasnot
changed their lIne-Item veto. In 1990LAUBSB
the State of Wisconsin amended theirbut
provialon." Well, it was interesting
when I looked at what the amendment
.s
really said. It reads, and I quote: "in my reed friend, the distinguished muapproving an appropriations bill i n
r Senator from New York and m
part, the Governor may not create a neighbor. And like the distinguished
new word by rejecting individual let- Senator from New.York, L too, hope
that wo will some day actually hays
tars is a word of the enrolledbIl."
aelllayed' I share his sense of ime
Mr. President, what the legislature
said was that the Governor could not triotiam in all things. I admi
his
change the word 'cannot' into
'can" sese of hintory. But I suspect he, like
by striking out the last three letters of 1, is at IsuY. many eventa this time Of
the word. That is not a real change in year when our national anthem Is
the philosophy behind the veto author- played. We are all very proud in hea'
ity. It is simply a housekeeping detail It, bat we sometimes, a springarrives
about making the measure what it wait for the words, "Play ball," right
ought to be, namely, the capacity of altar It Is played.
the executive to knock those things
So the Major League Baseball Anti
out of spending bills which are not in treat Reform Act Of IM Is being introthe beat Interest of the State. So, it is doced, Mr. President, It Is being-Introimportant as we go to conference to duced by Senators HarCH TuMLOND,
understand the success that the line- and myself I want the Senate to know
Item veto has enjoyed in the States,
why I back this.
.
In the end, I was encouraged by the
Senator Tuno
and Introduced
vote last night. Sixty-nine vetee t
on Febroary 14 an saller version of
favor of the line-item veto reflected a this legislation to remuveths antitrust
strong understanding that we must law exemption that major league baseadopt measures to restrain spending, ball has enjoyed for over 70 years.
and reduce the deficit. So we have Major league baseball, unlike pomade a significant step forward. For If tically any other business In this coonths people sent us here for any purpose try, has an exemption from the antiat all, it was to enact changes, such as trust lawe, - and Senator TnmN,
this, that will fundamentally alter the Senator Horcu, and I. and others lel
way we do business.
that should be removed. I look forward to the time when the. Actually. we are just saying that noconference report comes back and we body should be above tho law, We did
again have an opportunity to address this for Congress. We passed the Conthis issue. It is critically important. gresslonal Accountability Act, someThe vote last night was encouraging. thing I backed for years. which applies
However, while the battle has been the asme law to Congress as apply to
won, the war is not over. And as we everybody else. We ar Just saying
work out the differences between the baseball should liv by the me laws
two bills., I hope that the end product en everybody eise.
I regret very much that'the owners of
gives us as great a promise for fInacial Integrity as the measure we passed major league baseball teams and major
last night.
league baseball players have been onMr. President, as the Senator from able to get through their impasse. MeIndiana, you are to be commended for diation ban not been successful, fledyour role, along with Senator McCAIN. dential entreaties could not do It. ConIt was your hard work that ensured we greselenal pleas for a veiuntary settlearrived at a product which could be mont have gone for nought.
subscribed to by such a broad majority
What we have always thought of as
of the Senate. I hope that this body our national pastime may become a
acts on the conference report as it did thing of the post. lam afraid char what
last night. It was nighttime behavior, we saw as children when we would folmaybe somewhat reminiscent of times low games, when we would go to our
when we have done the wrong thing Little League games and Identify with
under the cover of darkness. Last verous major ieaguers at-that time Is
night's behavior, however, was com- gone. Seniors who look forward to the
mendable In that It was in the national Joys of spring training and following
interest. We should seek to replicate it their favorite tes on radio, youngIn the future.
star who identify with heroes in the
Mr. President, I suggest the absence world of taseball. this will herons,
of a quorum.
And let us not forget so m
wo
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the make monthly mortgage payments by
Senator will suspend his request. The being vendors of everything from TSnator from New York.
shirts to hut dogs, who park the car,

who take the tickets.
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Theo People are

also out of a ob.
Ther Is a public Interest in the
somption of major league baseball. I
sue concerned that the owners show no
Intent of really getting a strong commissIoner who might look cut for the
best Interest of baeeball. That is what
the cemnsoner is supposed to dothe private Interest of those who

rather for the
bes intereste of b
Itef
antitrust laws areidesigned to
protect consumers, but for over 70
years consumers have not seen these
applied to baseball, en the assumption
that there would be a strong commicsicer and the major league wold snorate to the best interest of baseball.
But thatis not what Is going on, .
In Vermont wher I grew up, virtually everybody wee a Ned Sox fan
Mew ther is divided loyalty between
the Red Sox and the Montreal Biped,
and ther is also the minor league
team, the Vermont Bxpos.
We also have jobein the State of Tr'
mont that rly us, bebalL There to a
company CallediMoot Wood Turnings In
Murthileld Fail,
- Trnings" Is
wood Vornibgs They mak The seuvenir. replica baseball bate, the Uttle
both that have'been passed out for 40
year on bat day at baseball- ames.
They had to drop a thirdof the 24person work forc because of the strke
test summer. That h-just one small
company. These are not people who
make a great deal of money, - They
make 15 and 99an hour, and they wer
nut of work because a sml group of
people cannot fiu out how to dlylds
up $2 biBlost It makes absoiutely n
sense.
We-lid a cbanos last year to night
this situation when we were considerlog a bill to repeal baseballsantitrust
exemption, but we decided to hold off
in the Senate, thinking that maybe everybody would work It out. Bight siter
that, negotiations between the major
league baseball owners and players dieintegrated. We saw a preemptive
strike, the unilateral impoeition of a
salary rap, failed efferts at mediation,
the loe of one sason and likely obliteratio of a second, and pleas from all
mer to get It going again,
I think ifwe bed repealed this out-ofdata, judicially proclaimed im uity
fr
the antitrust law, this matter
would not still be festering, No other
business, professional or amateur
sport, has this exemption fr
law
that major league baseball has enjoyed
and, Mr. President, bee abused.
In fact. one of the players who testfled at the Judiciary Committee hearlog this year asked a very perceptive
question. Be sid, let us suppose that
baseball did cot have an antitrust exemption and let us suppose they were
in the sorry sth they are in today and
tn
let us suppose baseball came to
Congress and said, "Oh, by the way, we
cannot clean up this mes we have, hut
would you kindly give usan antitrust
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exemption? Would you pass special
law to exempt us from the antitrust
laws"-omething nobody elo has. Mr.
President. they would get laughed off
Capitol Hill. There would be no antitrust exemption passed for them.
so the question is, if we would not
eact it today, why do we allow them
to have it? Why do we not just and it?
It is something that should be done.
I am concerned about the interest of
the public. I am concerned particularly
about the intelest of baseball fans. I
am not here to speak on behalf of the
baseball owners or the players. Former
conomialoner Pay Vincent said:
Basaball Iamore
ownership
of an ordinarybsh-ese. Ownorshave duty to take
ito conaIderation that they own part of
Ameoricasnationni pastim-in trust. This
trme soetimes reqcfre patting self-inter-

than

a

concerned about som o.
also
of
thImaanswers
alocneedaotsme
the
I got from some of major
league baseball's representatives. In
fact. I ahould note her on the floor
that the answers that they sent, their
written answers, are in severe variance
with their hearing testimony on sevoral points. In other words. they said
one thing at the hearing and they said
something ele after. in their answers.
I think the public shlould look at what
they did. because either they are grossly mistaken on one point or they are
not telling the troth on another.
For example. I asked the acting commissioner whether fans who reject replacement players and replacement
games would retain season tickets
when the strike ended and major
league players return? He testified emequivocally and without hesitation,
"Yes. air." But in his written response
to the same question, he did not confirm his testimony. Instead, he rsponded that policies with regard to
season tickets and priority seating are
handled by the clubs individually.
Well, he has given two answers. One
has to be honest, and one contradicts
the other. At the hearing. I asked
whether major league baseball owners,
who benefit from a special antitrust exemption in order to be able to join togather with regard to sports broadcasting, would make an unqualified commitment that major league baseball
playoff and World Series games would
continue to be broadcast over free tlevision through the year 2010.
The acting commissioner responded
in the affirmative. But when be got
away from the TV lights and cameras
and the hearing, he answers that "it is
not possible to make an unqualified
commitment that far Into the future."
I think the public Is being shortchanged by the policies and practices
of major league baseball and by such
disregard for the interests of the fans
as evidenced from the hearing record,
They ought to have a little bit of
competition. If we withdraw the antitrust exemption, they will have it.
There is no joy here in Washington as
we continue these proceedings-just a
sense Of loss, lost opportunities, lost
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Innocence, and loot otature for a game
that n0 symbollnod Amorica like no
other.
I command our ohairman, Snators
RAn and TEoRlOnr, for taking up
this challenge. Wo will move forward
on it.
Mr. MOYREAN. Mr. Presideot, I
suggeet the absence o a quorom.
The PRESIDING OFFICR.
The
clerk will nall the roil
The bill clerk proceeded to cell tho
rol.
Mr, POONRAN. Mr. Presideot, I ask
unanimonownet that the order for
the quorum Call he reminded.
The PRESIDING OFFICEt. Without
objection, It is so ordered
Mr. MOYRIAI.
Mr. President, in
the pirit of bipartisan hamony I
would like to yield 5 minutes. or ouch
to the datinguished senior Senator from Missouri_
The PRESIDIG OFFICER. The Senator from isouri Is recognized.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, Iwant in
express my sincer appreciation to my
good friend, the senior Senator from
Nw York. We have worked together on
many Important prjetsI
This is a Mesure before the Senate
today that is very Important to smal
bonines people al across thia country.
Today the person who operas a small
business has many problems. Ther is
nothing so glaring as the failure of the
node, as It now stands, to give any dedoctin for the payment of health inauance for the businese owner or that
owners family,
This 2P-perrent deduction level, an we
all know, coired December 11. 111
According to toe Treasury Department, approximately 3.2 milimo. selfemployed taxpayers cannot currently
deduct any of their health Isrance
premiums, unless thin is correted, The
3.2 million taxpayers represent ape
proximately 10 percent of the unoor
porated boniness owners in America
today.
We had hoped lat year, and we
talked a great deal In heath reform,
about the need to pot toe em1 healness owner on toe esme footing as the
employee of a large crporatin who
can rece, essetially, 100percent doductioce for the cost of health care prmuos.
large corporations already are shin
to exclude toes costs, and their employees do not have to report them on
their tax returns. we ore putting entre
preneor at a very, very serious dinadvantage. This problem afflicts sall
business ownar who ore famers, who
ae ranchers, who now truck drivers.
Thes people deserve fair tax credit
treatment.
One of the biggest concerns that we
have today is that witout this daduoton many families ore left without
heth insurance because of Its already
high cost, We think this Is a terrible
impact on the families. It Is vry hard
to imagIne a more difficult problem for
them in face. Nearly one-quarter or 23
percent of the self-employed fore oem
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atrd today. About 4 million of thos
who do not narry health insuronce ar
In fomilies headed by a sow-employed
worker.
This deduction makes Insurance
more affordable and helpe to got the
families the health norance that they
need and deserve to get. Whether them
o eail businesse to the town or the
city, or farmers, or truck drivars. an I
sold, or machers. them people deserve
to have the some kind of tax treatmeet.
The bill provides for a permanent entension of the deduntion. whiob thin
Is long overdue, and would provide retreactive deduction for the 1994returns
These returns are doe April 17.
We moot ant swiftly no that those
people who hove paid the health booranne claimsloat year will be able to deduct them Unfortntely, we were not
abie to sot in time, for farmers' retorna;,
whickwere due on March I-.
If we delay this hil further and are
not ableto get-it to the Prenident on
time, even more people who oelig
for the deduction will have to file
amended returns.
This Is going to burden the IRS with
paperwork, not to mention what in
even more Impotant, the bordens on
the, People whojhve'to reeMr.
Prenident, it Is tough enogh to bawd
to fe a imome tax retorn one time.
It is certainly no pldasure in hav to
file one again
I thin It is s vei very impcr
tant-and I commend the m
ra of
the bill and thi sponsors of toe leglatien-thst we ar making thin measure
Permanent, For Yesrs the self-employsd have been subjected to the oncertainty of-not knowing whether the
extension cold be grantedfor toe deduotlom I thinkIt has madelt very dIfficul fur the peoplto plan This
should take thatpr'blenawsy
,
Iam concerned about the fiscal pressores end tha need for deficit redectin but thin Is cot an aws where we
ought to ecnomis. Small boniness,
farmers, ranchers, trunk drivers-they
and their familes need to have the
health car-that thin wil encourage
them to have,
I would like to go forther, If we have
an opportunity, If toe money itsavalable, coontme In en seeing If we cannot get the deduction-be a par with
those people who work for large ocporations. But I am very pleased we no
moving en thi. I commend the managers of the bin, the ehairman and
ranking member of the committee as
well as the sponrs. ThIn wil have hoportantimpacte on the health ofmany.
many people, many of toes who are in
small businesses anl their families.
I than the distinguished Senator
from New York for yielding te time
and I urge my colleagues to support
thin vry Important measure.
Mr. POTRIlAf addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Cocmux). The Senator from New York.
- Mr. MOYNMA.
Mr. President I
know I speak for the distinguished
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chairman when I thank the senior Senator from Missouri for his Incisivermarksdeduction
I es pleased to see on the floor our
colleague from the Committee on Finance. the distinguished Senator from
llinois. I yield her 10 minutes, as she
evidently desiros. but in fact as much
time as she requires for her statement.
which I look forward to.
The PRESITING OFFICER. The Senator from Ilinos.
Me. MOSELEY -BRAUN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New
York. and the chairman of our committee. I stand to speak with regard to
Hit.
I amna strong supporter of the prosysloe that Is at the heart of H.R. 831, the
permanent extension and Increase of
the dedtion of health insuranc cents
for the self-employed. There Is no qoestion that the health Insurance expenses
of rillion of self-employed indlviduafte
around this country should be treated
lasgmore like taxpayers who work
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actively, so that It covers the 1994 ta Commission with the authority t
y.
the Provisiono that Increse that defer capital gre-s taxes sloing from
to 3 Percent. begining in transactios
Involving commica
14%. and the provisions that make that Mono prpertio. ectlally it permits
deduotion permanent, eliminating any those game to be roiled over as a nonpossihie future repetition of the kind of taxahie event. It does not eliminate
sitation we find oucselves In right even ens dollar of tax liability; it sinnow,
ply postpones the date when that tax
ootorlog the deduction, Increasing liability moot ho paid
it. and making it permanent is the
As initially reported by the Senate
right thing in do. It eliminates the Finnc Committee In 9M, the provikind of anxiety and uncertain
alto would have lloweda rollover if
sal-employed Americans ar facing the sale or exchange of the property
right now, and assures them that Con- wax required by the FCC a a condition
gross I committed in addressng the of the granting of the application.
disparity in the tax treatment of However the provision was broadeed
health in prance
s coststheIncrreosny Self- during the conference with the
employed Americana, and Americans of epresentaties. The conference ewh1 work for larger busin ss for the pert stated that, btcahaat
nonprofit Sctor, or for government.
. .. the Commilssion
does sot order or reSelf-employed Americans areinghardt
anchane.o.say partioular sale or
It has
working and make an enormous con- been deemd Mor apprsphiate is provide
tribtion in our economy. We should that the eletiof. bject to Otherconditions
1cd. eall he aaiable upon certilnet, we must not, make It mor dif
ilsit for them in make that coutribn- cellos h the comissos that the sal or
he
han" is necessary or appeewlat-I want
ior in
Mon by handicapping their ability
emphasis this'tord-oo efIeetlaie the
rsh Shalt
a d
Policies of the ciesin
with espet
rporations that provide health inri- Unfortunately. Mr. Presdent, thet- noa-ccsung
oenership or centred of radio
suracg coverage for their employees nansiCommittee has choessin end statisus.
get 100-percent deductihility for the this unacceptable, Inequitable, and W1- C
.. In is the FCC's authority in defer
Portiso of the health Insurance cents of fair situation by creating another one capital gain taxes in transactions intheir employees that they pay- The em- The price fur a public policyof moving velvIng the sale-of radio stations was
plOoss Of those companies use, afte- inwards greater euity In the Tax Cede broadened to in~iuds -televisison statax dollars only for that Portion of treatment of the health insurance ex- tions ropI. thes FCC's authority in
health insurance costs not paid far by Peuses of the self-employed, Is the orthis area was broadened yet aan no
their employers.
ahion of a itlly
unacceptable, ineqi- encbmapasbcable systems. n
tUntii 19M9,this authority was- used
In
the
=a
policy
table, and ofunfair
country ProIn thin coverage
vMeat
businesses
vidshealth
insurance
far treatment
the purchase of bldeast virtuali edolelvey by the kind of
their emploes. as does the Federal or certain other oommnnieatios'bsi people who then ow ed radin, telGoveernment, and State and local go- ceases by minority Americans, and. in visin, and cable systems,
peaand that
eraeot. Employer-provided. health In-" Sums circumstances, women. I aMo f tainly. at the time, did nbt include mIsranse Is at the hsart of this seen- court, seaking of the provisions In the orities or women,
try's system Of health insurance 0ev- committee Substitute repealing. the
it was not until i19 thteven ron
singe, and the tan deductibililty of ema- Provisisns known as section 1071.
radiostation in thsantrcotywa
-financed
health in
e coats
I Strongly Oppose the repeal of sec- owned by a minority, and it was not
encourages employer$ to Provide that Mon 1071for both procedural and sub- until Ii that thee was evan one tolinsudance.
atantive reasons. It Is a statement that vis i station In theiation owned by a
However, millions of American do Coagress
h
do s not cars about diversity minority. It was not until
4 that the
cot work far large corporations and do of voice in major portions or Nation's FCC first awarded a new radio Station
not have acce n
the kind of group communications industry which, after lcesen to a minority-owned compeny
health
e Plans
heartthat large Cur- all, are usingthe Public airwaves, or the sme way t bad awarded tens of
perations often prvide. Because they francises granted by the public, And billions of doiaronworth of bresorst
are alt-employed, these Americans It Is a statement that Congress, does sipectrum ionuom-inorities-for freeusally have io pay more far their not cars about Americans who have by en FCC comparative hearIng.
health Insurance. Because they are proceeded In good faith in spend litThe truth IS, Mr. President, that the
foself-employed
Is no e 1
upercent
orally
ailionsof dollarsmbased on the FCC initially handed out virtually all
tan deduction far the employer-pro- existence of Section 1m. They are of the
broadcast spectrum
to
video portion of health Insurance cents. being taught a very itter, expensive nominorities free of charge, and then
Congress has attempted in at least lesson, neverti
rely on the govern- used Section 1s1 over and over and
partially remedy this serioce inequity ment's word, or in take actions based over again to allow them i roll over
by providing a 25-perct deduction of on the law, beause the Government the huge capital gains they made In
the health insurance costs of the Self- mar decide, in a matter of
est
a few tax-free transactions
that allowed
employed. This provision of the Tax weeks i
repeal that law-retro- them to defer their tax liability. wa
Coede,however, was only temporary, actively,
FCC, as it handed ut the speotr m
and expired at the end of 199. What
Most Americans, T arc sure, have owned by all Americans; relied heavily
that means Is that, unless this Con- never heard of section 1071. and It is on the qstion of the proviu broadgross acts-now-all of the self-em- fair n oy that, until o, monthe ago, cast experience of competing applipsyed Americans across this country moot Members of Congress
D
knew little cantaa awardin new licnse, Yet for
will face a serious tsx Increase when or nothin about It. And ther was no Several dcadlus, even broadoast trainthey file their 1994 tan returns next particular reason for Congress in fou
pnlg
was denied in minorities in this
month.
os the
section. After all, it was enacted country and in some ports of this ceunThat is clearly a totally unaccept- in 1I as Prt of thewevenue amt of tryiasiamatter of lawi n
n
able result, It Is unfair, it isInequcthat year inhelp implement a new polState universities were legally barred
table. It is simply wrong. That Is why coythat prohibited the owner of radio from admitting i56oritih at the time
I Strongly support the provisions in the stations rom Owning more than one these stations were originally given
Pending
unl substitute fnr it,
that re- radio station in a given market
out, State-owned public honadbasting
stores the 21-percent deduction for
What ecion ao action does in to authorities refused in hire or train
health insurance expenses retro- provide the Federal Commninations them, State legislaturs denied black
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need and did not want. The FCC. In
threw the station into a public
reocation proceeding, which placed its
broadcast license In jeopardy. Faced
with the loss of the ability to do busineaa, the station dropped its black programming, and the FCC quietly
dropped the charges of "character violation."
These policies kept minorities from
participating in the free broadcast
spectrum "gold rush" that was going
on In America, And by the time these
policies were ended, the gold rush was
over. and there was no more spectrum
to allocate for free.
In 1978,the FCC finally recognized Its
role in denying minorities any opportunity to participate in the gold rush
and to enter the broadcast or cable indostries. That year, the FCC announced a policy of promoting ownership of broadcast facilities by offering
an FCC tax certificate to those who

turn.

voluntarily sell such facilities to mi-
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State colleges the funds to start broadcasting programs or to apply for broadcasting licenses. For example. the FCC
routinely granted broadcast licenses to
colleges and universities that were segregated by law, such as WBKY-FM.
serving the University of Kentucky.
which was licensed In 1941. WUNC-FM.
serving the University of North Carolina. which was licensed in 1952. and
KUT-FM. serving the University of
Texas. among many others.
These segregated policles helped ensure that a generation of minorities
would be denied the skills and the ancess necessary to enter the broadcast
industry-with the FCC's full endorsement and ratification.
meetandatiicaton.Thoem
The extent of the FCC's complicity is
by the
illutrated
rwr
h case
oso of Broward
itratdb
County Broadcasting versus FCC. This
1963 case involved a radio station.
WIXX. located in a community with a
large African-American population, a
population that received no black-orlented programming from any station
serving that market. WIX decided to
devote its program schedule to blackoriented news, public affairs, and
music. The city governmento nplined to the FCC that WIXX was offeri a format which the city did nt

This became an incentive for loves
ore to help with preserving and enpanding diversity of voice,
The FCC programs not a set-aide
or a qanta. It fanctions in the same
voluntary manner s the FCC' other
ose of ass certificatm. The FCC does
not require a percentage of licenaeo t
be contrlled by minorities, it does not
reqir Media properties to he cold to
minority-controlled businesoes. it does
not emuire a set percentage, nor dons
reqaire a nonminority seller of
media property to a minority-con
trolled bsines to even request a,
certificate,
is nothing compulsory.
So ther
ame no sooth aspcs of the tan
certificate Poicy at ail. The direct
beneficiaries of the te certificate may
or may nt be theiminority member. In
many instances t may be the nonmiority seller and/or the investors
who participate in the acquisition with
the minority purchaser. The benefit to
potential minority purchasers is the
incentive it Creates for sellers, and the
enhanced acces to capital it provid,
The FCC certificate Program then op
orates as a hey to unlock the dnor of
opportunity for minorities who have a

role in she broadcat Industry in our
ation.
There can he n question that minority entrepreneurs have a tougher time
noceosing the capital Markets Of this
contry. The FCC recngnLe this fact,
and the minority ownershp program
has expanded that access to capital,
Iu 1987, Congress explicitly endorsed
the FCC's actions in expanding the t-certificate program to encourage expded minority ownership of broadcast and cable systems. That year'
Conmere State, Justice, appropriatons bill contained laguage locking
program, they
Is the tao certifa
thought The committee report on the
bili stated Diversity of ownership resuits in diversity of programming and
improved service to minority and
women audiences. Similar langege
has bees included Is ecery anual ap.
propriatloes bili since that time, until
now
Betme 1978and 1994.the FCCIssued
317 tax certificate under its minority
ownership program. Radio stations rp.
resented abeut 3 percent of the certilcates issued, television stations 8 percent, cod cable systems, about 9 Pcent. These certificates helped mineritis enter a busines which, as I have
Otined. was virtually completely
closed to them- And It did so not by
taoing away a license from anyone. or
through asy foo of direct finaniai
ssistance tO the minonty buys= hot

nority Individuals or minority-contralled entitles. The FCC's policy was
based on the view that minority ownership of broadcast properties would proride a significant means of fostering
the inclusion of the views of minority
Arericans in programming, thereby
better serving the needs and Interests
of the minority community and enrichIn, the range
maeilnalhe~
available to
in
ag h offmaterial
the nonminority audience. The FCC
subsequently expanded its policy t
cover the sale of cable systems, as well.
In i92, during the Reagan administration. the FCC further expanded Ito s Iaeralrey
stated. o ra
tax certificate program. At that time,
nd TV statins. and cable syotems,
the FCC decided that. In addition t
those who sell properties to minorities and potential ivetors who were willenter partnerships with minor
investors who contribute to the sta.Iity log to
bitthe capital base of a mi- etie,buyers tW purchase these prop.
hilization of
nority enterprise would be able to reTh program has begun to make a
ceive a tax certificate On the ubse- difference ut it is worth keeping in
quant sai of their interest in the miind Cha. our of the 1,342 television
entity.
oority

stations
operating In the United
States, only 2d. or about 1.9 percent ar
owned by women. African-Amerinans
owned leos than that, only 21 stations.
Hispanics owned 9, and Asians owned 1.
In radio, the Situation is a little hottr. Oat of the 10.244 radio stations op
orating in the United Staten. 3H. or
about 3. percent are owned by women,
another 172 ar
owned by AfricanAmericans. Ill by Hispanics. 4 by
Asians. nd Shy native Americans.
Thes are the public airwaves we are
talking about. Mr. Prcsident. sod cabl
sro
amricas
e
to fui
isoer
Arica
to
oght tobantight
aetergtt nd there atcpt
ogtt
in thin industry.
should he
ogdiestofvceteau
tha
our broadcast and cabin systems
meet the needs of all of our people.
And research confirms a link, or the
nexus, between expading minority
ownership and diversity of voice.
By diversity of voice we mean the notins that the airwaves that we sommonicate on an Americans will Include the
viw o everybidy and not Just one
segment of the population or commo-

nityt hot of ali segments Of the popelatloc and the omnity. And Ia that
diversity comes the kind of vitality
that will keep our Nation vital and
keep our democracy aive.
You will recall George Orwell talked
In '1984" about the wave of cocooniction happening, and big brother
sent one message to the penple at al

ties. Ther were no alteroative mmsages, alternative points of view, sitar'
native perspectives to encourage Peepie to think for themselves. The whole
idea of diversity of voice Is that the entire community henefita when It has
the point of view and the p ctive Of
all our people, when the perspective
and the information that in ccmmunicated through the public airve
represents the whole panoply of Ameri
cans In this country and that we can
.il participate and draw from our di.
erity a a eoree of our Strength.
Ths Supreme Court made this clear,
In a nse of Motro Broadcasting, In.
versus FCC,In that cae, the Supreme
Court held that benign. rscc-conseisus
mesures mandated by Congress are
constitutionlly permissible, based on
a record of empirical evidence demcastrating a noons between minority
owership and diversity In programMing.
hscn
Teewr
iesuiso
TeewrfIveeuioo
hscn
section cited i the Metro Cas. Inclod
ing a study by the Congressional tsearch herce. 'Minority Broadcst

s

ONershi

a

r

m

That is to sy, does minority ownerhip escourage diversity ofviews?
This study. which looked at radio
data collcted by the FCC from over
1,000 radio and TV stations, showed a
strong correlation betwCes minority
ownership and programming targeted
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to minority ownerships and expansion
of diversity of voice for everyone. The
other studies all had similar findings,
showing differences in programming,
including news programming, and differences in the willingness to hire
women and minorities as employees.
Mr. President, what the Finance
Committee and the House of Representatives are now proposing with
this legislation, however, 1e to terminate this progress toward diversity, to
terminate the 1071tax oertifisate program and to do so retroactively and
with virtually no notice at all.
The committee report sets out three
reasons for terminating the program.
It says that the tax certificate program
has evolved far beyond what Congress
originally intended. The rePort makes
this argument even though It was Congrees that gave the FCC broad discretlion to set the terms of the tax certificate program.
Second, the committee report argues
that the FCC standards for Issuing the
certificates are
and therefore
subject to significant abuse. It asserts
that the FCC's determination of control does not guarantee that a minority purchaser will continue, to manage
the broadcast or cable property after
the tax certificate has been issued.
Third, the report argues that the tax
certificate program is not supervised
and reviewed by the Internal Revenue
Service, and that the FCC does not request information regarding the size of
the tan beoefit or otherwise act to ensure that the nonminority seller does
not get the entire benefit of the certifisate.
Mr. President, these arguments, It
seems to me, are sufficient to warrant
a reasoned. deliberate and careful review of this program and not the total
elimination retroactively of it. As a
general matter. I believe that all Federal programs should be periodically
reviewed. We should take a look at everything is make sure It works as it
was intended to work by this Congress.
to make sure that it is more efficient.
However, that commonsense principle.
I believe. should not be exploited as a
blanket license to just carelessly throw
out longstanding Federal laws without
any review before the fact, without any
chance to take a look at it. And yet
that is exactly what we are saying
here.
No study of the effectiveness of section 1071was undertaken by the House
of Representatives before it rushed to
repeal this legislation. Nor has the
Senate undertaken the opportunity to
fully study the merits of section 1071.
The majority leader of this body stood
in the Chamber just last week talking
about the fact that there are over 10
Federal programs he would like to see
reviewed as part of a comprehensive review of Federal affirmative action policies. And the majority leader asked
two Senate committees to hold hearings as part of that review. The majorIty leader also commended this admin-

vague
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istration for its. ongoing review of af- ate is to tetroactively repeal section
11rmative action policies and programs. 1(o1 simply because a particular AfriAll of thes anggestinus that there be can-American businessman is involved
a review indicate to me that the Fi- in a large transaction that is eligible
cance Committee should have at least for a tax certificate and the resulting
awaited the results of the administra- capital gains tax deferral. The rush to
tion's efforts and should have consid- undo thin transaction ignores. in my
ered whether or not section 1071 wan opinion. some important facts. The
working, whether It had problems, first is that the transaction that
whether Its objectives were important precipitated the House Committee's acones, and whether or not reform rather tion, the so-called Viacom transaction,
than
elimination would Is not the only pending transactionat
the PCC. There are at least 39othere.
have been more appropriate.
Second.,al of these acquirers have
That is not what. to happening with
this bill, Mr. President. Instead, we see justifiably relied on the existence of
a rush to judgment. Instead, what we section 1011, which has now been in
see is an unwillingness to confront the place for over 17 years and which has
fact that minorities and women have been explicitly endorsed by Congress
been excluded from the broadcast and over and over again through the approcable Industries and that minorities prIations process.
In the Viacom transaction, the purand woman continue to have access-tocapital problems that are significantly chasing group has incurred literally
greater and different than other poten- mIlions of dollars in out-of-pocket extial acquirers.
panses for costs such as legal fees, comIndeed, what we see Is a total dis- mitment fees, and travel. The preepecregard of .the policy considerations tive-minority purchaser has made it
having to do with diversity of voice clear that he wasentering into the
that led to the creation of this tax oer- transaction in order to run the company; not to purchase it for a quick retificate program ti the first place.
This hasty repeal would not just sale or turnover. Enormous amounts of
eliminate a genuinely worthy minority time and energy and faith in our Govownership program; it would also re- ernment have been placed in putting
peal all of the other uses of the FCC this transaction together. Major banks
tax certificates. For example, a broad- have committed to participate And
cast or cable licensee Is eligible for a the transaction was not hastily entered
tax certificate when it divests a media into In the last S0 dalys in, order toget
property In order to comply with the in under the wire before the repeal of
FCC's cable/broadcast cross-ownership this section. But the House of Rppolicy and the newspaperfrT croess- resentatives and the Finance Commitownership policy. Repeal of section tee seemed to ignore all the time and
1071.therefore, eliminates a reasonable money and energy that have beenexincentive for FCC licensees to comply pended, all the faith andyoonfidence In
laws that have been around for 17 years
with FCC policies.
Repealing section 1071. moreover, and seemingly went out of its way to
does not mean ending capital gains rppeal this section with a retroactive
rollovers in the future. There will still effective date to get at this transaction
be many many ways to structure which because of its size had made the
transactions in ways that will avoid newspapers.
capital gains taxes. And in fact the exMr. President, I believe what we see
perience is that the most recent sales here is a good example of why people
in the cable industry have all been tax- are so cynical about Government. What
free transactions that did cot involve we see here is an effort to ignore the
the tax certificate program which wss facts, to ignore the good-faith reliance
calculated to give minorities and on section 1071 exhibited by the prospective purchaser in all traneactions
women a chance.
Some recent examples illustrate this now pending before the FCC. What we
point. Time/Warner announced in Jan- see here is a total disregard of the equiunaryof 15 that it will acquire KBL ties and due process in an effort to rush
Communication from Houston Indus- to judgment,
tries In a tax-free stock transaction
Mr. President, retroactive effective
with an estimated purchase price of dates are very unusual in the Senate.
32.2 billion. Time/Warner has also an- In fact, this body bas a long and connounced a tax free acquisition of Sum- sistent history of using one of three
mit Communications for 3350 million dates as the effective date of a tax
via a stock exchange. Again, no tax change that reduces or eliminates tax
rollover questions there. Cox Cable ac- redemptions, exclusions or similar proquired Times Mirror Cable in a tax-free visions. The usual choice for those efmerger with an estimated price of 12.3 fective dates are the date of enactbillion. Minority entrepreneurs, how- ment, the first December.81st of the
ever, bemuse they frequently lack the year of enactment, or the first taxable
access to capital of long-established year beginning after one of the first
companies, cannot rely on ecotion =2B two date.
of the Tax Code which authorizes those
Putting aside tax rate changes, Mr.
tax-free transactions. Instead, they President, -the Senate has departed
have had to rely and have relied on see- from the usual. effective dates only in
lion1071.
rare circumstances where there has
That is why It Is particularly trQu- been a legitimate concern about the
bling that the proposal before the Sen- ability of taxpayers to rush the market

retroactive
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and therefore avoid changes. Even in
It is Interesting, In that situation
Just yesterday, Mr. President. thin
those rare cases where Congress was also ther was consensus, a agreement Senate, by a very strong vote of 6Dto
closing loopholes In the tax law be- between both bodies with regard to the 29, approved a form of line-Item veto
case taxpayers were abusing the sys- etting of en effective date. Again, that authority for too Prenident of tbe Uolttem. Congress adhered to the standards is oot what happened here. Her, he- ad Stoics. Senator after Senator stood
of fairness to ensure that taxpayers cause of a press relesse of one.Chamber up to explain how unfai it was that
wosid have sufficient nodie end could by one individnal, the Senate has the Congre was. In effect, blackmail
plan their private transactions, o that rusthed W odgmentto adopt that end log the President, by linking per-berths hesloess community could plan, thereby undo the work that all the rel item with most items In a single
the taxpayers could plan, so they could actors in tbe private sector have
ader-btil. Yet that is what we sea her
order their affairs in reliance en our taken in reliance on ection 1011.
today- Those who went- the Senate to
activity.
This Is the precedent that this body consider tbe option of reforning eeThat Isno
ss happened
not what
he,
wll overil If we approve the effe- don 107l have no choice butt to be
for the repeal of linked op. In effect, be blackmailed by
Mr. President. Th~be
provisions repealing tive date InresH
section
therefore represent a de, section 1011.
the fact that we alsowant to see te
made departure fues the general ProImentioned earlier that Congress has reform with the self-employed health
ns . We we to
cdure for drafting effectiveds
departed from the general role where insurance dedcti n
After reviewing the facte Q
endse
there was a perceived abuse of the, tax see the health Insurance passed, but
Sae being forcednbyathe coodents. I remain convinced there is no law, The general practice In those sie- now we
to s the date of the muttee action to accept ti ill-considpolicy reason to Justify singling ot aton has beentob
nfeir, rtrocommIttee ntion as the effective date. ered r shw-to-jdament
this particular section of the In
-b
active
nea- repeal of section 1.
and even then to Provide fair and
eaenue Cede for tansiecedeonted fr
As I slated at the ote , Iasin a
snabe transition rules. For example,
mulation ofcn effective date.
revenae
p
reconcilation iti, strong spporter of that proviseis and
th -ortheble to compare the offec in t the
oer
their
nceion o1t. an
Congress
shot down
a loophole
are that
It needs
expedIted
tiv te
fo affairspin
the reealnsseci
amendment
to section
ha ofthrough
the In- Ieraoden.
However,'
ther
Is no conadresechtis hid to ha
pre ened hret, teill o veue Code. The 1o 0 act was that the sectionloll issue had to be
provlson.
T1he
commitpasd
27, 16M. and signed linked to that
dtae Mr.
Whas
date
Wat
Prthe
t eneary
esident.
p 11 106fetie
Is c e f id Into
lawon nOctober
November . of that year. to e substitute now befera'us baaofnet
daeon Wll, threresiet
s the Hdae t that case. the genes.] effective date sufficient to ensure budget neutrality
oa wich te Croma the
House applied to securlies purchased after even without the provision repealing
Weysrea Mdafting e ie iuesd a October 9,
0o-the day befo -the section 10deuto i
Afe revewingthe ngfate adomittee Ways and Means Committee reperted
However, the Provision repealing ecwold review this section a thnt ot the l
but
ell. Congress also provided tion 1071te in the bill. And It i clear
they might censtder repealing the ec- a trnsition role where the material that the need for action in the next i
tdon In which case he intended to re
terms of a transaction -were described weeks to complete action on the health
a Jenuary 17effective date,
in a written public annoiemant be- insurance provisions effectively proIh
has this bodyOver allowed afoe
Octoberree
10,
0. andiliSHc 1ogll udes thso Senator, or any member of
ngle Meesber of the House of 107- was made before that date. The same the Senate, from acting to try to slow
retntativs to unilaterally dictate the role was provided in another section of down this train, and to ensure that the
effective date of a tan change? When the 1199 at dealin with debt e- objectives of the minority ownership
the chief or sta of sithe
Commit- chanOcs.
aeint
tax certificate prograin et the aientee en Taxation was asked this uesAnother example Is provided by the tion they deserve.
b
eurlt
don dring the Ways and Means mark- 19 Hovenour econcliation Act, evet me conclude by reminding my
op. I anderand that he cited the tan- Again, ther were perceived bvice
atusee by colleagues that diversity ofd
In
exempt leasing bill that we introduced basinesses makin debt-financed stock our eletonhemedia remains critically
by ormer Congressman Jake Pickle sales to biOll s; there the generaloef- Important. and thal we have i lasple
We, In that case,the aority leader, fective date for n
that
iandment
siblity to every Americ n t e th
Sen.ator Dots,
introduced a companion modified the Partial Interest exlrion entry is open enough to penit that
bill in the Senate. And In that ease, the for HOP oaes was for loans made business to meatthe neds of all of cur
srnlacdve effective date was
all aftermade
July 10 1o9r the day before that citiens. It Is also critically Important
but moot by three very generously, provision was presented in' a chair- that Government act responsibly, and
broadly applicable transition roles and mes ar to the Way atd Means that Government keep it Word, y rea host of targeted roles.
Conmmittee.
Pealing section 1011retroactively, we
The most recent and mor relevant
to t e
tevenneAct of 1
which
deb, waa are alling to meet our obligation to
example Of ant effective date that was signed into law on December 22, 1W1, those who have In good Seth relied on
eet by press release Occurred In the Congress closed a loophole that allowed the law of the
se land, d our obligation
Taxo Reform Act of 18n However,
m In C" corpration to avoid LIO recap- to the American people gealyly to
. Iantthat
were
htaxyers
Put on notice tore by converting to "b" corporation legisate responsibly,
n 1*4- 2 years before the press re- status. Them thei effective date was
pealing thin etion ietyctlbyase-wen CTreasury PblsPked a tax comber 16, 117-the date of the con- actively, we have also, I believe, taken
reform Propoal In that cae, a press ference committee action. Moreover, a a rush to judgment and puto t great
misse We, issuedin reVolve the dir- transition
ri was provided where peril an important policy consideration
fbil ns between a retroactive Janusry ther was a hoard of directors reaolu- baing to do with diveroity of voice,
re i
effective date to a House provil aton before the Decembera1 date.
Mr. President aintend
I
i
to ocltinne
son dealing with tax-exempt ons,
Why are taxpayers With applications working on the Issue rased by
aection
and
a Senate provision with a January pending before the FCC not desering 1071and I intend e continue working
1, 1 Prospective data. What Is Imper- of transition rele ? The only concrete to try to convince my coliaguos in
taut to note Is that this was a joint answer that I have received to this this body that the bbjectivs Of dier
prens r ele; It Wassged not only by question Is that the sie of the one of slty of vcice a important ones that
both chairman of the House and Senate those transactions, the Viaom. tre - must be preserved. I intend to continue
ta-riting committees, but also by acltion, Is Just too great-the Impliaepeaking out on the issue of the importhe two ranking members and the See- don is that we would somehow ae- tance of Inclusion of women and tretary of the Treasury. It Is elantoter tax revenues if we refuse t Provide a norities, in every industry in this Naeting that the Partis Involved chose a reaonable and appropriate transition tion, but certi n commnunIcatioe,
dase wallafter the etroactive January rule-nd so the committee ubstit e which hao such a broad-range effect on
1, 1966, Hnes bill; they agree instead before the Senate has us reasonable the way that people see ourcountry,
en September 2,
tvda
and appropriate transition
r.e
the way that people see the world, the
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nently extend the health insurance Pre- Washington Post last Sandal, Morch
501cm for the self-employed bat that 19. 1995, and I socne In many other
given access.
It is cooes to Information that Is at they didn't have the money to get the newspapers, in which be in nyndinlod.
a cannon whicb is an unfortunate exthe heart of the section 1071prograsm. lob done,
For ton long. Members said they enple of tasteless, offensive, blank
And the notion that access to that information ought to tome from as many wanted to Increase the deduction be- husno. It belittles the war record.
places as we can manage, to the extent yosd 25 percent-bet they did not have bravery, and selfless sacrifice of the
distinguished majority leader. Mr.
that section 1711has had a positive ef- the money.
fect In encouraging diversity of voice,
Today, we wtll vote en legislation DOLE,by ridiculing the woonds he oencouraging diversity of ownership. l that, at long last, permanently extends fared and still carrie. and alwayn will,
lowing women and minorittee a chance the health insrance premium dednc- from the Italian campaign of World
to participate in an industry in which ten for the self-employed, and in War fI. The war record of all elected ofthey wqre historically deliherately ex- creses It from 25 to 10 percent for 95 1101509in salli a matter of some attenlon dozing political campaigns, and
cluded, it had a ealutary effect an
and afterward,
meaning and reason, and It is someWhat does this mean hock home? Mr. I=
lo
exception. But why anything that we should protect and pr- Well, this is real. Ts means tanners oue would take An excursion into cynical dock cartoon hor
over thie is inand smal business people get relief,
serve in this body, and not otherwise.
I think It Is unfortunate that this
I heard from Randy ionk
in Eel- comprehensible and Inexcusable.
tin political system and cellure
to go Into his
retroactive repeal has been associated ens who was plan
with this Important health care initia- own husines, He needed the deductlon most be honed on civility, mutual retive. I think it is something that I in- as he could continue to afford health spent and honor. The disoonree and doansurice coverage. I think this lea- bate in Presidential campaigns, Indeed
tend to continue to fight. And I hope.
that as we move down the road In con- lation is needed, It wil help Randy, any campaign, should pdoperiy tenon
alderation of thin tax legislation, we nd many other hardworking, gutsy the positions of the candidates on the
will not lose the one opportunity we entrepreneucs ilke hin start cat on major lses of the day. sod what scishad to unlock the door, to Provide op- their own
tens are being offered, We have had
Folly Rks of Missoula called me op too much of personal attacks, negative
portunlty as a way of responding to
oncerns that may be misplaced, to to sy hew angry she was that seif-em- campaignIng. add the politico of cyniconcerns that need to be articulated played individuals were losing their I5- stm in Amnrca. In recent year I
and talked about, but concerns that we percet health insurance pkemdum do- thin It would be beneficial If we all
really have not looked closely enough dootlen while corporations kept their tried a little mom to elevate the poutat to see the bnellt for all Americans. 100-percent dedution,,And I thin
Cal discourse In America, and that we
And so I hope that the health care Polly Is right to be angry..
focus on whom we should, tonstrucdeduction passes. I want to snpport
Today we will take a first step to tively, lead tie Nation.Or attitude
that. I want to help that. But on sec- help Folly. Randy. and an selle
ehould certainly be positive sld, while
tion 1071. the fight is not over. The ptsyed across America,
we differ n many issues, strv for onfight continues.
My only lomplaint is that we should failing courtesy and respect.
I hope that what has happened here have acted earler, For the cash-basis
Mr. DOLErariis wtth him the symwith regard to this retroactive repeal farmers who had to pay their taxes by hol and the physical result of his valor
Is wake-up call to women, to minori- Mach 1. Congress is Fwseks late.
In combat, defending or cnty,
doties. to people In this country who care
t Is true that the farmers an fending the very abilityof cartooniste
about diversity. who think that It le amend their returns and coliect a re- to exercise their rads in freedom, and
important, that we cannot sit back. tent Rot amending the return Will or very ability to conduct an honorAnd, as complex as this Issue may take time and, nes their acount- able, civil, enlghtened debate in a deseem. fundamentally It is a very simple ante work for free, will coot thes moory. Mr. DOLEhas dedicted his
one. It is an isas of whether or not the fare money. Probably 3Din 50bucks entire life to the serie or the Nation.
airwaves of this country are for all apiece.
Mr. Trodeae, I believe. owe M. DOLE
Americans or for some Americans. I beRot with today's notion, Congress an apology for thJn entirely inapproprilieve that inclusion and diversity is the willatleastdotherightthing..
ate attack and Innuendo.
strength of our country and not otherWe will permanently extend the
Mr. President, I yield the fl.
wise, and I will fight to maintain no- health insrance premium deduction as
cess to the airwaves for all Americans. Montana farmer small business peeSEfl"MPLOTRI EALTH
plo: and all of America's self-employed
Thank you. Mr. President.
INSURANCE COSTS DEDUCTION
Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair. have at least one lees thing to worry
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Son- stool In the years ahead- The Senate continued with the Conator from New Yort.
Mr. President, I intend to vote for adoration of the bill.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I this legislation and I strongly encour
XAslrnc1
cUiws semomo
D,
coosur ecelin
most emphatically wish to state the age my colleagues in vote for It. And I
debt in whiet we all find ourselves to will push hard to make sore it gets to
Mn. MOSEtY-RAUN. Mr. Peithe Senator from Illinois for her power- the President's desk fast so the dedodent, I rise in request a Clarification to
ful and persasive statement; her first ten Is avanable to an the self-em- a provtsion in HR. 9M relating to the
on this particular subject, but not, I played fiig their tax returns before binding Contract exception to the redare think and hope, her last.
April 17.
peal of section 1071.
We will continue now with this deI thank the Chair. and I yield the
BindIng contract exceptions in
bate.
floor
changes to te tax laws are commonly
Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to
Mr. EYRD addressed the Chair.
Included In tax legislation in protect
my friend and colleague, the senior
The PRESIDIG OFFICER. The Son- taxpayers who, in reiance on the laws,
Sena.tor from Montana.
star from Weet Virginia.
entered into legally binding agree
The PRtESIDING OFFICER- The SenMr BYRD. Mr. reelent, I than
mente prior in the effective date of the
ator from Montanathe diingtshed Senator from Oregon statutory change bet where the tans
Mr. SAtiGUS. Mr. President, I thank [Mr. PACKWOOD]
for deterring to me action tnef will not be Completed
MYgood friend, as well, the senior Son- brel
othat I might make a brie1cuti
after that effective date. Thlt. 91
ama rm New York,.
ins~inn.,,,J
clodes such a binding contract eacepMr President. in Montana, we havesa____
tion to the repeal of section 1IM1 The
ssylu-"l'Wa cot what yen say, lt'n
intent of this exception int honor taxwhat you do,"
BLACK HtUMOiR
Payern' kcnd faith reliance on the law,
For too long. Members of Congress
r. BYRD. Mr. President, a cartoon
The binding contract exception In
saod they only wish they, Cold perm- by Mr. Gerry
e
Trudeut appesed in the this bill, however, wautd net apply It
kind of Information to which they are

a
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baseball is not a business in interstate my belief that it maybe worthwhile ro
commerce and is therefore immun
viewing the franchise relocation issue
from the reach of the federal antitrust as it relates to all professional sports.
laws. This ruling was almost certainly
The Hatch-Thureond-Leahy legislawrong when it was first rendered in ton would also maintain the status
1922.Fiftyyears later, in 1972,when the quo for the minor leagues. It is imporSupreme Court readdressed this ques- vat to protect the cxstn minor
tion, the limited concept of interstate league relationships in order to avoid
commerce on which the 1922 ruling disruption of the more than 170minor
rested had long since been shattered. league teant which exist throughout
The Court in 1972accurately noted that our Notion, the Hatch-Thurmond
baseball's antitrust immunity was an Leahy bill also makes clear tht it
"aberration" that no other sport or i
des not override the provisions of the
dustry enjoyed. But it left it to Con- Sports Broadcast Act of 11 which
gress to correct the Court's error.
permits leaguewide contracts with telA limited repeal of this antitrust imviuton netwks.
munity is now in order. Labor negotia
Our bill is not specially drafted in an
tions between owners and players are attempt to resolve the baseball's curimpeded by the fact that baseball play- rent labor dispute. The logislation doe
ers, unlike all other workers, have no not affect the so-called nonstatutory
resort under the law if the baseball labor exem
owners act in a manner that would, in ers from tionwit
ls
employ
the absence of the immunity, violate an
othe an
lwu whreathey
the antitrust laws. This aberration in with vlvdin colecte
aning
the antitrust laws has handed the owners a huge club that gives them unique
will not automatially toleverage in bargaining and discourages
moe
problems, but I believe
them from accepting reasonable terms. it
This is an aberration that Government
I noted earlier that as the chairman
has created and it is an aberration
that Government should fix.
of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr.
The legislation that I am introducing Antitrust, Businm Rights, and CueTHURMOND,Mr. LEAHY, Mr. would provide for a limited repeal of petition Subcommittee, I held a hearand Mr. GRAHAM): professional baseball's antitrust immnu- ing en baseballs antitrust eoemption
MOYNIHAN,
S. 627 A bill to require the general nity. This repeal would not affect the on February 15, 1995.At the hearing,
application of the antitrust laws to two matters that owners say that the the subcommittee heard from bath
major league baseball, and for other immunity
legitimately
protects: players and oners on whether the anpurposes: to the Committee on the Ju- Namely, franchise relocation rules, and emption helps or hur the sport, and
diciary,
the minor leagues. Under our bill, what effect repeal would have on labor
major league baseball's ability to con- relations and other isues. the sub
trol franchise relocation and to deal committee very directly told the own
F MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
with the minor leagues would remain ers and players that it is up to them to
ANTITRUST REFORM ACT
unchanged. Our bill also would not af- resolve their differences quickly and
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, up until feet any other sport or business.
ploy ball for the sake of the American
now those of us who have supported reI urge my colleagues in the Senate public.
forming the application of the anti- and the House to support thi legislo
Mr. resident. I do not believe that
the Congress should interfere in basetrust laws to baseball have been di- tion.
Mr. THURMONq. Mr. President, I ball's ongoing labor dispute. But itm
vided between competing approaches. I,
together with Senators MOYNIHAN,rise today en support of th Major my
d belief that the Congress should reGRAHAM,
and others, introduced S. 415. League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act peal the Court imposed antitrust exSenator THURMOND,
together with Sen- of 19o, which I am cosponsoring with omption end restore baseball to th
Senator HATCH,Senator LEAHIY,and same level playing ield as other pro
ator LEAHY,introduced S. 416.
I am pleased to introduce today a bill others, Our legislation would repeal fessional sports and unregulated budsi
that brings together these competing the antitrust enomption which ohields nessos. By removing the antitrust oapproaches and that has the consoli- major league bapseballfrom the anti- emption, the players and owners wi l
dated support of Senator THURMOND.trust laws that apply to a11 other have one less distraction from their ne
Senator LEAHY,
Senator MOYNIHAN,
and sports and unreguloted businesses In gotiations, and the Congress well no
Senator GRAHAM.
We believe that this our Notion. This bill is a result of dis- longer be intertwined in bseboll's po
bill will bring about sound reforms cussionsrbetween myself and Senaters c ntitrust enemption
that ensure that baseball is treated HATCHand LnofY following the retestns
By Mr.
hield m
fairly and properly under the antitrust hearing which I chaired on this imporr
HELMS) (orhmef n
laws. We believe that in the long run tent issue. I am particularly pleased
our bill will contribute to constructive that this legislation focuses on the ore
S 6s A bill to rpoal the Federal es
labor relations between the players and going policy issues relting to bs-e
te
a gn
the owners. We believe that the re- boll's spncial antitrust exemption.
eratlon-skipping tranrsfers; to tho CoinThe Hatch-Thurmond-Leahy legisla- miitte no Finance.
forms proposed by this bill are worth
making even apart from the existence tion oliminates baseball's antitrust
graemt wil nRoSVAoTic ACT
of the ongoing dispute between base- emption, with certain exceptions. and
is hosed on S. 41is the Major League
Mr. RYL. Mr. President, I rise today
ball owners and players.
Let me emphasize that our bill would Baseball Antitrust Reform Act, which with my colleague from North Cornnot impose a big-government solution Senator LEAHY and I introduced on lina, Senator HELMS to introduce tha
to the current dispute between the February 14, 1995. Ono substantive Family Heritage Fredseriation Act, a
owners and the players, On the con- change has boon made to include a pro bill to repeal Federal estat and gift
trary. It would get government out of vision relotiog to franchise relocation, taxes, and the tan on generation kipthe way by eliminating a serious gov- in order to address concerno raised by ping transfers. A companion bill, H.R.
some about the practical effect of end- 784. was introduced in the House of
ernment-made obstacle to settlement.
last month by ConSeventy-three years ago, the Su- Ing baseball's antitrust exemption. As I Representativ
preme Court ruled that professional have previously stated, however, it is gresomas CHIS C x of California.
"(3) ANNUALnPORT.-The program adminlistrator of each State shall issue an annual
report summerizing the program evaluation
under paragraph (1). The report shall be
signed by each member of the citizens oversight committee of the State and shall be
submitted to the Secretary.
"(4) FEDERALADviSORYCOMuTE E ACT.The requirements of sections 9, 10(a)(2).10(e).
10f). and 14of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to a
citizens oversight committee established
under this subsection.
"(5) NOTICE.-A citizens oversight committee shall provide adequate public notice before conducting a meeting onder this settlon, including notification in the official
StateJournal.
s."(m) Fu
"I) FUNDIG PiotrrY.-The Secretary
shall give priority to a waterways restoration pmject under this section in making
funding decisions under this Act.
FUNDS.-The Secretary
"(2) TRANSFERRED
may accept the transfer of funds from other
Federal departments and agencies to carry
ot this section.
OF REQtRmrsNTS.'3) APPutcAr.trr
Funds made available to carry out this seetion, and fInancial assistance provided with
the funds. shall be subject to this section
and, to the extent the requirements are consistene withis section. other provisions of
this Act..
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there, supposedly to stimulate the our antitrust laws to major league
economy. All of them voted for the tax baseball,
increase. The tax increase was the 1993 What we did was to remove the and
tax increase that President Clinton trust exemption given to major league
had. It was characterized as the largest baseball. I hope that the full Judiciary
single tax increase in the history of Committee, the Senate and the other
public finance in America or any place body will take this up and pass it eelin the world, and those are not the atively soon,
words of conservative Republican JIM
Baseball has for decades had a special
INHOPE.Those are the words of PATRICK exemption from the antitrust laws,
MOYNIHAN,
who at that time was chair which laws apply to everything else,
man of the Senate Finance Committee. every other business in this country
Further down here they all had ei- and every other professional sport
ther D or F ratings by the National What this means is that baseball and
Taxpayers Union. In other words, they these who own it and run it are baxi
were the big spenders. and those are tally above the law,
Now they have shown what this
the ones who were defeated. They are
not here. Look around. They are not means. They have shown great disdain
here.
for the fans, for those who do not make
In the House of Representatives, 66 of the $1 million alaries, like the people
them went out. Almost all of the 66 who park the cars, that sell peanuts
voted yes on the stimulus bill, voted and beer and hot dogs and soda at the
yes on the tax increase, and had a D or various stadiums, for the communities
F rating by the National Taxpayers that have taxed their people through
Union
bond issues to build stadiums, for those
So I just suggest to you, Mr. Presi- who make the pennants and the T
dent, that we make it abundantly clear shirts and the baseball caps, and even,
to the liberals In Congress, the few lib- in the State of Vermont, those who
erals who are left, because most of make the souvenir bats given out on
them were wiped out in the November bat day. Such people hove been out of
8 revolution, there is going to be an- jobs over the past year because of the
other wave coming up in 1996,and this baseball strike,
is the opportunity for us to be fiscally
And throughout all of this, people.
responsible, for us to be able to stand some acting in extremely high-handed
up and say no to some of these useless fashion, are able to say, Well, the fans
programs that have outlived their use- be damned Because we hove this ex
fulness and say yes to future genera- emption from antitrust, we can act to
tions, including my two grandchildren. gether. We can do whatever we want.
Glade and Maggie Inhofe. This is what
The antitrust exemption was pro
is going to work for America, and this tided for baseball on the assumption
is probably the centerfold of the revo- that those who control baseball would
lution of November 8.
act in the best interest of the game and
Mr. President, I suggest the absence the best interest of the fans, would do
of a quorum.
it responsibly and that we would have
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The a strung commissioner. The practical
clerk will please call the roll.
matter is they have done nose of this
The legislative clerk proceeded to in the loot few years.
I recall testimony in a hearing that
call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask Senator THUBSoND and I had in which
unanimous consent that the order for the question was asked: Let us assume
the quorum call be rescinded.
baseball did not have an exemption
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without from the antitrust laws and let us as
objection, it is so ordered.
some we saw the situation, the sorry
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I under- situation, we have seen for nearly a
stand that the parliamentary situation year in baseball. If the owners came in
is that we are in morning business: is and said, "Oh. by the way. Congress,
that correct?
give us something you hove not given
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Tech- any other business. Give us an exemp
nically speaking, the Senate is on H.R. non from the antitrust laws.' Would
1131.
they net be laughed off Capisol Hill? Of
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, if no one course, they would,
else is seeking recognition, I ask unanRepublicans and Democrats alike,
imous consent to proceed as though in both in the Senate and the House,
morning business.
would say. "We are not going to give
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without you that. We are not going to give you
objection, it is so ordered.
this special exemption from tie anti
trust laws that we don't give to football or basketball or General Motors or
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them an antitrust exemption today,
yet they hove it.
So, I hope, by the same token, everyone in the Senate will join with Sen
ato TiIURdOND, Senator HATCH, and
myself-an Interesting coalition, if
ever there was one-and would withdraw the antitrust exemption. It is not
deserved by baseball. It should not be
continued for baseball. They should be
treated as anybody else.
Their behavior in the past year has
shown why they should not hve that
special exemption, if they ever really
deserved it. But whether they have deserved it or not, they hove now lost it.
We should take it away.
So, Mr. President. I hope that this
legislation will work its way through
the committee process fairly quickly.
come to the flose of rho Senata, and be
voted upon.
I have watched some of the activities
of the baseball teams, I mean things
that ore so petty, so petty. For exampie, the way they treat Little League
teams.
When I was a youngster and when my
children were, the idea was, if you had
a Little League team, you built up
soe following for various teams. You
proudly wore the logos of a team-the
Red Sax, the Yankees. whoever else it
might be.
Now they say: Well, we will require
each one of those children to pay us I6
for the privilege of having their logo on
their uniform. This is just pennyante
baloney.
What it does. it says. 'We expect you
to be fan supporting us, but, kid.
you're going to pay for it.'
I recall as a child being at Feoway
Park and seeing some of the greats of
baseball come by. If you held out a
baseball, they would autograph it for
you. And they were paid a tiny fraction
what
Is
paid
to
these
of
moltimillonares today who tell you.
Yes, you can come in and for x noeher of dollars we may give you the autograph." This is spoiling the whole
idea of baseball.
So, as I said, Mr. President, we ought
to lift their antitrust exemption. They
do not deserve it. They never really
earned it in the first place. and they
have done nothing to keep it today.
Let us get rid of it. Let us treat them
as the business they have become end
let us stand up for the fans for a
change.
I have seen a situation in the hearings where even the acting commis
sinner of beseball in his testimony
tried to mislead the Senate; gave conflieting testimony, gave testimony
that turned out not to be true: and did
correct
his testimony.
Apple
or Monsanto
E71 Dow Chemial
VREMOVING THE ANTITRUST
that they
of disdain
is the tokind
not not
This move
Weorare
else.
or
anybody
Computers
LAG
MAOR
EMPTIN
FRM
EMPTIONgog
to give it to you And pcially show for the Congress.
BASEBALL
we are not going to give it to you beWell, then let us not give them the
Mr, LEAHY. Mr. President, yester- cause of the way you have been act- exemption to the laws. You can hve
day the Senate Subcommittee on Anti- ing."
disdain for the laws, you can have dis
trust. Business Rights and Competition
We would not pass a statutory ox- dam for the game. you can hove dis
of the Committee on the Judiciary emption. and I daresay. Mr. President, dai for your own responsibilities, you
voted out S.627, the Hatch-Thurmond- there would not be one Member of the cn have disdain for your own fans, but
Leaky bill clarifying the application of U.S. Senate that would vote to give we are not going to give you a special
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exemption under the law to carry out
that disdain.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will please call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Lobjection, it is so ordered.
BUDGET BALANCING IS A THREESTEP PROCESS
Mr. KYL. Mr. President. I wanted to
comment on two things. one which has
just occurred and one which is about to
occur. I hope. We know that last night
the House of Representatives passed
historic tax relief for the American
people, I want to address that for a moment.
Second, we know there have been discussions between the majority and minority leader on an attempt to reach
an agreement on a rescissions package
which we could conclude before the
Easter recess.
Mr. President. the House of Representatives adopted a rescissions
package of about $17 billion and the
Senate has been working on a package
somewhat less than that. It is our hope
between the majority and minority we
can come to an agreement on a package which would represent our effort to
meet the House, if not precisely their
figure, at least something close to it so
that as the House and Senate take the
recess during the Eastertime. our constituents back home would know that
both the House and Senate were serious about saving money.
Mr. President, during the last campaign. as I was running for this office.
people asked me what it would take to
balance the budget? I said it is a threestep process.
The first thing we can do is immediately try to save some of the money
that the Congress has already appropriated. We know that every year there
is money appropriated that really can
not be spent very effectively. If we
could make a head start on balancing
the budget by just saving some of that
money for next year. it would dem
onstrete our commitment to a long
term goal of balancing the budget.
That is what the rescission package
is about. I will come back to that in a
moment. The second step, of course, is
the decisions that we make throughout
the year for that year's budget. The
third step, of course, is the long-term
balancing of the budget process which I
have contended can only be done effectively through the adoption of the balanced budget amendment, because
without the discipline of the constitutional requirement to balance the
budget I have always felt it doubtful
Congress would actually develop the
willpower and the commitment to see
that difficult project through.

Those are really the three steps that
I articulate.
In the second step, what I had said
was each month throughout the legislative year we deal with legislation
that spends money. We can make the
conscious decision not to spend as
much, to limit Federal spending. When
it comes time to appropriate the funds,
we can set priorities and we can end
passing appropriations bills that limit
the growth in Federal spending.
Mr. President, we have heard the figures that if we adopt a tax relief plan
for the American people we can still
balance the Federal budget by the year
2002 if we limit growth in Federal
spending to 2 percent a year. We are
not talking about draconian cute, but
talking about limiting the growth in
spending.
So the first step is to try to save
money that we do not have to spend
next year through a rescissions bill.
The second step is to make the tough
additions each week, each month, as
this year goes by, as we pass the appropriations bills, to spend less money
than we had anticipated spending.
If we do that each year for 7 years,
we will have achieved a balanced budget by the year 2002, without the need
for a constitutional amendment.
We know that would provide more
discipline, would give the Congress a
better ability to control spending. but
we will deal with the issue of the constitutional amendment later this year
and probably next year.
Let me go back to the first of those
three steps, the rescission package, because that is what has been before the
Senate for the past week.
The idea of rescissions-not a term
that the American people would necessarily relate to-but the idea of rescissions is to simply not spend money
that we counted on spending, because
we really do not have to spend it.
Hero is an example: We appropriate
money to the General Services Administration to build a building. We say it
will cost $2 million, so here is the
money for it. GSA lets out the bids but
none of the companies that would bid
on it gives the GSA a bid they want to
accept. The bids do not supply the
right kind of construction or architect
or something.
So the GSA does not let the bids for
the contract, so the contract is delayed
a year. That $2 million which has been
appropriated for next year, really, cannot efficiently be spent next year. The
construction project on which it was
supposed to be spent cannot be built.
Why should we force the GSA to
spend that money on something? We
can rescind the money. We can call
that money back, and save it for this
year, and either decide to apply it to
deficit reduction or apply it to some
other expenditure for next year.
There are a lot of different programs
that we have been talking about rescinding money in. The net result has
been an agreement that somewhere between $13or $14 billion and $17 billion,
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we can save the American people-taxpayers-that much money in this coming fiscal year because we really do not
need to spend that money even though
the money has been authorized to be
spent.
Now we have had some disagreements
in the Senate about whether we should
agree to the House level of $17billion.
There has been some disagreement between the Democrats and Republicans
as to where to save that money.
I am hopeful that within a few minutes the majority and the minority
leader will announce an agreement
which represents not totally a Republican view or a Democratic view but a
view that both share, that we need to
save as much money as possible.
While it will not get to the S17billion
level that the House of Representatives
has adopted, it will be close to that. It
will be in the range of $16 billion, I
hope. and that we will then be able to
quickly adopt that rescissions package,
go into conference with the House so
that as soon as we return from the
Easter recess we can send to the President savings of between $16and $17billion.
Some people have said, why are we
taking time to deal with that problem
when we have a much bigger problem
of developing a budget of over $1 trillion? Beginning the process of reducing
Federal spending over a period of 7
years to reach a balanced budget, perhaps in the order of magnitude of $1
trillion over the 7-year period.
What is $17 billion? Well, we have all
quoted Everett Dirksen, who use to
speak in this Chamber, and who made
famous "A billion here and a billion
there, pretty soon you are talking real
money." To the American people. $17
billion is a lot of money, and it is a
very good downpayment on the savings
that we have to make in the future.
Because of the consternation I have
seen expressed on the floor here about
some of the savings even within the $17
billion package, it makes it clear to me
that it will be a very hard process if we
cannot agree to some of the things that
are in the S16 or $17 billion package.
how will we agree to something 10
times greater than that or 100 times
greater than that?
Clearly, we have to start from the
bottom up. Each program has to be
prioritized. and we have to try and find
savings everywhere we can. In each
line of that Federal budget, there is
something to be saved. When we add it
all up, it adds up to big dollars.
If we only look to the big programs.
then we are forced to look at things
like Social Security and Medicare and
defense. Frankly, most Senators understand that there is much about those
programs which precludes the Senate
from making the huge savings that
would have to be made there if we ig.
nore the smaller programs.
It is important to start at a level of
rescissions. I am very. very hopeful
that within a few minutes our leadership will indicate an agreement on a
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I want our Vice President and their
Prime Minister to know that I support
their efforts to strengthen cooperation
between our two countries. I believe
here in the United States, despite our
concerns about issues like Chechnya,
Russia's continuing efforts to establish
democracy and an open market economy actually merit our support. I believe that the American people want to
engage the Russians constructively. We
want to assist them with reform. Most
of all, we want to prevent a return to
the authoritarianism of the old Soviet
regime.
One topic of conversation between
the Vice President and the Prime Minister will be the future of United States
aid to Russia. Some Senators have argued that the aid should be terminated,
or at least substantially curtailed, and
I do not agree.
Indeed, I find that after a slow start
3 years ago. the United States aid program to Russia Is now making a significant contribution to advancing political and economic reform, I would
like tojust lay out a few examples.
The largest element of U.S. aid is to
provide technical assistance to help the
Russians privatize their state-owned
enterprises. Think what we have here.
We have people who have lived their
entire lives in a centrally planned
economy. They do not have any idea
how to run a private enterprise. They
have never had to sell their products.
They have never had to worry about
productivity. In fact, when the Berlin
Wall fell, there probably were not more
than 100 people in the Soviet Union
who actually knew how to analyze an
honest corporate profit-and-loss statement. They also did not have stock
markets, banks or the legal system
necessary to support private enter
prise. You could not enter a contract in
Moscow and have it enforced in St. Petersburg. You could not enter a contract in Moscow and have it enforced in
other parts of Moscow.
I think it is in our national interest
to help them acquire this know-how.
Thanks in large part to our assistance,
50 percent-50 percent-of the Russian
gross domestic product now comes
from the private sector, and with United States help the Russians are drafting a commercial code, setting up
stock markets, and training their police to fight the organized crime that
could so easily stifle entrepreneurship.
I support this aid effort. I support the
aid effort because

I think that the

more successful private enterprise Russia has, the more people are going to be
resisting any attempt to reestablish
Communist dictatorship.
I want to assure other Senators we
are simply not shoveling money out
the door to them. In fact, many aid
dollars are going to Americans. We are
sending Americans over to show people
how to run a private enterprise economy.
More and more, we are leveraging our
taxpayer dollars with contributions
from the private sector. There are pri-
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vate enterprises that are interested in regarding Chechnya and the Iran reacparticipating in the assistance program tor sale. I also know that he will work
as a part of an effort to sell products. to strengthen dialog and cooperation
There are also lots of volunteers. In between our two countries. And I do
fact, these enterprises and volunteers not know of any better way to promote
allow us to multiply what we do.
world peace.
Another significant element is bringing Russians to the United States.
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Most of us remember the days of the
ANTITRUST REFORM ACT
Soviet Union. The Government prevented most Russians from seeing what
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I note
life outside their country was like. Un- that we are approaching the end of
less you held a special privileged posi- June. We are approaching the July
tion in academe or the government, Fourth weekend. I must say. I hear
you could not leave. Most people only staff and everybody else's sigh of relief,
had a vague notion of the advantage of and I agree.
living In an open society. I think that
But as we approach the July Fourth
the more Russians actually visit the weekend, we know the All Star game,
West. talk to Americans, see how we featuring the finest major league baselive, the more likely it is they will re- ball players, cannot be all that far besist a return to totalitarianism.
hind. It looks like the All Star game
Some have suggested that we suspend will actually be played this year and
all aid to show our objections to the the year-old dispute about player pensale of nuclear reactors to Iran, or Rus- sion fund payments has now been resian actions in Chechnya. Of course, I solved.
am intensely concerned about what is
We should also note that this year
happening in Chechnya. Russian mili- the major league season did not begin
tary violence against civilians has far until a Federal judge granted an inexceeded accepted standards of civ- junction, and the owners and the playilized behavior, regardless of what they ers, who shut the game down last Auclaim was the provocation by Chechen gust and robbed the fans of pennant
separatists. Use of landmines aimed races and the World Series, finally deprimarily at the civilian population is clared a cease-fire in their ongoing hosjust one of the egregious things they tilities. They then had to scramble to
have done.
begin a shortened 144-game schedule.
By its actions in Chechnya over the
nother unfair labor practice prolast 6 months, the Russian Government ceeding against the owners is still
shows it still has a lot to learn about pending, although that hearing has
democratic values and respect for now been postponed. I hope that this is
human rights. I hope now with the cur- a sign that the owners and the players
rent negotiations they are finally will finally do the right thing. finally
learning. In fact, that is why I joined be responsible, finally get back to the
with Senator McCONNELL
this spring in bargaining table and reach a collective
insisting on shifting some of our pro- bargaining agreement that will remove
posed aid to Russia to provide humani- the cloud that is hanging over the rest
tarian assistance to the Chechens as a of the season and all of major league
token of our disapproval.
baseball.
Let us think about what we are talkI am not the only one who expresses
ing about as far as aid to Russia is con- that concern, Mr. President. Look at
corned. We are talking about $200-$300 the fans. Interest in major league basemillion overall in aid. Think about bail is undeniably down. Attendance
what we spent in waging the cold war figures show It. They are down between
over the years with the former Soviet 20 and 30 percent. I suspect the
Union. This does not even cover the in- viewership figures show it and certerest on what we used to spend. It is tainly advertising and merchandising
also a drop in the bucket compared to revenue show it as well.
the Russian Government budget. If we
In fact. in another major blow to the
cut the aid off, nobody in the central grand old game this morning, both
government in Russia Is going to no- NBC and ABC have indicated that they
tice, because the amounts would not be are not even going to bid on broadcast
that large. The people who will notice rights for baseball in the future.
are those reformers and those entreWhen I go to a baseball game this
preneurs and those in the private sec- evening, I suspect for the first time in
tor in Russia who are pointing to the years I am going to see empty seats. I
West and the United States especially think that is really something we
as somebody who is helping them move should all be concerned about, those
to democracy. They will notice, be- who love baseball.
cause they are the ones who will find
Older fans have been turned off, and
their voices not heard as well if aid is the younger ones have decided to spend
cut off.
their time and attention en other purAnd so, Mr. President. I support the suits.
Vice President's mission to Moscow. I
Of course, injuries to some of the star
believe that promoting democratiza- players have not helped. Those injuries
tion of the second greatest military are not the cause of baseball's decline,
power in the world enhances U.S. secu- however. Indeed, other players and
rity. I know that the Vice President teams are having outstanding seasons
will convey forcefully to Prime Min- and major league rosters are full of
ister Chernomyrdin America's concerns bright, young, talented players.

S8992

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE

The problems are anger, disillusionment, and disdain. As the season
began, the acting commissioner was
quoted as saying: "We knew there
would be some fallout. It's very tough
to assess, but there is a residue from
the work stoppage. there's no question.
There is a lot of anger out there."
Let me tell him, there is. At our Febmary 15 hearing on legislation to end
baseball's antitrust exemption, I asked
the acting commissioner how fans get
their voices heard. I will quote what I
said at that time: Fans are disgruntIed; I mean, they are really ripped. Do
they vote with their feet?"
I asked that question of the acting
commissioner at that hearing. Unfortunately, that was in February. The
strike dragged on, fans suffered
through the owner's experiment with
so-called replacement teams-and what
a laugh that was-and the matter remains unsettled and unsettling.
Mr Selig answered me last February
by declaring he understood the frustrathon fans were feeling, but he observed
that when the strike ended, there
would be an enormous healing process.
I told him back in February. "The
longer you go, the harder that healing
process is going to be."
I wish I had been wrong; I believe I
was right. Because it is sad that for
some, the wounds will not heal; for
others, it will take a very long time;
for still others, they will never have
the attachment to the game that begins in childhood and binds generations
and nurtures over time.
I do not think that those who are the
game's current caretakers appreciate
the damage they have done. I do not
believe those who are running major
league baseball today, with few exceptions, realize the enormous damage
they have done to baseball. Slick advertising and discount tickets and special giveaway nights are not going to
make up the difference. The last year
has been disastrous. There are a lot of
people who are more interested in their
own egos and own pocketbooks than
they were in the true interest of the
fans.
What the fans are saying is. "You
took us for granted. you hurt us, you
insulted us, you disregarded us, you
worried only about your own egos and
your own pocketbooks, so now maybe
we will let you know how we feel."
With broadcast networks, who were
partners with the baseball owners in
the baseball network, today indicating
that they will be abandoning the game,
fans across the country who had expected to follow their teams over free
television will likely be forced to suffer
another blow.
Nothing has been solved. The problems and differences persist, and things
are getting worse. There is no collective bargaining agreement and, as far
as the public is aware, no prospects of
one any time soon. To borrow from an
old baseball observer, "It ain't over."
Why should people return to the
game or. as we are apparently viewed,

June23, 1995

why should we patronize this commer- friends and family-I hope I see more
cial activity if the risk remains of hav- people than we have seen in the past.
ing affections toyed with again and But I also hope I see owners and playhaving hopes of a championship ers coming together to put the interdashed-not by a better team but by ests of baseball above themselves.
competing economic interests?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous conSo I believe the time has come for sent that the report of the ABA section
the Senate to act. The Senate Anti- on antitrust law be printed in the
trust Subcommittee has reported a bill RECORD.
to the Judiciary Committee. This conThere being no objection, the matesensus bill, S. 627, is sponsored by Sen- rial was ordered to be printed in the
ators HATCH, THURMOND, MOYNIHAN, RECORD. as follows:
GRAHAM; and myself. It would cut back REPORT OF 'E SEmoN OF AtNTYRUSTLAw
baseball's judicially created and aberOF ME AMEoIAN BAR AsSocrXTIONONTHE
PROPOSEDMaOsR LEAC BASEALL Aenrational antitrust exemption. Congress
TRUST REPORMa
ACT OF1995-JUNE 9, 1995
may not be able to solve every problem
These vie are presented on behalf of the
or heal baseball's self-inflicted wounds,
but we can do this: We can pass legisla- Section of Antitrust Law of the American
Association. They have not been aption that will declare that professional Bar
by the Board of Governorm or House of
baseball can no longer operate above proved
of the American Bar Association
the law. We can say the same laws that Delegates
and. accordingly, should not be constmed as
apply to every other business apply to representing the position of the Association.
baseball. The antitrust laws that apply
INTRODUCTiON
to all other professional sports and
On March 27, 1995, Senators Hatch, Thurcommercial activity should apply to mond, Moynihan, Leahy and Graham introprofessional baseball, as well. Profes- duced the Major League Baseball Antitrust
sional baseball has a very special ex- Reform Act of 1995 (te "Baseball Antitrust
emption that no other business got. It Act").1
The bill would amend the Clayton Act to
was given to them with the trust and
expectation that they would use it in subject the bsiness of professional major
the best interests of the game. They league baseball to the federal antitrust lone.
EXECUTIVE
SUsiARY
have violated that trust. They have
The Senate is considering legislation to rehad people testify before us who were
major league professional bseball'sjuless than candid with the Congress. verse
exemption from the antitrust lows.
And they turned their backs on the dicial
The exemption dates to a 1922 Supreme
most important people-the hundreds Court decision that the business of major
of thousands, even millions, of fans league professional baseball was not engaged
throughout this country.
in Interstate commerce.
Along with the other members of the
Supreme Court decisions affirming the
Judiciary Committee, I recently re- baseball exemption on the grounds of stare
ceived a report of the section on anti- decisis In 1953 and 1972 indicate that judicial
trust law of the American Bar Assocla- reversal of the exomption Is highly onlikely.
These decisions cite repeated Congressional
tion that examines the Hatch-Thur
consideration and Inaction in support of the
mond-Leahy, et al., bill. The antitrust conclusion tha itis up to Congress to repeal
section of the ABA reasons that profes- the exemption.
sional baseball's antitrust exemption is
The American Bar Association disfavors
not tailored to achieve well-defined, any exemptions that are not narrowly taijustified public goals. The antitrust lored to achieve well-defined goals. The basesection, therefore. "supports legisla- ball exemption, rooted In a limited. long
view of interstate comtive repeal of the exemption of profes- since-abandoned,
does not meet this test. Accordingly,
sional major league baseball from the merce,
the Section of Antitrust Law of the AmerFederal antitrust laws." Moreover, the ican Bar Association (the "Section" or the
report notes that putting professional "Antitrust Section") supports legislative rebaseball on an equal footing with other peal of the exemption of professional major
professional sports and business and league baseball from the federal antitrust
having the antitrust laws apply "can- laws.
Repeal of the baseball exemption can and
not fairly be criticized as 'taking
permit uniform development of antisides'" in baseball's current labor- should
trust law in the sports Industry. The Sumanagement battle.
preme Court has ruled that other sports bustI look forward to working with our nesses are subject to the federal antitrust
Judiciary Committee chairman to have laws, giving rise to a substantial body of
our bill, S. 627, considered by the Judi. sports-related antitrust law, notably in conciary Committee at our earliest oppor- nection with football and basketball. The
tunity and then promptly by the Sen- very interest in uniform application and deate. It is time the Senate act and end velopment of antitrust law that prompts
this destructive aberration in our law. support for repeal of baseball's anomalous
demands that Congressional conThen maybe when baseball is subject to exemption
of any such provision be industrythe same laws as everybody else, when sideration
wide rather than baseball-specific.
they are subject to the same laws as all
DISCUSSION
other professional sports, as all other
In 1922. the Supreme Court ruled that the
commercial activity, maybe they will business of professional baseball was not onrealize that they are not above the gaged in interstate commerce, and, conlaw-just as I hope they begin to real- sequently, was exempt from antitrust scmize they are not above the fans' inter- tinya Both professional baseball andjudicial
Interpretation of the commerce clause subseests.
So, Mr. President. when I go to the quently evolved. In 1953, the Court upheld
baseball game this evening-something
I will thoroughly enjoy doing with
Footnotes at end of arfde.
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Mr. L AHY Mr. P
t
that the distinguished Senator from
Ohio is on the floor.
I yield the floor.
Mr.I
unanimous consent to proceed as in
morning lousiness.
The PRESIDING O ICER. Wi
t
TbjeREIIN
isFCE
sooreedt
bjection,

They will certainly have very little
chn tev
c
t
Mr. President. these young people do
not o much that they reject our valte. It is not that they are protesting

against our values. Rather, they never
learned these values to begin with.
Th group of young people is unfortunately, tragically, growing.
AT-RISK YOUTH
19i5,crime
the juvenile
arrest
rate
forSince
violent
has tripled.
Children
Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, this are the fattest growing segment of the
Congress and the American people ar
criminal population.
now engaged in a historic debate about
Mr. President, since 1975. homelesswelfare. I would like to talk this afternoon about the people we need to focus creased fester among familiet with
on in that debate.
children than among any othcr group.
Mr. President, when I was in Youngs- Every year, nearly one million young
town, OH, a couple of months ago. I people between the age of 12 and 19 are
visited a church that ran a program for themselves victims of violent crime.
what is termed "at-risk youth." The
Mr. President, too many young peo
kids that I saw that evening were seat- ple are not getting the education they
ed in a circle talking about their lives, need either. Since 1960. we have spent
talking about their problems. One of 200 portent more on public schools, in
the teenagers was asked this question: real dollars. But the quality of edu"Why do you get up in the morning?" cation is not improving. A 1ii8 study
That is a simple question. This young found that of all the notions tested, the
men responded: "Because I don't want United States finished dead lout in
to be dead."
science.
Mr. President, people that were there
In my home State. the State of Ohio.
that evening thought he might have the Ohio Department of Education oays
missed the meaning of the question and that they really do not have complete
misunderstood it. So they asked him statistics on graduation. But the sahis goals for the rest of the day. He tistim they do have suggest that of the
said, again, that he did not want to die, children who enter Ohio high schools,
That was his objective for an average only 71 percent graduate 4 years later.
day
But that statistic really sugarcoats the
Mr. President, that teenager, that much more dismal reality in many of
young nc, is growing up in a different our cties. In Youngstown, ON, for
I
country from most of the rest of us-a ample, the reported figure is that only
country most of
would have a very 4 Ts
percent
w graduate after 4 yearlin
difficult time recognining.
Columbus, only 44 percent: and in ToNow, the sociologists call that teen- ledo, only 37 percent. I suspect that
ager at risk. That is kind of a strange these figures would not be different in
term. As parents, we know that, in a any major city in this country today.
sense. all children are at risk at all
Mr. President, these children are
times. But these children are at risk in really not being educated. We all knew
a different sense, in a different way. what not educating a young pervon
They are in grave danger of living very leads to. According to the educational
sad, very unhappy. very tragic lives.
resting service, half of the herds of
By the term "ac-risk," we mean thil households on welfare are dropouts.
dree who are not learing the skils That should not be a surprise. The Ohio
they need to really participate at all in lepartedent of Rehabilitaton and Carsociety: children who are more than a rections-cur State prison system
grade behind in school: children who ports that at least
percent of the-reindrop out: children who are abused, as- mates in Ohio prisons are dropouts.
saulted and live in constant danger of
I would soy, Mr. President, based on
violent crime: children who ae home my own experience as Lieutenant Gayless or who run away from home. By ernor in Ohio and being in charge oi
at-risk, we mean children who are hay our prison system and working with
Ing children. children who arejuvenile the Governor in this area, that figure
offenders themselves. already experit is probably a lot higher than that.
enring the justice system because of
Mr. President, these young people are
the crimes that they have committed,
falling behind every day. They are fall
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ing behind too far and too fast. Almost
5 million children are growing up in
neighborhoods where the majority of
men are unemployed for most of the
year.

And certainly too many children are
having children. Since 1960,the rate of
unmarried teenagers having children
has increased almost 200percent.
Since 1960,the percentage of families
headed by single parents has also tripled. You hear a lot, of course, about
single-parent families. But I feel that
too many people really are missing the
point. They are missing the point
about why this is really an important
issue and what all of the ramifications
really are.
Let me point out for the Senate, Mr.
President, one reason why that statistic, that figure, is so very important It
is important because children growing
up in single-parent families are poorer
than children, on the average, who live
with two parents.
Children who do not have fathers
around are five times more likely to be
poor. They are also 10 times more likely to be extremely poor. to live in the
kind of grinding poverty which is very
hard to escape.
Mr. President. it is hard to escape
this poverty because it is more than
economic poverty. It is a poverty, really, of the spirit, the poverty especially
of young men who are growing up with
no role models.
It is a basic fact of human existence
that when boys grow up without fathers, they become men without knowing what mature manhood really is
supposed to be. That is really what fatherhood is all about, giving young
people an adult male, a role model, to
learn from. Young people need to have
strong adult role models around if they
are going to break out of the cycle of
dysfunctional behavior.
All the social pathologies I talk
about in this speech really reinforce
each other. Only the involvement of
strong, caring adults in children's lives
can ever truly break this vicious cycle.
Consider another fact: 54 percent of
all females who drop out of school are
either pregnant at the time or already
have children. Mr. President, the early,
decisive intervention of a strong adult
role model can certainly prevent a lot
of problems. The young people I am
talking about many times lack fathers.
They lack role models, they lack education, they lack hope. That is why
America today is losing these young
people.
The class of young people I am talking about who are seriously at risk is
growing, and it is heading toward an
explosion, right in the middle of what
is and what should remain the richest,
greatest, the most powerful country in
the world.
Mr. President, that is simply wrong.
We. as a society. cannot afford to lose
more and more young people to social
trends that hurt people and destroy
lives. We simply cannot let this problem continue to grow. We have to do
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this month. The Supply Corps is PREEMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT die proposed legislotion would create serious
charged with the responsibility of proLIABILITY LAWS
new problems In the field of product liability
viding logistical support to all U.S. * Mr. COHEN. Mr. Predent, I have op- by dictatiog
u siugle set of roles controliog
die iroess of claims aud the dssii
disbl
Corps
Navy Supply
Navy ships.
NosThe
shps.TheNay
Sppl Copsposed
Federal produceiteiliability reform sty of evidence It would conflict with
longwas created by Congress in the Naval legislation primarily because I believe standing state lows governiog tore hiaility,
Armament Act of 1794 and officially it is a mistake to replace laws that workers' compensation nd Insurance esela.
began its service to our Nation in 1795. have been carefully crafted by the bees, By dots1 so. sash proposals sould
The Supply Corps has seen many dra- State courts and legislature over the place ate legislures and state courts in
matic changes since the early days of
two centuries with a o size-fits onoleruble lea straghejeches.
nce with our ge
the
1790's.onfo
its founding. During
itsfoudin.
th late
lae
Orin 111'.
al peceof egilaton eveope
opposition
so federal
preemp'
each of our Navy ships was assigned a Washington. DC. Through the timeii eral
tuo policy
of stateInlaw
aad in the
soaction
thac
single warrant officer with the enor- tested methods of common law adju it is partiaslarly improper foe the fedem
mous responsibility of purchasing and dication and legislative adjustentc
erent
to attempt to restrict citizen ne
providing all of the necessary equip- the State courts and legislatures have es to stote courts, the National Confemece
ment and provisions to maintain the worked together to develop tort laws of Sato Legislatures strocgly opposesall
ship's daily operations. A modern air that strike the appropriate balance a legielusio before Congress shut would base
craft carrier serving with the U.S. tseen the needs of plaintiffs and do the effect of preempting st
laws regslat'
Navy today may have as many as 15 fendants, and those of consumers and log recovery for Injuries tased by defectise
supply officers aboard. The board vari- buciness. Over the past decade, the products..
ety of duties currently performed by State, have been reforming their own
supply officers require them to have tort systems by experirenting with al- rTNE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
detailed knowledge of accounting pro- ternative dispute resolution proseANTITRUST REFORM ACT
cedures, food service, foreign currency dures. caps on punitive damages and
exchanges, and management of pay changes in liability standards. In fact,
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yescer
day the Senate Judiciary Committee
records. The Navy Supply Corps School
currently trains about 3,800 students le Earecetscition ornA er- began consideration of the Major
League Basball Antitrust Reform Act,
per year so become specialists in busi- that State legislatores hove t
ness. Inventory management, financial m.
627. I look forward to the committee
cnsinraitheirhi
mor thn
7 ne and
totthat
aw new
ill product
inther cmpltbills
trnsprtaio,
prcesing
E
data processing, dat
transportation.
storcurrent
sessions
measure at our neat business meeting
age procedures, petroleum handling,
an
ucaigliability
lwhaebeenceinIi-and
reporting
it
to
the Senate.
and purchasing.nosMihgn
dNotDatahs
I am pleased to note that the Navy
This year the major league season
Supply Corps School has been located year.
in Athens, inGA,thes.GAsice
since January
1,is 194.supposed
1954a
the
the When
Federala system
anary15
to way
work.
problem judga granted an injunction and the
Every supply officer serving with the arises the States should be the forum owners and players, who had shut the
US. Navy has been trained at the Sup- for experimenting with new practices game down last August and robbed fans
ply Corps School in Athens. In addition and devising now solutions. A Federal of pennant races and a World Series, 01the school is home to the foreign offi- law, such as the one passed by the Sen- nally declared a ceasefire in their oncer supply course [FOSCO]. Since the ate would bin
course began its operations in 1955. it to .
t
e
r hostiitis.The
aoing
ghant scramble
has graduated more than 1.200 intera gin
hl a
mak
te l-e
schedule.
national studentslofficers from over 50 which has virtually no experience legAs fars Iacanotelltten
and
different countries. The foreign officer. islating
in this area,
responsible
for the b
ab to t
entire Nation's
product
liability
sysborahing
abole.thvey
bareain
donreto
supply course serves the extremely im- tea. It is ironic that this extension of
portant function of increasing the
ment than they were 3 months ago. A
number of military contacts between whe
w r try
ing
o r
tine
further unfair trade practices corn
the United States and other friendly and scope of the Federal Government plaint tomains pending against the
governments. Such contacts enhance
to the States and owner
Interest In major league baseball Is
the level of understanding between naundeniably down. Attendance figures
tions and make significant contribu- localities
Recently the National Conferenco of chow it-they are down betw
tions to the cause of peace. Recently,
percent. Ratings for the recent All
Sing edeapd
abili lthe Navy Supply Corps School received
the prestigious "E" Award, which rec- ispating The C orc
not
th
Star Game were down 10 percent from
ognizes excellence in the field of traine
last year. Advertising and merchandisEducationwould with State laws governing tort i tg revenues show it, us well. Both
of Naval Edcatonlict
Chief theChif
ing from the
ofNavl
ing.fru
and Training.
NBC and ABC recently indicated that
The outstanding relationship bethey will not even bid on broadcast
tween the NavytheSuply
Supply
Corps Sc
SchoolState
Nay Cors
otres and courts in an intolerableegisla
legal rights for baellithfur,
and the local Athens community
In spite of the outstanding years that
should serve as a model for other mili- saightjacket.
I ask that the complete text of the the Boston Red Sow, Cleveland Indians,
tary installations and host commu- National Conference of State Legisla California Angels. Cincinnati Rods,
nities to follow. Many of the students tore's rsolution be printed in the Colorado Rockies and Atlanta Braves
and staff at the Navy Supply Corps R
are having and the young, talented
School actively participate as tutors
The iesalutioi follows,
players throughout the leagurs, the
and mentors for local at-risk students
NACoo CE oe 5TAt Losis s settled business affairs that haunt
in Athens area schools. While the stuROLUfIOAM=oJuLy
11
major league baseball and disillusioned
dents benefit from the interaction with
NCSLhas reviewed propsed federal logic many of its fans. Older fans have been
much-needed positive role models, the lociss thus would preempt stone law by on- turned off and the younger ones have
participating service members receive oely restricting the rights or persons in decided to spend their time and attena boost in morale that comes from the Jured by defective peoducts to seek recory tion on other pursuits.
realization that they are making a ree- in state courts. Oath legislation task t
Meanwhile interest and attendance
agnizable improvement in the lives of meet the stondaeds necessary far federal pm' at minor league baseball games contin.
aes. If the Vermont Expos are any idiemption.
their fellow citizens.
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to
I pericular, n temprehemive evidence cation fan
join me
the
sdemantating
thata problem
stte prodof of major league baseball have turned to
creused
laws hateeither
cc liability
th0ea U.S'
rponrultn
in ccongratulating
mepin
join
minor lcague games. Attendance at
Navy Supply Corps for its 200 years of such dimension that a federal solution i
excellent service. We wish it continued warranted or chat rederal legislatin wuld Centennial Field for Expos' games is up
success in the future..
ashiev in stated ails. CSL believes dint more than 10 pereent and merchandis
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sales are booming. It is friendly, fun, professional baseball's antitrust ex- go right out the door as tan outs for
and entertaining. I know that I will emption is not tailored to achieve well- the wealthiest Americans.
enjoy taking in a few games during the defined andjustified public goals.
The Republicans also claim that al
August recess, if there Is an August reThe antitrust section, therefore, they want to do is hold Meditate toot
cess.
"supports legislative repeal of the an- increases to the same rate as private
As the season began. Bud Selig, base- eption of professional major league health care inflation. But such claims
ball's acting commissioner was quoted baseball from the federal antitrust simply ignore the fact that the number
as saying: "We knew there would be laws." Moreover, the report notes that of people an Medicare is increasing rap
some fallout. It's very tough to assess, putting professional baseball on equal idly, as is the average age. The fastest
but there is a residue from the work footing with other professional sports growing population segment in the
stoppage, there's no question. There is and business and having the antitrust United States is people over 15. and
a lot of anger out there."
laws apply "cannot fairly be criticieed these people need a great deal of mediAt our February 15hearing on legis- as 'taking sides' In baseball's current cal care.
lation to end baseball's antitrust ex- labor-management battle.
The budget for Medicare must in
emption. I had asked the acting comI look forward to working with our crease simply to keep up with these d
missioner how fans get their voices Judiciary Committee chairmen to have mographic trends, If it does not, baneheard I observed even then: "Fans are our bill, S. 627, considered favorably by fits will decline and costs for recipients
disgruntled: I mean, they are really the Judiciary Committee at
our
earli will increase
ripped. Do they vote with their feet?" ant opportunity and then promptly by
s
eras
Unfortunately, the strike dragged on, the Senate. It is time that the Senate
According to press reports, that is
fans suffered through the owners' ox- act and end this destructive
exactly what the Republicans are planperlesent with so-called replacement Lin our law,*
Jnng: increased tests and reduced beneteams, and the matter remains unset- lfits.
Unfortunately, we do not know all
tied and unpettling.
he details of the plan because it is
Mr. Selig answered me last February
MEDICARE'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY
being drafted in secret. Ijoined with a
by observing that when the strike f Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise number of my colleagues on the Budget
ended, there would be an enormous both to salute
sa the
th anniversary of and Finance Committees yesterday in
healing process. I said then: "The Medicare and to tall on the Bepub- sending a letter to our distinguished
longer you go. the harder the healing licans to release their secret plan to Majority Leader asking him to release
process is gong to be." I soy now that overhaul the system.
details of the Republican Medicare
major league baseball has gone too far
Medicare has been an American sue plan before the August recess.
and has been above the law coo long.
tess story. It has provided health and
I am sympathetic to the occasional
I do not think chat those who are the financial security to millions of Amer need for confidentiality in drafting leg
game's
ssr seniors for three decades now, islation. I believe, however, that the
current thaltiene
caretakers appreciate
trikeg lean
bye obsrvng
the damage that they have done. Slick Along with Social Security, Medicare Republica
have had ample time to
advertising, discount ticket and spe- has transformed the retirement years come forward with a proposal. It has
cial giveaway nights will not make up from a time of fear to a time of con- been nearly 9 months since the Repubthe difference. The last year has been fidence. Searing anxiety that the next licanis cook the majority in Congress
disastrous.
ilness would bankrupt you and your and nearly 7 months since they actuWre, nothing has been resolved children has bean replatd by the su
ally took power.
The problems and differences persist
ur
knowledge that a solemn contract will
But now
ay told they will not
eed
you f thcare you ieed.
unveil their plan for Medicare until
agreement and, so far as the public is
Btnow, at a time when we should be September nearly a full year after
aware, no prospect of one any time celebrating Medicare and discussing they were elected. By that time, there
soon To borrow from a famous base- how to make it stronger, we ae in- will be little time for hearings camball great. "It ain't over, 'til it's over." stead discussing draconian cute and a mittee consideration or public discusWhy should people return to major secret plan to turn the system on its sion of these sweeping proposals. The
league ballparks or pacroniee major head.
Medicare reforms will likely be folded
league teams if the risk remains of
During the last week, word has into the reconciliation bill, which will
having affections toyed with again and leaked ou in the New York Times and be considered under special rules limithaving hopes of a championship the Washington Post about the Medi- ing debate. We will be under the gun to
dashed-not by a better team but by care cuts being cobbled together in a pass the bill by October 1 In order to
labor-management problems?
back room somewhere over on the keep the overnment running.
I believe the time has come for the House side. According
to both reports,
That is no way to consider the moot
Senate to act. The Senate Antitrust the House Republicans have a plan that radical overhaul of Medicare in 30
Subcommittee reported the bill to the would give seniors a devil's choice: face years. The Republicans must come forJudiciary Committee on April . This
1,000 a year in additional premiums, ward with their plan now so that sen
conseosus bill, S. ha7,Is sponsored by copayments and deductibles or be ira and their families will have time
Senators HATCH,
Thexsoii, MOYNIHANi,forced into a health plan that could to digest the propsals and understand
CAH-AM, and myself, It would cut back very well deprive them of the choice of what they would mean to them personbaseball's judicially created and aber- their own doctor
ally and financially. We must have ado
rational antitrust anemption.
TAXcur'
quate time to weigh this legislation-a
Congress may not be able to solve
iush Why re
wrenching changes few hectic days in late September is
every problem or heal baseball's self' being contemplated for Meldicare? To not good enough.
inflicted wounds, but we can do this: pay for a ta cut for the wealthiest
momoucboas
We can pass legislation that will d
Americans. The 1270 billion in Medi
As I said, we do not know the eact
a
that professional baseball can no care cute are roughly equivalent to the nature of the Republicans' Medicare
longer operate above the law, The anti- Republican budget's proposed lids hil- cuts because they have not been retrust laws apply to all other profes- lion tax cut-more than half of which leased. What we do know from reports
sonal sports and commerial activity would flow to people earing more than in the press however, is quite dcour'
should apply to professional baseball, 10,00 a year
a ig
Iwelli
te
The Republican Medicare cuts would
Medicare budgt would not keep
Along with the other members of the not be reinvested bock into the system up with medical inflation or the influx
Judiciary Committee, I recently re to make it solvent The majority is not of new recipients and as a result it
celvoed a report of the section on arti cutting Medicare in order to strength would cover less and cost mo for to
trust law of the American Bar Associa- en it. Hardly one dime of the savings cipient with each pasing year.
clan that examines . 27. The anti would be put back into the system.
The Republicans apparently contrust section of the ABA reasons that Nearly every bit of the savings would template transforming Medicare Into a
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widow,Ronalee,and the rest of the family, way. tt will merelyprovidean opportunity
for sportscombioed-incodiog the 1994-95stoke
and a posthumoussalute to a fallen hero, the consuwersof tere servicesto protect whichendedthe posihility of a WorldSeries
BrianD. Myers,Sr.,of Schuylerville,
NY.
their privacyit theyoowieh.After alt,the pis- for thetirst time to 90 yeawanddeprivedaur
creationof onrprivacyis oneof car Nation's citiesof thousands
at jobsand mitteons
ofdottare Intax revnes-e co no tonger tfrd
which uncheck
CONSUMER INTERNET PRIVACYfreedoms
n
anner
a
in
hase9alt
fessional
p
tat
to
to
circ1m9net.
altwed
e
not
st
m
technotgy
CY
19 ACTOP
OF tes
PROTECTION ACT PROTC~tO
__________
(yed byno otherproeeoional
sport.
The bill I ow intreducing
todayts based n
HON.
BRUCE
F.VENTO
END THE ABUSE OP PUSH POLLS
a legistion approvedbytheSenateJudioiary
OF NNESOTA
Commiteelast Congress
andis similarIs legINTHEHOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES
HON.
JOSEPH
R.PITTS
stov aroptedbythe HeaveJudiciaryCow
Tuesday, January;, 1997
O
wite rirg the 103dCongres partiallyreIN '~tESOUS
OPBEPSSONA~tiOS
pealingthe antitrustexemptian.es e conMr. VENTO.Mr. Speaker,the age of the
came haveprevioasly
beenwisedthatby reInloet puts more and more AmericansonTuesday ]anuary 7, 1997
pealing the antitrust exemphon me coald
ine-evolving fasterthan we ever imagined. Mr. PIS. Mr Speaker.in recentyears, somehowho disrptng the operation ot the
Eachday newcompanies
and industries
grow many campaigns
have sed assattied minorleague, or professional
hasebalf'abiout of the constanttechnological innovation allegationsagainston opponent
in their pelts. i to limitfranchiserelocation
or jointlynegothat has come to symbolizethis informationWhiletheseposhpoltsmayhe sn politirts netsorbroadcasting arrangemnts, the
superhighway. The Interet has reached into no some, I betievethat the one or negative lerislaton carefullyeliminates these maem
our schools,businesses,
andhomes.It hasal- sggestive, and anfoandedinformationin
fromthe scopeof the newantitmutcoverage.
lowedaverageAmericans
sittingin theprivacy pollfels to meetthe democraticgoal of per- Afteradvoatig repealofthe exemption for
of their livingmomsto connectwith and ex-vading notemwith truthandfaimeve.
any em, I beleve the timeis fially ripefar
ploretheworld.The Intemetprovides us with That'swhy I introduced
the PushPoll Dls- enactment
of this legiston. to thepastsome
entertainment,
information,and communica-claimerAct today.Thiahit wilt discoarage
the legislatorshad objectedto legislatingin thin
tion. But with all the wondersof the Interet prctice of slandering
a condidate
in a Federa ara hecauseof their hesitancyto take any
comesthepotentialforproblems.Today,I am electionsorer the gaise of a legitimatepoll, echoswhichcould impactthe ongoinglabor
introducing the ConsumerIntemet Privacy The PoshPall Disclaimer
Act ill requirethat hove But are to eneri ano atProtection
Act of 1997in an effortto address any personor organization
conducting pall
bargaining
agreement,
lbs objection no
brctive
just onesuch glaringproblem.
To gain access to the Intemet's endless to providedin the poit.or a statementthat ln soits.
web of sites, users must work throughan them is no soarceIf this is the case.Farther, agreedto markwith the playersto necka pintemetprovideror server. WhilteIbs sem- my billwill requirethatthe idntbty of the por- galrepealof the antitmut exemption
as partof
ers providea valuableservice to their cus- son or gro p sponsoringthe poll, wettas their newlahoraccord.Theirmemorandum
of
tomers,theyare alsocapableof collecting
an thy identityef thecallar,ha discloed.
uoderstanding provides, [tjhe clefs andthe
enormous amount of personalinformation Mr. Speaker,
it is Vitalthatmaworktogether [Major League BaseballPlayersAssociation]
about theseindividual
consumers.
Besides the to redacethe cegatieeimpactpoohpollshave milljointly reqoestandcooperatein lobbying
personalinformationan Intemetsewer may on the Federalelectionproceso.I urge that the Congressto pose a law clarifyingthat
collect whenthey enrolla subscriber,
seers the provisionsis my bill be includedin the Major Leaguebasebll playor are covered
are alsocapableof identifying
the sites their largercampaignfinance reformhiltwhich is anderthe antitrustlowe(i.e.,thatmajorbegan
subscribers visit,Withoutdoubtsuchinforma- expected to he consideredis Congress.I playeremillhave the same rights coderthe
lion would be quite valuableto those inter- thak the Speaks, andlookfard to waik- antdrustlaws an do oiher preesional ath
ested in marketing,while providingservers ingwith himduringthe If5th Congress
on this ise, e.g. foothalland baskethallplayers),
with yetanothersourceof revenueforprovid- important
te
alog with a provisionwhich makesit clear
ing such personaland private information
thatpaseageof the ft Ios not changothe
about consumers.
The result-subscribers aretimet
ora
'1 applicationof the
lamein any other
inundated withjunk mailandlore-mail,based BASEBALL PANS AND COMMIJ
canted or with respectto any otherpersonor
on such salesof theirprofilesto thirdparties. NtTgBS PROTECTION ACT OF 1997 entity."
Mylegislationisintendedto informand pmI haveaskedthatthe bill he introducedan
tact the privacyof the Intewet user byrquirHON.
JOHN
CONYERS,
JR.
H.R.21, in hoor of the coageoos cantor
ing servers to obtain the written consentof
Onsacar
folder, Cart Flood. Mr. Flood, one of the
theirsubscribers
beforedisclosing
any of their
IN THE HOUSE
OF RPSENTATIVES
greateet
playersof his time,riskedhiscower
personalinformationto third parties.In addiwhenh challnged baseball'srenameclase
tion, my bill requiresa serverto provideits
Tuesday, January, 1997
afterhe was tradedfrom the St. LootsCar
subscribers access to any personalInforma- Mr. CONYERSMr. Speaker,
todayI amin rinas to the Philadelphia
Philles. Although
tion collectedbythe serveron its users, along troducingthe "RaveballFans and Comma- the SapremeCourtrejectedFlcod'schallenge
with the identityof any recipientsof suchper- sims Protection
Act of 1997" It is time that in 1972,we all owea debtof gratitudefor his
sonal infornation.
CongressReallysteps op io the plots and willingness
tochollengethe baseball
oiigarch
Whilethis bill addressesmany concems,I endsbaseball'sanitrust eoemption whichwas
Professional
baseballis nowa mow than$
do not view this legislationas a final draf, atthe ot ofthe debilitatingtrikoof 1994-95. billion annal boninessandthe timehas long
Professional
baseballto te only Industryin since passedwheyif couldbe contended
that
completewith everydetail,but ratheras a first
stop downa roadwe are bound to travel. Ob- the UnitedStatesthatin eoemptfromtheanti- baseballdid not constitute'iatemsatecowviously, issues involvingthe Internetare new trus lawswithoutbeing sabjectto alterative memo.'Thereis bipatisan sopportin boththe
andcomplexanddeservecarefulandthought- reouatory snpemisonThis circumstanco
re- Hooseand Senatefor taig actionon this
ful consideration.
The Intemettouchesan in- soled bow an erroncoas1922SoyremeCowl iss, and I tookforwardto Congressfinally
anomaty of base
credibleand increasing numberof peopleand decisionholdingthatbaseballdid net involve repealingthe longotanding
industries,and it is clear thatthe perspective "Interstatecommerce"
and was thereforebe- 1 11's antihest exemption.
and inputfromtheseinterests are vital to the pondthe reachof the antitrusttows.Congress
success ofthis process.
has toiledto overtar this decisiondespite THE STATE WATER SOVEREIGNTY
As the Intemetbecomesa more integral subsequent court decisions holdingthat the
PROTECTtON ACT
part of our daily lves, it is importantthatwe other pmfeional sports werefolly subjectto
In Congresstake a commonsense
approach, theantitrustlame
like this proposedlegislation,to ensurethe
Theremay have beena timewhen basecitizensof our Nationare able to benefit and bals unique treatmentwas a soarce of pride
OPIDAHO
retaina voicein the use of this technology end distinctivefor the many lal fees who
wihout involuntarily
sacrificingtheir personal loed or nationalpastime.Ret with baseball
Tuesday Jantary 7, 1997
privacy My legislation will not hamperthe sufferingmorework stoppagesover the last Mr. CRAPO.
Mr. Speoker,I poets Introduce
growthand innovationof the Intenet in any 25 pem than all ofIthe other professionalthe StateWaterSovereignty
Prtction Act,a
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feets differentutilizationof hnalthcorn sorv- MONTHLY
PAYMENT
MAES
TAMEEICAAE-PWIYYEE
CARE
ices.
PLAN
In 1996, Dr.Jaho E. Wennberg,
rho director
afthAeCantorfor the Evatuative
Cfloial StudIns
195
99
HON.
MAJOR
R.OWENS
ies at DartmouthMedioatSchool,pubtished nWq
m M Pip
p
i
OFNew Y
'The DartmouthAtvlaoof HealthCae." The
i
IN THEHOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES ales showsthatthe ratesofhospitalbodsand
u0
54
U
130.1
$40 5,9
,=0Ow 9
phrysloiaos
par 1.000 residentsdetermines
Tuesday February4, 1997
how much care MedicarehanAfciadesuse. ii5
4
t
Mr OWENS.Mr. Speaker,PresidentClin- Revtsingthe highlyoaie AAPCCpayieot isae MN_
359 2 299 15 99 4u
ton's inaugural address was not a State of the formuta will result in greater equi for Medi- Tera tE
20
t
Unionspeechobligatedto providesubstance core beoefciares regardlessof where they
forgeneralproposals.Appropriately,
the Presi- he, allowinAchoicesemongplansand mor
The paymentratesalsoillust theooeral
dent used his secondinauguralstatementto equitabledistriution of out-of-pocketcosts ioutahitityend unpredictability of MPCC'sseta two for the next 4 years,the preludeto andadditional
Saneftpaokages
factom thatdiscourageheuth planstram onthe 21st century.Americais a great country Becauseat the needto correctthe inequity tedig ew mothetsand remainingis other
blessedby Godwithwealthfar surpassing
any is the MPCC paymentformulafor miltionsof markets.
Nationon the faceof the Earthnow, or in the Medicarehenefciudes,I stronglysupported If there is a sitoerlininAto HCPA'srelease
past The RomanEmpirewas a beggur entity changes to fhe formuladudin consideratonof the 199755k-hosed
managed
corepsyment
compared
to the rich andpowerfulAmericans. lastsessionof the MedicarnPresemation
Act, rules, it was containedin Dr%Vtodoc's rnGodhas grantedus an opportunity
unparalled Regreahl, congressional ents to reforo marks:"The forula used to set HMOpay
in history.PresidentClintoncalledupon both the geographic
dispantyand inequites in the mont rutes is Yamed.It shortchunges
rural
leaders andordinary citizensto measureup to AAPCCformutameredeniodbythe strokeof areas and marketowherene is delioered
this splendidmoment.The Presidentcalled the PresidentA
netspen
more effiienty, and may limit heoefciary
sponuoalof
altof us
ust0hno
nls hatreds
ard and
n
The legislation I am itoducing today ear- choice."
to abandon ancient
obsessions with trivialissues.Fora briefmo- ramsthe AAPCCpaymontgap between rural
Dr. Vtodeck'scommentsindicote HCPAs
ment in historywe ar the Indispensable p e- nd eths arnasin u hudgetnoutralfashion. uoderstunding of the inequityis the current
pie. Othernationshave occupiedthis position At a minimum,s cunty mouldreceive80 per- AAPCCformulaandthe needforchange it me
before andfailedthe world.TheAmericanno cootsf the natienulinput-pdce-adjostod
copi- are to oer all Medir benefciares true
lossus shouldbreakthe historicpaftemofem- ationrate.This changehelpsreflectthe hoe choicesis tho type end format hoath core
piresdevouringthemselves.
As we move into cot of doing hasiness,takinginto consider- theymentte receive.I see thisas a sigral that
the 21st centurywe need indispensable
lead atiun uncontrollahle
factors such s wage in the monthsaheadme canmsrkin a bipardemwith globalvisions. We need profoundde- rates or supplycosts.The languagealso im- son pragmaticway to improvethe AAPCC
plomonta o3yeor averagefor the baselise poymentformsu
cisions,
Mr Speakr, corretin the AAPCCpaythan I yr. This hnge prides
INDISPENS
hs
helth cre mot formulais tl. The 15th Congress
rpresentuon
reater
indispensabl eeipsot
The
Under
tar
an area. Thisthistodcl
bill Is basedon the the opportunity
to makethe formulamoreeqUneG God.
h
ntieon
costs
uardiian
ofod
the pivotal generation. Most
Physician Payt Reoe Commission
tunate or all the lands. For a brief M on, 1996AnsualRep
The whole world we hold in our hands,
my colleaguesen the Committee
on Ways
Iternet sorcery ompuer
gi. Tiny spirW
e HealthCarePinuncingAdminis- and Moansto mao tho nendedchanes to
its make opportunity tragic. Wear the ianmat
is
the AAPCC
formulaThe tongerwe
dispensable
nation. Guardian of the pivotal rutes for Medicoremanagedcore plune,the contnue to y
generation.
Millionires must
rise to seethela
aistyt efficienthealthcoremarketsmillhe penalized
oda htpyet
motrsoleeeaeo
Mitsoie
nera.
seed. Or smother beneath their splendid Medicore-managed
cor plansmouldincrease andrerat areaswill tag hehisd,leaviog many
greed.Capitalism isKing, With pteta oan aerage of 5.9 percentas of January1
dicarebeneciaes with feer choices.
be Pope.Bankshoardgold.Than coutd feen
forr-A61997-signicoultdy lower
the
n
tilize universal hope.Jefferson Lincoln R
honatsvetugeincreasoof 10.1perct.
seelt King, Make your star spangled legacy
termsofseed
the solency
goodrstrustinfund-mo
your ghostseo
sting,
Is stow URT FLOOD: AN UNCOMMON MAN
Medicate
the is
rlogNee ofThis
To bringa
D"puhysrgou.
IesDispatch
global
visions, Indispensable
epeddinA
the rate of AroarNof Mrdicre
to
profound decisions,Interet sorcery computer magic,Tiny spirits make opportunity stuve off its immioentbaruptoy. The bad
tragic, We are the indispensable nation, sews is that this aoemgeincreaserefects
or rrcoto
tN TOSs OP EESENTATIVS
Guardian of the pivotal generation. With lb- wide vadation in perentage Incrases from
erty and justice for the world, Under God.
cunty ts county. Four countes: Vatencia,
Tuesday, February4. 1997
N.M.; and three New York State counties Mr CONYERE.
Mr. Speaker,1 monthags,
SUPPORT GREATER MEDICARE EQ-and
He o, actuallywill reitroduced legislationrepeig hasa's
SUPPT ANDEATRNME
thy
EQceive
negation
grossib-real
decreasos.
Beantitrust
exemption.
bill was designated
UITYIYME
-mber
cuse the actualdsllarvadations are alsoex- HR. 21, in honor The
of Cort FleadRE
FORMING THE AAPCC PAYMENT reme,ma-i
paymentarnasget a dohte whonhe playedfor theSt. LouisCardinals.
FORMULA
whommy-ismer percootage
iscreosesoff a
loan ear whenthe termshemasd courage
tamerbase.
are usedalltoo frequentlyCurtFloodstands
HON.
JIM RAMSTAD
This situaton continues a trend inherost5 oat as the genuineaticle, a tine inspiran to
OFcore'
the gamedpaymentformula.The following alt AmeALFRIs
whotore aAoutenomic and
IN THEHOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES tabte illustratesthe vast vaditin bteen
t is i- President
Clinton
sea
woten
4, 17
Tuesday,
February
his acorner
undartcles
reiterate
these
portontto pointout that eon thoughthe 19A6 whichdescrdhe
M.RMTedyMr peakur, 19
Mr RAMSTAD.
Mr Speaker.I rse today to AAPCCpaymentincreasedan overage or
pn
Introduce
legislation to respondto an issueof 1a.1 percentnot alt countie shared in the
Ms ofsa
waeoftecorg
r wl
gret rep~ace
to
o Medicare
edior beneficiariess
beelaries hountyof thatincrase. The sameis alsotroe Curt Piooddisplayed
great importance
whoa he refusedto acand healthcore providersin my district and for the1997AAPCC
payments.
ceptheing tradedta the Philadelphia
Phnlies.
throughoutthe country-reforming the pay- Countiesthat typicallylost ground were
ment for Medicarerisk-basedmanagedcare those in efficientmarketsand ra cosntles His to thee o
isser
plans
with historicallysmer reimhursement
rates
To
Currently. Medicarepayments
to risk-based Bemuse of these lswer paymentrates and After 12yearsin tho MajorLeagues.
0 do
healthcare plansare calculated
on the basis lowerannealincreses, theseregimewiltcsn nOt
feeand
thatsotd
t am
a pieceoror
property
o he0
hughe
Irreupeetine
my wishes.
of Medicarespendingin eachcounty'sfee-for- tinue In lack the ahility ts atract managed betievethen ay syscem
which producesct
sevice section--medical care outsideof man- case optionsts their areaor offer enhanced resut outes my has rtghraa a nittoes
agedcare plans.The variation inthe adjusted healthcore benefts oftenfoundin higherpay- andIsInconsisten with the taws oftheUeltaverageper cpito cost [AAPCC]
formulare- went commniies.
useti
ferai
ed Snattsand e
statza.
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Although Curt Flood lost his legal battle lasting inftuence as the sport be toted no
self-imposed exfle. T
challenging baseballs antirust exemption, the
moth.
asd siospy, Plead
trolle
his stand."
Wepe that the lovtng conten aad nap
public recognized the moral validity of his atH
I oto you faily
asd friends will
ssain By 1976, tree agesoy
an-toed and te
guments-he goerel-hewaneelapateof eoprly was
not a piece of property. Hisin oar Jsice of Pied's stand againsthad
the reserve
case paved the way for free agency in all pro- thoaght
lese was vindinated. Boo Plood stayed an
S ea
fessional sports. A national poll taken in the
wake of Ffod v. Kuhn showed that fans opBI
CLISO.
lster.
he pet his toe back its
hasehalt gin
posed the reserve clause, which bonsd playgerly. as a radianouncer for the Oakland
Pram the Washington Pose. Jan. 1997P A's far one sesson. He looked like a shy
emto teams for life, by an 8 to I margin.
And while thousands of athletes have subQsr
OrLy.A HMO
hyperseaitive ghost of himself. Thogh
sequently benefited from free agency. Curt
(By Thomas oswell)
only 41, hn seemed for otder. His tounds were
Every few years, Cart Plned wnuld re deep. Hin neme of isolatinn wan almost pal'
Flood paid a heavy price for his decision to
take on the baseball owners. The 3-time all- appear. Moyhe that was sowe coud tmrs
an
gFo
star and 7-me gold glove award winner hisgfast'agtog end haggard fete with she
regarding him iks a soldier who'd sotfered
played only 13 more games before being
laughing ballplayer's meg that ted ware Ishelt shank Io a necessey hassle. tobody,
forced out of baseball.
the 1iS before he sank baseball to the Sa- howeter, hod a na far his fragile ndi
Less well known is the fortitude Curt Flood
prow Coon-,
teen He ha
ae o mae. P and died
ta wnt ie
displayed in fighting racial intolerance. At the
same time Jackie Robinson was breaking the
of threat tanner Monday at 59 It was Martin
seemed
omwteind-ad wwighed earlk
color barrier with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Curt Lather King Jr. Day. Of alt the fIgr
w
Flood was facing the Jim Crow lawsas the
spors is she las gontion. pehap
only and undeniably-red cosldnt begin to get
ae It.
sole black man playing for the High Point, NC
Plond cold die on the annversary of a arFinally, is 1994 Plead stood before she
.!_Tom..
tyr's death ted havt it seem a fitting memo- taenentts again briefly during the playern
He alone was barred from gas station rest rial,
strike tens
rooms. Only Curt Flood was forced to eat at
Par a few days perhaps we tan remember
'
cil.h
toe part o
sible
the ktitchen door while his teammates were
the difference between a ree ethl-ore ho
League.
Really. he reek the stage to give modern
of a genuine
nassn
hnh
takes risksred
far the
om
served asee tnIedso
hedern he
nden
ol
eartake
phony.
lank'at-me
rebels who only players some baAkbnne. The message was
played
a doubleheader, he experienced only
the ver s
t of their net
o
sblnal: This gy b
ed t
greater humiliation. As he explained to Ken
biography.
Il of yea
Bums:
Rebellios that's worthy nf she name Ito'
rak end aye h
i pu h en the
After the end of the first game you take off about attitude. The rebel to wham our re' re owner toem
abut breakieg the onion,
your uniform and you threw it into a big
spent and or heart gumseat Is the use, sunk hove a little
guts. The money in yur bank
pile . . . [But the clubhouse manager] sent as Plead, whenever is this wend wanted
an-aunt name ant of thin guy's peace of
my uniform to the colored cleaners which tank ajob Heles had the mined fortne to
was probably 20minutes away and there tet
tee what wan right and
ng
Pled's legany remains a tangled ne. Yo
while all the other guys were en the field. the tst to himself.
coold soy he did the grndwork so athlete
players have lust a tree them'
[The crowd has] really been giving me hell'"Baeball
alt day long, red now I'm sitting there stark pies;' sold playern asian heed Donald ehr
sePlead ld the tenterstune of the
naked weting for my uniform to come back
en Monday. "A man of quiet dtgnty, Cart
Shaq Pu martian, no to speak. Plead helped
tram the cleanern and the other guys were P
make a world where B
ant us the field. So finally they get my uni- esaml
fur all who had the privilege to body mill moth the Superman tattne en his
form back red I walk out on the field .
knew him, When it
name time in take a
hicept self-lefateetion into routine. n.o
boy youd think that I had just burned the
sta at great personal rink rnldd
American Flag.
he believed
rightbe as "Bad As I Wares B
- million salary? If you tint tovehody. peel
CoIt Floods talents and goodwill extended
Plead had the braint red the se
noordta bueo'
off a big statck of Croe Cleottands. No pink.
a ranaoeinI
iet
wel
ell beyond baseball. aedbsbl.H
e
a foundation
to
sfair employHowever,
Ta
Cr
benefit inner-city
hesliltee-ty youngsters.
ysogtei. s anamlined
An accomplished
by temperaenat, he wan nomplotely onie
Cyivit will soy that Flood stood fur tamepainter, his portrait of Martin Luther King
to a pubit brawl shot lauted
He thing to that shout who followed him culd
hangs today in Corretta King's living room,
wasin distrsed by nflirt as Fehr In Invig
afford to stood tar sothg
in
torment always
rated by it. And Floed'
In the end, we will remember Curt Flood for
having the courage to tell America what shamed,
helping athletes woke market salaries for
en a
111 their sen-im, he allows them to lice
should have been plain and obvious all along.
Whenbe arrived Is Washington
Distdmination is wrong. People-ven ath- after sitting eat a teason, be played only 13 bigger stole. We bear about the jerks. Bet
in the minority. Mere eth'
th
s ar stall
e
dut ed I
gin for the Benetr, Y
leteSre not property. Baseball is a business
Derreli ree of the Redskins
le ar like
at
wer
r hld
st
is C
and shold be subject to the competition laws.
-u
tiewao o who wan thosen this week as the NPL' shir
Ahte the P
tag fero
A few days before
Curt Flood died. I wrote tog kim Inside. A
tadium,
meof
of the Year for kin charity aed cammunity
him, suggesting that if the legislation I intm- chered. But enough bonedto let Plood knew
work
duced in his honor was to pass into law, he that, fur him, n plate was he O the
Per some ef as, Head
ould be a deity
should coame to the White House signing tere- read e was vilified eta traitor who wanted
teai. Maybe hell themesanslute using the
language mere prenisely when me destribe
i the national pastie.
mony That cant happen now, but I know hist t
Bankthee, memories of Blank Poaer so- ear famous atbees.
indomitable spirit will be with us as we conWhen me one "teerege" in destribe a qua,
totes were in the ai.
So Plead, thueghiel
tinue his fight for equality and faimess. I know
takrn a peinkilling that,
pigeon-haled at redi- terbenk who
all Members-and indeed all professional ath- hat never extreme, w
mene
ll
we
maybe we'll blush Whi
eg
Sikof fmat.
t"like
he awas
wa
said
this courageous
in mouing
lts oin me sta-jon
e i mewig
tis oeageostreated-d
traded
pitte
inks maket
a Jump shut at the homera
man.
How tould Anserine saentias a system where
"hero." maybe we'll hej.se a hit abashed.
Te Warn blas,
a e owned amn fur
bin whole career?
tht
i herns, what weed have we HeOEed
Wshaingtan, DC, January24. 1997 After betting .100 in 30 at-hate, Pined fled,
r
i
And Doe sey as log
Hard as It may be to betiee these days.
Mrs. CURTFLOOD,
4139CloverdaleAn.
Plead didn't mret fame. He
eethod when "tragio' perhays well think of she last 2
Lo Angele, CA.
tatkig about himself and en
admitted yearn of Plead's life-end the price be paid
DeR MRS. FLoOD: Hillary and I wete sad- thee be teethed the thught shot he might be far following his nsmeence. Thea, our per,
dened to learn of your husband's death. and
horting hit
sport.
vyontive sharpened, maybe we'll oote a
we exteed our deepest sympathy
Par yearn, Plood disappeared from the ya' hotter ward
Cars Ftood wan a main of eietraardinery tin tee, often living in tEmrpt. to 1972
ability, courage. and conviction. His achieve- Flood v. Kuhn,.the Suyreme Courtupheld
tPea the New York Times. Jan. 21, 11
ments on the field were matched only by the
haseball'
rigkt
tartitrust
immunity.
laEaN
pLOes, A Ma r
ALL
strength of his character, While there are no
Plead Bad fought the law and, temporarily,
the lam won.
words to ease the pain of your loss. I hop
(By Money Chesni
'Yea hove en underutand that if yu do
you can take comfort In the knowledge that
Curt will ba remembered by so many Amer- what I did en baseball, yau oes hated, ugly,
to a recent tetter to Fnk
Slocum, eetam aneoneof baseball's finest player
l and a detingta le person." he said, texlaining kin cite diretor at the Basebloe Assssto
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Team (B A.T.). Curt Flood wrote. "The 1996
holiday seaon brings mixed feelings ofjoy
and sadns. Therefore. we'll take the advice
that mother Laura gave to me when I was a
kid. She'd say 'Start counting your blessIngs. Squirtis. by theI
a
hovewas
time,
Fl yoo't
, wo
59,fu"ntin
died yesterday after a
yearlong battle with throat cancer. and it is
the players who came after him in the major
leagues who should count their blessings for
having had a man of his stature and dignity
an rnag recede them
Profession
athletes, fur the most part.
live for their time. They generally don't rareW
what happened before them and. worse, they
often don't know. Sadly, many baseball players wouldnot even be able to identify Flood,
wouldn't even know that he was the forerunner of Andy Messersith. another name they
wouldnt reaognize for the impact he had on
their les
But that day in Atlanta in the last month
of 194, the players in the meeting room of
the players association executive board knew
about the man who was to speak to them.
They saluted him with a standing ovation
before hespok
s9.
pokee
"It almost made me forget what I was
going to say." Flood said afterward. "It
taught ma little short, I felt a lump In my
throea."
Flood moo in the room that day in his ca parity as vice president of the United Baseball League. a venture that did not reach
fruition. Twenty-five years earlier, in 1969.
he appeared before another Players Assocla'
tion
ecutive board seeking support for the
task he was about to undertake. The St.
Louis Cardinals, for whom he had played for
12years, had traded him to the Philadelphia
Phillims. and he didn't want 0090
enra
RihadM os.,h wa tanu onns genral
nsel at the tie I te
recalled
im'
lld yestrday
eserdy ha
Flood
came
0o
hIm
and
Marvis
Miller,
they
heed o
the
oninmsdtl
haler
wane
head of the unon, and told tMari
them he wanted
to challenge the
tem that he said
"Malin
d I weren't s
i
was t
as. if he had some other agenda," Moss said.
"We arranged for him to come to the board
meeting in Puerto Rico. The idea wo to let
him talk to the board and o
ce them
that
hehe was
fr snere."a
real that heeralyblee
really believed
thisan
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ways Identified as his lawyer. had planoed to
ppa before the BAT. board tomorrow
morning to express Floods ppreta
for
the msista. Instead, Moss made plans to
rotur to Los
As.
his letter to
um. Flood also wrote,
Say this: 'tort accomplished nvery goal
that he st for himself, and simply moond
.'he
He didot gais a victory 25 years ago, and
't athieve statistcs that
warn good enough for the Hall of Fame."t
when Flnod's oaron rot ape dontnHi
of Pane ballot, this svor marked o
X.
ave mo

t

sf o

re.gnon.

[Fro the Hew York Times. Jan. 1,1997]
CoRTFLco Is DEAD r 59ZDrnrR
Drivc
(By Joseph Grto
Car Fiood. the Ali'Stor center fielder fnr
the St. Louis Cardinals in the 19i0's who hetents a pioneering figure In the legal atttc
on hesohoilo rmerr
clas
that fore
shadowed the a of free agents, died yastor
day in Los Angeles. He was
Flood died at the U.C.L.A Medical Center.
where he had been a patient in recus
months, after developiag pnmonia He had
een sfferig from throat roomr since last
pri
At bat and espetially on the Ield, Flood
wm on outstnding player for a dome years
with the St. Loo Cardinals, a castor fielder
old
ln
sen e
in a
r i th 10a
atted sa.00
or tunes,
Out in w his stiff rsolve regarding rhe
unfairness of basehall's virtually enslave
meet of players and his nourage in challeag,
g anarred
ystem Flood
that peetated
this condition
Obat
heyend baseball.
It all erysixlllmd when the Cardinals
ad Flood to rho Philadelphia Philles trad.
after
tan 1ret season and Flood refose to go. Rep-

rested by Arruer J. Goeberg. forme
ciatd Jstice of the Supreme Court and
United Staes Ambassadr to the United Ha
tiaoo Flood triggered a legal war that shook
s
a ally lost the btl
in Federal
Distrlt Coort in How York when thn judge
this and he was sincere."
With the bard's support, Flood took his
ugeste
t ta piayers and club owners
rhallenge all the way to the United States
e issu
t almost sir years
Supreme Coors. He lost. but his effort even- loser. he won the war when other baseball
other
players,
players ssocefoly sued and broke from the
tually
emboldened
r
system," which for almost a cn
Mesuersmith in particular. Unfornately
to
hod bound
player to his team ynnr
beside losing the case, Flood sow his can
di Ate out
sttngoa
te 1970
sasn.hnafter year
die. After sitting
the
season.
he
played briefly for the Washington Senators
passed. salaries in all sports soared, teurns
lo191
He knew be wasn't the same player he had sought salary saps no contain the damage 00
heen. and be walked away from the ony j
b
ir poynils and large citiesobare enqoired
ha had known. A parIah In an owner domiI
a
nated business, Flood was not welcome to
The solitary figure who prompted this rev
wear a baseball uniform. Instead, he drifted
t C
was
from country to country. first to Majorca, Hoao on -Ian 1..
where he opened a bar and became an alco- Okland. He was sbaft and skiany. bu he
hol.
then back to the United States, then signed his first professional cot
w
to Sweden. then back home aga.
at Dk d Technical High
.
In recent years, Flood operated a youth
ars in the
ir
league and
Aftnr two
center in Los Angeles. He enjoyed working
Redsseswooenly
with children. He would have enjoyed work- briefly withythe Clocin
Ing with young professional baseball players, traded in 1950to St. Losis. where ho played
too, but he never had the opportunity. Ner, for the nex 12 nees._ and three times
the Hew
ertheless, he retained his dignity and, in the played lathe World Sr-aiest
Yankees in 19b4.the Boston Red Boo in
lasi year his rourge.Yr
Yasteray, Joe Garaglola. president of 1907and the Detroit Tigers in 1968.
His talents were unquestined. Daring a
BAT,. recaled that he testified for baseball
in Flood s lawsuit, "I thought if the reserve earer that looted from lilt to 1911.he boned
. sool T hoots, appeared in thee World
clause went. baseball was going." Garugila
said "I woo so wrong I cant begin t ttell S
and reigned in nter field fnr if years
you. it took a lot of guts for him to do what for the Csrdioal.
Gring one open. he played in 226 comeca
he did."
Garagiolas organitios had helped Flood tire games without tarmnltlog an error and
nthe
lest year. and Moss, whom Flood al
i 16the
rtance
irnseason witho
ads r cm t

~i
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mining an error and in 1960went tho ntire
tayon without making a misplay. Heaven
hncame a portrols arit
of some talnt who
w oommissined to point August A. Bosch
Jr! the owter of the Cardinals, and his childfeni i oils.
At the peak of his career. though. the man
with the flawless glove misjudged a lin
rim ad shppCada
tte
f8orotet
the asWold ereragale Detote
and Cardinnis we
tied at
three gameso apiecr with Bob Gibson facing
Mickey Leioc for the cbampioship In St.
Lois In Game 7. The were stareless for six
iT
ired the is twn TterseSot atrwo
sigle
Jirt
folloed wit te har
ive to tooter,
. _car.
Flood lost night of the bali momentarily.
tak a tople of steps in toward home plate.
reversed direction and sipped while she ball
carried over his head for a triple and t
russ. The Tigers wan. 4-I. ad captnred the
Series,
After the game. Tim Mctarvnr stood in tan
f.teCardinais' iooknr'room regret
a
d
"tor Flood, yasee bean
siol
fourth plane and Booth eleaned boe. In n
bloohbooter trade. he snt Flood, Mctar
and -In Hner to Philadelphia for within
Alto, Cookie Rojat and Jerry Johnson. Bsr
Floo sed fr
tht "e
d" players to their tea
and
laws - Oar back as 192.
The trial opened May 1i, ii7g hefore Judge
Irving Bee Cooper In the United States Court
Hoe
i low
Manhattan.
defendants
included
Commissiner
of Th
Raseball
Bowie
Ktohn, the presidents of tan Hationel and
American Leagues and tan Cbief exncutive of
all 24 te
then in the big leaes. They
fa
wan determined not to be traded without his
toesent. When he was asked which team ha
w ted to play for. he tstified. "The team
that maks o th best
r
Tbe "reserve clause' is contracts woo ot
toppled during the trial, hot It tame under
sustained attack. Martin Miller.
director of the players association, described
how baseball contracts tied the playe to his
tlub forever and said. "The playr has no sy
whatsoever in terms f what toditio
ho
plays under, always hearing in mind be has
the on atrtie:
Ha myd~d ofn
dlfftrnnt way to main a living."
The Trial rasumed 10 weeks, 2.000 pages o
t scrlpt and 56 ehihits. Judge Cooper sug'
sd that reasonable men" could find a
solution outside rourt ood ruled: "We am
a
lond who sat otae
1919season, did not
think s. He signed with tan Washingto
o
S
1971 for 11,
hot nfsr two
months s
quit end flew to Eope.
When the coon woo appealed to the So'
preee Cort. tan justices-in a 5-2 ruling
supported the Gistriet Cocrt and the Court
of Appeals and loft tan "eeserve clause" on,
sturbad. Bat Car Flood bad ser the stage
lutlon thot followed In 1976,and
for the e
of free agents poored through.
generat
"seball players have lost a trGaragiml
pion" the players' anion had, Donald Fehr.
said yesterday. "Whm it came time to sake
a stand, at great persnnal risk and sacrifice,
h prodly stood firm for what he believed
ight.n
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less than holy works of my colleagues us wel
correct location of the Aceeira offices at
fare. Withut hying In npstage Mos. I offr
4144Lindell Bl.
When traded no the Phitadelptia Phillies. the following poenciplesfor consideratiun:
Flood refosedi to go. He petitioned no Corn Treasore the chutdren. Thoo sholt not
mtloner Bowls Role Than the corect sysTRIBUTE TO CURT FLOOD
te as akin to slavery and shut tt violated pr!iities moneyb= nosthesau
o ea
anitrost lows. The nemmissioner refused
Thous Shalt cotrak
h tsso
ea
HON.WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY
Floods requt for froe agency. He son nut of
tgi'ai n0 t
f
phr.
OF
Smissot
basehal to 1970whsle tegally hattling the lion children itpoety.
act eny disahility payiests so
ihatt
IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
rasesher of the Wasbington Senasoes, hatovr6
0.000 of the 97rest childe of ou ca
ted just 13 g19nes. Ater toe gome he 97nr
Wednesday, March 5,.997
feond e hlack funerat wreath at his tocker.
Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, I stand today to
hre
a
le d'
,
00000el
d tee tsis
hece
rehed
recogoize and pay tribule to my friend and
he former St. Louis Cardinals outfielder Curthis
awst. HowTh
hall ot deceive our
ato
Flood, who died on January 20,
1997.
ever,
la17 an arhitrator
geted free age
rs fenced to hear the hurden of a disincogrted safety net and an evaporated entttle
dite
In addition to this status as professional ey to Bo ptayers, d permontly
eent. with the false prophecies of hous paythe neserectause and led to creation of the
baseball player, Curt will be remembered as
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AUTHORIZING THE PRINTING OF
COPIES OF THE PUBLICATION
ENTITLED "THE UNITED STATES
CAPITOL' AS A SENATE DOCUMENT
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Con. Res. 115, submitted
earlier by Senator WARNER.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 15)
to authorize the prietieg of copies of the
publication entitled "The United States Capitol as a Senate document.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
concurrent resolution.
Mr JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous
consent the resolution be agreed to,
the motion to reconsider be laid upon
the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution appear at this
point In the RECooD
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
The concurrent resolution (S. Con.
Res. 115) was considered and agreed to
as follows:
S. CON.RSs. 115
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives onrrring), That (a) a revised
edition of the publication entitled "The
United States Capitol" (referred to as "the
pamphlet") shall be reprinted as a Senate
document
bi There shall be printed 2,000,000copies of
the pamphlet In the English language at a
cost not to exceed $100.000for distribution as
follows
(1(A) 206,000 coples of the publication for
the use of the Senate with 2.000 copies distriuited to each Member;
(B) 886.000copies of the publication for the
use of the Hoose of Representatives. with
2.000 copies distributed to eech Member and
(C) 908 000 of the publication for distribution to the Capitol Guide Service; or
(2) if the total printing and production
costs of copies in paragraph (1) exceed
$100.000,such number of copies of the publication as does not exceed total printing and
production costs of $100,000. with distribution to be allocated in the same proportion
ie) wasth nto the copies printed pursuant to subsection (b). there shall be printed
at a total printing and production cost of not
to exceed $70.000(1) 50.000 copies of the pamphlet in each of
the following 5 languages: German. French.
Russian, Chinese, and Japanese; and
i2) 100,000copies of the pamphlet in Spanish,
to be distributed to the Capitol Guide Servtee.
AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT OF
THE EXPENSES OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SENATE
ATTENDING THE FUNERAL OF A

SENATOR
Mr JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 263, submitted earlier
by Senator WARNER.
The
The PRESIDING OFFICER.
clerk will report.
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The legislative clerk read as follows: nothieg in this subsection shall be conotrced as
A resolution (S. Res 263) to authorize the providing the ob for any negative hseere
he pplira'
regarding the .stiaw cneig
payment of the expenses of repreoetative
al
of the Senate attending the fooetnl of a Sen
'b) Nothing containedi in sehsectitn (a) of
acer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there this setion hall be demed in change the appl'
objection to the immediate consider- rati of ee antitrustJw to the condact. acs,
ation of the resolution?
pecee o geoeans by, between, or among
There being no objection, the Senate persons engaging In, onducting, or parsespat
lg In the business of organized prafesiaa
proceeded to consider the resolution.
Mr. JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous baseball except the Condort acts, practies e,
consent the resolution be agreed to. agreement e which subsection (a) of this sos'
the motion to reconsider be laid upon eon shall apply Marc spotheaiiy hot net by
she nti
the table, and that any statements re- deme o chan thectio
to easest
lating to the resolution appear at this
'(I) the oganied pvofessiosal baseball amapoint in the RECORD.
The resolution (S. Res. 263) was tanr draft, the reserve ause as applied to minor
oleague playes the agreemene betvoon
agreed to, as follows:
nzed professional major leagse baseball tenon
S. RES. 263
e teams o the Natonal Association of
Resolved,and
eaguessommoAge
the '
mittee on Rules and Administration the knona
Secretary of the Senate is authorized to pay, ment the relatioship between orgidr
from the contingent fund of the Senate. the frssbsso l
eague baeeball and organieed
actual and necessary expenses incurred by
the representatives of the Senate who attend
the funeral of a Senator, including the fmatterlag
ess
.i;
any
conct
nraol of a retired Senator. Expenses of the
Senate representatives attending the funeral
of a Senator shall be processed on vouchers meats of persons in the business of orgasied
aelaig frchise en
submitted by the Secretary of the Senate profcslianon
cin.
froniow
and appeoved by the Chairman of the Coesm- assin Isses or
mittee on Rules and Administration.
eso te
iodship
transfe
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997

1

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar 231. 5. 53.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
5
A bill (S 53) to require the geral application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill which has been reported from the
Committee on the Judiciary, with an
amendment to strike all after the eacting clause and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
SEGTON
L. SHORT TITLE.
This Act maybe cited as the "CurtFlod Act
ofl1997"
SEC. . PUenpOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify
that major league baseballplayers an covered
under the antitrustlas (Le., that major league
players will have the same rights under the
antirust laws as do otherprofeesional athletes,
eg., football and basketball players), along with
a provsion that makes it clear that the passage
of this Act does not change the appication of
the antitrust lawnsin any other context or with
respectto anyothe person or encity.
SEC a APPI.IATION OF TE ANTITRUSTIAWS
rio pnroptewsirsga acsjon £,escr
mASEmia
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq) in
amended by adding at the end the following
newooeoron:
"SEC. 27 (a) The conduct, acts, practices,or
agreements of persona in the business of organizedproessionalmajorleaguebasebalrelaing
to or affecting employment to play baseball at
the major league level ate subject to the antsltrust laws to the same etent such conduct acts
practices,or agreements rould be subject to the
antitrust lawns If engaged In by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting
hoever, That
interstate commbrce: PN

"(3) any condccch
arepraetbce. or egree
meats protested by Poblic Law Sf 331 (15 US.C
12g0 ,
.co
moy knon as the spert
BroadoastingAct of1961'); or
'Y4) te relaionhip bersroo porseco IN the
husiness of organized profesonal baseball and
empires or other lndirldcalo irks are employed
in the business of organized profesiona base
ballbysokpersons
'm
'Ye)As cod In this setion, Pn
any individual,paresnership.corporation, or soinrporated association crony ronbinationor
aoclselm, thereof.
Asotsc'aT SO. 3479
Mr JEFFOSDS. Senator HATCHhas a
sk for Its considerotion.
Th
PRESIDING OFFICER
Thc
clerk will report
The assistant legislative clerk rad
3ev
The Scooter froe Ventr.
and
mos]. foe Me, HATCH,proposes a,
mint eumbered 3
The aendeent Is as follows:
Strike all after the enactine clause and Isaet in lion thereof the feliowing:
SECTIONI SHORTtIt
This Act esy he sited as the "Cov Flood
Act of 1998"
SEC 0. PURPOSE
It ithe purysof shis legislation in stato
that major league baseball playes are cered undor the antitrust laws (i.,. shot
major league baseball players will have the
same elgbti under she oiose lass as do
other professional othletes, e.g., footbl and
basketball ployers), aloog with a pmtoision
that makes it clear that the passage of this
Act des sot change the application of the
or with
antitrust laws in any other mon
reopoct to ony other person r enticy.
LAWS
EQ z. aOLICATIOS Or won ktlSt
0
UE
3
t
O ii
BASEBAL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.SC. 5ll ct seq. Is
eded by adding at the cod the tollowing
onded,
tction:
i
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and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent major league
player's contract by an alleged violation of
the antitrust laws, provided however, that
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation shall not include
any conduct, acts, practices or agreements of
persons in the business of organized professlana1 baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor
league level, including any organized prfssional baseball amateur or first-year player
draft, or any reserve clause as applied o
(b) No court shall rely on the enactment minor league players, or
(4) a person who was a party to a major
of this sections a basis for changing the apleague players contract or who was playing
plication of the antitrust laws to any con- baseball as the major leage level at the conduct, acts, practices or agreements other
clusion
of the last full championship season
than thise set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit or imply a immediately preceding the expiration of the
cause of action by which to challenge under last collective bargaining agreement bethe antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the nwen pertins in the buiness of organized
antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, prac- roffesional major league baseball and the
tices or agreements that do not directly re- exclusive collective bargaining representsplaye.
late to or affect employment of major league tive of major league beall
person
"(d)(1)s As used
scayes - 'pes
sut1section,
edity in this
usny
mean()
baseball players to play baseball at the meam
any entity, including an individual,
major league level. Including but oat limited
partnership. corporation, trust or uincoror
ination
comb
any
soiaino
pate
otin oraycbhiaioO
(1) any conduct acts, practices at agree- paratd as
ments of person engaging in, conducting or mssoiatian thereof. As used in this section,
participating in the business of organized the National Association of Professional
its member leagues and
professional baseball relating to or affecting Baseball Leagues.
the
employment to play baseball at the minor the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in
league level, any organized professional business of organized professional maJr
baseball.
baseball amateur or first-year player droft, league
e2) in
conduct, acts, pracor any reserve clause as applied to minor tices or agreements that directly relate or
leaseaplayats.
ehl agreement between organized pro affect hash employment of major league
fessional major league baseball teams and baseball players to play baseball at the
she teams of the National Association of major league level and also relate to or afprofesProfessional Baseball Leagues, commonly feat any other aspect of organized
known as the 'Professional Baseball Agree sional baseball, includlg but sot limited o
ment: the relationship between organized employment to play baseball at the minor
profession majar league baseball and orga league level and the other areas set forth a
nized prefessional minor league baseball, and subsection (b) above, only those components,
organized professional minor league base- portions or aspects of such condact, acts,
ball, or any other matter relating to orga- practices or agreements that directly relate
to or affect employment of major league
nized professional baseball's minor leagues;
l(3)
any conduct, acts, practices or agree- baseball players to play baseball at the
ments of persons engaging in, conducting or majqor leagu level
m ) As seed isubsection (a). interpretaparticipating in the business of organized tion of the term 'directly' shall not be govprofessional baseball relating to or affecting ered by any Interpretation of 29 U.S.C. b151
franchise expansin. location or relocation, cs seq. a- -mended).
franchise ownership issues. including owner"ets Nosisg in this section shall be conship transfers, the relationship between she strued to affect the application to organized
o0ce of the Commissioner and franchise
at the nonstatctry
owners, the marketing or sales of the et- professional baseball the
antitrust laws.
fram
tamment product of organized professional lar '(5)exemption
The scope of the conduct. aces, pracbaseball and the licensing of intellectual tices or agreements covered by subsection
property rights owned or held by organized (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly conprofessional baseball teams individually or strued.
collectively.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices or agreements protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 offer on behalf of myself and Senator
US .C 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as LEAmY,the Ranking Member of the Ju'the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
diciary Committee, an amendment in
"(1) the relationship between persons in
the nature of a substitute to S. 53. the
the business of organized professional base- Curt Flood Act of 1997.This bill, which
ball and umpires or ether individoal who
Comare employed In the business of organized was reported out of the Judiciary
mittee on July 31, 1998,by a vote of 12professional baseball by such persons: or
(6) any conduct, acts, practices or agree- 6, clarifies that the antitrust laws
ments of persons eat in the businae af orga- apply to labor relations at the major
nised prefesslonal major league baseball.
league level, but does not have any af(c) Only a major league baseball player fect on any other persons or cirhas standing to sue under this secton. For cumstances. Given our limited time, I
the purposes of this section, a major league
will only make a few brief comments,
baseball player is(1) a person who is a party to a major and would ask unanimous consent that
league player's contract. or is playing base- my full statement be entered into the
bill at the major league level. or
RECORD.
Sc
27(a) Subject to subsections (b)
through (d) below, the conduct. acts, practices or agreements of persons in the buasness of organized professional major league
haseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players to
play baseball at the major league level ae"
subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws
if engaged in by persons in any other professlotal sports business affecting interstate

uss nvolving

(2) a person who a a party to a major

league player's contract or playing baseball
at the majar league level at the time of the

Injury that is the subject of the complaint;

"(3) a person who has been a party to a
major league players contract or who has
played baseball at the major league level.

In a baseball season that is likely to
set records In a number of different
categories. I am extremely pleased to
be able to report that a truly historic
milestone in the history of professional
baseball has been reached. People said
it would never happen, bat today I can

tell you that major league baseoll
players, along with hoth major and
reached an

ing that the antitrust lawo apply to
major league professional basehall

labor relation. This agreed upon Ianguage is refleoted in the sustitute we
are offering today.
With this historic agreement I am
confident that Congress will, once and

for all, make clear that professisnol
baseball players have the same rights
as other professional athletes. and will
help assure basball fans across the
United States that our national pantime will not again be interrupted by
trikes With the home run battles and
jying a resurgence. And, as fans are
returning to the ballparks they deserve to knosw that players will he on
the field, not mired in lahor disputes. I

am pleased that Congreos will, it noe

appears, be able to help guarantee that
this is the case.
De

t

an

aberrat

reme Cu
n

a
i
l
d o
major league baseball have not

subject to antitrust laws, unlike any
other industry u America. In every
other professional sport, antitrust las
serve to stabiize relatom between the
em and players an
hat
ons
on

i

recent years. baseball has eperinced
mre work stoppages, including the
disastrous utrike of 1i91nI95 than pro
Passional basketball, hockey and fast
bell combined.
In the 10d Congress. the Noose Judisiaiy Comittee teak the first Impsrrant step by approving legislation
which would hove esured that the
antitrust lawv apply to majar league
baseball labor relations, without inpatig
the minor leagues or team relocation issues. Daring the 104th Con

grsthe SenateJudiciary Committee
n
eote Ant627,sThe
a o
farm

Act, to

apply federal antitrust

laws to major league baseball labor relations. None of these bills were passtd.

however, as many Members of Congress
ware reluctant to take final attics

while there was an ongoing labor dispate.
With the settling of the labor dispute
and with the signing of a long term
agreement between the mjor league
baseball team owners and the players
anion, the time was right this Congress
finally en address this mortar In fact,
in the new collective bargaining ogremnt, the owners pledged to work with
the players to pass legislation that
makes clear that major league baseball
in subject to the federal antitrust laws
with regard to owner-player relations.
At the beginning of this Congress, we
introduced S. 53, a bill which was specifically supported by both the players
and osners and which was reported out
of the Judiciary Committee almost us
aetly one year ago. At the Committee
markup, however, several Members indicated a concern that the bill might

S9496

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

inadvertently have a negative impact
on the Minor Leagues Although both
Senator LEAHY and myself were firmly
of the view that the bill as reported
adequately
protected
the
minor
leagues against such a consequence, we
pledged to work with the minor
leagues representatives, in conjunction with the major league owners and
players, to make certain that their
concerns were fully addressed.
Although this process took much
longer, and much more work, than I
had anticipated. I am pleased to report
that it has been completed. I have in
my hand a letter from the minor
leagues, and a letter co-signed by Don
Fehr and Bud Selig. indicating that the
major league players, and major and
minor league owners, all support a
new, slightly amended version of S. 53.
I ask unanimous consent that these
letters be printed In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
NATtoNALAssoclATION OF
PRFEssiONAL BASmoL LsGes, INC..
Wachingtao, DC, July 27, 1998.
Re baseball legislatico.
Hon. OiaN HATCt.
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee. U.S.
Senate, Senate Dirksen Office Building,
Washington. DC.
Dcia MaRCeRAI N. As you know, the National Assoation of Professional Baseball
Leagues, Inc. ("NAPBL") objected to S. 53 as
it was reported oat of the Judiciary Committee last year. Since that time, we have been
consulted about proposals to amend the bill
to assure the continued conival or mser
league baseball. We understand that a draft
of an amended bill has been put forth by the
major leagues and the Players' Association
(copy attached) that I believe addresses the
concerns of the NAPBL which we support in
its final form.
Respectfully yours,
StanleyM. Brand.
July 21,1998.
Hoc,. O
HATCH,Chahman,
Hon. PATRiCKLEAHY.
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee,
US Senate,

ALLAH. "BUD"SELIG,
Commissioner, Major
League Baseball.

OFFICEOFToo COMIeSSIONER,
MOR LEAGU BAsEBALL,
July21, 1998.
DONALDM. FEns, EsQuIRe.
Executive Directorand General Counsel, Major
League Baseball Players Association, New
York, NY.
DEARDON: As you know, in our efforts to
address the concerns of the minor leagues
with S. 53, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, several changes in the bill
were agreed to by the parties. i.e., the Major
League Clubs. the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the National Assciation of Professional Baseball League
(miner leagues). Among those changes was
the addition of the word "directly" immediately before "relating to" in new sub
section (a) of the bill.
This letter is to confirm our mutual oderstanding that the addition of that word was
something sought by the Minor leagues and
is intended to indicate that this legislation
is not meant to allow claims by con major
league players. By using "directly" we are
not limiting the application of new subsection (a) to matters which would be considered mandatory subjects of bargaining in the
collective bargaining context. Indeed, that is
the reason we agreed to add paragraph (d)(3).
Thre is no question that. under this Act.
major league baseball players may pursue
the same actions as could be brought by athletes in professional football and basketball
with respect to their employment at the
major
leagute.
I
as ceour with this intent and interpretation.
Very truly yous,
Atan H. ScLIC.
Commissioner ofBaseball.
Mr. HATCH. This new bill specifically precludes courts from relying on
the bill to change the application of
the antitrust laws in areas other than
player-owner relations: clarifies who
has standing under the new law; and
adds several provisions which ensure
that the bill will not harm the minor

leagues.

Senator LEAHY and I have incorporate these changes into our substitute, which, given its support across
LEAHY:the board, we hope and expect to be
ANDSENATOR
DcSAstADwin HATCH
As requested by the Committee, the parties passed today without objection. I urge
represented below have met and agreed to my colleagues to adopt this substitute.
the attached substitute language for S. 53. In
This amendment, while providing
particular, we believe the substitute lan- major league players with the antiguage adequately addresses the concerns ex- trust protections of their colleagues in
pressed by some members of the Judiciary the other professional sports, such as
Committee that S. 53. as reported, did not basketball and football, is absolutely
sufficiently protect the interests of the
minor leagues. We understand that the neutral with respect to the state of the
minor leagues will advise you that they antitrust laws between all entities and
agree with our assessment by a separate let- in all circumstances other than in the
area of employment as between major
We thank you for your leadership and pa- league owners and players. Whatever
tiecce. Although, obviously, you are under the law was the day before this bill
no obligation to use this language in your
legislative activities regarding S. 53. we hope passes in those other areas it will conthat you will look favorably upon it in light tinue to be after the bill passes. Let me
of the agreement of the parties and ourjoint emphasize that the bill affects no pendcommitment to work together to ensure its ing or decided cases except to the expassage
tent a court would consider exempting
Ir you have any questions or comments, major league clubs from the antitrust
please do not hesitate to contact us.
laws in their dealings with major
Sincerely.
league playera.
DoNALOM. EcR,
But because of the complex relationExecutive Director,
ship between the major leagues and
Major
League
their affiliated minor leagues, it was
Baseball
Players
Association.
necessary to write the bill in a way to
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direct a court's attention to only those
practices. or aspects of practices, that
affect major league players. It is for
that reason, that a bill that ought to
be rather simple to write goes to such
lengths to emphasize its neutrality.

And, although much of the Report filed
by the Committee with respect to S. 53

is still applicable to this substitute,
there have been some changes.
Section 2 states the bill's purpose. As
originally contained in S. 53. the purpose section used the word "clarify'instead of the word "state" as used in
this substitute. That language had
been taken verbatim from the collective bargaining agreement signed in
1997 between major league owners and
major league players. When the minor
leagues entered the discussions, they
objected to the use of the word "clarify" on the grounds that using this
term created an inference regarding
the current applicability of the antitrust laws to professional baseball. The
parties therefore agreed to insert in
lieu thereof the word "state," Both the
parties and the Committee agree that
Congress is taking no position on the
current state of the law one way or the
other. It is also for that reason that
subsection (b) was inserted, as will be
discussed.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to
add a new section 27. As was the case
with S.53, as reported, new subsection
27(a) states that the antitrust laws
apply to actions relating to professional baseball players' employment to
play baseball at the major league level
and as in S.53 is intended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the
antitrust laws, as it now exists and as
it may develop.
In order to accommodate the concerns of the minor leagues however,
new subsection (a) has been changed by
adding the word "directly" immediately before the phrase "relating to
or affecting employment" and the
phrase "major league players" has
been added before the phrase "to play
baseball." These two changes were also
made at the behest of the minor
leagues in order to ensure that minor
league players, particularly those who
had spent some time in the major
leagues, did not use new subsection (a)
as a bootstrap by which to attack conduct, acts, practices or agreements designed to apply to minor league employment. This is in keeping with the
neutrality sought by the Committee
with respect to parties and cicumstances not

between major league

owners and major league players.
Additionally, the new draft adds a
new paragraph (d)(3) that states that
the term directly is not to be governed
by interpretations of the labor lawn.
This paragraph was added to ensure
that no court would use the word "directly" in too narrow a fashion and
limit matters covered in subsection (a)
to those that would otherwise be
known as mandatory subjects of bargaining in the labor law context. The
use of directly is related to the relationship between the major leagues and
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the minor leagues, not the relationship
between major league owners and players. Mr. President, I have a letter from
the Commissioner of Baseball, Mr.
Allan H "Bud" Selig, to the Executive
Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, confirming this
interpretation of the use of the word
"directly" and I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the RECoRD
at this time.
As in S. 53, as reported, new subsection (b) is the subsection which implements the portion of the purpose
section stating that the "passage of
the Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other
context or with respect to any other
person or entity." In other words, with
respect to areas set forth in subsection
(b), whatever the law was before the
enactment of this legislation, it is unchanged by the passage of the legislathon. With the exception of the express
statutory exemption in the area of television rights recognized in paragraph
(d)(4). each of the areas set forth depend upon judicial interpretation of
the law. But Congress at this time
seeks only to address the specific question of the application of the antitrust
laws in the context of the employment
of major league players at the major
league level.
Thus, as to any matter set forth in
subsection (b), a plaintiff will not be
able to allege an antitrust violation by
virtue of the enactment of this Act.
Nor can the courts use the enactment
of this Act to glean congressional intent as to the validity or lack thereof
of such actions.

New subsection "c" deals specifically
with the issue of standing. Although
normally standing under such an act
would be governed by the standing provision of the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 15, the minor leagues again expressed concern that without a more
limited standing provision, minor
league players or amateurs would be
able to attack what are in reality
minor league issues by bootstrapping
under this Act through subsection (a).
The subsection sets forth the zone of
persons to be protected from alleged
antitrust violations by major league
owners under this Act.
New paragraph (d)(1) defines "person" for the purposes of the Act, but
includes a provision expressly recognizing that minor league clubs and
leagues are not in the business of
major league baseball. This addition
was requested by the minor leagues to
ensure that they would not be named
as party defendants in every action
brought against the major leagues pursuant to subsection (a).
New paragraph (d)(2) was added to
give the courts direction in cases involving matters that relate to both
matters covered by subsection (a) and
to those matters as to which the Act is
neutral as set forth in subsection (b).
In such a case, the acts, conducts or
agreements may be challenged under
this Act as they directly relates to the

employment of major league players at
the major league level, but to the extent the practice is challenged as to its
effect on any issue set forth in subsection (b), it must be challenged under
current law, which may or may not
provide relief.
New paragraph (d)(5) merely reflects
the Committee's intention that a
court's determination of which fact situations fall within subsection (b)
should follow ordinary rules of statutory construction, and should not be
subject to any exceptions or departures
from these rules.
As stated in the Committee Report,
nothing in this bill is intended to affect
the scope or applicability of the "nonstatutory" labor exemption from the
antitrust laws. See. e.g.. Brown v. Pro
Football, 116S.Ct. 2116(1996).
Before yielding to my good friend
from Vermont, I would like to thank
him for his hard work on this bill. His
bipartisan efforts have been vital to
the process. I would also like to thank
our original cosponsors, Senators
THURMOND
and MOYNIHAN.
I urge the
quick adoption of this bill, which will
help restore stability to major league
baseball labor relations.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, this summer we are being treated to an exceptional season of baseball, from the
record breaking pace of the New York
Yankees and the resurgence of the Boston Red Sox, to a number of inspiring
individual achievements, including the
perfect game of David Wells and the
home run displays of McGwire, Griffey
and Sosa. Such are the exploits that
childhood memories are made of-and
which we all thought could be counted
on, that is until the summer of 1994.
Now finally, after years of turmoil,
major league baseball isjust beginning
to emerge from the slump it inflicted
upon itself, by returning to that which
makes the game great-the game and
the players on the field. And, last
weekend, Larry Doby and others at
long last were inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. These are steps in
the right direction.
Today, the Senate will give baseball
another nudge in the right direction by
passing 5. 53, the "Curt Flood Act of
1998."Murray Chass, a gifted reporter
writing for The New York Times noted
that on this issue we have finally
"moved into scoring position with a
bill that would alter the antitrust exemption Major League Baseball has enjoyed since 1922."
I am gratified that 76 years after an
aberrant Supreme Court decision, we
are finally making it clear that with
respect to the antitrust laws, major
league baseball teams are no different
than teams in any other professional
sport. For years. baseball was the only
business or sport, of which I am aware,
that claimed an exemption from antitrust laws, without any regulation in
lieu of those laws. The Supreme Court
refused to undue its mistake with respect to major league baseball made in
the 1922 case of Federal Baseball. Fi-
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nally, in the most well-known case on
the issue, Flood v. Kuhn, the Court reaffirmed the Federal Baseball case on
the basis of the legal principle of stare
decisis while specifically finding that
professional baseball is indeed an activity of interstate commerce, and
thereby rejecting the legal basis for the
Federal Baseball case.
Mr. President, as a result of that and
subsequent decisions, and with the end
of the major league reserve clause as
the result of an arbitrator's ruling in
1976,there has been a growing debate
as to the continued vitality, if any. of
any antitrust exemption for baseball.
It is for precisely this reason that this
bill is limited in its scope to employment relations between major league
owners and major league players. That
is what is at the heart of turmoil in
baseball and what is at the heart of the
breach of trust with the fans that
marked the cancellation of the 1994
World Series. At least we can take this
small step toward ensuring the continuity of the game and restoring public confidence in it.
When David Cone testified at our
hearing three years ago, he posed a
most perceptive question. He asked: If
baseball were coming to Congress to
ask us to provide a statutory antitrust
exemption. would such a bill be passed?
The answer to that question is a resounding no. Nor should the owners,
sitting at the negotiating table in a
labor dispute, think that their anticompetitive behavior cannot be challenged. That is an advantage enjoyed
by no other group of employers.
The certainty provided by this bill
will level the playing field, making
labor disruptions less likely in the future. The real beneficiaries will be the
fans. They deserve it.
Mr. President, I just wanted to comment briefly on a couple of changes
made in the substitute from the bill as
reported by the Committee. First, the
changes in the language in subsection
(a) are not intended to limit in any
way the rights of players at the major
league level as they would be construed
under the language of the bill as reported by the Judiciary Committee
last July. The additional language was
added to ensure that a minor league
player, or someone who had played at
the major league level and returned to
the minor leagues, cannot use subsection (a), concerned with play at the
major league level, to attack what is
really a minor league employment
issue only. Alternatively, neither can
the major leagues use the wording of
subsection (a) and that of subsection
(d) to subvert the purpose of subsection
(a) merely by linking a major league
practice with a minor league practice.
That linkage itself may be an antitrust
violation and be actionable under this
Act. It cannot be used as a subterfuge
by which to subject players at the
major league level to acts, practices or
agreements that teams or owners in
other sports could not subject athletes
to.
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A bill (S. 1134) granting the consent aod
approval of Congress to an interstate forest
ire protection coopact.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the bill be
rad three timm and passed; that the
motion to reconsider be laid upon the
table: and that ay statements relating
to the bill be placed at the appropriate
place in the REtORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It lose ordered.
The bill (S. 1134) was deemed read the
third time and passed, as foilowo:
S.1134
SeiteoattecbytheSmateandfoeeeflep
aetatirm of the Uoited States ofAserica in
Coogees' asseabled,
STIN 1 tONSENTOr tONGRES.
Oi) In Gcocoa-Tho conseot and opproval
Congress is given o so interstate forest
fire pcotection compact, as set ot is sobsection In).
(s) Cnoa.-The compact reads nobstontinlly as follows.
"TE NORTHWEST WJLDLAND FIRE
PEOTECTION AGREEMENT
"THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by
med between the State. Feovincial. sod Tot
rtocial wildlaod fire preton ageie signtory hereto, hereioofter referred us as
"Member".
FO
tNo N CONDTIN the
agree:
"ArticleI
'1.1 Tho purpose of this Agreement is to
promo o
rvntopeupso
fetv
control of forest fires in the Northwest
mildland tegion of the United States and ad,
oceas of Canada (by the Members by
jent
preventioe
old in
prnvding motual
pressppresslon and control nfwildlaad firm.
end by estahlshiog pronedore in operating
plans that will fonilitate tech aid.
"Article I
2.1 The agreement shell become affection
any
r those Members ratifying it wstwo or more Members, the States of Oregon.
Washington. Alaska, Idahn, Montana. or the
Yukon Torioiy. or the Frevin of British
Colombi. or the Province nf Alberta bate
retified it.
'2.1 Any State, Province, or Territory not
menciond in this Article mhich is contignos to any Member may become a party to
tbio Agreement nebjec to onanimos upPre of the Memhers.
"Article I
"3.1 The role of the Members is to deteram
sd cntos
mim. nimetane
te prvnin
be foond for eakandio
presopprion. and cntrol of forest Bras in
the area comprising the Membr's terriory;
ho of ohn
ad the
so cbordinate the plaing
appropriate agencies of the Members; and to
con.rdisae the rendering of aid by the Mew,
other In fighting tildand fires.
to eachCngrers
apprvalof
may develop
'3.2 The Members ct.pera
siTe operating plans for the progrars toe
INTERSTATE FOREST FIRE
ered by this Agreement. Operating plans
PROTECTION COMPACT
tern, fiscal pro
I ask
President.
SFFORDS.
Mr.
M. Prsidet, Iaskcediures, personel contacts. resoorces availMr JPPORS.
unaolmous consent that the Senate able, and snsdarde applicabl to the pro
proceed to the immediate consider- gram. Other sections may be added as neet
emlrya
ation of Calendor No. 4t1h S. 1134.
Atile TV
he
OFFICER. Without
PRESIDING
I
T
"4.1 A majsrity of Members sholl ten.
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
for the trametion nf its
stitute a qoors
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows: generol bosiness. Motions of Members

Finally, the practices set forth in
subsection (b) are not intended to be
affected by this Act. While this is true.
it should be remembered that although
the pure entrepreneurial decisions in
this area are unaffected by the Act, if
those decisions are made in such a way
as to implicate employment of major
league players at the major league
level, once again, those actions may be
actionable under subsection (a). More
importantly, we are making no findings as to how, under labor laws. those
issues are to be treated.
In closing, Mr. President, I would
like to thank all those involved in this
of
Chairman HATCH,
undertaking:
course, without whose unfailing efforts
this result would not be possible; our
fellow cosponsors, Senators THURMOND
and MOYNIHAN. and other members of
our Committee; and JOHN CONYERS, the
Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, for making this bill a
priority And I want to commend the
interested parties for working to find a
solution they can all support. Not only
have they done a service to the fans,
but they may find, on reflection, that
they have done a service to themselves
by working together for the good of the
game.
Finally, Mr. President. I would be remiss if I did not comment on the man
for whom this legislation is named.
Curt Flood. He was a superb athlete
and a courageous man who sacrificed
his career for perhaps a more lasting
others refused,
baseall When
baseball legacy.
Wenohersrefuednd
egac.
he stood up and said no to a system
that he thought un-American as it
bound one man to another for his professional career without choice and
without a voice in his future.
I am sad that he did not live long
enough to see this day. In deference to
his memory and in the interests of
every fan of this great game, I hope
every
that Congress will act quickly on this
bill. I am delighted that we are moving
forward today and that we are finally
able to enjoy the game once again.
Mr. JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous
consent the amendment be considered
as read and agreed to. the bill be considered read a third time and passed as
amended, the motion to reconsider be
laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed at
the appropriate place in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3479) was agreed
to.
The bill (S. 53). as amended. won con.
bSidered read a third time and passed.

J
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present shall be carried by a simple majority
except as stated in Article II Each Member
will have one vote on motions brought before
them.
"Article V
'5.1 Whenever a Member requests aid
from any other Member in controlling or
the Members
preventing wildland fire,
agree, to the extent they possibly can, to
rcnder all possible aid.
"Article VI
"6.1 Whenever the forces of soy Member
are aiding another Member under this Agreemest. the employees of such Member shall
operate under the direction of the officers of
the Member to which they are rendering aid
and be considered agents of the Member they
are rendering aid to and, therefore, have the
same privileges and imunities as comparable
0 employees of the Member to which
the at rendering aid'
"6.2 No Member or its officers or employees rendering aid within another State, Territory, or Provice, pursuant to this Agreement shall be liable on account of any act or
omission on the part of such forces while so
engaged, or on accounat of the maintenance
or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith to the extent authorized
by the laws of the Member receiving the assistance. The receiving Member, to the extent authorized by the laws of the State.
Territory. or Province, agrees to indemnify
and save-hariless the assisting Member
from soy-sck hiability.
o.3 Any Member rendering outside aid
pursuant to this Agreement shall be reimbursed by the Member receiving such aid for
any loss or damage to. or expense incurred in
the operation of any equipment and for the
cost of all materials, tramportation, wages.
salaries and maintenance of personnel and
equipment incurred in connection with such
request in accordance with the prnvisions of
the previous section. Nothing contained
herein shall prevent any assisting Member
free assuming such loss. damage, expense or
other cost or from loaning such equipment
or from donating such services to the receivIng Member without charge or cost.
"6.4 For purposes of the Agreement. pcrsonnel shall be considered employees of each
sending Member for the payment of compensation to injured employees and death
benefits to the representatives of deceased
employees injured or killed while rendering
aid to another Member pursuant to this
Agreemnt.
. The Members shall formulate proce
dures for claims and reimbursement under
the provisions of this Article.
"Article VII
'7.1 When appropriations for support of
this agreement, or for the support of common services in executing this agreement,
are needed, costs will be allocated equally
among the Members.
"7.2 As necessary, Members shall keep accurate books of account, showing in full, its
rereIpts and disbursements, and the books of
account shall be open at any reasonable time
to the inspection of representatives of the
Members.
"7.3 The Members may accept any and all
donations, gifts, and grants of money. equip
ment, supplies, materials and services from
the Federal or any local government. or any
agency thereof and from any perosn, firm or
corporation. for any of Its purposes and functions under this Agreement, and may receive
and ose the same subject to the terms, conditions, and regulations governing such donetions, gifts, and grents.
"Article VIII
"8.1 Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to limit or restrict the powers of
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1
BLONDIE LABOUISSE, 1915-1998
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998
* Mr WELLSTONE. Mr. President, e Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. Fminit, I
late last night, the Senate passed by note with sadnms the passing of a load
unanimous consent S. 53. I have been mg citizen of my hometown, New One
contacted by the Attorney General of ann. Louisiana. Caroyn Gay Louisse.
my State. Hubert H. Humphrey III. and a community leader and civic activist
asked to try to clarify a technical legal for many decades, deed this past week
point about the effect of this legisla end at the ag of 3. She was the
tion. The State of Minnesota, through daughter of Edward James Gay, a Senthe office of Attorney General, and the star from Louisiana from lilt until
Minnesota Twins are currently in- 1921
Known to everyone as "Blondie," she
volved in an antitrust-related investigation. It is my understanding that was the classic Southern woman who,
S 53will have no impact on this inves- when she saw something locking in the
tigation or any litigation arising out of community, would immediately stop
forward. m up her sleeves, and sot
the investigation,
Mr HATCH. That is correct. The bill about making things right For coonsimply makes it clear that major plo, when she sas that New Orleans
league baseball players have the same had an inadequate, out-of-date library
rights under the antitrust laws as do facility, she immediately began to
other professional athletes. The bill spearhead efforts to buid a nos, moddoes not change current law in any em Maln Library. She also worked to
other context or with respect to any develop and expand public affairs pro,
gramrnng at our local public teleother person or entityMr. WELLSTONE Thank you for vision station (WYES). She was an aethat clarification. I also note that sev- tiv participant in several task forte
eral lower Courts have recently found committee dealing with education in
that baseball currently enjoys only a New Orles.
Blondie was dedscated to progressive
narrow exemption from antitrust laws
and that this exemption applies only to politics. In the lilt's and lilt's, she
the reserve system. For example, the was part of a circle of young people in
Florida Supreme Court in Butterworth New Orleans who fought hard to elimi
v. National League, 644 So.2d 1021(Fls nate corruption from politim and to
1994).the U.S. District Court in Penn- make state and local government more
sylvania in Piazza v. Major League responsive to the needs of its citizens,
Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) She campaigned to elect reform can
and a Minnesota State court in a case didacas as governor of Louisiana and
Involving the Twins have all held the mayor of New Orleans. She was one of
baseball exemption from antitrust laws the founding members of the Independ
is now limited only to the reserve sys- ent Women's Organization, which is a
tem It is my understanding that S. 53 leading reform organization in Nes Orwill have no effect on the courts' ulDin-sleans.
She received the 1991Times-Picayune
mate resolution of the scope of the
Cup. the single mostc pres0nmtesbyn
zomto on matters
antItrust
antitt
exemption
beyond Loving
..
in Ne
those related to owner-player relations cigious award given annually
for community service. The s
atOrleans
ction committee, in recommending
Mr. HATCH. That is correct. S. 53 is
a e
a
forcomt
intended to have no effect other than an cm
to clarify the status of major league
man.
players under
regrd
al the
oherconestor
o antitrust laws. Withlow
th , I extend my sympathies to her famregard to all other context or other ily. Blondle Laboutse meant a great
the law will be the deal to the people of Now Orleans. She
entities.
persons orperon
orenitisth
same after passage of the Act as it
will be issed.
today.

Mr, LEAHY. I concur with the statement of the Chairman of the Committee The bill affects no pending or decided cases except to the extent that
courts have exempted major league
baseball clubs from the antitrust laws
in their dealings with major league
players. In fact, Section 3 of the legislation makes clear that the law is unchanged with regard to issues such as
relocation. The bill has no impact on
the recent decisions in federal and
state courts in Florida. Pennsylvania
and Minnesota concerning baseball's
status under the antitrust laws.
Mr- WELLSTONE. I thank the Senator, I call to my colleagues attention
the decision in Minnesota Twins v.
State by Humphrey, No, 62-CX-98-568
(Mine. disc. Court. 2d Judicial disc.,
Ramsey County April
t) re
printed in 1998-I Trade Cases (CCH)
2 3
3
t! ,1 6.-
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He, rt. He was also awarded the Silver
Stor r Medal on two occasions for his
hero ism as well as the Bronze Star
Med al with Combat 'V- device.
General Neal distinguished himself
overr the years as one of the Marine
Corp s' finest commanding officers.
Wh ther as a battery commander, arte ry battalion commander, Deputy
Mat ne Expeditionary Force Com-an der or Commanding General of the
2nd Marine Division, his reputation as
an uncommonly gifted leader of Marimes has grown with each billet he
held . In thejoint arena, he served with
distiiction as the Commanding Denoral Joint Task Force for Operation
humanitarian relief effort
GIT MO, theimmigrants
in Cuba and as
for Haitian
the Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief
OfS taff for U.S. Central Command.
year after year he
D ay after day,
the rare quality of baldens onstrated
difficult and often dangerous reanti ng
with a keen concern for
spoi sibilities
of his Marines. Butch has
the welfare
officer. Most Ameribeet a superb staff
remember him from his no-noncans daily briefings during the Persian
sons oWar,
he also distinguished
Gulf self in but
personnel management as
him as in operational
planning.
well is unique combination
of leaderTI and administrative skills
carried
ship to the very highest levels of the
him ine Corps. His impeccable charMar r and strong moral fiber make him
acre ider among the very best of our naa1le 's military commanders. Yet what
tio ds out most to me when I think of
5t5
fine officer is his simplicity and
this suming
nature.
spite
all the accolades and all the
Do
hoo ors, he remains a simple man from
sachusetts. I got to know him and
Mac
his wife Kathy because they attend the
san e church as my wife Marcelle and I.
i a hard working New Englander
Ho with love of God, country and
Csrnps dedicated a lifetime in service to
our nation. Too often we do not thank
the Butch Neals of the world, those
who choose a lifetime of service and
ifice so that the rest of us can live
and free.
Be tch, we are grateful for the service
you have rendered as a Marine. as well
a tI ie sacrifices made by both you and
your family. I wish Butch, his wife
Ra iy and their children Andrew, Amy
and Erin much health and happiness in
the years ahead. Our country is better
for the many contributions he has
give n us.*

RTIREMENT OF GENRRAL
RICHARD I. NEAL
* Mr. LBAHY. Mr. President, I rise
today to honor a fine Marine Officer,
General Butch Neal, the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps, who
will soon retire from active duty.
General Neal's long and distinguished
career began more than thirty years
ago following his graduation from
PAUL O'DWYER
Northeastern University when he was
commissioned a Second Lieutenant in * Mr DODD. Mr. President, I rise
the United States Marine Corps. Pal- ted y to pay tribute to one of the most
lowing the completion of The Basic pss ionate and committed political
School at uanico, Butch was trained lead ers that this country has ever
as an artillery officer and was assigned kno en: Paul O'Dwyer of New York
to duty in the Republic of Vietnam City . Sadly. Mr. O'Dwyer recently died,
whore he served tours as a Forward Oh one day before his 91st birthday.
server and as anrAdvisor to the VietA former New York City Council
namase
M.
Marine Corps.
Pros ident, Paul O'Dwyer was the soul
While serving in Vietnam, he was of p litical activism in New York for a
wounded and received the Purple half century.
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Author Frank McCourt mourned him solved from both his Colleagues and his
as "one of the pure souls" who "devel- odveraries.
Paul O'Dwyer was truly one of a
oped convictions early in life and never
wavered." And not only did Paul kind, end he will be dearly missed for
O'Dwyer hold deep convictions, he also his leadership and more importantly
acted on them. Mr. O'Dwyer once said, for his friendship.e
"Politics is the only machinery around
53-THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF"
can really straighten
yoSa.elystagtn~"
on
whc you
owhich
1998
things out." And hardly a day wont by,
where Paul O'Dwyer didn't work to
The text of S. 53, the Curt Flood Act
"straighten things out" for the people
of our country and our world who were of 1998, as passed by the Senate on July
30, 1i9i, is as follows:
most in need.
He was the quintessential champion
Be it coariod by She Senata and House effp
of the underdog, and his thick white
ata
mane of hair became the symbol of
most every significant social move- Cesdi'aa obod,
so
she "o
ment in New York during the past 50
A a10esnyond
years
The causes be championed were as di- Aca of96
It ithe purpose of this legislation t0 siete
verse as the people and places of our
great nation, but at the soul of each of char major league basehali players are catthe antitrust laws (i.e., that
his endeavors was the pursuit of social ered uer
major leagoe baseball players will base th
justice
He immigrated to the United States same rights under the antitrust laws as do
from Ireland when he was 17, and ha ether professional atblotes, eg.. footbell end
worked his entire adult life for a united bashetball player,), aloag with a provision
f the
pssge af
coordina-he
the
was H
Ieland. He
sorinAct doss not chasnge the applicatien
Irean.
ws
he national
atonl
ntitrust laws Ie toy other roext or wish
tor for the American League for an Undivided Ireland. He worked very closely respect so any other person or totity.
with Gerry Adams and fought for hio sE. 'PPLIAUON OcTHE ArIVsT tAS
tlOR LOSOC
T PROFIONb
historic trip to the United States so he
ASmaIl_
could plead his case for peace and anClayton Act (15 U.S.C. §10 et eqj is
derstanding in his homeland. And he
insisted on meeting with Protestant amsnded by addiog at the sd the followig
teweste'
loaders whoIevisited our shores.
"SC. 27. (a) Subjt to subsectioas (b)
He fought diligently for the creation through (d). she condact, acts, practices,
of the State of Israel. As chairman of ogretmeats at persoot In the business of or
the Lawyer's Committee for Justice in gasleed preieniseal major league bas.bell
Palestine, he pleaded at the United Na- directly relating to er affossiog employment
asublers
maea
tions in the late 1940s for Israeli soy- basealahe
ast
tevsae tstes
sins
ah
ereigntyjs
ereignty.sre
He was deeply committed to ending sash oade ats
pattesa
eea
segregation in our country. He success- would be subject to the antitrost lowo it
fully litigated a critical desegregation gaged in by persons in soy ether prafenesal
suit in 1951, which opened the way for tporis booioos affeccing interstete sow
blacks to live in Stuyvesant Town. a merce.
complex. Heeague
housing cople,
large Manhattan
ef this Noiourtasha asis re ebeg the ap't
larg Mahattn
husig
law tany eet th asis
also went to the Deep South to register ptis
oaycn other
voters, campaign for piato acts, fteattutlw
practices, er agreemens
African-American
Afrian-mercanvotesampignfardart,
black candidates, and provide legal as- than those set forth in subsection (a). This
tection does sot Create, permit or Imply a
sistance.
of action by whic so challeogesuder
He successfully argued before the Su- ca
preme Court for the right of mainland the antitrust laws, or othersise apply the
acts pracconduct,
Puerto Ricans to take their voter lit- antitrst laws
ageewstitha
dosetdirctl~
site,to,o any
eracy test in Spanish.
lat
areemeyateo
o drerty
His constant support of
minoritylaetorftepymnofajregu
as the
bateball
pley
sueball players to
ofmnoiy
upr
osas
causesHihelped deny him a mainstream moor league lesel. insluding hot sot limited
role in American politics. In all his ef- to"(T) aoy s.nduct, acts, practices, or agree
forts to win elective public office, he
a of pecsons togaging is, conducting or
succeeded just twice, once as Manhat- mets
tan's councilman at large and the participating in she butiness of organitod
baseball relatiog to or affecting
Council
profossiol
City
other time as New York
employment o plot baseball as the miter
President. He also won the Democratic
nomination for U.S. Senator in 1968, league level, any orgaized professional
r
a ple s
classo
but lost the general election to Senator or ay rer
aasplidtmnor
_
an y rs
O'Dwyer didn't
Jacob.,bJvtBuPaul
Javits. But P laffe
"(2) the agreement benwein srganizd pro
enter politics to win elections, he did
so because he saw injustice in this fesioaal major leegue baseball teams and
country, and he was determined to the tems of the Natioal Asiociation of
Prfessional Baseball Leagues. comoly
eradicate it.
In the end, Paul O'Dwyer may have kown as the 'ProfeionalIgaseball Agree
lost more elections than he won, but mot', the relationtbip hetween eaeised
and osga
major logus baseball
his leadership was not based on itiles. prfeiel professional
mineor league heseball. or
""sited
rs
It was built on principles.
any ther masier relating to osganized proPerhaps that is why few individuals fwsiaaal baseball's miser leagues,
"(3) any condect. acts, practices, or agree'
have ever earned the level of respect
meats of pemoos eagaging ie, condscting or
and admiration that Fool OtDwyar r-
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pariicipaing i the business of organiad
profesoal boseball relating to or affecting
fraschie expanion. locution or relcatisa,
franchise orihii issues. including siserbedwfrnoche
eaionsr
C
the
s
sfic
frhete
he
ioer a
o
Owie
ofeseiterl
oosent prktc o n rales
fognzdpoesoa
rdc
tiier
baseball and she licensieg of ietelleetuel
or held by organiacd
proper righs owe
profcssional baseball taus Indisidally or
collectisely:
any condoct, acts, praoticm or agre
meets proced by Poblis Lu il-Ill (15
U.C § 1291at soil (somioely Zsw as the
ersonsiIn
Ass o
reasi
'Spot
She husiness of orgaoized prof'..sioal baseoheriss
o
basbl
ag
a
c prsor
argacm
tessr
ats odta
eee
ofpsos ajo leaue bseball
"let)Qely
major league baseball player
uoder this section. Par
has stadiog ts
the porposes of this section. a major leege
baseball player is
"(i) a person who ft a party to a major
league player's contrat. er is ployieg be
ballt the majr egue level or so , major
"-(2)a person who sas a party
league pler'
contract or playiog baseball
at the major league level us tho time of the
Injury tt is the subjecc of the complaist;
or
'(31 a peron who has bee a party te a
_ajar league player's coocract or who has
played baseball es she mor league level,
and who claims he baa bees iejured In Mis offorts t secure a suoeqet major league
c
play'
Ta
araded hoion
cntrt w
the
for she porposes of chit paragraph, the el
pall

af pcrisna
fsiese
employmen
logus level,
b
draft, c

Ohs husinest of erganized prot
to pla b
a
or affecting
at the mior
y
Ielodin0 asy organized prafanreeeoclause as apppcdyto

or a party to a major
who was
"(4) a personplayers
league player's contract or who was playing
baseball at she major leegsio level at theses'elatiofthe lest full champioship seaso
preceding the expiratios of the
lastl
dye bargoiniog ageement betwoot persoes is the businws of organied
and the
baseball
major league
proecsional
represtebargaining
eoelasive colltctive
f
leag baseall players.
(d)
d is tis section, 'pies'n
sa
"ivl)
means any entity, inslsding a0 iedividual,
partership. corporation. tress or aelor
association or any cewbination or
pasd
associaties thereof. As toed in tis secion.
the Notional Association cf Professional
Basoball Lagues, its member leagues and
the clubs of those leagoes, are sot 'in ths
busiessofrganizd pmi'ecsiesul major
It.o-e basoball'.
pros
.jes In ses involving condut, oets
agreements chat direccly relace so
tieor
both employieat of majr leage
basoball players to play baseball at the
major league lcvel and aho relat to or at
focs any ether aspect sf srganiaed professional basoball, iocludig bat set limited to
tmployent to play baseball at the minor
league level aed the ether areas sot forth Is
chase componmns,
above, only
subsectionor(b)aspects
of tush condoct, acts,
portions
practices, or egreemenis that directly relaso
o or attest employment of major league
players in ploy hasoball at the major league
lvel maybe challenged under tubsertion (a)
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and then only to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment of
major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level,
(31 As used in subsestion (a). Interprto a
tlon of the term 'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation of section 151 at
seq of title 29. United States Code (as
amtended)
"(4) Nothing In this section shall be construed to affect the application to organized
professional baseball of the nonstatotory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
'(5) The scope of the conduct. acts, practices. or agreements
covered by subsection
1ehicl
(b) shall not be strictly or narrowly con-

jrel.Lsat______

tting service, and other -1caed and cop
port octiriios.
(5) the tens tpac essptatisn service"
otion ofa space trampartlo
and Its payloads far asporain
to,
fm. or within oter space, oI suborbital ea
jectery, and the cadoc of ransportinga pay
lead to, from, or within eater ome or in subobtltaetr
(6) te tea
ac transprtat vehicle"
means any vehicle constructed for the parpe
of oporatig .
rasprtinga payload so,
f
w
ter spac or in suborbital
trajetory and Inciudea any component of'sash
vehicle net
designed
or adaptedfor
andspecificaly
Its payloads
or
raoraot,
ayod
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ment of this Act, a study that identilles and examines(A) the opportunitiesfor commercialprovids
to ploy a role In fntmatsonal Space Station astivities including operation, use servicing, and
augmentation;
(B) the potential cost savings to be derived
from commercial providers playing a role in
each of these activItes;
(C) which of the opportunities described in
subparograph (A) the Administrator plans to
make available to cammercial providers in fiscal
year 1999and 2000;
(D) the specificpolicies and inhatives the Adminisratoris adranchg to encourage and faclitate the e commercial opportsnies; sod
(E) the rerenues and cost resmburmsemnts to
the Federal Government from commercial uses
of the Space Station.
(2) The Administrator shall deliver to the
Committee o Science ofthe House of Reproesentatices and the Committee OnrCommerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate, Within 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
an independently-cenductedmarket study that
examinas and evaluatespotentialindustryinterest in proidding commercial goods and sevices
for the operaton, senicrig and augmeneatisn
of the International Space Station, and is the
commercial use of the International Space Station. This study shall also include updates to
the cost savings and revenue estimates made in
the study described in paragraph (1) based on
the externalmarket assesment.
(3) The Administratorshall dellver to the Congress, no later than the submission of the Presdents annual budget request for fiscal year
2T, a report detalIng how may proposals
(whether solicted er not) the National Aero
namics and Spaoe Administrationreceived during calendar year 1998regarding commercialoperation, servicing, utilization, or augmentation
of the InternationalSpace Station, broken down
by each of these four categories, and
how many agreements theNational Aeronautics
and Space Administration has entered into in
response to these proposals, also broken down
by these foor categories.
(4) Each of the studles andreportsrequiredby
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall include consideraton of the potential role of State governments as broken in promoting commercial participation in the InternationalSpate Station
progrm.
SEC, 102 COtstZCsL SPACELALWCH
MENMS
(a) AMENDMErs.-Chapter 701 of title 49,
UnitedStates Code, is amended(I) in the table ofsections(A) by amending the item relating to section
70104 to read as follows:
"70104. Restrictions on launches, operations,
and reentries.";
(B) by amending the item relating to section
70108 to read as follows:
"70108. Prohibition, suspension, and end of
launches, operation of launch
sites and reentry cites, and reen
tries."
(C) by amending the item relating to section
70109to readasfolows:
"70109.Preemption ofscheduledlaunchesor re-

(7)theter 'State" ateant each af the sevra
State, ef the Union,' the District of Cailuabia,
the Cotsatoalth of Pserta Mioo, the Virgin
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1939;
H. Res. 557. Expressing Support for
U.S. Onvernesent Efforts Co Identify
Holocaust Era Assets, Urging the es
titution of Individual and Communal
Property;
H. Con. Res. 331, Expressing the
Sense of Congress Concerning the Inadequacy of Sewage Infrastructure Facilities in Tijuana, Mexoico;
N. Con. REm. 309, Condemning the
Forced Abduction of Ugandan Children
and Their Use An Soldiers;
H.E. 3874, William P. Coodling Child
Nutrition Reauthorization Act of 1998;
S. 2206. Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998;
S.1 Res. 51;
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Sn the conference report was agreed
to
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
A Motion to reconsider was laid on
the table,
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER
PRO TEMPORE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
GUTKNFCHT). Pursuant to the proviSions of House Resolution 577. the
Chair desires to inform Members that
the official picture of the House while
in session will be taken immediately
after approval of the Journal when the
House convenes tomorrow.
The Chair further announces that
any recorded votes requested tonight
will be postponed until tomorrow.

shine.

r

CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to
suspend the rules and pass the Senate
bill (S. 53) to require the general appli
cation of the antitrust laws to major
lengue baseball, and for other purposes.
The Clerk mad as follows:
S.53
Be it enacted by the Senate andHouse ofRepresenatisof the United Steate of .America in
Congress assembled,
SE1ONLSHIORTTITLE.

October 7, 1998

agrerments of persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball
relating to or affecting employment
of major Irgue baseball players to play
baseoll rat te major legur Intel are sob
ject to the antitrust laws to the same extent
sucb tonduct, arts. prartlem. or agreomento
oldh
suhject tn the antitrust lats Iten
gaged in by persons so any other professional
spurts business affecting interstate com-

directly

f)No cnnrt shall rely on the enactment
of this sectuon as a honin to hnging the ap
pllratinn of the antitrust lows tn any tooduct, acts, practices. orcagrent
nther
than those set forth io sohrtou
a This
section does not create, permit or
imply a
cause of action by which to challenge
under
the antltrnst laws. nr othenvise apply the
ontitruso laos to, any cnduct, nan, peontice ooeentthat dn not dirrcly re
iu-tor affect amploymcenstof mujor leagiue
baseball playnys tn play baseball at the
major leagun level, including but not limited
s"(1) any conduct. acts, practices. or agreements of persons engaging in, conducting or
participating In the basinets of organiaed
professional
obeblH rluning to nr affeting
employmet to play baseb11 at the minor
leaun
level, any organized proteuniooul
baseball amateur or first-year player draft.
or any reserve clause as applied to minor
league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized profes iono. major leagae baseball teams and
the teans of the National Ascation of
Baseball Leagues, commonly
Praeoional
h as the Profrssioual Baseball Agree.
mot'r
oen lat"oe'bip he
e srganized
prafeoslosal ojar lenganibseball and rgad
nized professional minor league baseball. or
any other matter relating to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
"() any tondnt, arts, practices. or agreements of pesos engaging in, codncting or
prticipatine s the riness of srgonized
professonal basehall relating so or affecting
franchise epanson. location or relocation,
franchise ownership issues. including owncr
ship transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissionier and franchise
owners, the marketing or sales of the entertalinment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of Intellectual
pruperty clgbLs owned or held hy organized
professional baseball teas individuolly or
:nllecrtvely;
(4) any conduct, ats. practices, or agree
mnts protectad hy Pablic Law 81-331 (1I
U.S.C. 51291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
Spoots Broadcasting Act of 1961);
(5) the relationship between persons in
the business of organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who
ire employed in the busins of organized
irofessional heseball bysooo peruna; r
'(6) any conduct, acts, practices. or agreernents of peisns not in the hasiness it orgaioed professional major legue baseball
-)c) Daly a major leaue buseball player
b astansadingrtos~under ehis section. Pop
ifthis section, a major league
se purpose
lemseball player is"(1) a person who is a party to a major
eaea players ontrac, or is playing baseal tcemjrleauae lend; or
e(2) a person who was a party to a major
l eague
player's contract or playing baseball
at the major league level at the time of the
njuy that is the subject of the complaint;

Th Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood
Ant of 199i8'.
SEC.2. PURPOSE.
Is is the purpose of this legislution co state
that major leage banball players am c n
ered ouder the antitrust lows (ie., that
major league basoball players will hove the
sae righto sodrr the antitrnst Ins as do
other professional athletes, e g.. fbotball and
hasketball playep)
aln
Itharovision
that makes it clour that the Passageof this
Act does not change the applieaion of the
antinrust las in any other tootees or snith
ANNOUNCEMENT OF BILLS AND respect to any other person or entity.
OF TH ANTITRUSTLAWS
RESOLUTIONS TO BE CONSID- SEC.3. APPLICATION
TO PROPESSIONoJ.
MtsLIOnLEAGUE
ERED UNDER SUSPENSION
OF
BASEBALL.
01 a person who hea ben a porty to a
THE RULES ON THURSDAY, OCThe Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §12 ec seq.) isn rejor
league playr's
aended by addieg at the end the following played baseball nt 000courract or who bas
TOBER 8, 1998
majar leaue lenet,
rn sectin;
Mr HULSHOF. Mr. Speaker. pursurd
SEct. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) ft so e eis he hus been injred in his ofant to H. Res. 575. I arnounce the fol- through (d), the conduct,
o cneuro a subsequent dmvjor leange
acts, practices, or p laer
layoro contract by as alleged violation at
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the antitrust laws. Provided however That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation shall not include
any conduct. acts, practices, or agreements
of persons in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play baseboll at the minor
league level' including any organized professonal baseball amoteur or first-year player
draft. or any reserve clause as applied to
minor league players; or
(4) a person who was a party to a major
league player's contract or who was playing
baseball at the major league level as the concluslon of the last full championship season
immediately preceding the expiration of the
last collective bargaining agreement between persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball and the
exclusive collective bargaining reprsentamajo legu baseb~all players.,
sitdo
tdivmrued
hi
s seae. person
means any ratify. including an individual.
partnership. corporation. trust or unincorparated association or any combination or
association thereof. As used in this section,
the National Association of Professisnal
Baseball Leagues, its member leagues and
the clobs of those leagues, are not 'in the
business of organized professional major
lagu baseball'.
(2) In cas e ivolving canduct, acts, prac
tices. or agreements that directly relate to
or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level and also relate to or affet any other aspect of organized professional baseball, including but not limited to
employment to play baseball at the minor
league level and the other areas set forth in
subsecolon (b) above, only those components,
portionas or aspects of such conduct, acts.
practices, or agreements that directly relate
to or affect employment of major league
players to play baseball at the major league
level may be challenged under subsection (a)
and then only to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment of
major league baseball players to play base.
ball at the major league level.
(3) As used in subsection (a). Interpretatian of the term directly shall not be guered by any interpretation of section 151 ut
seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
amended)
(4) Nothing in this section shall be con-

strued to affect the application to organized

profesional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
(5) The scope of the conduct, acts. prcsicrs. or agreemenso covered by subsection
(b) shall no ho strictly or narrowly construed .
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE) and the gentleman

from Michigan (Mr. CONYERs)each will
control 20minutes
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. HYDE).
(Mr HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks)
Mr HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr HYDE. Mr. Speaker. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
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Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S.
53, the Curt Flood Act of 1998. After
years of disagreement, the baseball
players, the baseball owners, and the
minor leagues have reached an historic
agreement on the application of the
antitrust laws to labor relations in

could not challenge allegedly unlawfulemployment terms under the antitrust laws.
The major league clubs, of course, disagreed withthis view.They contended that the
baseball exemption was irrelevant to their
labor negotiations with the union. The clubs
argued that, like every other muli-employer

baseball. This agreement has already
passed the Senate by unanimous con-

bargaining group, they were protected from

antitrust challenges to their employment terms
sent, and I hope we will pass it today. by the nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption.
Mr. Speaker, let me just add. because In that regard, I want to note that nothing in
we are talking about baseball, let me this bill willaffect in any way the protections
tip my cap to my good friend, the gen- afforded to the major league clubs by the nonteman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS)statutory labor antitrust exemption.
As a result of this difference of opinion, both
the ranking member of the Committee
on the Judiciary. He has his own bill the players and the owners were willingto
on this topic. H.R. 21. and he has led support the repeal of the specific and narrow
the charge on this issue in the House. I portion of the baseball exempton covering
want to thank him for his outstanding labor relations between major league players
work in bringing this bill to fruition.
and major league clubs. The bill was carefully
I also want to thank my friends, Sen- drafted, however, to leave the remainder of
ators ORRIN HATCHand PAT LEAHY, the exemption intact.

chairman and ranking member of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
They worked many long hours to negotiate the delicate compromise that this
bill embodies. We are also indebted to
them for their outstanding efforts in
bringing this bill to passage. I am delighted to support this simple but important bill, and I ask my colleagues to
do the same.
Mr.Speaker, I rise in support of S. 53, the
"Curt Flood Act of 1998." After years of disagreement, the baseball players, the baseball
owners, and the minor leagues have reached
a historic agreement on the application of the
antitrust laws to labor relations in baseball.
This agreement has already passed the Senate by unanimous consent, and I hope that we
willpass it today.
The Supreme Court first held that the business of baseball is exempt from the antitrust
laws in 1922. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The
Court. emphasizing organized baseball's longstanding reliance on that exemption, has twice
declined to overrule its original1922 decision.
Flood v Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson
v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953). Instead, the Court has left it to Congress to decide whether the baseball exemption should coantinue.
Given the agreement of the parties, Congress has now decided to legislate in this
area, but we do so only in an extremely narrow manner. S. 53 leaves completely unchanged all aspects of the baseball exemption
except for the narrow issue of the labor relations of major league players at the major
league level as set out in detail in the new
subsection 27(b) of the Claylon Act.
This bill originates from a compromise
struck during the last round of collective bargaining between the major league owners and
the major league players. Aftera lengthy labor
dispute, these parties reached a collective bargaining agreement that, among other things,
required negotiation to reach agreement on a
limited repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption. They did so because the players' union

argued that the antitrust exemption contributed
to the labor disputes that have long marked its
relationship with the owners. Specifically, the
union asserted that it was disadvantaged in its
labor negotiations with the owners because,
unlikeunions of other professional athletes, it

Before this bill passed the Senate, several
changes were adopted to address concems
raised by owners of the minor league teams-the members of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues. Minorleague
baseball owners were concemed that the
original billreported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee might not adequately protect their
interests. Specifically, the minor league clubs
were concemed that the originalversion of S.
53 was not sufficientlyclear to preserve antitrust protection for (1) the relationship between the major league clubs and the minor
league clubs and (2) those workrules and employment terms that arguably affect both major
league and minor league baseball players.
Members of Congress agreed that this narrow legislation should not hurt the grass roots
minor league baseball played in over 150
towns across the country. For that reason, the

minor league clubs were invitedinto the discussion and given an opportunity to suggest
changes to address their concems, and those
changes have been incorporated.
As a result of these three-way negotiations,
the parties agreed to amend the billin several
significant ways. These amendments clarify
the limitedreach of the billand the expansive
nature of the continued protection the billaffords to minor league baseball. For instance,
to accommodate the concems of the minor
league clubs, subsection (b) of the new section 27 of the Clayton Act was changed by
adding the word "directly"immediately before
the phrase "relating to or affectingemployment" and the phrase "major league players"
was added before the phrase "to play baseball." These changes were made to ensure
that neither major league players nor minor
league players could use new subsection (a)
to attack conduct, acts, practices, or agreements designed to applyto minor league employment.
In addition, new subsection (c) was added
to clarifythat only major league players could
sue under the new subsection (a). Again,the
minor leagues were concemed that, without a
narrow standing section, minorleague players
or amateurs might attempt to attack minor
league issues by asserting that these issues
also indirectlyaffected major league employment terms.
Therefore. the naw subsection (c) carefully
limitsthe zone of persons protected by the bill
to only major league players by providingthat
"only a major league baseball player has
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standingto sue under" this limitedantitrust for the first time in 90 years, and delegislatin. Thestanding provisiongivesmajor priving many of our cities of tens of
leaguebaseball playersthe samerightto sue millions of dollars in tax revenues, we
underthe antitrustlaws overthe majorleague can now no longer afford to treat proemployment
ters thatotherprofessional
ath- fessional baseball in a manner enjoyed
letes have.Of course,the UnitedStateshas by no other professional sport. And
standingto sue to enjoinall antitrustviolations that is what S. 53 and H.R. 21 attempt
under15 U.S.C§§4 and 25, andwe do not to do.
I am very pleased to be a major sponintendsubsection
27(c)to limitthat broadausor of this legislation, because conthoety.
This billdoes not affect the applicationof cerns have been previously raised that
the antitrustlaws to anyoneoutsidethe busi by repealing the antitrust exemption
nessof baseball.In particular,it doesnot af- we would somehow be disrupting the
fect the applicationof the anhtrustlaws to operation of the minor leagues. That'
otherprofessional
sports.The lawwith respect my colleagues will remember, was the
to the other professionalsportsremainsex- defense that was always raised. An
ugly specter. Or professional baseball's
actly the sameafterthis billbecomes law.
Becausewe are talkingaboutbaseball, let ability to limit franchise relocation
metip mycap to mygoodfriend,the Ranking might also occur. This legislation careMemberof the JudiciaryCommittee,JOHN fully eliminates these matters from
CONYERS.
Mr. CONYERs
has his own bill on the scope of new antitrust coverage.
this topic,H.R.21,and he has ledthe charge In the past, some of us in this body
on thisissuein theHouse.I wantto thankhim objected to legislating in this area befor his outstanding
work in bringingthis billto cause of their hesitancy to take any
action which could impact an ongoing
fruition,
I also want to thank my friendsSenators labor dispute. But because the owners
ORRINHArCHand PATLEAHY.
the Chairman and the players have recently agreed to
andRankingMemberof the Senate Judiciary enter into a new collective bargaining
Committee.
Theyworkedmany long hours to agreement, that objection no longer exnegotiatethedelicatecompromise
thatthisbill ists. Additionally, the baseball owners
embodies. We are also indebtedto themfor are now in full support of this legislatheiroutstanding
effortsin bringingthis bill to tion, as of course the Major League
Players Association has always been.
passage.
This bill wasintroduced by myself in
Mr Speaker,I am delightedto supportthis
simple,but important,bll, and I ask my col- honor of a very courageous and beauleagues
to do thesame.At thispoint,Iwill re- tiful ball player, center fielder. Curt
Flood, who passed away earlier this
samethe balance of mytime.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of year. in January, and. unfortunately, is
no longer with us to see the fruit of his
my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield work. Mr. Flood, one of the greatest
players of his time, risked his career
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given when he challenged baseball's reserve
permission to revise and extend his re- clause after he was traded from the St.
Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia
marks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this Phillies. Although the Supreme Court
Curt Flood Act is an important piece of rejected the 1972challenge of Flood, we
legislation. I thank the gentleman all owe a debt of gratitude for his willfrom Illinois (Chairman HYDE) for his ingness to challenge the baseball olivery charitable comments. As two garchy. And he paid the price, too.
By the way, at his funeral in Califor
baseball aficionados, we know that the
right thing is being done as we move nia, George Will, perhaps the supreme
baseball nut of all, was there, and Revthis to finality.
Professional baseball is the only in- erend Jesse Jackson. Senior was there
dustry in the United States exempt as well. It was a very touching event.
Now, this bill has gone through many
from the antitrust laws without being
subject to regulatory supervision. This changes over the years and was introcircumstance has resulted from a rath- duced originally in the 103rd Congress
er sorry Supreme Court decision in 1922 by our former beloved member of the
holding that baseball did not involve Judiciary, Mike Synar, of Oklahoma.
In order to address the concern of the
interstate commerce and was beyond
minor leagues. it contains many
the reach of antitrust laws.
redundancies and, accordingly, a court
O12145
may have questions about how the proFor some reason, we in the Congress visions of this bill will interrelate. Any
have failed to rectify this, despite sub- court facing such questions would be
sequent court decisions holding that advised, if I may dare suggest, to reall the other professional sports were turn to the purpose section of the bill
fully subject to these same laws that for aid and interpretation. The purpose
baseball claimed to be exempt from.
section states what Congress intends;
There may have been a time when that is, that it is no longer subject to
baseball's unique treatment was a question that major league baseball
source of pride and distinction for players have the same rights under
many loyal fans who loved our national antitrust laws as do other professional
pastime. But with baseball suffering athletes.
more work stoppages over the last cenThis is a simple proposition, yet it is
tury than all the other sports com- indeed startling that 26years after this
bined. including a 1994strike which brave and eloquent player, Curt Flood,
ended the possibility of a world series stood alone before the Supreme Court
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to seek an answer to a question whose
answer seemed obvious to him, that it
is only just now being addressed by
this branch of government. I am very
proud of the Congress for this.
If a court has any doubt as to the
meaning or purpose of any prevision of
this act, it should be guided by our purpose. which is. at long last, to give the
answer that Mr. Flood indeed knew to
be the correct one. The legislation is
not intended to have an adverse effect
on any ongoing litigation nor intended
to limit the ability of the United
States Government to bring antitrust
actions.
It is overdue. I hope it will be quickly
passed for the good of the game, which
has once again demonstrated why we
love it, why baseball is on a resurgence, and we are just delighted that
now that McGwire and Sosa have
brought new enjoyment and life to the
game that we now have this legislation
to accompany it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. JIM BUNNINC),
a member of
Baseball's Hall of Fame.
(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Illinois for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support
of S. 53. the Curt Flood Act, named for
the player who challenged the antitrust laws all the way to the Supreme
Court.
Baseball is the only sport, and just
about the only business in America,
that is immune from the antitrust
laws. Because of an outdated supreme
court decision, major league baseball
has been operating under a different
set of rules than everyone else for the
past 75 years. The legislation before us
today is very simple: It provides for a
limited repeal of that exemption when
it comes to labor-management relations.
Baseball has had big troubles in recent years, and the antitrust exemption has been the root cause. There has
been eight work stoppages in the last
three decades, and it is no coincidence
that baseball, the only sport that enjoyed such special treatment, has had
more strikes and lockouts than all
other sports combined.
After playing and managing in professional baseball for over 25 years, and
serving on the Executive Board of the
Players Association, I know firsthand
how the exemption distorts playerowner relationships and has contributed to the turmoil in baseball. The exemption effectively removes a negotiating tool from the labor negotiating
process and forces both sides to play
hardball when it comes to bargaining
over contracts. It removes a way for
the players to push their grievances,
and encourages the owners to take a
hard line and reduces their incentive to
compromise.
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Personally, I think this exemption
should be repealed altogether. Baseball
is a multibillion dollar business that
should have to play by the same rules
as other sports and businesses. The exemption is anti-competitive and antiAmerican. But by passing this bill
today. and partially repealing the exemption, we provide another avenue for
the owners and the players to explore
another way to vent steam before calling a strike or staging a lockout.

Michigan (Mr. CONYERS).and also by
the chairman, provides baseball play-

em with the same rights already afforded the National Football League
and the National Basketball Associa-

tion players. So they can act as their
counterparts do in other fields of endeavor. But this also recognizes the importance of an antitrust exemption for
certain aspects of the game so team
owners may continue to cooperate on
issues such as league expansion, franThis is a bipartisan consensus bill chise location and broadcast rights,
that the Senate passed without opposi- without fear of lawsuit. So it protects
tion. It is supported by all of the af- and helps minor league baseball that is
fected parties in baseball, owners. play- important In my State.
Mr. Speaker, baseball is America's
ers. and the minor leagues. Everyone
agrees that it represents a positive step pastime and it is my State's as well.
Arkansas has produced its share of
forward for cur national pastime.
But most importantly, this legisla- baseball greats as well, men like Lou
tion represents a win for the fans. Just Brock. Dizzy Dean, George Kell, and
4 years ago the players were on strike. Brooks Robinson, all Hall of Famers,
The world series was canceled. Baseball that have made us proud as they have
seemed doomed. But this year, as the carried a little bit of Arkansas to the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CON- far corners of this country.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill for
YERS)has said, baseball has had a renaissance. Mark McGwire and Sammy baseball, the players and owners alike;
Sosa thrilled us with the home run it is a good bill for the fans, and I urge
race. The playoffs are more exciting my colleagues to support it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker. I yield 2
than ever before. And baseball is back.
Fans are returning to baseball, and minutes to the gentleman from New
passing this bill today will help ensure York (Mr. BOEHLERT).
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given
that the game does not spiral backwards, down into the abyss of labor permission to revise and extend his restrife. It will help ensure that the fans marks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise
are not robbed of their right to the
in support of this conference report. I
greatest game ever invented.
Mr. Speaker. I urge strong support do so in my capacity as chairman of
the Minor League Baseball Caucus. The
for the bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield common thread that unites all of us in
this caucus is our love for America's
myself such time as I may consume.
I neglected to mention that the gen- pastime.
tleman from Kentucky (Mr. JIM I am a little bit disappointed that the
BtNNING),Hall of Famer, worked dili- two gentlemen that preceded me in the
gently on this bill with myself and the well, the gentleman from Kentucky
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), (Mr. BUNNING), who is a member of the
and be was also a Detroit Tiger, where Baseball Hall of Fame, when he talked
his greatest playing took place, and we about the great year of 1998, I am surstill claim him, although he represents prised that he, a great Hall of Fame
the great State of Kentucky. And. Mr. pitcher, did not mention that David
Speaker, he has a baseball in his hand Wells pitched a perfect game for the

now, as we watch.
Mr Speaker, I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HUTCHINSON).
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, I
want to thank the chairman for yielding me this time, and I want to thank
the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr.
BUNNING) for signing my baseball and
being such a great baseball hero.
I speak as a fan today. In Arkansas.
we do not have major league baseball
in the State. but we have minor league
baseball and we have a great baseball
tradition. This bill that Is before us has
been agreed to by the players and the
owners, but, more importantly, in my
judgment, it is a bill for the fans. The
fans want to see the boys of summer
out on the field. They want to see them
play ball. This has been a great year
for the fans and we want that to continue without interruption.
This bill, as has been explained, and
so eloquently by the gentleman from

New York Yankees. The gentleman
from Kentucky knows more than most
that good pitching beats good hitting
all the time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BOEHLERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. I would like to point out
to the gentleman that the gentleman
from Kentucky (Mr. BUNNING) also
pitched a perfect game when he was in
the major leagues.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Reclaiming my
time, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is
exactly right, and I was one of the
great fans cheering him on when he
pitched that perfect game.
And my colleague from Arkansas neglected to mention another great Hall
of Famer from his home State. Arky
Vaughn.
The fact of the matter is, one of the
reasons why this settlement was delayed was the genuine concern for the
future of minor league baseball. Because when all is said and done, while
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we are all thrilled by America's pastime, most people have to watch it on
television. But across America, 35 million fans are going to the ball parks to
see minor league baseball, in places
like Syracuse, New York. and Utica,
New York, and all over America. In Toledo, Ohio, the Mudhens. Who can forget them.
Ol2200
It is indeed America's pastime. The
great concern that all of us had was
the preservation of minor league baseball. I am pleased to report to my colleagues that the minor league baseball
officials have worked cooperatively
and they do endorse this package. It is
good for baseball at all levels.
Mr.LUTHER.Mr.Speaker, in an attempt to
clarifythe legislative intent of S. 53, I would
liketo place the followingSenate colloquybeJudiciary
tween Senator PAULWELLSTONE,
and RankCommittee Chairman ORRINHATCH
ing Judiciary Committee Member PATRICK
LEAHY
in the House record.
PLCD Act o 1998
CURT
Mr. WELsTONE.Mr. President, late last
night (July 30, 1998),the Senate passedby
unanimous cosent S. 53. I have been contaoted by the Attorney General of my State,
Hubert H. Humphrey III. and asked to try to
clarify a technical legal point about the effeet of this legislation. The State of Minnesota. through the office of Attorney General, and the Minnesota Twins are currently
involved in asantitrust-related investigation. It is my understanding that S. 53wi
have no impact on this Investigation or any

litigation arising out of the investigation.
That is correct. The bill simply
Mr. HATCH.
makes it clear that major league baseball
players have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.
The bill does not change current law in any
other context or with respect to any other
person or entity.
Mr. WELtOsNo.Thank you for that cladfication. I also note that several lower courts
have recently found that baseball currently
enjoys only a narrow exemption from antitrust laws and that this exemption applies
only to the reserve system. For exaeple, the
Florida Supreme Court in Bttensorth v. Na-

donal League, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994),the
U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania in Plazza
v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420
(E.D. Pa. 1993) and a Minnesota State court
in a case involving the Twins have all held
the baseball exemption from antitrust lace
is now limited only to the reserve system. It

Is my understanding that S. 53will have no
effect on the courts ultimate resolution of
the scope of the antitrust exemption on mat-

ters beyond these related to snerplayer re
latlons at the major league level.
Mr. Hate. That is correct. S. 53 Is Intended to have no effect other than to clarify
the status of major league players under the
antitrust laws, With regard to all other context or other persons or entities, the law will

be the same after passage of the Act as it is
today.
Mr. LEAHY.I concur with the satement of
the Chairman of the Committee. The bill affects no pending or decided cases except to
the extent that courts have exempted major
league baseball clubs from the antitrust laws
in their dealings with major league players.
In fact. Section 3 of the legislation makes
clear that the law is unchanged with regard
to issues such as relocation. The bill has no
impact on the recent decisions in federal and
state courts in Florida, Pennsylvania and
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antitrust laws.
Mndrthe
W nitust
lsank the
thveoo.,
ided by the ronstatatoty laborantitrusten- taon,the bosebalownersare nowis full sopMr.
WELLSTONE.
I thank
Senator I calaM
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and
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to
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my colleagues ttenti
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Thatlegislation
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In 1972,the Supreme
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tion forbaseballs special exemption.
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smashing the thirty-seven-year
home run failedto ovetro this decion despitesabse- antitrastactons.
recordheldbyRogerMans?
quentnoon docisionsholdingthot the other Mr. Speoher,thisbill is longoverdue. I hope
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Section 107 requires that the Secretary of
State grant U.S. citizens access to U.S. missions abroad for religious activities on a basis
no less favorable than that for other nongovernmental activities unrelated to the conduct of the diplomatic mission. State Department policy already allows U.S. Government
mission employees access to U.S. facilities for
religious services in environments where
such services are not available locally. The
extension of this practice to U.S. citizens who
generally enjoy no privileges and immunities
in the host state has the potential to create
conflicts with host country laws and to impair
the ability of U.S. missions to function effectively. Care also must be taken to ensure that
this provision is implemented consistent with
the First Amendment. Accordingly, I have
asked the Department of State to prepare
guidance to clarify the scope of this provision
and the grounds on which mission premises
are generally available to nongovernmental
organizations.
Finally, I will interpret the Act's exception
in section 405(d) concerning the provision of
medicines, food, or other humanitarian assistance to apply to any loam, loan guarantees, extensions of credit, issuance of letters
of credit, or other financing measures necessary or incidental to the sale of such goods.
Additionally, I will interpret the license requirements in section 423 regarding specified items to apply only to countries of particular concern.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
October 27, 1998.
NOTE:H.R. 2431, approved October 27, was assigned Public Law No. 105-292. An original was
not available for verification of the content of this
statement.
-1
Istatement on Signing the Curt Flood
Act of 1998
October27,1998
Today I am pleased to have signed into
law S. 53, the "Curt Flood Act of 1998." This

legislation is the successful culmination of bipartisan efforts to treat employment matters
with respect to Major League Baseball players under the antitrust laws in the same way
such matters are treated for athletes in other
professional sports.
It is especially fitting that this legislation
honors a courageous baseball player and individual, the late Curt Flood, whose enormous
talents on the baseball diamond were
matched by his courage off the field. It was
29 years ago this month that Curt Flood refused a trade from the St. Louis Cardinals
to the Philadelphia Phillies. His bold stand
set in motion the events that culminate in
the bill I have signed into law.
The Act appropriately limits baseball's special judicially created antitrust exemption by
expressly applying the antitrust laws to certain conduct of Major League Baseball; the
applicability of the antitrust laws with respect
to all other conduct is unchanged. The Act
in no way codifies or extends the baseball
exemption and would not affect the applicability of those laws to certain matters that,
it has been argued, the exemption would legitimately protect (including franchise relocation rules and the minor leagues).
The Act does not in any way limit the
standing of the United States to bring an
antitrust action. The antitrust laws protect
the public's interest in the efficient operation
of the free market system, thereby protecting
consumers, and the United States has standing to sue to enjoin all violations.
It is sound policy to treat the employment
matters of Major League Baseball players
under the antitrust laws in the same way such
matters are treated for athletes in other professional sports.
Willian J. Clinton
The White House,
Cctober27,1998.

-I

NOTE:S. 53, approveedOctober 27, was assigned
Public Law No. 105-297. An original was not
available for verification of the content of this
statement.
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MoyNIHAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
JANUARY

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of

5 1997".
6
7

8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"SEC.

27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 feet
6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional

8

baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-

9

ment between professional major league baseball

10

teams and teams of the National Association of

11

Baseball, commonly known as the 'Professional

12

Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to

13

the minor leagues;

14

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

15

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

16

ball on franchise relocation; or

17

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

18

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.)

19

'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
0

(commonly known as the
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANuARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MOYNIHAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

OCTOBER 29, 1997
Reported by M.r. HATcH, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SEGTION i SHORT TITLE.

4

This At my be eit-ed as the "GC t Fleed Aet ef

5 1-997"-

2
1 SEC.

2

-2 APPLGATIO

OF THEMANTRUST LAWS TO PRO-

FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE EASEwALLn

3

The Glayten Aet

+5

USG- 2 et seeq

is amended

4 by adding at the end the following new seetiomt
5

"Se 2- (-a Subjeet to subseetion {-b- the antitrast

6 laws shall apply t-o the business of professional major
7 league basebal8

{b Nothing in this seetion shall be eonstr'ued to f-

9 feet10

or nonapplicability of the

"(1) the applicabilt

11

entitms laws t-o the anatenr draft

f professional

12

baseball the miner league reserve elase the agree-

13

ient between professional maaor league baseball

14

teams and teamus of the National Asseeiatien

15

Baseball; eemmenly knmwn as the 'Professional

16

Baseball Ag#eement', or any ether matter relating to

17

the iner leagues,

18

"-)the

applicabili

f

r-nonapplicabiliy ef the

19

entitrast laws to any restraint by professional base-

20

ball n fra-nehise reloeation; or

21

l-'} the applieation of Publie Law 87 331 (1-

22

-- S0 7 1291 et seq.

23

ASpes Broadestinig Aet of 19 61').".

24
25

feonizatly known as t-he

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Mood Act of 1997".

3
1
2

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that

3 major league baseball players are covered under the anti4 trust laws (i.e., that major league players will have the same
5 rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional ath6 letes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a pro7 vision that makes it clear that the passage of this Act does
8 not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
9 other context or with respect to any other person or entity.
10
11

12

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by

13 adding at the end the following new section:
14

"SEc. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agree-

15 ments of persons in the business of organized professional
16 major league baseball relating to or affecting employment
17 to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the
18 antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, prac19 tices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws
20 if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
21 business affecting interstate commerce: Provided, however,
22 That nothing in this subsection shall be construed as pro23 viding the basis for any negative inference regarding the
24 caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws
25 to minor league baseball.

4
1

"(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section

2 shall be deemed to change the application of the antitrust
3 laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements by, be4 tween, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or par5 ticipatingin the business of organized professionalbaseball,
6 except the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements to which
7 subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More specifically,
8 but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
9 deemed to change the applicationof the antitrust laws to10

"(1) the organized professional baseball amateur

11

draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league

12

players, the agreement between organized professional

13

major league baseball teams and the teams of the Na-

14

tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,

15

commonly known as the 'ProfessionalBaseballAgree-

16

ment', the relationship between organized professional

17

major league baseball and organized professional

18

minor league baseball, or any other matter relating to

19

professional organized baseball's minor leagues;

20

"(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

21

of persons in the business of organized professional

22

baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or

23

relocation,franchise ownership issues, including own-

24

ership transfers, and the relationship between the Of-

25

fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners;

5
1

"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

2

protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et

3

seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcasting

4

Act of 1961'); or

5

"(4) the relationship between persons in the busi-

6

ness of organized professional baseball and umpires or

7

other individuals who are employed in the business of

8

organized professional baseball by such persons.

9

"(c) As used in this section, 'persons' means any indi-

10 vidual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated asso11 ciation or any combination or association thereof".
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AN ACT

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of

5 1998".

2
1
2

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major

3 league baseball players are covered under the antitrust
4 laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the
5 same rights under the antitrust laws as do other profes6 sional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along
7 with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of
8 this Act does not change the application of the antitrust
9 laws in any other context or with respect to any other per10 son or entity.
11
12
13

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended

14 by adding at the end the following new section:
15

"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d),

16 the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
17 the business of organized professional major league base18 ball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
19 league baseball players to play baseball at the major
20 league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same
21 extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
22 be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons
23 in any other professional sports business affecting inter24 state connerce.
25

"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this see-

26 tion as a basis for changing the application of the anti-

3
1 trust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 other than those set forth in subsection (a). This section
3 does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which
4 to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply
5 the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or
6 agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employ7 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
8 the major league level, including but not limited to9

"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

10

of persons engaging in, conducting or participating

11

in the business of organized professional baseball re-

12

lating to or affecting employment to play baseball at

13

the minor league level, any organized professional

14

baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any

15

reserve clause as applied to minor league players;

16

"(2) the agreement between organized profes-

17

sional major league baseball teams and the teams of

18

the National Association of Professional Baseball

19

Leagues,

20

Baseball Agreement', the relationship between orga-

21

nized professional major league baseball and orga-

22

nized professional minor league baseball, or any

23

other matter relating to organized professional base-

24

ball's minor leagues;

commonly known as the 'Professional

4
1

"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

2

of persons engaging in, conducting or participating

3

in the business of organized professional baseball re-

4

lating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or

5

relocation, franchise

6

ownership transfers, the relationship between the Of-

7

fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the

8

marketing or sales of the entertainment product of

9

organized professional baseball and the licensing of

10

intellectual property rights owned or held by orga-

11

nized professional baseball teams individually or col-

12

lectively;

ownership issues, including

13

"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

14

protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291

15

et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcast-

16

ing Act of 1961');

17

"(5) the relationship between persons in the

18

business of organized professional baseball and unm-

19

pires or other individuals who are employed in the

20

business of organized professional baseball by such

21

persons; or

22

"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

23

of persons not in the business of organized profes-

24

sional major league baseball.

5
1

"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing

2 to sue under this section. For the purposes of this section,
3 a major league baseball player is4

"(1) a person who is a party to a major league

5

player's contract, or is playing baseball at the major

6

league level; or

7

"(2) a person who was a party to a major

8

league player's contract or playing baseball at the

9

major league level at the time of the injury that is

10

the subject of the complaint; or

11

"(3) a person who has been a party to a major

12

league player's contract or who has played baseball

13

at the major league level, and who claims he has

14

been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent

15

major league player's contract by an alleged viola-

16

tion of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That

17

for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged anti-

18

trust violation shall not include any conduct, acts,

19

practices, or agreements of persons in the business

20

of organized professional baseball relating to or af-

21

fecting employment to play baseball at the minor

22

league level, including any organized professional

23

baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any

24

reserve clause as applied to minor league players; or

6
1

"(4) a person who was a party to a major

2

league player's contract or who was playing baseball

3

at the major league level at the conclusion of the

4

last full championship season immediately preceding

5

the expiration of the last collective bargaining agree-

6

ment between persons in the business of organized

7

professional major league baseball and the exclusive

8

collective bargaining representative of major league

9

baseball players.

10

"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any

11 entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation,
12 trust or unincorporated association or any combination or
13 association thereof. As used in this section, the National
14 Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member
15 leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in the busi16 ness of organized professional major league baseball'.
17

"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or

18 agreements that directly relate to or affect both employ19 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
20 the major league level and also relate to or affect any other
21 aspect of organized professional baseball, including but
22 not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor
23 league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
24 (b) above, only those components, portions or aspects of
25 such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly

7
1 relate to or affect employment of major league players to
2 play baseball at the major league level may be challenged
3 under subsection (a) and then only to the extent that they
4 directly relate to or affect employment of major league
5 baseball players to play baseball at the major league level.
6

"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the

7 term 'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation
8 of section 151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
9 amended).
10

"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

11 feet the application to organized professional baseball of
12 the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
13

"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or

14 agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly
15 or narrowly construed.".
Passed the Senate July 30, 1998.
Attest:

Secretary.
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AN ACT
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of

5 1998".

2
1
2

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major

3 league baseball players are covered under the antitrust
4 laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the
5 same rights under the antitrust laws as do other profes6 sional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along
7 with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of
8 this Act does not change the application of the antitrust
9 laws in any other context or with respect to any other per10 son or entity.
11
12

13

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended

14 by adding at the end the following new section:
15

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d),

16 the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
17 the business of organized professional major league base18 ball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
19 league baseball players to play baseball at the major
20 league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same
21 extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
22 be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons
23 in any other professional sports business affecting inter24 state commerce.
25

"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this sec-

26 tion as a basis for changing the application of the anti-

3
1 trust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 other than those set forth in subsection (a). This section
3 does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which
4 to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply
5 the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or
6 agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employ7 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
8 the major league level, including but not limited to9

"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

10

of persons engaging in, conducting or participating

11

in the business of organized professional baseball re-

12

lating to or affecting employment to play baseball at

13

the minor league level, any organized professional

14

baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any

15

reserve clause as applied to minor league players;

16

"(2) the agreement between organized profes-

17

sional major league baseball teams and the teams of

18

the National Association of Professional Baseball

19

Leagues,

20

Baseball Agreement', the relationship between orga-

21

nized professional major league baseball and orga-

22

nized professional minor league baseball, or any

23

other matter relating to organized professional base-

24

ball's minor leagues;

commonly known as the 'Professional

4
1

"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

2

of persons engaging in, conducting or participating

3

in the business of organized professional baseball re-

4

lating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or

5

relocation, franchise

6

ownership transfers, the relationship between the Of-

7

fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the

8

marketing or sales of the entertainment product of

9

organized professional baseball and the licensing of

10

intellectual property rights owned or held by orga-

11

nized professional baseball teams individually or col-

12

lectively;

ownership issues, including

13

"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

14

protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291

15

et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcast-

16

ing Act of 1961');

17

"(5) the relationship between persons in the

18

business of organized professional baseball and um-

19

pires or other individuals who are employed in the

20

business of organized professional baseball by such

21

persons; or

22

"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements

23

of persons not in the business of organized profes-

24

sional major league baseball.

5
1

"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing

2 to sue under this section. For the purposes of this section,
3 a major league baseball player is4

"(1) a person who is a party to a major league

5

player's contract, or is playing baseball at the major

6

league level; or

7

"(2)

a person who was a party to a major

8

league player's contract or playing baseball at the

9

major league level at the time of the injury that is

10

the subject of the complaint; or

11

"(3) a person who has been a party to a major

12

league player's contract or who has played baseball

13

at the major league level, and who claims he has

14

been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent

15

major league player's contract by an alleged viola-

16

tion of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That

17

for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged anti-

18

trust violation shall not include any conduct, acts,

19

practices, or agreements of persons in the business

20

of organized professional baseball relating to or af-

21

fecting employment to play baseball at the minor

22

league level, including any organized professional

23

baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any

24

reserve clause as applied to minor league players; or

6
1

"(4) a person who was a party to a major

2

league player's contract or who was playing baseball

3

at the major league level at the conclusion of the

4

last full championship season immediately preceding

5

the expiration of the last collective bargaining agree-

6

ment between persons in the business of organized

7

professional major league baseball and the exclusive

8

collective bargaining representative of major league

9

baseball players.

10

"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any

11 entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation,
12 trust or unincorporated association or any combination or
13 association thereof. As used in this section, the National
14 Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member
15 leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in the busi16 ness of organized professional major league baseball'.
17

"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or

18 agreements that directly relate to or affect both employ19 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
20 the major league level and also relate to or affect any other
21 aspect of organized professional baseball, including but
22 not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor
23 league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
24 (b) above, only those components, portions or aspects of
25 such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly

7
1 relate to or affect employment of major league players to
2 play baseball at the major league level may be challenged
3 under subsection (a) and then only to the extent that they
4 directly relate to or affect employment of major league
5 baseball players to play baseball at the major league level.
6

"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the

7 term 'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation
8 of section 151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
9 amended).
10

"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

11 feet the application to organized professional baseball of
12 the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
13

"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or

14 agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly
15 or narrowly construed.".
Passed the Senate July 30, 1998.
Attest:

GARY SISCO,
Secretary.
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1998".
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league
baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that
major league baseball players will have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear
that the passage of this Act does not change the application of
the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as
a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth
in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply
a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws,
or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices,
or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level, including but not limited to-"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized
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professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the
'Professional Baseball Agreement', the relationship between
organized professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues,
including ownership transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing
or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned
or held by organized professional baseball teams individually
or collectively;
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected
by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.) (commonly
known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(5) the relationship between persons in the business of
organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons; or
"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball.
"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue
under this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league
baseball player is"(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's
contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level; or
"(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or
"(3) a person who has been a party to a major league
player's contract or who has played baseball at the major league
level, and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to
secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an
alleged violation of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball
at the minor league level, including any organized professional
baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve
clause as applied to minor league players; or
"(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or who was playing baseball at the major league level
at the conclusion of the last full championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining
agreement between persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.

S.53-3
"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated
association or any combination or association thereof. As used in
this section, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are
not 'in the business of organized professional major league baseball'.
"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
that directly relate to or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level and
also relate to or affect any other aspect of organized professional
baseball, including but not limited to employment to play baseball
at the minor league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
(b), only those components, portions or aspects of such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect
employment of major league players to play baseball at the major
league level may be challenged under subsection (a) and then only
to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level.
"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term
'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation of section
151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as amended).
"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly construed.".

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice Presidentof the United States and
Presidentof the Senate.
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HR 3368 IH
102d CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 3368
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

September 19, 1991
Mr. CHANDLER (for himself, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. DICKS, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr.
SWIFT, Mr. MORRISON, and Mrs. UNSOELD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
Be it enacted by the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the UnitedStates ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the 'Major League Baseball Equity Act'.

FINDINGS
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that-(1) Major League Baseball is becoming increasingly stratified in terms of the relative
economic power of its teams;
(2) the current practice of gate receipt revenue sharing in both the American League and
National League also works to the competitive advantage of the teams in the larger
markets; and
(3) the Major League Baseball teams in the larger markets have a competitive advantage
over other Major League Baseball teams in their ability to negotiate favorable
independent broadcasting contracts.

DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3. In this Act, the term-(1) 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given such term under section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44);
(2) 'independent broadcasting contract' means any contract, entered into independently
by or on behalf of a Major League Baseball team, for the transmission of one or more
games of that Major League Baseball team by means of television broadcast, cable
television transmission, or radio broadcast;
(3) 'League' means the league of professional baseball teams known as the American
League or the league of professional baseball teams laown as the National League; and
(4) 'Major League Baseball' means both Leagues.

PURPOSE
SEC. 4. The purpose of this Act is to create equity within Major League Baseball, by providing
teams in smaller markets the opportunity to compete financially with the teams in the larger
markets.

BROADCASTING REVENUE SHARING
SEC. 5. (a) Any revenue generated pursuant to an independent broadcasting contract should be
shared in accordance with the requirements of this section.
(b) Except in the case of revenue generated as a result of nationally transmitted cable
television, the Major League team that is party to such contract shall receive-(1) 80 percent of the revenue from the transmission of the home games of that team; and
(2) 20 percent of the revenue from the transmission of games in which that team is the
visiting team.
(c) All other revenue generated pursuant to such contract, including all revenue from nationally
transmitted cable television, shall be divided equally among the other teams of the League of
which the contracting team is a member. Each League shall establish accounts for the deposit
of revenue to which this subsection applies and shall, at regular intervals, distribute the correct
shares of such revenue.

PENALTY
SEC. 6. Unless Major League Baseball has, prior to the beginning of the 1993 baseball season,
established and implemented a program under which any revenue generated pursuant to

independent broadcasting contracts is shared in accordance with section 5, the antitrust laws
shall apply to Major League Baseball, each League, and all Major League Baseball teams.
END
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HR 5489 IH
102d CONGRESS
2d Session

H. R. 5489
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 25, 1992
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BIELL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SECTION 1. FINDING.
The Congress finds that the business of providing for profit public baseball games between
teams of professional baseball players in a league and between such teams of rival leagues is in,
or affects, interstate commerce.

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of providing for profit public baseball games
between teams of professional baseball players and to leagues composed of teams of
professional baseball players.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
For purposes of this Act, the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section 5 relates to
unfair methods of competition.

SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
END
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102d CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1727
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 19, 1991
Mr. GORTON (for himself and Mr. ADAMS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the 'Major League Baseball Equity Act'.

FINDINGS
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that-(1) Major League Baseball is becoming increasingly stratified in terms of the relative
economic power of its teams;
(2) the current practice of gate receipt revenue sharing in both the American League and
National League also works to the competitive advantage of the teams in the larger
markets; and
(3) the Major League Baseball teams in the larger markets have a competitive advantage
over other Major League Baseball teams in their ability to negotiate favorable
independent broadcasting contracts.

DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3. In this Act, the term-(1) 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given such term under section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44);
(2) 'independent broadcasting contract' means any contract, entered into independently
by or on behalf of a Major League Baseball team, for the transmission of one or more
games of that Major League Baseball team by means of television broadcast, cable
television transmission, or radio broadcast;
(3) 'League' means the league of professional baseball teams known as the American
League or the league of professional baseball teams known as the National League; and
(4) 'Major League Baseball' means both Leagues.

PURPOSE
SEC. 4. The purpose of this Act is to create equity within Major League Baseball, by providing
teams in smaller markets the opportunity to compete financially with the teams in the larger
markets.

BROADCASTING REVENUE SHARING
SEC. 5. (a) Any revenue generated pursuant to an independent broadcasting contract should be
shared in accordance with the requirements of this section.
(b) Except in the case of revenue generated as a result of nationally transmitted cable
television, the Major League team that is party to such contract shall receive-(1) 80 percent of the revenue from the transmission of the home games of that team; and
(2) 20 percent of the revenue from the transmission of games in which that team is the
visiting team.
(c) All other revenue generated pursuant to such contract, including all revenue from nationally
transmitted cable television, shall be divided equally among the other teams of the League of
which the contracting team is a member. Each League shall establish accounts for the deposit
of revenue to which this subsection applies and shall, at regular intervals, distribute the correct
shares of such revenue.

PENALTY
SEC. 6. Unless Major League Baseball has, prior to the beginning of the 1993 baseball season,
established and implemented a program under which any revenue generated pursuant to

independent broadcasting contracts is shared in accordance with section 5, the antitrust laws
shall apply to Major League Baseball, each League, and all Major League Baseball teams.
END
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102d CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 172
To limit or rescind the antitrust exemption now accorded baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 2 Qegislative day, JULY 8), 1991
Mr. SPECTER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary

RESOLUTION
To limit or rescind the antitrust exemption now accorded baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
Whereas, baseball has enjoyed an antitrust exemption since 1922 when the Supreme Court of the
United States held that baseball was a sport and not a business;
Whereas, baseball, today is admittedly a business;
Whereas, baseball's recent moves to pay cable television and baseball's recent announcement that
only two new franchises would be created by the National League shows disregard for the public's
interests compared with the owners' financial interests;
Whereas, recent moves by football, basketball and hockey to pay cable and/or pay-per-view
demonstrates disregard for the public's interests compared with the owners' financial interests;
Whereas, football, basketball and hockey enjoy a special limited exemption from the antitrust laws as
provided in the Sports Broadcasting Act (15 U.S.C. 1291-95);
Whereas, only 58.6 percent of United States households have purchased cable service and only 77.4
percent of United States households have access to cable service; and
Whereas, big league sports franchises may function as businesses extracting whatever profit the
market will bear, existing antitrust exemptions should be limited or rescinded unless big league sports
franchise owners demonstrate reasonable concern for the public's interest. Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That Congress should limit or rescind the antitrust exemptions now accorded
football, baseball, basketball and hockey.
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HR 108 IH
103d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 108
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 5, 1993
Mr. BLIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, and Mr. MCCOLLUM) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BIELL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,
SECTION 1. FINDING.
The Congress finds that the business of providing for profit public baseball games between
teams of professional baseball players in a league and between such teams of rival leagues is in,
or affects, interstate commerce.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of providing for profit public baseball games
between teams of professional baseball players and to leagues composed of teams of
professional baseball players.
SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
For purposes of this Act, the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section 5 relates to
unfair methods of competition.

SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
END
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HR 1549 1H
103d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1549
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball from the antitrust
exemption applicable to certain television contracts.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 31, 1993
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball from the antitrust
exemption applicable to certain television contracts.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Antitrust Restoration Amendment of 1993'.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.
The Act of September 30, 1961 (15 U.S.C. 1291-1294) is amended-(1) in the first section by striking 'baseball,' each place it appears,
(2) in sections 4 and 6 by striking 'baseball,' each place it appears, and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
'SEC. 7. The antitrust laws referred to in section 1 shall apply with respect to joint agreements
of the kind described in such section entered into by or among persons engaging in or
conducting the organized professional team sport of baseball.'.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

(a) EFFECTIVE DATE- Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS- With respect to joint agreements entered into before
the date of the enactment of this Act, the amendments made by section 2 shall not apply until
the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
END
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HR 4965 IH
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4965
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 12, 1994
Mr. OWENS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994'.

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) IN GENERAL- In the event that a unilateral term or condition is imposed by any
party that has been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and
the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall
apply to that term or condition.
'(b) TERMINATION OF EFFECTIVENESS- Subsection (a) shall cease to be effective upon
the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the
labor organization representing the players of major league baseball to replace the basic

agreement between the two parties that expired on December 31, 1993, but subsection (a) shall
continue to apply to conduct occurring prior to the adoption of such an agreement.
'(c) DEFINITION- In this section, 'term or condition' does not include a strike or a lockout.'.
END
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HR 4994 1H
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 18, 1994
Mr. SYNAR (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
Be it enacted by the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the UnitedStates ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of the amendment made by section 3 to encourage serious negotiations
between the major league baseball players and the owners of major league baseball, to prevent
the continued economic loss to individuals not involved in the negotiations whose livelihood
depends on baseball being played, to prevent ongoing losses to those communities that host
major league baseball, and to preserve the remainder of the season, the playoffs, and the World
Series for the fans of baseball.

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) In the event that unilateral terms or conditions are imposed by any party that has
been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the labor
organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall apply to

such terms and conditions and such terms and conditions may be challenged by any party to
such agreement in any district court of the United States for the district in which one of the
parties is doing business.
'(b) If, prior to the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league
baseball and the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball that
replaces the basic agreement between the parties that expired on December 31, 1993, unilateral
terms and conditions are imposed by any party to the prior agreement, and those terms and
conditions are challenged in a court action in accordance with subsection (a), the application of
such unilaterally imposed terms and conditions shall be stayed during the pendency of any such
action or appeal therefrom.
'(c) The term 'terms and conditions' shall not include either a strike or a lockout.'.
END

Document No. 48

HR 4994 RH
Union Calendar No. 488
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
[Report No. 103-871]
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 18, 1994
Mr. SYNAR (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. BLIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
November 29, 1994
Additional sponsors: Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. GORDON, and Mr. Sanders
November 29, 1994
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union and ordered to be printed
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
[Struck out->] SECTION 1.

SHORT TITLE.

[<-Struck out]

[Struck out->] This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans and Communities
Protection Act of 1994' . [<-Struck out]

[Struck out->] SEC.

2.

PURPOSE.

[<-Struck out]

[Struck out->] It is the purpose of the amendment made by section 3 to
encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and
the owners of major league baseball, to prevent the continued economic loss
to individuals not involved in the negotiations whose livelihood depends on
baseball being played, to prevent ongoing losses to those communities that
host major league baseball, and to preserve the remainder of the season, the
playoffs, and the World Series for the fans of baseball. [<-Struck out]

[Struck out->]

SEC.

3.

APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR

LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

[<-

Struck out]
[Struckout->] The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.)
the end the following new section: [<-Struck out]

is

amended by adding at

[Struckout->]

'SEC. 27. (a) In the event that unilateral terms or conditions
are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement between the
owners of major league baseball and the labor organization representing the
players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall apply to such
terms and conditions and such terms and conditions may be challenged by any
party to such agreement in any district court of the United States for the
district
in which one of the parties is doing business. [<-Struckout]

[Struck out->] (b) If, prior to the mutual adoption of an agreement between
the owners of major league baseball and the labor organization representing
the players of major league baseball that replaces the basic agreement
between the parties that expired on December 31, 1993, unilateral terms and
conditions are imposed by any party to the prior agreement, and those terms
and conditions are challenged in a court action in accordance with
subsection (a), the application of such unilaterally imposed terms and
conditions shall be stayed during the pendency of any such action or appeal
therefrom. [<-Struck out]

[Struck out->]

'(c)

The term 'terms

strike or a lockout.'

and conditions'

shall not include either a

. [<-Struck out]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'BaseballFans and Communities ProtectionAct of.1994'.

SEC 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LA WS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq) is amended by adding at the end the following:
'SEC. 27. (a)If unilateralterms and conditions of employment in restraintof trade or
commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement between 2 or more
major league baseballclubs and the labororganizationrepresentingthe players ofmajor
league baseball,such unilateralimpositionshall be subject to the antitrustlaws.
'(b) Subsection (a)shall not apply to a term or condition imposed solely with respect to a

professionalbaseballplayer who is a partyto a unform player contractthat is assigned, atthe
time the imposition described in such subsection occurs, to a baseballclub that is not a major
leagueprofessionalbaseball club.
'(c) This section shall not be construed to modif, impair,or supersede the operation of-'(1) the Act ofSeptember 30, 1961 (PublicLaw 87-331; 15 U.S.C 1291 et seq.), or
'(2) any Federalstatute relatingto labor relations.
'(d) Forpurposes of this section, the term 'terms and conditions'does not include a strike or a
lockout.'.
Union Calendar No. 488
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
[Report No. 103-8711
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.

November 29, 1994
Reported with an amendment
END
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1st Session
S.500
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 4, (legislative day, MARCH 3), 1993
Mr. METZENBAUM (for himself, Mr. MACK, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WARNER, Mr.
BINGAMAN, Mr. LOTT, Mr. KERREY, Mr. WELLSTONE, and Mr. ROBB) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enacted by the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the UnitedStates ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that-(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate commerce;
and
(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to reverse the result of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.C 356 (1953), and Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which exempted baseball from coverage under the
antitrust laws.

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL

BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply to the business of
organized professional baseball.'
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions and amendments made by this Act shall take effect one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and-(1) shall apply to conduct that occurs and any agreement in effect after such effective
date; and
(2) shall not apply to conduct that occurred before such effective date.
END
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103d CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2380
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 11, 1994
Mr. METZENBAUM (for himself, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. FEINGOLD) introduced the following bill;
which was read the first time

A BILL
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congressassembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) IN GENERAL- In the event that a unilateral term or condition is imposed by any
party that has been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and
the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall
apply to that term or condition.
'(b) TERMINATION OF EFFECTIVENESS- Subsection (a) shall cease to be effective upon
the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the

labor organization representing the players of major league baseball to replace the basic
agreement between the two parties that expired on December 31, 1993, but subsection (a) shall
continue to apply to conduct occurring prior to the adoption of such an agreement.
'(c) DEFINITION- In this section, 'term or condition' does not include a strike or a lockout.'.
END
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104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and

5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR

7

LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-

8

TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

9

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

10 by adding at the end the following:

2
1

"SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of

2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8

"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-

9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14

"(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,

15 impair, or supersede the operation of16
17
18

"(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public
Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
"(2) any Federal statute relating to labor rela-

19

tions.

20

"(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms

21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
0
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104TH CONGRESS

1sT SESSIONHeR

10

To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball
from the antitrust exemption applicable to certain television contracts.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball from the antitrust exemption applicable
to certain television contracts.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Antitrust

5 Restoration Amendment of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.
7

The Act of September 30, 1961 (15 U.S.C. 1291-

8 1294) is amended9
10

(1) in the first section by striking "baseball,"
each place it appears,

2
1

(2) in sections 4 and 6 by striking "baseball,"

2

each place it appears, and

3

(3) by adding at the end the following:

4

"SEC. 7. The antitrust laws referred to in section 1

5 shall apply with respect to joint agreements of the kind
6 described in such section entered into by or among persons
7 engaging in or conducting the organized professional team
8 sport of baseball.".
9

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

10

(a) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Except as provided in sub-

11 section (b), this Act and the amendments made by this
12 Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this
13 Act.
14

(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-With respect

15 to joint agreements entered into before the date of the
16 enactment of this Act, the amendments made by section
17 2 shall not apply until the expiration of the 1-year period
18 beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
0
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To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such
teams, shall be subject to the antitrust laws.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY

4, 1995

Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky, and Mr.
OWENS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues
composed of such teams, shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. FINDING.

The Congress finds that the business of providing for

5 profit public baseball games between teams of professional
6 baseball players in a league and between such teams of
7 rival leagues is in, or affects, interstate commerce.

2
1
2
3

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL.

The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of pro-

4 viding for profit public baseball games between teams of
5 professional baseball players and to leagues composed of
6 teams of professional baseball players.
7
8

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.

For purposes of this Act, the term "antitrust laws"

9 has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first sec10 tion of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that
11 such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Com12 mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section
13 5 relates to unfair methods of competition.
14
15

SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.

Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct oc-

16 curring before the date of the enactment of this Act.
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To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky (for himself and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and

5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR

7

LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-

8

TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

9

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

10 by adding at the end the following:

2
1

"SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of

2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8

"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-

9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14

"(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,

15 impair, or supersede the operation of16
17
18

"(1)

the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public

Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
"(2)

any Federal statute relating to labor

19

relations.

20

"(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms

21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
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To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and

5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR

7

LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-

8

TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

9

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

10 by adding at the end the following:

2
1

"SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of

2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8

"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-

9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14

"(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,

15 impair, or supersede the operation of16
17
18

"(1)

the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public

Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
"(2) any Federal statute relating to labor rela-

19

tions.

20

"(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms

21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
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To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such
teams shall be subject to the antitrust laws.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. TRAFICANT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6
7
8
9

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate commerce, and

2
1

(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to re-

2

verse the result of the decisions of the Supreme

3

Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club

4

v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson

5

v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),

6

and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which ex-

7

empted baseball from coverage under the antitrust

8

laws.

9

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-

10
11

SIONAL BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

12 by adding at the end the following section:
13

"SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331

14 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly known as the Sports
15 Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply
16 to the business of organized professional baseball.".
17

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

18

This Act and the amendments made by this Act

19 shall20
21
22
23

(1) take effect 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
(2) apply to conduct that occurs and any agreement in effect after such effective date, and

3
1
2

(3) not apply to conduct that occurred before
such effective date.
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To establish a national commission to oversee and regulate major league
and minor league baseball, to promote the interests of consumers, local
communities, and taxpayers, to recommend modification of the antitrust
exemption for Major League Baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 30, 1995
Mr. LAFALCE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce and, in addition, to the Committees on Economic and
Educational Opportunities and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL
To establish a national commission to oversee and regulate
major league and minor league baseball, to promote the
interests of consumers, local communities, and taxpayers,
to recommend modification of the antitrust exemption
for Major League Baseball, and for other purposes.

1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "National Commission

5 on Professional Baseball Act of 1995".

2

1
2

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT.

There is hereby established the National Commission

3 on Professional Baseball (hereafter in this Act referred to
4 as the "Commission").
5 SEC. 3. MEMBERSHIP.
6

(a) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT .- The Commission

7 shall be composed of seven members, all of whom shall
8 be appointed by the President. The President shall ap9 point10
11
12
13

(1) one member after consultation with the
owners of Major League Baseball;
(2) one member after consultation with the
Major League Baseball Players Association;

14

(3) one member after consultation with the Na-

15

tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,

16

Incorporated;

17

(4)

one

member

after

solicitation

of rec-

18

ommendations from government officials of cities,

19

towns, or counties in which major league and minor

20

league baseball teams are located; and

21

(5) three members after consultation with base-

22

ball fan organizations and the informal solicitation

23

of recommendations from the general public, one of

24

whom the President shall designate as Chairman of

25

the Commission.

3
1

(b) TERM.-Members of the Commission shall be ap-

2 pointed for a five-year term. In the event that the term
3 of the Commission is extended by the Congress pursuant
4 to section 10 of this Act, the term of individual members
5 shall also be extended, except that no individual may serve
6 as a member for more than six years.
7

(c) QUORuM.-A majority of the members of the

8 Commission shall constitute a quorum, but the Commis9 sion may provide for the taking of testimony and the re10 ception of evidence at meetings at which there are present
11 not less than three members of the Commission.
12

(d) APPOINTMENT

DATE.-The first appointments

13 made under subsection (a) shall be made within sixty days
14 after the date of enactment of this Act.
15

(e) FIRST MEETING.-The first meeting of the Com-

16 mission shall be called by the Chairman and shall be held
17 within ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act.
18

(f) PUBLIC MEETINGS.-All Commission meetings

19 and hearings shall be open to the public.
20

(g) VACANCY .- If any member of the Commission is

21 unable to serve a full term or becomes unqualified to serve
22 in such position, a new member shall be appointed to serve
23 the remainder of such term of office, within forty-five days
24 of the vacancy, in the same manner in which the original
25 appointment was made.

4
1 SEC. 4. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.
2

The duties of the Commission are to oversee and in-

3 vestigate any aspect of major league baseball and minor
4 league baseball, where, in the opinion of the Commission,
5 it is in the best interests of baseball to intervene, including
6 but not limited to the7
8

(1) negotiation of contract agreements between
major league team owners and players;

9

(2) renegotiation of the professional baseball

10

agreement between major league and minor league

11

team owners;

12

(3) setting of ticket prices;

13

(4) expansion and relocation of major league

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

and minor league team franchises;
(5) structural requirements and financing of
baseball stadiums and facilities;
(6) terms and conditions of minor league player
contracts;
(7) licensing of television broadcast rights and
allocation of television revenues;
(8) licensing and marketing of merchandise and
allocation of revenues; and

23

(9) revenue sharing among owners of major

24

league teams and among the major and minor

25

leagues.

5
1

(b) ARBITR ATION AND MEDIATION .- The duty of the

2 Commission to intervene in any aspect of major league or
3 minor league baseball, pursuant to subsection (a) of this
4 section, shall include but not be limited to the5

(1) conduct of binding arbitration in the event

6

of a labor impasse between Major League Baseball

7

and players; and

8

(2) mediation or arbitration of disputes between

9

Major League Baseball or individual owners of

10

major league teams and minor league baseball team

11

owners.

12
13

SEC. 5. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) HEARINGS AND MEETINGS.-The Commission or,

14 on authorization of the Commission, a panel of at least
15 three members of the Commission, may hold such hear16 ings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testi17 mony, and receive such evidence, as the Commission con18 siders appropriate.
19

(b)

OBTAINING

INFORMATION.-The

Commission

20 may secure directly from any Federal department, agency,
21

or court information and assistance necessary to enable

22 it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairman
23 of the Commission, the head of such agency or department
24 shall furnish such information or assistance to the Com25 mission. In addition, the Commission may request any rel-

6
1 evant information from any appropriate parties with an
2 interest in major league or minor league baseball.
3
4

(c) SUBPOENA POWER.(1) ISSUANCE.-The

Commission may issue

5

subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of

6

witnesses and the production of any evidence that

7

relates to any matter under investigation by the

8

Commission. The attendance of witnesses and the

9

production of evidence may be required from any

10

place within a judicial district at any designated

11

place of hearing within the judicial district.

12

(2) ENFOR CEMENT .- If a person issued a sub-

13

poena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey the sub-

14

poena or is guilty of contumacy, any court of the

15

United States within the judicial district within

16

which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial

17

district within which the person is found or resides

18

or transacts business may (upon application by the

19

Commission) order the person to appear before the

20

Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony

21

relating to the matter under investigation. Any fail-

22

ure to obey the order of the court may be punished

23

by the court as a contempt of the court.

24

(3) MANNER OF SERVICE.-A subpoena of the

25

Commission shall be served in the manner provided

7
1

for subpoenas issued by a United States district

2

court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

3

the United States district courts.

4

(4) PLACE OF SERVICE.-All process of any

5

court to which application may be made under this

6

section may be served in the judicial district in

7

which the person required to be served resides or

8

may be found.

9

(d) ORDER S AND

INJUNCTIONS .- Whenever

the

10 Commission has reason to believe that an act or practice
11 of Major League Baseball or of any individual owner of
12 a major league baseball team may not be in the public
13 interest or in the best interest of baseball, the Commission
14 shall have authority15

(1) to issue orders to stay temporarily such act

16

or practice pending review by the Commission or

17

pending a request for mediation or arbitration of

18

disputes involving such action submitted to the Com-

19

mission by baseball players, minor league team own-

20

ers, or public officials; and

21

(2) to bring a civil action in an appropriate dis-

22

trict court of the United States to enjoin such act

23

or practice and, upon proper showing that such ac-

24

tion would be in the public interest, to obtain a tem-

25

porary restraining order or a preliminary injunction

8
1

against such act or practice: Provided, however, That

2

in proper cases the Commission may seek, and upon

3

proper showing of proof, the court may grant a per-

4

manent injunction.

5

(f) FACILITIES AND SUPPORT SERVICES.-The Ad-

6 ministrator of General Services shall provide to the Com7 mission on a reimbursable basis such facilities and support
8 services as the Commission may request. Upon request of
9 the Commission, the head of a Federal department or
10 agency may make any of the facilities and services of such
11 agency available to the Commission to assist the Commis12 sion in carrying out its duties under this Act.
13

(g) EXP END ITU RES AND CONTRA CTS .- The Commis-

14 sion or, on authorization of the Commission, a member
15 of the Commission may make expenditures and enter into
16 contracts for the procurement of such supplies, services,
17 and property as the Commission or members consider ap18 propriate for the purposes of carrying out the duties of
19 the Commission. Such expenditures and contracts may be
20 made only to such extent or in such amounts as appro21 priated under section 9 of this Act.
22

(h) MAILS.-The Commission may use the United

23 States mails in the same manner and under the same con24 ditions as other Federal departments and agencies of the
25 United States.

9

1

SEC. 6. COMPENSATION OF THE COMMISSION.

2

(a) COMPENSATION .- Each member of the Commis-

3 sion shall be a full-time Federal employee and shall be
4 paid at an annual rate of basic pay payable for level II
5 of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5,
6 United States Code.
7

(b) EXPENSES .- Members of the Commission shall

8 be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary
9 expenses incurred by them in the performance of their du10 ties.
11 SEC. 7. STAFF OF COMMISSION; EXPERTS AND CONSULT-

12
13
14

ANTS.

(a) STAFF.(1)

APPOINTMENT .- The

Chairman

of the

15

Commission may appoint and terminate no more

16

than ten staff personnel to enable the Commission to

17

perform its duties.

18

(2)

COMPENSATION .- The Chairman of the

19

Commission may fix the compensation of personnel

20

without regard to the provision of chapter 51 and

21

subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States

22

Code, relating to classification of position and Gen-

23

eral Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay

24

may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the

25

Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

10
1

(b) EXPERTS AND CONSULTA NTS.-The Commission

2 may procure temporary and intermittent services of ex-

3 perts and consultants under section 3109(b) of title 5,
4 United States Code.
5 SEC. 8. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

6

(a) COMMISSI ON STUDY .- The Commission shall un-

7 dertake a study of the antitrust exemption for Major
8 League Baseball that shall include but not be limited to
9 analysis of the10

(1) effects of the antitrust exemption on major

11

league and minor league baseball players, minor

12

league baseball teams, baseball fans, local govern-

13

ments, and taxpayers of municipalities in which

14

baseball teams are located;

15
16

(2) possible effects of continuing the antitrust
exemption;

17

(3) possible effects of proposals for modification

18

of the antitrust exemption on Major League Base-

19

ball, minor league baseball teams, major league and

20

minor league baseball players, baseball fans, local

21

governments, and taxpayers, including but not lim-

22

ited to proposals for-

23

(A) elimination of the antitrust exemption;

24

(B) partial elimination of the antitrust ex-

25

emption for purposes of labor relations between

11
1

Major League Baseball and professional base-

2

ball players or for purposes of major league

3

team franchise expansion or relocation; and

4

(C) elimination of the antitrust exemption

5

with protections to hold harmless existing con-

6

tractual relationships between major league and

7

minor league baseball teams with respect to

8

player development,

9

and other activities that might otherwise be

10
11

territorial arrangements,

subject to the antitrust laws.
(b) REPORT.-Not later than three years after the

12 date of the enactment of the Act, the Commission shall
13 submit to the Congress a report containing its findings
14 and conclusions pursuant to this section, together with its
15 recommendations as to any legislation it may consider ap16 propriate for modification of the antitrust exemption for
17 Major League Baseball.
18 SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION AND FEES.
19

(a) AUTHOR IZATION.-There are authorized to be ap-

20 propriated such funds as may be necessary to carry out
21 this title, except that the amount of such funds shall not
22 exceed the amount of funds made available pursuant to
23 subsection (b) of this section. All funds appropriated
24 under this section shall remain available until expended.

12
1

(b) FEES.-Major League Baseball shall pay to the

2 Treasury of the United States on or before March 15 of
3 each calendar year a fee in the amount of two-tenths of
4 1 per centum of the aggregate dollar amount of combined
5 team revenues received during each preceding calendar
6 year, except that the Commission, by rule, may exempt
7 any revenue or class of revenue from any fee imposed by
8 this subsection, if the Commission finds that such exemp9 tion is consistent with the public interest. The Commis10 sion, by rule, shall set forth the manner and terms under
11 which such payment shall be made after consultation with
12 the Secretary of the Treasury and Major League Baseball.
13 Payment of any fee under this subsection shall be made
14 for each of the five years that this Act shall be effective,
15 and for any additional years the Congress shall determine
16 pursuant to section 10 of this Act.
17 SEC. 10. TERM OF THE COMMISSION.

18

The duties and powers set forth in this Act shall

19 cease to be effective five years after the date of enactment,
20 unless otherwise extended by the Congress.
21 SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.
22

This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment.
0
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To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such
teams, shall be subject to the antitrust laws.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 31, 1995
Mr. TORRES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues
composed of such teams, shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3
4

SECTION 1. FINDING.

The Congress finds that the business of providing for

5 profit public baseball games between teams of professional
6 baseball players in a league and between such teams of
7 rival leagues is in, or affects, interstate commerce.

2
1
2
3

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL.

The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of pro-

4 viding for profit public baseball games between teams of
5 professional baseball players and to leagues composed of
6 teams of professional baseball players.
7
8

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.

For purposes of this Act, the term "antitrust laws"

9 has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first sec-

10 tion of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that
11 such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Com12 mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section
13 5 relates to unfair methods of competition.
14
15

SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.

Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct oc-

16 curring before the date of the enactment of this Act.
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 11, 1995
Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky (for himself, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida, Mr.
OWENS, Mr. PARKER, Mr. McKEON, and Mr. TRAFICANT) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6
7
8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 fect6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur

8

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

9

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

10

lating to the minor leagues;

11

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

12

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

13

ball on franchise relocation; or

14

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

15

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

16

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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To require the partial application of the antitrust laws to major and minor
league baseball.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 12, 1995
Mr. McHALE (for himself, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. FILNER, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky, Mr. POMEROY, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. ORTIz, Mr. BEILENSON, Mr.
McNuLTY, Mr. BARCIA, Mr. ZIMMER, Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi, Ms.
WOOLSEY, Mr. ORTON, Mr. EVANS, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. HINCHEY, Ms.
LOFGREN, and Mr. VISCLOSKY) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the partial application of the antitrust laws to
major and minor league baseball.

1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995" or the "Giles Act".
6

7

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE CLAYTON ACT.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

8 by adding at the end the following:

2
1

"SEc. 27. The antitrust laws shall apply to any re-

2 straint or agreement imposed by professional baseball,
3 major or minor league team owners, their agents or em4 ployees, on the location of any minor league team or fran5 chise.".
0
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S 1

To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such
teams shall be subject to the antitrust laws.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. MOYNIHAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to the antitrust

laws.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act may be cited as the "National Pastime Pres-

5 ervation Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7
8
9

The Congress finds that(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate commerce; and

2
1

(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to re-

2

verse the result of the decisions of the Supreme

3

Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club

4

of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Profes-

5

sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson

6

v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),

7

and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which ex-

8

empted baseball from coverage under the antitrust

9

laws.

10
11
12

SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

13 by adding at the end the following new section:
14

"SEc. 27. (a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in

15 Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly
16 known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'), the
17 antitrust laws shall apply to the business of organized pro-

18 fessional baseball.
19

"(b) APPLICATION OF SECTION.-This section-

20

(1) shall apply to any agreement that is in ef-

21

fect on or after the date of enactment of this section

22

and to conduct engaged in after that date in further-

23

ance of that agreement or in furtherance of any

24

other object; but

3
1
2

(2) shall not apply to conduct engaged in before
that date.".
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To apply the antitrust laws to major league baseball in certain circumstances,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 14 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. BINGAMAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws to major league baseball in
certain circumstances, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congressassembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act shall be known as the "Professional Base-

5 ball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO7
8

FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new sections:

2

1
2

"SEC. 27. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS.

"(a) IN GENERAL.-The antitrust laws shall apply

3 to the business of organized professional major league
4 baseball with respect to labor relations between labor and
5 management (including agreements between the labor or6 ganization representing the players of professional major
7 league baseball and the owners of professional major
8 league teams and agreements between such individual
9 owners and players).
10

"(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this

11 section shall be construed to affect12

"(1)

the outcome of any antitrust litigation

13

based on any area or activity of the business of pro-

14

fessional baseball other than the area of, or an activ-

15

ity relating to, relations between labor and manage-

16

ment of major league baseball;

17

"(2) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

1291 et seq.)

(commonly known as the

18

U.S.C.

19

'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'); or

20

"(3) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

21

antitrust laws to professional baseball's

amateur

22

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

23

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

24

lating to the minor leagues.

3
1 "SEC. 28. THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION.
2

"(a) IN GENERAL.-The nonstatutory labor exemp-

3 tion from the antitrust laws shall not apply to any term
4 or condition that5

"(1)

is unilaterally imposed or maintained by

6

any party that has been subject to an agreement be-

7

tween the owners of major league baseball and the

8

labor organization representing the players of major

9

league baseball; and

10

"(2) differs substantially from the provisions of

11

the basic agreement between the two parties that ex-

12

pired on December 31, 1993.

13

"(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION."(1)

14

IN GENERAL.-Nothing in this section

15

shall otherwise be construed to affect the scope or

16

application of the nonstatutory labor exemption from

17

the antitrust laws.
"(2)

18

DEFINITION.-As used in this section,

19

'term or condition' does not include a strike or lock-

20

out.

21

"(c) TERMINATION.-Subsection (a) shall not apply

22 to conduct that is incidental to, or that occurs after, the
23 mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of
24 major league baseball and the labor organization rep25 resenting the players of major league baseball to replace
26 the basic agreement between the two parties that expired

4
1 on December 31, 1993, but shall apply to other conduct
2 occurring before the adoption of such an agreement.".
0
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1ST SESSION

To require the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 14 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995
Mr. THURMOND (for himself and Mr. LEAHY) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the application of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6
7

8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 fect6

"(1)

the application of the antitrust laws to

7

baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve

8

clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any

9

other matter relating to the minor leagues; or

10

"(2) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
(commonly known as the

11

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.)

12

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
0
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 27, 1995
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and
Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6
7
8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 fect6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur

8

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

9

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

10

lating to the minor leagues;

11

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

12

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

13

ball on franchise relocation; or

14

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

15

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

16

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
0
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARICH 27, 1995
Mr. HATC (for himself, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and
Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
FEBRUARY

6, 1996

Reported by Mr. HATCH without amendment

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".

2
1

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-

2

3

FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

4 by adding at the end the following new section:
5

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

6 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
7 league baseball.
8

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

9 feet10

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

11

antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur

12

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

13

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

14

lating to the minor leagues;

15

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

16

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

17

ball on franchise relocation; or

18

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

19

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

20

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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To provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous antitrust litigation, to
promote equitable resolution of disputes over the location of professional
sports franchises, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
APRIL 23, 1996
Mr. THURMOND introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous antitrust litigation, to promote equitable resolution of disputes over the location of professional sports franchises,
and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Professional Sports

5 Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996".
6
7

SEC. 2. ACTIONS AUTHORIZED.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any provision of

8 the antitrust laws, and subject to section 3 and subsection

2
1 (b) of this section, a professional sports league or its mem2 ber franchises may establish and enforce rules and proce3 dures for the purpose of deciding whether a member fran4 chise may change its home territory.
5

(b) CONsTRUCTION.-Nothing in this section shall be

6 construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any conduct
7 which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if en8 gaged in by a single entity.
9
10

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTITRUST PROTECTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.-This Act applies to a professional

11 sports league and its member franchises if such league12

(1) establishes applicable rules and procedures

13

to govern whether a member franchise may change

14

its home territory that are available upon request to

15

any interested party;

16

(2) affords due process, including 180 days no-

17

tice and an opportunity to be heard, to interested

18

parties prior to deciding whether a member fran-

19

chise may change its home territory; and

20

(3) promotes comparable economic opportuni-

21

ties by sharing revenue among member franchises to

22

account for disparities in revenue received or costs

23

saved due to direct or indirect public benefits and

24

subsidies, including publicly financed facilities, rent

25

abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrange-

3
1

ments for parking, concessions, and other amenities,

2

and other public benefits not generally available to

3

businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction.

4

(b) RULES AND PROCEDURES.-Rules and proce-

5 dures established under subsection (a)(1) shall require
6 consideration of various factors to protect the public inter7 est, including8

(1) the extent to which fan support for a mem-

9

ber franchise has been demonstrated through attend-

10

ance, ticket sales, and television ratings, during the

11

period in which the member franchise played in its

12

home territory;

13

(2) the extent to which the member franchise

14

has, directly or indirectly, received public financial

15

support through publicly financed facilities, rent

16

abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrange-

17

ments for parking, concessions, and other amenities,

18

and any other public benefits not generally available

19

to businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction, and

20

the extent to which such support continues;

21

(3) the effect that relocation would have on con-

22

tracts, agreements, and understandings between the

23

member franchise and public and private parties;

24

(4) the extent of any net operating losses expe-

25

rienced by the member franchise in recent years and

4
1

the extent to which the member franchise bears re-

2

sponsibility for such losses; and

3

(5) any bona fide offer to purchase the member

4

franchise at fair market value, if such offer includes

5

the continued location of such member franchise in

6

its home territory.

7

SEC. 4. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

8

(a) STANDARD OF REvIEw.-The standard of judi-

9 cial review shall be de novo in any action challenging the
10 establishment and enforcement of rules and procedures for
11 deciding whether a member franchise may change its
12 home territory, except that the reviewing court shall give
13 deference to actions of the professional sports league re14 garding compliance with paragraphs (1) and (3) of section
15 3(a).
16

(b) DECLARATORY ACTIONS.-A professional sports

17 league or any interested party may seek a declaratory
18 judgment with respect to whether paragraphs (1) and (3)
19 of section 3(a) are adequately satisfied by the professional
20 sports league for this Act to apply.

21

(c) LIMITATION ON

MONETARY

DAMAGEs.-A judi-

22 cial finding that a professional sports league did not com23 ply with any provision of section 3 shall result only in fur24 ther proceedings by the professional sports league and

5
1 shall not result in liability under the antitrust laws or
2 monetary damages, if3

(1) the professional sports league implemented

4

a revenue sharing plan in a good faith attempt to

5

comply with section 3(a)(3) prior to the specific dis-

6

pute in issue; or

7

(2) a prior declaratory judgment held that the

8

revenue sharing plan of the professional sports

9

league complied with section 3(a)(3).

10

(d) VENuE.-In any action challenging the establish-

11 ment and enforcement of rules and procedures to decide
12 whether a member franchise may change its home terri13 tory, venue shall be proper only in the United States Dis14 trict Court for the District of Columbia, except that15

(1) venue shall be proper only in the United

16

States District Court for the Southern District of

17

New York if the existing or proposed home territory

18

of a member franchise is located within 100 miles of

19

the United States District Court for the District of

20

Columbia; and

21

(2) venue shall be proper only in the United

22

States District Court for the Northern District of Il-

23

linois if-

24

(A) the existing home territory of a mem-

25

ber franchise is located within 100 miles of the

6
1

United States District Court for the District of

2

Columbia or the Southern District of New

3

York; and

4

(B) the proposed home territory of the

5

member franchise is located within 100 miles of

6

the United States District Court for the Dis-

7

trict of Columbia or the Southern District of

8

New York.

9

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

10
11

For purposes of this Act(1) the term "antitrust laws"-

12

(A) has the same meaning as in subsection

13

(a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15

14

U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes

15

section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

16

(15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section

17

relates to unfair methods of competition; and

18

(B) includes any State law comparable to

19

the laws referred to in subparagraph (A);

20

(2) the terms

"professional

sports team",

21

"team", "member franchise", and "franchise" mean

22

any team of professional athletes that is a member

23

of a professional sports league;

24
25

(3) the terms "professional sports league" and
"league" mean-

7
1

(A) an association of 2 or more profes-

2

sional sports teams that governs the conduct of

3

its members and regulates the contests and ex-

4

hibitions in which such teams regularly engage;

5

(B) whose decisions relating to franchise

6

relocation would otherwise be subject to the

7

antitrust laws; and

8
9

(C) that has combined franchise revenues
of more than $10,000,000 per year;

10

(4) the term "interested party" means the

11

member franchise at issue, local and State govern-

12

ment officials, owners and operators of playing fa-

13

cilities, concessionaires, and others whose business

14

relations would be directly and significantly affected

15

by the franchise relocation at issue, and representa-

16

tives of organized civic and fan groups; and

17

(5) the term "playing facility" means the sta-

18

dium, arena, or other venue in which professional

19

sports teams regularly conduct their contests and ex-

20

hibitions.

21
22

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act applies to any action occurring on or after

23 the date of enactment of this Act.
0
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S.1767

To harmonize the application of the antitrust laws to professional sports,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 16, 1996
Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To harmonize the application of the antitrust laws to
professional sports, and for other purposes.

1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Sports Antitrust Re-

5 form Act of 1996".
6
7
8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"SEC. 27. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-

2
3

FESSIONAL SPORTS.

"(a) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-

4

"(1) the term 'home territory' means the geo-

5

graphic metropolitan area within which a member

6

team operates and plays the majority of its home

7

games;

8
9

"(2) the term 'interested party' includes, with
respect to a member team-

10

"(A) any political subdivision of a State

11

that provides, or has provided, financial assist-

12

ance, including tax abatement, for facilities (in-

13

eluding a stadium or arena) in which the mem-

14

ber team plays;

15

"(B) a representative of the political sub-

16

division with jurisdiction over the geographic

17

area in which the stadium or arena of the mem-

18

ber team is located;

19

"(C) a member team;

20

"(D) the owner or operator of a stadium

21

or arena of a member team; and

22

"(E) any other person who is determined

23

to be an affected party by the sports league of

24

the member team;

25

"(3) the term 'member team' means a team of

26

professional athletes-

3
1
2
3

"(A) organized to play professional football, basketball, or hockey; and
"(B) that is a member of a professional

4

sports league;

5

"(4) the term 'person' means any individual,

6

partnership, corporation, or unincorporated associa-

7

tion, any combination or association thereof, or any

8

State or political subdivision of a State;

9
10
11
12
13
14

"(5) the term 'professional sports league' means
an association that"(A) is composed of 2 or more member
teams;
"(B) regulates the contests and exhibitions
of its member teams; and

15

"(C) has been engaged in competition in a

16

particular sport for a period of more than 7

17

years; and

18

"(6) the terms 'stadium' and 'arena' mean the

19

principal physical facility within which a member

20

team has played the majority of its home games.

21

"(b) ESTABLISITMENT OF RULE.-

22

"(1) IN GENERAL.-Subject to the require-

23

ments set forth in this section, any professional

24

sports league may establish a rule-

4
1

"(A) authorizing the membership of that

2

league to decide whether or not a member team

3

of that league may be relocated outside of the

4

home territory of that member team; and

5

"(B) requiring that any person seeking to

6

change the home territory of that member team

7

obtain the approval of the appropriate profes-

8

sional sports league.

9

"(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAWS.-

10

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the

11

antitrust laws shall not apply to the enforcement or

12

application by a professional sports league of any

13

rule established pursuant to paragraph (1).

14

"(c) PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.-

15

"(1) REQUEST FOR APPROVAL.-

16

"(A) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 210

17

days before the commencement of the season in

18

which a member team proposes to play in a new

19

location, any person seeking to change the

20

home territory of that member team shall sub-

21

mit a request for approval of the proposed

22

change to the appropriate professional sports

23

league.

5
1

"(B)

REQuIREM~nENT.-Each request for

2

approval submitted under subparagraph (A)

3

shall-

4

"(i) be in writing;

5

"(ii) be delivered in person or by cer-

6

tified mail to each interested party by not

7

later than 30 days after submission to the

8

appropriate

9

under subparagraph (A);

professional

sports

league

10

"(iii) be made available by the date

11

specified in clause (ii) to the news media;

12

"(iv) be published by the date speci-

13

fled in clause (iii) in 1 or more newspapers

14

of general circulation within the home ter-

15

ritory of the member team; and

16
17
18

"(v) contain"(I) an identification of the proposed location of the member team;

19

"(II) a summary of the reasons

20

for the change in home territory based

21

on the criteria described in paragraph

22

(2) (B); and

23

"(III) the date on which the pro-

24

posed change would become effective.

25

"(2) PROCEDURES.-

6
1

"(A) ESTABLISIIENT.-Each professional

2

sports league shall establish rules and proce-

3

dures for approving or disapproving requests

4

submitted under paragraph (1), that shall-

5

"(i) include criteria to be considered

6

by the professional sports league in ap-

7

proving or disapproving such requests; and

8

"(ii) be made available upon request

9

to any interested party.

10

"(B) CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDERED.-The

11

criteria described in subparagraph (A)(i) shall

12

include-

13

"(i) the extent to which fan loyalty to

14

and support for the member team has been

15

demonstrated during the tenure of the

16

member team in the home territory;

17

"(ii) the degree to which the member

18

team has engaged in good faith negotia-

19

tions with appropriate persons concerning

20

the terms and conditions under which the

21

member team would continue to play its

22

games in the home territory of the member

23

team;

24

"(iii) the degree to which the owner-

25

ship or management of the member team

7
1

has contributed to any circumstance that

2

might demonstrate the need for the reloca-

3

tion of the member team;

4

"(iv) the extent to which the member

5

team has, directly or indirectly, received

6

public financial support by means of any

7

publicly financed playing facility, special

8

tax treatment, or any other form of public

9

financial support;

10

"(v) the adequacy of the stadium or

11

arena of the member team, and the willing-

12

ness of the stadium or arena authority and

13

the local government to remedy any defi-

14

ciencies in the stadium or arena;

15

"(vi) whether the member team has

16

incurred net operating losses, exclusive of

17

depreciation or amortization, sufficient to

18

threaten the continued financial viability of

19

the member team;

20

"(vii) whether any other member team

21

in the professional sports league is located

22

in the home territory of the member team;

23

"(viii) whether the member team pro-

24

poses to relocate to a territory in which no

8
1

other member team in the professional

2

sports league is located;

3

"(ix) whether the stadium or arena

4

authority, if public, is opposed to the relo-

5

cation; and

6

"(x) any other criteria considered to

7

be appropriate by the professional sports

8

league.

9

"(3) HEARINGs.-In determining whether to

10

approve or disapprove a proposed request submitted

11

under paragraph (1), the professional sports league

12

shall-

13

"(A) conduct a hearing at which interested

14

parties shall be afforded an opportunity to sub-

15

mit written testimony and exhibits; and

16

"(B) keep a written record of that hearing

17

and any testimony and exhibits submitted

18

under subparagraph (A).

19

"(d) JUDICIAL REVIEW.-

20

"(1) IN GENERAL.-A decision by a profes-

21

sional sports league to approve or disapprove a re-

22

quest submitted under paragraph (1) may only be

23

reviewed in a civil action filed by an interested party

24

in accordance with this subsection.

25

"(2) VENE.-

9
1

"(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in

2

subparagraph (B), an action under this sub-

3

section may be filed only in the United States

4

District Court for the District of Columbia.

5

"(B) EXCEPTIoN.-If the home territory

6

of the member team or the proposed home ter-

7

ritory of the member team is located within a

8

50-mile radius of the District of Columbia, an

9

action under this subsection may be filed only

10

in the United States District Court for the

11

Southern District of New York.

12

"(3) ThmE.-

13

"(A) FILING.-An action under this sub-

14

section shall be filed not later than 14 days

15

after the date of the formal vote of the profes-

16

sional sports league approving or disapproving

17

the proposed relocation.

18

"(B) REvIE.-Not later than 30 days

19

after the filing of the action in accordance with

20

subparagraph (A), the district court shall issue

21

an order with respect to that action.

22

"(4) STANDARD OF REVIEw.-The scope of ju-

23

dicial review in any action under this subsection

24

shall be limited to a determination of whether-

10
1

"(A) in deciding whether to approve or dis-

2

approve a proposed relocation, the professional

3

sports league failed to comply with this section;

4

and

5

"(B) the decision of the professional sports

6

league to approve or disapprove a proposed re-

7

location was arbitrary or capricious.

8

"(5) RELIEF GRANTED BY COURT.-

9

"(A) IN GENERAL.-In any action under

10

this subsection, if the district court makes a de-

11

termination described in subparagraph (A) or

12

(B) of paragraph (4), the court shall-

13

"(i)

remand the matter for further

14

consideration by the professional sports

15

league; and

16

"(ii)

enjoin any relocation of the

17

member team at issue until the profes-

18

sional sports team has reconsidered the

19

matter in accordance with the order of the

20

court under this paragraph.

21

"(B)

LIiTATION.-The

court may not

22

grant any relief in any action under this sub-

23

section other than enjoining or approving en-

24

forcement of the decision by the professional

11
1

sports league to approve or disapprove a re-

2

quest submitted under paragraph (1).".
0
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105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H Re21

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 7, 1997
M01r.
CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3

4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and

5 Communities Protection Act of 1997".
6
7
8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following:

2
1

"SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 feet6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur

8

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

9

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

10

lating to the minor leagues;

11

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

12

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

13

ball on franchise relocation; or

14

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

15

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

16

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
0

Document No. 69

I

105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

He Rx 704

To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
Mr. BUNNING (for himself and Mr. Conyers) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball

5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1997".
6
7
8

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended

9 by adding at the end the following new section:

2
1

"Sc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust

2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-

5 feet6

"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

7

antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur

8

draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-

9

sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-

10

lating to the minor leagues;

11

"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the

12

antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-

13

ball on franchise relocation; or

14

"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15

15

U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the

16

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
0
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BASEBALL FANS AND COMMUNITIES PROTECTION ACT
OF 1994

NovzmBER 29, 1994.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4994]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 4994) to apply the antitrust laws of the United States to
major league baseball, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as
amended do pass.
The amendiment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TrrLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of
1994".
SEC. 2. APPIICATION OF THE ANITTRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXrRAORDINARY CICUMSTANCES.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the followmng:
"Sic. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in restraint of trade
or commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement between 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject
to the antitrust laws.
"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed solely with respect to a professional baseball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
99-006

2
that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in such subsection occurs, to
a baseball dub that is not a major league professional baseball club.
"(c) This section shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the operation of"(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et
se.), or
"(2) any Federal statute relating to labor relations.
"(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms and conditions' does not include
a strike or a lockout.".

EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT

Inasmuch as H.R. 4994 was ordered reported with a single
amendment in the nature of a substitute, the contents of this report constitute an explanation of that amendment.
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
Professional baseball is the only industry in the United States
that is exempt from the antitrust laws without being subject to alternative regulatory supervision. There may have been a time
when such singularity was a secret source of pride and distinction
for the many who loved the game as perhaps the finest outward
manifestation of the American way of life and culture that bound
a diverse people together. That time has ended. The continuing
baseball strike of 1994-which ended the regular season, which
ended the possibility of a World Series for the first time in 90
years, and which has very nearly ended the love affair of the American people with their national pastime-has more than any other
event or legal argument created the necessary political will to subject this business to the same rules of fair and open competition,
of respect for the ultimate consumer, as all other business enterprises in this country.
The Committee's formal action of partially repealing the
nonstatutory antitrust exemption-which Congress never initiated
or endorsed but by which it has been saddled for over 70 yearsis really the first step in ending a legal fiction about the game created and perpetuated by the Supreme Court, as perhaps one of its
greatest indulgences. That indulgence, fueled first by sentimentality and then by risk-aversion, has now vested such complete power
over the sport by its financial owners as to enable them to end the
game at will.
The Committee now acts to end the illusion which has spawned
very real economic consequences. It does so by partially repealing
the nonstatutory exemption created by the 1922 decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs. In so doing, the Committee responds to the current
phase of a recurring crisis in baseball in a very limited, yet crucial,
way: by subjecting the traditional parties to Major League Baseball's 2 collective bargaining agreement-the players' union and
owners-to the Nation's antitrust laws in the event one party unilaterally imposes an anticompetitive term or condition of employ259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2
. "Major League Baseball" is an unincorporated association, consisting of the 28 major league
baseball clubs: the term is commonly used to describe the operations of the American League
and the National League in professional baseball.

3
3

ment on the other. The legislation, H.R. 4994 (the "Baseball Fans
and Communities Protection Act of 1994"), exempts minor league
baseball from the scope of its coverage, and does not interfere with
either the Sports Broadcasting Act 4 or any Federal labor relations
statute.
Congress enacted the antitrust laws a century ago to safeguard
business freedom and consumer welfare in the economic sphere,
much as personal liberties were safeguarded at the Nation's founding.5 Born in reaction to the massive consolidation of economic resources into well-integrated monopolies and cartels caused by the
rapid industrialization in the mid-to late nineteenth century, the
antitrust laws were conceived as statutes of general applicability.
The history of antitrust legislation in Congress demonstrates a
heavy presumption against any departure from this principle.
Unfortunately, this same presumption has not always obtained
in the courts, as judicial rationales were constructed to declare the
conduct of certain industries as lacking the sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce to trigger the application of the Federal statutes, including the antitrust laws. Such a rationale was applied by
the Supreme Court to the business of insurance in the 1868 decision of Paul v. Virginia,6 during an era when commerce was indeed
more localized and before the advent of Federal regulation. To its
credit, the Supreme Court by 1944 recognized that the reach of the
Commerce Clause, through its own subsequent decisions and
through the development of Federal regulatory agencies, made the
Paul decision antiquated. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,7 the Court set aside the anomalous rationale
underlying its holding of 75 years earlier.
The judicially-created baseball exemption had no such logical development and denouement. Instead, the Supreme Court, in a fit
of sentimentality and an act of denial, clung to the type of nineteenth century analysis found in Paul v. Virginia by holding that
Federal jurisdictional requirements were not met with respect to
the business of baseball. Whether this action in 1922 was the
Court's way of attempting to bolster the game in the wake of the
"Black Sox" scandal and the welcomed arrival of Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis as Commissioner is unknown. But whatever the
motive, it ceased to have any validity as developments unfolded in
the succeeding decades. When the next antitrust challenge occurred
25 years later, the Supreme Court declined to reconsider its holding in light of changed circumstances, claiming "detrimental reliance" on behalf of the owner-beneficiaries. 8 Mereover, the Court
then shifted the barden of reconsideration to Congress, which had
never statutorily authorized the spurious immunity in the first
place. In a final stroke of audacity, the Court proceeded to preempt
'While the antitrust laws apply to the realm of professional sports in numerous ways, many
of the antitrust issues raised in the professional sports context concern allegations of player restraints imposed by team employers. See generally Warren Freedman, Professional Sports and
Antitrust 72 (1987); Ethan Lock, -The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports",
1989 Duke LJ.. 339, 344-345.

15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.

The antitrust laws have been aptly termed the "charter of economic liberty." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
6 75 U.S. (8 Wall; 168 ('186A).

7 322 U.S.

533 (1944).
e2oolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
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State antitrust challenges through a convoluted estoppel theory
akin to "admission by silence": that because Congress had been silent on what the Court had wrought on its own initiative, then
Congress should be construed to have approved the exemption,
thereby entering and preempting the field even with respect to any
State law to the contrary 9
The end result was the perpetuation of the business of baseball
as a closed, cartelized industry in which the few, incumbent club
owners possess inordinate economic power and every other partyplayers, fans, municipalities, minor league club owners, potential
expansion team investors-remain economically marginalized. In a
sense, the competitive landscape resembles the very type of business arrangements that spurred Congress to enact the antitrust
laws in the first place.
The statism of the anticompetitive situation is obvious: since organized baseball began in 1871 right through the baseball strike of
1994, the same patterns of oligopolistic control are discernible: control over the players through the "reserve clause"; control over the
franchises through collusive agreements; control over the Commissioner as agent and not activist. That the most recent strike is but
one of a series of work stoppages in recent years appears no coincidence, given the unchanging intersection of an untettered antitrust
exemption together with what Judge Jerome Frank labelled a "peonage" labor arrangement.10
As indicated earlier, the action taken by the Committee is purposely narrow and targeted to deal with the most pressing problem
connected with the antitrust exemption. As such, the Committee
wishes to make clear that by applying the antitrust laws to baseball in the delineated circumstances of H.R. 4994, it is in no way
endorsing the view that the exemption extends beyond the facts of
Federal Baseball." Nor should the Committee's more limited action create any possible implication that a broader repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is not indicated from a public policy
standpoint-or that the courts are not the more appropriate forum
to take this step if only the fortitude were found. However, if the
record compiled before the Committee is considered a reliable guide
to action, then there appears to be a strong agreement for sweeping, if not total, repeal.
HEARINGS
The Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law conducted
oversight hearings on baseball's antitrust exemption on March 31,
1993, and September 22, 1994.
Witnesses at the March 31, 1993 hearing included the Hon. Bob
Graham and the Hon. Connie Mack, U.S. Senators from the State
of Florida; the Hon. Michael Bilirakis and the Hon. C. W. Bill
Young, U.S. Representatives from the State of Florida; the Hon.
Jim Bunning, U.S. Representative from the State of Kentucky; the
Hon. Frank Horton, former U.S. Representative from the State of
New York; Allan H. "Bud" Selig, chairman, Executive Council of
9Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258. 284-285 (1972). See also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
0
oGardellav. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949).
"See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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Major League Baseball, and owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, accompanied by Jimmie Lee Solomon, direc.tor of minor league relations for Major League Baseball; Stanley Brand, Brand & Lowell,
and special counsel, Professional Baseball Leagues; Gary R. Rob-

erts, vice dean and professor of law, Tulane University; Donald M.
Fehr, executive director, Major League Baseball Players Association; James A. Michener, author of "Sports in America"; James W.
Quinn, Weil, Gotshal & Manges; and Stephen Ross, professor of
law, University of Illinois.
Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Selig, Mr. Fehr, and Mr. Brand also testified
at the September 22, 1994, hearing, along with the Hon. Sherwood
L. Boehlert, U.S. Representative from the State of New York; John
Feinstein, sportswriter and author of "Play Ball-The Life and
Troubled Times of Major League Baseball"; and Adam Kolton, executive director, Sports Fans United.
COMMITTEE VOTE
On September 28, 1994, a reporting quorum being present, the
Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law ordered H.R.
4994, amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute,
reported to the Committee on the Judiciary by voice vote. On September 29, 1994, a reporting quorum being present, the Committee
on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 4994, as amended, reported to the
full House by voice vote.
DIscuSSION
I. HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Early history
Although the game of baseball as we know it today had its genesis in 1842, the first professional association, the National Association of Professional Base Ball Players, was not organized until
1871. Soon thereafter, the formation of the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs in 1876 led to the transfer of power over
the game from the players to their financial backers.12 These financial backers-the National League club owners-soon began collaborating on issues such as player control, and by 1887 were requiring that the best players on each3 club (or team) be bound to
that team through a "reserve clause." 1
1See

generally Geoffrey G. Ward and Ken K. Burns, Baseball: An Illustrated History 23-

24 (1994) [hereinafter Ward & Burns]. In February 1876, Chicago White Stockings owner and

coal magnate William A. Hulbert met with seven other club owners eager as he was to tighten
their gnp on the game" and formed the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs. There
were eight charter members: Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, and Louisville. Id. at 24.
13A reserve clause" seeks to give a club owner the perpetual right to bind, or "reserve," a
player to a team. In 1879, the National League owners adopted Boston Red Stockings owner
Arthur Soden's proposal to secretly "reserve" 5 players per team-and thus the "reserve system"
was born. See Lee Lowenfish and Tony Lupien, The Imperfect Diamond: The Story of Baseball's
Reserve System and the Men Who Fought to Change It 18 (1980); Ward & Burns, supra note
12, at 24 ('To solidif their power, [Chicago White Stockings owner] Hulbert and his allies soon
added a reserve clause to the contracts of the five beat men on every team: this required that
for his current employer and, in ffect, 'reserved' his services in perpeity. Playeach pla
too strenuously were fired, then blacklisted."). The number of reservd players
ers
the
to 11 per team in 1883, to 12 in 1885, 14 in 1887-and by the early 1
was enl
reserve cluse was in the contract of every professional baseball player. See Michael Canes, The
Social Benefits of Team Quality, in Government and the Sports Business 83(1974).

6
In response to the owners' reserve system and other unilateral
practices--such as the capping of player salaries--the players, led
by John Montgomery ("Monte") Ward, a star pitcher and shortstop
for the New York Giants, in 1889 organized a new league known
as the Players' Leagui. Most of the star players went to the new
league for the 1890 season. 4 The National League owners responded with cutthroat aggression; and Chicago White Stockings
owner A.G. Spalding openly declared at the time: "I am for war
without quarter. I was opposed at first, but now I wani to fight
until one of us drops dead. * * * From this point on it will simply
be a case of dog eat dog, and the dog with the bull dog tendencies
will live the longest."15 Within a year, the National League owners
had eliminated the Players' League as a competitor.18 When the
National League owners eliminated yet another competitor league
(the American Association) after the 1891 season, their 7monopoly
control over professional baseball was firmly established.1
Another brief period of economic competition in professional
baseball began in 1899, with the formation of what was to become
the American League. But by 1903, the American and National
Leagues agreed that it would be less expensive if they were to collaborate in their business, rather than competitively bid for player
services and fan support. The leagues formalized their cooperative
intent in a "National Agreement," which called for two separate but
equal leagues that would honor each other's contracts (maintaining
the reserve clause system for the leagues' mutual benefit), and provided for an annual "World's Series" to be played between the
champion of each league.' 8 A National Baseball Commission was
established, composed of the presidents of the two leagues and a
permanent chairman. The National Agree ment empowered the
commission to control baseball by its own decrees, enforcing them
the aid of law, and answerable .o no power outside its
without
own.' 9
Soon thereafter, the death of major league player Addie Joss, and
the financial need of his widow, inspired a benefit game organized
by the players with proceeds to benefit Mrs. Joss. This experience
galvanized anew the players' attention on their own future secu1

4See generally Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions 5-6 11992) [hereinafter Zimbalist,
Billions].
5
, 6 Quoted in Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 39.
1 Although the National League initially reacted to the Players' League by commencing a salary war and giving tickets away to build attendance, the Players' League at first held its own
financially. Sever National League owners then sought court injunctions to prevent players
from moving to the Players' League; but the courts rejected the owners' requests for i nunctions,
on the ground that the reserve clause contracts lacked "mutuality" -as players coud be dismissed by the clubs with a mere 10 days' notice, yet were obligatcd to play for the clubs their
entire baseball playing lives. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890). Ultimately, however, the National League owners were able to coopt the backers of the Players'
League through a combination of financial inducements and merger proposals. See, e.g., Zimba.
list. Billions, supra note 14, at 6; Robert Berry et al., Labor Relations in Professional Sports
49 (1986) [hereinafter Labor Relations; E.C. Alft, Jr., The Development of Baseball as a Business: 1876-1900 [hereinafter Alft], in Study of Monopoly Power: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 6, Organized Baseball,
7 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1432-1443 (1951) (hereinafter 1951 House Hearings].
1 See, e.g., Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 6 ("The AA dissolved after the 1891 season
with four of its teams added to the NL"). The National League soon reaped the harvest of its
monooly power as player salaries fell an average of 40 percent in 1893, while team profits rose.
, in 1951 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 1443.
See
18See Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 65-67; see also Dan Abramson, Baseball & the Court,
in Constitution 68, 69-71 (Fall 1992) [hereinafter Abramson].
I9See generally Wa-d & Bums, supra note 12, at 65-06.
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rity. Following the 1912 season, the players organized the Fraternity of Professional Base Ball Players of America-with the avowed
purpose of eliminating the reserve clause and gaining for the
players a larger percentage of the profits produced by the game. 20
B. Origin of professional baseball's nonstatutoryantitrust exemption
By the end of 1913, another league, the Federal Baseball League,
was formed by a group of wealthy businessmen. Several major
league players joined the new Federal League, even at the risk of
being "blacklisted" by the two entrenched, cooperating major
leagues. 2 1 In 1915, after incurring significant financial losses, the
Federal Baseball League brought an antitrust suit against the
American and National Leagues, asking the court for a declaration
that the National Agreement was anticompetitive and that the reserve clauses in individual player, contracts were void.22 Subsequent to trial, and pending a decision by Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis (later to become the first professional baseball commissioner), the Federal League reached a settlement with the American and National Leagues. In return for agreeing to dissolve the
Federal League, its owners were to receive $600,000 each and owners of the Chicago and St. Louis Federal League franchises were
permitted to purchase two existing major league teams.
The owners of the Baltimore Federal League franchise, denied
the opportunity to purchase an existing major league team, filed
their own antitrust suit.3 Following a trial, a jury found that the
defendants had unlawfully conspired to destroy the Federal
League, and that the Baltimore club had been damaged in the
amount of $80,000 (which by law was trebled to $240,000).24 However, in 1921, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the antitrust laws did not apply to professional baseball because the sport was neither trade, nor commerce, nor conducted among the States.25 And in 1922, the Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court in a lengthy opinion delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
[T)he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the
Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and
20 See id. at 121. Like the short-lived Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players founded
in the 1880's by Monte Ward, which was crushed along with Ward's Players' League (see supra
notes 14-16 and accompanying text), the fraternity was a precursor to the current Major League
Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA). The MLBPA was formed in 1954 primarily as an outgrowth of player unhappiness over the lack of progress in bargaining for an improved pension
plan. But between 1954 and 1966, the MLBPA's legal counsel was Judge Robert Cannon, a man
who aspired to be baseball's commissioner and supprted the reserve clause. As a result, the
MLBPA did not prove to be an active force until after 1966, when Marvin Miller, a longtime
negotiator for the United Steelworkers, was chosen as the MLBPA's first executive director. See
Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 17.
21 See Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 121-123.
2 See id. at 123.
23 See generally Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 123, 127; Lionel S. Sobel, Professional
Sports and the Law 1-7 (1977) [hereinafter Sobel].
24 See generally Abramson, supra note 18, at 72; Sobel, supra note 23, at 56 n.18; National
League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs v. FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore, 269 Fed. 681, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1921), ald, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Private persons injured in their business or property
by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws are entitled to recover treble damages. Clayton
Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15. In addition to compensating injured plaintiffs, treble damages serve to
punish wrongdoers and enlist private plaintiffs in the work of detecting, punishing, and thereby
deterring anticompetitive conduct.
25 National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs v. FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore, 269
F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1921), affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to
change the character of the business. According to this dis-

tinction insisted upon in Hooper v. California, * * * the

transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That
to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for
money, would not be called trade or
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words.26
Although this reasoning and result may have comported with the
narrow view of interstate commerce as articulated in the earlier
Hooper opinion, that narrow view had already been significantly
undermined by statutes passed and Judicial decisions rendered in
the years intervening between Hooper and Federal Baseball.27 (The
Hooper rationale was explicitly overruled in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).28) The Court's
failure to recognize these developments and apply the antitrust
laws to the burgeoning interstate business of professional baseball
allowed the National and American Leagues to continue strengthening their cartel, and through it, their grip on the game and the
players.
The power and influence of the National and American leagues
during this period was vividly illustrated by professional baseball's
"farm system," by which major league clubs, through ownership
and affiliation, were able to control minor league teams stocked
with large numbers of players subject to long-term reserve clause
requirements. The farm system, which was perfected by Branch
Rickey's St. Louis Cardinals in the 1920's, strengthened the major

league owners' control over baseball players in a number of re-

spects. First, being bound by the reserve clause, players in the
minor league system had no choice but to stay within that team's
system or leave professional baseball altogether. Second, low minor
league salaries helped pressure major league players to reduce
their own salary demands, lest they lose their jobs to a minor
26 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs, 259

U.S. 200, 208-209 (1922) (citing Hooper v. California,155 U.S. 648 (1895)).

27 Hooper was itself a decision by a Court believing that it was constrained to follow precedent-in that case the precedent of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Both Paul
and Hooper dealt with the extent of State regulatory authority; Federal authority was not at
issue. Moreover, at the time of Paul, Congress had made scant use of its Commerce Clause powers, and the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis at the time of Paul had generally treated the "interstate commerce" threshold as a bright line dividing Federal and State authority.
See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875); Steamship Co. v. Postwardens, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 31 (1867); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). With the creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, however, Congress clearly had signaled an intent to
assert its authority over key business sectors having interstate ramifications. The Sherman Act
of 1890 had, of course, gone even further, forbidding "[e]very contract, combination * * *, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." By 1922, there were
a number of Supreme Court opinions indicating that the Court had increasngly broadened its
view of the activities that came within the Federal Government's Commerce Clause Powers,
while holding that recognition of Federal authority in no way diminished State authority unless
Congress clearly preempted the field. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 434-435
(1912); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209-210 (1894); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 699702 (1880).
2s 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Hooper had rested upon the notion that the issuance of insurance policies throughout several States did not constitute interstate commerce. But South-Eastern Underwriters held that a fire insurance company conducting substantial interstate business was
involved in interstate commerce, and that it was therefore subject to the Sherman Act. Id. at
541 ("This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function
in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in
all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of (these] companies' methods of doing
business.").

9
league player willing to work at the major league level for less.
Third, major league omers were able to sell the contracts of minor
league players bound by reserve clauses.29
The antitrust exemption conferred upon professional baseball by
the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball went unchallenged for 25
years. The first challenge grew out of the 1946 attempt by entrepreneurs in Mexico to establish a competitive new league by recruiting players with promises of higher salaries. When the Mexican entrepreneurs succeeded in signing 18 major league players,
the major leagues blacklisted all 18 players, and suspended them
for 5 years. 0 The major leagues also entered into agreements with
foreign leagues in the Caribbean, South and Central America, and
Canada not to hire the blacklisted players. And when the promoters of the Mexican League failed financially and abandoned their
battle, the new leaders of that league entered into a like agreement
with the major leagues, to honor each other's player contracts, including the reserve clause provisions.3'
With no place left to play, one of the suspended players, Danny
Gardella, brought suit under the antitrust laws challenging his
blacklisting. Apparently, the Supreme Court's recent broadening in
South-Eastern Underwriters of what constituted interstate commerce in the insurance context gave Mr. Gardella cause for hope.
And in the 1949 decision of Gardella v. Chandler,32 the Second Circuit held, in opinions by Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank,
that the advent of nationwide radio and television baseball game
broadcasts, in conjunction with the interstate movement of teams,
was enough to bring the business of professional baseball within
the definition of interstate commerce for purposes of the antitrust
laws. In his opinion, Judge Frank not only characterized the Federal Baseball decision as "an impotent zombie," but pointed out
that the exemption created by the decision had led to a pernicious
restraint on basic human liberty:
I think [Federal Baseball] should be * * * distinguished,
if possible, because * * * we have here a monopoly which,

in its effect on ball-players like the plaintiff, possesses
characteristics shockingly repugnant to moral principles
that, at least since the War Between the States, have been
basic in America, as shown by the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, condemning "involuntary servitude,"
and by subsequent Congressional enactments on that subject. For the "reserve clause," as has been observed, results
in something resembling peonage of the baseball player. 3
Professional baseball quickly settled out of court with Gardella, but
34
by 1951 found itself defending eight additional antitrust suits.

" See Abramson, supra note 18, at 72-73. See also Benjamin Rader, Baseball: A History of
Amerca's Game 134 (1972); NeI Sullivan, The Minors: The Struggles and the Triumph of Baseball's Poor Relation from 1876 to the Present 99-100 (1990); Lance Davis, Self-Regulation in
Baseball, 1909-1971, in Government and the Sports Business 349, 365 (1974); Murray Polner,
Branch Rickey 86 (1982).
'o See Abramson, supra note 18, at 73.
" See Sobel, supra note 23, at 7-19.
'2 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id at 409 (citations omitted).
' See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 13.
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Uncertain of its chances in the courts, professional baseball
turned to Congress. Three bills were introduced in the Houseeach of which would have codified a blanket antitrust exemption
for all professional sports organizations. These bills were extensively studied by Representative Emmanuel Celler's Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power (predecessor to the Subcommittee
on Economic and Commercial Law), which recommended against
their passage.35
Perhaps as significant as the Subcommittee's rejection of the bills
was the rationale for the rejection that was provided in the Subcommittee's report. The report premised its reasoning and conclusions on the expectation that Federal Baseball would be overru!ed:
The Supreme Court's decision in the Federal League
case has not been over-ruled. Nevertheless, as the various
opinions in the recent case of Gardella v. Chandler demonstrate, it may be seriously doubted whether baseball
should now be regarded as exempt from the antitrust laws.
Since 1922, there have been important changes both in the
operations of organized baseball and also in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of the statutes enacted
pursuant to Congress'
constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce.36
The Subcommittee's assumption that the courts would apply
more current interstate commerce jurisprudence to overrule the
Court-created antitrust exemption of professional baseball proved
to be mistaken. Notwithstanding the judicial and legislative developments in the area during the 1940's and the first years of the
1950's, Federal Baseball was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
the 1953 decision of Toolson v. New York Yankees.37 The case was
brought by George Toolson, a player in the New York Yankees'
farm system who objected to his reassignment from the Newark,
New Jersey, club to one in Binghamton, New York. When he refused to report to the Binghamton club, the club placed him on its
list," barring him completely from playing professional
"ineligible
baseball.3 8
The district court dismissed Mr. Toolson's claim without a trial,
holding: "If the Federal Baseball Club case is, as Judge Frank intimates, an 'impotent zombie,' I feel that it is not my duty to so find
but that the Supreme Court should so declare."3 9 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 0 In a short per curiam opinion affirming the dismissal,
the Supreme Court avoided reconsideration of the interstate commerce question, emphasizing instead professional baseball's 30-year
reliance on the exemption:
The business [of baseball] has * * * been left for thirty
years to develop, on the understanding that it was not sub35 See 1951 House Hearings, supra note 16; Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Organized Baseball, H. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952) [hereinafter Celler Report).
36Celler Report, supra note 35, at 228.
3346 U.S. 356 (1953).
"See generally Abramson, supra note 18, at 74.
39ooson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th
Cir. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
'Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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ject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask
us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there
are evils in this field which now warrant application to it
of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation."1
A series of court decisions holding other professional sports subject to the antitrust laws has only highlighted the anomalous status of professional baseball's antitrust exemption.4 2 Meanwhile, the
phenomenal growth of baseball revenues from broadcast contracts,4 3 coupled with the continued judicial acceptance of baserelaball's reserve clause, has led to increasingly difficult labor
tions 44-- and pressure for additional congressional scrutiny.' 5
The next chapter in this history is the Supreme Court's redffirmation of Federal Baseball in the 1972 decision, Flood v. Kuhn.46
The case arose as a result of a trade between the St. Louis Cardinals and the Philadelphia Phillies. One traded player, Curt
Flood, refused to accept the trade and sign a contract with thc
Phillies, and instead challenged the reserve clause by bringing an
antitrust suit. Reiterating the rationale of its Toolson ruling, the
Supreme Court again stressed the "reliance" factor and stated it
was the responsibility of Congress, not the Judiciary, to change this
longstanding anomaly.
"Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. at 356, 357 (1953) (emphasis added).
"See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
"According to Marvin Miller, former executive director of the Major League Baseball rlayers
Association. player salaries rose insignificantly in the 20 years after World War 11, despite ateep
inflation, an by 1967 the average major league player salary was only $19,000. See Abramson,
supra note 18, at 74.
The average major league player salary for 1993 reportedly was $1.2 million. See Timothy K.
Smith and ir~e Norton, "Trowing Curves," Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Smith
& Norton); Andrew Zimbalist, "Field of Schemes," The New Republic. Aug. 15, 1994, at 11 [hereinafter Zimbalist, Field]. At this level overall players' salaries equal 50 to 58 percent of Major
League Baseball revenue. See Smith & Norton, supra. Such percentages are not considered particularly high for a labor-intensive business such as professional baseball: for example, advertising agencies and consulting firms generally spend between 50 percent and 60 percent of revenue
on worker pay, and law firms can spend as much as 75 percent on employee salaries. Id. It is
also important to recognize that a major league player's average professional life is less than
6 years; and that the median baseball Is er salary for 1993 reportedly was $410,000-far less
than the average salay See Andrew Zmblist, "Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity,"
4 Seton Hall J. Sport Law 287, 291 (1994) [hereinafter Zimbalist, "Immunity") ("Of those who
make it [to the Major Leagues], only one in eight stays for more than six years"); Zimbalist,
Field, supra.
"The industry's labor difficulties were highlighted by the 1966 holdout of the Los Angeles
Dodgers' star pitchers Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale. Kourax and Drysdale, who were primanly responsible for their team's World Series victory in the previous year, held out for 32
days into the season before settling with the team for a combined contract of $240,000, after
having threatened to bring suit against the team under California's anti-peonage laws. See
Abramson, supra note 18, at 75.
"One of the better known attempts by Congress to review baseball's unique antitrust status
occurred in 1958, when then-New York Yankees manager Casey Stengel and star center fielder
Mickey Mantle testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Stengel's
testimony included an extended speech highlighted by his famous double talk (known as
"Stengelese"), by which he managed to speak for 45 minutes without ever taking a position on
the pending legislation.
Asked by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver why a bill should be passed, Stengel answered
with rambling testimony marked by bursts of laughter from the audience:
Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. Stengel, I am not sure that I made my question clear. [Laughter.]
Mr. STENGEL Yes, sir. Well that is all right. I am not sure I am going to answer
yours perfectly either. [Laughter.]
Mantle then brought down the house by stating, "My views are just about the same as
Casey's." Organized Professional Team Sports: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13, 24 (1958). See also Ward
& Burns, supra note 12, at 354-355.
"407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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Justice Blackmun's majority opinion is perhaps best known for
its frequent romantic homages to professional baseball's heritage
and place in our Nation's history.'? While Flood followed the
Court's decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson, the Justices visibly wrestled with the bizarre results these decisions had wrought.
Even the majority opinion characterized the exemption as "an
anomaly" and "an aberration confined to baseball."48 And in his
dissent, Justice Douglas proclaimed professional baseball's antitrust exemption to be a "derelict in the stream of law that [the
Court), its creator, should remove." 49 In the end, though, the majority concluded that "what the Court said in Federal Baseball in
1922 and what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in
1972: the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and not
judicial, action."so In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger
emphasized this point by unabashedly
declaring: "[Ilt is time the
Congress acted to solve this problem." 5 I
One of the more remarkable aspects of the Flood opinion is that
after inferring congressional intent from congressiona "positive inaction," the Court went on to hold that Congress had preempted
State antitrust law enforcement in the area. 52 This judicial construction of the law has severely limited the States' power to enforce their own antitrust laws against professional baseball for activities covered by the judicially created exemption from Federal
antitrust laws.
ronically, in earlier times, the author of the original 1922 Federal Baseball decision that spawned professional baseball's
nonstatutory antitrust exemption-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.-would have taken issue with the Court's illogical adherence to
any precedent that flew in the face of fundamentally changed circumstances over the years. In criticizing such blind acceptance
nearly 90 years prior to Flood and 35 years prior to his own opinion in Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes noted:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
rule simply
laid down have vanished long since, and the
53
persists from the blind imitation of the past.
C. Recent history-Loss of the reserve clause and the collusion cases
Professional baseball's reserve clause, as upheld in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood, permitted the major league clubs to exclusively reserve the right to contract with and employ players, denying them the right to consider alternative job offers in baseball.
"Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court included references to Ring Lardner's short stories;
Ernest L. Thayer's poem, "Casey at the Bat"; and some 88 professional baseball player greats.
Id. at 262-264.
"Id. at 282.
49Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
lId. at 286.
52Id. at 284-285 (embracing the lower courts' reasoning that State antitrust regulation would
conflict with Federal policy and that national uniformity is required relative to the regulation
of baseball and its reserve system; and that, as the burden on interstate commerce outweighs
the States' interest in regulating baseball's reserve system, the Commerce Clause precludes the
application of State antitrust law).
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1887).
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Baseball's owners insisted that the reserve clause was necessary to
maintain the "competitive balance" of the game.5 4 However, developments since the Flood case have disproved this contention. In
1975, the reserve clause was invalidated and player "free agency"
was born when an arbitrator ruled, in response to a grievance filed
by major league players Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally,
that the language of the uniform player's contract and certain
major league rules did not provide the clubs with a legal right to
perpetually reserve a player's services.55 The owners' loss of the reserve clause does not seem to have disrupted the competitive balance of the game, as prophesied by the owners, but rather to have
enhanced it.56
Following the arrival of free agency in baseball, beginning in
1985, baseball owners organized a surreptitious industry-wide boycott of free agents that continued for several years and led the
players to file three labor grievances alleging collusion.5 7 These
collusion cases" have been well documented in the press. A lead
article in the Wall Street Journal described how then-Commissioner Peter Ueberroth chided the owners for being "dumb" and
"stupid" in bidding on free agents; and he was quoted by an owner
to have closed a meeting where the collusion was planned by saying, "Well, you are smart businessmen. You all agree we have a
problem. Go solve it."58
The first two grievances stemmed from the owners' agreement
not to bid on each other's free agents during the 1985 and 1986 offseasons; both times, the arbitrator found in favor of the players. 59
But the owners' collusion had taken its toll. For example, it had
left Atlanta Braves player Bob Horner no choice but to sign with
a Japanese baseball club. And Montreal Expos star Andre Dawson
had been able to sign with a new club only after he publicly announced he would sign a 1-year, nonguaranteed contract with the
Chicago Cubs for any figure the Cubs chose-a figure that reportedly turned out to be a 60-percent reduction from his previous
year's salary.6o
"See generally Zimbabst, Billions. supra note 14, at 13-14. See also, e.g., Inquiry Into Pto1fessional Sports: Hearings before the House Select Comm. on Professional Sports (Part 1,. 94th
Cong, 2d Ses 19 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Select Committee Hearings (Part 1)] (statement of
Bowie K. Kuhn) ("We believe that a reserve system remains necessary to ensure the continuation of 'honest and vigorous' competition in Baseball.").
"See Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 LA 101 (1975), affd sub nom. Kansas City Royals v.
Major League Baseball PlayersAssh, 409 F. Supp. 233, af'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). See
also Zimbabst. Immunity. supra note 43, at 290. (The district and circuit courts held that the
arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement was broad enough to cover the dispute in question-namely, the players' grievances.)
,&See James Quirk and Rodney D. Fort Pay Dirt 284-285 (1992) [hereinafter Quirk & Fort]
ex plainng various studies showing no statistical distinction with regard to competitive balance
in the American League in the 14 years following the introduction of ree agency, and indicating
that the National League actually experienced increased competitive balance under free agency).
See also Zimbabst, Bailbons, supra note 14, at 14, and authorities cited therein (argument that
reserve clause could preserve competitive balance rebutted by prevalence of player sales over
the years)
"See generally Major League Baseball PlayersAss'n v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance
No 86-2 (1987) (Roberts, Arb) [hereinafter Grievance No. 86-2]; Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No. 87-3 (1988) (Nicolau. Arb.) [hereinafter
Grevance No. 87-31; Major League Baseball PlayersAssn v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No. 88-1 (1990) (Nicolau, Arb.) (hereinafter Grievance No. 88-1].
"John Helyar. How Peter Ueberroth Led the Major Leagues in the "Collusion Era," Wall St.
J . May 20, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Helyar].
"See Grievance No. 86-2, supra note 57; Grievance No. 87-3, supra note 57.
-See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 25.
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The third grievance concerned an "information bank" used by the
owners in the 1987 off-season to share information about their various offers to free agents. The players alleged that the purpose and
effect of the bank was to control player salaries and contract
lengths. The players prevailed on this grievance as well,6 1 and the
owners subsequently agreed to pay a record $280 million in damages stemming from the three grievance decisions. 62 Had the antitrust laws also been available to the players, there could have been
the additional deterrent effect of treble damages.
D. Scope of baseball'snonstatutory antitrust exemption
Although the Supreme Court has upheld professional baseball's
reserve clause against antitrust challenge on three separate occasions, it is unclear how far the exemption extends. Baseball owners
have asserted that the scope is practically unlimited, relating
broadly to the entire business of baseball. 63 A number of courts,
however, have held that the exemption is limited in scope. In Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n.,64 a Federal
district court in Texas held the exemption inapplicable to local
broadcasting. And in Postema v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,65 a Federal district court in New York held the exemption inapplicable to alleged anticompetitive actions taken wiLh
respact to umpires.
More recently, two courts narrowed the scope of the exemption
even further, holding that it applies only to the reserve clause system. Both cases concerned the owners' refusal to approve the relocation of the San Francisco Giants to St. Petersburg, Florida. The
first case was Piazza v. Major League Baseball.66 In denying the
owners' motion for summary judgment, the Piazza court explained
that "[i]n 1972 .

.

. the Court in Flood v. Kuhn stripped from Fed-

eral Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases may
have had beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause." 67 Piazza's rationale was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Butterworth v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,68 in which the court reversed a lower court ruling
that had quashed a civil investigative demand issued in connection
with the State's antitrust review of the owners' refusal to approve
the relocation. The court noted the disagreement among the courts
Grievance No. 88-i, supra note 57.
See, e.g., Murray Chass, "Record Collusion Damagei Reported," N.Y Times. Nov. 4, 1990,
at G1.
.See, e.g., Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 1994 Fla. LEXIS
1531. '9 (Fla. 1994). However, in answer to Chairman Brooks' question as to whether baseball's
antitrust exemption should give baseball owners the nht to conspire to squash the development
of a rival league by denying it access to stadiums an broadcast revenue, Mr. Selig responded:
"No, I do not believe it does." Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 22, 1994) (forthcoming) [hereinafter September 1994 House Hearngs] (tr. at 70).
1'541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
65799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
6833

F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

67Id. at 436 (quoting and citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,282-283 (1972)). But see Charles
0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 P.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); accord
Professional Baseball Schs. & Clubs v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1086 (11th Cir. 1982). Major
League Baseball reportedly has settled the Piazza suit, which concerned both antitrust and defamatiwn allegations, through a payment in excess of $6 million and a written apology. See Mi
chael Bamberger, "Baseball Apologizes to Rejected Investors," Phil. Inquirer, Nov. 3, 1994, at

D5.

e6Butterworth v. National League of Profe-sional Baseball Clubs, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 1531 (Fla.
1994).
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as to the scope of professional baseball's antitrust exemption, but
embraced the Piazza court's determination that Flood repudiated
the stare decisis "rule" of Federal Baseball and Toolson (namely,
that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce and thus
not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act>-and left only the stare
decisis "result" (namely, the exemption of baseball's reserve system
from Federal antitrust law):
As explained by the district court in Piazza, prior to
Flood lower courts were bound by both the rule of Federal
Baseball and Toolson (that the business of baseball is not
interstate commerce and thus not within the Sherman
Antitrust Act) and the result of those decisions (that baseball's reserve system is exempt from the antitrust laws).
Because Flood invalidated the rule of Federal Baseball and
Toolson by declaring that baseball is interstate commerce,
the Piazza court concluded that no rule from the earlier
cases binds the lower courts as a matter of stare decisis.
Instead, lower courts are only bound by the disposition of
the case based upon the facts presented, namely that the
reserve system is exempt from the antitrust laws."6
Recognizing the current judicial uncertainty over the scope of
professional baseball's antitrust exemption, the Committee wishes
to make it abundantly clear that in taking action to permit the
antitrust laws to apply to certain conduct in the particular context
of H.R. 4994, the Committee is in no way endorsing a view that
the exemption extends beyond the facts of Federal Baseball,
Toolson, or Flood-or even endorsing the application of the exemption in those specific factual circumstances. At the same time, the
Committee does not wish to repeat the mistake of the Celler Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, which in 1952 chose
not to act to repeal baseball's nonstatutory exemption, based in
part on the assumption that the Supreme Court would overrule
Federal Baseball. 70
E. Application of the antitrust laws to other sports
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball, the
courts have held the antitrust laws to apply to other professional
sports, including professional football, basketball, and hockey.7 '
The scope of activities prohibited under the antitrust laws as applied to these other sports is circumscribed in important respects,
however, by two antitrust doctrines of general applicability-the
"rule of reason" and the nonstatutory labor exemption. A description of these judicially created doctrines follows.
NId. at '12

(citing Piazza, 331 F. Supp. 420, 437-438 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
'See supra notes 3-36 and accompanying text.
"See Radoutch v. National Footoad League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball); Nassau Sports
v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (professional hockey). Indeed, in every other instance
in which a court has had to decide whether an organized sport is subject to the antitrust laws,
the court has decided in the affirmative. See Desson v. Professional Golfers Ass'n. of America,
358 F.2d 165 (Oth Cir.), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 846 (1968) (professional golf); Washington State
Bowling Pronrictors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.) (professional bowling),
cert, denied. 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Amateur Softball Asan. of America v. United States, 467 F.
2d 312 (10'h Cir. 1972) (amateur softball).
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The rule of reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act literally prohibits "every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." But the Supreme
Court quickly recognized that every commercial agreement "restrains" trade in some fashion-even if only between two partiesand that Congress surely did not intend for courts to construe the
Act to invalidate every agreement, but rather, only those7 2 agreements imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Some
types of agreements-such as price fixin -have been shown repeatedly by their nature and necessary effect to be so plainly anticompetitive that no further elaborate study is needed to establish
their illegality; they are "illegal per se."7 3 For most types of agreements, however, the reasonableness of a challenged restraint can
only be evaluated by balancing its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects-through an analysis of the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why the restraint
was imposed. 74 The requirement that such a balancing analysis be
undertaken is known as the "rule of reason." The courts have long
recognized that a professional sports league is a joint venture,
whose product-a series of contests leading to a championship-requires a level of business coordination beyond that required in
most other industries.7 5 Accordingly, in evaluating the joint conduct of sports teams acting under the auspices of their league,
76
courts have generally applied the more tolerant "rule of reason."
Nonstetutory labor exemption
In order to more closely harmonize the Nation's antitrust and
labor laws, beginning in 1914 Congress by statute has chosen to
2See United States v. Joint Traffic Assn, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1(1911); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238(1918).
7See,
e.g., NationalSoc'y of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Northern Pac. Rv. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Supreme Court has established

that it is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts may
classify those relationships as per se violations of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); accord Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S.
1(1979).
7See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); National Soc'y of Pro.
fessionalEngineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
7s See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984).
Some professional sports leagues have argued that their teams' separate ownership should be
disregarded and the league treated as a "single entity" for purposes of antitrust analysis. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Com'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League,
379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Gary Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Professional Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 Tul. L. Rev.
562 (1986); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity
Under Section I of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (1983). Since there can be no "contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade" unless the conduct involves two or more separate entities, such treatment would immunize sports leagues against most antitrust liability. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 762 (1984). However, the courts have rejected the argument that sports leagues
constitute a single entity. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, supra; North Am. Soccer Leaue v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257-1259
(2d Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
See, e.g., Naional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984); Los Angeles M . Coliseum Commn v. National Football League. 726
F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, Congress has codified this more favorable, ruleof-reason treatment of joint ventures that do not involve naked anticompetitive collusion, first for
R&D Joint ventures in the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815, and more recently for production joint ventures in the National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117.
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protect from antitrust assault the formation of labor unions and
their organizational and collective activities as sanctioned under
the labor laws.r In addition, in order to further encourage Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, as embodied by the
National Labor Relations Act,78 the courts have recognized that
certain union-employer agreements should be accorded a limited
nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption.
The Supreme Court first set forth the nonstatutory exemption in
1965 in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co, in which a
three-justice plurality held that a restriction on the number of
hours butchers could be required to work was not in violation of
the antitrust laws because the union had obtained it "through bona
fide, arm's length bargaining in pursuit of its own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor
groups." 79 The Court elaborated the exemption 10 years later in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, holding that a picket to secure a contractor's agreement
to subcontract plumbing and electrical work only to firms with a
current contract with the union violated the Sherman Act. The
Court explained the rationale for and the limits to the nonstatutory
labor exemption as follows:
The non-statutory exemption has its source in the strong
labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions.
Union success in organizing workers and standardizing
wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be
achieved if this effect on business competition were held a
violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the
lessening of business competition based on differences in
wages and working conditions.80
However, it is well established that implied exemptions to the
antitrust laws, such as the judicially created nonstatutory labor exemption, are strongly disfavored 81 and are to be construed as being
no broader than is clearly necessitated by the public policy requiring their recognition.82 Thus, the nonstatutory labor exemption set
forth in Jewel Tea and Connell is inherently limited. 83
77In response to Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), in which the Supreme Court held a
union's nationwide secondary boycott of nonunion-made hats to be violative of the Sherman Act,
Congress enacted Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, explicitly exempting the operation
of labor organizations from the antitrust laws by stating that labor is not an article of commerce. To bolster section 6, Congress subequently enacted section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29
U S.C. 152, and later the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §J 101-110, 113-115, to prevent the
antitrust laws from being used to enjoin labor organizational and strike activities that are authorized under the labor laws.
7229 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
'381 U.S. 676,689-90 (1965).
so421 U.S. 616,622-623 (1975).
o See, e.g., United States v. PhiladelphiaNad1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) ("Repeals
of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and ave
only been found in cases of plain repug
cy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.").
s2 See, e.g., CaliforniaRetail Liquor
lers Ass' v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105106 (1980); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
*1Connell,421 U.S. at 621-622.
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In 1976, in Mackey v. National FootballLeague,84 the Eighth Circuit while concluding that the nonstatutory labor exemption would
apply to some restraints imposed by professional sports team owners in connection with collective bargaining agreements, held that
the particular player restraint involved in that case was outside
the scope of the exemption.8S (The restraint at issue in Mackey was
the so-called "Rozelle Rule," named after then-NFL commissioner
Pete Rozelle, whereby an NFL team signing a player after the player's contract with another team expired was required to provide the
player's former team with compensation, which could even take the
form of other players or draft choices.) Mackey held that the
nonstatutory labor exemption applies only where the restraint: (i)
primarily affects only parties to the collective bargaining agreement relationship; (ii) concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (iii) is a product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.86 The Mackey three-pronged test has become the standard
used to apply the nonstatutory labor exemption in other sports
player restraint cases.87
The court in Mackey did not address the extent, if any, to which
the nonstatutory exemption continues after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.8 8 But in recent years a number of
courts have considered the issue. For example, in the 1987 decision
in Bridgeman v. NationalBasketball Association, a Federal district
court in New Jersey held the exemption lasts only so long as the
employer continues to impose a particular restriction unchanged
from the expired agreement, and reasonably believes that the challenged practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the
next collective bargaining agreement.8 9 In the 1988 decision in
Powell v. National FootballLeague ("Powell I"),90 a Federal district
court in Minnesota, reviewing the lawfulness of certain restraints
on player free agency unilaterally imposed by the NFL, held that
the nonstatutory labor exemption continues only until the parties
have reached an "impasse" in their collective bargaining.9 ' And in
1991, in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., a Federal district court in the
District of Columbia ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption
ends simultaneously
with the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 92
"543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
"Id. at 616-616.
"Id. at 613-614. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the "Rozelle Rule" met the first 2 prongs of
the standard, but that there was no bona fide arm's length bargaining over the Rule Rather
the court held, the Rule had simply remained unchanged since being unilaterally promulgated
by the NFL in 1963. Id. at 616.
87See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); McCourt v. California qports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.
1979); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmer*
man v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-404 (D.D.C. 1986); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Mackey court concluded that the
Rozelle Rule did not meet the third prong of the test-that the restraint be a product of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining-because the Rule had originally been unilaterally imposed by the
owners, and had simply been carried forward in later agreements without ever being the subject
of bona fide arm's-length collective bargaining.
*See Mackey, 543 V.2d at 616 n.18.
89675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987).
90678 F. Supp. 777, 788-789 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
no realistic possibility that
91The court defined "impasse" as the point at which "there ap
continuing discussions concerning the provision at issue would be fruitful." 678 F. Supp. at 788.
92782 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1991), appeals docketed, Nos. 93-7165, 94-7071 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 27, 1993, Mar. 31, 1994).
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In contrast, two courts have held that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues to apply even after impasse, for so long as the
"labor relationship" continues between the players' union and the
owners: Powell v. National Football League ("Powell II," reversing
Powell I); 93 and National Basketball Association v. Williams.9 4 The
Powell II and Williams decisions have been widely criticized by
legal commentators,9 5 and both the Bush and Clinton Justice Departments have filed amicus briefs in opposition to the positions reflected in these cases. 96 Powell II and Williams, in extending the
duration of the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse, create a potentially interminable immunity from the antitrust laws.
By sanctioning conduct which would otherwise be seen as collusive,
the decisions certainly do not appear to serve any legitimate antitrust policy; as the dissent in Powell II noted, such an indefinite
exemption eliminates "the owners' fear of the antitrust lever; therefore, little incentive exists for the owners to ameliorate anticompetitive behavior. 9 ' * * *" And by impeding constructive labor
management dialogue and making collective bargaining even more
difficult to achieve in the future,9 8 the decisions seem to turn on
its head the original rationale for the nonstatutory labor exemption-the encouragement of collective bargaining.
F. Historical arguments concerning outright repeal of baseball's
antitrust exemption
The merits (and demerits) of the nonstatutory antitrust exemption granted professional baseball by the Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball have been extensively reviewed and debated in the seven
decades following the decision. There have been a number of con9930 F.2d 1293. 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). The court concluded
that the NFL's "Right of First Refusal/Compensation" system--a successor to the "Rozelle Rule"
--satisfied the Mackey test. The court noted that the system had been incorporated into the recently expired collective bargaining agreement, as well as the previous one, both of which had
been "negt tiated in good faith and at arm's length." 930 F.2d at 1303. The court also noted that
negotiating impasses were often temporary ann in fact could ultimately help move negotiations
forward-that under the labor laws, impasse is regarded as "a recurring feature in the bargaining process and one which is not sufficiently destructive of group bargaining to justify withdrawal." Id. at 1299 (citing Charles D. Bona-no Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404
(1982)). The court held that an agreed restraint thus "conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship" and "clothed with union approval" would continue to be insulated from antitrust challenge for as long beyond impasse as labor grievances before the National Labor Relations Board are still pending or possible. Id. at 1302-1304.
84547F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (player challenge to restraints imposed from an expired
collective bargaining agreement without the players union's consent), appeal docketed, 94-7709
(2d Cir. Jul. 19, 1994).
"See, e.g., Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the National Football League Players Association, 67 Den. L. Rev. 135, 151-153 (1990); Daniel C. Nester, "Labor Exemption to Antitrust Scrutiny in Professional Sports", 15 S. Ill. U. L.J. 123, 136140 (1990); Note, "Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption," 104 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 891 (1991); Note, "When Does the Buzzer Sound?:
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports", 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1064-1065
(1994); Note, Powell v. National Football League: "Modified Impasse Standard Determines Scope
of Labor Exemption", 1990 Utah L. Rev. 381, 395-397.
"See Supreme Court Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Powell v. National Football League. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit (No. 89-1421). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Second Circuit Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, National Basketball Association v. Williams, On Appeal From
an Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (No. 947709).
"930 F.2d at 1307 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
"Powell II has had the effect of forcing the football players' union to decertify and cease all
bargaining in order to permit its members to bring an antitrust challenge. See Powell v. National Football League ("McNeil"), 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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gressional bills and hearings concerning the issue.9 9 And two congressional committees have previously filed reports.
The first report, filed in 1952 by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, chaired by Emmanuel Celler,
recommended against adoption of legislation that would have codified professional baseball's antitrust exemption.1oo The Celler Report concluded that a legislative grant of complete immunity to
baseball would be unwise because of the potential that such power
would be used arbitrarily:
If a blanket immunity were granted, all appeals to the
courts from a possibly arbitrary decision by the rulers of
professional baseball would be foreclosed. In the past the
reserve clause has been employed as a war measure to
fight the development of competing leagues, sometimes at
the expense of individual players. Although instances of
arbitrary exercise of power have been rare, they have occurred in the past. The possibility, however remote, that
power will be misused in the future makes it unwise perpetually to preclude resort to the courts in such cases.' 0
A second congressional report grew out of the investigation conducted by the House Select Committee on Professional Sports. The
Select Committee was established by the House of Representatives
in 1976, with a mandate to investigate the apparent instability prevailing in professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey,
and to assess and report on the need for any remedial legislation.10 2 In its 1977 Final Report, issued after some 28 hearings, the
Select Committee concluded that "adequate justification does not
wThere have been numerous bills and resolutions introduced relative to Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n.17 (1972) (listing 16
bills that had been considered by Congress between 1953 and 1972). See also, e.g.. H.R. 11078,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R..3789, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11382, 94th Cong..
2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 11940, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 1239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 2129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 130.3, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); S. 1476, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3287, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3094, 98th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 2687, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); H.R. 2593, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); H.R.
2976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. Res. 172, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. 5489, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 108, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1549. 103d Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 500, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. 4965, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2380.
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. Andt. 2601, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4994, 103d Cong..
2d Sess. (1994).
.
Congress has conducted a number of hearings on the matter over the years. See Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n.18 (1972) (listing hearings conducted between 1953 and 1972). See
also, e.g., Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings before the House Select Comm. on Professiona! Sports (Part I and 2), 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 425-439 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Select Committee Hearings]; Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 23 (1982) (hereinafter 1982 House Hearings]; Baseball's Antitrust Immunity: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on the Validity of Major League Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 406 (1992) (hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings]; Baseball's Antitrust Exemption:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter March 1993 House Hearings); Can a Weak
Commissioner Protect the "Best Interests" of the Game? St. Petersburg, Florida Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1994) (forthcoming); September 1994 House Hearings,
supra note 63.
'o See sipra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
ion Cellar Report, supra note 35, at 230.
O2Final Report, Inquiry Into Professional Sports, House Select Comm. on Professional Sports,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Select Committee Report].
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During and subsequent to the hearings conducted by the Select
Committee, the Justice Department has consistently and forcefully
advocated. full repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption. In 1976,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joe Sims was unequivocal in
expressing the Department's view that the exemption should be
lifted:
Simply stated, I know of no economic or other data
which supports in any way the conclusion that professional
sports should be exempted from the antitrust laws. That
being the case, this question should be laid to rest, unless
and until baseball or another professional sports industry
comes forth with a compelling case to apply different commercial rules to their business than are common in this
country.1 04
Sims further explained that current antitrust principles, including rule of reason analysis, would recognize and take into account
those practices within a sport or league that are "essential to the
continuing viability of the sport or league," and noted that several
sports antitrust decisions have in fact taken industry needs into account in their analyses.10 According to Sims, "[tihe availability of
this sort of an analysis * * * marks as absurd any claim that the
antitrust laws cannot rationally be applied to the professional
sports business."10 6 These views were reiterated by the Reagan
Justice Department during a 1982 hearing, when Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. testified:
It has been the position of the Antitrust Division for
some time that baseball's exemption is an anachronism
and should be eliminated. I reaffirm that position today. I
know of no economic data or other persuasive justification
for o.ntinuing to treat baseball differently from the other
professional- team sports, all of which are now clearly subject to the antitrust laws. As I stated earlier, antitrust
courts have sufficient flexibility in the rule of reason analysis to take into account any special considerations that
may be found to exist in baseball.107
For their part, baseball's owners have repeatedly sought congressional support for the antitrust exemption granted in the Federal
Baseball case, 108 focusing on a number of rationales they believe
justify their exemption. As the Committee reviews the owners' arguments, it is important to note that, as with any other group advocating an antitrust exemption, the burden of persuasion lies with
the owners.109 It is also important to note that a number of the po1lId. at 60.

,04 1976 Select Committee Hearings (Part 2), supra note 99, at 288.
20 Id. at 289.
1oe Id.
107 1982 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 23.
1osSee generally supra note 99 and accompanying text.
09As the Justice Department has repeatedly noted:
[T1he burden of proof for purposes of the decision making process should be on the
proponents of continuing antitrust immunity to show a convIDcing public interest raContinued
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tential concerns raised by the owners and set forth in the following
pages are not implicated by H.R. 4994, which relates only to the
unilateral imposition of anticompetitive terms and conditions of
employment.
1. Baseball is not a business
The rationale for professional baseball's nonstatutory exemption
from the antitrust laws, as articulated by Justice Holmes in the
Federal Baseball case, was that professional baseball was not
"trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words."o1 0 However, as of 1993, Major League Baseball has exploded into a $1.9 billion-per-year industry,"' and it is now indisputable that it not only involves interstate commerce, but constitutes a significant interstate financial enterprise." 2 Much of this
growth has occurred in the last 20 years, with gross revenues having grown more than tenfold since 1975.113 And the indirect fiscal
impact of professional baseball is even more significant: the most
recent strike has been estimated to have cost an average of 1,249
full- and part-time jobs per major league city, and to have cost the
local economy of each major league city an average of $1.16 million
per home game. 114
Despite the size and financial impact of professional baseball, its
owners have long asserted that their industry is distinguished by
its lack of profitability,' 5 and prior to the most recent strike had
predicted industrywide losses of some $100 million for the 1994
season.'16 However, it has also been noted that baseball franchises

may have strong incentives to generate paper losses in order to obtain tax writeoffs and obtain more favorable financial conditions
during negotiations with labor unions and municipalities." 7 As a
tionale for abandoning competition. Each existing or proposed exemption should be justitied in terms of empirically demonstrated characteristics of the specific industry that
make competition unworkable. The defects in the marketplace necessary to justify an
antitrust exemption must be substantial and clear.
Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission for the Review
of The Antitrust Laws and Procedures (Jan. 22, 1979). See also 1976 Select Committee Hearings
(Part 2), supra note 99, at 299 (statement of Joe Sims) ("the proponent of an antitrust exemption
has the burden of establishing the necessity of getting that antitrust exemption."); 1982 House
Hearings, supra note 99 (statement of Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.) and accompanying text.
no259 U.S. at 208.
n'Roger G. 11zl,
Baseball Economics in the 1990's: A Report to the Major League Baseball
Players Association 3 (Aug. 1994) [hereinafter Noll Report] (to be printed at appendix 1 of September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63). This report was based on owner-provided financial
data
122covering the years 1991-1993, and on pre-strike forecasts for 1994.
See id.; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 282. See also Quirk & Fort, supra note 56, at 1-2 (in
July 1991, Financial World estimated the annual revenues for Major League Baseball to be even
greater than those of the other professional sports leagues: $1.35 billion, as compared to $1.3
billion for the National Football League, $606 million for the National Basketball Association,
and $465 million for the National Hockey League).
"3 March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 129 (statement of Donald Fehr). See also
Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at xiii (noting that attendance at Maior League Baseball
games rose 47 percent between 1977 and 1991, attendance records were set in 6 of the 7 years
between 1985 and 1991, and annual revenues for Major League Baseball grew from $718 million
in 11985
to nearly $1.4 billion in 1990).
4
1 The United States Conference of Mayors, The Economic Impact of the Baseball Strike: A
Survey of Major League Cities 2 (Sept. 1994). See also Matthew Purdy and Richard Sandomir,
Colleagues or Competitors? 28 Owners in the Spotlight, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1994, at sec. 1,
p. 1 (hereinafter Purdy & Sandomir); Steve Rushin, Casualties of War, Sports Illustrated, Oct
10, 1994, at 37 (discussing impact of strike on nonplayer employees).
'"See,
e.g., September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 59-60).
5
" See Noll Report, supra note 111, at8, 10.
"'See Smith & Norton, supra note 43. One way owners can obtain tax writeoffs is to assign
a high share of the purchase price of a baseball franchise to the value of its players-allowing
an owner to depreciate, or deduct from taxable income from other businesses, a certain share
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result of these and other factors, Stanford Economics Professor
Roger G. Noll, in his capacity as a consultant for the players union,
reported that, had the owners not significantly underestimated
their projected 1994 revenues and overstated their 1994 expenses,
they would have shown a profit of between $50 million and $140
million had the season continued uninterrupted.' 8 Moreover, the
debate about current operating income does not account for the
perhaps more salient issue of the overall capital value of a baseball
franchise, which has increased dramatically in recent years." 19
Historically, obtaining fair and accurate financial data and projections concerning professional baseball has proven difficult. 120 As
a result, at the Subcommittee's September 22, 1994 hearing, Chairman Brooks sought full disclosure of the owners' books and finanof the purchase pnce every year. See generally Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 34-36,
Charles C. Euchner, Playing the Field Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them
45 (1993) Ihereinafter Euchner). When asked to comment on whether this tax shelter situation
is fair, Bill Veeck, former owner of the Indians and the White Sox, argued: "Look, we play the
'Star-Spangled Banner' before every game. You want us to pay income taxes too?" Bill Veeck.
The Hustler's Handbook 328 (1965).
The case of the Texas Rangers is illustrative of the clubs' municipal subsidy leveraging Incentive The Rangers have posted 3 profit only once in the past 5 years. However, Rangers co-owner
tand Texas Governor-elect) George W. Bush recently admitted that such losses are just "for book
purposes, not for cash purposes. Cash-flow-wise the Ringers are doing very well " Quoted in Ken
Herman. "Bush the Business Man- Baseball Has Ben Very Good to Him. Candidate Admits.
Hous Post, Oct 9, 1994, at A33 Bush also credited h mself and his franchise co-owners for their
entrepreneuralism in building 'a brand-new ballpark which adds franchise stabiuity " Id lowever, this new $190 million ballpark (named "The Ballpark") was actually financed for the Ranger, by the taxpa ers of the -it) of Arlington. Texas--through $135 million in local public bonds
bi-ked by a halfcent sal,-- tax. along with money expected to be paid by the Rangers through
lutrt revenue to be generated by The Ballpark. See id. Even before Arlington considered build.
ing The Ballpark for the Rangers, it had been estimated that the net loss over a 30-year penod
to the city for its vanous subsidies paid to obtain i-nd retain the Rangers would be well over
$21 millon See Mark S Rosentraub, "Financial Incentives, Locational Decision-Making and
Pro---ional Sports The Oase of the Texas Rangers Baseball Network and the City of Alington.
f. xi-, in 1977 Select '.-mmittee Report," supra note 102. at 201, 208-212 (unpublished paper
hv Uraversity of Texas at Arhngton Urban Studies Professor Rosentraub. presented to the 1976
>.-c- Committ.'e on Sports and repnnted by the committee as appendix l-4 to its 1977 Final
Ri-port See al-o Michael K Ozanian and Brooke ;rabarek, "Foul'," Financial World, Sept 1.
1
a91,it
IR, 19-20 explaining that stadium revenues have replaced local media revenues as the
most important factor in franchise value and profitability, and noting that the Baltimore One Cleveland Indians and Texas Rangers are ext mples of midsiue market clubs whr will be
in Maser L-ague BasebiP's upper echelon in terms >f operating income this year--despite their
lower-than-average mecia revenues-because of thei- publicly financed new ballparks)
"'S- Noll Report. supra not,? Ill, at 16 See alsc Smith &sNorton, supra note 43 ("The scant
fgtor-s that have tnckled out over the years md cate that team owners go to considerable
l- rqth- t-, inflate expei-es and deflate revenue " Club representatives have been quoted as
-iu-otic-ng their own linancial data Tornto Blue Jays President Paul Beeston has acknowl.- e.A- "Anyone who qu tes profits of a baseball ck b is missing the point. Under generally acS-I,[d
accounting print ples I can turn a $4 milhoi profit into a $2 million loss, and I can get
*, ry natio,,Il account ng firm to agree with me " Quoted in Zimbahst, Billions, supra note 14,
at 62 And 'eveql yea-- ago ar owner anonymousl - stated that what all the spending (eg., for
frahilhses and playc-i "shows is just how healti y the industry really is." Quoted in Peter
Gammons. "Pch Man'X tAme." Sports Illustrated, E ec 11, 1989, at 60.
'Fr example, the B iltimor? Onoles franchise ,ias sold for $12 million in 1979, $70 million
in 1499. and $173 minlliin in 1993--the highest amount ever paid for a sports franchise. See
P
& Sandomir, ipr note 114 Even the Seattie Manners, one of baseball's weakest teams
1rdy
financially and on te field, sold for $6 5 million in 1977. $13 million in 1981, $77 million in
u1988,
and S1660rmilben ir 1992 See Zimbabst, "Immunity," supra note 43, at 287, 299 Likewise,
the pnce to enter the league as an expansion franchise, through the payment of expansion fees
t'- exi'ting team, has suadily nsen from the $1.9 milhon the New York Mets and the Houston
Colts each paid in IS-62 '- the $95 million that tf e Colorado Roclues and the Flonda Marlins
each aidin 1993 See Ziribalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 141
Ied,,
'-me' of ite oranized baseball team osners concerning player salaries have been
heard since at least 1881 when Chicago White Stxkings owner A.G Spalding declared: "Salanem must come down, or the interest of the publ c must be increased in some way. If one or
the other does not happer, bankruptcy stares eveiy team in the face." Quoted in Smith & Nori-n, supri note 43. Eighty four years later, in 1965, the book No Joy in Mudville examined "the
decine and fall of besebah " See id. However, the major leagues have only experienced one team
hankruptcy filing in their tustory. See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 72, 217 n.73 (citing
Labor F-laton-. up-a not 1 16, at 78).
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cial data. 12 1 In response, Major League Baseball provided the Committee with summaries of financial information for the various
clubs in the aggregate for the years 1975--1992, along with an unedited copy of the 1994 Noll Report.122 Unfortunately, this information is not adequate to permit the Committee or the public to
evaluate objectively the clubs' true financial condition. For example, the owners failed to provide the Committee with any club-specific financial data, tax returns, information concerning actual "salaries" and "expenses" paid to a club owner's own family members,
information pertaining to related party transactions, stadium
leases, and broadcast agreements and the clubs' broadcast allocation agreement.1 23 Absent this information, it is impossible to assess Professor Noll's contention that Major League baseball clubs
have significantly
understated their revenues and overstated their
expenses.12 4
2. Effect on the minor leagues
Another argument offered in support of the continuation of professional baseball's antitrust exemption is that it is necessary to
preserve the minor league system. Currently, the various minor
league teams are bound to major league affiliates through the Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA), pursuant to which, among
other things, the major league teams contribute to the payment of
minor league player costs.' 25 The owners of the major league and
minor league baseball clubs assert that if the antitrust exemption
were repealed, the major leagues would reduce or eliminate this socalled "subsidy" payment.12 6 The owners further argue that certain
a21September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 60-61).
22
1 See supra note 111.
12At the September 22, 1994 hearings, Mr. Selig, although initially offering to provide information only under a "controlled procedure," later appeared to withdraw this precondition:
Mr. BROOKs. Controlled procedure is not what we had in mind. I mean, that is what
we are t
to avoid. We would like to take an open look at them, as we can at the
publicly dsosed financial statements of every corporation in the country *
Mr. SELIG. I understand that.
Mr. BROOKs. Not a controlled procedure. That word isMr. SELIG. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. We have obviously turned over all of
our information and we would be very happy to sit down and give you all the information that we have.
September 1994 House Hearins, supra note 63 (tr. at 60-61). However, in a November 8, 1994
letter to the Subcommittee on behaf of Major League Baseball, the owners' outside lawyers insisted on unspecified confidentiality protections for certain additional information. Id., to be reprinted at appendix I.
124Even if Major League Baseball's assertion of unprofitability were accurate this would not
serve to justify an exemption from the Nation's competition laws; experience has shown that
unprofitable firms can collude to impair consumer welfare. See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, "U.S. Sues
8 Airlines Over Fares: Computers Caled Price Fixing Tools," N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1992, at D1
(reporting the Government's filing of antitrust suit accusing the eight largest American airlines
of using a computerized reservation system to fix airfares, and that the airlines responded by
saying it is wrong for the Government to be adding to the troubles of an industry that has lost
$7 billion in the last 2 years); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 836 F. Supp. 9
(D.D.C. 1993Xapproval of consent decree in airlines price fixing case); Joe Davidson, "Six Big
Airlines Settle U.S. Suit on Price Fixing- Scheme Using Data System May Have Cost Public
$2 Billion in 4 Years," Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1994. at A2 (re rting the filing of a proposed consent decree concerning six remaining defendant airlines, unir which they agreed to modify the
ticket reservation system at issue).
12 Professional Baseball Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Professional Clubs and the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (1991) [hereinafter
Professional
Baseball Agreement).
6
" See, e.g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 65 (statement of Jimmie Lee Solomon) ("the many benefits of minor league baseball * * * flow directly from the Major League
Clubs' financial support of this system.' * * [I1n 1992 the Major League Clubs spent over $211
million on this player development system."); September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63,
at 49 (statement of Stanley Brand) ("Without support from the Major Leagues which might not
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aspects of the operation of minor league baseball, such as its reserve clause (by which players are bound to teams for up to 6V2
years), would be susceptible to legal attack if the exemption were
repealed.127
Re Committee traditionally views with extreme skepticism
those who argue that their particular industry is in need of a special shield from the antitrust laws in order to survive. As Representative Watt remarked to Mr. Selig at the Subcommittee's September 22, 1994 hearing:
How is [the argument in support of baseball's antitrust
exemption] different from any other industry? I mean,
* * * if I buy that, then I guess I buy exempting IBM and

a number of other industries from antitrust also. I, for the
life of me, can't understand why you think baseball has
in those things than any
any more vested public interest
other business would have. 128
However, repeal of the exemption would not necessarily have any
impact on the major leagues' continuing need to develop player talent to remain competitive. As University of Illinois Law Professor
Stephen Ross explained:
The bottom line is that major league owners spend over
$5 million annually on player development because it is a
prudent investment to do so, not out of altruistic charity
to small and medium-size minor league communities.
Whether that money is spent directly on players in their
own farm system, or indirectly on players purchased from
independent minor leagues, the prudence of the investment will not be affected by the antitrust exemption.129
It is also instructive to note that even with (and arguably because of) its exemption, Major League Baseball has sought to dramatically increase the share of player development costs borne by
minor league franchises and their local communities in recent
years. This is illustrated by the Professional Baseball Agreement
negotiated between Major League Baseball and the minor leagues
in 1990. The agreement reduced the major league teams' share of
minor league operating expenses, required the minor leagues to
make new and higher payments to the major leagues out of ticket
be available if the exemption were stripped, minor league baseball in these [small] towns could
go the way of the 5 and 10.").
'"See, e.g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 117 (statement of Stanley Brand).
See also Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 105-106 (describing mechanics of minor league
player reserve clause).
122September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 137) (statement of Representative
Watt).
Equitable arguments for the restrictions mandated by the current minor league system are
called into doubt by the fact that fewer than 1 out of 10 minor league players ever achieves
a viable major league career (see Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 1061, and that the avertopplayers in the minors represents only about 4 percent of a major league
age slary earned
salary (see Zimbalit, Billions, supra note 14, at 85). For a detailed account of the personal costs
exacted by collusive minor league behavior in restricting player movement, see the testimony
of former minor league p layer Roc Harrison before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights. 1992 Senate Hearings. supra note 99, at 406.
n March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99 at 177 (statement of Stephen Rosa). Indeed,
it ha been asserted that the minor leagues would be better off if they were
rated independently from the major leagues. See Neil Sullivan, The Minors, at iz (1990) (notin that on several
occasions over the years the minor leagues were in a position to operate Iependenty, yet
chose to accept the "artifAcial hierarchy" of the major leagues rather trhan assume the potential
economic risks-and rewardsof independence).
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revenues, and required the minor leagues (and their home communities) to make a variety of costly stadium facility improvements.130
These changes came on top of a series of rules changes adopted
prior to 1990 that further
constrained the minor leagues' ability to
operate profitably.' 3 1
The owners have also argued that repeal of the exemption will
jeopardize the minor leagues by preventing them from maintaining
their current method of operations, and that "unlike the other
minor league structure in
major sports," baseball needs a special 32
which it can develop its future players.' But this assertion does
not fully account for the fact that major league professional hockey,
a sport subject to the antitrust laws, relies on a complex system of
amateur, semi-professional, and minor league programs that are
heavily subsidized by the major league teams. Evidence submitted
during the investigation of the Select Committee on Professional
Sorts indicated that professional hockey spends an amount on
aoer development comparable to that spent by professional base9 .133

Further, any possible impact that repeal of baseball's antitrust
exemption might have on the minor leagues may well be mitigated
by the fact that in such event the operations and key agreements
pertaining to the minor leagues would be subject to a "rule of reason" analysis, thereby protecting those restraints whose procom-4
petitive effects outweigh any harmful impacts on competition. Even if some aspect of baseball's minor league operations was
found to be unreasonably restrictive-such as the reserve clause restrictions-players could continue to agree to similar restrictions on
their movement, on an individual contractual basis or as part of a
collective bargaining agreement. Removing baseball's antitrust exemption should not change the fact that major league owners have
strong negotiating leverage when dealing with prospective minor
league players, and the vast majority of minor leaguers are therefore likely to prove amenable to long-term contracts binding them
to a team for a specified period of time. 35
The greater threat to the viability of the minor leagues would appear to be the continued availability of the antitrust exemption to
the major leagues. For example, if the major league owners jointly
conspired to eliminate whole divisions of the minor leagues, the exemption could leave the minor league franchises powerless to fight
back from a legal perspective. In such an event, as University of
"3See Professional Baseball Agreement, supra note 125, at Art. VII (F) and Attachment A.
See also Jon Scher, The Major League/Minor League Scorecard, Baseball Am., Jan. 10, 1991,
at 13; Jon Scher, Majors, Minors Set to Sign Long-Term Deal, Baseball Am., Jan. 10. 1991, at
13; Mike Dodd Minor Leas Have Until 1995 to Upgrade Ballparks USA Today, Sept. 2
1993 at 2C. The General
;er of one minor league team described the new Professional
Baseball Agement as follows: All of a sudden, we the Class A Asheville Tourists] go from
being a fairly profitable, fairly solid club to struggling to break even again. So if you have the
[San Diego] Chicken coming in on a Friday night and it gets rained out, you're in trouble." See
Jon Scher, Minor League Notebook, Baseball Am., January 25, 1991, at 16 (quoting Ron McKee).
"'As early as 1988, a minor league owner stated: "[e]very year, [the major leagues] do something that makes it more impossble for us to operate. Every year, the major league teams
change the rules a little bit to make it harder for us." See Bill James, The BiB James Baseball
Abstract 1988, at 19 (quoting unidentified minor league owner).
"'See March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 63 (statement of Jimmie Lee Solomon);
September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 137) (statement of Allen "Bud" Selig).
'33 1977 Select Committee Report, supra note 102, at 56.
" 4 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
35See March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 228-231 (statement of Stephen F.
Ross).
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Maryland Professor Arthur T. Johnson has noted: "[t]he preservation of baseball's antitrust exemption * * * guaranteels] that the

major leagues' dominance will go unchallenged. There will be no
guarantee that the current number of minor league teams will be
maintained." 136 These very concerns were highlighted during the
contentious negotiations leading up to the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement, when Major League Baseball threatened to completely sever its relationship with the minor leagues.' 3 7 It was reported that in light of such developments, the minor leagues began
fashioning a lobbying strategy to repeal the antitrust exemption.' 3 8
The fact that the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement was ultimately agreed to by the parties does not diminish the future risk
to the minor leagues. Indeed, Eddie Einhorn, an owner of the Chicago White Sox, has complained about spending over $3 million to
develop one prospect who may not even make it to the minor
leagues, and has previously proposed that the major leagues disband the minor leagues and instead contribute to a centralized
development program into which players would be drafted.1 39
3. Effect on franchise relocations
Defenders of the antitrust exemption also contend that it is necessary in order to enable professional baseball to protect local communities and fans against abandonment by teams seeking more lucrative venues.140 They point to the 1984 Ninth Circuit decision in
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League ("Raiders 1"),'4' in which the owner of the Raiders football
team and its new home community (Los Angeles) successfully challenged on antitrust grounds the National Football League's refusal
to permit the Raiders to relocate from Oakland under the League's
three-fourths owner approval rule.142 However, it is important to
note that in Raiders I, the district court did not hold that the
NFL's restrictions on franchise relocations were per se unlawful,
but rather, allowed the jury to evaluate the restriction under the
"wArthur T. Johnson, Minor League Baseball: Fact Versus Myth 8(1994) (unpublished paper)
[herebsafter Johnson, Minor League Baseball).
"See supra notes 125, 130-131 and accompanying text. The Associated Press reported that,
"The chief negotiator for the major leagues said the commissioner's office would begin discussions to start new minor leagues and clubs outside the* * *current minor league governing
body." Ronald Blum. AP Sports News, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP Pile (Nov. 18,
1990). And the Sporting News reported that Major League Baseball was "sending out franchise
applications" and that as soon as leases were signed, the major leagues would abandon attempts
to reach a deal with the minor leagues. Majors, Minors Can't Agree, Sporting News, Nov. 26.
1990, at 37.
"'Mark Maske, Major-Minor Reconciliation Effort Begins; Vincent 'Planning on
New
System.' Wash. Post, Nov. 27. 1990, at E4 (reporting that members of the minor leagues' executive comnuttee were so concerned about the negotiations that they were "eyeing possible legal
measures against the majors" and "seeking to determine what congressional support [they)
might have for challenging the major leagues' exemption from federal antitrust laws ).
"'See Jack Sands and Peter Gammons, Coming Apart at the Seams: How Baseball Owners,
Players, and Television Executives Have Led Our National Pastime to the Brink of Disaster 98
(1993*
'oSee, e g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 48-49 (statement of Bud Selig).
14726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
142Onginally, the rule required unanimous consent of all owners for a club relocation into the
"home territory" of another team-including consent of the owner who would face the new competition. When an earlier Sherman Act challenge to the rule by the LDs Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission was dismissed for lack of ripeness, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), the
NFL revised the rule to require a 3/4 majority for any relocation. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1384-1385.
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rule of reason.143 The court of appeals made it clear that there was
araple room for the NFL to apply franchise relocation rules in a
manner that did not unreasonably restrain competition, explaining
that restrictions on team movement should withstand antitrust
scrutiny where they are:
closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in producing
the [professional sports league's] "product" and competing
with other forms of entertainment. An express recognition
and consideration of those objective factors espoused by
the NFL as important, such as population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance, etc., would be well advised. Fan loyalty and location continuity could also be
considered.'"
And a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision reviewing the damage
award stemming from the Raiders' move to Los Angeles specifically
held that the NFL franchise relocation rule was not necessarily unlawfil in all cases--but only that it was unreasonable as applied
by the owners under the particular facts involved. See Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. National Football League ("Raiders
II").145
It is important to recognize that the application of "rule of reason" antitrust analysis in Raiders I and Raiders II has not disabled
professional sports leagues from preventing objectionable franchise
relocations. In 1984, the NFL was able to block the Philadelphia
Eagles from moving to Phoenix.'" And, in 1985, the National
Hockey League reached an agreement with the St. Louis Blues,
keeping the Blues from moving to Saskatchewan.147 Moreover, the
National Basketball Association, while ultimately approving the
San Diego Clippers' 1984-1985 move from San Diego to Los Angeles, first won a court ruling that under its rules it could block the
move.'4
Furthermore, an antitrust exemption is a suspect means of protecting local communities against franchise relocation. Franchise
relocation worries flow directly from a symptom of classic cartel behavior: the suppression of product output, or supply, below demand
in order to increase price, and profits, for the benefit of the cartel
members.' 4 9 Because the incumbent baseball club owners may exercise their franchise power not only to restrict relocations of existing clubs, but also to limit the formation of new clubs, many communities desirous and fully capable of supporting a major league
club are unable to obtain.pne; and communities that have a club
"3See 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). See notes 74-76 and accompanying texL
I-Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Commn, 726 F.2d at 1397 (citations omitted).
145791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
'*See Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S.259 and S.287
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61
(1985) (hereinafter Senate Community Protection Hearings] (statement of Pete Rozelle, NFL
Commissioner).
'47See id. at 84; Los Angales Times, June 28, 1985, pt. III, at 12, col.1.
1*See National Basketball Assn v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Basketball Ass'n, 484
U.S. 060 (1987); Michael A. Cardozo and Jeffrey A. Mishkin, "Does a League Have a Right to
Deternune Where Teams Play?" Nat'1 L.J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 23-24.
'#See, e.g., Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 123-124; Quirk, An Economic Analysis of
Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 Lay & Contemp. Probs. 42, 43-47 (1973) [Lereinafter Quirk, Team Movements).
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know they keep it only at the owner's pleasure and at the risk of
other communities' efforts to "steal away" one of the few existing

major league teams for themselves. This chronic shortage of clubs
gives incumbent owners powerful leverage during negotiations with
their home communities over taxes and community-subsidized stadium construction and renovation.o5 0 And because the individual
clubs, though part of an organized league, maintain their separate
financial identities, they have an incentive to act in their own interest when casting a vote on a franchise expansion or relocation.
For example, the notes of the owners' meeting to discuss the San
Francisco Giants' proposed relocation to St. Petersburg indicate
that a major consideration leading some owners to oppose the franchise m6ve was that their own revenues would be adversely affected.' 5
To date, baseball refuses to publicly commit to oppose any franchise relocation not agreed to by the community threatened with
losing its club, or even to give the home community a "right of first
refusal"-either of which would serve as a more straightforward
means of preventing harm to fans and communities.152 Indeed,
under the supposed "stabilizer" of the Major League Baseball
nonstatutory antitrust exemption, both major league and minor
league professional baseball have experienced widespread franchise
relocations and threats of relocations, impacting scores of communities. Since 1950, Major League Baseball has permitted eleven relocations,' 53 with litigation ensuing after a number of the moves. 5 4
0

' Some observers have noted that soon after Mr. Selig defended baseball's antitrust exemption as the protector of franchise stability at the 1992 Senate hearings, he was reported to have
threatened to move the Brewers out of Milwaukee unless the city agreed to finance the building
of a new stadium for the team. See Zimbalist, Immunity, supra note 43. at 303; Dave Van Dyke,
Brewers: If You Build It, New Stadium Vital to Keep Franchise, Chi. Sun-Times, May 17, 1993,
at 101. Likewise. Holy Cross Politizal Science Professor Charles C. Euchner has chronicled the
means by which the Chicago White Soi <tsed the leverage of possible relocation to negotiate publc concesions relative to the building of a new stadium for the White Sox:
Some experts predicted that organized baseball wouid reject a move of the White Sax
from the third largest market in the nation, but at no time did the baseball hierarchy
intercede to restrain th- bidding. In fact, the American League president injected himself into the process, only to strengthon the White Sox's bargaining position, when he
argued that Comisky Park was iwadequate.
ELchner, :upra note 117, at 148 (citing correspondence from Robert Brown, Presidert of the
Amenern League, to Mary O'Connell of the fans organization Save Our Sox (undated)).
'"See Minutes of Special Meeting, Nov. 10, 1992, reprinted in March 1993 House Hearings,
supra note 99. at 246-252.
"When the controversy surrounding the National Football League Raiders brought this issue
to Congressicnal attention, various bills were introduced to regulate professional sports franchise relocation. One bill, S. 259, was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation in the 99th Congress. S 259 would have imposed requirements for league
consideration of team relocations, with judicial review. The team seeking to relocate would have
been required to give notice, stating the justification for the move, based on 12 specified factors.
The league would have had to hold a public hearing, and articulate the reason for its decision
on the record. The league's decision would have been subject to judicial review, under which
the decision could be overturned if not suportd by substantial evidence. And thes local community would have retained the option of challenging the league's decision tunder the antitrust
laws. SeeS. 259,99th Cong., let eas.
&-7 10 (1985).
'"See, e.g., Arthur T. Johnson, Murucipaf Administration and the Sports Franchise Relocation issue, Pub. Admn. Rev 519-520 (Nov.-Dec. 1983). Contrary to poular assertion, many of
the moves, such as the relocations of the Dodgers and the Giants to Cfomia, were completely
unrelated to lack of fan support. See, e.g., Quirk, Team Movements, supra note 149, at 60.
Seattle and Milwaukee filed antitzrast suits following the transfer of local baseball

as*Bosh

franchises. See 1976 Select Committee Hatings (Part 2), supra note 99, at 425 (Seattle's lawsuit, stemming from Mr. Selig's moving the old Seattle Pilots team to Milwaukee, was settled
through the award to Seattle of a new expansion team in 1977); Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.), cart, denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966) (application of State antitrust laws
Continued
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At least as importantly, during this same period major league franchises have threatened to move many more times.155 As commentain other
tors have noted, by simply exploring options for playing
cities, teams have procured all manner of largess.15 6 As for the
franchises
minor leagues, between 1987 and 1993 alone, forty-nine
moved--one out of every four minor league teams.'5 7 The smaller
communities appear to have an especially difficult time retaining
their minor league franchises; nearly two-thirds of the franchise relocations between 1987 and 1993 occurred from communities with
a population of less than 100,000.158 This trend has been exacerbated by recent stadium facility improvement requirements imposed on minor league clubs and their communities by Major
League59 Baseball through the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement.1
4. Effect on broadcastrelationships
Another concern voiced in relation to the possible repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is that it might unreasonably intrude
upon the owners' ability to jointly negotiate national broadcast contracts. However, the Sports Broadcasting Act, which provides a
limited antitrust exemption to enable the member clubs of professional sports leagues to jointly pool their separate rights in sponsored telecasting of their games to sell to a purchaser, clearly applies to professional baseball.160 Therefore, any congressional repeal of baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption would not prejudice professional baseball's ability to jointly negotiate such agreements with the networks. Major League Baseball would be in precisely the same position as the other major professional sportsgoverned by both the Sports Broadcasting Act and the antitrust
laws.
Repeal of baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption, however,
would permit the antitrust laws to apply to unreasonable restraints
of trade imposed by a league on individual teams with respect to
to Major League Baseball's approval of the Braves' relocation was held to unconstitutionally
interfere with interstate commerce).
"See, e.g., Euchner, supra note 117, at 5 ("At some point in the past decade, virtually all
professional franchises publicly threatened to move to a different city in order to extract the
financial) benefits they desired from local governments."); Zimbalist, Immunity, supra note 43,
at 313 ("The standard ploy for a (Major League Baseball] franchise is to threaten to move the
team.").
'"See, e.g., Zimbalist, Immunity supra note 43, at 313 ("Such threats have consistently
brought owners either more favorabe rental contracts for their teams, . . . or stadium retrofits
. or entire new stadiums with a wide array of revenue-generating accoutrements. . . .");
Euchner, supra note 117, at 24 ('Even thou h teams infrequently move, threats of transfers
drive cities into exensive bidding wars. .. . The number of cities seeking teams is so large that
franchises always have plausible alternatives for their current sites."); id. at x ("New stadiums
are only the beginning. The willingness to threaten departure has secured for teams a variety
of land deals, lower taxes, more revenues from parking and concessions, control of stadium operations, guaranteed ticket sales, renovation of stadiums with luxury seating, control over neighborhoods and transportation systems. The list goes on.").
'"See Johnson, Minor League Baseball, supra note 136, at 5. Moreover, 74.2 percent of the
communities polled in a 1989 survey reported that the stadium lease with their minor league
team was for a term of 5 years or less (many were year-to-year). Such short-term leases invite
frequent demands for stadium improvements or better lease rental terms. See Arthur T. Johnson, Local Government and Minor League Baseball: A Survey of Issues and Trends 8 (Washing
ton, D.C.: International City Management Association) [hereinafter Johnson, Local Government]. According to the same survey, 40 percent of the communities reported that they were
the target of demands for stadium improvements or better rental terms at the time the previous
lease had expired; and in every case, the team had threatened to relocate. Id. at 10.
"'SeeJohnson, Minor League Baseball. supra note 136, at 5.
"'See supra notes 125, 130-131 and accompanying text.
'-See 13 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq..
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their local broadcast rights. Well-established case precedent exists
limiting sports leagues latitude in abusing their local broadcast
market,'61 and there is no reason to conclude that baseball cannot
live under the same rules as govern the other professional sports
leagues. Indeed, antitrust rules in this area should serve to increase overall consumer choice and welfare, by permitting a team
to broadcast more of its own games than a league might otherwise
permit.16 2 For example, a recent antitrust action brought by the
Connecticut Attorney General resulted in a settlement permitting
State residents to view professional basketball games involving the
Boston Celtics as well as the New York Knicks. 6 3
5. Role of the baseball commissioner
It has also been asserted that professional baseball need not be
subject to the antitrust laws, because of the existence of a strong
and independent commissioner. 1
Although the Committee does not accept the premise of this argument-that private regulation is sufficient to justify an antitrust
exemption-close examination of the relevant history and facts indicates that baseball's commissioner has not been characterized by
"strength" and "independence." The argument is even further diminished by the fact that Major League Baseball has been operating without an even nominally independent
commissioner in the
two years since Fay Vincent's departure.16 5
The office of the commissioner was created in 1919, following the
infamous "Black Sox" scandal-in an effort to restore public confidence in the integrity of the game.' 66 The owners at the time
chose Federal Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis to be the first commissioner.167 He served as commissioner for almost 24 years, and
"'1See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd Partnershipv. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d
667 (7th Cir. 1992) (the Chicago Bulls--owned by Jerry Reinsdorf, co-owner of the Chicago
White Sox-successfully challenged an NBA rule limiting the number of games "superstation"
WGN could carry), cart. denied, U.S. -,
113 S. CL 409 (1992). See also NCAA
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (NCAA rule restraining member
schools in the number of games they could contract to broadcast held unlawful).
" See, e.g., Senate 1992 Hearings, supra note 99, at 420 (statement of Gene Kimmelman)
("To promote maximum sports viewing options at the lowest price and to infuse competitive
market pressures in the structure of Major League Baseball, [the Consumer Federation of America] urges Congress to eliminate Major League laseball's antitrust immunity and to ensure that
the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust exemption is limited to national off-air broadcasting contracts.").
6Cable Television Basketball Blackout Settlement Agreement between the Attorney General's Office of the State of Connecticut and the National Basketball Association, Apr. 28, 1993.
See Commerce Clearinghouse Report, 150,101 (May 18, 1993).
"Baseball owners contend they are operating the business of baseball, through the commissioner system, in a highly responsible manner-i.e., obviating the need for subjecting the sport
to antitrust regulation. See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 13-14 (stat -ent of
Bud Selig). See also Report of the Restructuring Committee [hereinafter Restructuring Report]
("The role of the Commissioner in protecting the public interest has long distinguished (Major
League Baseball) from all other professional sports and has justified the special status of Baseball3 as the national game.").
"
See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
'"See, e.g. Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145. The scandal involved eight members
of the 1919 Chicago White Sox, accused of intentionally losing the 1919 World Series for payoffs,
and caused the White Sox to be dubbed the "Black Sox." See Eliot Asinoff, Eight Men Out
(1963); David Q. Voigt, 2 American Baseball, at xiii-xvili (1970).
"' Landis, a man who had built a formidable reputation through his activities on the benchincluding fining Standard Oil $29 million for antitrust violations and attempting to extradite
the Kaiser of Germany because a Chicagoan died when a German submarine sank the Lusitania-demanded and received from the owners control over "whatever and whoever" had to do
with the game. See Harold Seymour, 2 Baseball: The Golden Age 322, 369 (1971) [hereinafter
Seymour]; Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145. The day after the eight accused "Black
Continued
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is generally credited with restoring to the game a certain degree
of the respectability it had lost during the "Black Sox" scandal.168
However, since Judge Landis' tenure, the independence-not to
mention the strength-of baseball's commissioners has been uneven, to say the least. Happy Chandler served as Commissioner
from 1945 until 1951, when the owners failed to reappoint him, reportedly because he had supported union activities of umpires, and
had advocated the admission of African-Americans into the major
leagues.169 Chandler was followed by Ford Frick, who served from
1951 until 1965, but was perceived by many to be dominated by
Dodgers owner Walter O'Malley.o70 Retired Air Force Lieutenant
General William Eckert served only from 1965 until his firing in
1968.171 Eckert was followed by Bowie Kuhn, formerly outside
counsel to Major League Baseball. Kuhn's 15-year tenure was
scarred by his failure to receive the owner's support for another
term, despite his very active campaign to remain as commissioner.172 Peter Ueberroth followed Kuhn in 1984. While Ueberroth
was perhaps the strongest commissioner since Judge Landis, his
single term was marred by the collusion cases brought by the players in the mid-1980's.' 73 As Smith College Professor Andrew Zimbalist has written:
Ueberroth stands out among baseball's commissit, aers in
his ability to discipline and galvanize the owners behind a
clear economic project. Unfortunately for the owners, the
and left them saddled with a
Sroject involved collusion
280 million settlement.' 7 4
Ueberroth's successor, Bart Giamatti, died in 1989, after just 5
months in office.175 He was followed that same year by Fay Vincent, who was "relieved" of his duties in September 1992, when
powerful owners objected to his proposed division realignment plan,
his allocation of expansion fee revenues, and his perceived
intermeddling in the owners' labor negotiating strategies.' 7 6 As an
anonymous owner reportedly remarked after Vincent's assignment
of a minority share of $190 million in expansion fee revenues to the
American League: "That's it. Fay Vincent is history. Every AmerSox" players were acquitted in a court of law, he barred them from baseball for life. See Will
Lingo, "Baseball's Eight Commissioners," Baseball Am., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 199.1, at 14 [herein.
after Lingo, Commissioners]'"See Seymour, supra note 167; Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145; Lingo, Commis.
sioners, supra note 167.
165See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 43.
"old.
at 44.
7
1 1See Lin, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 14-15; Kenneth M. Jennings, Balls and
Strikes: The Money Game in Professional Baseball 86 (1990). See also Lingo, Commissioners,
supra note 167, at 14 ("Baseball historians are almost universal in their aisdain for Eckert'o
work and their assessment that he was completely overmatched in his job. (The retired Air
Force general was] so invisible and lacking in strong views that some called lum "The Unknown
Soldier.").
7
1 2See Bowie Kuhn, Hard Ball 366-427 (1987); Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 44. See
also Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15 ("Like most commissioners who acted at all
independently and served long enough, Kuhn eventually drew the scorn of enough owners to
become
ineffective, and left his post.").
73
1 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. See also Lingo, Commissioners, supra note
167,74 at 15; Helyar, supra note 58.
17 5 Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14 at 44.
3 See Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15.
u7 See Zimoadst, Billions, supra note 14, at 45; Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15.
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ican League Owner I've talked to

*

*

*

has serious doubts about

renewing Vincent's contract." 177
At the conclusion of his service, Vincent pointedly warned that
the "[o]wners have a duty to take into consideration that they own
a part of America's national pastime in trust. This trust sometimes
requires putting self-interest second."1 78 But since Vincent's departure, Major League Baseball has operated without outside supervision, having instead chosen to police itself through an ownerdominated executive council headed by Milwaukee Brewers owner
Bud Selig.179 The commissioner's position has remained empty for
more than 2 years.
The powers of the vacant commissioner's office were recently
weakened by an owners' "Restructuring Committee." Previously,
the linchpin of the commissioner's authority derived from a clause
in Article I of the Major League Agreement and the Commissioner's contract bestowing upon him powers to take any and all
actions deemed to be in the "best interests" of the game. 8 0 The
newly adopted Restructuring Committee's recommendations prevent future commissioners from using the "best interests" powers
with respect to a whole host of matters-including issues relating
to the expansion, sale, and relocation of teams; scheduling;
interleague play; divisional alignment; and revenue sharing among
the owners.' 8 Moreover, the commissioner is explicitly proscribed
from using the "best interests" powers with regard to collective bargaining matters, so that he would have no power, for example, to
end or prevent a play-stopping decision by the owners to stage a
lockout of players over bargaining issues.182 Significantly, the new
guidelines do not attempt to resolve the issue of whether the owners have the power to fire the commissioner without cause 1ss-the
core dispute in Fay Vincent's 1992 departure, and a key consideration relative to the widespread call for the next commissioner to
be truly "independent."
After reviewing the changes the owners made to the commissioner's office, former commissioner Ueberroth commented:
Basically, the commissioner seems to have no portfolio,
power or job. That's what it looks like from a distance. I
think the changes dramatically change the position. There
will be the appearance of more responsibility, but substantially less authority. That's the recipe for a non job. 8 4
"Quoted
10. 1990, 't

usQuote

in Bob Nightengale, "Herzog Turned Off by Baseball's Greed," Baseball Am., Aug.
14.

in David Greising, "Baseball's Bases Are Still Loaded With Problems," Bus. Wk.,
Sept. 21, 1993, at 37.
**Se", e.g., Joe Gergen. "Baseball Still in No Hurry to Choose a Commissioner," LA Times,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 1; Roger Angell, Shades of Blue, The New Yorker, Dec. 7, 1992, at 124, 127
[hereini.fter Angedl. See also Will Lingo, "Baseball Seeks Strong Leaders," Baseball Am., Nov.
28-Dec. 11, 1994, at 14 (hereinafter Lingo, Leaders) ("Brewers owner Bud Selig is the de facto
commitsioner. But Selig is nothing more than an extension of the owners.").
SO&e,
e.g., Angell, supra note 179.
8
1
s1t-e
Restructuring Report, supra note 164.
&82SM
id. at 6. See also Jack McCallum, "The Toothless Commissioner," Sports Illustrated,
Feb. 2.1 1994 at 14; "Owners Plan Limits Commissioner's Power- 'Best Interests' Ruling Revised," Chi. TAb., Feb. 12, 1994, at CI.
IssSee Restructuring Report, supra note 164.
'" Quoted in Ronald Blum, "Res'tructuring," AP, Feb. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File. Chicago White Sox co-owner Jerry Reinsdorf candidly summarized his view of
the position when he stated that the Job of the next commissioner will be to "run the business
Continued
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II. H.R. 4994
On August 12, 1994, Major League Baseball experienced its
eighth baseball work stoppage since 1972 a5 -more stoppages than
in professional basketball, football and hockey, combined. 8 6 This
most recent work stoppage ultimately led to the cancellation of the
remainder of the regular season and the World Series. The strike
has become the longest-running strike in professional sports history, and the only sports work stoppage not only to result in the
complete loss of post-season play, but to threaten to carry over into
the next season. The emotional and financial damage to professional baseball and the country caused by the strike is tangible,
and has been well noted by the media and the fans.' 8 7 This course
of events has crystallized for the public the peculiar tendency of
professional baseball to be forced to resort to strikes and lockouts
as a means of resolving labor disagreements-a result, in large
part, of its judicially granted antitrust exemption.188
H.R. 4994 would subject Major League Baseball's owners and
players to the Nation's antitrust laws in the event one of those parties unilaterally imposes an anticompetitive term or condition on
the other. While the case for a far broader repeal of the antitrust
exemption is compelling, at this late juncture in the 103d Congress,
the Committee opted to respond legislatively to the most urgent
competitive problem facing Major League Baseball-its failure to
be subject to the same antitrust rules as the other sports in the
event of a breakdown of the collective bargaining process and the
unilateral imposition of terms by one of the parties. As such, the
legislation was specificall3 drafted so that it would not implicate issues relating to other activities, such as the operation of the minor
leagues or franchise relocation.
The hearing record provides clear evidence that the availability
of antitrust remedies as a last resort, while not a panacea, has confor the owners, not the players or the umpires or fans." Quoted in Angell, supra note 179, at
127.5
s See, e.g., Athelia Knight and Richard Justice, "Work Stoppages a Part of Baseball," Wash.
Post,
Aug. 11, 1994, at D1.
256
*See BNA Plus Work Stoppage Statistics.
187 See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, "Field of Dreams Turns into Nightmare in New Jersey," N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1994, at B9; Ira Berkow, "Yesterday Was Just Perfect for a Ball Game," N.Y.
Times, Aug. 29, 1994, at C9; Murray Chass, "Game's Ultimate Strikeout Is Hang in the Balance," N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1994, at B11: Thomas Boswell, "Baseball Season Ends Now," Wash.
Post, Sept. 15, 1994, at BI; Shirely Povich, "For Years, the Game Changed; Now, It Has
Stopped," Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1994, at B4; Claire Smith, "What Strike Needs Is a Designated
Hero," N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1994, at 26. See also September 1994 "House Hearings," supra note
63 (tr. at 57) (statement of Adam Kolton) (stating that he harbors "no doubt that many fans
have been so alienated by the strike" that they will stay away and boycott future baseball
games); id. at 55-56 (explaining the view of his group, Sports Fans United, that 'ithe antitrust
exemption as we see it is really a giant permission slip issued by the courts for baseball owners
to treat fans any way they want without any consequences," and reporting that his rup had
joined the Consumer Federation of America, Fans First, and more than a dozen other fan groups
across the country on a national petition drive to end professional baseball's antitrust exemption
and that the petition had well over 15,000 signatures even though the campaign had just
be8ne, e.g., Jim Bunning, "Repeal that Anti-trust Exmption," N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1994. at
:Ball
Major
League Baseball's Monopoly," Bus. Wk., Nov. 1992,
A15; Kathleen Madigan, "l ul
1
a- 42; Connie Mack& Richard M. Blau, The Need for Fair Play Repealing the Federal Baseball
Antitrust Exemption," 45 Fla. L. Rev. 201 (1993; Robert G. Berger, "After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption From the Antitrust Laws," 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
209 (1983); Claire Smith, 'Antitrust Exemption is Also in Question," N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1994,
at B9; Charles Rembar, "When Justice Holmes Swung and Missed," N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1994,
at A23; Thomas Boswell, "Step up to the Plate, Mr. President," Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1994, at
B6; "Kiss it Goodbye," Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1994, at A26.
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tributed in a positive fashion to resolving several labor disputes experienced in other professional sports. The case of professional football is illuminating. For example, in 1987, after the failure of negotiations both during and after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and an unsuccessful player strike, a number of
players brought an antitrust challenge against the owners' unilateral imposition of a "Right of First Refusal/Compensation System,"
which was included in the expired collective bargaining agreement.18 9 A Minnesota Federal district court ultimately ruled that
the owners' unilateral imposition of the "Right of First Refusal/
Compensation System" was unlawful, 9 0 and the NFL owners and
players were then able to enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement.1ax Likewise in professional basketball, several judicial
decisions and settlements, reached during antitrust litigation between the players and the National Basketball Association after
the breakdown of collective bargaining, have facilitated-and then
been incorporated into-new collective bargaining agreements. 192
asiSe Powell 1. 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 9,0 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). A "Right of First Refusal/Compensation System" restricts the
ability of a player to sign with another team as a "free agent." Under this system, a team could
retain a veteran free agent by exercising a right of first refusal and by matching a club's offer.
Even if the old team decided not to match the offer, it would receive compensation from the
new team in the form of additional draft choices. Id. at 779.
soSee Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); "McNeil," 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn.
1991). But see- supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (regarding criticism of Powell II for
having the effect of forcing the union to decertify, thereby delaying the availability of antitrust
remedies to the harmed players).
"'See White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Minn. 1993). See also Letter
From Gene Upshaw, Executive Director, National Football League Players Association, to Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 22, 1994):
Only when [NFL] players prevailed in a series of antitrust actions, and gained signifi.
cant damages, did the owners finally agree in the labor context to a drastic amelioration
of [owner-imposed player restrictions).
In my view, giving any group of sports owners an exemption from the antitrust laws
gives them a huge additional and unneeded advantage in labor negotiations. With the
exemption in hand, the owners know they can jointly impose severe labor negotiations.
When this is coupled with the owners' already overwhelming economic advantage. the
result is that the collective bargaining rights guaranteed by the labor laws lecome a
meaningless sham.
The NFL's 1977 collective bargaining agreement was also incorporated in a court-approved class
action settlement that ended 5 years of labor discord. See Alexander v. National Football
League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 161,730, 1977 WL 1497 (D. Minn. 1977), affd sub nom. Reynolds v National Football League, 584 F.2d 280 18th Cir. 1978).
1In 1970. NBA players commenced a class action antitrust suit against the NBA, challenging certain league-imposed player restrictions. See Robertson v. National Basketball Assn. 389
F Supp 867, 884-889 (S.D.N.Y, 1975). By 1976. the parties in Robertson were able to enter
into, and the district court approved, an antitrust settlement agreement, which gave rise to collective bargaining agreements between the NBA and NBA players. Moreover, after a collective
bargaining agreement between the players and the NBA expired in 1982, when the NBA sought
for the first time to impose a salary cap on the players, the players were able to successfully
challenge this uulateral action by the NA in court as violative of the terms of the parties'
settlement agreement in Robertson. The players and the NBA were then able to negotiate a mutually agreeable Memorandum of Understanding modifying their settlement agreement, and
likewise entered into a rew multi-year collective bargaining agreement that included a salary
cap. When the collective bargaining agreement expired in 1987, the players and the NBA entered into a Moratorium Agreement, whereby certain NBA practices would remain in effect but
no new contracts would be signed.
When the Moratorium Agreement expired on October 1, 1987 without a mutually agreeable
resolution the players brought another antitrust suit, which culminated a year later in a new
collective bargaining agreement. Although this collective bargaining agreement expired on June
23, 1994, the parties have been able to reach a no strike/no lock out agreement, so that the
1994-1995 season has been able to proceed without interruption, despite the parties' ongoing
legal battle. See National Basketball Assn v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). apStrikes a Labor Deal:
peal docketed, 94-7709 (2d Cir. Jul. 19, 1994); Richard Justice, "A
ers, Players Agree to Play Uninterrupted Season", Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1994, at Cl; Sam
Smith, "NBA Keeps Eye on Ball, Avoids Strike 3: Players, Owners Announce They'll Play Full
Season", Chi. Trib.. Oct. 28, 1994, at NI.
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This has permitted professional basketball to continue operating
without significant interruption.
Despite its neutral and narrowly written goals, H.R. 4994 has
been criticized by some as being unfair. For example, at the Committee's September 29, 1994 markup, it was asserted that the bill
would give professional baseball players a unique "choice" of remedies by allowing them to proceed under either the labor laws or
the antitrust laws.193 However, there is no language whatsoever in
the Committee-approved bill which would grant baseball players
any rights not enjoyed by professional players of other sports. The
legislation merely subjects any unilateral imposition of employment
terms and conditions to possible challenge under the antitrust
laws. It does not specify that any particular unilateral imposition
would necessarily violate the antitrust laws; nor does it alter the
operation of the rule of reason or the nonstatutory labor exemption.
It was further asserted that the bill would somehow create a risk
of sweeping the minor leagues within its coverage, by subjecting
them to the direct impact of antitrust claims, challenges and litigation.194 But again, close examination of the bill indicates that by
intent and application, it could only grant rights to major league
players. While it is far from clear that as a public policy matter the
minor leagues should be entitled to any antitrust exemption,s95
H.R. 4994 is nonetheless specifically limited to the unilateral imposition of terms, outside of a collective bargaining agreement, involving the major leagues.
Finally, it was asserted at the Committee's markup that Congress should not become involved in any labor strike "when there
is no national security interest involved" and that the Committee
should not take sides in the current strike.' 96 This argument also
misses the point. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and affirmatively solicited Congressional action in response to the Court's
grant of antitrust immunity in its now-discredited Federal Baseball
decision. '19 By failing to repeal the exemption in the face of the Supreme Court's granting professional baseball a unique antitrust exemption, Congress has effectively taken sides in an ongoing labor
dispute. Given this history, it should not now require a "national
security interest" to remedy such an inequitable anomaly.
The Committee wishes to make it clear that by zupporting a narrowly crafted limitation on baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption, as reflected in H.R. 4994, it does not intend to imply in
any way that a more comprehensive response is not also justifiedor to imply that the courts should not act decisively themselves to
correct this misinterpretation in an appropriate case. Indeed, the
record before the Committee appears to provide a clear and compel'See September 28, 1994 Markup of H.R. 4994, Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law
of the House Judiciary Comm. (tr. at 21) [hereinafter 1994 Markup) (statement of Representative Hamilton Fish)
-See
September 1S94 House Hearings, supra note 63, at 47 (statement of Stanley Brand).
5
See supra notes 128, 157-159 and accompanying text.
'eSee 1994 Markup, supra note 193 (tr. at 21) (statement of Representative Fish).
1In 1953, in Toolson, the Court wrote: "We think that, if there are evils in this field which
now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation." Toolson v. New
York Yankees, 346 U.S. at 357. And in 1972, in Flood, Justice Blackmun wrote that 'what [the
Court] said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated is
for congressional, and not judicial action." Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 289.
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ling case in support of outright repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1
This section states the bill's short title, the "Baseball Fans and
Communities Protection Act of 1994."
Section 2
Section 2 of the bill amends the Clayton Act to add a new section
27 partially removing the judicially created antitrust exemption for
professional baseball.
Proposed new section 27(a) of the Clayton Act provides that if
unilateral terms and conditions of employment in restraint of trade
or commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an
agreement between two or more Major League Baseball clubs and
the labor organization representing the players of Major League
Baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
The reference in section 27(a) to the unilateral terms and conditions being imposed "in restraint of trade" is intended to incorporate the same limitations as are presently set forth in the antitrust laws; such reference is not intended to create a new requirement, in addition to that imposed generally by the antitrust laws
and their attendant bodies of jurisprudence. The references to
"major league baseball" include the major league clubs comprising
the National and the American Leagues,' 9 8 and any similar new
clubs that may be established in the future.
The phrase "unilateral terms and conditions of employment" is
taken from the law of labor-management relations. It refers to
terms and conditions of employment imposed by employers on their
employees, or vice versa, outside the context or beyond the duration of a collective bargaining agreement.
The phrase "shall be subject to the antitrust laws" is intended to
incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust laws, as it exists and as it may develop.
By subjecting the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions
of employment to the antitrust laws, the Committee does not intend to create any implication that such imposition would necessarily be unlawful under the antitrust laws. Rather, such imposition would merely be subject to challenge under the antitrust laws,
as would be the case in other professional sports.
In so applying the antitrust laws, the various judicial doctrines
which have developed over the years with regard to professional
sports leagues would, depending on the applicable facts, apply to
professional baseball. Thus for example, Major League Baseball
owners would presumably be able to benefit from the rule of reason
where appropriate with respect to analyses of player restraints,19
and the players would be able to seek equitable relief to invalidate
such restraints to the same extent as players in other professional
'"See supra note 2.
I"See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

38
200

sports.
And in the context of an antitrust challenge to a unilaterally imposed term unchanged from an expired collective bargaining
agreement, the defending party may be able, depending on the applicable facts and judicial construction, to incorporate the
nonstatutory labor exemption into its substantive defense. 20' However, in the case of a new term or condition-one that was not contained in the expired collective bargaining agreement or one that
is imposed in a form changed from the expired agreement-the
term or condition would appear to fail the second and third prongs
of the Mackey test. That is to say, it would not be a subject of collective bargaining, nor the product of bona fide arm's-length negotiations. 202
Proposed new section 27(b) of the Clayton Act would exempt
from the application of subsection (a) any term or condition intended to apply solely with respect to a professional baseball player
who is a party to any uniform player contract that is assigned, at
the time of the imposition of the term or condition occurs, to a
baseball club that is not a major league professional baseball club.
This section clarifies that the bill does not confer any rights under
the antitrust laws on any minor league players (i.e. players who
are not on the roster of a major league club or who are not a free
agent).
Proposed new section 27(c) of the Clayton Act clarifies that the
legislation shall not be construed to modify or affect the rights or
duties that any person may have under Federal labor law. All currently available processes and remedies under labor-related laws
continue to be available to the parties. For example, the parties'
duty to bargain collectively, under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(bX3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) and (bX3), will
be unaffected by this legislation. Similarly, the legislation will also
not affect the operation of the Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1291 et seq., which explicitly permits the owners of professional
-See, e.g.. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 234-235 (D. Minn. 1992)

(granting a temporary restraining order to four NFL players, effectively making them free
agents, in response to players' antitrust challenge to owners' application of player restraints
after termination of the collective bargaining relationship between the parties).
21See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
2 2
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Brown v. Po Football, Inc. appears to represent the only antitrust challenge to a sports
league's alleged imposition of new employment terms not pruviously included in a collective bargaining agreement See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 137-139 (D.D.C. 1991),
a ppeals docketed, Nos. 93-7165, 94-7071 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 1993, Mar 31 1994) In that case
which involved the NFL's unilateral imposition of a term providing that developmental squad
players would be paid a fixed salary rather than being permitted to negotiate their own salaries,
the district court held that because the salary restraint was never included in a collective baraining agreement, the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply. Id. at 139. (The court also
held, in te alternative, that the non-statutory labor exemption had ended with the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement. See supra text accompanying note 92.) See also Bridge'
man v. National Basketball Association, 675 F. Supp 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
Although some commentators have read Powell 11 very broadly, as authority for immunizing
even some new employment terms imposed after "impasse" (see, e.g., Note, "When Does the
Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports," 94 Colum. L. Rev
1045, 1064 (1994)), the case did not involve the impocition of a new term or cnndition, but rather, the maintenance of a term contained in the most recent collective barguning areement See
Supreme Court Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Powell v.National Football
League, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit (No. 89-1421), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) at 13 n.5. In the Committee's view,
the broad construction of Powell II suggested by these commentators would go far beyond the
limited purpose of the nonstatutory labor exemption. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
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baseball and other sports leagues to pool their separate rights in
sponsored telecasting of their games.
Proposed new section 27(d) of the Clayton Act excludes from the
term terms and conditions" as used in section 27 any strike or
lockout. Thus, both sides are permitted to continue to use the respective remedy available to them, and the use of that remedy cannot be challenged under the antitrust laws. This merely codifies the
existing antitrust understanding applicable to collective bargaining
in other industries.
COMMITIEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 2(IX3XA) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings
and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(bX 1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Operations were received as referred to in clause 2(lX3)(D) of
rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAx EXPENDITURES

Clause 2(lX3XB) of House Rule XI is inapplicable because this
legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased
tax expenditures.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(IX3XC) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to
the bill H.R. 4994, the following estimate and comparison, prepared
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section
403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. CONGRESS,

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, October 4, 1994.
Hon. JACK BROOKS,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.R. 4994, the Baseball Fans and Communities Protection
Act of 1994, as ordered reported by the House Committee on the
Judiciary on September 29, 1994. CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 4994 would result in no significant costs to the federal government or to state and local governments. Also, enactment of this bill
would not affect direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-yougo procedures would not apply.
H.R. 4994 would remove major league baseball's exemption from
antitrust laws if the club owners unilaterally impose terms and
conditions of employment on the players. By removing the antitrust
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exemption under these circumstances, this bill would allow the
labor organization representing the players to challeng the owners' decision in federal court. Enactment of H.R. 4994 would impose
additional costs on the U.S. court system to the extent that additional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does not expect any
resulting increase in case load or court costs to be significant.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased
to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Susanne S. Mehlman,
who can be reached at 226-2860.
Sincerely,
JAMES F. BLUM
(For Robert D. Reischauer, Director).
INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 2(1X4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee estimates that H.R. 4994 will
have no significant inflationary impact on prices and costs in the
national economy.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law ma-de by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

CIAYTON ACT
SEc. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in
restraint of trade -r commerce are imposed by any party that has
been subject to an agreement between 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor organization representing the players of
major league baseball,such unilateralimposition shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed
solely with respect to a professional baseball player who is a party
to a uniform player contract that is assigned,at the time the imposition described in such subsection cccurs, to a baseball club that is
not a major league professional baseball club.
(c) This section shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the operationof(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15
U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
(2) any Federalstatute relating to labor relations.
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "terms and conditions"
does not include a strike or a lockout.

DISSENTING VIEWS
As introduced, the "Baseball Fans and Community Protection Act
of 1994" (H.R. 4994) contained a number of fundamental flaws.
First, the language of the original bill would have pre-determined
that the antitrust laws were to apply ("the antitrust laws shall
apply") in the event the baseball players' union challenged an attempt by the club owners to unilaterally impose a term or condition
of employment (such as a salary cap). So, te bill itself would have
directed the district court to find what is normally the issue to be
decided in these cases. That is, whether it is appropriate for the
antitrust laws to apply or whether, instead, the parties should be
required to continue the collective bargaining process. In effect,
H.R. 4994 would have decided the issue of antitrust applicability
before the suit authorized by the bill was ever filed.
Secondly, the original bill was inconsistent with the provisions
and intent of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115).
That statute strictly prohibits the federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor dispute cases. Despite this longstanding federal
policy of non-intervention, H.R. 4994 would have imposed an "autoinatic injunction", the effect of which would have been to stay the
implementation of any unilateral term or condition of employment
pcnding the outcome of the union's antitrust action.
The substitute sponsored by Congressman Synar and favorably
reported by the House Judiciary Committee, is an admitted improvement over the original version of H.R. 4994. (For example, the
language explicitly imposing a stay has been removed.) However,
we continue to be concerned about both the propriety and timing
of this legislation and oppose its enactment. Simply put, Congress
should not intervene in an ongoing collective bargaining dispute
unless a national security interest is involved. Clearly, as important as baseball is to our national psyche, a baseball strike is not
a national security matter. The decision to legislatively move ahead
on this matter at this point is also highly questionable. It would
make more sense for Congress to revisit the basic issue of baseball's antitrust exemption next year, when the emotion and acrimony surrounding the current strike hopefully will have subsided.
Furthermore, the language of the substitute contains potentially
inconsistent provisions that must be clarified. The new subsection
27(a) of the Clayton Act states that the unilateral imposition of a
term or condition of employment "in restraint of trade * * * shall

(emphasis added) be subject to the antitrust laws." Then, subsection 27(c) says that this language "shall not be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede the operation of * * * (2) any Federal

statute relating to labor relations." When read together what do
these two provisions mean? Does the language preserve the nonstatutory labor exemption as it has been construed by the courts?
Does this language require that the baseball players' union decer(41)
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tify itself before bringing the action under subsection 27(a)? Or,
does it mean that the union could pursue an antitrust suit under
subsection (a), without foregoing any of its rights or remedies
under federal labor law?
At the Judiciary Committee markup, the substitute's sponsor indicated that its language was intended to place baseball teams on
equal footing with all other organized employers with respect to the
interplay between the labor and antitrust laws. Congressman
Synar assured Committee members that subsection (c) of the substitute was added to make clear that baseball teams would have
the same rights and defenses that are enjoyed by all other professional sports leagues and all other organized employers. That is,
subsection (c) was intended to make all of the exemptions to the
antitrust laws, particularly the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions, available to baseball teams in any antitrust action
brought under the substitute.
While we were pleased to hear Congressman Synar indicate that
the substitute would allow the baseball teams to retain all of the
usual exemptions and defenses in this area, we are concerned that
the language of the substitute does not say this as clearly as it
should. Specifically, we remain concerned that the language of the
substitute could allow the players' union to pursue antitrust remedies in federal court while retaining all of their rights under the
National Labor Relations Act. If so, they would be permitted to
continue their strike and could continue to file unfair labor practices complaints with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Such a repalt would not be consistent with the preponderance of
the caselaw on the so-called non-statutory labor exemption. In such
cases, the courts have generally ruled that a union must elect between labor law remedies and antitrust remedies. The question,
here, is whether the labor exemption applies after a collective bargaining agreement has expired. The only circuit court of appeals
that has decided this question, held in Powell II that the labor exemption survives an expired agreement as long as there is an "ongoing collective bargaining relationship." Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d
1293, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. den. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
The Powell II litigation began when the National Football
League Players Association's ("NFLPA") ended their 1987 strike.
Initially, the NFLPA challenged the NFL's continued adherence to
the free agency rules of the expired collective bargaining agreement. By the time Powell II got to the Eighth Circuit, however, the
NFL had unilaterally implemented its "Plan B" free agency system
after a collective bargaining impasse had been reached.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with a district court finding that
the exemption ended when the parties reached a bargaining impasse. The court noted that the labor laws provided the opposing
parties in a collective bargaming relationsbip with "offsetting tools"
through which either side coul' seek resolution of their labor dispute. The court reasoned that to allow the players to "pursue an
action for treble damages under the Sherman Act [once impasse
has been reached] would * * * improperly upset the careful balance established by Congress through the labor law." Id. at 1302.
The court concluded that the labor laws, not the antitrust laws,
govern disputes over terms and conditions of employment:
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The labor arena is one with well established rules which
are intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than
intervention by the courts. The League and the Players
have accepted this "level playing field" as the basis for
their often tempestuous re ationship, and we believe that
there is substantial justification for requiring the parties
to continue to fight on it, so that bargaining and the exertion of economic force may be used to bring about legitimate compromise. 930 F.2d at 1303.
The same rationale was followed in the most recent labor antitrust decision involving the expiration of a collection bargaining
agreement in a professional sports league. NBA v. Williams, Civil
Action No. 94 CIV. 4488 (L.D.N.Y. July 18, 1994). The collective
bargaimng agreement between the National Basketball Association
("NBA") and the National Basketball Players Association
("NBAPA") expired this summer. Nevertheless, the NBA teams
have continued to operate under tie terms of that expired agreement, including the salary cap and free agency provisions. After
the NBAPA threatened to sue the NBA under antitrust laws for
continuing to apply these terms, the NBA filed suit against the
NBAPA and representative players. The NBA sought a declaratory
judgment that the federal labor laws governed the dispute between
the parties and that, as a result, it lawfully could continue to apply
the terms of the expired agreement. The NBAPA and representative players counterclmed, alleging the continued imposition of
the salary cap and free agency rules violated and antitrust and was
not protected by the labor exemption.
Judge Duffy of the Southern District of New York found that
both sides were "simply using the court as a bargaining chip in the
collective bargaining process" in what was "a labor dispute that
does not belong in litigation." Williams, slip op. at 6-7. The court
found that the rationale of the Supreme Court precedent establishing the nonstatutory labor exemption and the policies of the federal
labor laws "mandate that the appropriate standard to apply in the
Powell II standard." Id. at 24.
The court concluded that the labor laws control in such disputes.
Quoting from Professor (now Judge) Winter's seminal work on the
interplay between the federal labor and antitrust laws, the court
explained that:
Collective bargaining seeks to order labor markets
through a system of countervailing power. Thus, it is often
referred to by economists as bilateral monopoly. If such a
structure is to be protected by law, then logically the antitrust claims between employers and employees must be extinguished. William, slip op. at 24 (quoting Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles. 81 Yale L.J. at 22.)
The court declared that the antitrust laws did not apply in what
was purely a labor dispute between the NBA and the players' collective bargaining representative. According to those labor laws,
the NBA could lawfully continue to operate under the terms of the
expired agreement. The court closed with the following suggestion
to the parties:
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[The] Parties are once again urged to pursue the only rationale course for the resolution of their disputes; that is,
of course of collective bargaining pursued by both sides in
good faith. No court, no matter how highly situated, can
replace this time honored manner of labor dispute 'resolution. Rather than clogging the courts with unnecessary litigation, the parties should pursue this course. Williams slip
op. at 28-29.
It is important to emphasize that neither the NFL nor the NBA
have an antitrust exemption. It should be further pointed out that
the National Hockey League (NHL)--currently involved in a work
stoppage-is also generally subject to the federal antitrust laws.'
There is also considerable speculation that there could be a work
stoppage in the NBA within the month. Nevertheless, all three of
the other professional sports leagues have seen considerable labor
strife, not dissimilar to that which we are witnessing with respect
to baseball. It would appear that labor strife in professional sports
has more to do with economics, than it has to do with the applicability of the federal antitrust laws.
Baseball's antitrust exemption has received considerable criticism and has been "under Fire" for many years. The Synar substitute, of course, would not repeal many aspects of baseball's antitrust immunity. However, at this point, it might be useful to point
out the problems that outright repeal of the antitrust exemption
would bring with it. For example, the relationship between the
major league teams and their minor league affiliates would be seriously undermined if the antitrust exemption is repealed in its totality.
Specifically, the major league teams currently enter into contracts with minor league players that bind those players to a particular club under a "reserve clause" for a period of six and onehalf years. That reserve clause-which no longer applies to major
league players after a certain number of years of service-would be
subject to challenge under the federal antitrust laws as a restraint
on trade. No major league team would have the financial incentive
to continue to invest large sums of money in the minor leagues in
such an uncertain situation. Specifically, why should they invest in
minor league player development if they had no on-going assurance
that the players (they had initially signed) would remain part of
their organization for a reasonable evaluation period? In addition,
the amateur draft. which provides the bulk of players for tile minor
leagues would also be subject to a challenge under the federal antitrust laws. Consequently, it is important for Congress to recognize
that the business relationship between the major league clubs and
their minor league affiliates would be altered if legislation unconditionally repealing the antitrust exemption were to be enacted.
Furthermore, there are other aspects of major league baseball
thac are currently exempt that could be challenged under the antitrast laws if the exemption was removed in its entirety. For exam0Ae, the territorial broadcasting rights that each te'am is allocated
IThe only exception to antitrust coverage for the NFL, NBA and NHL is contuined in the
Sports Broadcasting Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94. Under this law, the professional sports leagues
(baseball included) are protected from antitrust suits when they enter into league-wide contracts
wi!h television networks.
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for specific regions of the country could be challenged. Similarly,
the reasonableness of the rules governing franchise expansion and
franchise relocation decisions could also be challenged under the
antitrust laws if the exemption were to be removed. The point is
that a number of baseball's everyday business operations would become the focus of antitrust litigation, bringing with it confusion,
delay and the threat of treble damage awards.
The substitute attempts to limit its scope of labor disputes between the major league players and the owners, thereby not having
any impact on the minor leagues. Once again, during the Committee's markup, Congressman Synar attempted to allay concerns
about the language of the substitute. He stated: "It specifically exempts (the) minor leagues from the repeal of the antitrust law exemption in the bill." Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about
the language in subsection (b) of the substitute from the minor
league perspective. They note that it does affect some minor league
players in that the recent "Basic Agreement" between the major
league owners and the players' union involved certain aspects of
minor league contracts and affects the rights of minor league players carried on major league rosters. The bill needs to be further
amended to ensure that there is no adverse impact on the minor
leagues.
To summarize, the problem with the substitute version of H.R.
4994 is that the players' union may not be required to elect between labor law remedies and antitrust remedies, a result that
would be inconsistent with policies previously established by Congress and the federal courts with respect to labor disputes. The
Major League Baseball Players' Union could be permitted to retain
its rights and remedies under labor law while, at the same time,
seeking an antitrust law treble damage award in federal court.
That result would amount to Congress picking sides in a highly
publicized labor dispute-a dispute with no national security implications. The enactment of H.R. 4994, as reported by the Judiciary
Committee would be a bad precedent and serious public policy mistake. Congress should not intervene but, rather, allow the collective
bargaining process to continue.
HAMILTON FISH, Jr.
HENRY J. HYDE.
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.
GEORGE W. GEKAS.
HowARD COBLE.
STEVEN SCHIFF.
JIM RAMSTAD.
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I. TEXT OF S. 627, AS REPORTED
1104th Cong.. 1st sess.

A BILL To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995."
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
"Sec. 27 (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of professional major league baseball.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues;
"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to any restraint by professional baseball on franchise relocation; or
"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et
seq.) (commonly known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961)."
II. PURPOSE

This Committee has long held the view that free market competition, protected by the antitrust laws, is the foundation of our economic system. Immunity from the antitrust laws is appropriate
only in very limited circumstances, and only if certain precautions
are taken. Immunity should be granted and maintained only where
it is clear that competition will not work in a particular industry
or market. Moreover, any industry that is granted immunity is well
advised to adopt the least anticompetitive practices possible, in
order to preserve the fairness of the economic system and maintain
its exemption. With these principles in mind, the Committee has
reviewed S. 627, the "Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act
of 1995."
The purpose of S. 627 is to affirm that major league baseball's
owners and players are subject to the Nation's antitrust laws. Professional baseball is the only industry in the United States that
claims an exemption from the antitrust laws without being subject
to alternative regulatory supervision. Yet Congress has never declared professional baseball to be exempt from the antitrust laws.
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court shielded the owners of major
league baseball from the antitrust laws through its judicial decisions, beginning in 1922. While subsequently finding the exemption
to be an "anomaly," the Court expressly left it to Congress to modify the exemption.
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This legislation, S. 627, will end the anomalous antitrust loophole enjoyed by the owners of major league baseball, by clarifying
that the antitrust laws do apply to major league baseball with certain exceptions. Under S. 627, the antitrust laws will apply expressly to areas of immediate concern such as player relations,
competition from new leagues, and telecommunications activities
that are not within the scope of the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961. However, S. 627 will not affect existing law with respect to
professional baseball's ability to restrain franchise relocation, matters relating to the minor leagues, or the statutory provisions of the
Sports Broadcasting Act.
The baseball strike of 1994-95-which tarnished the national
pastime by curtailing the 1994 season and shortening the 1995 season-has reemphasized the need to express Congress, intent to
apply to professional baseball the rules of fair and open competition
that are followed by all other unregulated business enterprises in
this country, including all other sports leagues. The strike, which
started in August 1994 and did not end until April 1995, was not
prompted by the players' demand for more money, but by their lack
of any alternative when faced with the owners threats to impose
unilaterally terms and conditions of employment that could violate
the antitrust laws. Other professional athletes and similarly situated employees have alternatives to striking specifically because of
these laws. Unfortunately, negotiations were unproductive and, to
the fans great dismay, the 1994 World Series was never played.
These failed negotiations achieved what the Great Depression,
world wars, and scandal could not-the cancellation of the World
Series. The strike continued into the 1995 season, which began
only after a Federal injunction restored the terms of the old agreement. Remarkably, the owners and players have yet to reach a new
labor agreement. It is clearly time to end baseball's antitrust exemption.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Many bills have been introduced over the decades in response to
the Supreme Court's 1922 decision establishing baseball's antitrust
exemption. During the previous Congress, this Committee voted on
June 23, 1994, and narrowly failed to pass S. 500, which as amended, would have eliminated the antitrust exemption for major league
baseball as it related to labor issues.
In the 104th Congress, Senators Hatch, Moynihan, Graham, and
Bingaman introduced S. 415, the Professional Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995, on February 14, 1995. On that same day, Senators Thurmond and Leahy introduced S. 416, the Major League
Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995. While the two bills had
similar goals, the primary difference was that S. 415 would have
overridden the "nonstatutory labor exemption" in certain circumstances. The Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition promptly held a hearing on the bills.
Senator Thurmond chaired the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing
on February 15, 1995, at which both S. 415 and S. 416 were analyzed. Witnesses included: Senators Hatch, Moynihan, Kassebaum,
and Graham; Mr. Selig, chairman of the Major League Baseball
Executive Council; Mr. O'Connor of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Mr.
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Rill of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott; Mr. Fehr, executive director
of the Major League Baseball Players Association; Mr. Cone and
Mr. Murray, both baseball players and members of the Major
League Baseball Players Association; and Mr. Arquit of Rogers &
Wells.
Following the hearing, on March 27, 1995 Senators Hatch, Thurmond, and Leahy introduced a compromise bill, S. 627, the Major
League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, which was cosponsored by Senators Moynihan and Graham. The legislation was referred to this Committee and the Antitrust Subcommittee. On April
5, 1995, with a quorum present, the Antitrust, Business Rights,
and Competition Subcommittee approved S. 627 by voice vote for
full Committee consideration.
IV. VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

On August 3, 1995, with a quorum present, the Committee on
the Judiciary ordered S. 627 favorably reported by a vote of 9 to
8, with one member abstaining. In compliance with paragraph 7 of
Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the members of the
Committee voted as follows on S. 627:
YEAS

Hatch
Thurmond
Simpson
Thompson
DeWine
Abraham
Kennedy
Leahy
Feingold

NAYS

Grassley
Specter
Brown
Kyl
Biden
Heflin
Simon
Feinstein
ABSTENTION

Kohl
Senator Simpson offered an amendment that would have maintained the existing antitrust exemption if an independent baseball
commissioner was appointed in accordance with specific procedures. The amendment was not adopted by a vote of 6 to 11, with
one abstention, as follows:
YEAS

Hatch
Simpson
Grassley
Brown
Kennedy
Leahy

NAYS

Thurmond
Specter
Thompson
Kyl
DeWine
Abraham
Biden
Heflin
Simon
Feinstein
Feingold
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ABSTENTION

Kohl
V. DIscussIoN
Major league baseball has enjoyed an esteemed position in this
Nation over the last century. Often referred to as America's national pastime, the game has been a bond linking generations and
evokes special memories of family and childhood for many.
Unfortunately, the realities of baseball do not always match this
perception. The game is, in fact, a lucrative business-when not
sidelined by labor problems-generating billions of dollars in revenues and related income each year. With their current antitrust
status, the owners may conspire and collude without restraint, and
they have repeatedly taken unfair advantage of their unique legal
position. The antitrust laws were designed to prohibit the very kind
of economic practices that exist in major league baseball today.
The list of those harmed by baseball's antitrust exemption is
long. Municipalities, minor league owners, prospective investors,
players, and fans have all been victims of professional baseball's
anticompetitive practices. It is no surprise that the owners' relationship with the players has been so contentious; in fact, baseball
has been plagued with more work stoppages than all other professional sports combined. Nor is it surprising that record numbers of
fans decided to demonstrate their frustration in 1995 by staying
away from ballparks across the country-overall, the decline in attendance is estimated at more than 20 percent.
As the Committee began its consideration of S. 627, Chairman
Hatch summarized the need for legislation to resolve these problems by stating:
This bill will bring about sound reforms that ensure that
baseball is treated fairly and properly under the antitrust
laws. In the long run, our bill will contribute to constructive labor relations between the players and owners, and
will subject Major League Baseball to the same treatment
under the nation's laws that the other professional sports
experience.
Among groups which have analyzed and support this legislation,
two are particularly noteworthy. By letter of August 3, 1995, the
Department of Justice-which has enforcement responsibilities
over our Nation's antitrust laws-responded to Senator Leahy, the
ranking member of the Antitrust Subcommittee, stating that the
"Department supports legislation that would narrow baseball's special antitrust exemption by applying the antitrust laws to Major
League Baseball with certain exceptions." Likewise, the Section of
Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association supports S. 627 because it "reverses baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption and
places professional baseball on the same footing as other professional sports."
At the Committee's markup, Senator Leahy observed: "Congress
may not be able to solve every problem or heal baseball's self-inflicted wounds, but we can do this: We can pass legislation that
will declare that professional baseball can no longer operate above
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the law that governs all other professional sports and commercial
activity."
A. BACKGROUND OF BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION

Major league baseball's unusual antitrust status began with the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in FederalBaseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
Explaining why the antitrust laws should not apply, the Court held
that exhibitions of baseball did not satisfy the interstate commerce
jurisdictional requirement because they were "purely state affairs"
and not "trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words." In 1922, the Supreme Court could not have envisioned the
1993 World Series, where Canada's Toronto Blue Jays defeated the
Philadelphia Phillies in a game televised around the world. The
game the Court sought to protect bears little resemblance to the
billion dollar industry operating today.
A series of cases followed the 1922 decision of FederalBaseball,
in which the Federal courts refused to extend an antitrust exemption to any other sport,
I and held that other sports were subject
to the antitrust laws. 2 These decisions acknowledged the erroneous
nature of FederalBaseball, but refused to abandon the precedent
as it applied to baseball.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972), repudiated the legal basis of the FederalBaseball case
and its progeny. The Court correctly acknowledged in Floodthat its
prior decisions which created the exemption were now outdated
and incorrect. Specifically, the Court found that "[p]rofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce."
407 U.S. at 282. Rather than modify the exemption it had created,
however, the Court avoided the issue by holding that "[i]f there is
any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and
not by this Court." Id.3 Without the Supreme Court decisions in
Federal Baseball and Flood,major league baseball would have no
arguable claim to antitrust immunity. 4
1Radovich v. National FootballLeague, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); Haywood
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball); Nassau Sports v.
Peters,352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (professional hockey).
2 See eg. Dessen v. ProfessionalGolfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,385 U.S.
846 (1966) (professional golf); Washington State Bowlng ProprietorsAss'n v. PacificLanes. Inc.,
356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (professional bowling); Amateur Softball Ass'nv. UnitedStates, 467 F. 2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972) (amateur softball).
3The Court in Flood also held that state antitrust enforcement Is pre-empted, affirming the
appellate court's Ironic conclusion that the "burden on interstate commerce outweighs the states'
interests" in enforcing their own antitrust laws against baseball. 407 U.S. 284. To the extent
that the Federal exemption was due to baseball not being in interstate commerce and a "purely
state affair," however, State antitrust laws are the only ones that would apply to baseball.
4A federal court recently grappled with the Supreme Court's Flood decision in Piazza v. Major
League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The underlying facts in Piazza concerned the efforts of investors to purchase the San Francisco Giants and move the team to St.
Petersburg. FL. The league thwarted the move, and the investors sued. Noting that the Supreme Court in Floodhad repudiated the legal basis for the decision in Federal Baseball,the
district court limited the case to its facts and denied the league's motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the court found that the reserve clause at issue in FederalBaseball and Flood remained exempt from the antitrust laws, but that in all other respects baseball was a business
in interstate commerce and was therefore subject to the antitrust laws. The league reportedly
settled the suit before trial for $6 million. In a related case, the Supreme Court o Florida found
the Piazza rationale persuasive and adopted it in Butterworth v. NationalLeague ofProfessional
Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). See also Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 1995
Fla. App. Lexis 10391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (following rationale of Butterworth to reinstate state
antitrust claims). But see New OrleansPelicans Baseball, Inc. v. NationalAss'n of Professional

7
B. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Courts have repeatedly held that the antitrust laws do apply to
other professional sports, including professional football, basketball, and hockey, as discussed above, as well as all other unregulated businesses. However, the courts also have long recognized
that a professional sports league is a joint venture whose producta series of contests leading to a championship-could not be obtained if the individual franchises or teams were not permitted a
high degree of cooperation and business coordination beyond that
required in most other industries.5
Courts generally review the conduct of a bona fide joint venture
under the so-called "rule of reason" analysis, discussed next, which
balances benefits against any harm to competition, rather than
holding the conduct per se illegal without analyzing any defense or
justification. A second important doctrine explained below is the
nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, which applies generally to all sports and industries.
1. The rule of reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. 15 U.S.C. 1. Legality under the antitrust laws generally depends on whether the
conduct in question is considered "procompetitive" or "anticompetitive." Actions and conduct by joint ventures often have both procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects, so legality is determined
by balancing the beneficial effects on competition against the restraints the conduct imposes on competition. This balancing involves analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why the restraint was imposed. 6
This balancing analysis is known as the "rule of reason," and is
routinely used by
courts in deciding antitrust cases involving professional sports.7
BaseballLeagues. Inc., No. 93-253, 1994 WL 631144 (U.S.D.C., E.D. La. Mar. 1. 1994) (rejecting
Piazza as an "impressive dissent from precedent" and granting summary judgment based on existence of antitrust exemption).
sSee, e g. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976). cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85. 86 (1984).
6 See, e.g., Chicago Bd of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); National Socy
of7PrfessionalEng'rsv. UnitedStates, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
See, e.g., National CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 86; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'nv. NationalFootballLeague 726 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984).
Some professional sports leagues have argued for treatment as a "single entity" for purposes
of antitrust analysis, rather than individual teams. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1387; San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hoey League, 379 F. Supp.
966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Gary Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Professional Sports
Leagues under Section I of the Sherman Act An Alternative View, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 562 (1986);
Myron C. Grauer. Recognition of the National FootballLeague as a Single Entity underSection
1 of the Sherman Act Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
Because there can be no 'contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade" unless the
conduct involves two or more separate entities, such treatment would immunize sports leagues
against most antitrust liability. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984). Courts have rejected the argument that sports leagues constitute a single entity. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d 1381; North Am. Soccer League v. National FootballLeague, 670 F.2d 1249. 1257-1259 (2d Cir.). cert denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982);
cf Chicago ProfessionalSports & WGNv. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992) (Judge Easterbrook remanded case and encouraged league
to raise single entity theory before district court).
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While most restraints of trade are analyzed in terms of their reasonableness based on their nature, purpose, and effect, practices
such as price fixing have such a pernicious effect that they are presumed conclusively to be unreasonable. Under the per se rule, these
"naked restraints' on competition are deemed to be automatic antitrust violations without inquiry into their specific harm or business
justifications.
In sports cases, as noted, the courts typically rely on the rule of
reason to look at the purpose of any restriction and whether it reasonably relates to legitimate objectives or whether it is motivated
by an anticompetitive intent, such as eliminating a competitor from
the marketplace. The legality of a practice under the rule of reason
can only be determined by its effect on competition in a relevant
market. That is, to constitute an antitrust violation, the restriction
must result in the substantial foreclosure of competition of a particular product in a particular geographic area.

2. Nonstatutorylabor exemption
Understanding the broad outlines of the "nonstatutory labor exemption" is necessary to determine the practical impact and effect
of S. 627. The nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust
laws applies to all sports and industries, regardless of the existence
of other antitrust exemptions.
In an effort to harmonize the nation's antitrust and labor laws,
Congress has since 1914 protected from antitrust challenge the formation of labor unions and their collective activities as authorized
under the labor laws.8 While the statutory exemption is limited to
unilateral activities of labor unions and employees, the courts have
developed a limited "nonstatutory" labor exemption from the antitrust laws that applies to concerted activities and agreements between labor and nonlabor parties, such as between a union and employers in a collective bargaining setting.
The nonstatutory labor exemption is limited, both because the
exemption lasts only as long as there is a collective bargaining relationship and because all implied exemptions to the antitrust laws
are strongly disfavored and to be construed as being no broader

than clearly necessary. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1980).

That being said, there are conflicts and disagreements among
courts and academics over the extent and scope of the nonstatutory
labor exemption and, in particular, whether a union must decertify
in order for individual employees to be protected by the antitrust
laws.9 It is clear, however, that at some point the nonstatutory
labor exemption ends and employees have a right to invoke the
antitrust laws. Thus, any assertion that the antitrust laws have
nothing to do with labor relations is incorrect.
The recent bargaining between the National Basketball Association and the NBA Players Association provides an instructive ex-
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Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. 17 (exempts operation of labor organizations from the antitrust
laws by stating that labor is not an article of commerce): Clayton Act §20, 29 U.S.C. 52; and
Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. 101-110, 113-115.
9
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in order to review Brown v. Pro Football,50 F.3d
1041, 1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 1995), which adopted a broad view of the nonstatutory labor exemption
as protecting the entire collective bargaining process, and rejected the players' argument that
the exemption expires with the formal collective bargaining agreement.

9
ample of the importance of the possibility of invoking the antitrust
laws in the context of labor relations. The threat of union decertification led the parties to return to the bargaining table and ultimately to a new contract. The National Football League has also
experienced successful application of the antitrust laws to the relationship between labor and management in the multiemployer context.
The Committee need not address or resolve the debate over the
scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption and whether decertification is a necessary prerequisite before players invoke the antitrust
laws. It is sufficient to recognize that the antitrust laws play a role
in the labor-management context, and S. 627 will ensure that the
same rules apply to baseball as to all other sports and industries.
C. IMPACT OF EXEMPTION ON BASEBALL'S LABOR RELATIONS

On August 12, 1994, major league baseball experienced its eighth
baseball work stoppage since 1972-more stoppages than in professional basketball, football, and hockey, combined. The strike undeniably has had an impact on this legislation. For many supporters
of this legislation, the strike provided the motivation to seek modification of baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption. On the other
hand, among those who defend the current exemption, the strike
provided a reason to take no action. Senator Thurmond discussed
the effect of the strike during his subcommittee's hearing on February 15, 1995:
Some Members of Congress believe that we should not
get involved during the current strike, while other Members have asserted that in the absence of a strike there is
no need for the Congress to take action on this issue.
Whether there is a strike or not, it is my belief that it is
proper for the Congress to consider this antitrust issue as
a matter of public policy. The Congress has considered
baseball's antitrust exemption in the past, including serious attention by the Senate Judiciary Committee last year,
prior to the current strike. I intend to continue working on
this issue, even if the strike were to end today.
This most recent strike ultimately led to the cancellation of the
remainder of the 1994 regular season and the World Series. The
1994-95 strike was the longest in professional sports history, and
the only sports work stoppage to result not only in the complete
loss of postseason play, but to carry over into the next season. The
strike caused immeasurable emotional and financial damage to
professional baseball and the country, as has been noted by the
media and fans. This course of events has crystallized for the public the peculiar tendency of professional baseball to resort to strikes
and lockouts as a means of resolving labor disagreements-a result, in large measure, of its judicially granted antitrust exemption.
In testimony before the Antitrust Subcommittee, Mr. Arquit explained the impact of baseball's special antitrust status on labor relations as follows:
At present, because of the baseball exemption, owners
can act in concert to impose conditions on players, even in
the absence of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Knowing
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that they have the legal freedom ultimately to play this
trump card, the owners have less incentive to negotiate seriously at the early stages of the process. In contrast to the
Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, as embodied by the National Labor Relations Act, the baseball
antitrust exemption encourages exactly the opposite conduct by owners: protracted collective bargaining, leading
precisely to impasse. Given the jagged interface between
antitrust and labor relations created by the exemption, the
acrimonious history of collective bargaining in the context
of Major League Baseball comes as no surprise.
The facts leading up to the strike demonstrate its connection to
baseball's antitrust exemption, for baseball players faced a choice
that would never be faced by any other professional athlete or similarly situated employee. In 1993, even though the collective bargaining agreement in major league baseball had expired, the owners promised the players that they would not unilaterally implement new terms of employment in the off-season. Consequently,
there was no work stoppage. In 1994, however, the owners would
not make the same promise. If no agreement was reached between
the owners and players before the 1994-95 off-season, then the
owners could unilaterally attempt to change the terms of employment before the period for signing contracts for the 1995 season.10
The difference between baseball and other sports is that other
athletes have the option of challenging new terms of employment
under the antitrust laws.I1 Baseball players, having no such option,
are forced to either accept the new conditions or strike. Mr. Fehr
discussed this dynamic at the February 1995 hearing:
When parties sit down at the negotiating table they do
so fully knowledgeable of the rights and obligations of the
other side. In the case of baseball, when the owners sit
down at the table they look across the table at athletes
who they believe, if negotiations break down, have two and
only two options-accept their offer or strike. In any other
sport, when the owners sit down at the bargaining table
they look across the table at athletes who they know, if negotiations break down, have three options-accept their
offer, strike, or exercise their rights under the antitrust
laws.
As a result, the players chose to strike in August 1994 in an attempt to force negotiation of a new collective-bargaining agreement
during the season. Unfortunately, negotiations were unproductive
and on December 22, 1994, the owners implemented new terms of
employment. The strike continued, as players refused to sign contracts under new terms that were less favorable to the players than
those in the expired collective-bargaining agreement. The remainder of the 1994 season was lost, including the first cancellation of
the World Series. The 1995 season began only after a Federal judge
0Labor law permits the major league baseball owners, as it does other employers and owners
in other sports, to change the terms of employment at an impasse in the negotiations.
" As discussed above, players in other sports might have to decertify their union to be able
to bring an action in court, but the option remains nonetheless.
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issued an injunction restoring the terms of the old agreement.12
While the strike has ended, the dispute continues, as no labor
agreement has been reached. This legislation would help resolve
baseball's labor problems. As Chairman Hatch emphasized at the
Committee's markup, S. 627 "does not impose a big-government solution to baseball's problems. On the contrary, it would get government out of the way by eliminating a serious government-made obstacle to resolution of the labor difficulties in baseball."
Arguments that Congress should not interfere in ongoing labor
negotiations are unconvincing when there are no significant negotiations in progress. As Chairman Hatch said during the Committee markup: "There are no meaningful negotiations underway. The
players made their last proposal on March 30, 1995, and the owners have not made a counterproposal. Indeed, the owners suspended negotiations for 14 weeks after the March 30 proposal." In
light of this record, the Committee believes that S. 627 could provide the incentive to bring both parties back to the negotiating
table to resolve a labor dispute that threatens the very future of
the game.
D. OWNERS' ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS

The Committee views antitrust exemptions with skepticism, because free market competition, protected by our antitrust laws,
forms the foundation of our economic system. As with any other
group advocating an antitrust exemption, the burden of persuasion
lies with the owners, for an exemption should be maintained only
so long as it serves the public interest. In reviewing the owners' arguments, it is important to note that a number of the potential concerns raised by the owners are not implicated by S. 627, for the legislation does not affect the application of the antitrust laws to franchise relocation decisions or the relationship of the major leagues
to the minor leagues.
1. Baseballis not a business
The rationale for professional baseball's judicially created exemp-

tion from the antitrust laws in the FederalBaseball case was that
professional baseball was not a business in interstate commerce.
259 U.S. at 208. It has long been recognized by the Court, however,
that such a proposition is no longer true. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
It is now indisputable that major league baseball not only involves
interstate commerce, but constitutes a significant interstate financial enterprise, generating revenues and related economic activity-when not on strike-of billions of dollars a year.
Despite the size and financial impact of professional baseball, its
owners have long asserted that their industry is notable for its lack
of profitability. Prior to the recent strike, for example, owners had
predicted industrywide losses of some $100 million for the 1994

season. It is impossible to verify assertions of economic losses due
to the lack of financial disclosure by the owners, as well as the
multiplicity of revenue sources which may benefit owners apart

12Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.)
(National Labor Relations Board had reasonable cause to believe that the owners' unilateral actions constituted an unfair labor practice). aTfld, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
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from the team itself. Of course, profitability is not a factor in determining whether a particular enterprise is engaged in interstate
commerce or should be subject to the antitrust laws.
2. Effect on the minor leagues
Owners argue for continuation of professional baseball's antitrust
exemption on the basis that it is necessary to preserve the minor
league system. At the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, Mr. Selig
asserted that:
* * * the exemption preserves and enhances our Minor
League system throughout the United States, allowing
millions of fans the opportunity to watch professional baseball who would otherwise be deprived of that privilege.
Currently, most of the various minor league teams are bound to
major league affiliates. This relationship is governed by the Professional Baseball Agreement, under which the major league teams
substantially contribute to the payment of minor league player
costs. The owners of the major league and minor league baseball
clubs assert that if the antitrust laws applied to baseball, the major
leagues would reduce or eliminate this "subsidy" payment. The
owners further argue that certain aspects of the operation of minor
league baseball, such as its reserve clause (by which players are
bound to teams for up to 61/2 years), would be susceptible to legal
attack under the antitrust laws. Mr. Rill stated at the Antitrust
Subcommittee hearing that:
If the antitrust exemption is repealed, the continued use
of the minor league contract would very likely result in
challenges similar to those that wheeled around the majors' reserve clause. * * * Without the protection of the
minor league contract, [major league] clubs would not invest the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to operate the minor league system.
In addition to the usual skepticism with which claims for antitrust protections are greeted, many commentators and Members of
Congress have questioned the owners' sincerity in asserting a need
for special treatment to protect the minor leagues, in light of the
owners' own threats to the minor leagues. For example, in the
midst of contract negotiations in 1990, the owners threatened to do
away with the minors altogether.13 As the current agreement with
the minor leagues comes up for renegotiation, there is no certainty
that the relationship will continue as it has in the past regardless
of what happens to baseball's antitrust exemption.
More importantly, the Committee has elected to leave the law as
it currently exists with regard to the minor leagues. The legislation
expressly states in section 2 that it shall not be construed to affect
"the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause,
13The Associated Press reported that the "chief negotiator for the major leagues said the commissioner's office would begin discussions to start new minor leagues and clubs outside the
* * * current minor league governing body." Ronald Blum, AP Sports News, Lexis, AP File
(Nov. 18, 1990); "Majors, Minors Can't Agree," Sporting News, Nov. 26, 1990, at 37 (major
league baseball sending out new franchise applications and would abandon attempts to reach
agreement with minor leagues).
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the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter relating
to the minor leagues." At the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, Senator Thurmond explained the importance of maintaining the status
quo for the minor leagues:
Protecting the current relations with the minor leagues
is important to avoid disruption of the more than 170
minor league teams which are thriving throughout our Nation. This is a priority which other Members and I have
clearly expressed.
Despite the unambiguous language of the bill, opponents of the
legislation have continued to maintain that it might harm the
minor leagues. The Committee has asked repeatedly for the input
of the minor leagues, to determine if the proposed statutory language is insufficient to preserve current law. However, the minor
league owners have proposed no changes to the language of the
bill.
3. Effect on franchise relocations
Those defending the antitrust exemption also contend that it enables professional baseball to protect local communities and fans
against abandonment by teams seeking more lucrative venues.
Major league baseball does enjoy a good record of franchise stability, as least compared to other leagues. The bill expressly provides
that it shall not affect "the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to any restraint by professional baseball on franchise relocation." It is the Committee's intent that the status quo
of the law concerning franchise relocation remain in place. Thus,
S. 627 would have no impact on baseball's current ability to prevent franchise relocation.
4. Effect on broadcastrelationships
Another concern voiced with respect to application of the antitrust laws to professional baseball is that the laws might unreasonably intrude upon the owners' ability to negotiate jointly national
broadcast contracts. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 addresses
that concern, and applies to professional baseball. 15 U.S.C. 1291
et seq. The Sports Broadcasting Act provides a limited antitrust exemption to enable the member clubs of professional sports leagues
to jointly pool their separate rights in sponsored telecasting of their
games to sell to a purchaser.
To further ensure that baseball comes within the Sports Broadcasting Act, S. 627 provides that the legislation shall not be construed to affect "the application" of the Sports Broadcasting Act.
Thus, any congressional repeal of baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption would not prejudice professional baseball's ability
to negotiate jointly such agreements with the networks. Major
league baseball would be 4in the exact same position as the other
major professional sports.'
14With respect to local broadcast rights, application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball would prevent unreasonable restraints of trade from being imposed by the league on
Individual teams. Well-established precedent limits a sports league's latitude in abusing its local
broadcast market. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992) (the Chicago Bulls-owned
Continued
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5. Role of the baseballcommissioner

Some have argued that professional baseball need not be subject
to the antitrust laws, because of the existence of a strong and independent commissioner. Even if the Committee accepted the unique
argument that private regulation could suffice to justify an antitrust exemption, examination of the facts clearly reveals that baseball's commissioner has not been characterized by "strength" and
"independence." Major league baseball has been operating without
an even nominally independent commissioner since Fay Vincent's
departure in 1992.
The owners recently weakened the powers of the vacant commissioner's office through the actions of a Restructuring Committee.
Previously, the commissioner had authority to take any and all actions deemed to be in the "best interests" of the game. The recommendations recently adopted by the Restructuring Committee,
however, will prevent future commissioners from using the "best
interests" powers with respect to a list of issues, including: the expansion, sale, and relocation of teams; scheduling; interleague play;
divisional alignment; and revenue sharing among owners. The commissioner is also explicitly prohibited from using the "best interests" powers with regard to collective bargaining matters. After reviewing the changes the owners made to the commissioner's office,
former commissioner Peter Ueberroth commented:
Basically, the commissioner seems to have no portfolio,
power or job. * * * I think the changes dramatically
change the position. There will be the appearance of more
responsibility, but substantially less authority. That's the
recipe for a non job.
The commissioner would have no power, for example, to prevent or
end a play-stopping decision by the owners to stage a lockout of
players over collective bargaining issues.
VI. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1 states the bill's short title, the "Major League Baseball
Antitrust Reform Act of 1995."
Section 2 of the bill amends the Clayton Act to add a new section
27. Section 27(a) removes the judicially created antitrust exemption
for professional baseball and provides that the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of professional baseball as they apply to all
other professional sports. The phrase "the antitrust laws shall
apply" is intended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the
antitrust laws, as it now exists and as it may develop. In so applying the antitrust laws, the various judicial doctrines which have developed over the years and now apply to other professional sports
leagues would, depending on the applicable facts, apply to professional baseball.
by Jerry Reinsdorf, coowner of the Chicago White Sox-successfully challenged an NBA rule
limiting the number of games "superstation" WGN could carry). See also National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85 (NCAA rule restraining member schools in the number of games they
could contract to broadcast held unlawful). There is no reason to conclude that baseball cannot
live with the same rules that govern the other professional sports leagues. Indeed, one Federal
court has held that baseball's exemption is inapplicable to local broadcasting. HendersonBroadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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S. 627 clarifies that major league baseball's owners and players
are subject to the Nation's antitrust laws. The legislation was specifically drafted so that it would not implicate issues relating to
other activities, such as franchise relocation or the operation of the
minor leagues. The bill clarifies the law at the major league level.
While it is far from clear as a public policy matter that clarification
of the antitrust laws as they apply to the minor leagues should be
omitted from this legislation, S. 627 is nonetheless specifically limited to the major leagues.
New section 27(b)(1) of the Clayton Act states that subsection (a)
does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust
laws to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any other
matter relating to the minor leagues.
New section 27(b)(2) of the Clayton Act likewise states that subsection (a) does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of
the antitrust laws to any restraint on franchise relocation by professional baseball. Thus, both subsections (b)(1) and (b) (2) leave the
law as it is, and as the courts may interpret it in future cases.
New section 27(b) (3) of the Clayton Act provides that the legislation will not affect the application to professional baseball of the
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq., which explicitly
permits the owners in sports leagues to pool their separate rights
in sponsored telecasting of their games.
There is no language in the Committee-approved S. 627 that
would grant baseball players any rights not enjoyed by athletes in
other professional sports. The availability of antitrust remedies as
a last resort has made a positive contribution to resolving several
labor disputes experienced in other professional sports, and there
is no reason why baseball players and fans should not benefit from
these alternatives as well.
The Committee wishes to make clear that by supporting these
particular modifications of baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption in S. 627, it does not intend to imply that more comprehensive change is not also justified-or to imply that the courts
should not act decisively themselves to limit further baseball's exemption in appropriate cases. Indeed, a Federal court and the highest court of a State have already taken such action. Piazza, 831 F.
Supp. 420; Butterworth, 644 So. 2d 1021.
VII. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,

Washington, DC, August 8, 1995.

Hon. ORRIN G.

HATCH,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed S. 627, the Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of
1995, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on August 3, 1995. CBO estimates that enacting S. 627 would
result in no significant costs to the federal government or to state
or local governments. Also, enacting this bill would not affect direct
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spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would
not apply.
S. 627 would remove major league baseball's current exemption
from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and for decisions regarding the
relocation of major league franchises. By removing the antitrust exemption under these circumstances, this bill would allow the players under certain circumstances to challenge in federal court certain decisions by the owners. Enacting S. 627 would impose additional costs on the U.S. court system to the extent that additional
antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does not expect any resulting increase in caseload or court costs to be significant.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased
to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Susanne S. Mehlman.
Sincerely,
JUNE E. O'NEILL,

Director.
VIII. REGULATORY

IMPACT STATEMENT

In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no significant
additional regulatory impact or impact on personal privacy would
be incurred in carrying out the provisions of this legislation. After
due consideration, the Committee concluded that enactment of the
Act would not create any significant additional paperwork.

IX. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR THURMOND
It has been a pleasure to work with Chairman Hatch on S. 627,
the Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, during
this Congress. I join in the majority report, and wish to emphasize
a few key points on this important issue.
First, the Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Subcommittee s hearing on "The Court Imposed Major League Baseball
Antitrust Exemption," which I chaired in February 1995, was vital
to provide the foundation for this legislation. While those who oppose the bill assert that additional analysis is needed, I believe we
achieved the goal of providing a balanced and fair hearing to both
those who favor baseball's antitrust exemption and those who oppose it. Moreover, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have previously held numerous hearings on this issue. Although the antitrust aspects of baseball's special exemption are
complex, the issue does not suffer from lack of public hearings.
Second, opponents of this legislation continue to dwell on whether the Congress should get "involved" in baseball's antitrust exemption, given that a new labor agreement has not been reached despite the end of the strike. However, the Congress has played an
important role in baseball's antitrust exemption simply by its inaction. The Supreme Court has long viewed as outdated the reasoning underlying its decision creating baseball's exemption in Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), yet has steadfastly maintained that the
solution should come from Congress. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Thus, the Congress is involved even if it fails to act, as I
stated at the Antitrust Subcommittee markup of S. 627 on April 5,
1995:
As long as the special antitrust exemption remains in
place for baseball, the Congress is involved in the sport in
a way that it should not be. The Congress has an ongoing
impact on the sport simply by permitting the special exemption to remain long after the factual basis for it has
disappeared.
This bill is not a matter of choosing between owners and playersfor both groups are responsible for baseball's labor problems-but
exercising the responsibility of the Congress to legislate an end to
the judicially created exemption which the Court itself has long
held to be an anomaly.
Finally, opponents assert that S. 627 would be harmful to baseball's ability to control franchise relocation, despite language in the
bill expressly providing that it shall not affect "the applicability or
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any restraint by professional baseball on franchise relocation". In introducing S. 627, I
stated in the clearest possible terms that the legislation maintains
(17)
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the status quo for franchise relocation, although I noted "that it
may be worthwhile reviewing the franchise relocation issue as it
relates to all professional sports." Relocation is a significant issue
to all professional sports, as illustrated by the events of the last
year in the National Football League. As I indicated at my subcommittee's February hearing, legislation may be desirable to protect objective franchise relocation rules in professional sports.
Nonetheless, S. 627 would have no impact on baseball's current
ability to control franchise movement.
STRoM THuRMoND.

X. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR SPECTER
I have been involved in sports antitrust issues since coming to
the Senate. Franchise relocation, protection for smaller market
teams, revenue sharing have all been issues of concern to me, and
all implicate the antitrust laws. Like many Americans, I have been
a sports fan since I was a child. I was especially a baseball fan.
My current perspective, however, is not just a fan's. As a legislator,
I must look at the numerous issues affecting sports and public policy, from intangible ones that interest fans to the very tangible economic issues that drive professional sports today. After carefully
weighing all the relevant issues, I must oppose S. 627 at this time.
Despite the successful completion of the 1995 baseball season,
there is still no agreement between the players' union and the
major league owners. The underlying issues, which have caused
several strikes and lockouts over the past several years, most notoriously the strike that began during the 1994 season, causing the
cancellation of the World Series, have not been resolved. The players are free to strike again, and the owners retain the option of
locking the players out. Even as free agents are signed and the
"hot stove" league is in full swing, the 1996 season is threatened
by this failure of the parties to reach a collective-bargaining agreement.
Whatever the merits of eliminating major league baseball's
broad, judicially created exemption from the antitrust laws, Congress should not act while the labor situation remains uncertain.
Any action we take is certain to be viewed as favoring one side to
the dispute or the other. In such instances, Congress acts best
when it does not act at all. The complex labor problems that have
characterized baseball for the past years ought to be resolved by
the parties without congressional interference.
I am particularly concerned with this legislation because it will
not achieve one of its primary purposes, that of resolving baseball's
labor strife. This is a complex time for labor relations in professional sports. The professional football players' union was decertified in 1989. In the spring of 1995, the professional basketball players' union faced a serious internal struggle over whether to be decertified, and the National Basketball Association locked out the
players. These matters were finally resolved with the adoption of
a new collective-bargaining agreement. Even after the agreement
was struck, however, some union members took the union to court.
In hockey, last season began with a players' strike against the National Hockey League.
Football, basketball, and hockey do not enjoy an exemption from
the antitrust laws. Given the labor relations records of these other
professional sports, there is no reason to believe that the existence
of major league baseball's antitrust exemption is the reason for
baseball's labor relations problems. Thus, Congress should not in(19)
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tervene to no purpose while there is no contract between the players' union and the owners.
The problems faced by baseball and these other sports reflect a
variety of factors. Experts cannot agree on solutions to the problems that confront sports. Some argue that baseball's problems are
especially acute because of the exemption from the antitrust laws,
which makes baseball less susceptible to market forces. Others
argue that the antitrust exemption is irrelevant to baseball's problems. I am not able to say which side has the better of the argument, but the labor problems encountered by other professional
sports leagues makes me skeptical that eliminating baseball's antitrust exemption would have a salutary effect on its labor relations.
I do generally agree with the supporters of this bill that exemptions from the antitrust laws are bad public policy. Baseball, however, has such an exemption. Expectations and reliance interests
are based on that exemption. Whether or not that exemption ought
to be retained, I believe strongly that given the current state of
play, it would be a mistake for Congress to enact this bill. This bill
would only upset the current situation, making it less likely that
the parties to baseball's labor strife will be able to resolve their dispute between themselves. We should not lose sight of the fact that
voluntary collective bargaining is the basis of labor relations in this
country. The parties should be left to settle their current impasse
themselves without interference from Congress.
I must also raise a parochial reason for opposing the bill: the future of the Pittsburgh Pirates. While the bill purports to preserve
the antitrust exemption that allows major league baseball to block
franchise relocations, the uncertainty that the bill would engender
is likely to result in severe dislocations to the sport. In such an atmosphere, it is impossible to be certain that the Pirates would be
retained in Pittsburgh.
S. 627 does nothing to solve the roiling labor issues in baseball.
It will only serve to upset the current situation even further and
can only make a labor agreement less likely, as all sides learn to
deal with a new set of rules. Whatever the possible merits of this
bill as antitrust policy, this is the wrong time for the Senate to
adopt this bill.
ARLEN SPECTER.

XI. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR SIMON
In approving a repeal of major league baseball's longstanding
antitrust exemption, this Committee has decided to alter the balance of power in an ongoing labor dispute between millionaires
while the truly pressing problems facing our Nation remain unresolved. Congress should be devoting its time and resources to other
matters rather than inserting itself into a controversy for which
both sides deserve blame. Indeed, of the many labor disputes ongoing in America today, I can think of few, if any, that are less deserving of our attention than this one. The American people, who
have consistently opposed government's interference in this area,
agree.
Not only does S. 627 reflect Congress' misplaced priorities, it is
also unlikely to solve the problem it purports to address. Under two
recent Federal appellate decisions interpreting the antitrust laws'
so-called "non-statutory labor exception," 1 it appears that the antitrust laws are not applicable to the dispute between the players
and the owners. Given that the baseball strike of 1994-95 ended
not because of any expected change in major league baseball's status under the antitrust laws, but because of the courts' application
of our labor laws, S. 627 also appears unnecessary. In short, it is
doubtful that S. 627 will do anything other than give the players
an additional weapon in their broader, ongoing conflict with the
owners.
Finally, while I agree that baseball's antitrust exemption raises
certain questions, we should also remember that in some ways,
Congress may have more to learn from professional baseball than
professional baseball has to learn from Congress. Of the four major
professional sports in America, baseball has enjoyed by far the
most franchise stability. While NFL fans from Cleveland and Houston-and perhaps other cities-are faced with the prospect of losing
their beloved teams to other communities, and while this very
Committee is studying antitrust legislation to prevent these moves,
no baseball franchise has changed cities in over a quarter-century.
Even assuming that baseball's work stoppages are a direct result
of baseball's antitrust exemption-and we should remember that
those major sports which do not enjoy an antitrust exemption have
also experienced often-extended work stoppages in their own
right-the problems created by the application of the antitrust laws
to franchise relocation may be, in the minds of many loyal fans,
even greater.
S. 627 seeks to address this prospect by excepting franchise relocation issues from its coverage. Similarly, it attempts to deal with
concerns about the effect of the bill on the minor leagues by except' Brown v.

NationalFootballLeague, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995): NationalBasketball

Associationv. Williams, 45 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ing the minor leagues from its scope. Disputes regarding the scope
and nature of these exceptions, however, will undoubtedly result in
additional litigation-the outcome of which simply cannot be predicted. Indeed, the minor leagues oppose S. 627 despite the minorleague exception, and it can safely be said that this legislation, at
the very least, should make those concerned about sports franchise
relocation very uncomfortable.
The variety of problems facing our professional sports leagues
demonstrates that even if professional baseball is a deserving subject of Congress's attention, such consideration should not take
place on an ad hoc basis, in response to one "crisis" or another, but
should be part of an overall and careful reexamination of professional sports under the law. Only by studying the issue raised by
S. 627 in this broader context can Congress avoid the justifiable
criticism that it is simply playing favorites in a rancorous dispute
that, but for the parties stubbornness and lack of reason, should
have been resolved long ago.
PAUL SIMON.

XII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BROWN AND
FEINSTEIN
In 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes determined that the
game of baseball is not commerce to be regulated by the antitrust
laws. Since that time, Congress and the courts have had ample opportunity, during good times and bad, to revoke that antitrust exemption. Proponents of this legislation argue that the baseball
antitrust exemption, which has remained in place for 75 years, to
the benefit of franchise stability and minor league support, despite
repeated judicial and congressional inquiries, should now be lifted
in the middle of an ongoing labor dispute.
That argument is unconvincing for a couple of reasons. First, we
need to acknowledge, just as the National Football League (NFL)
has after suffering through a stunning number of franchise relocations, that there are times when, in the interest of the fans, professional sports teams must act as business partners instead of business competitors. For example, the Colorado Rockies and the San
Francisco Giants need to agree on the size of the field and the rules
of the game before they can successfully compete. Second, and more
importantly, Congress should not, as a matter of principle, intervene in an ongoing labor dispute.
BASEBALL AND THE INTERESTS OF THE FANS

Before we jump to any conclusions about whether Baseball has
abused its exemption from application of the antitrust laws, we
should consider some of the facts:
Baseball has a history of franchise stability that must be the
envy of the other major sports. In the past year, the NFL had
two franchises abandon the second largest market in the United States: the successful Los Angeles Raider franchise relocated from Los Angeles to Oakland, and the Los Angeles Rams
jumped to St. Louis. The NFL also will apparently now lose the
historic Cleveland Browns franchise to Baltimore and the
Houston Oilers to Memphis. The Chicago Bears are threatening to move to Gary, IN, while the Phoenix team (itself a recent transplant from St. Louis) has talked of moving again. In
hockey, franchises continue to move regularly. Even the NBA,
which has gone through the most popular era in its history
after a decade of problems, had the San Diego Clippers relocate
to Los Angeles. Baseball has not had a single relocation in the
past 25 years. On the contrary, the recent effort of the San
Francisco Giants to move was rejected by Baseball and the Giants remained in San Francisco. Contrary to the Oilers, at the
urging of Baseball, the Houston Astros decided not to pursue
relocation but instead redoubled their effects to be successful
in Houston. All of that was made possible by the exemption,
without which Baseball would be in the same vulnerable posi(23)

24
tion as the other sports. Given that Baseball, more than any
other sport, is steeped in tradition and stability, unchecked
franchise relocation would be disastrous to the national pastime.
Regarding the number of franchises, Baseball has kept pace
with the other major sports. In addition, Baseball has already
announced the addition of its 29th and 30th franchises to begin
play in Tampa Bay and Phoenix in 1998 and has under consideration the possibility of adding two additional franchises before the year 2000.
Despite the exemption, Baseball supports the minor league
system at a level of over $200 million per year. Minor league
baseball benefits hundreds of communities, large and small,
across the country. Relations between the major and minor
leagues are at an all- time high. The relationship is so inextricably intertwined that any attempt to eliminate the exemption, upon which 75 years of cooperative dealings have been
based, even with an attempted carve out, will no doubt create
numerous points of contention. For instance, the majority is
clear that it is eliminating the exemption with regard to labor
relations. But more than 37 percent of the players on each
team's major league roster are actually playing in the minor
leagues. Despite this bill's attempt to except the minor leagues,
the potential for conflict is inherent and obvious.
CIvic INVOLVEMENT WITH HOME TEAMS
Professional baseball and football are not like other businesses.
They are not commodities like Coca-Cola or Post Toasties. Around
baseball teams and football teams, perhaps more than anything
else, there is a civic spirit and a civic commitment. Communities
show this spirit in building stadiums and fixing up stadiums,
which are very costly; in chamber of commerce support; civic
lunches and receptions; and parades and other community celebrations.
There is no business that has the kind of civic dimension that
professional baseball and football have. The players are role models
for children, spending time at recreation centers and schools, helping underprivileged youngsters. Employees of other companies do
not do this to the same extent. Indeed, most teams have foundations which perform charitable and community activities, such as
engaging in canned food drives, toys for tots campaigns, and raising money for causes such as children's hospitals, Special Olympics,
and the March of Dimes. There are no companies which are so involved in the civic dimension of the community.
INTERVENING IN AN ONGOING LABOR DISPUTE
The current bill intervenes in a continuing labor dispute. The
majority report justifies this legislation on the basis that it "would
help resolve baseball's labor problems." This conclusion is dubious
at best.
The middle of an ongoing labor dispute is not the right time to
change the rules of the game. Both President Clinton and his chosen mediator, William Usery, repeatedly stated that the problems
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of baseball should be decided at the negotiating table. But, every
time this issue comes before Congress, the parties drop what they
are doing, leave the negotiating table, and focus their efforts on
legislation.
Despite baseball's antitrust exemption, the Major League Baseball Players Association has been among the most successful
unions in any industry in the history of this country. The average
player's salary has grown to over $1 million per year, despite several teams have severe financial problems, according to Major
League Baseball. Through negotiations, the Players Association has
also gained from the owners, in addition to the exorbitant salaries,
the elimination of the reserve system, and treble damages for any
collusion among owners regarding free agents.
Contrary to the proponents' suggestions, the courts are not always hostile to the baseball exemption. The two Federal courts
which have addressed the exemption since the Piazza opinion cited
by the majority expressly rejected Piazza and held that the exemption was both valid and expansive. New OrleansPelicansBaseball,
Inc. v. National Ass'n of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., No.
93-0253, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 631144 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994);
McCoy v. Major League Baseball, No. C95-383D, 1995 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19858
.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 1995). The Butterworth case cited
by the majority is a State court decision which contained no independent analysis and relied entirely on the reasoning of Piazza.
Baseball is not the only enterprise with this regulatory status.
Other industries have operated under regulatory schemes independent of the antitrust laws. Many will disagree with the suggestion by the majority that baseball is the only industry to claim an
exemption without being subject to alternative regulatory supervision. Here are some illustrations:
Fewer than 3 years ago, in the National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993, Congress conferred broad protection from antitrust treble damages liability on production
joint ventures in any industry, so long as they file notification
with the Justice Department. This legislation extended to production joint ventures the same longstanding antitrust protection previously accorded to research joint ventures by the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.
The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980 confers
broad antitrust protection on the distribution systems of soft
drink producers, with no regulatory supervision, so long as soft
drinks face "substantial and effective competition." That act
has been invoked repeatedly and successfully to forestall antitrust liability.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 protects
doctors and other health care providers from all damages liability under the antitrust laws for peer review activities so
long as those activities offer a minimum of procedural due
process.
It is obvious that Baseball, like these other businesses, will not
come crashing down if antitrust laws do not apply in the near future. Whereas, if we were to act now, it would be to take a position
in an ongoing dispute. That should not be the role of Congress.
Elimination of the antitrust exemption would not ensure labor
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peace-to the contrary, it would guarantee protracted, uncertain,
and expensive litigation and would complicate matters further.
THE EXEMPTION IS UNRELATED TO THE 1994-95 BASEBALL STRIKE

Proponents of the legislation suggest that all of the labor discord
in Baseball can somehow be attributed to the existence of the exemption and that its elimination would be a labor panacea. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, all that its elimination
would cause is unbridled litigation. In addition, the nonstatutory
labor exemption would preclude an antitrust suit absent decertification in any event, so eliminating the exemption in the fashion
contemplated would merely shift the fight from the current judicial
exemption to the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Despite the applicability of the antitrust laws to the other major
sports, they too have had their own significant labor problems. The
NFL went through 5 years of litigation and even played a portion
of one season with replacement players. The National Hockey
League (NHL) lost a significant part of last season and almost lost
the entire season while the owners engaged in a lockout of the
players. Although the National Basketball Association (NBA) has
not lost any portion of a season as a result of a work stoppage, it
did play the first 55 days of this season with replacement referees.
Following the proponents' logic that the antitrust exemption
somehow created the labor controversy, we would have to assume
there are other examples, aside from the strike, of labor disadvantage. Take a look at salaries: the NBA, the NFL and the NHL,
which do not have an exemption, do have a form of salary restraint. Baseball, which has the exemption, does not have a salary
restraint.
By suggesting that the 1994 strike could have been averted if
only the union had the ability to file an antitrust suit against the
owners, supporters of the proposed legislation greatly overstate
both the speed and effectiveness of antitrust legislation. Whatever
else they may be, antitrust cases are uncertain, expensive, and
above all, very time-consuming.
As the majority concedes, before an antitrust suit could be filed,
the union will still confront-as do the players in every other professional sport-the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, which derives from several Supreme Court decisions,

most notably Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). In order to bring an antitrust
action against the owners, the players would first have to decertify

their union to sever the collective bargaining relationship with the
club owners. The players could then have to file suit and proceed
through the typical morass that comprises current antitrust litigation. Only the NFL has proceeded down such a path, and that litigation took in excess of 5 years to resolve, with the final resolution
not determinative.

Although the majority report only discusses the repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption as affecting labor issues, it likely will
have ramifications in other areas as well.
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DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Dating all the way back to the Black Sox scandal of 1919, baseball has been able to effectively discipline its own personnel. However, the exercise of this power has been challenged on antitrust
grounds. For example:
When the Executive Council of Major League Baseball suspended Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott for racially and
ethnically insensitive remarks, Ms. Schott argued that without
the antitrust exemption her suspension would be considered an
illegal group boycott violative of antitrust laws. Schott made it
clear that without an antitrust exemption, every league suspension could be challenged in court.
When baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn disapproved the
assignments of three player contracts after their sale by Oakland Athletics owner Charles Finley, the Athletics commenced
an action in federal court claiming violations of antitrust laws.
Other sports have also been subjected to antitrust challenges for
protecting the integrity of their games:
When professional golfer Jane Blalock was suspended by the
Ladies Professional Golf Association for allegedly cheating, she
retaliated against the league by commencing an antitrust challenge.
When professional bowler Ralph Manok was suspended for
cheating by his bowling association, he too responded by instituting antitrust litigation.
When NBA star Jack Molinas was indefinitely suspended for
gambling, he sued the league on antitrust grounds.
Removing baseball's exemption could well open the floodgates to
further challenges to Baseball's important ability to protect the integrity of the game.
EQUIPMENT DEALS

Eliminating the antitrust exemption could also subject Major
League Baseball to challenges of exclusive contracts that it has established with equipment manufacturers. Although the exclusive
equipment deals help to maintain the uniformity of the game,
every new contract would carry the risk of an antitrust challenge.
Antitrust challenges against other sports leagues illustrate just
some of the types of costly and counterproductive court battles
baseball could face if the exemption is lifted:
When the PGA banned the use of golf clubs with certain Ushaped grooves on the professional tour, a golf club manufacturer sued, alleging that the ban was an unlawful boycott and
restraint on competition in violation of antitrust laws.
The United States Tennis Association, which banned doublestrung racquets from the professional tour, was subjected to a
lengthy antitrust challenge by a tennis racquet manufacturer
before the court ruled in the USTA's favor.
In another golf case, a golf shoe manufacturer sued the
USGA on antitrust grounds, alleging that a USGA determination that a certain golf shoe did not conform to a USGA rule
violated antitrust laws.
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It is clear from past examples of lawsuits-both within and outside of Major League Baseball-that Major League Clubs could face
a storm of new antitrust challenges if the exemption is lifted. While
it is impossible to say for certain whether any or all of these challenges would succeed, it is important not to underestimate the
chilling effect of potentially costly and time-consuming antitrust
litigation, which will only be encouraged by this legislation.
CONCLUSION

The important consideration here is the fans. Our first priority
ought to be to protect them. Ending a baseball season is unacceptable; so too is franchise relocation; so too is terminating support of
the minor leagues. To accommodate these interests, our sports
teams are going to have to act as business partners at times. As
even the proponents concede, the exemption serves a useful function in some areas: franchise stability, the relationship with the
minor leagues, certain broadcast matters. To act now in the middle
of an ongoing labor dispute would be counterproductive. As a matter of principle, Congress ought to stay out of this continuing labor
dispute.
HANK BROWN.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.

XIII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINSTEIN
In addition to the joint views I have filed with Senators Brown
and Heflin, I write separately to add some personal views. As the
former mayor of a city with two professional sports franchises,
baseball's Giants and football's 49ers, I had to fight to keep baseball in San Francisco, and I know firsthand that the only reason
the Giants didn't leave San Francisco was baseball's antitrust exemption. The need to maintain franchise stability, which baseball's
antitrust exemption clearly does-no Major League Baseball team
has abandoned its city for another since the Washington Senators
left the Nation's Capital for Texas almost 25 years ago-is the
overriding reason that I have consistently opposed repeal of the exemption, and will do everything in my power to see that this bill
does not pass.
Moreover, I believe that baseball's antitrust exemption, far from
being repealed, should be extended to other major professional
sports. As we state in the joint views, these teams, too, are integral
parts of their communities, and their fans and hometowns deserve
the same protections which baseball fans enjoy. Thus, I intend to
introduce legislation which will extend the exemption to other
sports.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.

(29)

XIV. CHANGES IN ExIsTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 627, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law which would be omitted
is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman
type):

UNITED STATES CODE

TITLE 15-COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 1-MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
§ 12. Words defined; short title
(a) "Antitrustlaws," as used herein, includes the Act entitled "An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an Act entitled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes," of August twenty-seventh, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four; an Act entitled "An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes,"' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
and also this Act.
SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business ofprofessionalmajorleague baseball.
(b) Nothingin this section shall be construed to affect(1) the applicabilityor nonapplicabilityof the antitrustlaws
to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause, the ProfessionalBaseball Agreement, or any other
matter relatingto the minor leagues;
(2)the applicabilityor nonapplicabilityof the antitrustlaws
to any restraintby professionalbaseball on franchise relocation;
or
(30)
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(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15 US.C. 1291 et
seq.) (commonly known as the Sports BroadcastingAct of 1961).
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BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1992

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRusT, MONOPOLIES
AND BusINESs RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Howard Metzenbaum
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Simon; Kohl; Thurmond; Specter; Brown;
Leahy, ex officio; Simpson, ex officio; Graham, ex officio; Feinstein,
ex officio; and Mack, ex officio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR METZENBAUM

Senator METZENBAUM. The subcommittee will come to order. Mr.
Vincent, please be seated.
This morning, the Antitrust Subcommittee holds an oversight
hearing on the validity of major league baseball's exemption from
the antitrust laws. All of us recognize that today's hearing does not
involve one of the critical problems facing the new President and
the new Congress, but there is, nevertheless, intense interest in
this subject among the public, the press, and my colleagues.
The reason for this interest is simple. Baseball has been a special
part of American life for over a century. It provides millions of fans

with a well-deserved break from the rigors of everyday life. Americans from all walks of life and from all parts of the country have
grown up with this game. It has been a bridge of tradition and nostalgia that connects the past with the present and parents with
their children.
But while the game of baseball remains a simple pleasure, the
business of baseball has become complicated and, at times, cut-

throat. As a consequence, there has been a certain element of disenchantment as to the fans. Major league baseball is not just a
sport. It is also a billion-dollar big business, and it is a big business
which enjoys unique treatment under the law.
Unlike any other big business in America, major league baseball
is a legally sanctioned, unregulated cartel. The Supreme Court conferred that extraordinary privilege upon baseball 70 years ago
when it granted major league baseball a complete exemption from
the antitrust laws. Justice Holmes reasoned that the antitrust laws
did not apply because baseball could not be considered interstate
commerce. Although the soundness of this ruling has often been
questioned even by the Court itself, it has never been overturned.
(1)
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Instead, the Court has tossed the ball to Congress, which is why
we are here today.
While Congress did not create baseball's blanket antitrust immunity, we do have the authority to remove it. Many in this body now
believe that it is time to repeal the exemption. The burden is on
major league baseball to demonstrate that the exemption is in the
public interest.
Baseball's antitrust exemption is a privilege that the baseball
owners may be abusing. I am particularly concerned that their
ouster of Fay Vincent, who is with us this morning, and their plans
to weaken the commissioner's powers invites more abuse of that
privilege. Fay Vincent understood that the antitrust exemption
placed a special obligation on the commissioner to govern the sport
in a manner that protected the public interest. Vincent had independent authority to put the interests of the fans and the interests
of the sport of baseball ahead of the business interests of the team
owners. That is no longer the case.
Jerry Reinsdorf, the owner of the Chicago White Sox, and one of
the key participants in Vincent's ouster, has stated that the job of
the next baseball commissioner will be to "run the business for the
owners, not the players or the umpires or the fans."
Many observers believe the owners removed Vinuent because
they feared he might use his authority as commissioner to prevent
a labor dispute from interfering with the upcoming 1993 season.
Vincent helped facilitate a quick end to the 1990 lockout, and the
hard-line owners did not want a repeat of that episode. So far, the
hard-liners have carried the day.
Three months ago, they forced out Vincent. Three days ago, they
succeeded in reopening the labor agreement with the players,
which many people view as a prelude to a possible lockout. The implications for fans are ominous. Every time there has been a labor
negotiation in baseball, there has been either a strike or a lockout.
It appears that the owners don't want a strong and independent
commissioner who can act in the best interests of the sport or act
as a potential check against abuse of their monopoly power. Instead, they want a commissioner who will function as the cruise director for their cartel. If decisions about the direction and future
of major league baseball are going to be dictated by the business
interests of team owners, then the owners should be required to
play by the same antitrust rules that apply to any other business.
Even if the owners give the next commissioner a fig leaf of authority, Vincent's ouster sends a clear signal that he or she should
not cross them. It also raises questions about whether baseball can
respond credibly and effectively to allegations of misconduct by an
owner or league official.
The owners' response to the Marge Schott controversy will offer
some insight on that score, but I believe that the public would have
more confidence in the outcome if the matter was being handled by
an independent commissioner rather than by a group of owners sitting in judgment of one of their own.
There are other issues that need to be explored aside from the
question of the commissioner's authority. The other three major
professional sports-football, basketball, and hockey-function
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quite well without the blanket exemption from the antitrust laws
enjoyed by baseball. Why should baseball be treated differently?
A number of commentators assert that baseball uses its privileged status to maintain an artificial scarcity of franchises. The recent tug of war between Tampa Bay and San Francisco is a perfect
illustration. It is clear that the number of cities which can support
baseball franchises greatly exceeds the number of franchises established by the owners.
A scarcity of franchises inflates the resale value of existing teams
and increases each owner's share of baseball's national broadcasting revenue, the total of which is about $380 million annually. It
also enables owners to squeeze concessions and subsidies from
their home cities by threatening relocation to another city. Many
cities badly in need of revenues for schools, hospitals, their police
and fire forces, and other vital projects have been forced to obtain
public funding of elaborate new stadiums or risk having their team
move to another city. This blackmail game is unseemly and a disservice to the fans.
The baseball owners trumpet their commitment to franchise stability even though they routinely threaten to abandon their home
city whenever it suits them financially, and the owners reportedly
have refused to permit municipal ownership of teams, which is
probably the most effective way to protect fans from franchise relocations. When Joan Kroc tried to give the Padres to the city of San
Diego, baseball's barons said no.
For decades, the owners also used their antitrust exemption to
suppress players' salaries and stifle player mobility through the
use of the reserve clause. As it now stands, the reserve clause can
bind a player to a single team for 6 years. Players have gained a
limited amount of movement through the collective bargaining
process, but the reopening of the labor agreement means that the
players will once again have to bargain for some semblance of a
free market. Moreover, minor league players who constitute the
vast majority of professional ballplayers still labor under conditions
reminiscent of indentured servitude.
Baseball's special treatment under the antitrust laws also has
helped to inflate the value of its TV contracts. The baseball owners
have agreed among themselves to impose territorial restrictions on
the broadcasting of games by local TV stations. These restrictions
can facilitate the movement of games to pay TV and hurt fans who
can't afford or don't have access to cable.
The sport of baseball is a national treasure, and both Congress
and the team owners must be careful not to take actions that
would hurt the game and alienate fans. But if the antitrust exemption does provide some benefit to the fans and the game, the owners are going to have to prove it. If the public does not benefit, then
the exemption should be restricted or repealed. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses.
I want to say to my colleagues who are sitting with me this
morning, good morning, Senator Feinstein, good morning, Senator
Graham, and good morning, Senator Leahy. We are happy to see
all of you here this morning. And Senators Simpson, Specter,
Mack, we are happy to see each of you. I am going to ask you, if
you don't mind, to withhold your opening statements so that we
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may hear from Mr. Vincent, who has a time commitment. I looked
right over my good friend, Paul Simon. I didn't say good morning
to Paul. Excuse me. I apologize.
We will hear from Mr. Vincent, and at the conclusion of Mr. Vincent's comments and questions we will then ask for opening statements from the members of the committee, and I hope my colleagues will indulge me in that respect. Mr. Vincent has to get
away and I think his testimony is particularly important to this
committee.
Mr. Vincent, we are very happy to welcome you here this morning. I know that there is a group of distinguished members of baseball who are also here and we will welcome them at a later point.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF FAY VINCENT, FORMER COMMISSIONER OF
BASEBALL
Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I prepared a short statement which I gave
to you. Let me just say at the outset that I appreciate your courtesies in helping me with the arrangements here today and acknowledging that I have a commitment in New York at 1:30.
I would stand or sit by the statement I prepared. I think at the
outset I would only remind you that I am at present an unemployed former bureaucrat without formal standing in baseball and
if I find questions that, in my humble opinion, are really more relevant to those with authority, I hope you will indulge me in
finessing those questions. I say so openly and without apology.
I think the people who have responsibility in baseball are really
better suited to deal with some of the problems that are you are
addressing, but I am at your service and I am prepared to be useful
to you, in large measure because I think your role in baseball, the
role of oversight and supervision, is critically important.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Vincent, your statement that you submitted is very direct; it is short. And because I don't think it is a
privileged matter between the former commissioner and the Members of the Senate, I am going to ask you if you would be kind
enough to read it. Would you be willing to do that, please? Do you
have a copy of it?
Mr. VINCENT. I would if you would provide a copy to me, yes, sir.
Senator METZENBAUM. Would staff please provide Mr. Vincent

with a copy of his statement, please?
Mr. VINCENT [reading]:

Senator Metzenbaum, distinguished members of the Senate, I am grateful to have
this opportunity to share my views on the continued viability of the existing antitrust exemption enjoyed by major league baseball. It is my opinion that the current
exemption should be retained so long as major league baseball, by which I mean
the owners, can justify the privilege of the special status the exemption affords. In
light of recent developments, I believe baseball must be pressed to persuade Congress that the antitrust immunity is warranted, and whether baseball presently deserves this special treatment is surely open to question.
In my view, the antitrust immunity baseball enjoys is not essential either to the
economic health or the legal integrity of the game. For years, Congress has considered the threat to remove the exemption as the principal weapon with which to
pressure baseball, but the threat to remove the exemption reminds one of the cry
of wolf. As my predecessor, Bart Giamatti, once remmded the Senate, if you take
away the exemption, what do you threaten to do next?
And yet the exemption has important significance. The immunity rmits baseball
or the commissioner to prevent the migration or transfer of a franense if the move
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is not in the best interests of baseball. Eliminating the immunity would have some
unattractive consequences, and there is no evidence that the immunity has been
abused by baseball. Thus, the immunity issue tends to be overblown when, in fact,
the significance of the antitrust status of baseball may be more symbolic than vital.
Again, the question is whether baseball deserves or requires this special status.
One of the major issues in baseball is whether baseball is or should view itself
as anything other than a business like any other business. When I was being attacked by various owners, I was told that they wanted the commissioner to be their
commissioner. They did not agree that the commissioner should have any obligation
to the public or to represent any other interest than the interests of the owners.
One owner said the players had their union leader, as did the umpires, but no one
represented the owners' interests.
Another view widely held by owners is that baseball should be run like any other
major corporation. The CEO or commissioner should report to the owners, who
would be able to fire the commissioner as the CEO in the corporate world can be
fired.
The corporate analo has eat appeal to owners who have difficulty accepting
or understanding why baseball is such a difficult enterprise. Thus, there is within
baseball a major debate taking place over how baseball is to see itself and what obligations, if any, baseball has to the public. My confidence in the wisdom of the resolution of this debate is well under control.
In my view, one, the existing antitrust exemption for major league baseball should
be retained only so long as baseball can persuade you that it is a unique institution
with special public interest obligations and not merely another business.
Two, to the extent major league baseball acknowledges the exemption is only justified by continuing recognition that baseball is a national trust with obligations to
this Congress and to the public that are not carried by ordinary businesses, the exemption should be continued and the performance of baseball closely monitored.
Three, if the owners of baseball continue on their stated course of making baseball
into their business, and at the same time insist that the commissioner is their CEO
to be fired at will, I would no longer support the preservation of the exemption. If
the exemption is to be surrendered, let it be by action of the owners. Only a strong
commissioner acting in the interests of baseball, and therefore the public, can protect the institution from the selfish and myopic attitudes of owners.
Baseball is not seriously dependent on the continuation of the antitrust exemption. This Congress has other alternatives available to it that seriously threaten
baseball. If you wish to get the attention of owners and to recapture their commitment to larger public interests, you may wish to consider expanding the range of
legislative options. The exemption has become, as I said, more of a symbol than a
vital baseball interest. It does symbolize that baseball is different. The question for
you and for baseball is whether major league baseball is willing to continue to carry
the burden of being different in order to preserve the exemption.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent. As I
understand it, you must leave in how much time, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am at your service, sir. I mean, I will leave
when I can. If we are doing useful work, I won't leave.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. We appreciate that

and the imposition upon your own personal commitments.
We will have 10-minute rounds for members of this panel.
Mr. Vincent, why, in your own words, were you forced out of the
job as commissioner of baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, sir. I think you would have to ask
the people who made that judgment.
Senator METZENBAUM. In your letter of resignation, you stated
that "Ownership of a baseball team is more than ownership of an
ordinary business. Owners have a duty to take into consideration
that they own a part of America's national pastime in trust. This
trust sometimes requires putting self-interest second."
Do you believe that, on their own, and without a strong and independent commissioner, baseball fans can be confident that the owners will put aside their own self-interest when it conflicts with the
best interests of the sport?
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Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I live as an optimist. I believe that baseball owners, when they consider the restructuring of the commissioner's office, will come to the conclusion that the commissioner's
office has served baseball well over 70 years. I would hope they
would not make major changes in the governance and the constitution of baseball, and I would hope they would hire somebody who
is going to be independent, who represents the public interest, recognizes that baseball is unique.
And, by the way, baseball is unique quite apart from its legal
status. It is unique because it is what it is, because it is so wellgrounded in our history, because it is part of our culture. Baseball
is unique, and I think if you are, as I am, an optimist, I believe
that baseball will do the right thing.
Senator METZENBAUM. You often have testified, and you have
done so again today, that the antitrust exemption obliges the leadership of baseball to govern the sport in a manner that protects the
public interest. But today you have noted that some of the owners
who opposed you "did not agree that the commissioner should have
any obligation to the public or to representing any interests other
than the interests of the owners." How widespread would you say
that view is among the 28 owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know and I don't believe that it is terribly widespread. I would think that one of the benefits of a hearing like this, frankly, is to remind people in baseball of what you
represent and of this special calling that all of us had in baseball.
I believe that there are 28 owners. It is very difficult to characterize a group of 28 to speak generally. Their views differ, as you will
hear, and my own sense is that while some owners may speak out,
they don't necessarily represent baseball, and the views that you
are addressing may, in fact, not be the views of the majority of
owners in baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. As I noted in my opening statement,

Jerry Reinsdorf, the owner of the Chicago White Sox, was recently
quoted as saying that the job of the next baseball commissioner
will be to "run the business for the owners, not the players or the
umpires or the fans." If the next commissioner is simply going to
be a CEO for the owners, don't you believe there is no longer justification for retaining the antitrust exemption?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Senator METzENBAuM. Let us say the owners, contrary to all indications which we have received up to this point, decide to invest
the next commissioner with the same degree of authority which
you had. Wouldn't the fact of your ouster send a strong signal to
your successor that he or she had better not do anything that goes
against the wishes of the owners even if it is in the best interests
of the game and the fans?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, you are right. That is a problem, and I think
that is one of the issues that baseball has to address. In order to
give a commissioner the kind of authority that he or she requires,
there has to be assurance that the person can act independently in
a fixed term. It is not unlike a judgeship or any other calling where
you are obviously going to make judgments that will disappoint
people, and as you make those judgments the number of disappointed people increases and it is a very difficult calling.
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I am disappointed that I wasn't able to persuade more owners
that I was doing the right thing, but I am not surprised. My predecessors had somewhat the same problem. It is a very difficult problem for baseball, and my advice to the owners is to give the commissioner the widest grant of authority with the most comfort and
security, but my example and the precedent of my circumstances
is certainly a difficult one.
Senator METZENBAUM. You have also testified that "Baseball is
not seriously dependent on the continuation of the antitrust exemption," and that the exemption is not "essential to the economic
health or the legal integrity of the game." If that is the case, why
do you think the owners continue to believe that the exemption is
critical to baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am not sure they do, sir. I think that it is
helpful, and like most things in baseball there is a reluctance to
change-I think reluctance in this body, among other things. And
I am not in favor of taking the exemption away, as I testified, unless it is clear that baseball wishes the exemption to go, and the
only way baseball can speak on that subject is by the way they establish the governance mechanism.
My view is that it is really up to baseball to show you, to prove
to the Congress and to the Senate, whether it believes the exemption is important. My point is I think that economically the threat
to baseball of removal of the exemption is overstated. One of the
reasons is that anybody wise has to be very careful. We are never
sure how far the exemption goes. So operating baseball, as I did,
I never relied on it to any great extent because I was never sure
of the breadth and extent of its viability. It is very important to
baseball in terms of migration of franchises, but apart from that I
can't recall that I ever thought I was using it.
Senator METZENBAUM. Now, in your testimony you suggested

that Congress consider "expanding the range of legislative options."
Can you give us some examples of possible legislative options that
youMr. VINCENT. Well, with all due respect, sir, I would leave that
to you. I am suggesting that if Congress wishes to address baseball,
it ought not always to think in terms exclusively of the antitrust
option. I think there are other ways in which Congress can look at
baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Vincent, the Marge Schott matter has
disturbed many people, and there is no question about it; it has
been an embarrassment to baseball. The owners have set up a committee to look into the situation and suggest possible actions in response to it. Do you think that the owners can handle this matter
themselves, or wouldn't it be better to have a strong and independent commissioner dealing with a matter of this kind?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, in my judgment, those aren't exclusive. I
think the owners may be able to handle the problem properly. We
will have to see. I think obviously it would be better, and I think
probably the owners would agree it would be better to have this
sort of thing dealt with by a sitting commissioner.
I think the original authority of the commissioner arose from a
belief among owners that there were some things owners could not
do, and the existence of the office was originally and historically
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grounded in that conviction. Owners need a commissioner from
time to time because there are some issues that are very difficult
for owners to deal with. This happens to be one. There is an interregnum and a hiatus in governance in baseball, and I think that
is unfortunate, but I don't think one should come to the conclusion
necessarily that the owners can't deal with this problem. My own
view is we ought to wait to see what they do.
Senator METZENBAUM. Now, you have been credited with spur-

ring more minority hiring in team front offices. A baseball writer
for the New York Times suggested that some owners may have
been rankled by the pressure that you applied on that issue. Do
you have an opinion as to why some teams have been slow to open
up front offices to minorities?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't, sir. I come from the corporate world, as you
know, and I recognize it is a problem throughout our society. Why
are some corporations slower than others? Leadership makes a difference. I think one of the things I tried to persuade owners of is
that there are dimensions of this that go beyond equity and fairness and the law.
Part of the concern I have for the long-term viability of baseball
is that Afro-Americans do not go to baseball games. The percentage
attendance represented by that fast-growing part of our society is
very small. So just cast in economic terms, which is, of course, not
the way to do it, but just cast in those terms I would think baseball
would be wise to move more swiftly. The pace is not attractive; it
is not what it ought to be, though some progress has been made.
Senator METZENBAUM. Three days ago, the owners voted to re-

open the labor agreement. Many observers believe that that action,
coupled with other moves made by the owners in recent months,
might interfere with the start of the 1993 season. You know the
two sides in this matter better than anyone else. Do you believe
there will be a lockout or a strike during the 1993 season?
Mr. VINCENT. Senator, this is one of those questions to which I
will now invoke my original statement.
Senator METZENBAum. Take the fifth?
Mr. VINCENT. There are people following me to whom I heartily
recommend that question. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Even though baseball remains our na-

tional pastime, one gets a sense that fans are disenchanted with
the way in which greed and monetary matters are interfering with
the sport. Instead of being a relief from the stresses of daily life,
baseball today is often simply a reminder of those pressures. Do
you think there is some way to reverse the trend, or are we past
the point of no return? What can we do to make baseball the national pastime that it was in yesteryear?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, again, with respect, Senator, I don't think it
ever was what we think it was. My own recollection is that the
business of baseball has always been an annoyance. I said one time
the business of baseball is like the Sun; you can't look at it for very
long without turning away. But I have read enough of the history
of baseball to recognize that there are distinguished historians who
believe that was the case in the 19th century.
The business of baseball has always involved questions of compensation, economic realities. Fans do not like that part of baseball,
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and I think baseball is wise to try to sublimate that part to the extent it can. But I don't think we ought to be romantic about the
history of baseball or the realities of the future of baseball. It is a
big business. There is no real hope that it is going to change. I
think what we have to do is protect the wonderful game and keep
the business from being unduly intrusive.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. My time has expired, and I would say to my colleagues that I have taken 10 minutes. I would hope that they might confine themselves to 5, but not
wanting to be unfair, if they need something more than that,
please go forward, but certainly not in excess of 10.
We will recognize members of the committee based upon seniority on the committee. Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator, I had indicated that at this point
we would use questions of Mr. Vincent and hold our opening statements to a later point, if you would, please.
Senator THURMOND. All right. Mr. Vincent, what is your view of
the appropriate role of the baseball commissioner, given the antitrust exemption, and would your answer be different if the exemption were eliminated?
Mr. VINCENT. I think my view of the role and authority of the
commissioner is that it is one of the American institutions which
by and large, with some exceptions, has worked. I don't see a particular reason to tinker with it or to change it radically, and I don't
think its viability is affected one way or the other by the existence
of the antitrust immunity.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Vincent, you also state that the antitrust exemption should be retained only if it can be justified by
baseball owners. Can the owners justify the exemption, and if so
how?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think they can, sir, and I think the way
they can do it is by acknowledging that baseball does have an obligation that goes beyond their own economic interest, that there is
something special about baseball. After all, the antitrust immunity
is a privilege; it can be removed by you. To the extent there is a
privilege, privileges ought to be justified. The privilege can be justified in baseball, in my judgment, but whether it will be justified,
at least to satisfy you gentlemen and ladies, is another matter.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time and
give the other Senators a chance, I won't ask any more questions
right now.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I think there
is a sentiment here and a sentiment in the American public that
the next commissioner has to be both independent and strong, and
I think that is one clear message that is here today.
My concern is the commitment to communities, and if I can use
an example from football, the movement of the St. Louis Cardinals
to Phoenix, I think, did a great disservice to the St. Louis community and to that area. I understand that football, like baseball, is
a business, but it is more than a business, as you know, Commissioner. I have to tell you I don't shed any tears when I see Phoenix
down at the bottom of their division now in the NFL.
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Tell me what the difference is because of the antitrust exemption
in how the NFL operates and how baseball operates.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am not an expert on the NFL. Let me just
tell you that from my own personal experience, the existence of the
authority within baseball to prevent migration of franchises-the
existence of that authority in the commissioner's office was used by
me, and I think should be taken into account very carefully by you
as you think about this immunity.
The ultimate ability of the commissioner to say to a franchise
owner, you may not move that franchise until additional steps have
been taken or additional efforts have been undertaken in the community, is a very forceful and, I think, helpful asset to the commissioner.
If you look at the history of baseball, when teams have moved,
including from this great city, the immediate effort is to replace the
team. If you look at the move from Kansas City to Oakland, Kansas City went out and replaced the team. From Seattle to Milwaukee, Seattle replaced the team. From Milwaukee to Atlanta, Milwaukee replaced the team; here, twice, and we are still trying to
replace the team in Washington.
I think the history of baseball shows that the migration of franchises has not been baseball's most distinguished moment, and
therefore migration should be looked at very skeptically. After all,
if an owner runs a team poorly and is having difficulty in the community, it is tempting to say I want to move to x, I will do better
there, or they will make me an offer which is economically very significant. That ignores the reality of the fans and the community.
It doesn't take into account that part of the problem may be that
particular owner and the way he is managing the team. Those are
things which I think a commissioner, in the proper course, ought
to be able to take into account.
So I would urge you to look very carefully at the migration issue
in terms of whose ox is being gored. When you leave, as you say,
the fans left behind immediately coalesce around an effort to get
a new franchise. Is that the way an institution should properly be
functioning?
Senator SIMON. And as far as the differences with football, can
you just roughly outline that?
Mr. VINCENT. The principal difference is that it is clear that the
commissioner of baseball and baseball have the ability to prevent
migration, to prevent transfers. The other leagues may, in fact, prevent transfers. The courts have not said that is illegal, but there
are procedural standards imposed by the courts which don't apply
in baseball's case. At least that was our view.
So I think it is easier, put it this way, for baseball to interfere
in the migration of franchises than it is for football or basketball,
though, in fact, those sports may also interfere. But the Al Davis
case in Oakland is another clear case where a franchise was moved
over the opposition of the league. There was litigation and the
transfer was valid.
Senator SIMON. Just a comment or two, Mr. Chairman, and then
I will yield to my colleagues. First, the Jerry Reinsdorf quote that
you have there, I assume, was not put together by a public relations firm. Let me say, in fairness to Jerry Reinsdorf, he is one who
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has stuck with the city of Chicago when, financially, I think it
would have been beneficial for him to move to the Tampa-St. Petersburg area.
Let me note also, Mr. Chairman, that I believe this is the first
committee meeting that our new colleague from California has attended, and we welcome you here, Senator Feinstein. And let me
also note, Mr. Chairman-I think it is not inappropriate-that Saturday our colleague, Strom Thurmond, celebrated his 90th birthday, and we wish you the very best.
Senator METZENBAUM. Hear, hear.
Senator THURMOND. I feel like I am 45. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. And I thank you, Commissioner.
Senator METZENBAUM. This subcommittee hearing is a little bit

unusual, and I think maybe one of the few that I have participated
in in the many years I have been in the Senate, because we have
with us this morning not only members of the subcommittee, but
we have members of the full committee and we have others who
are members of the Senate who are not members of the committee.
Normally, it is not the practice to extend the opportunity for
questioning to those who are not members of the subcommittee,
and sometimes permitting it if they are members of the full committee; very seldom, Members who are not members of either committee. I feel that there is such tremendous interest in this subject
and that the time pressures are not of such a nature, other than
Mr. Vincent's time pressures, that it would be inappropriate for me
to deny those who are not members of the committee an opportunity to question. So I will permit them to do so. I would again
emphasize the need for brevity.
Let me now turn to a longtime member of this committee and
one who has indicated his interest in the whole subject of the antitrust exemption over a period of many years, and who is recently
reelected, for which we congratulate him, Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that these
hearings are very important as they relate to sports and also to
very major financial interests. In my own State, Pennsylvania,
baseball, football, hockey, and basketball have an enormous impact
on the emotions and on the finances of the State, and I think that
applies to the Nation as a whole.
I believe that baseball has never recovered since the move of the
Dodgers from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in 1958. I say that as a
longtime baseball fan who became excited at the age of 8 and grew
up in the State of Kansas, where the most important morning activity was reviewing the box scores from the previous day.
I have to say to you, Mr. Vincent, that I don't quite agree with
you that we shouldn't be romantic about the history of baseball. I
am romantic about the history of baseball. I think it is an overwhelming passion of the American people. America is in love with
baseball. In addition, baseball has a unique business status with
an exemption from the antitrust laws while seeking, like every
other business, to exact the maximum profits. You have that triangle and it is a very serious issue.
As Senator Metzenbaum has alluded to, I have been involved
with this issue for many years. In 1982, this committee took up the
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move of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles, and in that year Senator Thurmond convened very prompt hearings to take up the subject. At that time my studies led me to conclude that sports are affected with a public interest; that is the way I articulate it. Football is; baseball is. In your opening statement, you comment about
baseball as a national trust, which is another way of stating the
same thing.
We are now seeing the flight of players-Bonilla, and now Barry
Bonds leaving Pittsburgh for example, which will decimate Pittsburgh as a city. While the franchise remains there, when the key
players are taken away, a significant part of that franchise departs.
Let me pick up on a first question, Mr. Vincent: the subject of
baseball as a national trust or being affected with the public interest. Permit me to state a proposition to you and ask you if you
agree with it. My own view is that a team ought not to be able to
move because of the fans' interests and because baseball is unique,
not simply another business. Thus I believe that the Oakland Raiders should not have been permitted to move from Oakland to Los
Angeles, where the team was making money and had keen fan support, simply to gain a bigger market in order to make more money.
But the Philadelphia Athletics, which moved to my hometown,
should have been permitted to move from Philadelphia to Kansas
City when they were not being supported.
I would ask if, as you define "national trust" or "affected with the
public interest," you would agree that a team ought to be limited
in moving simply to make more money, when it is a solid financial
operation in its current home city.
Mr. VINCENT. I would agree with that. I made a suggestion in
baseball which was as follows. I said if you are in a smaller market
and you try to move to a larger market, why should you, the owner
in the smaller market, be entitled to the benefits of the larger market? After all, the larger market theoretically is an expansion opportunity for baseball, and I thought that any premium which was
built into a transfer from a smaller to a larger market should accrue to the institution generally.
That is another way of saying that I think if you make more difficult and less financially attractive the transfer of franchises from
smaller to larger markets and you spread throughout baseball generally any benefit of Philadelphia moving to a larger market, let us
say, you make the issue one with much broader considerations.
But I would agree with you. I think that my conclusion is that
there has to be the possibility of transfer. There are times, I suppose, when it becomes absolutely essential, but I think the hurdle
rate-that is, the degree of difficulty that should be put to the owners before they can transfer a franchise-ought to be fairly high.
Senator SPECTER. Well, we considered an antitrust exemption for
the NFL, the National Football League, to enable the owners to
limit franchise moves to overrule, in effect, the court decision based
on that proposition; and we have a good bit of tension here between
baseball and Congress. Nobody knows what Congress is going to
do, including Congress, but the possibility of a revocation of the
antitrust laws does have an effect on baseball.
When legislation is proposed and it comes close, that may be
some signal to sports, that sports should follow the rule that you
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don't maximize profits to the extreme, that when a team is making
money in a city like Oakland, where the fans have an interest, you
simply can't pick up and move to a bigger city with bigger profits;
that you can't move away from Brooklyn; but let me move to another subject because of the limitation of time.
There is talk of a lockout, and I respect your situation in not
wanting to speculate about that. There has been talk of revenue
sharing among the baseball teams, as there is revenue sharing in
other sports for the limited antitrust exemption on television revenues. There has also been talk of a baseball cap which would turn
on a percentage of profits.
Before asking you about that as a possibility to head off what
looks like potential problems in 1993 or 1994, let me ask you about
the subject of having sports teams pay for their own stadiums.
When you talk about profits and a division between players and
owners, one cost is the operation of the stadium. In an era when
tickets cost as much as they do, some players are making as much
as they do, and some teams are making as much as they do, why
should the arrangements be made resulting in the blackmail Senator Metzenbaum articulated which I don't think is far off, although maybe a little strong. But why should the arrangements in
sports be such that the burden is placed on cities to finance these
expensive stadiums instead of financing coming out of profits,
which can be divided between the players and the owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, Senator, I don't mean to be disrespectful, but
what I have tried to do since I left the position is be careful about
expressing my views on issues that are current. I think you have
witnesses who really are better qualified than I. I have views on
those subjects. I think I have spoken to them in the past, but I
would ask your indulgence on that question because it does seem
to me that is a current issue for baseball and I wonder whether I
am really in a position to address that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Vincent, with all due respect, I
would not grant any indulgence on that subject. I think that you
have experience in this field. You have been the commissioner. You
know about the subject. Perhaps none is more knowledgeable in
the country, certainly in the room, on the subject. If you don't want
to express a view, I won't press you on it, but I don't thinkMr. VINCENT. Well, I think what I have said in the past I would
repeat to you, and that is that the issue of municipal support for
a franchise is, it seems to me, a marketplace issue. There are franchises where the stadia are owned by the owner of the team. Los
Angeles is a clear example. When the team moved to Los Angeles,
obviously the Los Angeles community gave the Dodgers considerable benefits.
I don't know that I think that it is necessarily totally inappropriate for a community, for a variety of reasons, to consider a sports
facility as it considers other entertainment facilities or other things
in the public interest. It seems to me that is a legislative rather
than a legal or sports issue.
I think sports people ask franchise cities to support facilities. The
cities are in a position to say yes or no. Some say yes and some
say no. I mean, the San Francisco votes in the past are clear examples of cities saying, no, we don't choose to do that. I don't have

14
strong feelings about that issue from a legal or legislative point of
view. I think it really to a very large extent depends on the community.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Vincent, I do not agree that it is a
marketplace issue in a context where baseball has an antitrust exemption. If baseball did not have that unique status, then perhaps
you could argue a marketplace issue.
Let me move to one other subject.
Mr. VINCENT. Could I make one rejoinder?
Senator SPECTER. Well, let me move ahead because we are-well,
go ahead, go ahead.
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator SPECTER. Television. In light of the antitrust exemption
which baseball enjoys, and the limited exemption which football,
basketball, and hockey enjoy, I am very much concerned, and have
expressed it many times in the past, with movement to pay television. The commissioner of football, Commissioner Rozelle, and
afterward Commissioner Tagliabue, made a commitment that they
would not put the Super Bowl on pay TV, but now a number of
games are moving to cable, which is pay.
All away games of the Philadelphia Phillies used to be available
to the public; something that I have discussed with the Philadelphia ownership. I am concerned about the public being forced to
pay for television. Maybe "forced" is too strong a word, but when
the Super Bowl is on or the World Series is on, we find very heavy
payments there. I would be interested in your view as to whether
you think baseball and football-in light of their special treatment
with the antitrust exemption, ought to have some special consideration for the fans and not move to pay television.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't think it is an issue that necessarily
prescients from the antitrust immunity because, as you point out,
the issue exists in football.
Senator SPECTER. Well, now, wait. Football has the antitrust immunity for revenue sharing.
Mr. VINCENT. And television, yes, as baseball would by statute,
I take it. From my point of view, it seems to me the World Series
and the Super Bowl and certain postseason events are unique, and
I think the sports people have made very serious commitments to
you that those events have to be, at least in the foreseeable future,
available generally, which means on network television.
The thing that makes this issue so difficult is not the political
point, sir, but the business point, which is the network business.
Television is changing so rapidly. The proliferation of channel
availability is changing. The availability of over-the-air television
signals is greater than it was.
So I think one of the difficulties we have, perhaps, is drawing a
distinction for all time between free television and pay television.
I think ultimately we will find that that distinction blurs, and in
time my guess is this issue will become diffused. I think for the
short term baseball-and I committed to you-has no interest in
putting post-season games on anything other than over-the-air television, for the reason you suggest. But I wouldn't be straight if I
didn't tell you that I think over the long term, as the television dis-
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tribution business changes, so will the way in which sports address
the problem.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Vincent. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Specter.
Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased
that you are holding these hearings. Mr. Vincent, I come from the
small State of Vermont, so at least I am one of the people here who
will be asking questions who does not have a baseball team in his
State, and will never have a baseball team in his State, and I am
here simply as somebody representing a lot of baseball fans who
are really very, very concerned about what is happening to the
game.
You have touched on many of the problems and many of the issues here today. Certainly, we see attendance going down. The reference you made to the small attendance of African-Americans, the
concerns being expressed by people all over the country about baseball-anybody who cares anything about baseball has to pay attention.
We have a case where there are strong antidrug rules on the
books, but then the league reinstates a player who has flunked his
drug test, I believe, seven times. I mean, what kind of a doublestandard image does that give? Or when you have the owner of a
team make racist remarks that never had a place, or shouldn't
have had a place in this country at any time, but especially not
today, you see the baseball community sort of sitting around
dithering about, saying gee, what should we do about this, at a
time when, if they asked their fans, they would find the vast majority of them are shocked and wouldn't have much problem in deciding what should be done and are wondering what kind of another world do some of the owners live in that they are still trying
to figure out what to do.
Or the player who complains that he is only making $6 million
and therefore, of course, he has got to charge kids if they want his
autograph-well, if you are one of these kids out playing little
league and you are worried about baseball, you can imagine what
kind of an impression you have.
Do you feel, as I do, that the best way to address these problems-maybe never to fully solve them-but at least the best way
to address these problems is to have a very strong and very independent commissioner of baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator LEAHY. Do you think that the way the baseball restructuring committee that is now reviewing the role of the commissioner-do you think that that has a real chance of establishing a
commissioner's office that is going to look out for the true interests
of the fans in the future?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hope so, Senator. As I said earlier, I really
believe that when the baseball owners look carefully at baseball
governance, they will conclude as you have concluded. I am an optimist. I think that some of the recent developments in baseball have
been very unattractive, but I am optimistic that people learn and
that the experience is relevant to the future. I hope that out of the
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restructuring will come not major change, but reaffirmation of
what you believe and I believe to be in the best interests of baseball.
Let me just say for the record on the drug issue with the person
who has been reinstated, baseball did not reinstate that person,
nor did anybody in authority in baseball. He was reinstated by an
arbitrator who was acting pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. Mr. Howe was thrown out of baseball by me for life. He
challenged that judgment in front of an arbitrator, a system set up
by collective bargaining. The arbitrator has the right to overturn
the judgment of the commissioner of baseball, and in this case he
did.
Senator LEAHY. I might say that in that case he certainly did not
send a signal that, in my estimation, is the kind of signal we
should be sending either to baseball fans, or especially to young
people, at a time when we have drug problems running rampant
through our schools and when we are trying to change as much by
example and education as we ever could by law enforcement.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I agree with that, and I must say I have said
publicly that commissioners make mistakes, but so do arbitrators.
Senator LEAHY. Now, you mentioned many times about the best
interests of baseball, a term that brings out, obviously, differing
views in different people's mind. But as commissioner, that was
your No. 1 charge. If you had to talk about the single most important issue facing the game today in the best interests of baseball,
what would it be?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think the single most challenging issue affecting baseball is to structure the game so that there is a partnership between the ownership and the players with continuing viability so that the disruption that occurs every 4 years with the confrontation is eliminated. That, from a business point of view, is
clearly the most significant challenge.
From the social point of view, the nonbusiness point of view,
though they blur, I think the issue of dealing effectively with the
minority issue is vital. It is vital both in terms of equity and fairness, but as I said earlier, it is also vital in terms of business. I
think that baseball is faced with some terrifically difficult problems, not unlike the rest of a number of major institutions, and
perhaps the country. Baseball is not unique, but I think I do have
confidence that the owners and new leadership will address those
issues.
Senator LEAHY. One of the problems is we have a lot of cities
that don't have a major league baseball team and they would like
to have one. If you remove the antitrust exemption, would that
have any effect on expansion?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. You know, again, coming back to
an issue I touched on earlier, one of the difficulties with expansion
is that expansion, despite what has been thought of generally, in
my view, was not in baseball's economic interest. It was very sound
policy to bring baseball to new areas. It was sound in terms of the
future of baseball. It may have been sound politically, but there
were substantial economic reasons not to expand.
When baseball is having its-
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Senator LEAHY. If you could elaborate on that, I am just curious
how much expansion you could undergo-and you were probably
going to say this in your answer anyway, but I am curious how
much expansion you could undergo without diluting the quality of
the product.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, there is clearly a question of the quality of
the product and the number of players, but I was really addressing
a much more simple issue, which is dilution of the equity of baseball, dilution of the ownership.
Senator LEAHY. I see.
Mr. VINCENT. I think that this body and the Senate task force
had an enormous role in promoting expansion of baseball, and I
have said publicly I think Senator Wirth played a significant role
historically in having that happen. But from a pure economic point
of view in baseball, further e ansion is not attractive, and I think
it is unlikely that baseball will expand again in the foreseeable future, not because there aren't cities qualified, not because people
aren't interested in baseball in other parts of the country, but because baseball simply has to deal with its economic problems and
come to grips with those first before additional expansion, in my
judgment, will be approved. I don't believe the owners in baseball
will vote to expand again in the near term.
Senator LEAHY. When you talk about those economic problems,
I look at the projections of CBS and others who carry baseball
games. I think one of the groups is estimating losses of $150 to
$200 million. Those contracts come up again when?
Mr. VINCENT. Right now.
Senator LEAHY. Obviously, they are going to offer a lot less
money.
Mr. VINCENT. That is right.
Senator LEAHY. Or are we going to go to pay-to-view TV for baseball and sort of hit the fans one more time?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. I think network television is still
going to be the carrier of essential baseball games, certainly the
postseason, for the foreseeable future. But I think you are right.
The amount paid for baseball games by the networks, and for that
matter by ESPN or by cable, is going to be substantially less,
which puts economic pressure on the ownership. There is going to
have to be major adjustment because revenues will decrease in
baseball without any question.
Senator LEAHY. A friend of mine said to me that the lesson of
the free agency era is that smart, frugal teams can win and make
money and dumb teams can overspend and still lose. Any truth in
that? I thought I would give you something fun to answer here.
Mr. VINCENT. Was it Chesterton who said about Wagner's music
it sounds better than it really is? I have that comment with respect
to that remark.
Senator LEAHY. Why does a major media market such as Florida-and I don't want to step in on Bob Graham's concerns here,
but that is a major media market. They couldn't get a major league
team until 1993. Is that part of the same thing you are saying
about expansion or is there more to it?
Mr. VINCENT. I think so, Senator. I think that the pressure to expand, frankly, was very largely political. I think it was appropriate,
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certainly, and it had its consequence; that is, it produced expansion. But I think that one of the lessons of expansion, and I think
baseball owners have seen it, is that expansion carries a substantial burden, economic and certainly in terms of the game itself.
So as I said to you earlier, I don't believe expansion is in baseball's short-term future.
Senator LEAHY. Certainly a lot of my constituents, and I think
others, are hearing the same thing. They are just hearing this general frustration with baseball, and it seems the frustration level is
the highest with those who love baseball the most. There is a lot
of fear that there might not be baseball for our children or their
children, certainly not the way we grew up. I think I saw my first
baseball game when I was 7 years old in Fenway Park. I think that
is also driving a lot of feeling, people saying, well, just get rid of
the antitrust exemption, and that may happen, that may well happen.
Do you feel, as I do, that baseball is reaching a critical point that
could actually determine whether there is a future for baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't. Let me state it a little differently. I
think that baseball will be played in the major cities in this country a hundred years from today.
Senator LEAHY. I hope so.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I believe it will. I said major cities. I think
the question for baseball is, can baseball be preserved as a national
sport in a number of cities of medium to smaller size, baseball preserved as we know it. In my judgment, baseball will surely survive
in some form, but the question really is what form. I think it is
simply overstating the case to say baseball is threatened, its viability or its continued existence as a major sport. I don't believe that
to be the case, but there are threats to baseball that are very serious.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Vincent.
Senator 1IETZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Leahy. Our next Sen-

ator is Senator Simpson, and I am getting some indications from
some members of the committee that it would be helpful if everybody didn't use their full 10 minutes, but I won't deprive you of
doing so. I would just urge you pleasantly, if you can, to cut it a
bit.
Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have seen you do
it the other way. [Laughter.]
I will take it this way. That is all right with me.
Senator METZENBAUM. You certainly would be the last that ought
to be cut back because you were one of those who raised the question at the Judiciary Committee hearing as to whether or not we
were going to go forward on this subject, and so please proceed. If
you can cut it, we would appreciate it, but if you can't, you will
have the full 10 minutes.
Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate that. Howard,
you have been very quick to establish this hearing. It arose from
a question in my mind before we left the last session as to Mr. Vincent's dismissal from baseball. That rankles me. I thought I don't
understand why that has taken place. I had come to know Bart
Giamatti, a wonderful, wonderful, splendid man, and then had
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come to know Fay Vincent and saw him as a strong, independent
commissioner and then saw him sacked.
I asked the question, well, if the owners are now running the
business-and it is a business, but it is also a game-what is the
situation? Do they still require the exemption in order to exist? I
think you have said very clearly you think that they could get
along without that if that were the case.
Because Howard has a passion for the game and a sense of fairness about these things, this hearing is taking place, and Connie
Mack has his own serious issues with regard to expansion, as does
Senator-elect Feinstein. These are not the things that I am focusing on. I am focusing on the fact that a commissioner was set up
because of the Black Sox scandal which nearly destroyed baseball.
I seem to recall that when Kennesaw Mountain Landis came to
the game, he came and demanded almost dictatorial authority to
do what he had to do, and he had it and he did it and baseball
prospered. It is certainly simple enough for us in Congress to take
the step to eliminate the exemption. I can't imagine a more simple
legislative step. All we have to do is have a congressional finding
that baseball, professional sports, does affect interstate commerce.
That is all we have to do, and existing antitrust laws should then
be sufficient to regulate the sport because it affects interstate commerce, period. Nothing really too fancy need be done here. So
maybe that is what we will have to do or will do.
I had a view that I see nothing wrong, in the abstract, with baseball occupying a higher ground and being treated that way under
the law, but the business of baseball depends upon the game of
baseball.
So let me just ask you a couple of questions. Isn't it fair to say
that the Black Sox scandal involving the throwing of the Series by
the White Sox in 1919 was the prominent reason for the creation
of the office?
Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, and you should know that Judge
Landis came from a Federal judgeship and one of the things he did
was he drafted what is known as the major league agreement, one
of the clauses of which says the commissioner during his term may
not have his authority diminished or his compensation decreased.
Now, would Judge Landis have written that clause if he weren't
convinced that he couldn't be fired and he didn't want to be fired
by indirection? He didn't want people to say, Your new office in
some small community. In this body, one is very careful about picking out such a community, so I think I will leave it just at that.
[Laughter.]
And that his compensation is reduced-he put that clause in because he knew he couldn't be fired. After all, if you could fire a
commissioner, why would you worry about his place of business or
his authority or his compensation? I believe strongly that, as a
matter of law, had I challenged the owners and litigated this case
I would have been successful, and I feel strongly that a commissioner should not be subject to being fired, short, I think, of cause.
I mean, I certainly think there are things subject to impeachment
that we could all agree are appropriate.
But I think if you put a commissioner in for a fixed term, you
ought to agree that he has the authority to act in the interests of
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the game. And if you think about the corporate analogy-I am
prescienting on this question, Senator Simpson, but I have an interest-the analogy is that a commissioner should be like a corporate CEO with a board of directors who can fire him. That, with
all due respect, is really absurd thinking.
What chief executive is in business to discipline his board? After
all, owners in baseball are subject to sanction by the commissioner.
If the owners in baseball were colluding-let us suppose threequarters plus one were colluding and the commissioner were subject to dismissal by a three-quarter vote. What do you suppose the
poor commissioner could do? If he proceeds to deal with collusion,
which is wrong, he will, by definition, offend three-quarters plus
one. If three-quarters plus one can dismiss him, I submit to you he
won't do anything.
The only way a commissioner can function is with the security,
as with a Federal judge, of his appointment, subject to impeachment for felonies, and short of that a fixed term. I can understand
why people might say, well, you are not subject to reelection.
Maybe the term should be fixed. You are dealing with that kind of
issue in this body. I think that is an issue for baseball.
But a commissioner who is subject to being in a position I was
put in simply is not going to do what I did. The lesson, I think,
of my circumstance is that if you do a number of things, by definition, you are going to insult people and they will be annoyed with
you.
Senator SIMPsON. Well, I think that that is the act of grace and
forbearance that attracted us to what you did. Rather than litigate,
you said that you would not do that because you didn't want to
drag baseball as a national institution, or the national pastime, as
Howard refers to it, through that litigation to prove you are right,
and I think you would have had one extraordinarily tight case on
that one.
Let me just ask a final question so that my colleagues can enter
in here, too. In that creation of the commissioner's office, there was
a phrase called "the best interests of the game." That was the creation of the "best interests of the game," powers which were given
to the commissioner relating to the broad authority that Kennesaw
Mountain Landis had. Tell us about that and how you felt about
that particular phrase.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, in some respects it is very difficult phrase.
If the phrase weren't there, I suppose the job would be easier, but
it is there and it was put there by Judge Landis because he wanted
to be free to act in the best interests of baseball quite apart from
owners' interests. I think it is a power which, like a number of
powers in this country, ought to be respected and not heavily used.
I said it was like having a major cannon in my office. I ought to
polish it regularly, I ought to show people that it existed, but it
ought not to be used.
On the other hand, there are occasions when I think it simply
has to be used, and unfortunately perhaps as a matter of bad luck,
I saw or was confronted with more of those issues than I guess others had been. I think it is a power which is important, but it is subject to being overused, and I think some of the criticism of me probably was that I did overuse it.
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Senator SIMPSON. Well, I will be listening for the issue of the
CEO relationship, the corporate board relationship. I like those
analogies, and there is one ancillary matter I tend to hang in and
listen to about what happened to you when you suggested realignment, a simple act of moving the Cubs to where they ought to be
in geographical areas and the basis of the opposition. The basis of
the opposition was who owns the Cubs, and that is the most curious business relationship to begin with because it is a baseball
team contracting for air time on a station owned by the same people. That is the kind of pro-business, anti-fan state of affairs that
will continue to be upheld in the absence of a commissioner, and
it will only harm the game.
These are some of the things. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The
yellow light has not even shown.
Senator METZENBAUM. You did well and you get two brownie

points.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you. I deserve that.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Graham? Senator Brown, I want

to apologize to you. You are a member of the committee, I know,
and therefore have some priority, but in the effort go back and
forthSenator BRowN. No, no, Mr. Chairman. You did exactly right.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also
express my appreciation to you for holding these hearings, and to
the very distinguished witnesses who are going to illuminate us on
the economics and policy of baseball.
I have a particular interest that I would like to use as a focus
of trying to get some greater clarity on baseball's policy, particularly as it relates to what Mr. Selig in his testimony and you have
indicated is the principal use of the antitrust exemption, and that
is relative to the migration of franchises.
You have both in your testimony used phrases that talk about
the franchises that were having substantial degrees of local community support should not be subject to relocation. Do you apply
that policy, or do you think it should be applied similarly to a city
which has a single franchise as distinct from a community that has
two or more franchises?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think it certainly is more likely that the
problem would come up in the situation where there is one franchise because, by definition, there are very few communities with
two-Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago-not many.
I, early on in my tenure, developed some criteria for migration
that were very severe because I thought the test should be severe,
and they were four. One was that the franchise was losing substantial money and had been losing money over a reasonably long period of time. Second, there was a continuing decline in attendance
which was persistent and not obviously correctable. Third, there
was a substantial defect with the facility. The stadium was inadequate and not likely to be corrected in the near term; and, fourth,
that the situation, the community, if you will, had made it clear
that it was unwilling to address or deal with the problems.
Now, those criteria are very difficult to satisfy. Cleveland, if you
will, met the criteria early on at the time when Cleveland was con-
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sidering a new stadium. I went to Cleveland, made the point. We
got the vote and the stadium is being built. But the fact of the matter is that, in my judgment, the characteristics that justify migration ought to be characteristics that basically are last resort. The
community has voted, the stadium is uninhabitable, the attendance
is subpar, and there is no likelihood of corrective measures. Those
criteria, if they persist, will not be met in most cases.
Senator GRAHAM. How would you apply those four criteria to the
situation in San Francisco as you saw it in that two-team metropolitan area in the summer of 1992?
Mr. VINCENT. San Francisco met the criteria at the time the vote
in San Jose was negative. I think the criteria I spelled out were
satisfied, and at that stage I told Mr. Lurie that he could look
around.
Senator GRAHAM. Could you expand on what your statement was
to Mr. Lurie and to potential suitors of the Giants in the summer
of 1992?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, you understand that my ability as commissioner to approve or authorize a transfer was different from my
ability to authorize an owner to consider a transfer. Up until that
point, I had not permitted owners to investigate transfers. I was
difficult on the Seattle ownership investigating transfers because I
didn't think the criteria were met in Seattle.
I told Mr. Lurie he could look around. I must say I distinguished-at least I thought I was clear to distinguish that from the
ultimate authority to move, which was not mine to give. That has
to come from the ownership generally. But in my view, it was appropriate at that time for Mr. Lurie to look around. Among other
things, at the same time I was talking to Mayor Jordan, who was
being energetic about keeping the team, and I think one of the realities of tis is that the process of considering options certainly
has some effect on a community like San Francisco responding as
it did to the problem.
Senator GRAHAM. As the commissioner, when you gave Mr. Lurie
the indication that he was at liberty to look for ownership and purchasers outside of the San Francisco Bay area, did you have any
expectation that the National League owners would concur in that?
Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't have known, and I would have been
more doubtful about whether the American League owners would
concur. On the question of whether Mr. Lurie was going to find a
home away, whether San Francisco would ultimately solve its problems, those were for the future and I really had no idea what was
going to happen.
The only thing I was in a position to do was to say to Mr. Lurie,
the vote has been negative, what options do you have. Candlestick
is a major problem, and I think in fairness and equity, it is not unreasonable for me to say it is appropriate for you to look around.
Senator GRAHAM. You indicated that one of the aspects of that
opening to look around was the impact on the San Francisco Bay
community, and the mayor is going to be making some comments
and we have a former mayor who has now joined us. There has
been concern that one of the uses of the no-migration policy has
been somewhat of a bait-and-switch process. First, it is indicated
that the franchise can leave, such as the White Sox were given
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some indication that they might be able to leave Chicago, and then
the local community is dragooned into making commitments to
keep them there, such as the building of the new Comiskey Park
in Chicago and other benefits, and then the franchise is denied the
right to leave.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I wonder whether it matters. As I said to you
earlier, Senator, suppose the franchise moved, as the franchise
moved from here twice, as it has moved from a variety of other
communities. What happens is the community left behind from
which baseball departs does, in fact, respond, and history tells you
the response is to generate a new team.
So I think what happens is that the threat of the departure does
have an effect. In some cases, as in San Francisco, it may have had
an effect before the departure. Certainly, that has been true in
other communities. But even if the franchise had moved, my sense
is there would have been, and there has been in other instances,
a galvanizing effort to immediately replace our beloved team, which
only calls into question the policy of migration generally.
Senator GRAHAM. Well, that statement has been less true where
you are dealing with a community that had multiple franchises. My
history tells me that there used to be two franchises in Boston and
when the Braves left, at least there was no successful effort to replace the Braves. When the Athletics left Philadelphia, there was
no successful effort to replace them. When the Browns left St.
Louis, there was no successful effort to replace them. When the
Dodgers and the Giants left New York, there was a successful effort to replace them with one expansion franchise.
So it seems to me that the history of how well expansion has
served to replace a city that lost a franchise is significantly a function of whether there was another team still in place in that community at the time that one left.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, but think about Washington. I mean, is this
a community in which there are two teams? I mean, do you consider Baltimore to be part of this megalopolis or not? I think you
make a point. I am not sure that I agree that that is the discerning
point. I think from a baseball point of view, from a management
of baseball point of view, it is better, I think, to put new baseball
teams via expansion in communities than to move-somebody mentioned the Dodgers' migration to California. While it was eminently
successful, there are lots of fans in New York-I see them regularly-who are still bitter. Now, they are getting older, but they are
still bitter.
So I think migration is not necessarily the answer to the yearning of people for new teams. We did expand. There are two communities that didn't previously have baseball and we have disappointed people behind. After all, some 2 million people saw baseball in Seattle and one of the questions I dealt with was should we
permit Seattle to move, and I think we were right to resist that.
The solution occurred and those 2 million fans have got to be
happier.
Senator GRAHAM. I want to pursue the implications of that, but
before that, you talked about making it more difficult to relocate
possibly by charging some relocation fee, and I know that was an
issue that came up in the question of the Giants. Has there ever
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been any formal decisionmaking process within major league baseball that would lead to the development of a relocation fee being
charged?
Mr. VINCENT. I suggested it. I think there are people in baseball
who agreed that it was a good idea. You would have to ask other
gentlemen who follow me. I don't know that anything has occurred
on that subject. You understand the premise for the suggestion is
the difference in value of baseball in a small market and a large
market.
Let us suppose you are an owner doing poorly in a small market
and you have an offer to move to a large market. The difference
in value of your franchise will be considerable. The question I
raised is why should you be permitted to race to the door and, because you get there first, capture that premium when, in fact, it
is a baseball asset. Since baseball has the right to approve the
transfer, baseball should have the right to recapture the difference
between what your team is worth in your community and what it
is worth in the Meadowlands, for example. I mean, there is no
question that if you moved a team to one of the major
megalopolises, you would get a substantial increase over the value
for most smaller market teams.
Senator GRAHAM. What concerns me is that there seems be a
pattern, a bait-and-switch pattern, in which baseball at least
stands passive, or in the case of the Giants more than passiveactually indicates through the commissioner's office that it is acceptable to consider relocation, creates a flurry of activity, and then
in some cases, as in Chicago, pounds the local community for substantial benefits beyond those that had earlier been available from
that community, but in the final hour draws in issues such as the
relocation fee which had never been formalized or suggested at the
beginning of this process, and ultimately deniesSenator METZENBAUM. Senator, can you wind up, please?
Senator GRAHAM [continuing]. The right of the franchise to relocate. It seems to me that that raises very serious questions as to
whether the migration policy is being used to serve some broader
interest or is being used just to gain economic advantage.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I see your question. I understand your point.
I don't think bait-and-switch is an appropriate characterization to
the extent I participated, and I would cite to you the fact that there
have been a number of franchises that have, in fact, moved.
Senator GRAHAM. When was the last relocation?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, not recently; that is correct.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. Senator Brown.
Senator BRowN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Vincent, we appreciate your joining us today and I think you bring a unique perspective that will be very helpful to the committee.
You had mentioned that perhaps the decision on whether or not
baseball loses the antitrust exemption might ultimately be up to
the baseball owners. In hearing that, it wasn't clear to me if you
are suggesting that the baseball owners should change the original
Landis agreement or should abide by the original Landis agreement.
Mr. VINCENT. I apologize.
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Senator BROwN. Were you suggesting changes or are you suggesting adherence to the original agreement?
Mr. VINCENT. I regret the ambiguity. What I was suggesting to
you was that if the owners can demonstrate to you satisfactorily
their concern and sensitivity to the kind of considerations that you
think are vital, then I would think continuance of the antitrust immunity and exemption and continuance of the status quo is appropriate.
To the extent that the owners are unwilling to acknowledge the
burden of the privilege, if you will, then I thmk= the owners are
making the judgment that they don't care that seriously about the
immunity because they are making judgments which, in effect, say
we are heading elsewhere, we want to be treated differently, or we
are willing to be treated differently as a result of these decisions.
I suggested that it is up to the owners only because I think it
is early to know how they are going to respond; it is premature.
I think depending on how the ownership functions, this committee
and others may address the issue.
Senator BRoWN. As you know, putting your fate in the hands of
a particular committee is a somewhat chancy enterprise. For some,
it might depend on whether or not you provide a new franchise for
Florida or Colorado. What actions do you have in mind when you
suggest that? Are you saying it is simply a matter of the attitude
that they go forward with? Is there something specific the owners
ought to do or ought not to do?
Mr. VINCENT. I think governance is very important. I happen to
think that the immunity is relevant to the role of the commissioner. I think a commissioner gives this organization and the public interest some comfort in terms of the independence of that
incumbent. So I would watch very carefully the way in which baseball restructures and alters its basic constitution. After all, the immunity attached 70 years ago. Things have changed, but the
central governance of baseball remarkably hasn't.
Now, there is talk about major changes in the way baseball is to
be governed. If those changes in governance come out in a way that
I suggest you should pay attention to, then I think the response of
the Congress might be to confront the antitrust immunity directly.
Senator BROWN. If I am hearing you correctly, you are saying the
commissioner, as it is now structured, has a great deal of independence and has a responsibility to the public or a responsibility that
is broader than just his responsibility or her responsibility to the
owners, and that if baseball changes that basic agreement to where
you lose that responsiveness or independence to the public, you
would trigger it on that.
Mr. VINCENT. One of the things you have to bear in mind is I
take the view that the commissioner can't be fired, but anybody
who thinks I wasn't fired is naive. So there has to be some conscious addressing of what do you expect from the next commissioner. If you leave things precisely as they are, there is considerable ambiguity in this person's mind as to whether he may suffer
the same fate. So I think there is more work to be done by baseball
before-at least this is my own view-before you can really, or I
submit, before you might want to really think seriously about baseball.
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Senator BRowN. The key being to ensure the independence of a
commissioner, I take it.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think that is absolutely right. I think, after
all, Congress is saying baseball is unique, it has a unique cachet.
But what makes baseball unique? One of the things that makes it
unique is the commissionership, somebody who has to come here
who responds to your importuning or suggesting and who is responsible for that special standing.
So I think baseball governance has worked. I think commissioners have been sensitive to the Congress and to public interest
issues, even if owners have not universally been sensitive, and I
don't see any reason to make a major change. And put it another
way; if there are major changes, then I think it is appropriate for
you to consider what those mean.
Senator BRowN. I don't mean to put you in an uncomfortable situation and if you would prefer not to respond, I would certainly understand, but I think part of the point of this whole discussion
comes down to whether or not you were fired or resigned. Obviously, in a formal nomenclature, my understanding is you resigned,
but you have referred to it and others have suggested that you
were, in effect, forced out. Were you forced out?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, Senator, I was forced out.
Senator BRowN. Let me ask you specifically, were you paid to
leave? Did you receive compensation in addition to your normal salary to leave?
Mr. VINCENT. No, no, and that factor fortuitously in my circumstance is not relevant. But from my point of view, the ownership made it clear that they were unhappy with me as commissioner. They were going to vote to fire me, which would have resulted in litigation challenging their right to do so, and I decided
not to precipitate that litigation in view of the fact that it was very
clear that litigation was going to result.
After all, you know very well one can't govern without the consent of the governed. Here was a case where people were no longer
willing to accept my leadership, and I was perfectly willing to move
aside once I recognized that it was not in my interest or baseball's
interest, particularly, to litigate.
Coming back to a point Senator Simpson made, the one thing
that I think is going to be true about baseball in the future is it
is going to be replete with litigation. Like all of American life, I
think litigation is going to become absolutely dominant in baseball
because every decision of substance will be challenged.
The Cubs' decision to challenge the realignment points the way.
If the Tribune Co., certainly a respectable, distinguished company,
thought it appropriate to challenge, then a number of decisions will
be challenged. So I predict to you that litigation is going to be a
way of life.
Yes, I was forced out. The ownership would have voted to fire
me, I was told some time soon after I resigned, and I made the
judgment that if I won the litigation, I would lose. I mean, what
would have been proven? I think what would have been proven is
important, but it wasn't important enough to pursue.
Senator BRowN. Is the Landis agreement, the basic framework
of baseball-does it permit the owners to fire you?
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Mr. VINCENT. Well, that, of course, is the legal question we would
have tested. In my judgment, no. Other people disagree.
Senator BROWN. And you chose to leave rather than embroil
baseball in that controversy. You did not request nor receive special compensation for doing that?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator BROWN. What would happen to minor league baseball if
the baseball antitrust exemption were changed or eliminated?
Mr. VINCENT. Matters would become somewhat more complicated, and I have to tell you, Senator, I think that is a question-this is one I am not finessing. I really am not totally satisfied
that I could give you a complete answer. Minor league baseball, in
my judgment, is threatened, and I think the immunity helps baseball deal in a collective way with the minor league institutions and
it is probably marginally helpful from that point of view.
But there is a problem with minor league baseball; namely, the
major league clubs are going to have to cut back on the subsidies
to minor league baseball and there is going to be in the future a
contraction of minor league franchises.
Senator BROWN. You have been faced-I say you-I mean in your
previous role, and baseball in general, has been faced with some
very tough problems in disciplining players-Pete Rose. Baseball is
embroiled right now in a very painful process of perhaps disciplining an owner or a major shareholder of one of the clubs. How would
the elimination of the antitrust exemption impact baseball's ability
to deal with those problems?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it would at all, Senator.
Senator BROWN. It would not change it?
Mr. VINCENT. Not in my judgment.
Senator BROWN. So baseball would still have the same ability, or
could have the same ability to deal with owners, for example, that
embarrass the game?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As I said, the reason the corporate analogy
falls apart is just that point. No chief executive is authorized or in
business to supervise the conduct of his directors and discipline
them if they misbehave. Moreover, they all are faithful to his enterprise. Baseball has all those conflicts at the ownership level, confhicts with the institution. The corporate analogy just won't hold up,
but it is a very popular one among owners.
Senator BROWN. You know, one of the things that I, and I suspect others on this committee and perhaps the public in general,
have had trouble understanding is the reluctance to expand. The
Colorado Rockies feel very fortunate to have a franchise. My understanding is the Colorado Rockies now have sold more season tickets
than any team in baseball, with the exception of one, and we expect to pass them.
Why was it so difficult to get a franchise in a town that wants
baseball, and why is it so difficult to get a franchise in a lot of
other communities in America that want and will support baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Because you are basically diluting the equity of
ownership at a time when baseball is having its financial problems.
It is not financially attractive to expand, despite the substantial
franchise fees that are paid by expansion clubs. You are diluting
the revenue of the other clubs permanently. It is a little bit like
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selling stock in a company when the stock is very low; people do
not do that. I think you have got a time in baseball when the equity is not as solid as it may be at other times, and therefore this
is not, in the short term, a time to expand.
As I said to you earlier, I think the decision may have been a
sound baseball decision, political decision, a variety of other things.
From a pure financial point of view, it was always my view expansion was not financially or economically sound.
Senator BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEiNSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.

Vincent, I would just like to indicate to you my admiration and respect, and thank you very much for your service to baseball.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I would like to ask you this question. You
pointed out the public interest that is served by a strong and independent commissioner, and I must say I would tend to agree with
that. My question to you is-and you also find that there is an interest to be served, to which I agree, in maintaining the exemption
of baseball. Would it be advisable, in your opinion, for this Congress to pass legislation which might, in fact, condition the exemption based upon a strong and independent commissioner who could
then respond to the public interest without fear of dismissal?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, it is a thought I hadn't really considered. It
does seem to me that that is a possibility. I don't necessarily have
any opposition to that. I wonder whether it is necessary. I would
wonder whether you might not be satisfied by other assurances or
other kinds of indicia as to the way baseball is going to be governed. But, again, with the regret that I hadn't thought about it,
I wouldn't have any personal difficulty with that.
Senator FEiNSTEIN. Could you point out what those assurances
might be or how they could be obtained?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think when the new commissioner is elected, it will be important to know what his or her authorities are,
what the governance conditions are, what the commissioner's perception of his independence and power-I can imagine a circumstance in which the next commissioner could appear before you
and give you sufficient assurances that would satisfy you about
what he considers or she considers the authority that the commissioner is going to pursue. I can imagine that. I am not sure that
I could predict that, but I certainly can imagine it.
Senator FEINSTEIN. If a commissioner were to appear before a
Senate committee or any other committee and give those assurances, what capability would the commissioner have of carrying out
the assurances if it ran counter to a majority of the owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I think a lot would depend upon the
governance arrangements that the commissioner is operating
under. If the next commissioner has the kind of authority that satisfies you, then, by definition, he has very considerable authority.
If the commissioner is in a position where, in your judgment, it is
unlikely that the commissioner is going to be independent or effective or viable or aggressive, then I think you might come out with
a different conclusion.
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I guess what I am saying is it is just premature, in my judgment,
because all the talk about restructuring baseball has not resulted
in any restructuring taking place in terms of essential governance,
and I think that from an optimist's point of view I would hope that
baseball would realize-and these hearings may make the realization more likely-that the kinds of commissionerships that historically have been in place ought to be preserved.
Senator FEINSTEIN. But I take it you do agree that the public interest is best served with a strong and independent commissioner.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes. You know, I think it is clear that the baseball
owners established the commissionership because they couldn't
deal with problems themselves. I mean, that is the history of it,
and I think those problems occur. You see them in the disciplinary
area; there are lots of others. It is very difficult for owners to do
some things within baseball, and therefore it seems to me wise, to
say nothing of politically prudent, to continue a system which by
and large has worked.
I am not suggesting that commissioners are any better than any
other group. We did dumb things, we made mistakes, and we have
our faults. But by and large, I thmk' there have been eight commissioners and I think the record is a decent one in terms of the kinds
of interests that baseball requires.
Let me remind you that baseball integrated not because owners
voted, but because a commissioner ordered the integration. That occurred in 1947, and anybody who thinks that that kind of change
in baseball would have occurred by owners' vote is wrong. There
are times in baseball history when the commissioner has made
judgments which you and I now, with the benefit of hindsight,
would agree were magnificent.
Happy Chandler ordered Jackie Robinson into baseball, on the
sponsorship of Branch Rickey and the Dodgers, to be sure, but
without that order, there would be no wonderful event preceding
all of the other things like Brown v. Board of Education. So I think
much can be said for my colleagues, my predecessors.
Senator FEINSTEIN. One last question along the lines of Senator
Leahy's in pointing out the incident that I think has precipitated
a major loss of public confidence in major league baseball. If there
were a strong commissioner and that commissioner were to take
that action, as you see baseball today, would the owners support
the action?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know how to answer that. I think my
own experience is that, by and large, a vast majority of the owners
will support intervention in that kind of situation and some will be
critical. I mean, there are 28 owners. It is, it seems to me, almost
inconceivable that a commissioner can do something to universal
applause.
Senator FEINSTEIN. It will be very interesting to see the result.
Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein.

Senator Mack is the last Senator to have an opportunity to inquire,
but he has been one of those Senators who has been most prominent and most concerned about this issue. At one point, he actually
was moving forward to conduct some hearings in another commit-
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tee and I indicated that I thought this committee had jurisdiction.
I appreciate his cooperation and we are very happy to have him sit
with us this morning. Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Well, thank you, Senator Metzenbaum, and I
want to express my appreciation to you for holding this hearing.
Second, I want to express my sadness and sympathy to the family
of Carl Barger, who died yesterday during the baseball meetings.
I want to express my sympathy not only to his family, but to his
colleagues with the Marlins, and also to major league baseball. He
was someone respected in the game and spent his life at it, so I
want to express those concerns at this point.
Fay, let me first say thank you for the time, also, that you have
spent with us over the last several years in trying to work through
the issues about expansion and where teams go, and so forth. I
want to start my questions really kind of clarifying, if I could,
where you stand on the issue about the antitrust exemption.
In your statement, you noted that the antitrust immunity baseball enjoys is not essential either to the economic health or to the
legal integrity of the game. Several sentences later, you argued
that the exemption has important significance, as it prevents the
migration or transfer of a franchise, and then later said that the
significance of the antitrust status of baseball may be more symbolic than vital, and I really want to try to just pin you down a
little bit more.
It sounds to me what you are saying is that the most significant
area of impact with the exemption has to do with the movement
of franchises.
Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator MACK. And would you confine it to that?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I said to you earlier, I think the lawyers
in baseball and people like me are cautious, and where we are not
sure how broadly the exemption really applies, one has to be careful about invoking it. So I think from my own experience the major
area in which the antitrust immunity has a special relevance is in
the area of franchise migration.
Senator MACK. And obviously that is the reason I have such interest in it.
Mr. VINCENT. I understand.

Senator MACK. And, again, I can understand-in fact, in almost
any legal issue there is always a question about how broad it is
and what it really does impact. I wonder if, in your opinion, the
process that major league baseball went through with respect to
the transfer of the San Francisco Giants after an offer was madethat is, in essence, developing an offer within San Franciscowould have been covered by the exemption. In other words, if there
had not been the exemption, do you think major league baseball
would have been able to do what they did after an offer had been
made to Bob Lurie, and an offer accepted, I might add?
Mr. VINCENT. I am not being coy here. I simply don't know
enough about really what happened after I left. I would say this
to you, that I think it is likely that baseball in the area of franchise
migration could construct approval conditions and terms and conditions under which baseball could prevent migration that would be
legally valid. Football and basketball have had some experience in
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this area. I don't think the immunity is coextensive with baseball's
inability to prevent migration. I think it helps.
Senator MAcK. But there are those of us who believe that since
there are not specific criteria-and I will go back to that in a moment, but the reality that there is not a clear framework sets up
situations which Tampa and St. Pete have now experienced for the
last 8 years. And I can't help but believe that the comments that
were made by you-and I think that you pretty much stayed that
course while you were commissioner-were really a statement that
said to Bob Lurie-and, again, I think you made the specific statement about all options are open to you, and that was clearly a
statement to the people in Tampa-St. Petersburg that things were
a little bit different this time; that while you weren't excited-and
in my discussions with you, you have been very clear about your
lack of excitement about moving franchises, but you did open up
that opportunity and the people of Tampa-St. Pete took that very
seriously.
When the offer was made and accepted by Bob Lurie, then to
have major league baseball come back in and say, wait a minute,
we would like to see if we can't work out some other arrangement,
would go to what Senator Graham referred to, the bait and switch.
"Blackmail" was used. Let me tell you, there are other terms used
in the State of Florida that are much, much tougher than that.
So what can a person like me who is representing all of those
folks in Florida-I can't any longer sit back and say, well, let us
just let the exemption take place because everything remains the
same and Tampa-St. Pete doesn't get a team.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, Senator, there were some things done that
were untidy, and from my point of view the difference between saying to someone you may go consider options and saying it would
be all right for you to sign a binding agreement to transfer the
franchise is obvious. I don't believe that Mr. Lurie had my approval
to sign an agreement with Tampa-St. Pete. I know he didn't. So,
therefore, that particular step was out of line with the ordinay
processes of baseball.
I
Before an owner can make an agreement to sell, much less to
move his franchise, there are all sorts of procedural steps within
baseball that must be met. Those were not met. I take it it was
a mistake, a misunderstanding, but that untidiness causes you and
others difficulty, and I understand that, but that is different from
the kinds of orderly procedures that really should be followed.
So I think it is probably appropriate to apologize for that untidiness, though I had nothing to do with it, and yet it seems to me
it is unfair to take the untidiness as indicia of a really serious baitand-switch attempt. I don't, from my personal knowledge, believe
anybody in baseball intended a bait-and-switch proposition with respect to franchises.
Senator MACK. Let me just say again, Fay, depending on your
perspective and where one sits, it is very, very hard for me to believe, it is very, very hard for the people of Tampa-St. Petersburg
to believe that there was not some inside maneuvering that went
on, using Tampa-St. Pete once again to craft an outcome that major
league baseball wanted to see take place.

32
Mr. VINCENT. Well, yes, I can understand that. I am just telling
you as a matter of fact just one gentleman to another, I don't know
of it, and while I was around, it did not occur.
Senator MACK. Yes, I understand that. Let me go back now again
to the criteria because you were pretty clear, I think, in kind of laying out the framework in which you were looking at the possible
move. The criteria I establish, the Giants fit squarely. The first was
a franchise that has to be losing money. The second is a franchise
where attendance is a problem. The third is a franchise where the
facility is inadequate without prospect of being improved, and the
last is a community which has by vote or otherwise indicated that
baseball is no longer important.
And I would say that there were four votes in this particular circumstance, and as I view what has happened since then, it is very
hard for me to understand how anyone can come to the conclusion
that any one of those four criteria have, in fact, been addressed. In
other words, we are going to have a team that is going to remain
in San Francisco with a new ownership group that is going to pay
$95 million and nothing else has changed.
Mr. VINCENT. But, Senator, I think there is a difference between
saying these are criteria which would permit a move and saying
these are criteria which require a move. What happened in San
Francisco, to be sure, took place after I left, but obviously the San
Francisco mayor and the business community made a determined
effort to retain the franchise.
Senator MACK. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that there
would have been a San Francisco group that would have come forward if there had not been the $115 million offer from the Tampa
Bay group?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how to answer that. I would think
your question is appropriate. I can certainly understand why that
offer made the departure look very imminent.
Senator MACK. Yes. I think most people would agree that the
offer would not have been made if it hadn't been for the Tampa
Bay group. Let me ask some questions that are broader in nature,
and again it really kind of develops from an unfortunate, cynical
position that I have developed over the last several years in watching this thing unfold.
Mr. VINCENT. I have noticed, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator MACK. I was trying to figure out how you explain this
very complicated thing of antitrust to the average person on the
street, and what I came up with was the idea that if 28 of us sitting around this table all were owners of major league baseball
teams and you as an owner were going to sell toMr. VINCENT. Heaven forbid.
Senator MACK. Yes, heaven forbid-would sell that team to a
group down in the Tampa Bay market, and the 28 of us would sit
around and say, you know, that $115 million is going to go to Bob
Lurie, it is not going to go to us. If we don't allow this sale to go
through, that market is still there and some time in the future the
28 of us can sell that market for $115 million and we get to share
it.

Maybe that didn't take place, but I see that as somewhat of a
driving incentive, and it raises this question which I think is fun-
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damental. Whose market is Tampa-St. Pete? Is it the people of
Tampa and St. Petersburg, or does it, in fact, belong to the 28 owners of major league baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think to the extent franchises can be granted in the future and expansion can take place, a community which
is a prime candidate for future expansion represents, if you will,
a baseball asset because baseball could put a new franchise, not
San Francisco, in Tampa-St. Pete and obviously get from that community a substantial amount of money.
So the extent there is the possibility of using that city as an expansion site, and to the extent that baseballs vote or approval is
required for a move, which I take it does prescient to some extent
from the immunity, then baseball has a particular role to play and,
in my judgment, the asset should be a baseball, if you will, asset,
so that the price-if Tampa-St. Pete were willing to pay a substantial premium to get the team from, let us say, Boston or Milwaukee
or Minnesota, that premium, it seems to me, because of baseball's
involvement, should not go to the transferor owner, but rather to
baseball generally, which makes the point you are trying to make.
This asset, the expansion possibility of Tampa-St. Pete, is a valuable asset. To let an owner who is in a particularly grave circumstance get to Tampa-St. Pete first, capture whatever economic
emoluments are available for his or her benefit without regard to
the interests of baseball generally, it seems to me at least raises
a policy question, at least.
Senator MACK. It also seems to me thatSenator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Specter has twisted

my arm to get 2 additional minutes, and then we will not have a
second round with respect to Mr. Vincent because we have other
witnesses who are waiting and I don't think this hearing ought to
go beyond 8 tonight.
Senator Specter, for 2 minutes only.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your last
answer, Mr. Vincent, is very revealing when you say that TampaSt. Petersburg is a baseball asset. I think the fact is that baseball
is an American asset. If baseball is going to regard an area as a
way to maximize its profits, and if it is going to function just like
any other business, I then believe that baseball is going to really
face rejection of its antitrust exemption.
Senator Feinstein makes an interesting observation when she
suggests conditioning an antitrust exemption on a strong commissioner, but then we would condition it on no pay TV and condition
it on letting other markets go. I do not think that is going to happen. I think that if it gets to the floor that it is very likely the exemption is going to go.
Mr. VINCENT. But, Senator, let me make a point to you thatSenator SPECTER. Let me ask my two questions. Then you can
respond to that.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator SPECTER. The two questions I have for you that we
didn't get to finish before turn on the very substantial talk of a
lockout in 1993 or 1994, and I would appreciate it if you would ad-
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dress question No. 1. Why shouldn't there be revenue sharing in
baseball like there is on the antitrust exemption for football on television receipts, and a salary cap like there is in basketball?
The second question relates to the issue of Marge Schott, which
we can't go into here, but the second question is this: I would like
to know what you did during your tenure as commissioner of baseball to bring in minorities-African-Americans, Hispanics,
women-because baseball does not have a very good record at this
moment on that important subject.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, on the first question with respect to labor,
revenue sharing occurs in baseball to a very substantial extent. It
is not, I think, as you suggest a case where baseball does not share
substantial revenues. It does. All national contracts, all national
television contracts in baseball are shared just the way they are in
football. The issue in baseball is largely a matter of local revenue,
and basketball and baseball generate some local revenue. Football
basically does not, so baseball is in a different circumstance.
Revenue sharing is an important subject. It is not an all-or-nothing proposition. There is a lot of revenue sharing going on. The
question is should there be more, and the answer is probably yes.
I think, in time, there will be more, but that is a complicated subject relating to labor negotiations which is frankly bey ad my ken
at the moment.
On the issue of minorities, Senator, with all due respect, I think
my record was-and I am being immodest here-pretty good. In
the commissioner's office where I was in charge of employment, 24
percent of the people I hired or had the ability to hire were minorities. That number would match any well-run, distinguished operation from that regard. Two of the nine senior people in baseballthe third highest ranking person in my office was black.
I think the problem in baseball is basically on the field. Baseball's numbers with respect to front office personnel-lawyers, marketing people, business people-are pretty good. The numbers are
up substantially. The deficiency in baseball is in the most visible
areas, on the field and general manager.
The fact that we are going to have more minorities managing
next year should not be misunderstood as a sign that the problem
is coming under control. We need much more progress in the minor
leagues. There were no AAA managers who were minorities the
year before last. Lots of people have to be employed in the system
to be sure that the chain will produce the kinds of people we want.
I think there has been progress in the areas that frankly I could
make progress in. I think the numbers that I generated are numbers that I am proud of. Look, we established a winter league in
Arizona. I said three of the six managers of that league should be
black. We hired three black managers. One of them didn't take the
job; he decided not to travel. But the other two, Jerry Royster and
Dusty Baker, have called me and said, thank you, that has given
us a chance to be in the major leagues this year in positions of
prominence. That is progress. There is progress being made, but
you and others ought to keep an eye on that. There should be considerable vigilance on baseball, and the ownership has to continue
to believe that it is an issue both of fairness and equity and of
sound business practice.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent. I
want to say on behalf of the committee and on behalf of the American people, thank you for your testimony, thank you for your patience with this committee. We may be back to you for further consultation and advice. I know you discomforted yourself somewhat
for other appointments in New York to be here with us today and
we are very grateful to you.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you. I wish you well. Thank you for your
courtesy.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vincent follows:]
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I am grateful to have this opportunity to share my
views on the continued viability of the existing antitrust
exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball.

It is my opinion

that the current exemption should be retained so long as Major
League Baseball --

by which I mean the owners --

can justify the

privilege of the special status the exemption affords.

In light

of recent developments, I believe baseball must be pressed to
persuade to Congress that the antitrust immunity is warranted.
And whether baseball prehently deserves this special treatment is
surely open to question.

I.

Significance of the Exemption

In my view the antitrust immunity baseball enjoys is
not essential either to the economic health or the legai
integrity of the game.

For years, Congress has considered the

threat to remove the exemption as the principal weapon with which
to pressure baseball.

But the threat to remove the exemption

reminds one of the cry of wolf.

As my predecessor Bart Giamatti

once reminded the Senate, if you take away the exemption, what do
you threaten to do next.
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And yet the exemption has important-significance.

The

immunity permits baseball (or the Commissioner) to prevent the
migration or transfer of a franchise if the move is not in the
best interest of baseball.

Eliminating the immunity would have

some unattractive consequences.

And there is no evidence that

the immunity has been abused by baseball.

Thus, the immunity

issue tends to be over-blown when in fact the significance of the
antitrust status of baseball may be more symbolic than vital.
Again, the question is whether baseball deserves or requires this
specialstatus.

II.

Baseball as ordinary Business

Qne of the major issues in baseball is whether baseball
is or should view itself as anything other than a business like
any other business.

When I was being attacked by certain owners, I was told
that they wanted the Commissioner to be their Commissioner.

They

did not agree that the Commissioner should have any obligation to
the public or to represent any other interests than the Interests
of the owners.

One owner said the players had their union leader

as did the umpires but no one represented the owners'
Another view widely held by owners is

should be run like any major corporation.

interests.

that baseball

The CEO or

Commissioner should report to the owners who would be able to
fire the Commissioner as the CEO in the corporate world can be
fireo.
The corporate analogy has great appeal to owners who have
diffic4ty accepting or understanding why baseball is such a
qiff cult enterpriqe.

Thuq, th*RF 4g Within Paseball

ebate tajing place ovgyp

PW

bpseball tq to see

Obligations, if any, baseball has to the public.

itself,

a mpjor

apd what

My confidence
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in the wisdom of the resolution of this debate is well under
control.
Conclusion:

It is my view that:

1.

The existing antitrust exemption for Major

League Baseball should be retained only so long as
baseball can persuade you that it is a unique
institution with special public interest obligations
and not merely another business.

2.

To the extent Major League Baseball

acknowledges that the exemption is only justified by
continuing recognition that baseball is a national
trust -- with obligations to this Congress and to the
public that are not carried by ordinary businesses -the exception should be continued and the performance
of baseball closely monitored.

3.

If the owners of baseball continue on their

stated course of making baseball into their business
and at the same time insist that the Commissioner is
their CEO to be fired at will, I would no longer
support the preservation of the exemption.

If the

exemption is to be surrendered let it be by the
of the owners.

action

Only a strong Commissioner acting in

the interests of baseball, and therefore the public,
can protect the institution from the selfish and myopic
attitudes of owners.

4.

Baseball is not seriously dependent on the

continuation of the anti-trust exemption.

This
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Congress has other alternates available to it that
seriously threatens baseball.

If you wish to get the

attention of the owners and to recapture their
commitment to larger public interests, you may wish to
consider expanding the range of legislative options.
The exemption has become more of a symbol than a vital
baseball interest.
different.

It symbolizes that baseball is

The question for you and for baseball is

whether Major League Baseball is willing to continue to
carry the burdens of being different in order to
preserve the exemption.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
The Chair will now announce the procedure that we will follow.
We will take a 5-minute recess, at which time we will return for
opening statements. Many of the members have already indicated
their view with respect to this subject. I will therefore ask the
members of the committee to confine themselves to opening statements not in excess of 2 minutes each, and if they don't have to
make them at all, it would be appreciated. Following that, we will
hear from Mr. Selig, representing baseball ownership.
We stand in recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Senator METZENBAUM. The subcommittee will come to order. At
this time, we will hear opening statements from the members of
the committee. I would ask them to limit their statements to a
maximum of 3 minutes, and I think many of them have probably
already covered the subject and indicated their concerns. If they
can waive the opening statement, so much the better, but certainly
I don't wish deny anyone the opportunity to make such an opening
statement.
Senator Thurmond, I had indicated that we were going to limit
opening statements to 3 minutes, but hoped that some would waive
opening statements and other would speak for a shorter period of
time.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
I will speak only about 22 minutes. Mr. Chairman, the hearing
this morning addresses an issue that is unique to baseball. No
other professional sport enjoys the privilege of a complete exemption from the antitrust laws as baseball does. This exemption dates
back to the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.
In that case, the Court reasoned that professional baseball was
local in nature and did not involve interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. Subsequent decisions, although questioning the wisdom of the blanket immunity and the reasoning behind it, have afrmed the Federal Baseball decision because of historical precedents and Congressional silence and inaction.
Mr. Chairman, in my view, the privilege of having an antitrust
exemption carries with it certain responsibilities, especially to consumers. This responsibility is particularly important when addressing issues concerning franchise relocation, such as the proposed
move of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg,
player salaries, and league expansion.
Each of my colleagues is no doubt aware of the controversy surrounding the resignation of Mr. Fay Vincent, the former commissioner of baseball. Given the historic view that the baseball commissioner is to act in the best interests of baseball, I am concerned
that any attempts to undermine the independence and effectiveness of this office will have a detrimental effect on consumers.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the role of the baseball commissioner, I am particularly interested in hearing from the witnesses
why baseball should enjoy an antitrust exemption when other
sports do not. I want to assure each of the witnesses that I have
an open mind on these issues and that I appreciate their willing-
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ness to appear and debate these issues at the hearing this mornm . Chairman, I have a statement from Senator Hatch that I
would like to put in the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. It will be so included.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hatch follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ORRIN HATCH

Like millions of Americans, I enjoy our national pastime of baseball. Like many
other Utahns, I am pleased that minor league professional baseball has found a
home in Utah.
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court ruled that professional baseball was
not subject to the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that ruling in 1953
and again in 1972. In the 70 years since the Court's 1922 ruling, professional baseball has well served the interests of hundreds of millions of baseball fans, and Congress has therefore seen fit not to repeal baseball's antitrust immunity.
In my view, this history places a very heavy burden on those who would now advocate a blanket repeal of baseball's antitrust immunity. This is not to say that professional baseball has been error-free. But whether a repeal of the antitrust immunity would, in the grand scheme, help rather than hurt the consumer-the baseball
fan-is speculative at best.
I am committed to ensuring that professional baseball continues to serve the interests of the fans. But to the extent that any problems currently exist, it is by no
means clear that repealing basebal's antitrust immunity would be an effective remedy.

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. I have no opening statement. I would observe
there is one modest member of the U.S. Senate who has declined
to come up and join us, our colleague, Senator Herb Kohl.
Senator METZENBAUM. We are very happy to have him. I as-

sumed that he preferred not to. He is a member of this committee
and we certainly would be verySenator SIMoN. He is going to join us. I apologize for saying he
is modest. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
will be brief and will submit, instead, for the record an extensive
statement that I made when I introduced a resolution on August
2, 1991, to have the Senate consider a rescission or modification of
the antitrust exemption for baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
I believe that these are important hearings and that the issue of
availability of franchises is one which baseball, as well as the other
sports, will have to take up very seriously if baseball is to retain
its antitrust exemption. When you compare the size of the country
and the baseball industry in 1901, when there were little more
than 76 million Americans with 16 major league teams, to today,
when there are 28 teams and a population in excess of 250 million
Americans, it is obvious that there ought to be many, many more
franchises.
The issue of pay television-a subject, I think, of great sensitivity
to the American people-is another which baseball will have to
take up very seriously if it is to receive its antitrust exemption.
While there has been a commitment from professional football not
to televise the Super Bowl, professional football is moving into pay
TV in a number of ways on the cable channels, and as I noted earlier, so is baseball, including the team in my own home city.
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Revenue sharing in professional football, at least with the TV on
professional football, is also something which I think has to be examined very closely by baseball, including the salary caps.
There is nothing that the Congress would rather do than do
nothing and not become involved in this tremendously complicated
subject, but that really requires self-regulation by the sports themselves. I think these hearings are very useful in highlighting some
of the issues which we look to baseball and other major league
sports to solve without any action on our part.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Senator Specter submitted the following excerpt from the Congressional Record:]
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Specter.
Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it is interesting, Mr. Chairman. When we have these hearings, we are really
talking about a very conservative game in the best sense of the
word. In baseball, the traditions get passed down from generation
to generation in a way that we don't see in many other customs
in our country. They don't change much and I don't think they
should.
I remember listening to Red Sox games on the radio when I was
growing up in Vermont, and I mentioned earlier the thrill of being
7 years old in 1947 and being in Fenway Park and watching
games. These are great memories and they are memories that include going to games with my own children, which I still do. They
are not really children anymore, but I still go to baseball games
with them, and some day if I have grandchildren, I hope to do that
with them, too, because we know it is the same game.
You don't countenance experiments in baseball lightly. You don't
have the equivalent of a three-point shot or instant replay. That
doesn't work with baseball. A run is a run; you get three strikes,
you are out. It is pretty simple and straightforward. But I do wonder whether baseball's longstanding antitrust exemption is one of
those traditions that is worth preserving. Let me be clear. I don't
stand on the side of the owners, nor on the side of the players. I
am standing on the side of the fan.
Our interests in Vermont are different than most of the other
States seen represented around this table. We don't have a professional sports team. We are not wooing a team. We weathered the
relocation of the AA Burlington Reds. We are not being jilted or
suffering because we are not being wooed by any major league. But
Vermonters care deeply about the good of the game.
Now, Mr. Vincent, who incidentally gave some of the best testimony I have heard before the Judiciary Committee, hit the nail on
the head in his resignation letter when he said, "Baseball is more
than ownership of an ordinary business. Owners have a duty to
take into consideration that they own a part of America's national
pastime in trust, and this trust sometimes requires not putting
self-interest first." I agree. The owners have a broader responsibility than treating baseball like an exclusive rotisserie league. Baseball belongs to all of us, not just to the owners.
Baseball is going through some tough times now. Marge Schott's
comments were disgraceful, absolutely disgraceful, inexcusable.
They damaged the integrity of the game. A respected commissioner
was ousted. The money chase continues, and a lockout may be on
the horizon. Nobody in this room can tell me with a straight face
that the lockout is going to help the fans. It is going to help some
financial interests, that is all.
So the question I ask to be answered from this hearing is essentially this: Does antitrust immunity protect the quality of the game
for the benefit of the fans or does it merely protect a cartel of owners? And if it is the latter, then we have no need to continue this
immunity and we ought to just get rid of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. At

this point, I will put into the record a statement from Senator
Brown.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:]
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DECEMBER 10, 1992, 9:00 A.M.
226 DIRKSEN

Mr. Chairman,
subcommittee today.
Subcommittee,

thank you for allowing me to join your
While,

I do not serve on the Antitrust

we have had the pleasure of working on a number of

antitrust issues together --

resale price maintenance,

modification to international antitrust laws and antitrust relief
for production joint ventures, to name a few.

Mr. Chairman,

the people of Colorado are anxiously awaiting

the 1993 Baseball season and the beginning of a long and
satisfying relationship with one of Baseball's two 1993 expansion
franchises, the Colorado Rockies.

The remarkable enthusiasm of

the people of Colorado for Major League Baseball is reflected by
the fact that the Rockies have already sold 30,000 season
tickets, the second highest total in the Major Leagues.

The

removal of baseball's antitrust exemption would dramatically
change the ground rules before-the game starts for the Colorado
Rockies.

For the last several years,

Coloradans have worked hard to

assemble a potential Baseball ownership group, build a stadium
and position Colorado as one of the two best expansion
candidates.

After going through a long and exhausting

application procedure, Colorado was chosen as a 1993 expansion
site.

The investors in the Colorado franchise paid $95 million

just to cover the franchise fees.

Start-up costs in Colorado

could make the totalinvestment over $125 million.
is

A new stadium

being built in Denver and the people of Colorado are picking

up part of the costs related that new stadium.
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Bill Brubaker's recent article in the Washington Post,
entitled,

"Income Disparity Tugs at Baseball's Seams," describes

the economics of professional baseball today and is

very

I would ask that a copy of his

informative in this regard.

article be made a part of the hearing record.

This enormous capital investment, and the time and effort
expended in the application process were based on a number of
critical assumptions.

Not the least of those assumptions was the

fact that Major League Baseball had a time-tested system of selfgovernance that is

exempt from endless court challenges under the

antitrust laws.

It

was of utmost importance to Coloradans that franchises,

and in particular the Rockies'

National League opponents, were

stable and were not likely to relocate unless Baseball's
procedures were followed.

The fact that the Rockies' National

League opponents include three natural rivals on the West Coast
and only one time zone away has caused great anticipation and
excitement for the team and its

fans.

To change the rules'that have been relied on for 70 years
without considering .he needs of the fans and new potential
franchises would be unfair.

In sports it's

generally agreed that the rules should not be

changed after the game has started.
and it

Colorado played by the rules

has become part of the great sport of Major League

Baseball.

To change the very nature of that sport without

insuring that we move to something better would be a mistake.

I would hope that this subcommittee will exercise caution
when considering changes in Baseball's antitrust exemption.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Since Senator Brown isn't here, I am

going to turn to a member of this committee who just joined us and
I think does have a statement he cares to make. We are very happy
to have you with us, Senator Kohl, for as long as you care to remain, and I assume you have a statement.
Senator KOHL. Well, thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. I have no
opening statement. I am here to introduce Bud Selig when he becomes your witness.
Senator METZENBAUM. Very good, thank you. Senator Graham,

do you have an opening statement?
Senator GRAHAM. Yes, Mr. Chairman, a very brief statement. I
think the fundamental question that we have before us today is
whether the behavior of major league baseball has been so supportive of the national pastime as to justify a continuation of an exemption from basic laws which in other areas of commerce prevent collusive and anticompetitive practices.
There are a number of issues which raise this question. Many of
those have already been discussed by this committee and by our
first witness. Since the issue of franchise migration has been cited
as the principal utility of the antitrust exemption, I think it is appropriate, therefore, that it be a primary focus of the question of
whether there is a justification for a continuation of this
exemption.
The statements that have been made by Mr. Vincent seem to
draw a distinctly different economic standard for expansion and relocation. Mr. Vincent stated that he believed that it was unlikely
that there would be expansion of major league baseball in the near
term because it was not in the economic interest of baseball to expand; that the dilution of ownership was adverse to the current
ownership of baseball. Therefore, free market principles are being
applied to negate expansion.
On the other hand, as it relates to relocation, we seem to have
a socialized set of standards, a set of criteria that essentially says
that if a city, whether it has one or more current franchises, is able
to meet minimal standards, it will be protected to keep that franchise, whereas other communities that may be expansive in terms
of their demographics and economics and their indication of their
ability to support major league baseball will be frozen out.
My State of Florida, which, when the major leagues were established, was a State of under 500,000 people and today has a population of in excess of 13 million people, has had to wait almostwell, has had to wait over 100 years from the beginning of the establishment of major league baseball to have its first franchise. We
feel as if our interests in this socialization of relocation-and Adam
Smith economics as applied to expansion has resulted in millions
of fans who would like to be able to see a baseball game close to
their hometown being denied the right to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to be pursuing the kinds of questions
that I asked of Mr. Vincent relative to what are the criteria that
major league baseball uses-are they being used in both the interests of a mobile fan base which is increasingly moving to States
like Florida and to the economic best interests of baseball itselfand whether the antitrust exemption is advantaging or retarding
the ability of baseball to serve those national interests.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.

Senator Simpson, I think I goofed a bit in not calling upon you.
Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 2 minutes and
I thank you for that. I do think it is very important what we are
about here today. I have given you my view of why I am here, why
I think we either say to baseball, if you want to have a good,
strong, independent commissioner, that is what I would prefer to
see, and if you do, then you keep the exemption; if you don't want
to have an independent commissioner and want to draft up a pile
of language that doesn't give him any authority and makes him removable at will for any whim, well, then I don't think you need the
exemption. It is kind of that simple for me. So I look forward to
it.
I was interested in the passage while preparing for this from the
case of Flood v. Kuhn. That was the 1972 case in which the great
outfielder, Curt Flood, challenged baseball's reserve clause, and
Judge Irving "Ben" Cooper said this. He said,
It would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and profession which brings circes
from daily travail and an escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land
were to suffer in the least because of undue concentration by anyone or any group
on commercial or profit considerations. The game is on higher ground. It behooves
everyone to keep it there. That is as good as any politician could do, that statement,
and so let us see if it is on higher ground. If it is, we won't cut the ground out.
If it is not on higher ground, there is certainly no reason for it.

The lifeblood of baseball is the fan. There is no real other thing.
In my mind, it depends on how much fascination this game will
have for the American fan, and that is the lifeblood of baseball. The
business of baseball depends on the game of baseball.
So thank you for bringing this to our attention, and the yellow
light has still not expired and I think I should receive another fine
grade.
Senator METZENBAUM. You get two kudos andSenator SIMPSON. Two kudos and one hurrah.
Senator METZENBAUM. You may have the next week off. You do

not have to attend any Senate sessions next week.
Senator SIMPSON. Yes, thank you, Howard.

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
try and go fast. I would like to, by unanimous consent, submit a
statement by my colleague, Senator-elect Barbara Boxer, and indicate that she wishes to concur in the statement I am about to
make.
Senator METZENBAUM. We are happy to have it and, without objection, it will be included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
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December 10, 1992
Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony in support of
San Francisco's efforts to retain the Giants baseball franchise in the
San Francisco Bay Area.
I do this not only because the financial
impact on the economy of the San Francisco area would be severe in
terms of lost taxes, jobs, and local economic development if the Giants
move, but also because communities across the nation need to feel
secure that their baseball teams will not be ripped away from them.
That is why franchise stability is so important and should be
maintained.
Baseball should hardly be criticized for its consistent
policy in favor of keeping franchises in communities that have
supported them for decades. In fact, baseball should be applauded for
its strong preference for franchise stability, which is in everyone's
interest.
Stripping baseball of its antitrust exemption would undermine the
foundation of franchise stability. It is not in the interest of major
league baseball nor of the communities which support it to have teams
constantly on the bidding block, stolen from one community after
another.
Baseball's decision this fall in support of retaining the Giants
in San Francisco is evidence that it continues to act in the public
interest and that there is no need for the antitrust laws to be
amended.
Indeed, judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws have
caused franchise instability in the other major sports.
I trust that the United States Senate will act on behalf of
communities who have invested years of financial and emotional support
in baseball teams which are so important to their quality of life.
I urge you not to take any action which would disrupt long
established traditions and expectations of hundreds of thousands of
people in Northern California and millions more baseball fans across
the country.
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Senator FEINSTEiN. Thank you very much.
I would like to begin by introducing a number of leaders who
have come from California for this hearing; specifically, San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan, who has led the effort to retain the Giants in San Francisco and will testify later this afternoon to those
efforts; second, Supervisor Jim Gonzalez, who is chairman of the finance committee of the board of supervisors, which is giving consideration to reducing a $750,000 a year lease fee to $1 for the Giants; and, third, City Attorney Louise Rennie, whose office has
taken a forceful legal stand to defend what San Francisco believes
is a legal lease.
I would like, if I can, to respond very respectfully to Senator
Mack's comment that San Franciscans have said that baseball is
not important. In fact, that is not correct. San Franciscans believe
that baseball is very important, and an unprecedented effort is underway-legal effort, financial effort, fan effort to retain the San
Francisco Giants in San Francisco. The vote in 1989, it should be
pointed out, came within 700 votes of passage directly following a
major earthquake, which incidentally took place when Candlestick
Park had 60,000 people in it in the first game of the World Series.
There are those that would say that baseball is a business and,
as such, should enjoy the freedom of the marketplace as any other
business. I would submit to you, Mr. Chairman and members, that
baseball is not a box of Tide on a supermarket shelf. Baseball is
unlike any business or corporation that can be sold willy-nilly to
the highest bidder.
Baseball is part of the fabric and unity of the American city.
Baseball draws its support from decades of developing a loyal fan
base, a fan base that celebrates by the millions when its team wins
and inundates the pubs to bemoan the fate of major losses. Communities, chambers of commerce, fan clubs all work to see that
baseball survives. I believe that baseball is not a business. I believe
it should maintain its exemption. I am here to say that this morning, and I thank you very much for the time. I will submit a written statement.
Senator METZENBAUM. The balance of your statement will be included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein and an excerpt
from the Congressional Record follow:]
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FEINSTECIN

Mr. Chairman, before I begin my statement, I would like to ask
for unanimous consent to submit for the record the testimony of
my colleague, Senator-elect Barbara Boxer, who has indicated that
she wishes to associate herself with the comments I am about to
make.

Now, I would like to introduce a number of leaders from
California:

San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan, who has led the

effort to keep the Giants in San Francisco;

Jim Gonzalez, chair

of the Finance Committee of the Board of Supervisors; and City
Attorney Louise Renne, whose office has taken a forceful legal
stand to see that San Francisco's legal rights are protected.

In testimony later this morning, Mayor Jordan will detail the
integral relationship between the Giants and San Francisco and
the steps that have been taken to keep this key 35-year resident
of our city at home.

As a former Mayor and a new Senator from California, my objective
here today is quite clear: without baseball's exemption from the
antitrust laws, San Francisco could have lost the Giants.
choice is clear.

So, my

I support the exemption.

Some will say the exemption should go and that baseball is a
private business that should be freely subject to the
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marketplace.

But in California we have seen what can happen in

the free marketplace.

Oakland, California, lost the Raiders in a

devastating blow to thousands of diehard fans in a major American
city.

Major League Baseball is more than just another business.

It

is

deeply linked to the psyche and fabric of the American city.

Baseball requires stability to build fan support.
with their teams.

Fans identify

This loyalty stretches over years, through

changes in roster and management, and over the ups and downs of
the win-loss column.

Families have an opportunity to enjoy

wholesome, relatively inexpensive entertainment.

Young boys and

girls play in little league games every afternoon, using the
professional players as their role models.

For 35 years, the Giants have been part of the rich mosaic of San
Francisco.

The Giants have given us one of the greatest

rivalries in baseball with the Los Angeles Dodgers, and this team
has produced many of the greatest players of all time -including Willie Mays, Willie McCovey, Juan Marichal, Will Clark,
and now --

hopefully --

Barry Bonds.

Fan clubs, communities, governments, and Chambers of Commerce all
become deeply involved in supporting a team.

For example, in San Francisco, the Giants are exempted from an
admissions tax. While I was Mayor, the city remodeled
Candlestick Park building 110 luxury suites, improving
concessions and restrooms, and expanding Candlestick's capacity
by 10,000 seats. The city initially built the stadium with bond
funds, and the Candlestick Park Fund contributed $30 million to
its remodeling. The stadium is under the jurisdiction of the
City and County's Recreation and Park Department.

The field and
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stadium are maintained by the city.

The city has a real interest

in retaining the team.

Some are calling for the removal of baseball's anti-trust
exemption saying that the sport is a private business engaged in
interstate commerce and should be treated like any other
business.

However, no other private business is really

comparable to a major sports franchise.

In my view, major league

sport franchises are a good deal different than any other
corporate asset that can sold willy nilly to any highest bidder.
A major league sports franchise is not a product like a box of
Tide that can be sold in a supermarket.

It is absolutely proper for the League to consider a number of
factors when determining whether or not to approve the sale of a
franchise.

Baseball should not be stripped of its ability to ensure that the
owners are of good reputation, will keep teams in America, and
keep a good geographical spread to the organization.

The League has taken these steps to protect the city and fans of
San Francisco when it rejected the proposal to sell the Giants to
St. Petersburg after considering scheduling difficulties, media
markets, divisional realignment issues, and fan support.

It makes no sense to me for this Congress to be involved in
legislation that would permit the type of devastation that
occurred in Oakland when the Raiders moved to Los Angeles and in
Baltimore when the Colts were stolen in the darkness of the night
from their fans.

In the end, Major League Baseball made a baseball decision and
not simply a business decision.

In my opinion, baseball cannot
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be faulted for making decisions in the best interests of the
sport and in the best interests of the fans in Major League
cities.

In conclusion, stability is not a new issue.

In 1985, I joined

more than 20 Mayors in supporting a resolution by the United
States Conference of Mayors which supported S. 259 -- a measure
that would have protected team stability.

A copy of that

resolution is attached.

I appear today to support baseball's anti-trust exemption.

Again, Mr. Chairman and men of the comittee, thank you for this
opportunity.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Mack.

Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a more detailed statement that I would like to have included in the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, the entire statement

will be included in the record.
Senator MACK. As Rick Dodge from St. Petersburg will attest,
and as every good citizen of Florida knows, the barons of baseball
have treated the people of Tampa Bay with disdain, utterly disregarding their hopes and their dreams for a future with a baseball
team.
The owners claim baseball acted to protect fans by upholding its
policy of locking teams into their present homes when it refused
the legitimate sale and movement of the Giants to the Tampa Bay
area, while there are at least 1.2 million households in the TampaSt. Petersburg metropolitan area filled with broken-hearted fans
whose interests major league baseball didn't protect. In fact, major
league baseball showed no respect for them at all. I deeply regret
that baseball has turned its back on these deserving people. Millions of fans deserve to be a part of our national pastime. Instead,
they have been unfairly left out.
The antitrust exemption represents an artificial legal framework
which the courts have set up around major league baseball to protect it. This has made the owners' pursuit of their self-interest inconsistent with the basic interests of baseball fans. This is the opposite of what happens when a free market competition is allowed
to work. Why won't the owners accept a system which has brought
so much good to every other industry in America?
Instead, their system is a fraud, an emotionally wrenching fraud.
The people of Tampa-St. Petersburg were used, demeaned, and insulted. Owners should be ashamed of what they did, but they
aren't. Tampa-St. Petersburg has on seven occasions in the last 8
years tried unsuccessfully to secure a team through expansion or
by purchase. We always played by the rules. We made bona fide
offers. We had commitments and promises from owners and commissioners. The taxpayers built a stadium, 30,000 season tickets
were sold, and in the end nothing.
Major league baseball has used us as a pawn. Owners hold the
Tampa Bay area as if it were their market, not ours. Then they use
it for leverage on current host cities and fans to extract new stadiums, tax benefits, and the like. This is a game in which only baseball owners win while everyone else loses. Enough is enough. Since
the courts refuse to act and major league baseball is committed to
its present course, the exemption from the antitrust laws must be
removed. The Congress must act.
A common question asked about antitrust exemption is will removing it really solve the problems of major league baseball. Only
time will tell, but I believe it will solve many of the problems, and
in the end more cities will have teams, more of our kids will have
an opportunity to play, and more fans will enjoy the game firsthand.
Mr. Chairman, I have a long family tradition in the game of
baseball. I love the game. I hope this hearing is only the first definitive and positive action toward bringing the public interest back
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into the decisionmaking process of major league baseball. I thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mack follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK

Mr. Chairman thank you for holding this hearing and for allowing me to
participate; to speak for the millions of baseball fans around this country
I believe recent
who deserve and badly want a team they can call their own.
events show the importance of this hearing to the future of baseball.
Now is a very uncertain time for Major League Baseball. As Rick Dodge from
St.Petersburg will attest and as every good citizen of Florida knows, the
Barons of Baseball have treated the people of the Tampa Bay area with disdain
and without regard to their hopes and dreams for a future with a baseball
It's unAmerican not to accept the highest
team. We had the highest offer.
offer.
The owners said baseball acted to protect fans by upholding its policy of
keeping teams in their home ports when it refused the move of the Giants to
Tampa Bay area. Well, there are at least 1.2 million households in the
Tampa/St. Petersburg metropolitan area filled with broken-hearted, would-be
baseball fans in the Tampa/ St. Petersburg metropolitan area whose interest
Major League Baseball didn't protect. Major League Baseball had no respect
Most assuredly, the people of San Francisco feel the same way.
for them.
For thoy, too, have been used by the very same baseball barons whom we have
charged with the privilege of custodianship over our national pastime.
Tampa deserves baseball. Orlando deserves baseball. Jacksonville deserves
San Francisco deserves baseball. Cities from Phoenix all the way
baseball.
to Buffalo deserve baseball -- teams they can call home teams -- but the
owners lock those cities out because they want to maintain the artificially
high value of the few teams in existence today. What other business would
leave so many hungry fans, customers, in the lurch?
Personally, I deeply regret baseball has turned its back on so many deserving
people. Millions of fans deserve to be a part of our national pastime, and
they aren't. They want to catch a foul ball, get an autograph, holler at the
ump for a call which we all know we can make better from the stands than he
can make by being right on top of the play, but they can't. I can't help
thinking this occurred because Baseball alone has an antitrust exemption and
that exemption must have some bearing on this curious behavior.
I can tell you as Florida's United States Senator the brides' maid towns are
tired of their insults. They're tired of dashed hopes and of being left at
the altar. Perhaps they're most tired of not knowing or understanding why
they can't have a team. They know darn well the free-market would allow them
the opportunity to have a team and keep a team. But no free-market principles
exist in baseball. And that is ironic because it is the free market which
allowed the owners to make so much money in their other endeavors and the free
market would solve so many of Baseball's problems. Why won't the owners
accept the system which has brought so much good to every other industry in
this country?
I'm here today to stand up for the people of my state who have no recourse
against Baseball. I'm here to say the leveraging of city over city must stop.
It's mean and it's unfair. I'm here to say nobody ever again should be
treated by baseball the way my constituents have been treated for nearly a
decade.
I am particulary hurt and angry because I know first-hand the people of Tampa
Bay acted in earnest and in good faith. They went above and beyond the
League's "criteria" to bring baseball to the area.
Over 31,000 people have
already purchased season tickets. They envisioned the Suncoast dome bustling
with activity and alive with the sounds of cheering fans.
They are proud there is a team in Miami and happy for their fellow Floridians
to the South. That franchise will one day become one of the most successful
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franchises in sports history. I'm sure of it. When I'm in Miami I can see
the fire in peoples' eyes when they speak of the Marlins.
It's the same way
in Tampa Bay when they speak of their soon-to-be team and, oh my, what a
rivalry could develop between the two teams. Folks in Florida are pretty
competitive, you know.
They look forward, whether it be in the National
League Championship Series or the World Series to slugging it out with their
cross-state rivals.
or no
But it appears their interest, the public interest, carries little
weight in the decision-making process of the league's owners and currently
there is no commissioner to reverse that trend. I'm not sure a strong
commissioner could do it in any event. What Major League Baseball needs
immediately is the discipline to serve its customers, the fans, which only a
strong dose of free-market principles can provide.
You see, its anybody's guess why the Giants didn't move to Florida: whether
it's because the owners wanted the franchise fees as opposed to Mr. Lurie
getting them or if the American League blocked the deal because they didn't
want to be shut out of Florida. We can be sure Baseball did not base its
decision on free-market principles or sound economic reasoning for the longterm viability of the game. If that were the case, Florida would have three
or four teams.
What will get Major League Baseball owners to focus on
So, the question is:
fan interest? How do we right the wrongs which Major League Baseball has
perpetrated on the people of Tampa and on cities around the country who
Better yet, what is it that will make
deserve baseball but can't get it.
owners consider something other than their own short-term, financial gain when
reaching decisions on things such as player relations, expansion, the new
commissioner, realignment and the ugly specter of bigotry and anti-semitism.
To answer that question thoroughly, to compensate the people of Florida and to
act in a prudent fashion we need to gather some information through this
hearing and in subsequent efforts and then, the Congress must act. We must
review audited, financial data of the teams. If a subpoena is necessary, then
so be it.
Congress also needs to investigate what actions Major League
Baseball is taking which violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Finally, it would
also be beneficial for the Congress to study what special tax advantages we
have given to owners over the years.
A common question asked about the exemption is: will removing it really solve
Mr. Chairman, but
the problems of Major League Baseball? Only time will tell,
at the very least it seems to be a necessary first step. It would sure make
real the possibility of a competing league with access to minor league talent.

If Tampa and Orlando and other cities have to go outside Major League Baseball
to get a big-league team, we're willing, but that new league must have access
to minor league talent.
Removing the antitrust exemption will speed up the
process.
I'm putting Major League Baseball on notice as of today. We will have more,
big-league baseball in Florida and it will be sooner rather than later. Those
markets belong to the fans and to the investors who want to quench fan desire
for a big-league team. Baseball must not belong solely to 28 Major League
Baseball owners.
Removing the antitrust exemption will help make expansion or
a new, competing league a reality. If we need to go further, then we will go
further.

I do not want other cities, teams and avid fans to go through the nightmare
Tampa/St. Petersburg has gone through over the last decade. It is simply
wrong to have the commissioner of baseball promise thousands of fans one
thing, when the other owners never had any intention of letting a baseball
team move to Tampa/ St. Petersburg.
It was a fraud, an emotionally-wrenching
fraud.
The people of Tampa/St. Petersburg were used, demeaned and insulted.
Baseball should be ashamed of what they did, but I believe they are not.
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Tampa/St. Petersburg has on seven occasions in the last eight years tried
unsuccessfully to secure a team through expansion or by purchasing another
team. We always played by the rules. We made bona fide offers. We had
comitments and promises from owners and commissioners. The taxpayers built a
stadium. 30,000 season tickets were sold. In the end, nothing.
Our only
utility to Major League Baseball has been as a pawn. Owners hold St. Pete as
a bargaining chip over the heads of their current, host cities and fans to get
new stadiums, tax benefits, and etc. That game is a game in which baseball
owners win and everybody else loses. Enough is enough.
I have a long family tradition in the game of baseball. I love the game. My
interests are far greater than parochial. But I am disturbed about the
future of the game. I hope this hearing is just the first step in definitive
action to bring the public interest back into the decision-making process of
Major League Baseball. I hope legislation is not necessary, but believe that
thinking is wishful at best. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Mack.
We have with us this morning three Members of the House who
would like to be heard-Congressman Schumer of New York, Michael Bilirakis of Florida, and Bill Young of Florida. Would you
please come to the table. I think you know the understanding to
limit your statements to 3 minutes, if you would, please.
Congressman Schumer, we are always happy to welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is always a
pleasure to come before this august committee and before your subcommittee. I speak as a member of your sister committee in the
House, and I first want to thank all of you for the opportunity to
speak before you briefly today.
Mr. Chairman, major league baseball is striking out. It is not the
quality of the play on the field. Our players today, it seems to me,
are as good or perhaps better than they have ever been, although
some nostalgists might debate me on that. Many in my district
think there was no better team than the 1955 Brooklyn Dodgers.
It is not the fans who are the problem either. Baseball's loyal
fans are enthusiastically packing the stadiums each summer and
soaking up every play on television and radio in numbers that boggle the mind. It is not even the ballpark food that is the problem,
although I will say their hot dogs set me back more than they did
a few years ago.
What ails baseball in America, Mr. Chairman, is irresponsible
team ownership, ownership that with each passing year increasingly acts as if baseball is its personal fiefdom to be operated for
one purpose: profit for the owners. They are truly out of control.
Let us look at the record. For years, they have tried to take more
and more of the games away from the fans by moving the broadcasts off the free airwaves and onto pay cable channels, many of
which are not available to my constituents. When Commissioner
Fay Vincent, the supposedly independent official charged with
managing the game in the best interests of baseball, took action
that the owners didn't like, they beheaded him.
Their record on the treatment of minorities is the worst of all the
major league sports. Their labor relations record and treatment of
the players in recent times has been a disaster, with simple contract negotiations resulting in owner lockouts in 1973, 1976, and
1990, and we learned earlier this week that the owners have voted
once again to reopen labor negotiations next month.
As if this were all not enough, allegations have recently appeared
about pejorative racial and anti-Semitic slurs attributed to Marge
Schott, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, allegations that have been
greeted with a suspicious silence by the owner fraternity at their
annual meeting in Louisville.
But we don't have to sit idly by and allow these disgraces to our
national pastime. We have the power to demand change. The owners have been able to get away with their outrageous behavior
largely because baseball is the only professional team sport to enjoy
complete immunity from the antitrust laws. It has been that way
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since 1922, but as Senator Simpson noted, we are not bound to preserve this exemption.
In large part, Congress has not subjected major league baseball
to the antitrust laws in exchange for an understood agreement that
the owners of baseball would operate the game for the public good.
The owners are dropping their end of the bargain.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Schumer.
Mr. SCHUMER. I appreciate it, and if I might, with the permission
of my colleagues, I must excuse myself.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schumer follows:]
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STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. SCIUMER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS (D-NY)
BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS
DECEMBER 10, 1992
THE TROUBLE WITH MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
MR. SCHUMER. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK CHAIRMAN MEIZENBAUM AND
TBE OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE FOR TEE OPPORTUNITY TO
SPEAK BEFORE YOU TODAY ABOUT A SITUATION THAT IS BOTH TROUBLING
AND SAD TO ALL OF US.

MATOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IS STRIKING OUT. NO, IT'S NOT THE QUALITY OF
PLAY ON THE FIELDS. OUR PLAYERS TODAY ARE AS GOOD OR PERHAPS
BETTER THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN (ALTHOUGH SOME NOSTALGISTS
MIGHT DEBATE ME ON THAI). IT'S NOT THE PANS. BASEBALL'S LOYAL FANS
ARE ENTHUSIASTICALLY PACKING THE STADIUMS EACH SUMMER AND
SOAKING UP EVERY PLAY ON TELEVISION AND RADIO IN NUMBERS THAT
BOGGLE THE MIND. IT'S NOT EVEN THE BALLPARK FOOD, ALTHOUGH A HOT
DOG WILL SET YOU BACK MORE THAN IT DID A FEW YEARS AGO.

WHAT ILLS BASEBALL IN AMERICA IS IRRESPONSIBLE TEAM OWNERSHIP.
OWNERSHIP THAT, WITH EACK PASSING YEAR, INCREASINGLY ACTS AS IF
BASEBALL IS ITS PERSONAL FIEFDOM TO BE OPERATED FOR ONE PURPOSE:
PROFITS FOR THE OWNERS.

THEY ARE TRULY OUT OF CONTROL. LOOK AT THE RECORD. FOR YEARS
THEY HAVE TRIED TO TAKE MORE AND MORE OF THE GAMES AWAY FROM
THE FANS BY MOVING THE BROADCASTS OFF THE FREE AIRWAVES AND ON
TO PAY CABLE CHANNELS. WHEN COMMISSIONER FAY VINCENT, THE
SUPPOSEDLY INDEPENDENT OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH MANAGING THE GAMB
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IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BASEBALL, TOOK ACTION THAT TEE OWNERS
DIDN'T LIKE, THEY BEEADED HIM. THEIR RECORD ON THE TREATMENT OF
MINORITIES IS THE WORST OF ALL MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS. THEIR LABOR
RELATIONS RECORD AND TREATMENT OF THE PLAYERS IN RECENT TIMES
MAS BEEN A DISASTER, WITH SIMPLE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING
IN OWNER LOCK-OUTS IN 1973, 1976 AND 1990. AND WE LEARNED EARLIER
THIS WEEK THAT THE OWNERS HAVE AQ]

VOTED TO REOPEN LABOR

DISCUSSIONS NEKT MONTH.

AS IF THIS WERE NOT ENOUGH, ALLEGATIONS HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED
ABOUT PEJORATIVE RACIAL AND ANTI-SEMITIC SLURS ATTRIBUTED TO
MARGE SCHOTT, OWNER OF THE CINCINNATI REDS. ALLEGATIONS THAT
HAVE BEEN GREETED WITH A SUSPICIOUS SILENCE BY THE OWNER
FRATERNITY AT THEiR ANNUAL MEETING IN LOUISVILLE.

BUT WE DON'T HAVE TO SIT IDLY BY AND ALLOW THE OWNERS TO FLEECE
AND DISGRACE OUR NATIONAL PASTIME. WE HAVE THE POWER TO DEMAND
A CHANGE. TE OWNERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THEIR
OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOR LARGELY BECAUSE BASEBALL IS THEE NLY
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORT TO ENJOY COMPLETE IMMUNITY FROM THE
ANTITRUST LAWS. IT'S BEEN THAT WAY SINCE 1922. BUT WE ARE NOT
BOUND TO PRESERVE THIS EXEMPTION.

IN LARGE PART, CONGRESS HAS NOT SUBJECTED MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN EXCHANGE FOR AN UNDERSTOOD AGREEMENT
THAT TIB OWNERS OF BASEBALL WOULD OPERATE THE GAME FOR 'E
PUBLIC GOOD. THE OWNERS ARE DROPPING THEIR END OF THE BARGAIN.

THE TIMB HAS COME FOR CONGRESS TO STAND UP TO THE OWNERS AND
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GIVE A STERN WARN

G THAT, UNLESS TBEY CLEAN-UP THEIR ACT,

ESPECIALLY BY APPOINTING A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONIL, WE
CAN PASS LEGISLATION TO FULLY SUBJECT TEEM TO THE SAME ANISTRUST
LAWS APPLICABLE TO OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, SUCH AS FOOTBALL.

THE OWNERS KEEP THROWING TBE FANS A CURVE AND HAVE GROWN RICH
OFF OF AN ANACHRONISTIC ANTITRUST EXEMPTION. IT IS TIME TO GIVE THE
NATION'S PASTIME BACK TO Tim PEOPLE TO WHOM

rr BELONGS - THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE. TE COUNT IS FULL, THREE BALLS, TWO STRIKES. WE
ARE WAITING FOR THE OWNERS TO STEP BACK UP TO THE PLATP.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis, we are happy to have you with us.
Mr. BILRAKIs. Mr. Chairman, thank you. With your indulgence,
may I yield to my other colleague from Florida, Mr. Young, at this
point, who has business over in the House committee?
Senator METZENBAUM. Congressman Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much to you and the
members of the committee for giving us an opportunity finally to
vent some frustration on this entire issue of how certain parts of
America are being treated by baseball. I associate myself with the
remarks of my Senator, Bob Graham, and my Senator, Connie
Mack, and I would like permission to submit a written statement
because much of it would repeat what Senator Mack has already
said.
Senator METENBAUM. Without objection, we will include the
statement in the record.
Mr. YOUNG. I hope that the members of the committee will know
that the brevity of my statement is no indication of a lack of intensity in my feelings about this because I think we in St. Petersburg-and I am the Representative from St. Petersburg in the
House of Representatives-I think we have been had by baseball.
I think they have used us to try to develop situations that were
beneficial to baseball owners and not to baseball as a game.
We have been thrown four balls pitched right to us by baseball,
but when they came to the plate they were considered strikes and
we were out, and that is not right. They shouldn't lead us on as
they have. I stayed out of this, and the city of St. Petersburg stayed
out of this argument on the antitrust discussion, but I am here
today to say that I am no longer out of it and I am here as part
of any effort to make the owners of baseball be responsible to the
fans and to the players and to the game which belongs to America
and not to the owners.
I thank you very much for this opportunity to make these brief
remarks.
Senator METZENBAUM. Does your statement indicate or imply

that you support the concept of repealing the antitrust exemption,
or do you think it ought to remain as is?
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, my statement will indicate that I
think we should seriously consider removing that antitrust exemption, and I give specific reasons why I think that should happen.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.

Mr. YOUNG. If I had the time, I would have presented them to
you orally, but I understand the time constraints.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. In the House, we are busy making committee assignments and I want to make sure that the five freshman from Florida don't lose out on good committee assignments.
Senator METZENBAUM. I understand your point.
Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
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Testimony of U.S. Rep. C. W..Bil Young
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
December 10, 1992

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and the members of the Committee for

holding this very in depth hearing today on the issue of Major.League Baseball's

antitrust exemption and to thank you for allowing me this time to share my thoughts.
As the Representative of St. Petersburg, Florida, a city which has a long and
proud baseball history and up until recently has had a very good relationship with
league officials, I share with you the frustration and bewilderment of the thousands of
residents of our community and the millions of people of the Tampa Bay area. Over
the course of the past 15 years, the prospect of a major league team playing in St.
Petersburg has been dangled in front of our community on no less than seven
occasions. The last four cases have perhaps been the most publicized and frustrating
for our community.
The Chicago White Sox, in 1988, nearly came to terms with the city to
relocate to the Suncoast Dome, but with the leverage provided by St. Petersburg's
offer, the state of Illinois, literally at the final hour, approved a legislative package to
fund the building of a brand new stadium to keep the White Sox in Chicago.
Last year there was the hotly contested effort to win one of two National
League expansion franchises. St. Petersburg was one of the finalists but just missed
out, once again disappointing Tampa Bay area baseball fans.
Earlier this year there was the highly controversial bid to move the Seattle
Mariners to St. Petersburg, which was blocked by major league owners who voted to
support an offer by a group of Japanese investors that kept the team in Seattle.
Then there was the August 6th agreement between a group of Tampa Bay area
investors and Bob Lurie, the owner of the San Francisco Giants, to buy the Giants
and move the team to St. Petersburg. The city saw this as perhaps its best chance to
bring a team to the Suncoast Dome.
Over the next three months, however, we watched as Major League Baseball
took full advantage of its antitrust exemption to block the sale of the Giants to the
Tampa Bay group. The league also worked directly with another prospective
ownership group to restructure a counterproposal which the league owners
subsequently approved to keep the Giants in San Francisco. This was three weeks
after National League President Bill White said the league would allow no further
changes to the competing proposals. When the Tampa Bay ownership group asked
for permission to alter their proposal in light of the league's last minute changes to
the competing proposal, they were turned down by league officials.
In the end, the owners forced Bob Lurie, the owner of the Giants, to accept a
package that paid him $15 million less for his team than the package offered by the
Tampa Bay group.
The Sherman Antitrust Act would not allow any other U.S. business or
industry to prohibit an owner from selling a business to another person or group. It
would not allow a business or industry to block the movement of a franchise to
another area. It even covers other major league sports leagues,-suck-as the- National
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Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League, which are all prohibited from allowing a committee of owners to block the
free enterprise rights of on an individual team's owner to sell or relocate a franchise.
The federal courts have considered this issue and have upheld the rights of individual
team owners in these other professional sports leagues.
Mr. Chairman, it has been 70 years since the Supreme Court ruling gave
major league baseball the antitrust exemption it has wielded to frustrate and
disappoint the people of St. Petersburg. Our city, however, is not alone. Other
communities have shared similar disappointing experiences at the hands of a small
committee of major league owners, or will share such an experience in the future.
The time is now for the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate to take
a hard Iook at the history of this antitrust exemption to determine if it has outlived its
useful life and if it should be repealed entirely or significantly modified through
legislation.
The strength of our nation's economy rests upon our fervent protection of a
free enterprise system which ensures fair access to markets and competition for all,
not just a few businesses and entrepreneurs. The owners of the teams which make up
'America's Game" should abide by these same rules.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the members of the
Committee to provide whatever information I can about St. Petersburg's experience
with Major League Baseball and its antitrust exemption so that you might have a
thorough case history to review and evaluate.
Thank you again for this time today to discuss this important matter which
threatens to undermine the integrity and support for our great national pastime.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Bilirakis.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BLIRAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. BILIRAmIs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I, too, appreciate this opportunity to appear before
you today as a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and also a sponsor of the legislation in the previous Congress to eliminate the antitrust exemption for major league baseball, and I fully intend to reintroduce this legislation in the 103d
Congress because I feel strongly that competition and fairness is as
important in the boardrooms of professional baseball as it is on its
diamonds.
Currently, Federal antitrust law prohibits businesses from taking actions that unreasonably constrain interstate commerce. However, as we know, in a 1922 decision that I can only term capricious, the U.S. Supreme Court exempted professional baseball from
these Federal antitrust laws as an amusement and not a business.
I am a great fan of the game, Mr. Chairman. My wife rightly
calls me a baseball nut. Life starts for me when spring training
starts, but I must tell you frankly that I do not find many of the
actions of the major league baseball owners amusing these days.
Their treatment of the fans, the players, host cities, and cities seeking that opportunity, even of their own commissioner, whom we
heard from here earlier today, militates against them, I think.
No other professional sport enjoys this kind of blanket exemption, something that this committee cannot overlook. What possible
standard, we must ask ourselves, can be advanced to support such
a circumstance in this day of multimillion-dollar player salaries
and telecommunications contracts? What possible difference sets
major league baseball's owners apart from their peers in other professional sports? I maintain that there is none.
This monopoly is unhealthy and needs to be modified. In fact, as
we all know, 50 years after its initial ruling the Supreme Court
went so far as to call baseball's exemption an anomaly and an aberration. More significantly, and this was referred to earlier by Senator Simpson, the Court stated that this was a problem that could
best be solved by the Congress. In Flood v. Kuhn, it was noted that
the inconsistency or illogic of the situation would have to be remedied by Congress and not by the Court.
In fact, baseball's antitrust exemption has been the subject of detailed study by the Congress, as we know. In the 82d Congress
back in the early 1950's, several bills were introduced in the House
to grant a blanket antitrust exemption to all professional sports.
They were studied by the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power which recommended against
their passage. In 1976, a report by the House Select Committee on
Professional Sports also concluded that there was no justification
for baseball's special exemption.
We have as a body, Mr. Chairman, studied this issue repeatedly
and in detail. Today, the time has come for action. We can deliver
a great big Christmas present all tied up with a bow for the Nation's many fans of major league baseball. The time has run out on
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the House of Lords that presently controls major league baseball,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much again for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilirakis and a letter to Senator
Metzenbaum follow:]
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TESTIMONY OF
CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL BILIRAKIS
ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
U.S. SENATE
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPHON
DECEMBER 10, 1992

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I DEEPLY
APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY AS A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMMITTEE, AND
SPONSOR OF LEGISLATION IN THE PREVIOUS CONGRESS TO ELIMINATE
THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

I FULLY INTEND TO RE-INTRODUCE THIS LEGISLATION IN THE 103RD
CONGRESS BECAUSE I FEEL STRONGLY THAT COMPETITION AND
FAIRNESS IS AS IMPORTANT IN THE BOARDROOMS OF PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL AS IT IS ON ITS DIAMONDS.

CURRENTLY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW PROHIBITS BUSINESSES FROM
TAKING ACTIONS THAT 'UNREASONABLY'

CONSTRAIN INTERSTATE

COMMERCE. HOWEVER, IN A 1922 DECISION THAT I CAN ONLY TERM
"CAPRICIOUS," THE U.S. SUPREME COURT EXEMPTED PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL FROM THESE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AS AN
"AMUShMENT" AND NOT A BUSINESS.

I AM A GREAT FAN OF THE GAME, MR. CHAIRMAN, BUT I MUST TELL
YOU FRANKLY THAT I DO NOT FIND MANY OF THE ACTIONS OF THE
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS AMUSING THESE DAYS.

THEIR TREATMENT OF THE FANS, THE PLAYERS, HOST CITIES AND
CITIES SEEKING THAT OPPORTUNITY - EVEN OF THEIR OWN
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COMMISSIONER, WHOM WE HAVE HEARD TESTIFY HERE TODAY

-

MILITATES AGAINST THEM.

NO OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORT ENJOYS THIS KIND OF BLANKET
EXEMPTION. WHAT POSSIBLE STANDARD CAN BE ADVANCED TO
SUPPORT SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS DAY OF MULTI-MILLIONDOLLAR PLAYER SALARIES AND TELE-COMMUNICATIONS CONTRACTS?
WHAT POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE SETS MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S
OWNERS APART FROM THEIR PEERS IN OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS?
I MAINTAIN THAT THERE IS NONE.

THIS MONOPOLY IS UNHEALTHY AND NEEDS TO BE MODIFIED.

IN FACT, AS WE ALL KNOW, 50 YEARS AFTER ITS INITIAL RULING, THE
SUPREME COURT WENT SO FAR AS TO CALL BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION
AN "ANOMALY" AND AN "ABERRATION."

MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COURT STATED THAT THIS WAS A
PROBLEM THAT COULD BEST BE SOLVED BY THE CONGRESS. IN EO

Y.UB,

IT WAS NOTED THAT THE "INCONSISTENCY OR ILLOGIC" OF

THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE TO BE "REMEDIED BY CONGRESS AND
NOT BY TH[E] COURT."

IN FACT, BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF DETAILED STUDY BY THE CONGRESS. IN THE 82ND CONGRESS,
SEVERAL BILLS WERE INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO GRANT A BLANKET ANTITRUST EXEMPTION TO
ALL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS. THESE WERE STUDIED BY THE HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMMrTEE'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF
MONOPOLY POWER, WHICH RECOMMENDED AGAINST THEIR PASSAGE.
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IN 1976, A REPORT BY THE HOUSE SELECT COMMIrEE ON
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO
JUSTIFICATION FOR BASEBALL'S SPECIAL EXEMPTION.

WE HAVE, AS A BODY, STUDIED THIS ISSUE REPEATEDLY AND IN
DETAIL. TODAY, THE TIME HAS COME FOR ACTION. WE CAN DELIVER
A GREAT, BIG CHRISTMAS PRESENT ALL TIED UP WITH A BOW FOR THE
NATION'S MANY FANS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
TIME HAS RUN OUT ON THE 'HOUSE OF LORDS" THAT PRESENTLY
CONTROLS MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL. TIME HAS RUN OUT ON THE
IMPERIAL FORCES THAT HAVE LIFE AND DEATH CONTROL OVER THE
DECISIONS OF TEAM EXPANSION OR RELOCATION. THE TIME HAS
COME TO GIVE AMERICA'S GAME BACK TO THE PEOPLE.

IN THE NEXT CONGRESS, WE CAN REMOVE THE SPECIAL STATUS THAT
PROTECTS THE GRINCHES THAT STOLE BASEBALL.

I HAVE HEARD IT SAID THAT THIS WILL NOT BE EASY. MR.
CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPENT ENOUGH TIME ON CAPITOL HELL TO KNOW
THAT THINGS INSIDE THESE WALLS RARELY ARE. I ALSO RARELY
HEAR THIS GIVEN AS A REASON NOT TO ACT.

I AM CERTAIN THAT MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL WILL PULL OUT ALL
THE STOPS TO PREVENT MY LEGISLATION OR ANY OTHER EFFORT
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR HEARING. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE OUR
EFFORTS CAN AND WILL BEAR FRUIT. WE CAN ACT ON THIS MATTER
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND IN THE NAME OF
JUST TREATMENT UNDER OUR LAWS JE WE HAVE THE WILL TO DO SO.
I INTEND TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH ALL INTERESTED
REPRESENTATIVES TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES.
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THE HIGH COURT HAS ABANDONED ITS INITIAL NARROW DEFINITION
OF COMMERCE IN THIS REGARD AND HAS OPENED THE DOOR FOR THE
CONGRESS TO RECTIFY THIS INSUPPORTABLE ERROR. WE MUST SEE
OUR WAY CLEAR TO DO THAT, NO MATTER THE OBSTACLES. IT IS
RIGHT, IT IS FAIR, AND THE FANS OF THE GREAT GAME OF BASEBALL
DESERVE NOTHING LESS.

THANK YOU.
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Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
It is my understanding that you will be chairing a December 10 hearing
regarding professional baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws.
This is an issue of special importance to me.
As you may already know, during the 102nd Congress I was the House
sponsor of legislation to eliminate professional baseball's exemption
from antitrust laws.
The bill number was H.R. 5489 and I have included
a copy of its text.
As a representative from the Tampa Bay area in Florida, I proposed this
legislation in order to remove the artificial barriers to league
expansion and allow qualified areas such as Tampa and St. Petersburg to
obtain a baseball franchise.
Baseball has been singled out for a
.
complete exemption from the antitrust laws that no other professional
sport enjoys.
This monopoly is unhealthy and needs to be rectified.
The United States Supreme Court in 1972 called the situation an
"anomaly, and an aberration' but said it was a problem best solved by
the Congress.
While my legislation did not come up for consideration in the 102nd
Congress, I plan to reintroduce it in the 103rd Congress when we convene
next month. I feel strongly that we need to bring competition and
fairness to baseball, and, therefore, I respectfully request the
opportunity to testify at your important hearing on this matter.
Warmest regards.

Memb r of Congress
MB:ddl
Enclosure

81
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
Now, our next witness will be Mr. Bud Selig, and I ask him to
come to the witness table. At the same time, I would like to introduce some who have accompanied him just for introduction purposes only. I think they are in the audience. I would like to ask
them to stand as I mention their names: Mr. George Bush of the
Texas Rangers, Mr. Bill Bartholomew of the Atlanta Braves, Mr.
Fred Kuhlman of the St. Louis Cardinals, Mr. Jerry McMorns of
the Colorado Rockies, and Mr. Heywood Sullivan of the Boston Red
Sox. Thank you. We are happy to have each of you with us.
Senator Kohl, all of us are aware of the fact that you not only
have a major constituent of yours with us today, but a very close
personal friend, and I wonder if you wouldn't like to say a few
words of introduction.
Senator Koim. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, baseball is an important part of the American way of life. It
reflects the character, the history, and the competitiveness of our
society. From Babe Ruth to Hammerin' Hank Aaron to the heroes
of today, as much as any other single activity baseball is America,
and our love for the game has united us for generations. So when
baseball hurts, America hurts, and that is why all of us are concerned about the problems that the game faces today.
Smaller cities like Milwaukee, Seattle, and Pittsburgh struggle to
generate enough revenue to stay profitable. They know that if they
o not make enough money, if they cannot pay their players
enough, then their hometown heroes will be lost to cities with more
money. For example, just this past Monday Paul Molitor signed
with Toronto after spending all of his 15-year career in Milwaukee
where he was indeed a real hero. For the money he got, you can't
blame him, but fans in Milwaukee have lost one of their stars.
None of the key participants in this struggle-the owners, the
players, and the cities-is without blame for baseball's problems,
and none, not the cities, not the players, not the owners, is exclusively to blame for the difficulties threatening the game.
As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I am fortunate enough to have
enjoyed a long association with professional sports-primarily basketball, but also major league baseball. Because of these past and
p resent ties, I will recuse myself from taking a role in this matter
efore the U.S. Senate, but I cannot and I do not want to recuse
myself today from the opportunity to say a few words about my
good friend, Bud Selig.
Bud Selig and I grew up on the same block in Milwaukee. Our
families were close friends. Bud and I played baseball together
when we were kids. He could not then, nor can he today, hit my
curve ball. [Laughter.]
Bud and I went to high school and college together and we
roomed for a year at the University of Wisconsin. We were then
and we remain today best friends.
Like many of us, Bud Selig has worked very hard to improve the
city that he calls home. In 1965, when the then Milwaukee Braves
left Milwaukee, Bud devoted himself to bringing major league baseball back to our community. In 1970, he was successful in getting
the Seattle Pilots to move to Milwaukee. But to view Bud's actions
as only those of an owner would be wrong. In fact, he is first and
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foremost a fan with a great love for the game of baseball and he
knows what it means to the people of a community to have pride
in their team, to win or lose with their team, and potentially to be
the equals of New York and Los Angeles because of their team.
Since 1970, in perhaps the smallest of the franchise cities, Bud
Selig and the Milwaukee Brewers have not only survived, but they
have been winners. Earlier this fall in a time of some turmoil, his
fellow owners selected Bud Selig to chair the executive council of
baseball. Never one to duck responsibility, he agreed to accept that
assignment and he is now, in essence, the commissioner of baseball. As recent events in Louisville show, he is faced with a difficult
task. I am certain he will discharge his responsibilities with skill,
intelligence, and sensitivity just as he has done since he was a
young man.
As I have said, I will recuse myself from this hearing and from
any debate or vote on this issue, but I do want to express the hope
that my colleagues will be fair with Bud Selig. Bud Selig did not
cause the problems the game faces today, but he is trying to help
resolve them and if we all work together, I am sure that can be
done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.

With that introduction, Mr. Selig, we are very happy to hear
from you.
STATEMENT OF ALLAN IL SELIG, OWNER, MILWAUKEE
BREWERS BASEBALL CLUB

Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kohl.
Mr. Chairman, before I start today-and I appreciate Senator
Mack acknowledging baseball suffered a terrible loss yesterday.
Carl Barger, the president of the Florida Marlins and the former
president of the Pittsburgh Pirates, died during our annual winter
meetings. On behalf of major league baseball, we offer our sincere
sympathy to his family, to his friends, to the Marlins, and to the
community.
Senator METZENBAUM. I think the members of this committee
join in expressing the same sentiments that you have just expressed, Mr. Selig.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my name is Bud Selig and
I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee today on behalf of
major league baseball. For the last 23 years, I have been the president of the Milwaukee Brewers. I currently serve in the position
of chairman of baseball's executive council.
I understand that this hearing is the result of concern over the
National League's decision not to approve the relocation of the Giants from San Francisco to Tampa-St. Petersburg and over the circumstances surrounding the departure of former Commissioner
Vincent. I will address both issues.
Let me say first to the many loyal baseball fans of Tampa-St.
Pete that I genuinely understand the disappointment that you feel.
I was in your shoes in the 1960's when it took me 6V2 years to
bring baseball back to Milwaukee, but the National League's decision to keep the Giants in San Francisco was simply a reaffirmation of baseball's long-established policy against the relocation of
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franchises that have not been abandoned by their local communities.
My vivid memory of the devastation caused when the Braves left
Milwaukee convinces me that baseball's preference for franchise
stability is plainly in the public interest. The Boston Braves moved
to my home town of Milwaukee in 1953. Their stay in Milwaukee
was one of the great success stories in baseball. Milwaukee supported the team spectacularly. Despite their success in Milwaukee,
the Braves moved to Atlanta at the end of the 1965 season, and
I was personally heartbroken and the entire State of Wisconsin
was traumatized.
The void in the community drove me to devote the next 62 years
of my life to bring baseball back to Milwaukee. Several deals with
existing teams fell through and we were passed over when baseball
expanded in 1969. Our break finally came when one of those expansion franchises failed after just 1 year. Baseball, acting responsibly and properly, in my view, went to great lengths to keep the
failing Pilots in Seattle, but the Pilot owners put the team into
bankruptcy and a bankruptcy judge ordered the sale of the club to
my group.
My experience in Milwaukee has convinced me that the appropriate policy for sports leagues is to prohibit franchise relocations
except in the most dire of circumstances when the local community
has over a sustained period demonstrated that it cannot support
the team. This, I am happy to report, is baseball's policy.
But if baseball were not exempt from the antitrust laws, a decision protecting franchise stability such as the one made in San
Francisco would subject baseball to costly and unpredictable treble
damage litigation. Without its exemption, baseball might not even
have attempted to save the Giants for the people of San Francisco.
Ever since a court concluded that the NFL was powerless to stop
Al Davis from abandoning Oakland, no sports league other than
baseball has been able to stop a franchise from relocating.
I am very proud of baseball's record on franchise stability. Because of baseball's exemption, it has by far the best record of professional sports in this area. No baseball club has been permitted
to relocate since the Washington Senators moved to Texas in 1972.
In contrast, football and basketball have each had three franchise
relocations since 1980 and hockey has had two.
As the record demonstrates, baseball has not abused its antitrust
exemption. While we have not prohibited all franchise moves, we
do not allow a club to relocate simply so that the owner can earn
greater profits. Indeed, the National League rejected the move to
Tampa-St. Pete despite the fact that it would have netted Bob
Lurie an additional $15 million. This shows that profit is not the
driving force in baseball's decisionmaking process.
Let me now address the circumstances of Fay Vincent's departure and what that departure means for the future of baseball. The
owners did not, as some have suggested, summarily dismiss Mr.
Vincent for protecting the best interests of the game. When Mr.
Vincent took office, he acknowledged that if he had ever lost the
confidence of a majority of owners, he would resign.
While Mr. Vincent had the full support of owners when he took
office in September 1989, by September 1992, 18 teams requested
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his resignation. The vote made it apparent to Mr. Vincent that he
had lost the confidence of a majority of the teams and he honored
his initial pledge and resigned. I cannot speak for all of the teams.
The clubs lost confidence in Mr. Vincent for many reasons. However, the concern heard most often was his inability to develop a
consensus on the vital issues that faced the game. Rather than
pulling together under his leadership, the teams were drawing further apart.
In the opinion of the clubs, Mr. Vincent was simply not the person to lead baseball during this very challenging period. Since his
departure, we have appointed a restructuring committee which is
hard at work. Although the restructuring committee has not yet
completed its work, I can say to you today that there will be a commissioner who will continue to have strong powers-the same
strong powers, I may add, to protect the integrity of the game.
In my personal view, Mr. Chairman, baseball has continued to
uphold its unique covenant with its fans, and it deserves to retain
its status under the antitrust laws. I sincerely thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I understand that my full written statement will be placed in the record.
Thank you.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Your entire statement will be placed in the record. At this point, the committee will go into a question-and-answer period. The Chair will
allot 10 minutes to himself and to the ranking member, and 5 minutes each to other members of the committee. If necessary, we will
have a second round.
Mr. Selig, in his prepared testimony Fay Vincent stated that he
would no longer support the antitrust exemption if the owners of
baseball continue on their course of making baseball into their
business and at the same time insist that the commissioner is their
CEO, to be fired at will. Press statements by your fellow owner,
Mr. Reinsdorf, and others suggest that you intend to do just that
and turn the commissioner into a CEO answerable solely to the
owners.
If that happens, my concern is that there won't be anyone with
independent authority to protect the fans. If you are going to weaken the power of the commissioner, and it is apparent that you already have, then who will be there to protect the fans when the
business interests of the owners conflict with the public interest
and the interests of the sport?
Mr. SELIG. Mr. Chairman, let me try to answer that in the context, sir, of my almost now 22 decades in this game. One needs
to understand the history of baseball. All of us who have been
raised in the business-and let me say this to you, sir, right from
the beginning-understand the need for a strong commissioner.
There is no question about that.
Whatever the reports have been-and this very sensitive issue
that the restructuring committee that has gone to work on September 9 in St. Louis, MO, has been composed of clubs, big markets,
small markets, pro-Fay Vincent people, people not for Fay Vincent
who have worked together-all of us in the game understand the
need for centralized authority. We also understand that on the integrity issues there will be no change, there will be no change.
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But let us understand that on other parts of the document, Senator Metzenbaum, the document is 71 years old. We live in a new
era, we live in a new society, and why shouldn't this document at
least be looked at to make baseball and bring baseball, the rest of
its functions and the structure of the office, into an era that it now
exists in? That doesn't mean the office is being weakened. On the
contrarySenator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, how do you explain this? You
say you want a strong commissioner. Eighteen members join together and fire Fay Vincent and indicate they no longer have confidence in him. A strong commissioner is either independent and,
when you are not happy with him, stays there regardless of that
fact-we give Federal judges lifetime appointments so that they
may be totally independent and not subject to the will of the people.
Here is a situation where Fay Vincent, apparently based upon
his comments here and what we have read about him previously,
was a balanced individual. He was concerned about the future of
baseball and the presence of baseball. Reinsdorf is out there talk* about we want a commissioner who will be the CEO for baseHow can you convince the American people and how can you convince this committee that you really mean what you say? What indication is there that you really want a strong commissioner? You
have fired several of them in the past many years.
Mr. SELIG. Many years, Senator. Let me suggest to you, sir, that
if you go back through the Happy Chandler episode in the late
1940's, there was a situation with Commissioner Eckert in the
1960's. There was even a situation with Commissioner Kuhn in the
early 1980's, but somehow, for whatever the reasons, the office
stayed intact, those powers intact.
Senator METZENBAum. But the commissioners lost their jobs.
Mr. SELIG. Well, OK. Let me answer that, but the fact of the
matter remains that what is a commissioner's job. The integrity
issue, there is no question about, but the ability to lead, the ability
to develop a consensus-after all, Senator Specter and others asked
very, very penetrating questions today about a lot of the economic
issues that confront this industry today.
Mr. Chairman, it was the view of the 18 clubs that there was not
a consensus, and instead of joining together to begin to solve those
problems which are clearly in the interests of clubs not only in
markets like Milwaukee, but in the big markets, we were breaking
down further. Now, Senator, that is in no one's best interest, and
so whether the 18 clubs were right or wrong, the fact of the matter
is that the best interests of the game, they believed, because of the
lack of consensus, were being served by asking Commissioner Vincent to resign.
Senator METZENBAum. Well, baseball's antitrust exemption is
truly an extraordinary privilege. It insulates baseball from the normal rules that govern our free market system. To the best of my
knowledge, it is maybe the only industry in America that has an
exemption. This Senator and I worked out some exemption for industry with respect to research and development some years ago,
but that was a limited kind of exemption under prescribed rules.
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Whenever Congress examines this subject, the leaders of major
league baseball come before us and say that the sport of baseball
is unique and deserves special treatment under the law. You tell
us, well, 18 members didn't agree to it. When Happy Chandler
made a decision, if my recollection is right, having to do with integrating baseball, that didn't sit very well at that time with the
baseball owners, as I understand.
But baseball also acts not very much like a business; it is a business, it is very big business. Fay Vincent was forced out because
he believed that the business interests of the owners should be subordinate to the best interests of the sport. He was concerned about
the fans. Some owners have threatened to leave their home cities
unless the public subsidized the cost of new stadiums, and that, to
me, is counterproductive to really what this whole Nation needs. I
mean, with the communities striving so hard to keep their schools
open, to pay their police and fire forces, to provide for an infrastructure, there is this extraction; either you do this or you don't
get the team to stay.
Players, especially the minor league players, are forced to accept
restrictions on their mobility as a condition of employment. How
can anybody sit before us and justify the reserve clause, which has
some limitation by reason of the contract that you have with the
Baseball Players Association, but would have none if you didn't
have that restriction, and would therefore make baseball subject to
the antitrust laws if there were no exemption?
And the whole concept of the reserve clause with respect to
minor league baseball players who are held by a team-when I
learned what baseball does to the minor league players, I absolutely couldn't believe my ears. I am not an authority on how baseball conducts itself, but the inability for a minor league player to
move from team to team or to be sold to a major league team because he is being held by one minor league team-baseball seems
to play the kind of hardball you see in most other businesses.
Under those circumstances, what conceivable reason is there for us
to continue to give baseball this unique privilege that no other
sport, no other business in America has?
Mr. SELIG. Well, Senator, I think there are a lot of reasons. I
think that baseball has, as I said in my statement-and you have
made a lot of points and I would like to cover as many of them as
is possible. The San Francisco situation is illustrative of a point,
and with all due respect to Senator Mack-and I know how he
feels, and Senator Graham. I can understand it because I have
been there. I lived, as I said, 62 years of my life trying to find a
team, being passed over four or five times.
But here we are with the best record on franchises, Senator. We
believe in stability. A lot of us who came into the business, and as
this policy really came into being in the 1970's, we believe in doing
the right thing.
Senator METZENBAUm. If you believe in stability, why did you
refuse San Diego the opportunity to get the team for free from Ms.
Kroc?
Mr. SELIG. Because a public entity, Senator Metzenbaum, is not
in the community's best interest. For interest-
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Senator METZENBAUM. They own a football team in Green Bay,
don't they?
Mr. SELIG. No, they don't, sir. I am on the board of the Green
Bay Packers and the community does not own the Green Bay Packers. The shareholders own the Green Bay Packers. The shareholders have nonvoting stock, sir, and I happen to be a shareholder. It
doesn't pay any dividends, but it is not owned by the community.
There is no entity in sports that is owned by that, and the city of
San Diego which now has a viable ownership group, Senator, a
local group-one of the great guidelines that we have, a local group
who-after all, if a public entity owns the team, No. 1, the team
starts losing money, as many baseball teams do today, and the San
Diego Padres are losing money.
Senator METZENBAUM. Didn't Ms. Kroe also offer San Diego $100
million in order to provide for continuing expenses and funds?
Mr. SELIG. It never got to that fact, Senator, because there would
be no stability in that situation. After all, you would understand
this better than I. Elections come and go, administrations change.
We have people trying to run a ball clubs. You have clubs that
begin to lose money and become a burden to the taxpayer. There
is no professional league, Senator, no professional league-by the
way, the other leagues don't have antitrust exemptions and they
don't allow that type of ownership. I don't believe, sir, that is reflective of any deficiency in baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, I have many more questions,
but frankly as we sit here today, I think the public would have
much more confidence in the ultimate outcome of the issue that is
now hanging over the head of baseball, the Marge Schott controversy, if the matter was being handled by a strong and independent commissioner.
A story in Tuesday's USA Today reported that 1 week after the
owners had appointed a committee to look into the matter, five people who said they heard Ms. Schott make racial slurs still had not
een contacted. The question is, what is going on? Why all the
delay, and wouldn't it be better if the Schott matter were being
handled by a strong and independent commissioner?
Al Campanis was banned from baseball for making racially insensitive remarks similar to those made by Ms. Schott. If Ms.
Schott is somehow treated more leniently than Mr. Campanis,
won't it appear that the owners are coddling one of their own, and
isn't it an issue that calls for urgent action rather than this long,
drawn-out delay?
Mr. SELIG. Let me suggest, No. 1, that the Al Campanis remarks
in 1987 on "Nightline" were done in public and Peter O'Malley, the
owner of the Dodgers, took appropriate action. I would say to you
that I don't think that any of you would have handled it any differently, Mr. Chairman, than I have.
Bill White, the president of the National League, and I were in
constant communication from day one when these allegations surfaced. We appointed a committee of two of our owners, plus the two
league presidents and the National League attorney. After all,
there is a spirit of fairness, there is a spirit of due process, there
is a spirit of thoughtfulness, there is a spirit of thoroughness. And,
sir, that is the period we are engaged in, and I must tell you that
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I do-I would suggest to all of you that knowing the facts as I
know them, I have every confidence that all of you would have reacted the same way that I did.
Senator METZENBAUM. My time has expired. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THUBMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, we are
glad to have you with us.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.
Senator THIBMOND. Mr. Selig, given your emphasis on franchise
stability, what would be your reaction to a legislative proposal to
limit the antitrust immunity only to franchise relocations?
Mr. SELIG. Senator Thurmond, I think that would not be in the
best interests of the public. That certainly is one issue, but there
are other issues relative to the minor leagues, relative to television,
that I think are very, very important, and I do believe that if one
studies our history-and I have lived a lot of it and studied it for
a long time-that they would believe and understand that the
public's interest is really being served by that exemption.
Senator THmmOND. Mr. Selig, do you believe there are reasons
other than franchise stability that justify the antitrust immunity,
and if so what are they?
Mr. SELIG. Well, television, labor, discipline matters. I think
there are a host of functions, Senator Thurmond, that are best
served by the antitrust exemption.
Senator THuRMOND. Mr. Selig, how do you defend the antitrust
immunity for baseball when other sports appear to operate successfully without such an immunity?
Mr. SELIG. I think there is a uniqueness to baseball that there
isn't to the other sports. Just, if you will, sir, consider the minor
league operations, the fact that baseball subsidizes its minor league
operations to the extent of well over $100 million. There is a difference in television policy. There are other things that I think that
baseball has done, and I think, frankly, the antitrust exemption,
again going back to franchise shifts, but it can get into television
and other things, has protected the public good.
Senator THuRmOND. Mr. Selig, several commentators and one of
the witnesses this morning cite minor league player rules as particularly onerous. They claim these rules would not exist if there
were no antitrust exemption. Can you explain the leading rationale
for these rules?
Mr. SELIG. Well, let me cover, Senator Thurmond, if I may, sir,
the minor league situation. We are unique in this area, as I said.
You know, hockey has a small farm system, and obviously football
and basketball have built-in farm systems. We subsidize the minor
league clubs well over $100 million a year. There are 17 leagues,
173 clubs, 4,300 minor league players. The minor league clubs are
subsidized.
I would remind you, and it will sure come up in other questions,
the major leagues in this year, in 1992, are a virtual break-even
industry just on operations alone, pre-interest and pre-tax and predepreciation. So the fact of the matter is this is an industry straining now to meet its commitments and there are many clubs, especially in the small and medium-sized markets, who are having an
extremely difficult time. So the minor league subsidization is already at the limit.
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Senator THURMOND. Mr. Selig, what is your view of the role of
the baseball commissioner, especially as to his relationship with
the owners? Mr. Vincent has stated that some of the owners believe
the commissioner should represent the owners, similar to a CEO
who could be hired and fired at will.
Mr. SELIG. As I said earlier, and I really believe this, there is no
doubt in my mind, Senator Thurmond, that baseball needs a strong
commissioner. The integrity issues should not be touched at all;
they will not. I have every confidence they won't be. The restructuring committee is sensitively looking at all parts of that operation, and I can assure you all of us who have been raised in baseball and who love it and participate in it on a daily basis understand the need for a very strong commissioner.
Senator THUMOND. Mr. Selig, I note that you cite an article
written by Mr. Gary Roberts concerning professional sports and
antitrust laws. As you know, Mr. Roberts will be one of the witnesses this morning on another panel. Do you agree with his analysis that the underlying structural problems with baseball-lack of
adequate revenue sharing, fewer than justified number of franchises, and the shifting of telecasting practices-require solutions
other than repeal of the antitrust laws?
Mr. SELIG. I do, sir; I do.
Senator THURMOND. For example, he proposes breaking the
league into four separate leagues that could not generally engage
in joint activities.
Mr. SELIG. Well, we all have different views on things. We have
a committee today that is looking at different schedules and different things, and that is all part of the process that quite frankly
has begun. There are a lot of ideas that we need to look at and are
in the process, sir, of looking at.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much. I have no more questions.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMoN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, one minor correction. There was a farm hockey team owned by the city of Peoria,
IL, a farm team of the St. Louis Blues.
Mr. SELIG. Well, I meant major league clubs. There are some
minor league baseball clubs, too.
Senator METZENBAUM. That are owned by the public?

Mr. SELIG. Yes. There are no major league clubs in any of the
sports is what I said.
Senator SIMoN. I guess this is just a word of admonition to your
restructuring committee and, frankly, you make a good impression,
you come on strong. I hope you get a commissioner that has the
same kind of approach. Gary Roberts-and I regret I won't be able
to stay here to hear him, but he has indicated in his writings that
over the last two decades the NFL has had over 60 suits filed on
the basis of the antitrust laws. Baseball doesn't need that, but
baseball may be headed for significant change if that restructuring
committee and the owners don't make very clear the strength and
the independence of the commissioner.
You have problems in baseball, as you have pointed out, but
those problems will be compounded if baseball is run by the Fed-
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eral courts or, with all due respect to my colleagues, by the U.S.
Senate. What I would like to see is that baseball's commissioner be
strong and independent. That is kind of the basic message that I
hope will come out of this hearing.
Mr. SELIG. And I share that view and we share that view, Senator Simon.
Senator SIMON. Thank you. I have no other questions.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Simon. Senator
Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. We have
had a chance to chat a couple of times.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Senator.
Senator MACK. I appreciate your point of view, but let me kind
of take issue with it, if I could.
Mr. SELIG. Well, I knew that you would, sir. I am not surprised.
Senator MACK. In your statements with respect to your commitment to maintaining stability as opposed to abandoning one side or
another, originally Milwaukee had a baseball team because it
moved a franchise from Boston. Milwaukee has a baseball team
today because of your efforts to move a team from Seattle. In short,
you acted contrary to the very message that you are giving us. Milwaukee would not have a team today if it had not been for your
doing exactly the kinds of things that the people in Tampa and St.
Pete want to get done.
So I guess my question to you is, it seems like stability is important, but by the same token there are other things that come up
from time to time that indicate that a franchise ought to be moved,
and the question is do you agree or disagree with the criteria that
basically were outlined by the former commissioner.
Mr. SELIG. I agree. I would also like to, if I may, comment on
the Milwaukee characterization, which obviously I have lived now
for almost 40 years through the Braves and, of course, my own involvement with the Brewers. The Braves moved from Boston because at that time there was a very strong feeling back in the
1950's that Boston couldn't support two baseball teams-a different
era.
When the Braves left for Atlanta, you know how I felt about
that; everybody in the world does. You know, it is gone and it is
done, but it was a very traumatic and, I thought, regrettable and
unfair thing. That doesn't mean we have to keep repeating regrettable and unfair things, not that Atlanta shouldn't have a baseball
team because it should have had. When we got a team backSenator MACK. Let me just askMr. SELIG. I am just going to finish my thought.
Senator MACK. OK

Mr. SELIG. When we got a team back, Senator Mack, we had
been turned down five times. We brought a team on October 10,
1969-I can still remember it-in Baltimore. Both leagues and
then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn kept going back to that community and giving it a chance, and they gave it one chance after another to come up with a local group.
Now, I had met Bowie Kuhn 4 years earlier in a baseball trial
in Milwaukee. Yet, in 1969 I never resented him giving Seattle
every chance in the world to buy that team, and I submit what I
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and we did for San Francisco was clearly consistent with that because I do believe-and then I will keep quiet-I do believe, sir, we
really do have a moral obligation.
As I think I told you one day, when the change came and I took
over, I was inundated with letters from kids in northern California
who had grown up with Willie Mays and Willie McCovey. It may
be naive and it may be trite, but I take that very seriously, and
I also take that seriously as part of our social responsibility. I understand the heartbreak in Tampa, but we are in a situation where
we can't please everybody at one time. So our policy has been the
same in Montreal, San Diego, Seattle. I mean, this wasn't anything
new.
Senator MACK. Well, are you suggesting, then, that the commissioner was misleading the people of Tampa-St. Pete? I understand
your concern about the interests of young fans being able to go to
the game and see their stars play. You know, we all understand
that. So, obviously, there has to be some criteria around which you
make decisions about when a team can leave, and the commissioner laid out, I thought, some fairly specific things.
I want to ask you this question. Do you believe that the group
that has now indicated its willingness to purchase Bob Lurie's
team for $95 million has changed any of the four criteria that were
outlined as a result of the commissioner's statement?
Mr. SELIG. I believe they have; I do believe they have. I think
if Peter McGowan were here today, he could answer that a little
more directly than I can, but the fact that they are willing, sir, to
spend, I think it was $100 million to buy the team which they now
have-they certainly have plans for a new stadium and will work
at that. It is not something that is going to come overnight, but
they have faith.
After all, one of the criteria that should always exist is when viable local ownership doesn't exist, and with all due respect, if that
wasn't the case in Cleveland, OH, there wouldn't be a baseball
team. I am merely saying if the people of San Francisco and that
ownership group, all of whom are very prominent citizens, very respected businessmen, have the faith and judgment that they believe they can make it work, why should I tell them that they are
wrong?
Senator MACK. Yes, but that would never have come about if it
hadn't been for the offer that was made by the people in TampaSt. Petersburg. There was no one willing to step forward until
there was a commitment made from some place else to move the
team to Tampa-St. Pete, and that gets me into my next question
to you. Will you pledge to the people of Tampa and St. Pete that
they won't be used again? We have gone through this 8 years.
Mr. SELIG. Well, let me-and believe me, I am very sensitive to
that. That is a perfectly valid point and I do understand that. I
could have said the same thing when we tried to buy the White
Sox. We were turned down by the National League expansion, we
were turned down by American League expansion. We bought the
Seattle club. Then we were turned away for another 6 months.
Believe me, I can understand the sensitivity and the heartbreak
and frustration in Tampa-St. Pete, but in that particular situation,
Senator Mack, we have to deal with where the club was. Tampa-
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St. Pete is clearly a major league area and should get a major
league baseball team.
Senator MACK. We have heard that for 8 years now. We have
gone through expansion. We have attempted to purchase, I think,
seven different teams and it just doesn't happen. And saying to the
people, you know, just be patient once again is not good enough.
The other message that you all are sending is, No. 1, keeping the
franchises where they are is, in fact, No. 1, which is a message of
saying you are going to have to wait to expand. We just got
through hearing what the former commissioner thought with respect to expansion. Are you then saying to me that the people of
Tampa-St. Pete may, in fact, get an expansion team in the next
year or two?
Mr. SELIG. No, no, I wouldn't-I couldn't say that to you because
I think that expansion, especially what I like to term undigested
expansion, is the worst thing for all parties. Certainly, Commissioner Vincent this morning, I think, enunciated the reasons as to
why. Even if one is quarrelsome about the talent level-and people
can argue about that and say, well, you know, they haven t had
pitching for 80 years and they haven't done this and that. Well,
there is no question, though, that significant dilution is not helpful
to anybody.
But keep something in mind, also, Senator. You have an industry-everybody has talked this morning and a lot this week-I
have heard in Louisville all week about the problems that beset
baseball, and they are there. You have a far longer tradition and
history in baseball than I do, but we have an industry today that
is a virtual break-even industry. Further expansion, weakening the
teams, especially teams in markets like Pittsburgh or Milwaukee
or Cleveland or San Diego or Seattle, is not helpful to anyone.
Expansion is always looked at as the panacea to solve all the ills.
The fact of the matter is that here we are with an antitrust exemption, but you have the NBA and the National Hockey League and
the National Football League without it, and yet we have as many
teams as they do.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Senator
Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, you were
reading from your submitted testimony in which you speak on the
future role of the commissioner. In the written testimony it says,
"The commissioner will continue to have strong powers to protect
the integrity of the game."
I think to underscore that, you emphasized that he will have the
same strong powers, and you were very emphatic about it. Are you
saying that the restructuring committee is not going to make any
changes in the authority of the commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. Certainly, on the integrity issues, from my understanding in talking to two cochairmen and other members of the
committee, yes, Senator Leahy, I am absolutely saying that.
Senator LEAHY. Well, what are the areas of authority that will
be changed by the restructuring committee?
Mr. SELIG. I don't know if "change" is the right word, but may
I cite an example for you which, unfortunately, last year during the
summer, I think was quite misunderstood. If I give you the exam-
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ple, I think you will understand why. In 1921, this agreement was
written. There were many things that didn't exist. In 1967, the
major league clubs started what is called the player relations committee. Unfortunately, I am also chairman of that, and that was to
handle labor.
Now, what you created because of the 46-year difference between
the two documents was an enormous ambiguity. It has never been
dealt with, Senator Leahy. That is why this restructuring committee is meeting. It is meeting really to clear up ambiguities. After
all, there was no television in 1921. There weren't a lot of things
in 1921.
Senator LEAHY. Well, let us go to more recently. You are talking
about the player relations committee. Some could argue that the
owners effectively gutted the commissioner's office before Mr. Vincent's resignation by transferring the responsibility for labor talks,
which is one of the commissioner's most important functions, to the
head of the player relations committee; having done that, the owners then voted no confidence in Mr. Vincent, 18 to 9, and demanded
his resignation.
He pointed out rightly that you couldn't fire him until his term
expired in, I believe, it was March 1994, and he threatened to litigate the issue. And I believe to his credit-I realize there were a
lot of other things going on-but to his credit he said he would resign and avoid a protracted legal battle that wouldn't be good for
baseball. With all the other things that baseball seems to be doing
to shoot itself in the foot at the moment, I tend to agree with that
decision.
I think you will hear as you listen to us on this committee that
we want a commissioner who can stand up to the owners on an
issue that is important to the fan. I think that that sort of follows
through almost all the questions and statements I have heard here.
Can you tell us as a result of this Restructuring committee that
what happened to Fay Vincent is not going to happen to the next
commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. I can, but let me go back to something, if I may, Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Sure.
Mr. SELIG. You said that, as a result of labor, we had effectively
gutted the office. Sir, the player relations committee has had the
same function since 1967, so you have it through Commissioner
Eckert. There was no change made.
Senator LEAHY. Did they have the commissioner's responsibility
for labor talks?
Mr. SELIG. No.

Senator LEAHY. That was a change?
Mr. SELIG. Once the PRO was formed, the commissioner at that
point, sir, did not have a direct role in labor. That was the ambiguity that I spoke about before. That is one of the things that the restructuring committee is properly dealing with right now.
Senator LEAHY. Won't it go back to the commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. That is something that they are debating. You know,
that certainlySenator LEAHY. But it is on the table?
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Mr. SELIG. Oh, absolutely. It certainly is on the table and is a
matter that they are very clearly discussing because life has
changed and a whole different era has changed. So you asked what
restructuring is doing. That is the type of thing that the restructuring committee is looking at with great specificity. That, in my judgment, Senator Leahy, strengthens that office because there are
clear lines of authority, and because of history, and there have
been so many changes, what you really have now, you really have
a document that needs just what it says, some restructuring.
But I have every confidence that, as I said earlier, the integrity
issues will not be changed, and I think when the restructuring
committee is done, some day, and hopefully in the very near future,
the new commissioner will be sitting here, and I hope much sooner
than later, quite frankly. I think that you will understand what I
have said here today that there is no question.
Senator LEAHY. But it is not just the integrity issue, which, of
course, undergirds everything else, but it is whether he has got the
independence to stand up for the fans' interest, at least in my
mind. Senator Metzenbaum, I believe, already quoted what Jerry
Reinsdorf was quoted as saying, that the commissioner should be
a CEO of the owners, not the players or the umpires or the fans.
He would handle issues involving integrity or discipline. In issues
involving business, he would answer to the board of directors, the
owners.
I understand the analogy to a typical business. But there is one
whopping difference from a typical business-they don't get this
antitrust exemption. If we are going to use this as an analogy that
this is a business and you respond to the board of directors-you
are a CEO, you respond to them, and so on-then why not just go
all the way and make it a real analogy to business and get rid of
the antitrust exemption and make baseball just like any other business?
Mr. SELIG. Because, Senator, I must tell you I will go back into
all the reasons for that, but I would like to say to you that there
is no question, as somebody who has been raised in this industry
and this business, the sport of baseball, that I agree with you, and
all of us agree with you, on the need for a strong commissioner. I
don't think there is really any disagreement on that.
Senator LEAHY. But when you consider the possible lockout coming up next, I am wondering how anybody is going to stand and
say, well, you know, this is really good for baseball, this is good for
the fans. All I am thinking about over and over again here is we
give this antitrust exemption; it is supposed to be something that
is going to be good for baseball, good for the fans. Certainly, what
we have seen in the last few months doesn't strike me as being
good for the fans. If we go to a lockout next, I don't see where that
benefits the fans.
I realize my time is up. Thank you for your testimony. Mr.
Chairman, I want to commend you for having these hearings.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy.

Mr. SELIG. Thank you, and I wish I had time to respond.
Senator METZENBAUM. I am not going to deny you an opportunity
to respond.
Senator LEAHY. Yes. Please respond.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Try to be reasonably brief.
Mr. SELIG. As far as the labor situation, Senator Leahy, I merely
would like to say to you that the clubs, after what I have kept saying over and over-have had a spirited 2- or 3-month debate in the
most democratic of processes-did two things the other day. The
first vote they took was in the event we reopen and wanted a work
stoppage that it had to be a three-quarters vote, as opposed to a
simple majority, to do that. That vote passed unanimously, 28 to
nothing.
Then after a very spirited debate-and I want to say to you
again, in an industry with significant economic problems-we could
get into the whole situation with television, whatever, and we could
be here for a hundred hours discussing it. The vote was 15 to 13
to reopen. Nobody talked about lockout. Hopefully, Don Fehr, who
is here today, and Dick Ravage, the president of the player relations committee, will sit down and, in my judgment, begin to construct a system that is responsive, and that is where we are today.
I don't think there is anything threatening about that, in my
judgment. On the contrary, I think if you look at these actions and
you understand the statements of people, I think that, frankly, we
have acted very responsibly and very sensitively.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, Senator Specter is up next.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have a longstanding engagement in South Carolina. I am going to have to leave now to
catch a plane to meet that engagement. I ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Fehr be allowed to answer for the record two questions
I have.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator THURMOND. I also ask unanimous consent that the members of panel four be allowed to answer four questions I have prepared.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered. Would it be
all right with you if they answer them in writing subsequent to the
hearing?
Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.
Senator METZENBAUM. All right.

Senator THURMOND. I also ask unanimous consent that the members of panel five be allowed to answer three questions I have prepared for the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, since I have to go and I am
the ranking member, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Specter be allowed to act as acting ranking member in my absence and
have the privileges that I would have as ranking member.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Mr. Selig, I have had to step out, so that I
have not heard all of your testimony, but I will try not to be repetitious. In reading your prepared statement, I was very much impressed and congratulate you on your efforts to bring back the
baseball team to Milwaukee after the Braves moved away even
though, as you articulated it, the Braves were making money and
had enormous attendance.
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I understand that you testified that there will be no immediate
plans in the future for expansion, and I would urge you to reconsider that. In taking a look at the statistics which I mentioned
briefly in my opening statement, in 1901 there were a little over
76 million Americans and 16 baseball teams; now, there are more
than 250 million Americans and 28 baseball teams. On a pro rata
basis, there ought to be about twice that many teams. I commend
the league for not allowing the Giants to be moved from San Francisco, although as I said earlier, I think that they shouldn't have
been moved from New York to San Francisco in the first place. But
I do believe that the forcefulness of your antitrust exemption, precluding moves from other cities, really underscores the necessity to
open new markets.
I know you were here when I disagreed with what former Commissioner Vincent had to say about Tampa-St. Pete being an asset
of baseball. Baseball is an asset of America. So my question to you
is why shouldn't you consider right away opening new markets like
Tampa-St. Pete?
Mr. SELIG. Well, Senator Specter, let me try to answer it again
in the context-Tampa-St. Pete is a marvelous market and there
is no question that it can support a major league baseball team,
but I go back to something I did say earlier. I call it undigested
expansion. Let me try to explain it in this regard.
You have an industry today, as I said earlier, that is struggling.
It is struggling as an industry mightily. If you expand, there is further dilution. Forget the playing talent thing. We can debate that
all day long, and there are those in this room who will disagree
with that and there are those in this room who will agree, and
most baseball people will agree that we can't stand the dilution.
After all, Senator Specter, we are just in the process of creating
two teams now. In fact, we are trying to figure out how we replace
a relief pitcher that we just lost and we don't have anybody, and
every club goes through that. But that, I understand, can go on forever.
But what I am saying to you, as an economic matter, Commissioner Vincent said this morning that it didn't make sense economically. Now, we have expanded by two teams. The further dilution
of that and the strain it puts on the Cleveland Indians and the Milwaukee Brewers and the Pittsburgh Pirates and the San Francisco
Giants is something that would create, Senator Specter, more hardships than problems it would solve.
Senator SPECTER. Why is that true, Mr. Selig? Take a look at
some of the players in the past: Cy Young won 511 games, Walter
Johnson won 416 games, Christie Matthewson won 373 games, and
Ty Cobb played for, as I recall, 24 years. Why not take a look at
Pittsburgh, whichlost Bonilla last year and which is about to lose
Barry Bonds?
Mr. SELIG. You are making my point here, though. That is exactly the point,
Senator SPECTER. Well, OK, but there are other ways to deal
with that. Why not go to revenue sharing? I have talked with the
owners and executives of the Pirates and the Phillies, and have
tried to talk to other people to get a practical grounding beyond
just a reading of the cases.
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Doug Danforth says there ought to be revenue sharing. Bill Giles
would like to see revenue sharing if it is in conjunction with a cap.
I don't mean to speak for these men, but I am accurately quoting
them on recent conversations. The National Football League enjoys
that wonderful antitrust exemption on pooling of television receipts. You pool national receipts for baseball, but you don't for
local receipts, and there is an enormous imbalance where the Yankees get, I have heard, in excess of $50 million and the Pirates get
a tiny fraction of that. Why not go to revenue sharing and some
form of a salary cap to try to deal fairly with teams like the Pirates?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I will try and answer that. First of all, let me
state, coming from the smallest market in baseball, you may know
how I feel, Senator Specter, about revenue sharing. I said earlier
that baseball itself is an industry that in 1992 is virtually a breakeven industry just on operations. So revenue sharing, per se-and
I am not being quarrelsome about it because it is a very legitimate
and a very sensitive issue that needs to be and will be discussed.
But revenue sharing, per se, without a player compensation system, cap-call it whatever you want-will not solve the problems.
If what you are suggesting is that you need to establish a player
compensation with different forms of revenue sharing, they must
be interlocked. We have no disagreement, sir.
Senator SPECTER. Are the leagues going to move to consider revenue sharing and a cap?
Mr. SELIG. Well, there has been a lot of conversation about it,
Senator Specter, and I feel quite a bit better about it. I think there
has been in the last 3 or 4 months a lot of discussion on both of
these issues, understanding, sir, that they need to be interfaced
and interlocked.
Senator SPECTER. How soon do you think you will come to grips
with that?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I am not a good prognosticator because I said
I would only be in this job 2 to 3 months and it is almost 4, so I
am not sure. But I think the issues of the day are forcing us to
confront them immediately.
Senator SPECTER. I want to get into a couple of other subjects.
Will there be a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Senator METZENBAUM. I think not.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman-

Senator METZENBAUM. Well, no, no; I want to change that. There
will be a second round of 5 minutes.
Senator SPECTER. Well, let me broach-my time is still running-the issue of television. Former Commissioner Rozelle and his
successor, Commissioner Tagliabue, have made a commitment that
the Super Bowl will not go to pay TV until the year 2000. Would
you be in a position to say that baseball will not go to pay TV for
the World Series or the league championship series until the year
2000?
Mr. SELIG. I guess one should never say never to anything, but
I can't foresee any circumstances today, Senator Specter, that we
would put any of our postseason games on pay television.
Senator SPECTER. I will resume this on my next round. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Selig.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, I am concerned about the word "we" that has appeared several times in
your responses to questions, and there seems to be a "we" that is
left out of that and that is the "we" of the millions of Americans
in growth areas like Florida who have been denied access to major
league baseball.
Do I interpret what you say that major league baseball at this
time does not have any timetable for expansion of franchises?
Mr. SELIG. That is right, Senator Graham. We are just expanding now, as you know. I mean, the Marlins are going to play next
year for the first time, and so are the Colorado Rockies.
Senator GRAHAM. Peter Uebberoth, when he was commissioner,
had a vision that there would be two 16-team leaguesMr. SELIG. I know that.
Senator GRAHAM [continuing]. Many rationales for that-and indicated that had he continued as commissioner there would have
been some schedule to achieve that goal. Is there any schedule likely to provide for the additional four teams that would be necessary
in order to have two 16-team leagues?
Mr. SELIG. There is not, but if I could just briefly elaborate on
that, Senator Graham, I said in my discussions with Senator Mack
that, in my view, having gotten an expansion team and lived
through a lot of expansions now, -the worst thing that can happen
to an industry is what I call so-called undigested expansion.
I submit to you that for us to rush into further expansion, with
as many clubs having financial difficulty as they are having today,
and the industry itself in a position that is far different from when
Peter Uebberoth talked about his-is not only unreasonable and
could have some devastating consequences for us; it is not fair to
the people coming in with new teams.
Senator GRAHAM. What concerns me is that you seem to be applying marketplace principles to the issue of expansion; that is,
that expansion would not be economically in the interests of major
league baseball. Mr. Vincent said that and gave reasons that were
both somewhat self-serving in terms of dilution of television revenue to the current ownership as well as the reasons that you give
of digestion.
Then you seem to apply Socialist principles to the issue of relocation. If you are not going to expand into markets that clearly have
the capacity to support major league baseball and you are not going
to consider the relocation of teams that are in weaker markets,
particularly multiple-team markets, isn't the effect of that to say
that I have got to go back and Senator Mack has to go back to our
citizens in growth areas, as well as communities such as this one,
such as Phoenix, such as Buffalo, and say, you know, forget it,
major league baseball has decided that it is not in its economic interests to expand and it is not going to apply marketplace principles to relocation?
Mr. SELIG. No, Senator, I really don't think so, and I will tell you
why. I mean, I understand what you are saying and, believe meI said to Senator Mack and I want to say the same thing to you.
I understand the frustration because I remember the heartbreak
that I went through, and it was hard for people to keep telling me
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to hang in there when it looked like there was no end to the journey.
But I say to you, with the clubs in many places now struggling
under this type of economic environment to be able to survive, I am
not sure that creating more franchises that will have the same
trouble in surviving will do anybody a great favor. I am not saying
that there will not be expansion some day in an orderly way, but
this thing that they could create 10 or 15 more franchises, or 4 or
6 or 8-I mean, I have read that, I have heard it. Look, the only
thing that isn't honed with, frankly, is any pragmatism. It is in
neither party's, in my judgment, sir, best interests.
Senator GRAHAM. Frankly, Mr. Selig, your economic arguments
aren't very compelling when major league baseball continues to
make decisions that are adverse to its economic interests and then
looks to somebody else to pick up the costs, like you want local
communities to pick up the costs. San Francisco is being asked now
to, I think, get $1 a year for the use of the stadium, as opposed
to $750,000. You are going to ask the players to take a cap on salaries rather than do those things that are within your own ability.
In your testimony, it is interesting to note that you say that in
the first era of the Milwaukee major league experience, the Braves
era, that the two most economically successful teams in the National League, the two with the highest attendance, were the Milwaukee Braves, the former Boston Braves, and the Los Angeles
Dodgers, the former Brooklyn Dodgers.
I think it is instructive that major league baseball in the 1950's
was making decisions based on what was in its best economic interest to take teams out of multiple-team cities and put them into
fresh markets, and got the benefit of that, but today you are saying
that major league baseball is not going to take that position.
It is interesting. In 1990, the combined attendance of the San
Francisco Giants and the Oakland Athletics was 4.9 million. Last
year, 1992, the current season, the combined attendance was 4.1
million. There has been a dramatic decline in the attendance in
that two-city baseball franchise. The commissioner said that every
criteria that he had set-declining attendance, losses by the franchise, an inadequate facility, and an indication of community support to provide adequate facilities-had been met, and therefore indicated to Mr. Lurie and to the public at large that the Giants were
going to be available to relocate, leaving the Oakland Athletics, just
as the Philadelphia Phillies, the Boston Red Sox, and the St. Louis
Cardinals had previously been left.
Senator SPECTER. The Philadelphia Athletics, please.
Senator GRAHAM. No, no. The Philadelphia Phillies were left, as
were the Boston Red Sox, as were the St. Louis Cardinals, to have
the benefit now of a single franchise in a metropolitan area. What
economic tearsSenator METZENBAUM. I am going to have to cut you off, Senator
Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. I just want to ask-and maybe my question
doesn't need an answer, but what economic tears of sympathy are
required for baseball when baseball has acted so adversely to its
interests in the 1990's, as compared to an enlightened period in the
1950's and 1960's?
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Mr. SELIG. Well, let me suggest to you, Senator Graham, that
that does surprise me a little bit, and I will tell you why. Here we
are, we are discussing social responsibility. All the people who have
talked about the people who are still mad in New York because the
Dodgers left-I have read and heard for years how irresponsible
baseball was in the 1950's and in the 1960's because they allowed
teams to move. I don't pass judgment. That was obviously long before my time.
We have desperately tried to keep teams, whether they are in
Cleveland or Pittsburgh or somewhere else, and now you are going
to say to me that they were more enlightened in the 1950's when
a cab driver who drove me in New York last week told me that he
never went to the baseball game because the Dodgers moved, because we had no conscience.
Senator GRAHAM. I mean, do you think major league baseball
would be better off today if we returned to the era where the westernmost team was St. Louis andMr. SELIG. No, no, I didn't say that. No, no, I didn't say that, but
I also wantSenator METZENBAUM. I am going to have to cut this off. This
hearing is going to go on until tonight at midnight if the Chair
doesn't take some strenuous action.
Mr. SELIG. I apologize.
Senator METZENBAuM. This hearing is going to have to conclude
by 3, and I am actually going to change the rule that I previously
made saying to Senator Specter that we would have a second
round. I have many questions. We are going to have to submit
some questions because I have, I think, eight or nine more witnesses and I can't be unfair to them, some of whom came from as
far as San Francisco.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. May I just quickly, Mr. ChairmanSenator METZENBAum. Excuse me, Senator Feinstein. Senator
Simpson is here and I am going back and forth. I apologize.
Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, does the record reflect properly
that on each occasion when you have admonished me I have stringently kept within the time constraints?
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simpson, on this one occasion

particularly with this hearing, your conduct has been exemplary.
Senator SIMPSON. Just a damn jewel, right?
Senator METZENBAUM. Yes, a damn jewel.
Senator SIMPSON. Just a jewel. I knew you would say that.
Well, I have myriad questions, and I missed the first round and
I thank Senator Feinstein, and I apologize sincerely. I think I referred to her earlier as Senator-elect, and yet I was right there the
moment she was sworn in. So it shows you that I do need a good
Christmas vacation. I think I was out on the road too long in the
last endeavor.
I understand, though, that you took-and it is good to see you
here. I know you through reputation. Many have contacted me and
said, you know, listen to this man, he is trying his best. I think
you come with the good will of many, as you all do. We are just
concerned about how it is going to be with a commissioner in the
future. Will this be an independent, free commissioner or, if not,
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as Fay described it, a CEO-type thing, which certainly those of us
who know business and reality know that when you have highpowered business people who have accumulated capital and bought
a ball team, that is the way they think. They think of it like running their business.
I understand you took issue with the characterization of the
Green Bay Packers as publicly owned, and you described it as a
shareholder-type arrangement. How are they controlled? Is that
kind of a public trading of stock? Would that be something in baseball? If not, why not?
Mr. SELIG. No, it is not publicly traded stock. In fact, it is stock
that people bought in the 1950's, and occasionally there are people
in their family who may give a share of stock away, Senator. It has
obviously been grandfathered by the NFL. There is no other ownership like it. It is run by an executive committee and then a board,
which I happen to be a member of, and it has been a remarkable
entity that I think the NFL deserves a great deal of credit for preserving.
Senator SIMPSON. Well, I guess my problem is in hearing and
trying to learn, and your issue of franchise relocation-and, boy,
that is a hot one, obviously, right here with my colleaguesMr. SELIG. Yes, sir.

Senator SIMPsoN [continuing]. And your review of matters with
Senator Metzenbaum. Just a final question, then. What about this
rule of providing a right of first refusal for cities? What we see, we
who are from the Wild West who will never see a baseball teamthat is why everybody in Wyoming will go to Denver and see the
Rockies, and they will love that like they do with the Broncos in
the NFL. But where are we when we see the attempt to, we are
going to leave and if you will build us this we will stay?
This, to me, seems like an eternal conflict, and I am simply going
to say what about a right of first refusal and you say, OK, you said
you were going to leave and now the community is going to buy you
up or people are going to gather together and buy you up?
Mr. SELIG. OK. Let me, if I can, Senator-we are going to build
a new stadium in Milwaukee that, frankly, the Brewers are very
hopeful to build. We have worked out a relationship with the public
sector where they have committed to take care of the infrastructure
costs and the Brewers are going to build a stadium. That is unique,
in a sense, but I think this. I know that people say that sports
teams will hold cities hostage.
However, I would also say to you that if you go to Baltimore Stadium, which I know you have been to many times, and you see the
renaissance of that area and you see what that stadium has done
for Baltimore-you go even to the new Comiskey Park, and even
though there are those who say the White Sox held the city hostage, and I don't believe that was so, I think that is a great partnership. I think a city believes it is a major league city because it
has it. It brings in millions.
Senator for instance, there is not a weekend of the 13 weekends
that the Milwaukee Brewers are home you can get a hotel room in
that area in that entire weekend. It brings, according to a study
we did, well over $200 million into our area. Economists can debate
all that. I merely submit to you that each city has to make its own
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judgment, and I think the people in Baltimore are very proud of
what they have done. I thmk the people in Chicago are very proud
of what they have done. We are working out a different arrangement, Senator. We have held a gun to nobody's head because I
wouldn't threaten.
Senator SIMPsoN. Well, thank you. It is the issue of conflict and
the issue of the power of the commissioner that attracts me to see
whether we have something we should do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Simpson.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Selig, it seems to me as I listen and also try to learn that these
hearings come down essentially to three things. One is the role of
the commissioner in the sport and the public interest and the element of social responsibility which you yourself referred to. The
second is the issue of the Giants and Tampa Bay-St. Pete, and the
third is the issue of an expansion policy. If this is, in fact, the
American tradition, the American game, why can't we see more of
it in America?
I would like to ask you a question on each of those. It is very
difficult for me to understand, if you take the Ms. Schott incident
and you take what baseball is supposed to be in this country, that
there can be any delay in taking an action. You have got to ascertain the facts. It is difficult for me to see how owners are going to
pass judgment one on the other; that the role of a strong, independent commissioner is really part of an antitrust exemption because
if you don't have the strong, independent commissioner able to
move rapidly and forcefully to protect social responsibility and the
public interest, you are just a mere business. Would you respond
to that, please?
Mr. SELIG. I certainly will, Senator Feinstein, and I agree with
you. I have said several times today-I want to say it again-having been raised in this business by people who really understood
back in the late 1960's and early 1970's when I came in, who really
sublimated their own interests to the best interests of baseball, all
of us understand the need for a strong commissioner.
I have expressed my feelings on our investigation of Ms. Schott.
I will still submit that all of you would be doing it the way I am
doing it and the executive council is doing it, given the circumstances.
Senator FEINSTEIN. So you would have no objection if that were
attached to an antitrust exemption?
Mr. SELIG. Well, the integrity issues of the commissioner are certainly not going to be touched by restructuring, and I agree with
you that they should be there and that baseball is best served by
having a strong commissioner in those areas. There is no question.
Senator FEINSTEIN. The second point on the Giants, would you
describe the procedure that you undertook to decide the Giants controversy?
Mr. SELIG. Well, after September 9 and 10 when the change took
place, that was really the-you know, that is when I got involved
in the issue, and I must say in all candor that Bob Lurie is a very
close friend of mine. I do have this historical view of franchise
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shifts which I guess I have to apologize to Senator Mack and Senator Graham for, but I do really believe-when talking to Bill
White, the president of the National League at that time, and all
the parties involved, I really felt we had a great responsibility to
San Francisco.
So there was at that point in time an effort undertaken in which
we really tried to see if there was a viable option. You know, when
you go back and study baseball's relocation policy, Senator Feinstein, you will see that we always insist on local ownership and we
always say when viable and available to us, and that was true, as
I said, if you go back to Montreal, you go back to San Diego. This
isn't the first time that has happened. Everybody is acting like, you
know, this was some foreshadowing event, that our policy changed.
Wrong, wrong, it did not change. It has been consistent.
While I can understand the heartbreak-and I understand it
very well, having lived through some of it myself-I say to you that
baseball acted in the socially responsible way and the McGowan
group came forward and they have kept the team in San Francisco,
and it is consistent with everything else that we have done. So that
was the objective in the month of September and October, and as
you know, fortunately, it had, for one group, a happy ending.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, yes. Obviously, I am very happy about
that, and I think Mayor Jordan will explain at what point the Giants decided that there might be outside ownership or be on the
market for sale because I think that is part of the time line here.
But I would like to go to the third point.
Mr. SELIG. Well, that is right. Excuse me. You know, after all,
Commissioner Vincent had some discussions with Mr. Lurie and,
frankly, there is a divergence of opinion on what took place. But
I wasn't there, so there is no sense in me commenting on those.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. On the point of expansion, you have
Tampa-St. Pete; they have built a stadium. They want a team, they
have got a market for a team. It is hard for me to understand in
this vast Nation, with all of the enthusiasm about baseball, why an
expansion team couldn't be granted in this case. You made some
comment earlier, well, we even have trouble getting a relief pitcher.
Are you saying that there isn't talent available?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I don't want to get into the talent thing, but I
would like to remind you of something. Everybody keeps saying
why can't you do this and why can't you do that. Now, here is the
NBA and the NFL, and I am not being the least bit critical, but
they have a farm system that is quite sophisticated in terms of the
colleges. I mean, players leave the colleges, have had great training, and come right to the big leagues. Yet, the NFL has the same
number of teams, and the NBA has one less than we do.
So this matter of talent, this matter of economics-of course, we
are concerned. Of course, we ought to be sensitive to Tampa-St.
Pete and, of course, we are and it is up to us to try to work something out in the future. But I can't sit here today, with candor, and
say to you that we have a plan and the plan is going to be x and
y because there are many difficulties and you must understand all
the internal difficulties, especially where you have an expansion
just starting right now and you start to think of another expansion
and what that does to them, and it sets off myriad problems. But

104
it wouldn't be in the two or four new cities' best interest if we
willy-nilly expand without having thought it through.
Senator FEINSTEIN. But are you saying you are willing to take
a look at it?
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. I am going to have

to cut this off. I have just got too many witnesses, one of which,
I know, wants to get back to San Francisco.
Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Each of us, including myself
and Senator SpecterSenator GRAHAM. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, but some of us who
had anticipated there being a second round-now that there is not
going to be, can we submit further questions, and also requests for
documents and other information which will be necessary to answer the questions?
Senator METZENBAUM. Absolutely. I am sure Mr. Selig will cooperate. I myself have a number of questions; I know that Senator
Specter does, and Senator Mack.
Mr. Selig, you have been very, very helpful. It is understandable
why the major league owners have chosen you to be their spokesperson and their leader. We still have some questions, notwithstanding the very able answers that you provided us with. Thanks
a lot.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you very much.

[Mr. Selig submitted the following material:]
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STATEMENT OF ALLAN H. SELIG, PRESIDENT
OF THE MILWAUKEE BREWERS BASEBALL CLUB
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the
Subcommittee today on behalf of Major League Baseball.

For the

last 23 years I have been the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club.

I currently

serve in the position of Chairman of Baseball's Executive
Council.

The Executive Council consists of myself, eight other

Club owners (four from each League)
Presidents.

and the two League

Baseball's governing documents provide that during a

vacancy in the Office of the Commissioner all of the powers and
duties of the Commissioner shall be exercised by the Executive
Council.

Those powers and duties include, of course, the

Commissioner's authority to act "in the best interests" of
Baseball.
Although I am confident that you requested that I
appear today because of my interim position as Chairman of the
Executive Council,

I must candidly tell

you that I necessarily

bring with me all that I have learned and experienced during my
23 years of operating a baseball franchise in Milwaukee.

My own

views with respect to the unique role that our National Pastime
plays in American society and the covenant that Baseball has with
the millions of Americans who support our great game are all
shaped by my personal experiences in Baseball, which began even
before the Brewers were born in 1970.

As I will explain in some

detail, I was deeply and personally affected by what I consider
to be a flagrant breach of that special covenant that Baseball
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has with its

fans when the Braves were allowed to move from

Milwaukee to Atlanta in 1966.

This is the type of breach of the

public trust that Baseball might not be able to prevent if

those

upset with the decision to save baseball in San Francisco
succeeded in stripping Baseball of its
exemption.

70-year antitrust

My personal experiences in Baseball leave no doubt in

my mind that the public interest was served in San Francisco by
Baseball's strong preference for franchises staying where they
are.

I am confident that you will agree that no legitimate

public policy would be served by legislation that would force
Baseball to constantly defend before antitrust juries the
reasonableness of its efforts to promote franchise stability.
I understand that this hearing was called today for two
reasons.

The first is the concern of some over the National

League's decision not to approve the relocation of the Giants
from San Francisco to Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg that I have just
touched on.

The second is some concern over the circumstances

surrounding the departure this Fall of former Commissioner
Vincent and what Baseball's governing structure will look like in
the future.

I will address both issues.

After you have heard

from all of the witnesses scheduled to appear today, I am
confident that you will conclude that in neither area did
Baseball abuse its

status under the antitrust laws or the special

trust that exists between the Game and the American people.

- 2 -
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BASEBALL'S STRONG PREFERENCE FOR FRANCHISE STABILITY
Let me first

say to the many, many loyal baseball fans

in the Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg area that I genuinely understand
and appreciate the disappointment and the anger that you feel as
a result of the National League's decision not to approve the
relocation of the Giants to your fine city.

As I will explain,

I

was in your shoes on several occasions in the 1960's when it took
me 6h years to bring a baseball team back to Milwaukee.

But the

National League's decision to keep the Giants in San Francisco,
where they have successfully operated with loyal support from
millions of fans for the past 35 years, was simply a
reaffirmation of Baseball's long established policy against the
relocation of franchises that have not been abandoned by their
local communities.

So although I understand the disappointment

of the people of Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg, my vivid memory of the
devastation caused in Milwaukee when the Braves went to Atlanta
leaves me firmly convinced that Baseball's preference for
franchise stability is not only an appropriate policy, but the
only policy that is in the public interest.
The Boston Braves moved to my hometown of Milwaukee in
1953.

Ironically, this was the first franchise relocation

permitted in Baseball since the 1903 Agreement between the
National and American Leagues.
was,

The Braves'

stay in Milwaukee

until their abrupt departure 12 years later, one of the

great success stories in Baseball.

Though a small town compared

to most other Major League cities, the Milwaukee community
- 3 -
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immediately embraced the Braves and supported them spectacularly.
Immediately, the Braves became a part of the basic fibre of the
Milwaukee community.

The Braves drew 1.83 million fans in their

inaugural season in Milwaukee, which was an all-time National
League record.

With increased seating the following year, the

Braves became the first National League Club to attract more than
2 million fans, and then duplicated this feat in 1955, 1956 and
1957.

Although these attendance figures are certainly high by

today's standards for a market like Milwaukee, they were
phenomenal back in the 1950's, when there were fewer home dates
and when Milwaukee's county Stadium was smaller than it is today.
In fact, the Braves led the League in attendance in 6 out of
their 12 years in Milwaukee, and only the Dodgers drew more
people over this 12-year period.

As a result of this tremendous

support, the Braves were also profitable in Milwaukee.
As a young man growing up in Milwaukee, I was one of
the many ardent fans of the Braves.

When the Braves put some

shares of the Club on the public market, I bought 2,000 shares
and was actually the largest public shareholder of the Club
(although I owned only a very small percentage of the team).
in

But

1963 we started to hear rumors that, despite the success of

the franchise in Milwaukee,

future Hall-of-Famers Hank Aaron,

Eddie Mathews and the rest of the Braves would be moving to
Atlanta.

The people of Milwaukee were outraged and they set

about to do everything they could to keep their beloved team in
town.

I was the co-chairman of a local campaign formed to save
- 4 -
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the Braves.

The owners of the Club tried to move the Club after

the 1964 season, but their stadium lease forced them to stay one
more year.

While the team played in Milwaukee during the 1965

season, the Club's management essentially abandoned them.

I

became a vice president of a Milwaukee civic group that actually
ran the Braves during that season.
But despite our best efforts, the Braves did move to
Atlanta at the end of the 1965 season.
heartbroken and I can tell

I was personally

the Subcommittee that the city of

Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin were traumatized by the loss
of that franchise.

The people in my town felt hostility,

bitterness and a deep sense of betrayal towards Major League
Baseball for allowing the Braves to abandon us.

Our loyal

financial and emotional support of Baseball was rewarded with a
slap in the face.

The years of drawing more than 2 million fans

per season were forgotten.

The Club simply got up and moved to

what it considered to be an even greener pasture and no one from
Major League Baseball stopped them.
The void left in the community by the Braves'

departure

drove me to devote the next 6h years of my life to trying to
bring Major League Baseball back to Milwaukee.

As I mentioned, I

understand the disappointment and frustration felt by the people
of Tampa Bay because I was there.

On several occasions during

those 6h years I was certain that I had reached an agreement to
purchase an existing franchise.

Each time the deal eventually
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fell through and the franchise stayed put.

We also lost out when

four expansion franchises were awarded to begin play in 1969.
Our break finally came when one of those expansion
franchises failed after just one year of operation.

By the end

of that 1969 season, the ownership group of the Seattle Pilots
concluded that it

could not successfully operate a franchise in

Seattle and so they began looking to sell the team.

I led a

group that signed a contract to buy the Pilots in October of
1969.

But for the next six months, Baseball, acting responsibly

and properly in my view, did everything it
Pilots in Seattle.

It

could to keep the

was not until the Pilots' owners put the

team into bankruptcy and the bankruptcy judge ordered the sale of
the Club to my group that Baseball reluctantly allowed the Club
to move to Milwaukee.
31, 1970,

We actually purchased the Club on March

just days before the opening of the 1970 season.

6h years of heartbreak,

After

the people of Milwaukee finally got back

something that should never have been taken from them.in the
first

place.
And that is the abridged version of how I became

involved in Major League Baseball.
Milwaukee is,

The moral of my experience in

to my mind, that the professional sports leagues in

general and Baseball in particular should vigilantly enforce
strong policies prohibiting Clubs from abandoning local
communities which have supported them.

The Milwaukee experience

confirms for me that the appropriate policy of every professional
sports league is to prohibit franchise relocations except in the
- 6 -
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most dire circumstances where the local community has, over a
sustained period, demonstrated that it

cannot or will not support

This, I an happy to report to you,

the franchise.

Baseball's policy.

is precisely

It is also the reason why the loyal

supporters of the San Francisco Giants will continue to enjoy the
performances of Will Clark and his teammates next year and for
(we hope) many years after that.
But if

Baseball were not exempt from the antitrust

laws, a decision protecting franchise stability such as the one
made in San Francisco would have certainly subjected Baseball to
a costly and unpredictable treble damage lawsuit.
without its

exemption,

Indeed,

Baseball might not have even attempted to

save the Giants for the people of San Francisco.

Ever since a

court concluded that the antitrust laws left the NFL powerless to
stop Al Davis from abandoning the remarkably supportive (and
profitable) Oakland market for greener pastures in Los
Angeles,1L no professional sports league other than Baseball has
been able to stop a franchise from abandoning its

local community

for what the owner perceives to be greater riches elsewhere.
This misguided application of the antitrust rules is
why Oakland is
still

11

famed Raiders, although it

have the publicly financed stadium it

with its
2006.

today without its

does

built for the team

annual debt service of $1.5 million through the year
It

is

also why Baltimore no longer has its

beloved Colts,

AA Los Aneles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
Lag,
726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cet denied, 469
U.S. 990 (1986).
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the football Cardinals now play in Phoenix rather than St. Louis,
the basketball Clippers are in Los Angeles rather than San Diego
and the basketball Kings play in Sacramento rather than Kansas
City.

From a purely personal standpoint, I feel for all the

loyal fans in those cities who lost such important parts of their
communities because of the Davis decision.

I think it is a sad

commentary that the NFL and the NBA could not prevent the hurt
that these communities have had to endure.
In a thoughtful article recently published in a
compilation of articles on the business of professional sports,
Professor Gary Roberts, who I understand will also testify today,
explained that the rash of NFL franchise moves following the Al
Davis case after decades of franchise stability in the NFL is a
"dramatic example" of the type of inevitable "chaos and
inefficiency" caused by allowing juries and judges to second
guess the "reasonableness" of a sports league's governance
decisions under antitrust conspiracy doctrine.?L
agree with Professor Roberts'

I heartily

conclusion that "[s]uch cases

essentially have created a prescription for turning the business
of running leagues over to hundreds of federal judges with vastly

U

The Business of Professional Sports 146 (P. Staudohar & J.
Mangan ed. 1992). I have attached a copy of Professor
Roberts' article to this statement for the Subcommittee's
benefit. I believe that it persuasively and conclusively
debunks the arguments of those who assert that the antitrust
laws would solve all of Baseball's problems.
- 8 -
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different philosophies and interests.

In the long run nobody

gains from such an unpredictable and irrational system."M
Those who suggest that Baseball's problems would
be solved by subjecting the Game's decisionmaking to the
antitrust principles developed in the other professional sports
simply ignore the undeniable fact that the application of
antitrust laws has been the cause of the many problems, including
franchise instability, that exist in the other professional
sports today.

Even Professor Zimbalist has recognized that

"la]pplying antitrust has hardly been a godsend to the erstwhile
NFL cities of Oakland and Baltimore. . . .
perspective, antitrust is

From the metropolitan

not the preferred remedy."M

In fact, Congress was so appalled by the Raiders'
abandonment of Oakland and the Colts' subsequent midnight move
out of Baltimore that several members introduced a number of
bills in 1984 and 1985 designed to promote franchise stability.
These bills would have given the professional sports leagues the
authority that only Baseball now has to stop franchises from
leaving communities that have supported them.
172, S. 259, S. 298).

(ERA,

Se.,

S.

Although differences in proper approach to

the problem prevented the passage of any of these bills, all
sides of the legislative debate recognized the vital public
interest in franchise stability.

IL
1

The only bill

that was reported

d, at 148.
A. Zimbalist, Baseball And Billions: A Probing Look Inside
The Bia Business Of our National Pastime 166 (1992).
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out of Committee was S. 259, the Professional Sports Community
Protection Act of 1985.

The preamble to S. 259 reflects this

public interest:
[This bill is intended] to protect the public
interest in stable relationships among
communities, professional sports teams and
leagues and in the successful operation of
such teams in communities throughout the
Nation, and for other purposes.
While S.

259 was not ultimately voted on by the full Senate, the

debate made clear that a vast majority of the legislators agreed
with the bill's

finding that "it

is

in the public interest to

preserve stability in the relationship between professional
sports teams and the communities in which such teams may
successfully operate.

.

.

."

It

is

that

that Baseball took into account when it
Francisco and it

is

same public interest

kept the Giants in San

the same public interest that Baseball has

succqssfully preserved for the last 20 years.
I am extremely proud of Baseball's record on franchise
stability.

Because Baseball's internal governance decisions have

not been subjected to the antitrust laws, Baseball has by far the
best record of the professional sports in the area of franchise
stability.

No baseball franchise was permitted to relocate

between 1903 and 1952.
1953 and 1972)

While several franchises moved between

(including the Braves'

move to Atlanta in 1966 and

the two relocations out of Washington, first to Minnesota in 1961
and then to Texas in 1972) no Club has been permitted to relocate
since the Senators' last move in 1972.

The recent attempted

relocations.of the Seattle Mariners and the San Francisco Giants
-
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are just the latest of a long list of potential relocations over
the last 20 years that were prevented by Baseball's strong policy
in favor of stability and against abandonment.

In contrast to

Baseball's unblemished record over the last 20 years, football
and basketball have each had three franchise relocations since
1980 and hockey has had two.
As Baseball's franchise relocation record amply
demonstrates, Baseball has in no way "abused" its antitrust
exemption.

While we have not flatly prohibited all franchise

relocations, we do not allow a franchise to relocate simply so
that the owner can earn greater profits.

Indeed, the fact that

the National League rejected the relocation to Tampa Bay/St.
Petersburg despite the fact that it

would have netted Bob Lurie a

reported $15 million more than he was able to get in San
Francisco shows that profit has not been the driving force in
Baseball's decisionmaking.

The San Francisco decision certainly

cannot be said to be evidence that Baseball has abused its
antitrust exemption.

Accordingly, there is obviously nothing

about Baseball's most recent decision in favor of franchise
stability in San Francisco that provides a legitimate basis for
altering Baseball's antitrust status.
Although the effects of eliminating Baseball's
exemption cannot be thoroughly anticipated by anyone, it seems
inevitable to me that the most immediate consequence would be
that a number of teams in small markets would attempt to abandon
some of Baseball's existing cities for what they think are better
-
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economic conditions elsewhere.

This is particularly likely today

because Baseball has moved into an extremely difficult economic
time.

As more and more small market Clubs continue to lose money

year after year, the temptation to move to a city that appears to
offer a "quick fix" is likely to become overwhelming.

Indeed,

Baseball could be faced with Clubs jumping from town to town to
take advantage of the "honeymoon" period that relocated teams
enjoy in their first few years.

It would obviously not be in the

public interest to render Baseball impotent to stop such conduct.

THE RESIGNATION OF FAY VINCENT
AND THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF BASEBALL
Some members of the Subcommittee have expressed concern
over Fay Vincent's departure and what that departure means for
the future of Baseball's Office of the Commissioner.
first

Let me

say that the owners did not summarily dismiss Mr. Vincent

for protecting the best interests of the Game and the public.
When Mr. Vincent took office, he acknowledged that if

he ever

lost the confidence of a majority of the owners, he would resign.
While Mr. Vincent had the full support of the owners when he took
office under very difficult circumstances after the death of Bart
Gianatti, he gradually lost that support.
teams requested his resignation.

By September, 1992, 18

Since he needed a majority of

the Clubs to be re-elected to a second term, and since the
decision on a second term could have been made as early as

-
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January 1993, Mr. Vincent recognized that he had become a lame
duck Commissioner and that he had lost the confidence of twothirds of the teams.

As a result, he honored his initial pledge

and resigned.
I cannot speak for all of the teams which lost
confidence in Fay Vincent.

Many Clubs had many reasons.

However, perhaps the most commonly articulated concern was his
inability to develop a consensus among the owners on the vital
issues that face the Game today.
under his leadership,

Rather than pulling together

the teams were drawing further and further

apart, and were advancing their parochial interests.

In the

opinion of an overwhelming majority of the Clubs, Mr. Vincent was
simply not the person to lead Baseball during what they all
realized would be a very difficult and challenging period.

Since

his departure, we have appointed a restructuring committee which
is hard at work and we are attempting to face the difficult
issues and build consensus.

It does not help the Game to have

numerous teams for sale and to have teams on the verge of
bankruptcy.

Nor will it help if eventually only a few teams can

afford all of the top players; fans will soon lose interest.
The Executive Council is now exercising the powers of
the Commissioner's Office, including its "best interests" powers.
Moreover, although the restructuring committee has not yet
completed its work, I can say that there will still be a
Commissioner who will continue to have strong powers to protect

-

13

-

118
the integrity of the Game.

There is

in my view no reason to

change the current laws to do something more.
In the meantime,

Baseball's responses to the two most

recent relocation attempts demonstrate that Baseball remains
committed to upholding the public's trust in the Game.
Subcommittee is

aware,

As the

there was an effort to move the Seattle

Mariners to Tampa Bay prior to the time Commissioner Vincent
resigned.

That effort was stopped and a new owner was found who

made a commitment to keep the Mariners in Seattle.

The proposed

move by the San Francisco Giants took place after Mr. Vincent's
resignation.

It also was stopped by Baseball and a new ownership

group was found that made a commitment to keep the Giants in San
Francisco.

And I can assure you today that this consistent

policy of favoring stability over abandonment will continue
regardless of the ultimate conclusion of the current
restructuring deliberations.

CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court reaffirmed Baseball's antitrust
exemption in the

Efl:g

case in 1972,

it

noted that over 50 bills

had been introduced with respect to Baseball over the previous 20
years.

The Court found it

significant that the only bills that

passed either the House or the Senate would have acted to expand
the antitrust exemption to the other professional league sports.
Those bills stripping Baseball of its
of Committee.

exemption never made it

Since 1972, Congress has considered scores of
-
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additional bills regarding Baseball and the antitrust status of
professional sports.

Again, the only bill

to make it

out of

Committee would have expanded the antitrust exemption for all
professional sports leagues.

In

short, Congress has often looked

at Baseball's position with respect to the antitrust laws and it
has always reaffirmed Baseball's status because Baseball's
conduct has always been consistent with the public interest.
Club owners and the governments and communities in
which Baseball currently operates have all relied on Baseball's
antitrust immunity which has now existed for 70 years.

As

explained above, nothing has happened recently to suggest that
Baseball has abused its exemption so that Congress should reverse
its long-held position on this issue.

If anything, recent events

such as Baseball's decision to preserve the National Pastime in
Seattle and San Francisco make it all the more clear that
Baseball's status should remain as it has for the last 70 years.
Baseball's critics who have advocated for the removal of
Baseball's exemption have consistently failed to describe the
ways in which the performance of Baseball would better serve the
public interest if

it

operated under the antitrust rules which

the courts have unfortunately applied to the other professional
sports leagues.

The same is true today.

The fact of the matter

is that the threat of antitrust liability has caused nothing but
confusion and instability in the other professional sports for
both the franchises'
operate.

investors and the communities in which they

Baseball has continued to uphold its unique covenant
-
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with its

fans and it

deserves to retain its

current status under

the antitrust laws.
I sincerely thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity
to speak before you today on these extremely important issues.
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Professional Sports
and the Antitrust Laws

Gary R. Roberts

Perhaps no area of law has impacted professional sports more over these
past twenty years than antitrust. Since 1966 the National Football League
alone has had to defend over sixty antitrust suits. The National Basketball
Association, and the National Hockey League, and even upstart leagues
like the now-defunct World Hockey Association (WHA), American Basketball League. and the United States Football League (USFL). have also been
frequently hit by such suits. Only major league baseball. which enjoys a
broad antitrust immunity as a result of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
has been able to operate without the substantial risk and expense of antitrust litigation.'
Although antitrust law seems mysterious and complex. its source is surprisingly simple. Except for the statute governing mergers of two firms, the
overwhelming bulk of antitrust law derives from the first two sections of
the 1890 Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits "every contract, combination. . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." while section 2
makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. or combine or
conspire .

.

. to monopolize" trade or commerce. Virtually all sports anti-

trust cases involve one or both of these vague statutory proscriptions-conspiracies to restrain trade and monopolization. 2
Antitrust cases against professional leagues or their member clubs generally are of two types. The first involves disputes between two different
leagues or between member clubs of different leagues. The second, and
more significant, category includes all cases brought by anyone having a
dispute with a league and alleging that a league rule or decision constitutes
an unlawful section I conspiracy among the individual member clubs of the
league. It is the second type of cases-those involving so-called intraleague
conspiracies-that has been the most frequent and problematic. and it has
had the greatest impact on professional sports.
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The Interleague Dispute Cases
The interleague type of case is typically brought by a young struggling
league claiming that an older and more established league monopolized or
attempted to monopolize some part of the sports entertainment market in
violation of Sherman Act section 2. To win such a claim the plaintiff must
prove two things: (1) that the defendant has, or is close to having, monopoly market power in some relevant market or line of commerce. and (2) that
the defendant has acted improperly in acquiring or maintaining that monopoly power. Because these issues are economically complex and often very
difficult to prove, plaintiffs also often allege that the defendant league's
conduct involved a section I conspiracy in restraint of trade. But regardless
of the legal theory, the essential claim is always that a well-established
league or its teams acted to cripple or destroy a rival league or teams in
order to maintain a monopoly position.
As suggested above, antitrust cases between leagues have been few and
have had relatively little impact on the structure or operation of professional
sports. The most recent example is the highly publicized case the USFL
brought against the NFL, which primarily claimed that the NFL's contracts
with the three major television networks unlawfully monopolized professional football. After a lengthy trial in 1986, a Manhattan jury found that
the NFL had monopolized professional football; however, apparently because the jury believed that the USFL went bankrupt primarily because of
its own mismanagement, it awarded the USFL damages of only one dollar
(which by law were automatically trebled to three). When the verdict was
affirmed on appeal, the demise of the USFL became permanent (USFL v.
NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 [2d Cir. 19881). In a similar case in 1962. the old
American Football League claimed that the NFL monopolized professional
football by putting teams in Dallas and Minnesota and threatening to expand in other cities in order to disrupt the AFL's initial operations. The
case resulted in a verdict for the NFL (AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60 [D.
Md. 1962], aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 [4th Cir. 1963]).
The WHA was more successful in its suit against the NHL in the early
1970s. The essence of this claim was that the NHL monopolized professional hockey by including a clause in all of its clubs' player contracts giving the club a permanent renewable option on the player when the contract
term ended, which prevented a player from playing for any other hockey
club until his NHL club no longer wanted him. Thus the WHA was unable
to employ good hockey players if they had ever played in the NHL and, as
a result, could never seriously compete with the NHL. In 1972 shortly after
the case was filed. the district judge issued a preliminary injunction against
the NHL's enforcement of these "lifetime reserve clauses" based on his
finding that at trial they would probably be found to constitute unlawful
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monopolization (Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. PhiladelphiaHockey

Club. 351 F. Supp. 462 [E.D. Pa. 1972]).
Unfortunately, the injunction was of little help to the WHA; by 1979 all
of its clubs were insolvent and had disbanded except for the teams in Hartford. Winnipeg, Edmonton. and Vancouver, all of which joined the NHL.
The case did, however. lead to a settlement between, the two leagues and
their player unions under which the NHL's lifetime reserve clause was replaced with a much less onerous "free agent compensation system" that
allowed a player to sign with any hockey team when his contract expired.
subject only to the new club giving some arbitrated compensation to the old
club, but only if both clubs were NHL members.
Another group of interleague cases has involved stadium lease or arena
lease provisions that give the leasing club an exclusive right to use the facility for its sport. If a facility is realistically the only one in the area capable of housing a professional team, the exercise of the exclusive rights
clause forecloses other leagues from putting a competing team in the city.
Several cases have involved plaintiffs who were trying to obtain franchises
in upstart leagues who alleged that such lease provisions allowed the established local team to monopolize the local market in its sport. These plaintiffs have generally been unsuccessful, either because alternative facilities
were available or because the team could not show that they would have
obtained a franchise in the new league even if the stadium had been available. The only such case to result in a published opinion was eventually
settled for $200,000 after thirteen years of litigation. The ruling in this case
makes it reasonably clear that the Sherman Act is violated if a new league
is excluded from a city because of such a lease provision, at least unless
very strong business justifications exist for restricting the newcomer's access to the facility (Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 [D.C. Cir.
19771, cert. denied. 436 U.S. 956 [19781).
Another interleague case involved a challenge by the North American
Soccer League (NASL) to the NFl's proposed by-law that would have prohibited majority owners or chief executive officers of NFL teams from owning an interest in franchises of other sports leagues. Specifically at issue
was the NFL's efforts to force Lamar Hunt. who owns the NFL's Kansas
City Chiefs. and Joe Robbie, who owns the Miami Dolphins. to divest their
interests (or in Robbie's case, his ife's interest) in NASL franchises. Because of the shaky financial position of the NASL, the divestment. combined with the paucity of non-NFL owners willing to invest in the NASL,
might have pushed the NASL over the financial edge (over which it eventually went anyway). Curiously, the primary claim in the case was not that
the NFL monopolized any relevant market, such as the league iports autumn entertainment market, but that the NFL clubs unlaw tullh conspired
among themselves under section I to restrain trade. After the Jitrict court
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in New York granted a summary judgment for the NFL. the court of appeals reversed and entered a judgment for the NASL on the grounds that the
NFL clubs had conspired to restrain the previously unheard-of sports capital
investment market (NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 [2d Cir.), cert. denied.
459 U.S. 1074 [19821).
The NASL decision has been severely criticized, not only because of its
result but because of its doctrinal justification. Justifying the decision on
conspiracy grounds rather than monopolization grounds seems totally at
odds with standard section 1 principles. which encourage vigorous independent competition between separate entities, such as two different leagues
Thus, although the decision clearly invalidated the NFL's cross-ownership
ban when applied against the struggling NASL. it is probably limited to its
specific facts-that is. the ban probably does not violate the law when ap.
plied by the NFL against cross-ownership in established sports leagues like
the NHL, NBA. or major league baseball, or rival leagues in the same
sport, like the WFL or USFL.
Generally, with the possible exception of the anomalous NASL case. the
decisions in these interleague cases have been unsurprising and unremark.
able, and they have had little impact on either the law or the structure Ir
professional sports. Most doctrinal principles relating to monopolization are
reasonably clear and have not changed, and in each of the cases the out.
come primarily turned not on the interpretation or application of the law
but on what the juries believed were the real facts of the case. While jur.
findings of fact usually are significant for a particular case, they generall%
have little or no impact on future cases or the general state of the law.
The one legal issue in these sports monopolization cases that is problem
atic, and will probably remain so, is how to define the relevant market thur
the plaintiff claims has been monopolized. The market definition must in
clude both a product and a geographic dimension-for example. prote,
sional football entertainment in the United States; ticket sales for footh
entertainment (high school, college. and professional) in the New York met
ropolitan area; network television rights for all kinds of entertainment in the
United States: television rights for all sports entertainment in New England
and so on. The possibilities are almost endless. The general rule for makmp,
this determination is that the proper market includes all the different bran,:
and products sold within the appropriate geographical area that are econom
ically competitive with one another-that is, those that serve approximate the same purpose for the average consumer so that consumers can swit,
from one to the other if price or quality materially changes.
Defining the proper relevant market is extraordinarily difficult. For eurm
pie, how can one identify everything that meaningfully competes with NF
football in a single market description? What percentage of people wh.
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now buy tickets to New York Giants football games would, if the Giants'
ticket prices increased by a certain amount, spend their entertainment dollars attending college football games? Would they attend Yankee baseball
games or Broadway shows or watch cartoons on television? Adding in the
geographic dimension, how far would disgruntled Giants fans be willing to
travel to find a substitute activity? How many would choose gambling in
Atlantic City or skiing in Vermont? Then again, what effect would the
amount of the ticket price increase have on all these factors? No one can
possibly know. Nonetheless, based on whatever information is available, a
plaintiff must establish that some group of actual or potential product alternatives exists that is generally substitutable to a sufficient number of consumers within an identified geographic area so that they comprise a
relevant market that the defendant has monopolized.
The market definition problem is not unique to sports cases. Defining a
relevant market is a nightmare in almost all monopolization cases. Because
of the complexity and conceptual difficulty (if not impossibility) of doing
the necessary economic analysis, courts generally either have reached a
knee-jerk conclusion (camouflaged by confusing rhetoric), or have ducked
the issue by leaving the question to juries to do what they instinctively feel
is just. But the fact that a defined relevant market is an essential element of
a monopolization case always injects a great deal of unpredictability into
these interleague cases.
This problem could be greatly reduced in cases between two leagues in
the same sport, like the USFL and the NFL, simply by identifying the relevant market as the labor market in which the leagues employ their players
instead of focusing on some market in which the leagues sell their entertainment products against one another. The labor market is undoubtedly the
proper market for relevant concern. If the NFL wanted to drive the USFL
out of business, by whatever method, it was not because it was seriously
concerned about NFL ticket buyers or television networks switching over to
the USFL. It wanted to stop the rapid escalation in player salaries caused
by the USFL's competition in the market for hiring football players. If the
NFL was trying to monopolize anything, it was this labor market. This
market is easy to define, and a plaintiff could probably prove that an established league like the NFL or NBA has enormous market power in it.4 By
focusing on the player market in cases between two leagues in the same
sport, plaintiffs would greatly increase their chance of success.
Ultimately, however, these types of cases will probably never be very
significant in altering the shape of professional sports because of the great
likelihood that in each sport no more than one established league will ever
exist for more than a brief period. Since World War II, one hockey, two
basketball, and four football leagues have sprung up to compete against the
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NHL, NBA. and NFL. respectively, and not one has survived more than a
few seasons. The public's demand for a single acknowledged "world champion," and the need over the long run to control player costs and competitive balance among teams (which cannot be done effectively in either
league if two are competing in the same sport), make it quite likely that the
established league in each sport will never face permanent competition or
be supplanted by an upstart league. Thus no matter what legal doctrines are
developed or what the outcome of any interleague monopolization cases
may be. it is unlikely that these cases will ever be of long-term or structural
significance.
The Intraleague Conspiracy Cases
The second type of sports antitrust case involves challenges to any league
rule, decision, or action ("league conduct") by some dissatisfied person
claiming that the conduct constituted a section I conspiracy of the league's
member clubs to restrain competition among themselves. These cases are by
far more frequent, more unpredictable, and doctrinally more problematic
than the interleague monopolization cases.
Cases in this category have involved virtually every type of league conduct. For example, league rules barring players from the league for a variety of reasons5 and rules assigning each player to a specific league member
(like the player drafts and reserve rules) 6 have been attacked by individual
players, player unions, and rival leagues. Persons disappointed with not being able to own a team have brought cases challenging league decisions not
to expand the league membership7 and not to approve the sale of a
franchise. 8 Stadiums seeking league tenants and even league members have
challenged league decisions not to allow teams to relocate their home
games to a new city.9 The Justice Department, fans, and television stations
have sued over league broadcasting contracts and practices.' 0 Equipment
manufacturers and players have even challenged playing-field rules." In
each case, the allegation was that the league's action had involved a conspiracy of the individual league members to restrain competition among
themselves in some commercial market.
Although the defendant leagues have won the overwhelming majority of
these cases, a few widely publicized cases in which leagues lost have had
an enormous impact on the structure and operation of professional sports.
The most notable are the John Mackey and Yazoo Smith cases from the mid1970s, which invalidated respectively the NFL's reserve system and college
player draft as they were then structured, completely altering the shape of
labor relations in professional sports. In the infamous Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum case the court found the NFIs efforts to require the then
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Oakland Raiders to play its home games in Oakland (as it had contractually
Seed to do) instead of in Los Angeles to be an unlawful conspiracy of the
oher NFL clubs What was so significant about these decisions was not
only the way they dramatically and directly changed the face of the game
but how they were based on legal principles that were confusing, aberrational, and inconsisient both with other antitrust decisions and with antitrust doctrine generally. The legacy of these cases is that today there is
virtually no conduct of any sports league (other than baseball) involving any
satter that-ciotgceivably be challenged successfully in the right court.
In order to underitand why these conspiracy cases are so doctrinally confoun
and troublesome for league operations, it is necessary first to unseciin I's condemnation of conspiracies is all about. The
bisic theory Wt free enterprise is that the products consumers want will be
Produced in the gaest quantity, at the highest quality, and at the cheapest
P=cif r
tion decisions conform to the dictates of supply and demand
W .
eis:quiibrium will be achieved when independent producers of
eahame or functionally interchangeable products compete with each other
to attract customers. It is through competition and each firm's desire to
Stact the greatest sumber of customers that prices are kept to a minimum
an quality maintained. It is for this reason that antitrust law seeks to maximize compptition by outlawing both (a) one firm driving all competitors
out qqu(iness (monopolization) and (b) groups of competitors getting toSehei 1 age on the price or quality of their otherwise competing prodBut sectial's condemnation of "every conspiracy in restraint of trade"
is notas sige as it might seem. Obviously, totally independent companies
li e
Morbrs,
fMz_ Ford, and Chrysler cannot agree on the price or design
ofmpcift Ab without illegally conspiring, but what about the Chevrolet,
and Cadic divisions of GM agreeing on the price of their cars?
Becmftes
are merely different divisions of the same company. it is undisputed tffutthey.Eititute a single legal person whose internal actions are
not 'conspiracies'-7his distinction underscores a critical aspect of antitrust doctrine ths ~y courts have failed to appreciate in sports league
cases--namely tAery type and form of cooperative action between sep1rat persots coeot possibly be illegal.
It thus becogae5 crucial for section I cases that the law define in some
Imaat 35
or.e
esja
aL to.be nsiered independeJof
Vah 6tfr-m put hi
w& ihic5 pi4ons; enties the law~ivM
~A t Bi
itbrifotead ot
Wber-sufs
dependent persons or
Mis who
tobs coqetitorf of each otberTeach agreements on
so-o*
how to coedact their busincis. Lll their prodiits,.ihey may unlawfu
n"coBptuition. But when prsons or entities that
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anerely employfs, partners, or divlsions of a single business firm make
agreem ens orjoint decisionfs in an effort to operate the firm profitably.
- their an
are clearly ordinary lawful cooperation.
In most factual contexts, making this distinction has not ttel a signifi.
gcnt problem for courts. Clearly, the different employees of a single corporation cannot illegally conspire with respect- to carrying on the
corporation's bustness. The partners in a recognized partnership (whether
individual people, corporations, or other partnerships) never illegally conspire when making decisions about the partnership's business--Different divisions, and even different subsidiary corporations that are wholly owned
by the same parent corporation (since the Supreme Court's Copperweld v.
Independence Tube decision in 1984), can never illegally conspire.'12 here
is only one type of business entity that continues to give the courts fitsthe joint venture. Unfortunately, this category includes sports leagues.
It is curious that for virtually every other legal purpose, joint ventures
and partnerships are treated identically. In fact, under standard business organization law principles, joint ventures are merely a kind of partnership
different from more typical partnerships only in that joint ventures are created by their partners for a narrow specific purpose or for a limited period
of time. Thus the special fiduciary obligations of partners to the business,
the liability of partners for the business's debts, and the authority of part.
ners to bind the business and the other partners are all exactly the same
whether the business is a joint venture or a more typical partaership. For
seemingly arbitrary reasons, federal antitrust courts have singled out joint
ventures and generally treated the internal business agreements of: beir
partners as conspiracies subject to condemnation if found tobtW"u esonable," whereas agreements among traditional partners have never been held
to be unlawful conspiracies.'.
From the standpoint of antitrust policy (namely, the advancement of consumer welfare), the distinction between joint ventures (like ports leagues)
and traditional partnerships and corporations is not justified. It is simply
nonsense to allow judges or juries unfamiliar with the indtistry to secondguess the wisdom of business decisions made by persons whose business is
affected. When the members of General Motors' corporate board of directors collectively decide where GM's factories will be located, o* when the
partners in a law, medical, or accounting firm collectively decid, where to
locate their offices, nobody in his right mind thinks the decisihouldobe
considered a conspiracy and tested for reasonableness by softio4A* olay
jury. But when the governing board of the NFL collectiveTy-ccides that
eight league games every year will be produced in Oakland instead of Los
Angeles, the decision is treated as a conspiracy, which a Los Angeles judge
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and jury can render illegal if they believe it to be unreasonable (as happened in the Los Angeles Coliseum/Raiderscase).

This distinction also has been made with respect to the hiring standards
and employment practices of corporations, partnerships, and sports leagues.
If IBM (corporation) or a major national accounting firm (partnership) decided not to hire anyone who had not completed college or insisted that
employee John Doe would have to agree to work at the company's Kansas
City Office if he wanted to be hired, nobody would question the policy as a
potentially unlawful conspiracy. But when a sports league declines to employ players who have not completed their years of college training or requires quarterback John Doe to play for the team in Kansas City, courts
condemn these decisions as unreasonable conspiracies (as in the Denver
Rockets. Mackey. and Smith cases)."
The reason generally given by courts and plaintiffs for this distinction is
that. unlike corporations and partnerships. sports leagues are not really
single business firms; they are a group of separately owned teams with distinct legal identities that maintain their own separate books and have different profits and losses. While these points are superficially true, they are
wholly irrelevant to antitrust policy because they overlook the fundamental
nature of the business of a sports league and the relationship among a
league's member teams. In fact, the antitrust policy of maximizing consumer welfare can be furthered only by treating league conduct in exactly
the same way as the law treats corporate and partnership conduct. To understand why this is so. one must first recognize that the unique product a
sports league produces is athletic (not economic) "competition," which requires separate teams as a necessary camouflage for the inherent partnership nature of a league.
Sports leagues produce a unique type of entertainment product-team
athletic competition. At a bare minimum two different teams are always
necessary to produce this product. Every game is the product of at least a
two-team joint venture. Although game tickets and television broadcasts
are often marketed as, for example, "Washington Redskins football," this
single reference is quite misleading. The Redskins team alone is incapable
of producing any football entertainment; the proper designation is "NFL
football."
Furthermore, although a single NFL game may be a discrete entertainInent event for some marketing purposes, it is not a separate product for
any meaningful economic or antitrust purpose. The product is actually the
league's annual series of 224 regular season games leading to a post-season
tournament and a Super Bowl champion. It is only because each game is
ultimately connected to the championship that it has substantial value. An
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isolated scrimmage game between two teams that did not count in any
league standings or statistical rankings would be far less attractive to consumers, and it certainly could not command millions of dollars in television
fees or twenty or more dollars a ticket from tens of thousands of fans.
A league's product is thus jointly produced, and no team produces anything by itself. Furthermore, no individual game is solely the product of
even the two participating teams; the value of every game is largely generited by the trademark and imprimatur of the league and the cooperation
and participation of all league members. each of which must recognize and
accept the results of every game. Each individual team's fortunes, no matter how the league elects to divide total league revenues and expenses. are
to a greater or lesser extent inherently affected by the success or failure of
every single league game. Thus decisions affecting the structure of the
league or the production or marketing of any league game affect the entire
league, and every member has a stake and an inherent right to participate in
those decisions, just as a partner in a law firm has a stake a- * a right to
vote in his firm's business decisions. For example, although the location of
the Raiders' home games will most greatly affect the Raiders (but only because of the league's pragmatic decision to give the majority of locally generated revenues to the home team), it also affects every other NFL
member.' 5 Without the acceptance. recognition, and occasional participation on the field of the other NFL members, those Raiders home games
would be of very little economic value.
Accordingly, no individual sports team is capable of any production without the full cooperation of the other league members, and each team's economic existence, as well as its profits, depends entirely on its being an
integral part of the league. It logically follows that these members are all
inherent partners in the business of producing the league's wholly integrated entertainment product, and thus the teams are not and cannot be
independent economic competitors of one another unless they voluntarily
allow themselves to be for practical business reasons.16 In short, it is the
league, not the individual club, that is the relevant business firm for proper
economic and legal analysis. and cooperation or agreements among the
members should be indistinguishable from those among the members of an%
partnership or the directors of any corporation.
From this perspective, a Minnesota Vikings home game is not a Vikings
product that the team is entitled unilaterally to produce and market any way
it chooses; it is always the product of at least one other team, and, as part
of the integrated NFL season, it is also the joint product of every member
club. If one league member has a right to determine when, where, against
whom, or under what rules it will play home games. logically the same set
of rights should exist for each team regarding road games. But obviously
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under such a disorganized regime no league product could be produced.
Only when all the teams agree to some method for deciding these production issues can there be a league schedule and a valuable entertainment
product. Clearly, there is no economic justification for legally requiring any
of these decisions to be made by individual teams unilaterally.
Because every NFL game is necessarily the product of the entire league,
the structural, production, and marketing decisions about every game are
by definition league decisions. The league may elect for pragmatic reasons
to have some of these decisions made by the individual teams (e.g.. setting
home game ticket prices or player salaries); by the hired commissioner
ie.g.. hiring game officials. drawing up the schedule of games. or negotiating network television contracts); or by some percentage vote of the member prtners (Mg.. determining the location of teams, setting the size of
team rosters, or agreeing to collective bargaining agreements). But regardless of what decision-making methodology the league elects to use for any
given matter, it is undeniable that the inherently joint nature of the league
and its product makes every decision, expressly or tacitly. a decision of the
collective league membership. For example. when the Raiders decided to
play its home games in Los Angeles. it necessarily imposed a leaguewide
decision on every NFL team to play extra road games there and to recognize and accept the results of the relocated games.
Despite the inherently joint or partnership nature of a sports league,
many are skeptical. The reason is, as noted earlier, that in some ways
leagues do not look like typical partnerships because each club has its own
owner(s), maintains separate books, and earns its own profit or loss. In
short. the teams look like independent and vigorous competitors. It is difficult for many to believe that the owners and employees of the various
, ue teams, who often publicly insult and deride each other and threaten
11ommit mayhem on one another, are really business partners. But the
economic reality is that they are and that these appearances are merely deceptive reflections of the unusual nature of the league product-athletic
competition.
Because the league's product is athletic competition. it must ensure at
least the appearance of honest and vigorous athletic rivalry among league
members. Thus member teams are allowed to operate with a great deal of
autonomy. It would look very suspicious to many fans and greatly diminish
their enthusiasm if the clubs were largely controlled from league headquarters and seemed to lack financial incentive to perform well on the field and
efficiently in the front office. But the fact that the league must create both
the appgance and reality of intense athletic competition does not lead to
the conclusion that the teams should be treated under the law like unrelated
business competitors. which they clearly are not.

132
146 / ROBERTS

The economic competition that many mistakenly think exists between the
teams because of their separate identities and limited operational autonomy
is not unlike the internal rivalries within any company operating through
semiautonomous profit centers. The only real difference is that leagues
openly advertise and promote this internal rivalry because they want to
heighten the appearance of vigorous athletic competition. whereas more
typical businesses have no incentive to create a public appearance of "infighting." But the law should recognize that deliberately created athletic
competition and internal rivalry in the league does not mean that the league
members must treat each other like independent business competitors who
are engaging in a conspiracy every time the league acts.
Furthermore, the fact that the individual teams make different profits or
losses is not material to the antitrust issue: if all league revenues were put
in a single common pot and all league expenses paid out of that pot. with
the remainder being distributed evenly among the clubs, nobody would
doubt that the league was a true partnership. The reason leagues do not
operate in that fashion is that it would destroy any incentive for the clubs to
field a top-quality team or keep costs down. To run the day-to-day operations of every team from central headquarters would be foolish from a management standpoint because it would destroy the necessary appearance (and
perhaps the reality) of honest athletic competition. 17 It is clearly good business for each club to be responsible for its own expenses and the quality of
its team.
The practice of having many decisions made and profits determined at a
decentralized level certainly should not distinguish leagues from partnerships or corporations. many of which have the same profit-center type of
management structure. In a law firm, an unequal profit-sharing arrange.
ment or one that allows the lawyer members great latitude to develop their
own practices is not grounds for treating every decision of the firm as an
internal "conspiracy" subject to review by a jury for reasonableness. The
decentralized sports league structure should be treated no differently.
It should be clear that treating every league rule, decision, or act as a
conspiracy of the member teams is pure folly. It is. of course, true that a
league may make bad business decisions from time to time, just as any
business might. A league may even act irrationally or with improper motives. In short, league conduct may occasionally injure consumers or be
unreasonable. But the business decisions of every corporation and partnership are sometimes foolish or injurious to consumers, yet that does not
mean that antitrust policy is furthered by treating their every decision as a
conspiracy. If every time a business acts it is an antitrust conspiracy of the
people making the decision, then every rule, decision. or act can be challenged by any disgruntled person. Business entities that are truly single pro-
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ductive firms simply could not survive the cost and uncertainty of a system
in which they had to defend the economic reasonableness of every company
decision to a jury whenever an employee, customer, supplier or competitor
did not like that decision.
This is the very reason why there is no question that the decision of a
corporation or a partnership to locate a branch office in Oakland instead of
Los Angeles, to require employees to have a college degree, or to require
employee John Doe to work in the company's Kansas City office does not
constitute an illegal conspiracy of the company's partners or board members. It is also the reason why a sports league decision to have its franchises
located in specific cities, to require players to have exhausted college eligibility requirements, or to force its players to play for designated teams
should not be considered an illegal conspiracy of the teams. It is simply
preposterous to presume that juries can generally make such league business decisions more wisely than can the very partners whose profits depend
on acting wisely. It is for this reason that the legal doctrine allowing every
league action to be reviewed by a court as a Sherman Act section I conspiracy of the league partners is irrational and contrary to antitrust policy
and should be permanently scrapped.
Nevertheless, a few remaining policy concerns cause some to insist that
courts should continue to use anticonspiracy law to review the business decisions of sports leagues. These concerns flow from the fact that in each
sport there has always been, except for brief intermittent periods, only one
league. For many purposes, this situation allows the league virtually to dictate terms to many with whom it deals. For example, a player excluded
from the league, assigned to a team he strongly desires not to play for, or
paid a salary he believes is unfair may have no alternative except not to
play at all. A stadium, city, or equipment supplier with whom a league
decides not to do business is often simply out of luck. Few corporations or
traditional partnerships have that kind of power to impact the lives of its
employees, customers, or suppliers so severely. Thus the notion persists
that courts should exercise authority to review the decisions of leagues under section I in order to ensure that league power is exercised fairly.
This concern is certainly not frivolous. The problem, however, is that the
underlying cause of the ability of leagues to wield such power is that for
some purposes. leagues usually possess monopoly power-for example, in
the labor market for players. Monopoly power in any industry is problematic from the standpoint of social and economic policy. which is precisely
Why Sherman Act section 2 proscribes monopolization and attempts to monOpolize. But the law does not, and should never, make it unlawful for a
business firm that has lawfully acquired monopoly power to operate. and it
should never subject that firm's every business decision to a rev sew on
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vague reasonableness grounds by a judge or jury. What is illegal is conduct
designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power. not conduct that merely
exercises it.

If a league has acted unlawfully to become or stay the only major league
in its sport, it can and should be found in violation of section 2. That is
what the interleague cases have all been about. However, if a league has not
improperly become a monopoly or improperly remained one (perhaps because it is a natural monopoly). the antitrust laws should leave it alone. To
try to correct a problem of monopoly power by allowing courts to review
every league business rule or decision under irrelevant section I conspiracy
doctrine, and to strike down on an ad hoc basis any decision with which the
court disagrees or which it believes to be unfair inevitably engenders chaos
and inefficiency. The rash of NFL franchise moves and the frequent threats
of moving by individual NFL owners that have followed the Los Angeles
Coliseum case, after decades of total franchise stability in the NFL. is a
dramatic example. Such cases essentially have created a prescription for
turning the business of running leagues over to hundreds of federal judges
with vastly different philosophies and abilities. In the long run nobod.
gains from such an unpredictable and irrational system.
If leagues do exercise their market power in ways that are unfair or
otherwise contrary to public policy, perhaps Congress should consider
legislative solutions. For example. if unreasonable player practices cannot
be corrected through collective bargaining or under existing labor law
they could be corrected in the same manner that various types of untair
discrimination in employment have been dealt with in civil rights legisla
tion. But such a decision to regulate league conduct must come from Con
gress if the regulation is to achieve established policy goals and still be talr
and consistent. The courts should apply existing law vigorously and cre
atively to correct evils that Congress has declared should be corrected. the,
should not manipulate a law condemning conspiracies to set themselve% .as the arbitrator of every dispute between a league and its actual or poren
tial employees, customers, or suppliers, based on wholly unpredictable id
hoc standards. No other business firm in the United States. monopoly
not, is so saddled with such constant judicial interference (unless Congrehas specifically given the regulators the power to further specific polit.e-.
and to follow specific standards and procedures). Neither should spor*.
leagues be.
NOTES
1. These three decisions were Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Tools,New York Yankees. 346 U.S. 356 (1953): and Federal Baseball Club v. Nil. Leae
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,it Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The scope of the "baseball exemption" is
mimewhat unclear. See Henderson BroadcastingCorp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541
- Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Twin City Sportservice. Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley &

(fo 365 F Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972). rev'd on other grounds. 512 F.2d 1264
19th Cir. 1975) (both cases limiting the exemption to league structure and operations
And player rules). Generally the scope of the exemption is thought to be quite broad,
and it clearly covers all cases involving alleged conspiracies between the member
Jubs in a league.
2. One exception is a group of cases brought against the NFL teams that inLJuded both regular season and preseason game tickets in their season ticket packAge Season ticket buyers in several cities alleged that this practice violated section
1 of the 1914 Clayton Act, which prohibits selling one product conditioned on the
buyer's purchase of a second product. Although the courts have not been uniform in
their reasoning, these cases have all been won by the defendant teams. See Driskill
t Dallas Cowboys Football Club. 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio v. High%oodServices. Inc.. 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club. 492 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots. 1973-1

Trade Cases 174,267 (D. Mass. 1972).
3. The NHL reserve system that emerged from this settlement is described in
detail in a 1979 antitrust case brought by a player who was awarded to the Los
Angeles Kings as "compensation" by an arbitrator after his old team, the Detroit
Red Wings, signed the Kings' star goaltender. The NHL eventually won the case on
the ground that the reserve system had been agreed to by the union in a collective
bargaining agreement and was therefore exempt from antitrust attack. McCourt v.
California Sports. Inc.. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
4. When a defendant has enormous economic power in a market in which it
purchases inputs used to produce its product, as opposed to one in which it sells its
output, it is said to have a "monopsony." Although a monopsony is,conceptually
somewhat different than a monopoly and is relatively rare in antitrust cases, the
economic evil of misallocated resources in either case is essentially the same. and
section 2 of the Sherman Act probably applies equally to both.
5. Examples include Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (ban on oneeyed players found legal); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.. 325 F.
Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp, 1315 (D. Conn.
1977) and Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases 166.012 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (minimum age or college eligibility requirements found unlawful); Molinas v. NBA. 190
F Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (suspension of player connected with gambling found
lawful); Bowman v. NFL, 402 F.Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975) (ban on WFL players
coming into the NFL past mid-season found unlawful).
6. For example, see Mackey v. NFL, 453 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed. 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (commissioner-determined compensation for free
agents found unlawful); Smith v. Pro-FootballInc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir 1979)
(NFL draft found unlawful); Kapp v. NFL. 390 F.Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (draft
and reserve rules were found unlawful, but the NFL eventually won a jury verdict
on the grounds of no injury); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(NBA reserve system found probably unlawful).
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7. In Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied.

467 U.S. 1215 (1984), the court found the NFI's decision not to give a former
Memphis team in the WFL an NFL franchise lawful.
8. In Levin v. NBA. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). the court found the
NBA's decision not to allow a sale of the Boston Celtics to plaintiffs lawful.
9. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (NFL refusal to schedule Raiders game in
Los Angeles found unlawful); San Francisco Seals v. NHL. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (NHL's refusal to schedule Seals game in Vancouver lawful). Also see
NBA v. SDC Basketball Club. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed. 108 S Ct

362 (1987) (NBA has a right to consider and vote on whether Clippers could move
from San Diego to Los Angeles).
10. In United States v. NFL. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). the court found
NFL blackouts of one team's games in another team's city lawful when the other

team is playing at home but unlawful when not playing at home. In both WTWV
Inc. v. NFL. 678 F.2d 142 (1lth Cir. 1982) and Blaich v. NFL. 212 F. Supp. 319

(S.D.N.Y. 1962). the courts ruled that NFL blackouts of television signals within a
75-mile radius of a game is lawful.
11. For example, the court in Carlock v. NFL. an unpublished decision in case
SA-79-CA-133 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 1982). found the NFL decision not to use the
plaintiffs laser gun to spot the ball after each play to be lawful. In Smith v. ProFootball Inc.. an unpublished decision in case no. 1643-70 (D.D.C.. June 27.
1973). aff'd without opinion. case no. 74-1958 (D.C. Cir., September 25. 19751.
the court found the NFL rule requiring the team of an injured player to take a
time-out if there is over a one-minute delay to be lawful.
12. Although no one disputes that the internal cooperation of corporations and
partnerships is not illegal, the doctrinal basis for this conclusion is not necessarilv
the same in both cases. Corporate behavior is lawful clearly because a corporation
is a single firm incapable of conspiring with itself. and its employees and director%
are considered merely parts of the same legal person. See Copperweld. 467 U S
752 (1984). Partnership conduct, on the other hand, is more probably immunized b.
a different legal explanation-that although partners may be legally separate per
sons, their cooperation in running the partnership is always per se lawful. This po
sition is referred to as the doctrine of ancillary restraints. See Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines. Inc.. 792 F.2d 210 (D.D.C. 1986).

13. Although Sherman Act section I expressly prohibits "every" conspiracy in
restraint of trade, since the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision in 1911 the
courts have read this language to proscribe only unreasonable restraints. Thus. it .in
agreement between two persons or entities is considered to be a conspiracy. it i
then subject to the so-called Rule of Reason and condemned only if it is found to be
unreasonable. Although for decades courts believed this rule allowed them to make
subjective assessments about what they intuitively felt was fair and unfair. the L S
Supreme Court has made it clear since the late 1970s that antitrust reasonablenev. n
a term of art defined as being whatever is beneficial for consumer welfare Thus
conspiracies that benefit consumers are not illegal; conspiracies that injure con'.um
ers are.
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14. In many of the cases involving restrictions on players. frequently an overriding issue has been present that obscured the underlying antitrust issues. Courts have
held that when the players' union agrees to a league rule in collective bargaining,
the rule is then immune from antitrust attack because of the so-called nonstatutory
labor exemption. See Powell v. NFL. 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. NBA,
809 F2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. CaliforniaSports. Inc.. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th
Cir 1979); Zimmerman v. NFL. 632 F Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). While the precise
scope and application of the labor exemption is far from clear and is a fascinating
issue of great importance to sports leagues today, it is well beyond the scope of the
present discussion.
15. All sports leagues allow their member clubs to keep a majority or all of the
revenues collected from the sale of tickets to home games. although most leagues
also require that some of this revenue be shared with other league members. Giving
the home team most of the locally generated revenue is done solely in order to
create an incentive for each club to promote its home games vigorously and to develop an exciting winning team. But because each game requires the complete cooperation of the other league members, the league always has the inherent power to
require that all gate revenues be divided equally (or any other way) among the members. just as the NFL divides the network television revenues from all NFL games
equally. If any team refused, the other teams could simply refuse to play it or include it in the league standings. And if a league did require equal sharing of gate
revenues, each member club would be indifferent as to which NFL game any fan
attended since its share of the revenue would be the same either way. Any incentive
the Raiders or any other team has to "compete" with other clubs or to move to a
more lucrative market exists largely because the league allows home teams to keep
most of their locally generated revenue.
16. This voluntary competition is not the type of competition required by the
antitrust laws, and an entity's controlling such voluntary internal competition is not
a "conspiracy" for section I purposes. This phenomenon is nothing more than internal firm rivalry similar to that encouraged by all companies between employees
or divisions as an incentive for them to perform as efficiently as possible-for example, competition engendered by performance bonuses, sales awards. promises of
Promotion, and so on. But when internal rivalry between a company's employees or
divisions becomes so cutthroat that it threatens to injure the company's profits, the
company's efforts to control or eliminate the counterproductive behavior would
never amount to illegal conspiracy.
17. Many decisions in any business are always better made at the local level,
where people are best able to judge what is involved. For example. league executives in New York would be far less able than local executives to judge what an
Individual player is worth to a club, what rent is appropriate for each stadium, how
best to market the local team, or how to cultivate good relationships with local
political and business leaders.
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COMM1rTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON,
DC 20510-6275

January 11, 1993

Bud Selig
c/o Tom Korologos
Timmons & Company
1850 K Street, N.W.
Suite 850
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Bud:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immdity. Your testimony is greatly
appreciated.
Unfortunately,
hearing, there are
Please respond, in
later than Monday,

due to the time constraints on the day of the
a few questions that were not answered.
writing, to the following questions by no
January 25, 1993:

Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1)
-

3

Mr. Selig, the primary argument you make in support of the
exemption is that Baseball needs antitrust immunity in order
to prevent franchises from routinely relocating from one
city to another.
In your testimony, you pointed to the NFL's failure to stop
the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles, as proof of
the importance of the antitrust exemption. But the court
which ruled in favor of the Raiders did not hold that any
effort by a sports league to limit franchise relocations
would violate the antitrust laws.
The court simply did not
like the particular manner in which the NFL tried to stop
the Raiders.
In fact, the court in the Raiders case
indicated that reasonable rules governing franchise
.relocations could withstand antitrust scrutiny. Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,
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726 f.2d 1381, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1984)[hereinafter "Raiders

1].

Three years after the 9th Circuit's decision in the Raiders
case, the court reiterated its view that the antitrust laws
do permit a sports league to impose restrictions on
National Basketball Association v.
franchise relocations.
SDC basketball club, 815 f.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). In that
case, the court specifically rejected the argument that
Raiders I stood for the proposition that the antitrust laws
prevent a sports league from devising rules which limit
The court stated that "neither the
franchise relocations.
jury's verdict in the Raiders case, nor the court's
affirmance of that verdict, held that a franchise movement
rule, in and of itself, was invalid under the antitrust
The court went on to say that "a
laws." Id. at 567.
careful analysis of the Raiders case makes it clear that
franchise movement restrictions are not invalid as a matter
of law." Id. at 568.
Given these statements by the 9th Circuit, please explain
why you continue to take the position that the Raiders case
stands for the proposition that the operation of the
antitrust laws would prevent Baseball from imposing
reasonable restrictions on franchise relocation.
2)

For years, the Baseball owners have agreed among themselves
to divide and allocatesterritories for local television
broadcasting.
In some instances, these territorial
allocations are exclusive. For example, the Red Sox have
the exclusive right to show their games on local television
stations in four New England states. In other instances,
these territorial agreements limit the number of teams who
can sell games to local stations in a particular state. For
example, only the Houston Astros and the Texas Rangers can
sell games to local TV channels in Texas and Louisiana.
In essence, the baseball owners are agreeing among
themselves to divide markets and limit output in an apparent
effort to maximize their revenues from broadcasting.
It is
certainly a tremendous advantage for the owners to be able
to

engage

in

these

kinds

of

agreements

without

fear

of

antitrust exposure.
There may be some pro-consumer benefits to these
restrictions. If so, the Supreme Court has made it clear in
the NCAA case that if the pro-consumer effect of a sports
league's TV agreements outweighed their harm to consumers
and competition, then they would pass muster under the
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
antitrust laws.
of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). That seems to be a
reasonable test. Wouldn't the public be better off if the
- owners' territorial restrictions and local TV contracts were
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the NCAA test?
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Senator Bob Graham's questions:
The Basic Agreement between the American League and the
National League and the Major League Baseball Players
Association, effective January 1, 1990, makes reference in

1)

Article XXIV to the work of the Baseball Economic Study
Committee (Pages 62-64).
Please provide the Subcommittee
with information developed by this group.

2)

In testimony to the Subcommittee on December 10,

1992, Mr.

Allan H. Selig (representing Major League Baseball owners)
stated that when Mr. Pay Vincent took office as commissioner
he did so with the understanding that he would resign if he
lost the confidence of a majority of owners.

Was such an understanding a pre-condition of Mr. Vincent's
employment as commissioner? If so, was such an
understanding also a pre-condition in the employment of
previous commissioners?

Please forward your answers to the attention of Erin
O'Connor, of my Subcommittee staff, at 308 Hart Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C. 20510. If you have any questions,

please contact Ms.
-

O'Connor at (202)224-5701,

FAXI (202)224-5474.

Again, thank you for y9ur contribution.
Very sincerely your

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,

Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights

EMM/eao
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MILWAUKEE BREWERS
BASEBALL CLUB

MILWAUKEE COUNTY STADIUM, MILWAUKEE, WI 53214 (414)933-4114

ALLAN H (BUD)SELIG
President - ChiefExecutive Officer

January 29, 1993

The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies & Business Rights
c/o Erin O'Connor
308 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to appear on behalf of Major
League Baseball before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies & Business
Rights on December 10, 1992. As I hope I made clear during my testimony, Major
League Baseball Takes extremely seriously its obligation to uphold the public's trust
in our great national game. We, therefore, take to heart the concerns raised by the
Subcommittee members at the December 10 hearing. Because I strongly believe
that the public interest would be poorly served by the repeal of Baseball's antitrust
exemption, I appreciate this opportunity to answer the Subcommittee's additional
questions.
I will first respond to the Chairman's two questions.
1. I certainly agree with the chairman's observation that Baseball's ability to
protect the interests of its loyal fans by maintaining stability and continuity in its
franchises is the area in which the exemption has the greatest significance. I must
respectfully disagree, however, with the suggestion that the few legal decisions
applying the antitrust laws to franchise relocations in professional sports (all of
which were decided by the Ninth Circuit) would allow Baseball confidently and
successfully to impose reasonable restrictions on franchise relocations absent its
exemption.
As I indicated on several occasions during my testimony, I am neither a lawyer nor
an expert on the complexities of the antitrust laws. But, as I understand it, the
Chairman is absolutely correct that, as a purely Legal matter, there is no absolute
rule that says that every decision by a professional sports league to block a
franchise relocation is unlawful under the antitrust laws. What I said in my
testimony, and what I sincerely believe to be the case, is that the confusion and
inherent unpredictability caused by the decisions mentioned in your letter mean
that, as a practical matter, a sports league subject to the antitrust laws simply
cannot stop a franchise from relocating.
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The fundamental problem under the current law, from the leagues' perspective, is
that there are no clear cut rules, or "safe Harbors", that can be followed when faced
with a proposed franchise relocation. As the Chairman noted, the Ninth Circuit in
the Raiders cases, and in the Clippers case, did not tell the NFL and NBA that
their franchise relocation rules were invalid in all cases. Instead, I understand that
the court left it to a jury to decide, after considering a myriad of different factors,
whether a league's application of its rules to the specific facts and circumstances of
each particular relocation is an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. I also understand
that the party complaining of the league's decision can prove the league's action
was "unreasonable" if it can merely convince the jury that there was a "less
restrictive" way for the league to address its legitimate concerns. I know there are
many clever economists and lawyers who, for a hefty fee, can think up a less
restrictive alternative to virtually every league rule.
All of this analysis of the "reasonableness" of the league's decision, of course,
necessarily takes place after the fact. When faced with a proposed move, a league
has no way of knowing which factors a jury (which will almost always be a local
jury) will ultimately find persuasive. Nor does it know whether a jury will find that
an alternative proposed by some "expert" which the league, has never even
considered, is a less restrictive one. As a result, the league is in an untenable
position at the time when it must make its decision. Even if it is firmly convinced
that rejection of the proposed move is reasonable in light of the unique facts and
circumstances, the risks of a jury reaching the opposite conclusion in a treble
damage antitrust action are so high that it cannot afford to block the move.
Our recent experience with the San Francisco/St. Petersburg situation provides a
compelling illustration of the realities that would confront Baseball if its exemption
were revoked. As the Subcommittee heard from the many energized advocates
from California and Florida, Baseball was presented with powerful arguments on
both sides of the San Francisco/St. Petersburg debate. But, despite the many
compelling reasons in favor of keeping the Giants where they have played for the
last 35 years, Baseball certainly could not have had absolute (or even reasonable)
confidence that an antitrust jury (probably sitting in Florida) would agree with the
reasonableness of a decision to keep the Giants in San Francisco.
And if, after years of costly litigation, we found out that our decision was not
"reasonable" in the eyes of the Florida jury, the very existence of our league could
be in jeopardy. That the risks of losing an antitrust action on a relocation decision
are this grave is shown by the lawsuits filed in the aftermath of the National
League's Giants decision. Notwithstanding our exemption, Baseball has been sued
by several different groups in several courts under a variety of theories. The
plaintiffs in one of those lawsuits, filed in Florida, have said that the National
League's decision caused them $3 billion in damages. In light of the enormity of
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claims such as these and the wholly unpredictable nature of litigation before juries
under the Ninth Circuit standard, it is easy to understand why Baseball almost
certainly would not have attempted to stop the Giants move if it did not have its
antitrust exemption. It is also easy to understand why Baseball would be virtually
powerless to stop any proposed franchise move - regardless of the merits of the
move.
I think that history subsequent to the Raiders case proves that the antitrust
decisions mentioned in the Chairman's letter have, as a practical matter, made the
other leagues unwilling to try to prevent relocations. Despite overwhelming
opposition within the league, the NFL did not even attempt to take actions against
Robert Irsay when he moved the Colts form Baltimore to Indianapolis under the
cover of the night. Likewise the NBA did not even attempt to stop the Clippers
from moving to Los Angeles because it was threatened with an antitrust lawsuit that
it could not afford to lose. Instead, it filed a declaratory judgment action after the
fact and sought money damages from the Club. The Clippers, of course, still play
in Los Angeles. Indeed, as I indicated in my testimony, no sports league other than
Baseball has successfully prohibited a franchise from moving since the Raiders case.
In sum, although I agree with the Chairman that there is no bright line rule of law
that sports leagues cannot stop franchise relocations, I strongly disagree that, absent
its exemption, Baseball could continue to apply the pro-stability policies that have
served the game and the public so well over the past twenty years. The lack of any
safe harbors and the enormous cost of being wrong have combined to make the
leagues that are subject to the antitrust laws impotent to protect the interests of
their fans. I strongly believe that it would not be in the public's interest to render
Baseball equally helpless to protect its fans.
2. Before responding to the Chairman's question regarding Baseball's broadcasting
rules, I want to clear up any confusion that might have resulted from my response
to Senator Specter's question on pay television. Senator Specter asked if Baseball
could commit that it would not put World Series or League Championship Series
games on pay television through the year 2000. I indicated that I could not foresee
the circumstances under which we would put any of our post-season games on pay
television during that time frame. In responding in this matter, I understood
Senator Specter to be referring to pay-per-view television and not cable television.
After reading the transcript of the entire hearing, however, I am not sure how
Senator Specter was defining "pay". I, therefore, want to address the cable issue.
Although Baseball has no current plans to move post-season games to cable
television, it is at least possible that some post-season games could be sold to a
cable broadcaster before the year 2000 if our play-offs are expanded or if the overthe-air networks show no interest in certain play-off games. Having said that, I
cannot foresee the circumstances under which World Series games would be on
cable television before the year 2000.
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With respect to the substance of the Chairman's second question, I must first
respectfully take issue with the statement that Baseball has placed territorial
restrictions on the Clubs' broadcasting rights in an effort to maximize broadcasting
revenues. Our territorial restrictions are not intended to, nor in fact do they,
maximize broadcasting revenues. Rather, the restrictions are a necessary result of
the interdependence of our teams. Because all of our teams depend on the success
of the other teams in the league for their own success (quite unlike "competitors"
in the normal industry setting), Baseball must adopt policies that ensure that all of
its Clubs, even those in small markets, have the economic wherewithal to compete
on the field. As explained below, the territorial restrictions play a critical role in
this effort.
First the territorial restrictions allow Baseball to sell television packages to national
broadcasters who will show the games of al of our clubs in all parts of the country.
We have been criticized by some for having too few games on "free" national
television. But, without our territorial restrictions, we would be unable to sell any
national games - on free or cable television. If the individual Clubs were able to
sell the rights to broadcast their games wherever they desired, we could not give
national broadcasters the exclusivity they demand. Although our national
broadcasting contracts have benefitted all of our member Clubs, they have been
critical in keeping our small market Clubs afloat. Without the revenues from these
packages, several small market Clubs would be unable to survive.
Moreover, the "home market" protections provided by the territorial restrictions
enable our smaller market Clubs to sell not only their local broadcasting rights, but
also tickets to their games. If all of the other Clubs could sell their television rights
in the Cleveland metropolitan market, for instance, the Cleveland broadcasters
might find that there is more consumer interest in teams other than the Indians.
Those broadcasters could find it more lucrative to buy rights from the Yankees and
the Dodgers, and the Indians could find themselves unable to sell their television
rights in their own home market. Not only would this leave the Indians without a
major revenue source, it would greatly hamper their ability to foster the type of
local following that is necessary for successful home attendance. Following the
home team on television develops an allegiance in fans who will then go out and
watch the team play in person. Without the protection of the territorial restrictions,
the special relationship that develops between baseball fans and "their" hometown
team would be at risk.
My own situation in Milwaukee is instructive. Despite the territorial restrictions,
we have been unable to secure a cable contract for the Brewers 'games. Without
the restrictions, we might not be able to secure any local television package. If that
happened, we obviously could not survive in Milwaukee. We could not generate
the type of revenues necessary to put a competitive team on the field. Clubs in
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other small market cities would be in the same predicament. Further expansion in
Baseball has been suggested by this Subcommittee. But if Baseball were unable to
provide Clubs with the home market protections afforded by the restricted
broadcasting territories, Baseball could not survive in many of its existing cities, let
alone expand into additional markets. Such a result, I submit, is not in the public
interest
The Problem with the NCAA test mentioned in the Chairman's question is that
Baseball's concern for the survival of franchises in cities that have supported teams
for as long as 100 years is not a concern of the antitrust laws. As the Chairman
indicated in his question, the NCAA decision made clear that "consumer welfare"
is the only concern of the antitrust laws. Consumer welfare in this context means
only the welfare of the consumers of televised baseball games. The Court in the
NCAA case said that broader interests such as those Baseball seeks to protect with
its territorial restrictions are irrelevant to the antitrust inquiry. In fact, professional
sports leagues' legitimate need to protect interests other than those of the broadcast
consumers was one of the reasons why Congress passed the limited antitrust
exemption in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.
While "consumer welfare' might be enhanced, I do not believe that the public
would be better off if they could watch as many as ten different baseball games on
television on any given night if it meant that baseball was actually played in only
the five or six largest cities in our country. The many baseball fans in cities like
Cleveland, Pittsburgh and San Diego would certainly not agree that their interests
were served by a decision that threatened the continued viability of the franchise
in their city, no matter how many choices they had with respect to televised
baseball. So I strongly disagree with the suggestion that the public would be better
off if Baseball's television rules were subject to the NCAA test.
I now turn to Senator Graham's two questions.
1. At my insistence, Baseball has made the entire Report of the Baseball
Economic Study Committee available to the public. I have attached a copy of the
Report to this letter for Senator Graham. Please let me know if the Subcommittee
needs any additional copies.
2. The answer to this question is no. Fay Vincent was elected to serve out the
remainder of Bart Giamatti's term under the most difficult circumstances. Most
owners knew very little about Fay at the time of Bart's death. In recognition of the
unique circumstances the led to his election, Fay stated that he would need to gain
the owner's confidence in his leadership to successfully complete Bart's term. At
the suggestion of the owners, Fay told the Clubs at the time of his election that he
would step down if he lost their confidence.
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I hope that I have been fully responsive to your questions. If you or Senator
Graham need any further information with respect to any of these issues, or if any
Subcommittee member has any additional questions, please let me know. As I
indicated at the outset, I appreciate the Subcommittee's concern and I want to
provide all of the information that you deem relevant to your inquiry. I am
confident that once the Subcommittee reviews all of the material it has gathered,
it will conclude that the continuation of Baseballs antitrust exemption is truly in
the public's interest.
Sincerely,

Allan H.Sehg
AHS:1sk
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Senator METZENBAUM. Our next witness is Donald M. Fehr, executive director of the Major League Baseball Players Association.
Mr. Fehr, we are happy to have you with us. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DONALD M. FEHR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW
YORK, NY
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been privileged to
be, first, the general counsel and then the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association for 15 years, and I
think it is fair to say that the players have considerably more experience in a more direct way over a longer period of time with baseball and its owners and how the antitrust exemption operates than
anyone else does.
With all due respect to the witnesses that we have had, I want
to suggest at the outset that I don't think these issues are all that
involved or all that complicated or all that difficult to understand,
and what I would like to do is just take a couple of minutes to outline what I believe are the overriding structural causes of the discussions that we have heard here today.
The first thing is that, as has been noted, baseball is an unregulated, antitrust-exempt-if it is not a cartel, it is cartel enough like
that it might as well be one. States may not regulate it because of
the peculiar way the Supreme Court acted in the Flood case. So to
the extent that public policy is being made, it is being made in
owners meetings.
Second, I suggest the issue is not at all whether there is a strong
commissioner or weak commissioner, something to which I will return in a few moments, but simply whether or not, regardless of
what the commissioner thinks, the law should permit what could
be considered unreasonably anticompetitive behavior.
I suggest that if any other industry came before you and said
don't apply this statute to us, whatever it is, which applies to everyone else because we will hire and pay someone that we will select because we like his or her views and he will take care of it all,
it would not be given a serious response.
I would also point out that David Stern of the NBA is generally
considered to be the strongest commissioner of any sport in the
modern era-a view that I share. That has been accomplished quite
apart from any necessity to have protection from the antitrust
laws.
The question that I would ask is one that I posed in my written
statement, which is, is there any explanation at all why a market
the size of Florida is not filled by an industry catering to consumers unless there was an interest on behalf of those controlling the
industry in not filling it and they were unafraid that anyone else
would do so? There is no alternative source of supply, so the individuals responsible for marketing baseball need not fill the markets. No one else will get a toe-hold.
We have a circumstance in baseball in which the public policy
must be, it seems to me, on the expansion issue-more teams rather than less, more opportunities for more fans to watch games up
close and personal than less. At the moment, that matter is decided
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entirely in owners meetings, as it always has been, and is not
reviewable by anyone on any basis.
Just a moment on the structure of baseball. In case there are any
members of this subcommittee or other Senators in attendance who
don't know, this is not an industry in which you can come into the
industry, you can open up a business and, if you sell a good product, you can do well; you can satisfy the consumer.
The facts are that the number of teams, where they play, what
the area of territorial and broadcast exclusivity will be, and indeed
who the owners will be, are all determined by the existing members of organized baseball. It is an extraordinary proposition.
There are problems in some small markets because the existing
revenue sharing agreements, if you will, are out of date. The revenue streams have changed. The revenue sharing agreements
haven't been maintained, and so some markets now generate vastly
more revenue than others, and that has effects like it would in any
other business. But the problem, I suggest, is not with anything except the structure that the owners created themselves, and they
can change that structure if they have the will to do that or it
could be examined by someone to determine if it was unreasonably
anticompetitive.
I must say that on the situation in San Francisco/Oakland, it
was a rather perplexing circumstance for the players. The owners
have been taking hard positions with the players in bargaining for
years, and in every negotiation beginning with 1981 through and
including 1990, one of the reasons has been that the San Francisco
Bay area is too small to support two teams; we won't revenueshare. Therefore, the players must make concessions to support
that. This is an extraordinary proposition, I think.
On the expansion and market issues, again, I believe that matters are much more simple than they have been described. In reading some of my prior testimony in 1985 on one of the relocation
bills, I noticed that I predicted that expansion would be long in
coming, even though it had been recently promised, and that eventually baseball would whittle it down to two markets at high prices
a long time from 1985. Regrettably, I was right. I suggest that
Commissioner Uebberoth, who was a very strong commissioner
during his tenure, did substantially nothing about expansion that
could be considered significant.
You get an idea of the attitude created by this special privilege
in connection with a couple of the statements that are made. One
has been talked about a lot here today. Is Tampa Bay baseball's
market? Well, it obviously shouldn't be, but it is equally obvious
the owners believe it to be, to be served when and as they choose.
It is not something that we would ordinarily in this country expect
to happen.
The second is Commissioner Vincent's comments about diluting
equity as a reason not to do that. Well, of course, you dilute equity
is a reason not to do that. If you have 28 owners that own all of
the country for baseball purposes and you add more, each one owns
less, so the equity is diluted.
Senator Biden in 1982, in one of these hearings, I think, summed
up the situation very well, better than I certainly have ever been
able to. He asked a witness if it weren't true that franchise reloca-
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tion was a zero sum game, the suggestion being, of course, that as
long as you have a limited number of teams, someone must lose,
and that is obviously the case.
I was struck listening to the comments of Senator Feinstein and
remembering a call I had from Mayor Jordan when the matter first
arose, which reflect both the anguish that they felt as public officials at the suggestion the team would be lost and then the joy and
the relief that was felt by themselves and their constituents when
that didn't happen. But wherever there is the joy and the relief,
there must necessarily be the anguish. That is what the zero sum
game is.
Senator METZENBAUM. Can you wind up?
Mr. FEHR. I just have one other comment, if I could, on commissioners. I would point out that the longest commissioner in recent
baseball history in terms of tenure was Bowie Kuhn. The current
football commissioner is Paul Tagliabue. The current basketball
commissioner is David Stern. What they all have in common is
very simple. They were all the owners' lawyers and chief negotiators before they became commissioner. There is no suggestion
these were independent people or people they were not otherwise
familiar with, or that they indeed did not develop the very positions which guide the owners' positions in things.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr. We will
have 5-minute rounds and only one round.
Mr. Fehr, even though baseball has an antitrust exemption,
major league players have prospered during the last 16 years
under your union. This year, average salaries for baseball players
will be $1 million. Some baseball owners attribute their financial
problems to these high player salaries.
My concern is that ultimately it is the fans who get stuck with
the bill for high player salaries. Mr. Fehr, why should the fans believe that they would be better off if baseball's antitrust exemption
were lifted and the players could negotiate directly with the owners
in a free market?
Mr. FEHR. First of all, what the players do now under the terms
the union has been able to negotiate for most of the higher priced
players, certainly, is that they do negotiate in a free market, and
that, after all, is what anyone else does in this country. You have
the freedom to look for a job. That is not something we take as special or unusual, and the market determines what value is.
The situation that you have now, though, means that there
aren't very many teams compared to the potential markets. Fans
can't watch games compared to what they might otherwise be able
to do, and they are disadvantaged because the product they want
to buy is not as readily available as it might otherwise be.
The last comment I would make is on ticket prices, and that is
that I have never seen a study which demonstrates a positive correlation between player salaries and ticket prices or anything else.
There is a reason for that. The reason is that the territorial exclusivity provides each team with what amounts to a local monopoly.
There isn't any baseball competition for that team, and so prices
tend to be set simply upon marginal revenue product determinations.
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Senator METZENBAUM. When the owners voted to reopen the collective bargaining agreement in the past, there has been a lockout
or a strike every time you have had to meet at the bargaining
table. Speaking as a fan, I would hope that it won't happen this
time. However, in light of the reopening, I am particularly concerned about your testimony that the antitrust exemption has "contributed to the continued labor strife between the owners and the
players." Can you give us some specific examples of how it has contributed to labor strife?
Mr. FEHR. I will give you two specific ones-three. In 1976, admittedly at a time when the development of the law and the labor
exemption was different than it is now, the players became free
agents through an arbitration decision. The owners responded with
a lockout which lasted most of spring training. Eventually, there
was an agreement reached that summer.
It strikes me that it would have been vastly less likely that the
issue of whether a player can look for another job at appropriate
points in his career if his contract is over would have to be resolved
in a labor confrontation had the antitrust laws applied. It is not
perfect. They still have fights in football. But in basketball, every
collective bargaining agreement in recent years has been wrapped
up in a consent decree in an antitrust case. They have had no
strikes and they have had no lockouts.
The last thing is the worst problem the players have had in the
last several years was massive collusion, or simply boycotting of
free agents and then price fixing by the owners in the late 1980's.
It strikes me as immensely less likely that the owners would have
engaged in that process had they been subject to a risk of treble
damages. That has contributed more than anything else in recent
times to extremely bad labor relations.
Senator METZENBAUM. I understand that baseball's antitrust exemption gives the owners a unique advantage during collective bargaining. Incidentally, I think I agree with you that this idea that
owners can collectively agree not to do business with a baseball
player strikes me as rather shocking and contrary to what I think
the free enterprise system is about.
In other professional sports, if the two sides reach an impasse
and the owners try to impose rules on the players unilaterally,
players have the option of suing them under the antitrust laws.
You describe that as a safety valve. If the owners and players were
to reach an impasse during the upcoming negotiations, could the
owners impose terms on the players unilaterally at any point, and
if so wouldn't that put the players in the position of either having
to work under terms dictated by the owners or to strike because
they don't have the safety valve of the antitrust laws?
Mr. FEHR. It removes that option, certainly, Senator. As you
know, under the labor law, if a bona fide impasse is reached in collective bargaining, at some point management can choose, if it
wants to, to implement conditions equivalent to its last offer in bargaining. The employees may strike at that point or later on if they
want to.
What happened in football after the 1987 strike, quite bluntly,
was that for all practical purposes the union was broken. But as
recent events have shown, there was a safety valve for the players
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which has provided a way for them to not suffer the continuation
of the anticompetitive practices. In baseball, if the owners were
ever able to break the union, they could rest, unless the law was
changed, on the notion that their problems were over.
Senator METZENBAUM. Under the circumstances that you have
just described, can you give the committee any assurance that the
players won't strike during the 1993 season?
Mr. FEHR. I can give the committee the assurances that the players don't want to. It is for any union or anyone that has ever represented them the last alternative you come to when others are exhausted. Nobody wants to do that; people want to go to work. The
problem is that we did not reopen the agreement. The owners did,
and once that process starts and you are in bargaining, what has
to happen is dictated by the course of the bargaining. All I can say
is it is not something the players will do unless they believe it is
absolutely necessary. It would not and could not have happened absent the reopener.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig testified that the owners have
used their antitrust immunity to prevent franchise relocations.
However, the owners have also used their antitrust immunity to
approve franchise relocations. My point is that the owners can use
their antitrust immunity as they see fit to either block or approve
a franchise relocation. The decision seems to depend on what is in
their best interest at the time.
Wouldn't the cities, the players, and the fans be better off if the
owners didn't have unfettered discretion on franchise relocations,
but instead were forced by the antitrust laws to develop reasonable
rules and procedures to govern those decisions?
Mr. FEHR. I certainly would agree with that general sentiment,
Senator, yes, and if there would be a way, in addition, to have
some vehicle for there to be more than one entity so there could
be competition for vacant markets, I suggest most of these discussions would have been long since academic.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.
Fehr.
Mr. FEHR. Thank you.
Senator MACK. It is good to see you again. I appreciate the conversations that we have had over the last several years. In listening to the responses that Mr. Selig gave to my questions about
Tampa-St. Pete getting a team, it kind of went something like this.
Expansion, no; voluntary movement, no; bankruptcy, yes. Really,
the message was just wait until a team is bankrupt and then you
folks down in Tampa-St. Pete probably will get a team. I would
suggest that there should be some alternative to that, and both you
and I, I think, share the same perspective.
In my opening comments, I referred to free markets. I am convinced that, while it won't solve every problem facing major league
baseball, if the owners would accept the concept of free markets,
I think we would see more teams, more players, more fans, and,
I would make the argument, more profits. I mean, I heard Mr.
Selig over and over and over again talk about this terrible condition that major league baseball finds itself in.
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As my colleague, Senator Graham, pointed out, I think one of the
reasons for that is because they have refused to go to the markets
on a timely basis, so I guess really kind of several things in there.
Do you agree with that basic approach? Second, if the exemption
were lifted, would that, in fact, open up the player market so that
the possibility of another league could come forward and expansion
could take place that way?
Mr. FEHR. There are lots of questions there. Let me try and take
them in some sort of a logical order. First, the artificial scarcity of
franchises does create the current problem, and if I may be so bold,
I think that San Francisco and Tampa have the same problem.
They know that one of them will lose. There are desperate attempts not to be the one that loses, and so, to say the least, you
have civic decisions made in circumstances more extreme than they
might otherwise be. You both would have been better off, both
areas, were there more teams.
Second, one of the effects of eliminating the exemption, I think,
would be to put pressure on the minor league system and the locking up of all the players. That would give rise to the possibility
that there could be additional leagues in a way that is not realistic
now. I assume that it is at least possible that someone would examine whether or not there is a section 2 issue as to whether there
should be the existing league and it be the only one that could
come up and be discussed.
The third benefit, I think, that the minor league issue would
have is that I am one of those people that believes we don't have
college baseball simply because the minor leagues exist. The major
league clubs draft 18-year-old kids, tell them that this is their one
and only chance to sign with major league baseball with this one
and only club and, in effect, pressure them not to go to college,
which strikes me as peculiarly not in the public interest, but that
is the way the system works.
I don't know that I got all your questions, but if I missed oneSenator MACK. I think you did.
Mr. FEHR. OK, thank you.
Senator MACK. Let us just explore that minor league thing for
just a moment. Again, when we have been in discussions about expansion, one of the things we were told-you know, I heard somebody say there are not enough left-handed pitchers. The impression
that we get is that we are a country that really just barely has
enough ball players to take care of the 28 teams that we now have.
Is there another approach that we ought to take a look at with respect to what is going on with the minor leagues that, in fact, will
strengthen major league baseball?
Mr. FEHR. One of the things that the interlocking major leagueminor league system with a limited number of franchises produces
is limited opportunities. People understand that. Everybody would
understand there are more major league jobs if there were 10 or
15 or 25 percent more teams than there are now.
I have been of two views with respect to the player availability
issue. The first one is that I just don't believe it is true that we
can have a population vastly larger, that blacks can play now, as
they did not before 1947, that significant numbers of players can
come from Latin America and more recently from Canada, and nev-
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ertheless the proportion of teams to the population has fallen dramatically. That strikes me as implausible.
Second, however, I think there is a pragmatic approach which
makes sense, and that is that if that is true, test it out by a series
of additions of teams, and when and if that problem occurs and the
product is no longer commercially viable, that will become apparent. I would not want to assume that before the process begins.
Senator MACK. Just one last question because I see my time is
about up. What happens to player salaries, though, as a result of
lifting the exemption, increasing the number of teams, increasing
the number of players that are available? What happens in that
kind of a market?
Mr. FEHR. I don't think there is any way to tell what happens
there. I think that it will depend a lot more on the overall economy
and how the game is marketed and what happens with what I in
shorthand call the telecommunications revolution than anything
else.
Having said that, I do want to make one point clear. We have
not-the players have never taken the position that the union's
goal should be to march in and determine what all the salaries
should be, although the clubs have asked us to from time to time.
What we have said is that the market ought to determine that both
in the individual case and in the aggregate case.
If you assume you will have a market level of salaries, whatever
that turns out to be, it can't be something, I suggest, by definition,
which causes major economic problems unless the industry is structured in such a way that you have people that just can't compete
with others.
Senator MACK. I probably should know this, but have you all
taken a position on the exemption? Do you favor the lifting of the
exemption?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. We have had that position for a very long time
both for some pragmatic, safety-valve reasons and for what we believe are sound public policy reasons.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.

Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Don, I am curious as to what has motivated
baseball's activities in the last 20 years. In the period from the
mid-1950's, which was about when the first relocation and then
subsequently expansion-until the mid-1970's, attendance at major
league baseball almost doubled. Actually, attendance had dropped
from 1950 to 1955 from 17.5 million to 16.6 million, then surged
over the next 20 years up to 31.3 million. So that period could be
characterized as one of instability, using the standards of our first
two speakers. It was actually a period of significant fan growth and
general prosperity.
Then beginning in the mid-1970's, the period of opposition to relocation-and but for the last two expansions into Colorado and
Florida, no expansion has occurred. What happened in the early to
mid-1970's that caused such a radical shift in baseball's assessment
of what its best interests would be?
Mr. FEHR. I think a couple of reasons. I am doing some speculating here, but I think a couple of things are reasonably obvious. The
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first one is that something happened at the same tixe, we believe,
caused by the coming of free agency in 1976, which is that overall
revenues and franchise values and attendance and television revenues began to skyrocket, and that had its effect on player salaries,
in addition to catching back up to the free market.
As that began to happen, I think it is natural that owners would
say if there are more of us and that doesn't increase the revenue
proportionately, then my proportional share might not be as great.
At the same time, you had the relocation of the Raiders to Los Angeles. That produced a result, which was that the NFL wanted to
come to the Congress and say we need antitrust freedom at this
point, too, having left Los Angeles without a market.
I think that, as Senator Feinstein would agree, most people in
Los Angeles would not consider Anaheim and Los Angeles the
same place. Why shouldn't there be two? Why shouldn't there be
three, including Oakland? And the reason was the league wasn't
ready to yet. I have always viewed the Raiders case as who gets
to sell the Los Angeles market, Al Davis or the league, and not
really about much of anything else. That slowed down, I believe,
all of the efforts toward expansion toward additional markets, and
the franchise values began to grow even more, the potential benefits of restricting the number of franchises grew proportionately.
Simply put, a threat to relocate the White Sox, for example, to
St. Petersburg is not credible unless there is a St. Petersburg to
threaten to relocate to. I know Senator Simon isn't here now, but
I was struck by his comment earlier. I seem to recall the Illinois
Legislature literally stopping the clock so they would have extra
time in the session so that they could provide the necessary funding so the team wouldn't leave. Whatever they were under, it was
not a lack of pressure.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr.
Senator GRAHAM. Don, one final question which really draws
from that Illinois experience-and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
put into the record a page from a book.
Senator MACK. I thought you were going to submit the whole
book.
Senator GRAHAM. Its author is going to be with us later.
Senator METZENBAUM. If we ever get to him.

[An excerpt from the above-mentioned book follows:]
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other team should not be allowed to relocate just the same way that a
Coca-Cola plant can relocate at will. Testifying next, broadcaster Howard
Cosell was asked what he thought of Turner's comment. Cosell responded without subtlety: "I find that argument really could not appeal
to anybody over the age of six . .. they talk out of both sides of their
mouths. They have developed an everspinning spiral of hypocrisy and
deceit that ascends up to the heavens." 2 Less poetically, Bill Veeck made
a similar appraisal of the Braves' move, calling it baseball's "latest-testimonial to the power of pure greed."2
Although no MLB team has packed its bags since 1972, a number of
teams threatened to do so in 1990 and 1991, including the Montreal
Expos, the Houston Astros, the Detroit Tigers, the Chicago White Sox,
the Milwaukee Brewers, the Cleveland Indians, the San Francisco
Giants, and the Seattle Mariners. The White Sox talked about moving to
St. Petersburg, Florida, which was offering a generous package of financial incentives as well as a new domed stadium. Chicago rewarded the
White Sox for their loyalty with a new stadium, equipped with modem luxury boxes projected to yield additional revenues over $5 million
annually.
Under the original agreement for a new White Sox stadium, the Illinois State Legislature created the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority
(ISFA) and authorized the expenditure of up to $120 million to build the
new ballpark. After St. Petersburg sweetened its offer, Chicago was compelled to reciprocate. The final plan called for $150 million for stadium
construction, financed by revenue bonds and a 2 percent hotel tax. Strong
neighborhood opposition from the low-income residents who would be
forced from their homes was eventually quieted by offering homeowners
market price for their homes plus a $25,000 cash bonus toward moving
expenses. Renters got moving expenses plus a $4,500 bonus plus $250
per month as a rent differential for one year.2 The city, of course, bore
these extra expenses. Chicago and the State of Illinois agreed to split any
operating losses on the stadium of up to $10 million per year. From 1991
to 2001 the ISFA will pay the Sox $2 million as a maintenance subsidy,
to be increased in later years; if attendance falls below 1.5 million per
year in the second decade of operations, the ISFA is obligated to buy
300,000 tickets per year.27 Asked if the White Sox painted the state
legislature into a corner, Representative Jim Stange replied: "Absolutely,
they held us up." 2n
The Tigers are involved in politically charged negotiations with Detroit for a new stadium. Domino's Pizza entrepreneur Thomas Monaghan owns the Tigers and is using ex-Michigan Wolverine coach Bo
Schembechler as his point man with the city. Despite Detroit's $34-
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Senator GRAHAM. And that is the extraordinary lengths that the
Illinois Legislature and the city of Chicago went to in order to keep
the White Sox there. If this policy of no relocation and the sanctity
of stability were the case, what credible threat did the White Sox
have to wield over the head of the State and the city? Why didn't
they just dismiss this as an idle menace and seek their protection
from the stability of major league owners against relocation?
Senator METZENBAUM. Very briefly, Mr. Fehr.
Mr. FEHR. I believe that your presumption is right that the policy
didn't really work, and its purpose, in my judgment, was not to
work in this fashion. You will notice that major league baseball's
officials did not complain about the potential relocation of the
White Sox unless and until it got to the point of an actual relocation. That is for a reason, because you can't have a bidding process
if you are suggesting that there is not going to be any sale.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Febr.
Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Febr, there is a limited amount of time, so let me go the
heart of the question relating to a possible lockout, and caps and
revenue sharing. There have been suggestions about revenue sharing for baseball like there is revenue sharing for the National Football League on television, and there has been talk that revenue
sharing alone will not work without a salary cap.
I understand that this goes right into the heart of your concern
representing players, but what can be done realistically, if anything, on a franchise like the Pittsburgh Pirates, where Bonilla has
already left and Barry Bonds is on his way out? There is not much
left of the franchise if, one by one, you strip away all the best players. And there is not much prospect for the future of the Pirates
if that is to be the habit, players bought by wealthy owners or by
teams in big markets with a lot of money. What can be done to stop
that kind of an exodus from Pittsburgh?
Mr. FEHR. Two or three things come up. First of all, I must suggest it is Bonilla. Bobby would be upset with me if I didn't make
that correction. In the overall situation, you have always had baseball teams that stripped themselves because they thought it was in
their short-term economic advantage to do that. The Oakland A's
stripped a championship team in 1975 and 1976. There was no free
agency. There was nothing yet at that point that would have suggested any need to do that.
Senator SPECTER. But they did it themselves.

Mr. FEHR. Yes. Second, what Barry Bonds or Bobby Bonilla or
any other player finds himself in is the following situation. He is
drafted out of high school or college, signs with an organization,
and until he gets to 6 years in the major leagues, by which point
you have eliminated 99-plus percent of all players who ever play
professional baseball, he has never once had the opportunity to go
and look for a job somewhere. That is all free agency is, this miraculous term; it is "I would like to go and look for a job like anyone
else does."
The question then becomes is baseball structured in such a way
so that, given the revenue streams in the 1990's, is it not very likely that Pittsburgh is going to be able to have the assets and the
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income that some of the other markets will. The answer to that
may well be yes. The question that we see is then the revenue
sharing agreements need to be revisited.
The other point I would say on the question of caps is really a
very simple one. Here is the question when it is put to the players:
We would like you to agree to a salary cap. Why? Well, Pittsburgh
doesn't have a lot of money. Why won't the big markets give them
any money? Well, they don't want to give them any money, and
that then leads to the following question. Would the players be
paid more or less if you had a salary cap, and the answer is they
would be paid more if you didn't have a salary cap. That makes
bargaining extremely difficult.
Senator SPECTER. With the yellow light still on and about to turn
to red, you have players like Barry Bonds with a very high salary
and you have a lot of players with a lower salary. I am not suggesting a conflict of interest because you represent them all, but don't
you have very substantially competing interests between the players at the lower end of the salary scale and those at the upper end
of the salary scale in representing the association as a whole?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, we do, as any union does. The job of the union
and the responsibility it has under Federal law is, in a democratic
fashion, to meld those interests and to come up with a position.
When and if the players feel that the current position is not the
one that they any longer want to adopt, it will change. It is their
decision.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I have no questions.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein has no questions. I
want to thank you, Mr. Febr. I think some of us do have additional
questions. I am sorry we don't have more time, but we are sort of
starting to run out of it. Thank you. Your testimony has been extremely helpful.
Mr. FEHR. I understand. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
[Mr. Fehr submitted the following material:]
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STATEMENT OF DONALD M. FEHR
Executive Director, Major League
Baseball Players Association

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES, AND BUSINESS RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

102nd Congress, Second Session
10 December 1992
Oversight Hearine on Baseball's Antitrust Exemotion

Mr. chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Donald M. Fehr.

I became the General Counsel of

the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) on August
1, 1977, and its Executive Director in December, 1983.

The MLBPA

is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
Major League Players, on whose behalf I appear here today.

I

welcome the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee and
present the Players' views with respect to baseball's antitrust
exemption.

For the reasons set forth below, baseball's unique

and privileged status should be eliminated.

Over the last decade, various Congressional committees and
subcommittees have looked into antitrust issues in the context of
professional sports, particularly with respect to the location
and relocation of franchises.

However, in my fifteen year tenure

with the MLBPA, this is the first oversight hearing directly
concerned with baseball's exemption.

While recent events, such

as the proposed relocation of the San Francisco Giants to St.
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Petersburg and the owners'

firing of Commissioner Vincent, no

doubt sparked the interest which led to this hearing, its

focus

should be more comprehensive than an inquiry, no matter how
detailed, into those events.

Rather, I respectfully suggest that

the focus of your attention should be and remain on one
fundamental question:

What is the public uolicv basis upon which

an antitrust exemption for baseball's owners should be continued?
If

an appropriate public policy basis cannot be found - and it

is

my strong belief that no such justification exists - then the
special privilege enjoyed by baseball's owners should fall.

I.

The Historical Basis for the Exemption

The starting point is the Supreme Court's decision in
Federal Baseball Club v. National LeaSMe,

In

259 US 200 (1922).

short, the Court determined that baseball, although a business,
neither operated interstate nor was the subject of commerce,

and

that as a result, the federal antitrust laws did not apply to
baseball.

Thus was the exemption born.

That such a sweeping

holding also threw into question whether at that time the
Congress could regulate baseball at all seems not to have been
noticed.

That is,

however,

of considerable interest in light of

the Court's subsequent ruling exempting baseball from the ambit
of state antitrust laws.

In essence, Federal Baseball gave to baseball's owners the
right to operate their business in cartel-like fashion.

ago, the Supreme Court recognized its mistake.
cases,

Long

In subsequent

the Court refused to extend baseball's exemption to any

other professional sport or business, and specifically noted that
baseball would be held subject to the antitrust laws if the Court
were to consider baseball's status for the first time.

SAg.,

&&j,

Radovich v. National Football League, 352 US 445 (1956).
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But while the Court has confessed its error it has refused
to remedy it by overruling Federal Baseball.

In Flood v. Kuhn,

407 US 258 (1972), the most recent baseball case to come before
it, the Supreme Court flatly held, as it had nearly twenty years
earlier in Toolson 346 US 356 (1953), that the business of
baseball was interstate commerce, and that the rationale of
Federal Baseball was simply wrong.

In his majority opinion,

Justice Blackmun wrote that baseball's exemption was "in
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.
.

.

Thasl become an aberration. .

.

."

a ve

Federal Baseball

[Emphasis added.]

Notwithstanding these strong words, the Court nevertheless
permitted the exemption to stand, on stare decisis grounds.
Justice Blackmun cited Congressional "inaction" as the reason
that the Court should decline to remedy the effects of erRal
Baseball.

The "illogic" of the Court's decision, he wrote, could

only be remedied by the Congress.

Concurring, Chief Justice

Burger wrote that the time had come for "the Congress [to act] to
solve this problem."

(See also the dissenting opinions of

Justices Douglas and Marshall.)
By rejecting the rationale of Federal Baseball, but then
holding that the need for uniformity and the potential for
burdening interstate commerce precluded the application of state
antitrust laws, the Court compounded its mistake.

ederal

Baseball, which originally had stood for the proposition that the
Congress lacked the power to legislate with respect to baseball,
had become instead an expression that Congress alone had the
power to regulate baseball.

It

is difficult to imagine a more

convoluted course to an illogical result.
was the perfect result:

But for the owners it

they were subject to the legislation of

neither the federal nor any state government.

Accordingly, twenty years ago the Court made clear that
there was no legal basis upon which the exemption should have
been granted or should be permitted to continue, except that the
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Congress had preserved the Court's error through its

inaction.

In this way the Court avoided coming to terms with its prior
the
decision, and cast the blame for baseball's exemption upon
about it.
Congress, as well as the responsibility to do something
Baseball's exemption

But the Congress has done nothing about it.

on
was last examined in 1976 by the House Select Committee
Professional Sports (Sisk Committee).

The Clubs, predictably,

was
urged the Select Committee to conclude that the exemption
justified and should be retained.

However,

in its

final report,

the Committee's judgment was otherwise:
Based on the information available to it,

the Committee has

concluded that adequate lustification does not exist for
baseball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and
that its exemption should be removed in the context of
overall sports antitrust reform.

[Emphasis added.]

Similarly, the Department of Justice has consistently
expressed the view that baseball's exemption should be
eliminated.

For example, Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Lipsky testified before the House Judiciary Committee on July 14,
1981, that the exemption "is an anachronism and should be
eliminated."
Baseball,

Yet today, more than seventy years after Fedral

baseball's owners continue to enjoy the freedom to

operate their business as a shared monopoly, without antitrust
scrutiny or governmental regulation.

The Congress has not acted.
legislatively eliminated.
has been taken.
around.

The exemption has not been

No up or down vote on the exemption

Baseball remains the only unregulated cartel

The aberration, the anomaly, the anachronism remains.

And through it all, no public policy basis has been articulated
for the existence of the clubs' antitrust exemption, much less
for its continuation.

The continuation of the exemption simply

cannot be justified in the absence of the Congress articulating
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and adopting a public policy rationale sufficiently compelling to
justify this unique treatment.'

II.

Baseball's Internal Structure

How do baseball's owners organize the industry?
to this question is

important; it

The answer

illuminates the circumstances

in which baseball operates in the last decade of the 20th
century.

In considering this question,

it

is

important to keep

in mind the behavior of the now twenty-eight owners with respect
to one another, as compared to their behavior with respect to the
rest of the world.

Baseball's structure can be easily described.

The main

factors at work are relatively few, and easily understood.

In

essence, baseball is a shared monopoly, of which all major league
and all minor league teams are a part.

The major league teams

are bound to one another through the Major League Agreement, and
the rules and regulations that the owners choose to enact under
the Major League Agreement (the Major League Rules) in their
internal meetings.

Every minor league club is

bound up with the

major league clubs through the Professional Baseball Agreement
and the rules and regulations enacted under it
Association Agreement,
Agreement.

and is

and the National

subject to the Major League

Each minor league club is

also bound to the other

minor league clubs through these same agreements.

These

agreements, together with certain others (e.g., the American and
National League Constitutions and Rules) determine the boundaries
1 In F1ood, the Court asserted that the baseball antitrust
exemption "rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's
unique characteristics and needs." What are those "unique
characteristics and needs?" Baseball's only unique
characteristic is that it benefits from an antitrust exemption
granted by a case that was, concededly, wrongly decided. Its
only "unique need" is to unreasonably restrain trade. Any other
alleged "need" is of a kind which can be and is routinely
addressed by Congress through enactment of legislation that is
prospective only.
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within which each club will be permitted to operate.

Taken

together these agreements and understandings provide the
framework within which the cartel-like behavior occurs.

The club

owners act as one would expect the members of a shared monopoly
to jointly act:

they strive to artificially control to t~heir

advantage the market prices both of what they sell, and of what
they buy.

The operating premises of this arrangement are simply

that, to the greatest extent possible, no club will economically
compete against another, and that consumers will have no
alternative source of supply.

The owners first agree among themselves on the number and
location of baseball franchises.

Thus, the club-owners divide

geographical markets, effectively giving each club territorial
exclusivity, and thereby making each club, as a practical matter,
a local monopoly.

Similar arrangements divide up local

broadcasting rights.

National over-the-air broadcast rights are

negotiated centrally by and on behalf of all clubs.

Accordingly,

for all practical purposes, competition, whether at the local,
regional, or national level is eliminated.

Moreover, a Major

League Club cannot be sold on the open market.

As we have

recently seen in the San Francisco situation, the sale of a club
is

subject to the approval of all of the other owners, in all

material respects, including the sale price and the identity of
the new owner(s).
of the other clubs.
is

Teams may not be relocated absent the consent
As a condition of ownership, each new owner

required to agree to all of the agreements by which major

league baseball operates,

including the territorial exclusivity,

local broadcasting rights division, and revenue sharing
agreements.

A sale and/or relocation can be disapproved for a

good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at all.
Membership in the club of Major League baseball owners is
membership in a very exclusive club indeed.
sense,

In an antitrust

the barriers to unwanted entry are effectively absolute.
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Similarly, the owners' agreements with one another determine
how the revenue from baseball is divided up.

Certain receipts

are shared by the clubs, but others are not.

To briefly

summarize, gate receipts are shared between the home and visiting
club to a limited degree.

Local broadcast revenue is not shared

to any meaningful degree.

National broadcast revenue is shared

equally, as is certain licensing revenue.

Plainly, revenue

disparities between the clubs (which can be significant) can be
traced directly to and,

in effect, are the necessary consequence

of the revenue sharing agreements which govern the relationships
by which the clubs have elected to operate.
owners themselves, by there agreements,
and to what extent,

And it

is

the club-

who determine whether,

revenue is shared.

The foregoing summarizes the manner in which baseball's
rules eliminate competition with respect to the selling of its
product.

In establishing and implementing these operating

agreements,

regulations and procedures, baseball's owners are

accountable to no one but themselves, and their actions are not
limited by any obligation to refrain from engaging in
unreasonably anticompetitive behavior.

III.

The Size of the Industry

At the time that Federal Baseball was decided, it is fair to
say that baseball was not a large industry.

Although baseball in

1972 was a much larger business than it had been in 1922, twenty
years ago baseball was a small fraction of its current size.
Indeed, in the period beginning with 1975, baseball's total
revenues have grown tenfold (unadjusted for inflation), to more
than $1.5 Billion.

For ease of comparison, one can look at the total industry
revenue numbers compiled by baseball for the years 1975-1992.

In
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1975, total revenue was approximately $162.5 Million (24 teams).
By 1980, that figure more than doubled, to more than $350 Million
(for 26 teams).

By 1985, only five seasons later, total revenue

exceeded $715 Million, more than doubling the figure of 1980.
Revenue was slightly more than $1 Billion in 1988, only three
years later, and then reached nearly $1.25 Billion in 1989.
During negotiations with the MLBPA in the winter of 1989-90, the
clubs projected 1990 revenue at $1.315 Billion, 1991 at $1.412
Billion, 1992 at $1.52 Billion, and 1993 at $1.64 Billion.

1990

actual revenue exceeded the projection, and 1991 revenue was
nearly 1.54 Billion, or more than $100 Million ahead of the
projection.

1992 revenue should comfortably exceed $1.6 Billion.

In short, baseball has become a large business in the last
several years.

Moreover, many baseball clubs are now owned by or

otherwise affiliated with large corporations including Turner
Communications (Atlanta Braves), the Chicago Tribune (Chicago
Cubs), which also holds broadcasting rights to seven teams
beginning 1993, Anheuser-Busch (St. Louis Cardinals) and LaBatt's
(Toronto Blue Jays).

Other clubs are owned by the principal

owners of other corporations, such as Levi-Strauss (Oakland A's),
Nintendo,

and others.

It

is an industry of this magnitude that

the club-owners operate free from antitrust scrutiny.

IV.

Effects on the Players

If baseball games are what the owners sell, then the
services of players are what the owners buy.

In this respect,

too, the club-owners have traditionally organized their
relationships in order to artificially control (lower) the market
price they would have to pay. Their vehicle to do so was the socalled "Reserve System".
system was to make it

The central purpose of the reserve

impossible for one club to compete with

another club for a player.
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Under this arrangement,

each club exclusively "reserved" the

right to contract with and employ certain players,

and the other

clubs agreed to honor that exclusive reservation, provided only
that they exacted the same promise in return.

Every club agreed

to keep "hands off" any player except those on its
list.

In

other words,

own reserve

the clubs simply divided up the players

among themselves, agreed that they would not compete for players,
and gave the players a single choice:

play for what you are

offered, or find some other line of work.

In baseball, a player

was not permitted to look-for a job, and weigh the benefits and
detriments of more than one potential offer of employment (if he
was good enough to be able to secure more than one offer), as
would an employee in virtually any other industry.

When signed

to his first professional contract, a player was stuck in that
single organization for the balance of his career.

He could only

move to another organization if he were unconditionally released
(baseball's euphemism for being fired), or if he were traded.
(Only in professional sports - following the lead of baseball are employers permitted to involuntarily assign a contract of
employment to a different employer in another location.)

In such

circumstances, it is not surprising that salaries were held down
to well below the levels that a free market for player services
would have otherwise produced.

And that, after all, was the

purpose of the reserve system.

The MLBPA was reconstituted as a functioning labor union in
1966, when Marvin Miller was selected by the players to be
Executive Director. 2

The task facing the newly formed union was

to secure, through collective bargaining, the agreement of the
major league clubs to do that which they most desperately did not
want to do; compete with one another for players in a free

2 All-Star pitcher Jim Bunning, now a Member
of Congress
from Kentucky, was one of the four players most instrumental in
re-forming the MLBPA and hiring Marvin Miller.
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In other words, the Players Association had to

market.

collectively bargain the existence of a free market for players'
services, and then be able to enforce and maintain that free
And it

market.

had to do this without recourse to the

fundamental laws which prohibit unreasonable restraints on
competition,

the anti-trust laws.

Given the foregoing, it

3

was not a surprise that the clubs'

resisted the players' efforts to bargain for free agency.
Rather, free agency came to baseball in December,

1975, by virtue

of a grievance arbitration decision, the Nessersmith-McNally
The arbitrator ruled that the language of the uniform

case.

player's contract and certain Major League rules did not after
all give the club a perpetual right to the player.

The clubs

tried first to enjoin the arbitration hearing from going forward,
and then attempted to overturn the arbitrator's award, but
See Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 LA 101 (1975), affId

failed.
asub n=.

K.C. Royals vs. MLBPA, 532 F2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).

The clubs then promptly locked out the players in the Spring of
the first

1976,

over this issue.

shot of what has proven to be endless conflict
The subsequent bargaining between the players

and clubs (in 1976, 1980, 1981, 1986 and 1990) can be seen merely
as a continuation of the owners' desire to drive down player
salaries by eliminating or restricting free agency.

In the years following the 1976 settlement, by which free
agency (albeit with length of service and many other
restrictions) became a part of the Basic Agreement between the
MLBPA and the clubs, players' salaries began to rise toward
market levels.

The clubs responded by unilaterally imposing

costly "compensation" on a club that signed a free agent. This
compensation (which was designed to and would have virtually
3

The idea that a player should be able to seek work with

another club(s) when his contract is over was such an extreme
notion that baseball adopted a special term for it:
agency".

"free
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ended the free market for players)' provoked the fifty day strike
which almost ended the 1981 season.

In the next bargaining

round, in 1985, the clubs were not so subtle.

They insisted on a

so-called "salary cap", which would have lowered player salaries
in the face of exploding revenues.s

The players struck in

August, and a settlement was quickly reached which preserved free
agency, at least on paper.

Immediately following the 1985 World Series, in flagrant
violation of the new Basic Agreement that they had just
negotiated with the MLBPA, the Major League clubs organized and
implemented a virtually complete and total boycott of free
agents.

For all practical purposes, the market for players

ceased to exist.

The clubs acted uniformly and in lockstep.

This was the beginning of what came to be known as free agency
"collusion".

The collusion was to last a very long time, and its

bad effects even longer.

The MLBPA filed a grievance alleging a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement, but as that matter progressed
the conspiracy just continued.

In breach of their agreement with

the players, the clubs in effect had reinstituted the old, prefree agency reserve system.

Management officials scoffed at the

players' claims, confidently asserting that "fiscal
responsibility" had at last returned to baseball.

When the clubs

4 "Compensation" for a free agent is another baseball term
with a hidden meaning. It does not refer to how much a player is
paid. On the contrary, a payment of compensation (here, a player
and a draft choice) is made from the team signing the free agent
to his former employer, to "compensate" the other club for the
"loss" of the free agent. In other words, part of the value of
the free agent is paid to his former team, not to him. This
reduces the value of his new contract by the amount of the
compensation. If the compensation is high, as in the clubs' 1981
proposal, free agency becomes just a memory, so the players
struck.
s A "salary cap" is a device by which the players are to
agree to "cap" their own salaries at a lower level than the clubs
would pay players absent the cap.
It is simply another mechanism
to constrain competition for players' services.
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found the arbitration hearing not to their liking, they tried to
fire the arbitrator in the middle of the case, hoping to derail
the process.

A separate grievance was filed and heard, resulting

in the arbitrator being reinstated.

Following the 1986 season, the boycott continued with even
more strength.
new arbitrator.

A second grievance was filed, this time before a
Finally, near the end of the 1987 season, the

players prevailed in the liability phase of the first collusion
case.

This did not, however, stop the conspiracy.

The clubs

simply shifted from a boycott of free agents to price fixing the
free agent market.

Yet a third grievance was filed.

Late in the 1988 season, the MLBPA prevailed in the second
collusion case.
case.

Subsequently, the players also won the third

In later opinions the arbitrators awarded damages for the

first three seasons at more than $100 Million dollars.
Eventually, in December, 1990, the cases settled.

The Clubs paid

the players $280 Million (in an industry that only employs about
700 players) plus provided much other very valuable, although not
specifically quantifiable relief.
This staggering amount --

it may be the largest settlement

in the history of American labor arbitration -- demonstrates how
pervasive and successful the collusion was.
however,

Most significant,

were the arbitrators, findings that the clubs violations

of the Basic Agreement had been intentional and deliberate.

And

the players were forced to contend with this massive premeditated
invasion of their rights without the fundamental protections of
the antitrust laws.

There can be little doubt that the clubs

would have refrained from this behavior had they been subject to
treble damages.

But, without question, the collusion cases

demonstrate the behavior of which the clubs are quite capable.
(Copies of the three decisions by the arbitrators finding the
collusion have been provided to the Subcommittee staff.)
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It is quite clear that the owners' antitrust exemption has
contributed to the continual strife between owners and players in
baseball.

The media often talk about the positive labor

relations between the National Basketball Association and the
Basketball Players Association.

But while there have been no

work stoppages in the NBA, the basketball players have been able
to do what the baseball players have not:

they have instituted

antitrust litigation, the settlement of which was wrapped up in
their collective bargaining agreements.
safety valve in the system.

In short, there was a

It is at least possible that, if

baseball players had the same protection as the basketball
players, one or more of the several strikes and lockouts (one or
the other of which has taken place in every bargaining round
beginning with 1972) could have been avoided.

Moreover, it

is fundamentally unfair to deny to baseball

players the protection of the antitrust laws that is afforded to
virtually all other individuals.

It

is

sometimes suggested that

baseball players do not need the protection of the antitrust laws
because their union has to date been successful.

But are not

baseball players entitled to the protection of the law as are all
others?

As was noted in Justice Marshall's dissent in Flood, at

407 US 292:
The importance of the antitrust laws to every
citizen must not be minimized.

They are as

important to baseball players as they are to
football players, lawyers, doctors or members
of any other class of workers.
The current circumstances of the minor leagues make this
clear.

Minor league baseball players, clearly the majority of

all professional players, for all practical purposes remain
subject to the traditional, pre-free agency reserve system.
Essentially, such players have no recourse.

Consider just one

facet of the reserve system, the amateur player draft, by which
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the clubs tell

each potential player the one,

single baseball

organization with whom he can negotiate or contract.

The Major

League Clubs direct, organize and conduct the draft, and enforce
the exclusive negotiating rights of the clubs as against the
players.

What if

that draft restrains the market unreasonably,

to the injury and damage of the players?

They have no recourse

but to submit, or to give up a baseball career.

.Is

that fair?

The most recent example of the clubs' behavior in this area
is

illuminating.

Last year, the clubs simply changed the rules

relating to the amateur draft, to make it virtually impossible
for a high school graduate to have any leverage in negotiations
with the clubs.

Not wanting the world to know that was the

reason for the rule change, the Clubs concocted the ridiculous
suggestion that they really were doing this to encourage young
poeple to go to college!

Because it violated a provision of the

Basic Agreement relating to compensation for free agents, the
MLBPA challenged the rule change and in his subsequent decision,
the arbitrator had no difficulty concluding that the rule change
was designed to and did shift greatly the leverage in favor of
the club in its negotiations with drafted amateur players and was
designed to save the Clubs money.
more or less.

It was about money, nothing

But the kids themselves have no effective remedy.

We do not and cannot represent them and cannot seek a monetary
remedy on their behalf.

As the arbitrator found, the kids would

have to pursue such remedies on their own in court.
fair?

Is that

Young people pressured into signing contracts, in

consequence of an improperly enacted rule, losing their
collegiate eligibility, which would restor their leverage, and
yet having no remedy other than to sue Major League Baseball?

Finally, players are also adversely affected by the
artificial scarcity of franchises maintained by the owners, an
issue with which this Committee should be vitally concerned.
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V.

Number and Location of Franchises

Over the last ten years or so, the Congress has been
repeatedly concerned with issues relating to the number and
location of professional sports franchises.

Numerous bills have

been introduced and considered (at least in committee) on
various aspects of this problem, and an Ad h= "Task Force" was
formed on baseball expansion.
some length on such issues.

I have previously testified at

6

Yet the problem remains, as events over the last several
years relating to the efforts to secure a team to play in St.
Petersburg so poignantly demonstrate.

Baseball's owners control

absolutely the number of franchises and where each franchise
will play.

The difficulty is

of franchises is

that because the absolute number

artificially scarce, some deserving cities will

always have to do without teams, and the owners will decide
which ones.

The number of teams (the supply) is limited because

that has the effect of pushing up the value of the existing
teams as well as the price which is paid to the owners of the
existing teams for an expansion club.
existing club, which is

A threat to relocate an

not a believable threat unless there is

a qualified city without a team to threaten to move to, provides
great leverage to the owners against both cities.

Thus, all

6 See Statement of Donald M. Fehr, before the Energy
and
Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and
Energy, April 4, 1985, On Professional Sports Team Relocation
Legislation; Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation United States Senate, April 27 and May 12,
1984; Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United
States Senate, August 16, September 16, 20 and 29.
And Ee
Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Introductory Views
from the Hill, 9 Seton Hall Legislative Journal (1985), by
Senator Slade Gorton, in which he recounts his experiences in
this regard as the Attorney General of Washington State, and as
a Senator.
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efforts to secure a team by expansion or relocation in the end
will benefit the owners of the existing teams.

Consider:

What economic forces were at work that

resulted in an entire industry - major league baseball electing not to market its product in Florida, one of the most
quickly growing, attractive areas in North America, until next
year?

What kind of consumer business could be expected to

ignore for the nearly fifty years after World War II the
burgeoning Florida population?
answer them.

To ask such questions is to

Only an enterprise interested in restricting the

supply of its product and absolutely unafraid that a competitor
will establish itself in such a market would so behave.

Moreover, it is important to remember that it is the
entire industry - all of the owners - who effectively act
together with respect to decisions regarding the number and
location of franchises.

Each have-not city seeking a team must

satisfy the owners as a group before it can succeed.
it

is

And,

while

certainly not uncommon for one locale to compete with

another for a particular factory or company headquarters,
are not required, as they are in baseball,
industry.

cities

to petition an entire

Budweiser, LaBatts and Coors do not get together and

jointly agree to limit the production of beer and the number of
facilities, each one protecting the others by refusing to locate
a plant except when and as the other two agree.

But that is how

it works in baseball.

The current situation works to the advantage of team
owners and to the disadvantage of cities in two different ways.
In the first, a club that considers relocating is in a position
to secure concessions from its local area, desperate to keep the
team where it is, as well as from the "have-not" city trying to
entice the team to move.

In the second, have-nots effectively
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bid against one another to acquire a scarce expansion franchise.
Moreover,

in nearly every situation, the owners permit, if

not

encourage the courtship to play out, so that the best possible
terms can be secured.

The most basic point is this: the markets alvays compete
for the teams; the owners do not compete for the markets.

And

it is the absence of the antitrust laws' proscription against
unreasonably restraints and the exercise of monopoly power which
allows the owners to proceed as they see fit.

In the case of

St. Petersburg, this situation has played itself out many times
in the last several years (e.g., the proposed relocation of the
White Sox and then of the Giants, as well as expansion).
Clearly, this situation continues because the clubs have agreel
not to compete with one another for territorial markets.

Can it

be seriously questioned that Florida would have had one or more
teams long ago if

the National and American Leagues were

competing with each other for new markets?

What is

the public

policy basis upon which such a situation is permitted to
continue?

In addition to cities and fans, players are also hurt
when the number of franchises is
Players lose jobs.

artificially held down.

Careers are shortened.

There is

competition for players than there should be.
extent that the number of franchises is
players careers are limited.
in his profession is

In

less

short, to the

artificially limited,

A player's opportunity to engage

thus constrained. 7

Owners often say that there cannot be additional clubs
because there are not enough players for more teams.
The owners
have always said that, no matter how many teams there were, how

large the population grew, or whether blacks were permitted to
Play. The players have always believed that there are more than
enough players for a significant number of additional teams.
However, that judgment need not be made.
Rather than assuming
that there are not enough players, let the number of teams
increase until it can be determined that such is the case.
And
let the market determine whether the players are good enough.
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VI.

Conclusion

No one can be certain what would happen in the event
that baseball's antitrust exemption were to be eliminated.

But

this much is certain: whatever the result, baseball's owners
would be faced with the same the state of affairs every other
American business is

compelled,

in the interests of pro-consumer

competition, to confront every day.

All

(save those which are

regulated) must abide the antitrust laws and refrain from
anticompetitive and monopolisitic behavior.

Why not the owners

of the 28 baseball teams?

That final question returns to the first.

Minimally, if

baseball's literally unique exemption from the antitrust laws,
which themselves are at the foundation of our free economic
society, is to be continued, the Congress must identify,
articulate and endorse the public policy principles upon which
baseball's owners should receive such special, preferred
treatment.

In baseball's case, what is

justification?

that public policy

No one has ever been able to find one --

not the

Supreme Court, not predecessor Congressional Committees, no
disinterested economists,

no one except the Clubs themselves.

But the inability to articulate a public policy basis for an
exemption of this magnitude itself undermines the clubs' views,
and demonstrates why the exemption should be repealed. It does
not serve anyone's interest -- except of course those upon whom
it was improvidently, and mistakenly bestowed.

Donald M. Fehr
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COMMITTEEON THEJUDICIARY
WASHINGTON,DC 20510-6275

January 11,

1993

Donald H. Fehr
Executive Director
Najor League Baseball
Players Association
805 3rd Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Mr. Fehr:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to he time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
,than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1)

Mr. Fehr, how wppld the application of the antitrust laws to
Major League Baseball affect labor relations and contract
negotiations between the players and the owners?

2)

In your testimoni, you stated that "the issue is not at all
whether there is a strong Commissioner or weak
Do you believe the owners can restructure
Commissioner."
the Commissioner's office so that Fay Vincent's successor
can freely exercise independent judgment or address critical
issues such as expansion in a manner that promotes the longterm interests of the sport and the fans?

.

Senator Thurmond's questions:
1)

2)

How do you answer Mr. Selig's point that the antitrust
exemption is important to protect franchise stability, and
thus the "covenant" that baseball has with its fans?
- How would you react to an antitrust exemption that was
limited to franchise relocation only?

I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights

BMM/eao
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29 January 1993
Hon. Howard K. Metzenbaum
Chairman, subcommittee on Antitrust,
onopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C., 20510-6275
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
This will reply to your letter of 11 January posing
questions by Senator Thurmond and you relative to baseball's
antitrust immunity. Before turning to the four questions asked,
however, I would like to make one preliminary observation, which I
believe should be kept in mind.
Baseball's current antitrust immunity does not run to some
abstract, amorphous institution, or to a "game", or to the
"national pastime." Rather, it is to baseball's 26 (now 28) owners
that the exemption runs. The exemption means that the owners may
operate as a cartel; nothing more, but nothing less. Thus, those
institutions charged with the making of public policy have no role
in baseball. The right to make public policy has been effectively
shifted from elected officials (federal, state and/or local) to the
owners themselves. Public policy is made in the confines of
owners' meetings. Accordingly, the exemption should be removed,
and baseball's owners subjected to the law of the land, unless the
Congress can identify, articulate and endorse a public policy basis
upon which the owners special, preferred treatment should be
permitted to continue.
I strongly believe that no such basis can
be found.

803THIRD AVENUENE%
TEL (212) 826008

1Ri.,1110022

Flk (212) 752-3619
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Chairman Metzenbaum's Ouestions
Question 1: Mr. Fehr, how would the application of the
antitrust laws to Major League Baseball affect labor relations and
contract negotiations between the players and the owners?
Answer: Application of the antitrust laws to baseball
would improve collective bargaining in this industry. The reason
is straightforward.
In baseball, as in the other professional team
sports, the team owners' goal is, and since the advent of free
agency has always been, to restrict or eliminate competition among
clubs for players. This is classic monopoly behavior. Because the
antitrust laws do not apply, baseball's owners have a built-in
incentive to try to break the union, because if they were to suceed
in doing so, they would once again be able to totally eliminate
competition for players.
There has been a work stoppage (lockout or strike) in
baseball in every negotiation for more than 20 years (1972, 1973,
1976, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1990). Contrast this record with that of
professional basketball, which has not had a stoppage, but in which
every agreement since the 1970's has been wrapped up in an
antitrust case consent decree. Or consider pro football, where the
NFL owners have recently learned that they may not unreasonably
restrain competition for players even if there is no union. Simply
put, the manner in which the parties negotiate would be different
if the antitrust laws applied. The owners would be much less
likely to force a confrontation with players over free agency
issues (the heart of every dispute beginning with 1976) if the
players had recourse to the antitrust laws to ensure competition.
Accordingly, the likelihood of a work stoppage over this issue
would be reduced.
Question 2: In your testimony, you stated that "the issue
is not at all whether there is a strong Commissioner or weak
Commissioner." Do you believe the owners can restructure the
Commissioner's office so that Fay Vincent's successor can freely
exercise independent judgment or address critical issues such as
expansion in a manner that promotes the long-term interests of the
sport and the fans?
Answer: I do not believe that the office of the
commissioner can be so restructured. To suggest that it can
ignores certain realities of the situation:
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-The Office of the Commissioner is established by the
Major League Agreement, an agreement entered into and
amended by the owners alone. The very raison detre of
the Office of the Commissioner is to serve the owners
joint ends. The powers and limits of the Office of the
Commissioner are established entirely by the owners.
-The owners hire, re-hire and pay the Commissioner.
And, as we have seen, they can fire the Commissioner.
-- The owners determine the pay of the Commissioner,
and set the budget for his office.
Given these facts, it is extremely unlikely that any Commissioner
can or would be independent of the owners. The owners will surely
select someone who will act on their collective behalf, and who
will know and remember who has employed him. One simply cannot
reasonably expect the owners to do otherwise, or a Commissioner, so
selected and paid, to act in a manner inconsistent with the
interests of the owners as a group, who are, after all, his
employers and constituents. Moreover, a Commissioner is
"independent" only to the extent and so long as there is no working
majority of owners in opposition. A Commissioner may be able to
mediate and/or arbitrate disputes between owners, or to act if the
owners as a group are unwilling or unable to do so. Of such
things, and only of such things consists the Commissioners vaunted
independence, as Fay Vincent discovered.
As is evident from Bud Selig's oral testimony, the public's
interests, which is in more rather than fewer major league teams
and in reducing the owners' power to exact public support for
facilities, etc., are not those of the owners, whose interests are
in artificially restricting the number of teams, thereby increasing
the value of each club by making it an artificially scarce
commodity, and to secure public subsidies by implicit or overt
threats to relocate. For example, Mr. selig testified why it is
emphatically not in the owners' interests to expand (e.g., to the
Tampa Bay area). A Commissioner selected and paid by the owners
will come down on the owners' side; it would be astonishing were he
to act otherwise. And he would be ignored (or fired, or both) if
he did so.
A Commissioner can be expected to act independently of the
owners and in the interests of the fans only if he were not
selected and paid by, and did not receive his authority from the
owners. In short, a Commissioner cannot be independent of the
owners unless he does not owe his job, his salary or his authority
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to them. In all probability, it would take regulation to achieve
such a result. Removing the exemption, and thereby requiring the
owners to refrain from anti-competitive behavior is a much easier,
more certain way to go.
Senator Thurmond's Questions
Ouestion 1: How do you answer Mr. Selig's point that the
antitrust exemption is important to protect franchise stability,
and thus the "covenant" that baseball has with its fans?
Answer: Mr. Selig is simply wrong. To begin with, the
pressure on franchise stability stems primarily, if not
exclusively, from baseball's owners maintaining an artificial
scarcity of franchises. This produces "have-not" cities, such as
Tampa - St. Petersburg, that seek to entice an owner to move by
offering more lucrative stadium leases and other concessions.
(This is, of course, the only way such a city can reasonably expect
to secure a franchise.) It is the shortage of teams that allows
existing owners to play one market against another to secure ever
more concessions.
Baseball permits - if not overtly encourages threats to relocate in order to secure concessions from the
existing city. Thus, the "franchise stability" question is created
by the exemption, which permits the artificial scarcity of teams.
Indeed, this entire situation is one which the owners have created
and maintained for their own benefit. Many an owner has reaped the
reward which followed public consideration of relocating his team.
Do baseball's owners object when an owner threatens to relocate his
team in order to maximize bargaining leverage with the city where
the team now plays? Did baseball tell the White Sox they could not
relocate to Tampa? Of course not: the owners want the ability to
threaten to move. That is what the artificial scarcity is all
about.
Second, the notion that if the exemption were removed teams
would move about willy-nilly is simply nonsense. Case law clearly
permits a league to have reasonable rules regarding franchise
location and relocation issues. The suggestion that under the
antitrust laws there can be no effective bar to relocation is a
simple scare tactic unworthy of serious consideration. * See also
my answer to the next question.
* During and after the Raiders litigation the NFL raised such
fears. But it did so both to avoid pressure to expand and to try
to pressure the Congress into giving it broader antitrust immunity.
Under the NFL's rules, of course, the result would have been that
the Rams would have left Los Angeles, and the Raiders would have
stayed in Oakland, leaving Los Angeles without a team.
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Onestion 2: How would you react to an antitrust exemption
that was limited to franchise relocation only?

Answe: While, for the reasons previously set forth,
eliminating the exemption with respect to everything except
franchise location issues would be helpful in terms of labor
relations, it would clearly do nothing to address the concerns of
(If this question has not been put to the
the have not cities.
owners, I hope that it will be. The owners claim only that the
exemption is needed with respect to franchise location issues.
Moreover, a bill of
Hence, they should not oppose this concept.)
this type would serve as the endorsement of the Congress to
baseball's owners' current practices with respect to the number and
location of teams. Such a bill would perpetuate the pressures on
localities that currently exist. From the point of view of the
fan, this would only continue the current situation of too many
cities
and too few teams.
By endorsing this concept, without more,

the Congress would, implicitly, be approving the artificial
scarcity of franchises the owners have maintained.
There is, however, a solution to franchise scarcity. If
baseball were split into two or more competing leagues, such
leagues would no doubt compete for vacant and attractive markets,
rather than the reverse, as now occurs. Such competition would
likely increase the number of teams, and decrease the number of
"have-not" cities, thereby reducing the pressure to relocate, and
increasing franchise stability. There is no way around it:
pressure on teams to relocate will abate only as and to the extent
that the number of teams increases. Alternatively, legislation
could provide a measure of antitrust protection for the owners in
this area, provided that the owners first were able to establish
that the number of teams was not artificially restricted. While
difficult to write, such a bill could provide a measure of relief
for fans in the "have-not" cities. On balance, however, I submit
that legislation forthrightly placing baseball under the antitrust
laws remains the best, most simple and most direct course.

SI

sin erely,

~hld

M. Aehr
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29 January 1993
Hon. Howard M. Metzenbaua
C/o Chris Harvie
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6275

Dear Senator Metzenbaumx
Enclosed please find my reply to your letter of 11 January.
In addition, I know that certain members of the Committee have
been interested in the report of Baseball's Economic Study

For the record I will forward a copy of that report,
Committee.
including the separate report by member Henry Aaron, under
separate cover.
Your /very truly,

DMF/ac

805THIRD AVENUE. NEW YORK, NY 10022
FAX. (212) 752.36%9
TEL. (212) 826080
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December 3, 1992

Mr. Donald Febr
Executive Director and General Counsel
Major League Baseball Players Association
805 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Mr. Allan "Bud" Selig
Chairman
Major League Baseball Players Relations Committee
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Dear Don and Bud:
With the transmittal of the enclosed report to you the independent members of the Baseball
Economic Study Committee conclude their work. We wish to thank you both for the
opportunity to participate in baseball's effort to think through its approach to the challenges
ahead and to share with you a few of the broader observations we have reached in the process
of our work together over the past year and a balf.
This document reports many facts and trends; the interpretation of this information is
controversial. On some matters the independent members were divided. The report language
reflects our efforts to bridge these divisions. No one of us, had be been writing alone, would
have worded the report exactly this way. But we found enough common ground in the
conclusions found herein to join in signing the report.

Henry Aaron
David Feller
Peter Goldmark
Paul Volcker
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PREFACE

The world of baseball provides our country with some of its most wonderful moments of
athletic competition. Baseball is part of our history, part of our character - a never exhausted
outlet for hope, and a continuing drama of grace, timing and achievement on the field of our
dreams
It is also filled today with money, conflict, and distrust.
The history of relations between owners of Professional Baseball Qubs and the Major
League Baseball Players Association has been characterized by repeated and acrimonious disputes.
Six rounds of collective bargaining have been marked by three strikes and three lockouts.
We believe that prolongation of the past pattern of strikes and lockouts in baseball would
inevitably damage the short and long term interests of both the clubs and the players. Unseemly
contests between club owners and players would only sour public attitudes toward the game as a
whole, with a consequent long-term reduction in both profits and salaries.
While public attention will shortly focus on the preliminary skirmishing surrounding
collective bargaining between the clubs and the players, we believe that baseball faces a challenge
far broader and more critical than simply reaching a labor agreement. That challenge is to arrest
the decline and embitterment of baseball in American life, and to forge a framework in which
owners and players can go beyond their individual financial interests to pursue constructively,
fruitfully and together their shared interests.
Baseball must be reconceived by its participants, the owners and the players, as a genuine
partnership which pursues competitive excellence, leads by moral and athletic example, resolves
labor disputes through negotiation rather than by insulting the public with lockouts and strikes, and
tempers financial greed with a sense of mutual cooperation and accountability to the public.
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The independent members of the Committee believe that a confluence of developments
makes such a partnership both more urgent and more possible than at any time in the recent past
These developments include:
- an imminent end to the heady increases in financial returns for both owners and players
that marked the 1980's;
- the likelihood of wrenching readjustments in the terms of national broadcasting contracts
with baseball;
- the particular threat posed to the financially weaker clubs by these and associated trends;
- the recognition by owners and players alike that something is amiss, as reflected by the
very appointment of an independent committee such as this for the first time in baseball's history.
Baseball has existed for more than a century in America. In the process it has brought
pleasure and pride to generations. But it is now being tested, perhaps as strongly as ever before,
as to whether it can muster the trust and the vision to build a true partnership for the future. We
think now is a good time to start.
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L Introduction

Assessment of the economic performance of baseball and of the forces bearing on its future
outlook are at the heart of our assignment While some issues are clear, the overall task is
difficult and potentially confusing for the following reasons:
Forecasting of revenues, expenses, profits and asset values in any industry is subject to many
uncertainties. It is complicated in baseball by important structural changes in recent years
in revenue and cost trends.
-

Owners, players, and others differ as to the relative importance of operating income, net
profits, cash flow, and franchise values. In particular, owners are interested in return on
their past investment and maintaining franchise values. From other points of view emphasis
on current and prospective operating income or cash flow is more usefuL

-

Because baseball is a business and a sport at the same time, and has important community
values and interests, the condition of this industry, more than that of other industries,
involves intangible and indirect returns and satisfactions in addition to the direct monetary
returns of owners.

Our primary concerns are whether, and to what extent, the health of baseball is threatened
by economic pressures, and the possible implications of these pressures for owner-player relations.
We do not believe that health can be determined simply by analyzing whether the returns available
to baseball owners are comparable to thbse in other industries, or even whether the returns justify
the prices paid for particular franchises in the past. What does matter is whether there is a
continued interest by existing owners in building their franchises and maintaining their
competitiveness and whether owners who wish to sell can find responsible and willing buyers.
In other words what is critical for baseball over time is not maintaining particular franchise
values, but that there be reasonably stable ownership able and willing to maintain the continuity
of their clubs and franchise location, to pay enough to attract exceptional athletes to baseball and
to their team, to justify the large capital expenditures for stadiums (whoever directly bears that
cost), and to maintain fan interest and healthy competition.
As the history of baseball suggests, this does not require every club to be profitable every
year. As in the past, the overall profitability of baseball may vary over cycles. But to have any
reasonable assurance that owners, eisting and new, will be willing to operate and acquire baseball
clubs, and be able to make the requisite investment, there should be some reasonable prospect of
achieving revenues in excess of expenditures most of the time.
For civic or avocational interests owners or ownership groups may sometimes be willing to
support a particular club through even extended periods of losses. However, we believe that a
healthy outlook for baseball does require the prospect that with effective management the industry
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as a whole be able to cover operating expenses, with a reasonable margin to cover necessary
investments and to maintain continuity during inevitable difficult years. Tat situation would usually
be reflected in significant franchise values. The absence of such franchise value for a significant
number of clubs, reflecting an inability to "carn their way' over the long hau, would be disruptive
not just for those clubs, but for the stability of baseball as a whole and thus to its appeal to the
public.
A wide range of motives impels people to own and operate baseball teams. Running a club
has a romantic appeal for many Americans. Others derive immeasurable benefits, such as prestige
and public approbation, from owning a baseball team, or capitalize on synergy with other
enterprises they own. Community leaders and civic bodies often come forward to finance the
acquisition of franchises because of the benefits major league baseball brings to a city. It is not
possible to determine what mix of financial, altruistic, civic, competitive or avocational interests
impels club owners to do what they do. What is important for the game and for the public interest
is that they continue to do so, i.e. that there be clubs, that games and seasons be competitive, and
that the continuation and the viability of the sport be supported by the existence of a market which
can assure the transfer of a club to new and responsible investors. There is every reason to believe
that this is the condition of baseball today. What is at issue is whether this situation can be
expected to continue in the future.
This test does not require that franchise values rise continuously or that higher values need
cover past losses. In that light, the information available to this Committee indicates that there
have been to this point buyers and communities willing to acquire and support clubs whose present
owners decide they cannot continue to operate them.
Information submitted to the staff indicates that sales prices of clubs rose sharply in the
1970's and '80's, and may have stabilized in real terms since the late 1980's. Whether prices will
be maintained in the future will depend upon trends in revenues and costs of individual clubs, of
baseball as a whole, and upon whether and how rules governing both the distribution of revenues
among clubs, in large markets and small, and player compensation may be changed in the future.
Because the reasons for investing in a major league baseball team include more than financial gain
the fact that profit rates are below those of other U.S. industries does not mean in itself that
baseball as a whole has a problem or that the condition we have described as necessary for its
continued health will not continue.
While the Committee makes some recommendations on changes that should be considered,
we are aware that the parties through collective bargaining are in the best position to decide the
specific contract terms that will govern their relationship. Baseball's economic system is intricate
and interdependent. As a result, any changes must be carefully analyzed. For the benefit of the
fans, the players, and the clubs, it is imperative that the parties address the issues facing the game
on a timely basis.
The atmosphere between the parties has been marked in the past by hostility and distrust.
It is the strong conviction of the Committee that if the clubs and players cooperate to deal with
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the problem they confront - if they approach these challenges in a spirit of genuine partnership
- they can cope with any trend or event in sight and operate baseball profitably for both owners
and players and enjoyably for the public. Overall, baseball panrates more than enough revenue
to thrive only peed, rashness, or a lack of reasonable cooperation can preclude economic viability
for both owners and players.
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IL The Economic Condition of Baseball
The Committee is charged to study and report on the 'overall economic condition of the
industry' but also current and impending problems, if any. In approaching this task, the Committee
examined revenues and expenses, operating income, and franchise values.
The Committee believes that more information about the financial operations of baseball
can and should be made public. Accordingly, this report includes as Attachment B a summary
report of financial operations for 1991 prepared for the clubs by the accounting firm of Ernst &
Young. This report is known as The 8-10-8 Report" because it presents information reported by
the clubs in three groupings of the eight largest, ten middle-size, and eight smallest clubs
respectively in terms of contribution to overall operating income.
Revenues

Gross real revenues rose at an average annual rate of 9 percent from 1985 through 1991.1
Several factors strongly suggest that revenues will not grow as fast in the first half of the 1990's
as they did in the late 1980's and may even decline.
Average game receipts per club have grown from $14 million in 1985 to $20 million in 1991,
or nearly 6 percent per year in real terms, as attendance reached new records and ticket prices
increased significantly. Some additional growth in attendance is possible in the years ahead as new
stadiums replace old ones but the rate of growth seems bound to slow. (1992 attendance was
approximately 2 percent below 1991 attendance.)
Much greater uncertainty surrounds future growth of revenues from national television
contracts which now account for 23 percent of total revenues. Current contracts with CBS and
ESPN will expire at the end of the 1993 season. Both CBS and ESPN have reported sizable losses
on their contracts. ESPN now has exercised its option, at a cost of $13 million, not to extend its
contract beyond 1993. Some of these losses may be attributable to the current recession, some to
the perceived attractiveness of baseball, some to secular declines in advertising expenditures, some
to competing programming, and some, perhaps, to business misjudgments. The concern of the clubs
that national television revenues will decline is understandable in the light of current circumstances.
Iocal television and radio revenues constitute nearly the same proportion of gross receipts
a network television. This source of revenue, which varies a great deal by individual club and size
of market, increased greatly between 1984 and 1991. Changes are not likely to be so abrupt as
in national television. Given the pressures on advertising generally over the past few years, growth

'Unsku oderwise specified all dara on rewoues and cenditures contained in this report ad in the accomaning
in constat 1991 dollars adjusted for chsanes in the Consmer price ider.
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at the pest rate is unlikely to continue and it appears unwise to assume future growth in local
media revenues that is faster than the growth in gate receipts.

No projected slackening in revenue growth will affect the financial viability of baseball if
the clubs cut expense growth, including player compensation, correspondingly. The clubs project
that expenditures other than player salaries will grow more slowly, but that player salaries will grow
more rapidly, than revenues. The players challenge the contention that salaries will grow if
revenues do not In projecting costs, the critical question is whether player compensation, which
grew at an average real annual rate of 10 percent from 1985 through 1991, will continue rising
even if growth of revenues slows or if revenues actually fall.2 We deal with this important issue
below.
Industry Operatine Income
As the annexed staff report indicates, the baseball industry as a whole consistently produced
net operating income before ta, averaging slightly more than 6 percent of revenue, from 1985
through 1991.
While acknowledging that other measures may be important, the Committee has chosen to
focus primarily on net operating income before tax in its analysis of baseball financial performance.
For one thing, this measure facilitates comparison among clubs that have quite different capital
structures. Moreover, it focusses on the elemental relationship of any operating business - whether
operating revenues cover expenses. In reaching its conclusions, however, the Committee did, where
appropriate, take into account other measures, especially return on investment (see Staff Analysis,
Section U). However, our analysis of trends in operating revenues and costs encompasses the
significant factors bearing on the financial outlook for the industry as a whole.
It should be emphasized that while standard accounting uses the terms profit and
profitability, we refer to net operating income before taxes. We exclude interest expense and
revenue, income tax liabilities and benefits, and the depreciation of the portion of the club
purchase price attributable to intangible assets. Major league baseball as a whole or an individual
club would have positive net operating income, under our definition, if its revenues from baseball
operations exceeded the expenses of those operations, even though net operating income might
not be enough to cover non-operating expenses, including, for example, interest on working capital
or tangible assets, interest on the money borrowed to purchase the club, much less any repayment
of loans or return on equity.

Me players hold that the 10 percct gwth rate ismiseading frtwo reaons. rst,they aim, salarics at the start
of the period are depreued ty the cary saes of llusion. Semnd, some players negotated multiyear cmus that
shihd salary for 1990, hen a work stoppSe was considered possible, to laterycars, thus inflating salaries intb efalyear
of the period.
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The period since 1985 has been one of remarkable growth - in attendance, in television
revenues, and in other revenue sources. As the annexed staff report shows, industry operating
income as of the end of the 1991 season, the last year for which final audited figures are available,
averaged $3.5 million per club. But this income was concentrated in a minority of clubs. Complete
data for 1992 will not be available before this Committee submits its report; but attendance fell
slightly and player salaries rose significantly, suggesting that the net operating income line will be
lower in 1992 than in 1991, which itself was well below earlier years.
The Committee is charged to consider not only the current economic condition of the
industry but also its future course. The industry as a whole, by its own standards, enjoyed several
years of healthy net operating income in the late 1980's; this does not necessarily mean that it will
continue to do so. Whether most clubs most of the time can comfortably cover operating expenses,
with some margin for necessary investments, is obviously economically important.
The clubs have presented "best" and 'worst' case projections of revenues and costs through
1994? Those projections indicate that the industry will suffer substantial losses in 1993 and 1994.
The projected decline in operating income hinges on the assumption that player salaries will grow
more rapidly than revenues, which in turn will be damped by a sharp drop in national television
revenue. The clubs assume that player salaries will grow an average of 7 percent (best case from
the standpoint of profitability) to 10 percent (worst case) in 1993 and 1994. Other costs are
assag to increase 3 to 6 percent, well below the assumed increase in revenues other than
national television.
Recognizing that all forecasting is inherently unreliable, and that the history of baseball
specifically is replete with predictions that have proven inaccurate, the information made available
to this Committee drives it to several broad conclusions:
- The rapid rise in gross revenues which characterized the late eighties and early nineties
is probably over for the time being. A major factor is the anticipated decline in revenues from
national television broadcasting under contracts which expire in 1993.
- The critical variable on the cost side is player salaries, which have risen sharply throughout
the eighties, and which - because they rose in 1991 and apparently in 1992 more rapidly than
revenues - are the principal cost element which has eaten into the operating margins which baseball
as a whole has enjoyed over the past 5-6 years.
Union representatives have suggested that, while they would not wish to endorse the
owners' projections of lower revenue growth, they would expect aggregate salary costs to be
responsive to aggregate revenue declines, just as they were to the rapid revenue increases of the
past. If player costs do not respond to changes in revenue, then there will be a serious economic
squeeze on baseball as a whole and a more imminent threat to the weaker clubs, raising doubts

"M Ob projectios are as i curc=t dogrs, at adjusted for kfbtiao.

195
Kspor or e.M.c s904 Commane""
Dcember 3. 199

as

l
Pae 9

aot simply about franchise value but about the continuity of established franchises and their ability
to compete for players and eventually public support. Then the case for new mechanisms to
provide for timely and orderly adjustment would, in the interests of owners and players alike,
become more compelling.
Franchise Valties
Despite the fall-off in operating income, the prices at which franchises have sold have
remained high. During the past four years, seven clubs have been sold for prices (expressed in
constant 1991 dollars) ranging from $80 million to $131 million. The average price has been $94
million. Investors in Tampa-St. Petersburg are reported to have offered approximately $110 million
for the San Francisco team, but the owners disapproved the transfer of this franchise.
No recent upward or downward trend in franchise values is discernable. This is a matter
of some controversy. The clubs hold that the sale of the Detroit Tigers in 1992 for a price below
that of the expansion franchises is evidence of softness in asset values. The players assert that the
willingness of San Francisco investors to offer $100 million for the San Francisco franchise
contradicts this claim. Should the present pattern of franchise values hold in the future, there
would appear to be little reason for apprehension about future economic pressure on baseball as
a whole.
'Flamacially Troubled' Clubs
Whatever the economic condition of baseball as a whole, not all clubs fare equally well.
Some franchises are highly successful financially, others are not As we note in the following
section, wide disparities in income have not at this point created troublesome differences in onfield performance. But some clubs are currently losing money, some have lost money persistently
in recent years, and the next few years may aggravate the situation. The clubs claim that eleven
team are 'financially troubled.' The clubs and players dispute whether the number of teams that
merit the designation of 'financially troubled' is eleven or some smaller number. They also dispute
exactly how much money has been lost. Whatever the merits in this dispute - and we stipulate
that at least some clubs have been unprofitable in the sense of a persistent inability to achieve
revenues equal to operating costs - any squeeze on industry profits would mean that clubs that
have lost money in the past are at risk of losing more in the future.
The "bottom eight' group of clubs in the appended 8-10-8 report (See Attachment B) is
in the main typical of clubs alleged by the owners to be 'financially troubled," and it is such clubs
which run the greatest risk of being adversely affected in the years ahead.
The staff report contains an analysis of financial performance and of the recent history of
franchise values. It confirms that several clubs have lost money year after year based on the
operating income measure the staff finds most defensible; we have noted elsewhere that it seems
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likely that a number of these clubs will face an even more difficult period in the years immediately
ahead.
Nevertheless, the Committee was told by the clubs that there is no evidence that current
franchises will go out of existence. As noted, substantial prices continue to be paid, even for
franchises considered troubled. The owners claim that the number of potential bidders for old or
new franchises at established prices is diminishing. The recent sale of the Seattle club and the
competition for the San Francisco franchise - all involving clubs claimed to be troubled - make
it evident that, for whatever reason, baseball franchises are still considered valuable property.
The committee has seen no evidence that baseball cannot support the prospective 28 franchises.
Whether the difficulties of the troubled clubs reach the point of undermining the stability
and competitive positions of major league baseball, vis-a-vis other sports or the balance within
baseball itself, turns in part on the relationship between player compensation and revenue, as we
have discussed earlier, as well as on the revenue trend itselL
Revease ShariE
Revenues of some clubs (mostly large market clubs) persistently exceed revenues of other
clubs. Because these discrepancies could lead to competitive imbalance and do contribute to
financial difficulties of small market clubs, this Committee was directed to consider the extent and
nature of revenue sharing.
Major league baseball is a joint enterprise, a shared monopoly exempt from the antitrust
laws by virtue of judicial decisions that Congress has not revoked. This exemption permits the
clubs to establish a system of governance that regulates the number and location of franchises,
which in turn influence the economic futures of particular clubs.
An important example of the way in which the economic impact of baseball's established
regulatory and financial framework has evolved can be found in the rules and processes that govern
how and to what extent various sources of revenue are allocated to individual clubs or the joint
enterprise. In general, the arrangements assume that each club is entitled to the revenues
generated by its local market. The rules adopted significantly affect the profitability or
unprofitability of individual clubs. Specifically, revenues can be "shared"to reduce disparities among
clubs -or divided in ways that increase disparities or leave them unaffected.
A principal finding of this Committee is that the owners now face a set of conditions and
economic prospects which requires a basic restructuring of the rules and processes that determine
how and to what extent various sources of revenue are allocated to individual dubs or the joint
enterprise.
Some current financial arrangements reduce and some increase revenue disparities.
Disparity-reducing arrangements include those governing the distribution of revenues from national
broadcasting (about $350 million in 1991) and licensing ($55 million in 1991). Together, these two
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sources accounted for about 26 percent of revenues. Revenues from the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, the All-star game, and fees paid by superstations are also fully shared. A small portion
of game receipts is shared with visiting teams.' In the American League a portion of local cable
revenue sharing is also shared.'
In recent years, local broadcasting has generated a growing portion of the industry's revenue
and the disparity in the revenues generated by individual clubs has skyrocketed. While the
American League has recently increased the sharing of local cable (as opposed to over-the-air
broadcast and radio) revenue, the general rule remains that each club is exclusively entitled to the
local broadcasting revenue generated in its own market.
The rules that govern the distribution of revenues among the clubs need review. As far
as the Committee can tell, revenue sharing arrangements have not been updated to reflect
enormous recent changes in revenue sources. The fixed nominal payment to visiting clubs in the
National League represents a steadily declining share of steadily rising ticket prices. Such practices
may have made sense a century ago. They are now inadequate to bridge current disparities in
revenue among the clubs. In short, baseball's revenue sharing rules produce a much different result
in the early 1990's from that of a generation ago.
One aspect of current revenue allocation may actually widen financial disparities in the years
immediately ahead. By far the most important component of revenue sharing in baseball today is
the arrangement governing national broadcasting, which distributes revenue among the twenty-six
major league clubs on an equal basis. The amount of that revenue has grown significantly over
the past decade, and reached about $350 million in 1991. Should national broadcasting revenues
decline, the cushioning effect of the existing revenue sharing arrangements will actuallybe reduced
precisely when the financially weaker clubs may need it most. We have stated earlier that some
clubs may face difficult circumstances, including operating deficits, in the immediate future. We
believe that increased revenue sharing is warranted, and that under no circumstances should a
possible decline in television revenues be permitted to reduce total revenue sharing.
While, as reported below, no overall problem of competitive balance in major league
baseball has cisted or cists now, the committee judges it important to make sure that financial
imbalances do not create such a problem. In particular,the financially weakest clubs must not be
led by low revenues to slash payrolls dramatically by selling off their star players in an effort to
reduce costs and become profitable. Such practices would produce what is essentially minor league
baseball in which some teams make no meaningful attempt to produce winning teams, would break

'Shad pte receipts equal 20 percent of revenue from ticket ales la the Ameran league and S0.47 to S0.72 per
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faith with the public in the affected cities and harm baseball as a whole.' Increased revenue
sharing, we believe, would reduce the likelihood of such unfortunate behavior.
Revenue sharing is an established feature of baseball's financial arrangements. It has played
an important role in moderating financial disparities among the clubs over the past decade. The
troubled financial times baseball may encounter in the immediate future make it more appropriate
than ever before to fashion a mechanism that will support the financially weaker teams. A number
of existing and potential revenue sources could be dedicated in whole or in part to an extended
revenue sharing arrangement
Whatever sources are selected, we recommend that the current level of twenty-five percent
shared revenues should be considered as a Goor, and that significant increments in this percentage
should be achieved promptly.
The specifics of increased revenue sharing will be complicated to design and implement.
The Committee does not believe its mandate requires it to make detailed recommendations on the
structural and procedural modifications to the present rules in baseball that might be necessary.
The clubs link revenue sharing to the establishment of limits on player salaries to a percentage
of overall revenue. The players reject such limits, but claim a voice in the determination of
revenue sharing arrangements. On this disagreement we take no position. We do note, however,
that we see an important relationship between our recommendation for additional revenue sharing
and our recommendation concerning salary arbitration, which is set forth in the next section.
Our analysis and the discussion between the players and owners persuade us that
both parties, players as well as clubs, have an enormous interest in the additional financial stability
that extended revenue sharing would bring to baseball. The fans and the communities served by
major league baseball have an even larger stake.
Franchise location
Franchise relocation is another possible but limited solution when a team finds itself in a
market where sufficient revenues are difficult or impossible to generate. It is obviously not in the
best interests of baseball as a whole if franchises are moved frequently. On the other hand no
franchise in major league baseball has been moved for twenty years. The recent controversy
surrounding the proposed move of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa-St. Petersburg is illustrative.
Both the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants are on a list of clubs the owners
designate as 'financially troubled. The Giants' owner proposed to sell the team to a group of

'Tbere i soe evidence that thi occurred in the 1950's, after the Philadelphia AthiLtics rnchie wa said to Kawm
City, which became in the view of sone a fam dub for the New York Yankees. See Hank Greeberg. e Stm Of y
ge (1989), p. 215. Many believe that this wu the strateg employed by the Houston dub bAfre ks recnt ae. It
sne that
reduced its player salary am, which had been about average in 1991, by aMost Mfypercent In 199Z at the ame
average salary for al clubs increaed thirty percent. It wa reported that this wa the strategy proposed by the fairst,
and
enmuccesful, syndicate seeking to keep the San Francisco Giants in San rancisco.
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fevstors found by an owners' committee to be financially responsible which would have relocated
the team to St. Petersburg. Moving the Giants to Plorida, it at least appears, would have
strengthened both the Giants and Oakland (which would have remained as the sole team in the
Bay area); it also seems likely that the move would have benefitted the players, who had no voice
in the decision. On the other hand, there may well have been other factors which caused the clubs
to reject the proposed move. We recognize baseballs legitimate interest in preserving the
traditions of the game in a community that has supported a club for over thirty years.
The Committee heard no testimony on this isue and makes no judgment about the
proposed sale and relocation of San Francisco to St. Petersburg. What the controversy does
illustrate is that income disparities among the clubs, at least in part, result from and are
perpetuated by the system of rules now in effect.
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III. Implication for Methods of Setting Player Salaries
As we have indicated earlier, the future financial health of baseball as a whole depends on
whether player salaries will adjust to any slowing of revenue growth. The players assert that just
as salaries responded to the growth in revenues they will respond to decline or slowing in growth.
The clubs contend that salaries will not respond because of long-term contracts that promise
salaries based on more bullish revenue expectations and because arbitration tends to pass on to
'poorer' clubs the salary costs paid by "richer' clubs.
The Committee is not persuaded that any relief is required from long-term contracts. A
club may have erred in its own expectations as to revenues. A club may have deliberately engaged
in deficit spending in order to increase its chance of succeeding on the field or because of pride,
civic virtue or other considerations. We see no reason in such cases to suggest a change in the
compensation system to account for past decisions voluntarily and deliberately entered into by the
clubs.
Putting aside, therefore, the existence of long term contracts, the issue before the
Committee is whether anything in the existing arrangement for determining player salaries will
prevent salaries from responding to changes in revenues. History provides no clear guide, since
baseball has not had to confront a situation of declining revenues since the present arrangement
for determining salaries was put in place. As staff analysis shows, in the 1978-81 period when the
reserve clause was breaking apart salaries as a share of revenues rose sharply, from 30 to 48
percent. Since then, including collusion payments, the share has remained close to 46 percent,
though it did rise to nearly 51 percent in 1991. (See Staff Analysis, Figure 2.)
Players fall into three broad categories, based on seniority. players with fewer than three
years of major league service;" players with six or more years of such service; and players falling
between those two categories.

layer ivth Fewr than Three Years of Savice The bargaining agreement provides that
clubs may pay players with fewer than three years of service any salary the team wishes, so long
as the salary is a) at least $100,000 per year plus an adjustment for cost of living increases between
1991 and 1992 b) no more than 20 percent below the salary in the previous year; and c) no more
than 30 percent below the salary two years past. If the player does not accept the team offer, he
We refer to payer whth less than three years of major league aervice fo covCenico.
b dividg lineis not
precisely at three years. Under the 1990 agreement the salaries of a few of the most sor players in the upothreeyears bracket are grouped with thoe who have completed three years. There were 17 suh players in 1991. For
convrec, tvmer, the te "three
me
of service will be usd througbout s abo iWding tO plaWycrs
wih fewer
than three years of srvie who are thus treated.
It should alo be dear that length of major league serve is not calulated contiuously from tbe due of a
piayer's first major league servic. A year of srve is credited coly for 172 days mna major league's active i c, the
25 man rser during the saon until September 1, the 40 man rater thereafter.
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cannot play major league baseball. For a variety of reasons, clubs typically pay such players more
than the required minimum. In 1991, 45 percent of all major league players were in this category.
'beir salaries, however, constituted slightly less than 9 percent of total salaries.
Compensation for such players, therefore, imposes little burden on the clubs. In any event,
such salaries are under control of the clubs. If operating revenues decline, the clubs could reduce
the salaries paid to these players, subject only to the minimum salary and the maximum reduction
percentage (which is larger than even the most pessimistic forecast of decline in club revenues).
tyrs vith Sir Ar
Mor Yes ofSmc
At the other end of the spectrum, players who
have completed six years of major league service and who are not playing under a multi-year
contract extending beyond six years are eligible to become "free agents.' Free agents may negotiate
with any team and sign a contract of any mutually agreed duration for any mutually agreed
compensation. In 1991, 30 percent of the players had six years or more of service. Their salaries,
however, constituted almost 61 percent of the total salary bill.
These players include a large proportion of the prominent 'franchise" players with a
substantial public following, but only a small portion of these players is eligible to exercise freeagency rights in any given year. Some are playing under multi-year contracts signed before or after
they became eligible to be free agents. After a player who ranks statistically among the top 50
percent in performance of all major league players at his position has exercised his right to free
agency, he may not do so again for a period of five years. Clubs are obligated to pay free agent
players only the salaries they voluntarily agree to as a result of negotiations with the player and/or
his agent
Unless it can be clearly demonstrated to be inimical to baseball as a whole we see no
reason why outsiders should interfere with freely negotiated contracts between clubs and individual
players. While the salaries of selected players are quite high, similar or higher salaries are paid in
other sports and in the long run baseball needs to be attractive to talented young athletes.
In short, with respect to players with fewer than three years of service and those with six
or more years of service, constituting 75 percent of the players and nearly 70 percent of the total
salary bill, the clubs are paying salaries to which they have agreed. The arrangements set forth by
the collective bargaining agreement in themselves create no structural impediment to salaries
responding to changes in the revenue.
Players wih Thrar To Sir Years of Smice Players with at least three but fewer than six
years of major league service are subject to the reserve system and are bound to the clubs that
signed them, but are normally eligible for final offer salary arbitration, unless they have signed
multi-year contracts. In 1991, 25 percent of major league players fell in this service category.
They received slightly less than 31 percent of total player salaries.
The clubs argue that the 'pernicious" system of final offer salary arbitration is the second
of the two reasons for their prediction that player salaries will not be responsive to the projected
decline in national television revenues. Under final offer arbitration, the player and the club to
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which the player is reserved each present the arbitrator with a proposed salary for a one-year
contract, together with arguments on why the proposed salary each party advocates is the more
reasonable. Arbitrators must pick one proposed salary or the other. In making their decisions,
arbitrators are barred from considering the financial condition of the club.
Probably the most important factor considered by the arbitrator is the salaries paid to
"comparable" players, including free agents. Relevant free agent contracts include not only those
signed in the current year, but all contracts still in effect that were signed in the previous years.
The emphasis on *comparable salaries" was intended to and had the effect of eliminating geographic
differentials in salaries. Iength of service is also an important part of the salary arbitration criteria.
This has resulted in arbitrators' decisions which show a pattern of average salaries, in the group
of players eligible for arbitration, graduated by length of service with the higher salaries on average
being paid to those players with longer major league service.
The Committee has heard three arguments on why arbitration produces undesirable effects.
First, both the players and the clubs allege that arbitration systematically produces salaries different
from those that would be generated by unfettered contracting between players and clubs.
Second, the clubs hold that arbitration reduces the effective control of the clubs over their
payrolls. The lack of control arises, it is argued, because the clubs are forced either to release
arbitration-eligible players as unrestricted free agents or to tender contracts to the players, which
automatically precipitates arbitration under current rules if the player does not accept what the club
has offered. Under final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator may choose the player's bid, which may
considerably exceed what the club had been planning to spend. The statistical analysis conducted
by staff on the lag between arbitration awards and free agency salaries was not considered
conclusive enough by the Committee to provide much clarification on this point.
The players argue that arbitration does not deprive owners of effective control over their
salary budgets because the club may refuse to tender a contract to a player and may enter the freeagent market to acquire a player who can provide comparable services. If the club tenders a
contract, the players argue, it is because it thinks it can get 'more player for the money through
arbitration than it can through the free agent market. Since no one denies that clubs can control
what they spend in the free agent market, the players maintain that the clubs can do at least as
well, on the average, under arbitration as they can under free agency.
The third argument against arbitration is that it deprives players who wish to play for a
team other than their current one of the opportunity to act on that preference.
As a general matter, the Committee believes that in the absence of other compelling
arguments restrictions on contracting between the parties should be minimized. The burden of
proof is on those who would restrict the ability of individual players and owners to contract freely
with each other. The Committee finds no such justification for arbitration as currently applied to
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three-to-six year players. Accordingly, we recommend that the service level at which players
become free agents be reduced from six to three years.s
The enlargement of the number of players entitled to free agency may have a number of
side effects. One may be an increase in the number of long-term guaranteed contracts to ensure
clubs that they will be able to keep promising players. Another may be an increase in the number
of players moving from club to club. That, however, may or may not be balanced by a decrease
in the number of trades of players in the three to six year category. It is impossible to predict with
certainty the ctent of such side effects. However, if the enlargement of free agency produces such
significantly larger movement of players as to decrease fan loyalty to teams, it would be in the
interest of the parties to negotiate subsequently some small deterrent to movement by players in
the three to six year service group.
Taking all these considerations into account, the Committee recommends that the parties
move to extend free agency to players in the three-to-six year category. We have not agreed to
recommend any changes in the rules governing player compensation other than the reduction in
the service requirement for free agency from six to three years.

pi
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IV. Competitive Balance

A reasonable degree of competitive balance is essential to the excitement of baseball. One
of the great attractions of baseball is that on any given day any team may beat any other team.
Tight pennant races, Cinderella teams, underdogs, and David-and-Goliath contests are all part of
the lore and attraction of the national pastime, perhaps more so than in other spors. The
practical question, therefore, is whether financial imbalances among teams have undermined
competitive balance sufficiently to be "a problem."
Clubs situated in large communities usually have access to more local television revenues
and game receipts than do clubs in small communities. Common sense suggests that clubs with
larger revenues should be able to field stronger teams, on the average, than small market clubs can.
This advantage should arise from the greater capacity of large-market clubs to support extensive
farm systems to develop future players and to offer higher salaries to attract star players. Clubs
that can remain financially viable only by keeping payrolls low might be expected to win relatively
fewer games. Such a strategy might (or might not) keep these teams profitable, but it could
destroy competitive balance.'
The Committee found no evidence that such a problem has existed in the past two
decades." The 1991 World Series involved two clubs that were last in their division's standings in
1990. Six of eleven teams alleged by the clubs to be in chronic financial difficulty (see section II
above) finished in the top third of their respective division races in 1992; two won division titles.
As the staff report shows, clubs in large markets enjoyed an advantage on the field of 2.5 games
during the period from 1984 through 1990. Staff estimates indicate that a club in a market four
times as large as that of another club would win from 2.5 to 5.2 more games than the smaller
market team. (See Staff Analysis, Section II.) Staff analysis finds no evidence that competitive
balance has decreased and some that it has increased since the advent of free agency.

'Economic tbcory also sugests that larg market teca should be stronger than small market team. If transaction
csts were small, it would be in the interest of both owners and pisyers for players to be employed In bsebal markets
where they coold contribute most to team revenues. If a player were in another market than the oe where be could
generate highest revnues, it would pay the team that owns his contract to negotiate a mutually advantageoussale with
the team where the players addition to revenue wa highest. Ibe rules under which players are compensated would not
afnct this coclusion if transaction costs were small. In fact, transaction cots are sipilficant. As the ten indicates, the
teadency indicated by conomic theory s observed in practice. Economic tory does not, howver, indicate how Iwa
the dicapancy in co-feMlperformance wilbe.
Competitive balance" ba no obvious simple denition. It could reft to the frequccy with whi team win the
World Series, the league chatnpioship, or their division or it couMlrefer to the frequency with which teams are In the
race' at some date in the season, which itacif could be dened in maious ways. Competitive balace could also refer to
the difference in the averae number of pme won between first and last place team or to the standard deviation in the
number of wi. It could be bued o a compariso at singie-ason records or on averages over several seasons. [bc
number of oIb definition
competitive blance is infnite. The staff tried several defnits. None indicated a
decarse in competitive balance and one indicated large imtlances.
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From one standpoint, it is puzzling why the great differences in baseball market size-the
largest market is effectively four times the size of the smallest-have not resulted in larger
differences in won-lost records than those actually observed. Part of the answer to this puzzle
seems to be that such factors as skill in player development, managerial ability, the equalizing effect
of injuries, teamwork and synergy among the players, and just plain luck play a larger part in
performance on the field than many suppose. Part may be that the greater revenue potential of
the large-market teams is absorbed by (i.e. 'capitalized into) higher purchase value so that a higher
operating margin is needed to service debt or provide a return on equity. In any event, under
the existing compensation arrangements, economic differences as represented by market size are
weakly associated with differences in won-lost records. We have found no sign, moreover, that the
association between economic differences and competitive imbalance has grown stronger over time."
The data contained in the staff analysis do strongly suggest that there is a statistical
association between payroll size and on-the-field performance. (See Staff Analysis, Figure 13.)
They do not, however, establish which is the cause and which is the effect. It is arguable that
there is a "winner's curse', i.e. that superiox: on-the-field performance capped by a league or world
series championship causes payrolls to rise. The reverse may also be true, i.e. that payroll increases
lead to superior on-the-field performance. The evidence before the Committee is too inconclusive
to support a definitive judgment on this question. We do conclude that at least to this date there
has been no problem of competitive balance.
We are not asserting that competition between the clubs is in perfect balance. Some teams
have done poorly in recent years, including Cleveland, Seattle, and Houston, three of the eleven
clubs alleged to be financially troubled. Whether these clubs will continue to perform poorly is
not certain. As the result of its recent sale, ownership of the Seattle franchise moves to owners
with larger financial resources; and Cleveland will have a new and more attractive stadium. As the
experience of Baltimore dramatically illustrates, new and attractive stadiums can sharply increase
fan interest and attendance, although in Baltimore's case the effect of the new stadium is difficult
to disentangle from the team's greatly improved on-field performance.
The evidence we have found on the effect of market size on competitive balance suggests
that increased revenue sharing would probably add slightly to competitive balance, but that the
addition would be small in the context of a generally profitable industry. However, as indicated
earlier, revenue sharing could help protect against cost pressure on weaker franchises if a serious
cost-revenue squeeze were to develop for the industry generally.

nnbc optisum deree at competitive balance is hard to define. Fas would probably be happics if every club
appeared to be a Conender every year. Total baembal revenues would probably be nimabd, however, if large market
tms won a bit more often than small market team do, but not by wide margins. Pennant races would continue to be
and the sight dominance of large teas would mmie the rester drawing power and ideviion potential of the
ager murkets. Ibe rather modest current advantage of large market teans seems to be roughly consistent with this
scoone ideal.
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V. Other Issues
This section treats three other issues the Committee chose to address.
Related Part, Transactions

Many teams are part of business groups that engage in activities other than baseball. These
groupings may involve partnerships or corporations.

The common element is that separate

businesses, each of which is wholly or partly owned in common, sometimes engage in business
transactions with one another. The prices paid by one such business to another may or may not
be the same as would result if the businesses were independently owned. In such caes, the
revenues, expenses, and profits of each entity may differ from those that would have been

generated by arm's length transactions.
The players have long alleged that such transactions cause baseball profits to be
systematically understated. The dubs acknowledge that some minor distortions may occur, but hold
that they do not much color the overall picture of basebal's economic condition.
The Committee finds no evidence to suggest that local variations in media contracts, stadium
arrangements and other related party transactions invalidate the general picture of club profitability
that cmerges from the combined operating statements furnished by the owners.

The staff analysis concludes that, with the exception of a handful of cases, the discrepancies
reported are small, not suspect, or come down in the end to reasonable questions of judgment
And with one ciception, where the club has not furnished enough data to allow a conclusive
judgment, none of the cases concern financially troubled clubs.

The Committee concludes that the profits of a smal number of teams, most of which ae
profitable, are somewhat understated became of related party transactions. Tbe financial condition
of some other teams may be affected to a relatively sinor csent. In the aggregate, baseball is
probably slightly more profitable than the statistics submitted to the Commissione suggest. ot
this Committee does not think that its comments about the future or its recomendatio
have been changed if eams transacted al business completely at an-s length.

would

Eleuer CeMMastie Ias*@ em Cambhpp 118Me
During the bargaining leading, up so the current labor-management agreement, the dubs
advanced a proposal that would have established mainmum and maximum gram salaries for each
club based an a percentage of certain defined revenues for the dubs as a whole. Under thi
proposal the salaries of al players with fewer than si years of seavice would be deterained by
statisticalacasure of perfosmance and would be paid from a common pool. Tbe rules would have
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provided numerous exceptions to the maximum, most notably an exclusion of salaries paid to
players on any club's roster in the previous year. A broadly similar minimum-maximum rule, with
the same exception, is in operation in professional basketball. The players did not accept this
proposal and the clubs withdrew it.
The Committee does not express an opinion on any floor-cciling proposal. It did identify
various advantages and disadvantages to the idea. Some of the prominent ones are as follows:
Advantages:
*
*
*
*

Allows clubs collectively and individually to negotiate their total labor costs within
broad limits clearly related to revenue growth. Combined with revenue-sharing,
contributes to stabilizing the weaker clubs.
Gives both players and owners a common stake in the overall commercial success
of baseball, since they would share explicitly in the same revenue stream.
May increase management-labor harmony by focusing contract negotiations on
exactly how much of the pie labor will get, and then fixing that for the duration of
the contract.
During a period of severe financial adjustment could be designed to protect players
against rapidly falling salaries.

Disadvantages:
The Committee recommendations with respect to players with three to six years of service
would in fact allow the clubs to negotiate all of their player costs clearly and specifically. Any
minmum-maximum proposal would add nothing except to limit the ability of players to negotiate
with individual dubs and to artificially restrict dubs from paying what they think players are worth.
If as basketball has found to be necessary, and as the clubs proposed in 1990, an exception to the
maximum permits clubs to resign their own players without regard to the maximum, free agency
would be essentially eliminated, since bidding clubs would be subject to the maximum while the
players' current clubs would not. The result would be to reduce total player compensation and,
as in basketball, might be to seriously affect competitive balance. If no such exception were made,
dubs with payrolls now in excess of the maximum would be required to reduce the salaries of their
present players and would be powerless to bid for any players at all.
If total player salaries are contractually tied to revenues, the players would insist on the
right to have an equal voice in the negotiations and decisions which the clubs now make
unilaterally that directly affect revenues, such as franchise sales and moves, new franchises,
television and cable contracts, ticket prices, revenue sharing, etc. Fnally, any direct tie to gross
dub revenues would require a relationship of trust in the accuracy of club statements as to
revenues; it is dear that, at present, the union does not have the requisite level of trust.
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MarketlaE and Promotion of Baseball
During the course of its work, members of the Committee frequently encountered
observations on baseball from people knowledgeable about the marketing of professional sports.
They have noted that effective and determined efforts by local clubs to boost attendance and
promote their teams have produced marked results in recent years both at the gate and on the
bottom line. At the same time, many expressed the view that baseball is marketed and promoted
less well on a national level than are other major sports. In particular, observers in the world of
sports and the media expressed the view that both basketball and football do a superior job at the
national level of communicating the excitement and attraction of their sport to the public, and of
finding ways to manage scheduling, competition and promotion of stars that build audiences and
hence advertising revenue.
Although fan support of baseball is near all-time highs, the Committee judges that
aggressive promotion of baseball can produce even better results. To realize this potential will
involve looking at a wide range of matters, including how to make playoff and championship
competition more attractive; exploring the possibility of more international baseball competition;
additional ways to market local television rights; and possible restructuring of league structure and
season length. These issues can be addressed only through disciplined and effective cooperation
between players and clubs. Indeed, the very challenge of more effective national marketing for
baseball underscores the need for a broad and durable partnership between players and owners.
Marketing in baseball means marketing the players, particularly the stars; and the only way that can
work is for players and owners to share a vital sense of their very real common interest and to
develop a pattern of cooperation which allows them to build on that common interest.
Another opportunity is the management and marketing of television rights to cable
distributors and other outlets for baseball programming other than national over-the-air
broadcasters. Some of the dubs do a remarkably sophisticated job of selling local media rights to
their games. But most TV markets now have 300-400 games per season available to the viewer;
these games are available helter-skelter and often are not effectively promoted or scheduled so as
to maximize audience and advertising potentiaL It is ironic that of the major sports, the only one
with a judicially sanctioned anti-trust exemption is the one which makes available its entertainment
product on the least controlled, least effectively marketed basis. The present price of most regular
season games sold to local cable systems can range anywhere from $15,000 per game on the low
end to $100,000 and higher per game on the upper end. Local TV may replace national
broadcasting as the fastest growing source of revenue for baseball. While this revenue picture will
certainly be affected by the general slowdown in TV revenue growth we have described elsewhere,
baseball as a whole has a tremendous stake in maximizing the growth of local TV audience and
revenue in the future. Many clubs presently do a professional job of selling and marketing their
games on a local ADIn basis. But the increasing availability of multi-channel TV in markets all
over the country, increasingly refined market segmentation programming strategies, and the
profusion of other sports events available to distributors and local systems, are beginning to give
ADL Area at Dominant InOccm, a televison marketing term raerring to the populado at a geographic are In
which a panicular am of VHF statn are the principal om reccived.
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an enormous advantage to any sport or entertainment which does an aggressive, nationally
coordinated job of packaging. scheduling selling and promotion. The Committe feels this
opportunity should be a major focus of baseball's efforts in the future.
The Committee makes no recommendation on how the players and clubs should organize
to improve the marketing and promotion of baseball. We note simply that increases in overall
baseball revenues create the potential for both parties to gain, and that "growing the overall pie
is a vital objective that the owners and players share in common. We think that cooperative efforts
to increase revenues may be more important in the 1990's than they would have been in the 1980's.
Some parts of the game must and will forever remain the same. The bases will always be
ninety feet apart, and there will always be three outs per half inning. But by examining
imaginatively other aspects of the sport that do evolve over time in response to changing
conditions, baseball may develop avenues of promotion which can rekindle public interest, attract
new fans, and intensify the loyalty of existing ones.

Henry Aaron
David Feller
Peter Goldmark
Paul Volcker
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Except from Article XXIV
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Parties
Establishing Economic Study Committee

A. Study Committee
A Study Committee shall be established no later than September 1, 1990, to
study and report to the Commissioner and to the Parties to this Agreement on
the overall economic condition of the industry, including a description of current
or impending problems, if any; the cause of such problems; and possible
solutions. The Committee shall be composed of six (6) individuals, four (4) of
whom shall not be or have been an employee, member o or consultant to, any
club, the Player Relations Committee, the Association or Major League BasebalL
The Chairman of the Player Relations Committee and the Executive Director of
the Association, or their designees, shall serve as co-chairs of the Committee and
shall each recommend two (2) additional members who shall be appointed by the
Commissioner to serve on the Committee. The Committee shall consider the
following issues as part of its study;
1. The relationship, if any, between club revenues and on-field
competition;
2. The extent and nature of revenue sharing among the clubs;
3. The advantages (and/or disadvantages) of compensating players
based on a percentage of combined industry revenues;
4. Past and future trends in national and local media markets;
5. The extent, nature, and value of club related party
transactions;
6. Franchise values;
7. The number and location of geographical markets (including
franchise relocation); and
8. Such other matters as the Committee (or either of the cochairs thereof) deems appropriate.
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Report of Independent Accountants
Major League Baseball Clubs
We have compiled the accompanying combined summary of operations (before income
taxes) (the "Summary') of the twenty-six Major League Baseball Clubs (the "Clubs') and
the.Major Leagues Central Fund for the 1991 playing season. The Summary combines
the revenues and expenses of each of the Clubs and the Major Leagues Central Fund for
the respective fiscal year end which included the 1991 playing season. For presentation
purposes, the Clubs have been grouped based on their respective contributions to income
(loss) from baseball operations.
We audited the statements of revenues and expenses of six of the twenty-six Clubs and
that of the Major Leagues Central Fund. Our audits were made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting
records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. The statements of revenues and expenses of the twenty other Clubs together with
the reports of other auditors thereon have been furnished to us through respective League
Counsel. Each Club has also furnished to us, through the respective League Counsel, a
completed questionnaire (the "Questionnaire") containing detailed financial information
for the respective fiscal year end which included the 1991 playing season. The income
(loss) before income taxes reported on these Questionnaires have been agreed by us to the
respective Clubs' audited statements of revenues and expenses. These Questionnaires
have been used to effect the above-mentioned compilation.
Management has elected to omit substantially all of the disclosures required by generally
accepted accounting principles. If the omitted disclosures were included with the
Summary, they might influence the user's conclusions about the operatipns of the twentysix Major League Baseball Clubs and the Major Leagues Central Fund for the 1991
playing season. Accordingly, the Summary is not designed for those who are not informed about such matters.
In our opinion, based on our audits, the reports of other auditors, and the reconciliation of
the income (loss) before income taxes reported on the Questionnaires to the respective
Clubs' audited statements of revenues and expenses referred to above, the Summary for
the 1991 playing season has been properly compiled from the Qdestionnaires and the
statement of revenues and expenses of the Major Leagues Central Fund.

I

214
The accompanying combined schedules of operating revenues, major league player costs,
team operating expenses and major league player acquisition costs, scouting and player
development expenses, stadium operations expenses, marketing, publicity and ticket
operations expenses, general and administrative expenses, and amortization of franchise
acquisition costs for the 1991 playing season have been compiled from the information
included in the Questionnaires and the statement of revenues and expenses of the Major
14agues Central Fund. Such schedules are presented for purposes of additional analysis
and are not a required part of the Summary. In our opinion, based on our audits, the
reports of other auditors, and the reconciliation of the income (loss) before income taxes
reported on the Questionnaires to the respective Clubs' audited statements of revenues
and expenses referred to above, the combined schedules have been properly compiled
from the Questionnaires and the statement of revenues and expenses of the Major
Leagues Central Fund.

July 31, 1992
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues
Schedule I
(In Thousands)
Top
Elght

Middle
Ten

Bottom
Eight

Tetal

S 218.792
28.913
5.645
8,951
175,283
22.963
1,300
199546

S 195.906
19,877
5,266
10,980
159,783
21.794
1,210
182.787

S 143309
19.246
3.911
3,950
116,202
23351
1,135
140.688

S 558.007
68,036
14,822
23,881
451,268
68.108
3,645
523.021

4.422

4.401

4.225

13,048

30,123
45.981
25.888
5,200
805
107,997

37,654
57.476
32.361
6,500
1,006
134,997

30,123
45981
25,888
5,200
805
107,997

97.900
149.438
84.137
16,900
2,616
350,991

59.650
2
59648

58361
5,099
53.262

32398
3,488
28.910

150.409
8,589
141,820

Radio:
Gross revenues
Less direct expenses
Local radio-nct

23.430
469

22961

28.214
3,326
24-888

23,642
4,501
19.141

75,286
8,96
66.990

Cable:
Gross revenues (including advertising)
Less direct expenses. including local taxes
Less television scrambling
Local cable-net
Total Local Television and Radio

43.119
118
43,001
125.610

32.112
500
148
31,464
109.614

25,877
1,607
118
24,152
72.203

101.108
2.107
384
98,617
307427

A. Regular Season Game Receipts
Home game receipts-ner
Total home game receipts
Less visiting club share
Less League share
Less admission/sales tax
Total home game receipts-net
Away game receipts
Unredeemed tickets, rain checks
Total Regular Season Came Receipts
B. Spring Training Game Receipts (net of
rent and stadium operations expenses)
C. National Broadcasting
Regular season
World series
League Championship Series
All-Star Game
Foreign rights
Total National Broadcasting
D. Local Television and Radio
Television:
Gross revenues
Less direct expenses
Television-net

4
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues (continued)
Schedule I (continued)
(In Thousands)

Top
Eivht

Middle
Ten

Bottom
Eight

Total

S 58,970

S 42,349

S 29,653

S 130,972

sales and cost of publications)
Stadium signs and scoreboard, act of direct
saes expenses (including commissions)
Serecards-aetolexpenses
Yearbooks-nect of expenses
Othe-netofexpenses
Total Advenising and Publications

11.818
1,538
830
5,189
19,375

7,797
2.196
137
504
10,634

5.253
1.181
139
612
7,185

24.68
4,915
1,106
6,305
37,194

G. Parkng, Net

6458

5370

5,637

17,465

H. Stadium Suite Rentals
Gross revenues (excluding ticket revenues)
Lnss direct expenses (including labor and

13.093

7.350

3,680

24.123

Total Stadium Suite Rentals

4,272
8.821

828
6.522

416
3,264

5,516
18607

L Copyright Royally Tribunal

4,099

5,124

4,099

13322

J. Amortization of amounts received in 1989
relating to network telecasting
agreements

2,846

3,865

3,086

9,797

2013
372
549
(899)

8.837
3.193
751
(4,485)

3.111
374
725
(1,328)

13.961
3.939
2025
(6,712)

2,035

8.296

2.882

13.213

IL n.Park Cocessios, Net (including
restauraat/stadlum dub revenues
and novelties, but excluding sales of

publications)
F. Advertising and Publications (including

supplies. but excluding depreciation)

L League Championship Series and

World Series
Shareofsamereceipts-net
Conicessions-net

Otherrevenues
less expenses
Total League Championship Series and
World Series

5
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues (continued)
Schedule I (continued)
(In Thousands)

LNational liceasing

Top
Eight

Middle
Ten

Bottom
Eight

S 17,249

S 21337

S 16849

1.582
1,659
621
1390
16,910
22,162

2,429
6.632
777
290
7,071
17,199

2,404
289
621
678
3.550
7.542

6,415
8,580
2,019
2,358
27,531
46,903

S579.590

S552A95

S405.310

SI.537.395

Total
S

55,435

M. Other Baseball.Related Revenues
National marketing
Local marketing and licensing
All-Star Game receipts
Receipts from exhibition games
Other-net
Total Other Baseball-Relatcd Revenues
Total Operating Revenues
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Team Operating Expenses
and Major League Player Acquisition Costs
Schedule

m

(In Thousands)

Top
'iht
E..hf

Team Operating Expenses
Salaries-nanager. coaches and trainers
Spring taining
Transportation and road trip expenses
Hotelsand meals
Players moving allowances and expenses
Disability, life. accident and travel insurance
Workers' compensation insurance
Uniforms and playing equipment
Baseballs
Bats
Clubhouse expenses
Medical expenses
Other expenses

S 7,493
3,835
7.172
3.196
218
2,356
4.815
354
749
352
849
700

1,631
33,720

Major League Player Acquisition Costs
Amortization of cost of contracts
purchased-active players
-players released or retired
(Gain) loss on sale of player contracts
TotatTeam Operating Expenses and Major
League Player Acquisition Costs

694
9
163
866
S34.586

Middle
Ten

T"

S 10.251
7.346
7,881
4.524
404
2.259
6,012
455
821
446
1,169
1,419
10Q71

44,058

327
214
(32)
509
S 44.567

Bottom
Rht

El ht
S 6.771
4,511
7,098
3.745
263
2,607
7,015
225
666
311
890
705

Tald1

S 24.515
15.692
22.151
11,465
885
7,222
17.542
1.034
2.236
1,109
2,908
2,824

1 072

774

35,879

113,657

617
1,646
(756)
1,507
S 37.386

1,638
1.869
(625)
2,882
S 116.539

8
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Scouting and Player Development Expenses
Schedule IV
(In Thousands)

TOp

Middle

Bottom

Eight

Ten

Eight

Total

S 8,035
5.481
614
14,130

511.261
7.250
1,200
19,711

S 7.428
5.655
523
13,606

S 26.724
18386
2,337
47,447

Scening Expeases
Travel expenses
Other expenses
Tatal Scouting Expenses
Amateur Player Acquisition Costs

Minor League signing bonuses and other
player acquisition costs
Con of released players
Sak ofcontracts-net (gain)

Other
Totsl Amateur Player Acquisition Costs
Player Development Expenses
Salaries-front office (farm director. director
ofplayer development, assistances. etc.)
Salaries-managers, coaches. trainers and
instructors
Class AAA Clubs
Cha AA Clubs
Class A Clubs
Rookie Clubs
Spring training (March camps only)
Extended spring training (including
June camps)
Insructional league
Latin American and other foreign
National Association. net

Oiler expenses
Total Player Development Expenses
Toral Scouting and Player Development
Expenses

9.937
725
(500)
105
10,267

10.036
1.090
(575)
301
10,852

5.577
110
(146)
292
5,833

25.550
1,925
(1,221)
698
26,952

2.350

2.164

1.670

6.184

5.707
6.401
2.996
5.900
2.596
3,336

7.903
7.636
3.244
6.806
2,075
3.565

5.751
7.042
3.326
5.543
1,274
2,826

19.361
21.079
9,566
18.249
5,945
9.727

1.469
1.558
2,176
134
3,661
38,284

1.071
1,677
1.503
164
2.997
40,805

941
974
1,306
134
2,956
33,743

3.481
4.209
4.985
432
9,614
112.832

S 62.681

S 71.368

S 53.182

S 187.231

9
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs

1991 Season
Combined Stadium Operations Expenses
Schedule V
(In Thousands)
Top
Eiaht

Middle
Ten

Bottom
Eiht

Total

S 19.321
2297

S 12,957
3.077

S 13.880
1.590

S 46.158
6964

Salaries (or contracted cost) for day of

game and season personnel
Salaries-year-round personnel

Signs and scoreboard operations, including
salaries
Rent (including olncelstadium rent, use taxes.
Cable TV, super suites. etc.)
Depreciation o stadium (including super
suites and scoreboard) and equipment
Real estate and property taxes

Utilities
Maintenance and repairs

Other expenses
Total Stadium Operations Expenses

2,087

957

2,228

5,272

15,254

7.571

9.104

31.929

12,468

9.339
1.628
3.812
3,516
2222
S 45,079

2,601
184
1.946
1,190
1,068
S 33.791

24408
3,593
9.736
6.917
5-919
S 140.896

1,781

3.978
2,211
2.629
S 62.026

10
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Marketing, Publicity and Ticket Operations Expenses
Schedule VI
(In Thousands)
Top

Salaries, including bonuses and commissions:
Marketing/promodons
Publicity/community relations
Sales office
Ticket office
Total Salaries

Game promotions--net (revenue) expense
Advertising
Club newslcter
Ticket printing and schedules
Agencyand credit card commissions
Press
room expenses (salanes and
food supplies)
Other (including Media Guide)
All-Star Game expense
Total Marketng. Publicity and Tickc
Operations Expenses

Middle

Bottom

Te

Fieht

Ta~Id

S 1.746
1.931
1.683
4,263
9,623

S 3.693
2.701
2,480
4,632
13506

S 1,885
1.836
1.930
4,247
9,898

S 7.324

(1.456)
3.192
33
632
1.367

342
5,499
574
1.293
1,233

(923)
3922
28
842
929

(2.037)
12,613
635
2.767
3.529

809
3.988
179
8,744

950
3.910
224
14,025

1,001
3,722
179
9,700

2.760
11.620
582
32,469

S 18.367

S 27.531

S 19.598

S 65.496

Fleht

6.468
6.093
13,142
33,027
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined General and Administrative Expenses
Schedule VII
(In Thousands)

Salaries-tasetall administration
Salae -business administration
Payroll taxes
Travel and entertainment
Employee benefitsGroup life. health and other
Retirement. profit sharing, 401(k) plans, etc.
Insurance.
General liability-primary and excess
Other
Legal fees
Accounting fees
Other professional fees
Business taxes
Computer operations. including ticket office
Telephone
Postage
Stationery and supplies
Drug program
Charitable contributions
Other expenses
Total General and Administrative Expcnses

Bottom

Top

Middle
Ten

Eight

Total

S 4,672
9.760
7,401
4.113

S 5,692

S 4.115

S 14.479

11,916
9.256
8.018

8.116
6379
3.512

29.792
23.036
15.643

4.482
3.454

6.108
4,866

4.851
3.245

15.441
11.565

3,585
2,389
4,045
1.009
4,289
978
1,270
1.989
1,302
1.434
82
1,677

3.768
911
3.488
1.396
2,525
855
1.107
2.355
1.485
1.149
103
1,552

1,729
295
1.883
643
3,029
941
396
1.496
1.006
920
82
600

9.0=2

Eight

22

S 64.470

S 6,82

2,AS591

S56

3.595
9416
3.048

9.843
2774
2.773
5.840
3.793
3.503
267
3.829
11S44
96
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MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERs ASSOCIATION
Dotra MLFein

2 February 1993
Hon. Howard M. Netzenbau
c/o Chris Harvie
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Honopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6275
Re:

Baseball's Antitrust Exemption

Dear Senator Metzenbaum:

In order to complete the record, I am enclosing a copy of
the Baseball Economic Study Committee Report. I understand that
you may have received parts of the report from representatives of

the owners.

In particular, I draw your attention to the

Supplementary Statement of member Henry Aaron.

In my view,

Henry

gave more serious consideration to the issues facing baseball
than other members of the Committee.

Your very truly,

Donald M. Fehr
DMF/mc

805 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK. NY 10022
TEL (212) 8264808
FAX: (212) 752-3649
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The 19W93 Basic Agreement between the American and National

ague Baseball

Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) established an Economic
Study Committee (ESC). The ESC is to report on "the overall economic condition of the
ladustry, including a description of current or impending problems, ... the cause of such
problems, and possible solutions."

The ESC hired a staff to do the factual and statistical work necessary for this
examination. This is the staff analysis. It focuses heavily on two questions the ESC felt to
be of paramount importance - the overall economic condition of baseball clubs, and the state
of competitive balance between clubs with large and small revenue bases. Section I deals
with the overall economic condition of the industry and impending problems. Section II looks
for evidence of these problems on the financial side - how profitable are baseball clubs, how
much are clubs worth, how large are rates of return from owning clubs? Section

El

looks for

evidence on the competitive side - how competitive are the clubs on the field, how large are
disparities in win-loss records, how great are the competitive advantages of clubs with
greater revenue potentials?

Since this is just an analytical report, it contains no

recommendations of changes that might be made in the structure of major league baseball.
Recommendations can be found in the report of the ESC itself.

L The Overall Condition of Major League Baseball

To appraise the economic condition of major league baseball, we were able to examine
cwfidential club data submitted to the Commissioner, covering the years 1978 to 1991. We
converted all figures in this report to 1991 US dollars by deflating by the Consumer Price

1
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Inde.

Since the data are confidential, we generally just give either club ar group averages,

not the data for particular clubs.

On the surface major league baseball looks reasonably healthy. As can be seen in Figure
1, overall real revenue for the 26 major league baseball clubs grew fairly slowly, at an
annual average real growth rate of 3 percent, from 1978 to 1982 (the year following
baseball's worst strike). Since that time revenues have increased sharply, at an annual
average real growth rate of 10 percent from 1982 to 1991. Over this span major league
baseball has more doubled its share of US real gross domestic product. Over the 1985-91
period, the focus of much of the ESC's report, the annual average real growth rate was 9
percent

There has been much attention to the explosion in players' salaries. For most of this
century these salaries were held down by the old reserve clause system, which bound players
to clubs and did not let players sell their services on the free market. The reserve clause
system began to break apart in the mid-1970s, and player salaries began a rapid ascent, at
the annual average real growth rate of 12 percent a year from 1978 to 1991; 10 percent a
year from 1985 to 1991.

But after an initial change, baseball revenues grew rapidly enough that even this rapid
growth of players salaries did not absorb an unusually high fraction of revenues. Figure 2
shows player costs, including pension payments and collusion payments (to be explained
later), as a share of club revenues. In the 1978-81 period, when the reserve clause system
was breaking apart, this share rose sharply, from 30 percent to 48 percent. Since then.
including the collusion payments, the share has remained pretty close to 46 percent, though
it did rise to 51 percent in 1991.

2
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The results for the overall operating income (to be defined below) of baseball clubs are
sawn in Figure S. Average club operating income was low or negative up to 1I65 but then
began a rally through 1990, reaching a peak of $5 million per club. It dipped back to $3.5
million per club in 1991.

These numbers illustrate the high points. Each comes with a variety of qualifications and
complications, to be discussed further below. And, even if these overall figures give the
superficial appearance of health - revenues are rising rapidly, operating income Used to be
negative and is now positive - there could be potential trouble spots. Two of the main ones
are:
a The vast disparity in revenues between clubs.
a The adjustment of the compensation system to slowdowns in revenue growth.

Revenue disparities

There is a widespread variation in the size of club markets, and in potential revenues.
City population sizes vary from the two New York teams, splitting up a metropolitan
population of 19 million, to Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Cincinnati, each with metropolitan
populations of less than 2 million.

Similar population disparities exist in the other major professional sports - football,
basketball, and hockey. But because of its more decentralized revenue sources, the revenue
disparities are much greater in baseball. Average club revenue was $56 million in 1991, of
which only $12 million came from a flat distribution from the major league central fund
(MLCF). The balance, over three-fourths of total revenue, was raised by the clubs on their
own, in markets as widely disparate in size as those cited above. This led to a great variation
3
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in total revenues warss clubs - from

$98 million for the top revenue club to $89 million for

the lowest revenue club. The lower number is lew than the entire player payroll for some
clubs.

Since clubs are bought and sold in free capital markets, franchise prices would be expected
to capitalize these disparities. This means that clubs in large markets with high revenue
potentials will tend to sell for more than clubs in small markets. It also means that star
players will generally be worth more in large markets, where their contribution to winning
games will produce more gate receipts and local television revenue. Would-be baseball
owners then have a choice - they can buy large market clubs for a high price, knowing that if
they do they will have the revenue potential to buy more star players and win more, or they
can buy small market clubs without these advantages, but for a smaller price.

This description is more or less the way all free markets work in a capitalist system whether for consumers or investors, one gets more if one pays more. But since baseball is not
a pure business, these free market attributes can lead to difficulties.

All clubs, from

whatever size market, must bid for the same players and compete on the same playing fields.
Large market clubs could bid player salaries to such a level that small market clubs could
not afford to field competitive clubs and still remain profitable. If the small market clubs try
to remain competitive, the impact of revenue disparities will be felt in the financial
statements.

If the small market clubs try to remain profitable, the impact of revenue

disparities will be felt in win-loss records. For this reason, it is necessary to examine both
financial records and on-field performance to see how serious these problems are.

A4justment

4
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The former reserve clause system has now been supplanted by a system with three
categories for setting player salaries. In this system:
o Most players with fewer than three years of major league service mut accept what the
clubs ofer them, provided that this offer exceeds the minimum salary of $100,O0

per year.

In 1991 45 percent of all major league players were in this category, but these players
received only 9 percent of total compensation.
o Players with more than six years of major league service are eligible to become free
agents and to sign contracts with aty club for any agreed on duration. In 199130 percent of
major league players had at least six years of major league service and these players received
61 percent of total compensation.
o Players in the middle with more than three but fewer than six years of major league
service are sulect to the reserve system and bound to the club that signed them, but are
normally eligible for final offer salary arbitration, unless they have signed multi-year
contracts. In 1991 25 percent of major league players were in this category, receiving 31
percent of total compensation.

Since the rules of collective bargaining create no impediment to clubs regarding player
costs in the first two categories, those worried about the adjustment of costs to revenues focus
on the third category - arbitration. There is a possibility that if the growth of revenues is
suddenly altered, say it slows dramatically, arbitration salaries will be set relative to free
agent salaries negotiated when revenue prospects were more optimistic, will not adjust to
revenues quickly, and will not be entirely under the control of baseball clubs. In this sense a
sudden slowdown in revenue growth could at least temporarily worsen baseball club incomes.

0

0

5

0
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These seem to be the main potential problems with the structure of majorleague baseball
To see how serious they are we must look more carefully at the economic and competitive
prospects for baseball clubs with different revenue base, as well as at the aiustment
warhanm

I. Evidence of Financial Health - Operating Income, Franchise Values, and Rates
of Return

We turn first to the financial aide. How "profitable" are baseball clubs, both in general
and for small market clubs in particular? Since it is difficult to define or appraise the
general profitability of clubs, we look at things in three different ways - we examine the
operating income of the clubs, we examine the franchise values of the clubs, and we combine
these two pieces of information to compute realized real rates of return from owning baseball
clubs.

Income statements

Since 1978 all clubs have submitted common audited financial forms on their baseball
operations to the Commissioner. With the advice of Ernst and Young, these forms have
become increasingly standardized over the years. We used these forms to compute a time
series of the real operating income of each baseball club, on a common accrual basis over
time and across clubs. The resultant data are probably more consistent and accurate than
data for most other American industries.

There are seven accounting issues worth special mention:

6
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e INormally

when groups buy baseball clubs they incur

varying amounts of debt. To the new owners, the interest on this debt looks like a fixed
expense just like any other fixed expense. But to accountants, the interest is a function of
the capital structure. What is paid out in interest by dubs with debt would appear as profits
to clubswithout debt.

Hence unless interest payments and receipts are excluded, cub

epense statements simply are not comparable, given that different clubs purchased for
different amounts at different times would have different interest expenses. We have thus
followed accepted accounting practice by removing all interest payments and receipts from
operating expenses and revenues (putting them "below the line," in accounting vernacular),
and computing the net operating income of baseball clubs as if all dubs were financed
entirely by equity (Sorter. JournalofAcCzauntncy. 1986).

o Amnisition costs. Initial owner acquisition costs - costs of the initial player roster, lease
arrangements, the stadium, and "good will" - are considered as capital transactions and also
eliminated from expenses and revenues (put below the line). But when a tangible asset such
as the stadium depreciates in the course of operating the club, this depreciation is considered
a depreciable expense (above the line), even if the club does not actually pay out any cash.
When the initial roster depreciates and the club is forced to acquire new players, these
subsequent new player acquisition costs are also considered as expenses (above the line). But
no further depreciation for initial rosters is allowed in our definition of operating income.

o ML.

This is a shell entity that receives revenues from national and superstation

television arrangements, licensing, and the All-Star game, and uses the revenue to finance
the Commissioner's Office, centralized scouting and umpiring expenses, and payments to the
player pension fund. The balance of the revenue is returned to the clubs, a flat amount per
club. We treat this MLCF as a 27th club. When the total revenues of baseball are measured,
we add the revenues of the 26 real clubs (net of the MLCF distribution) to the revenues of the
7
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ALCF. When club averages are calculated, we compute this average across the 26 real cubs,
including as revenues the amounts received by the clubs from the MLCF.

o Collusion payments. In the late 1980s the clubs were found to be guilty of collusive
bidding for free agents. The dubs and players reached an out-of-court settlement that had
the dubs pay $280 million to the MLBPA, which then redistributed the funds to individual
players. We allocated the non-interest component of this amount, $242 million, to club
salaries over the relevant years, 1986-92, using an annual distribution worked out by the
MLBPA (as was seen earlier in Figure 2, this allocation roughly preserves the ratio of player
costs to club revenues over the collusion period). For each year the adjustment to player
salaries was a flat amount per club, regardless of how much the club may or may not have
benefitted from collusion. While there seems to be no feasible alternative to this treatment,
it should be noted that some dubs could have benefitted more from collusion than this flat
addition to expenses, and had their operating income over this period artificially inflated,
while other clubs could have benefitted less and had their operating income artificially
depressed.

o Bonuses and deferred comoensation. Very often baseball player or television contracts
involve signing bonuses. Where we could identify these, we spread the bonuses according to
the language of the contract or evenly across the years of the contract, to prevent otherwise
erratic movements in revenues and expenses. Because the clubs themselves differ widely in
how they treat these bonuses, it was not always possible to make these spreads.

On the other side, sometimes player contracts involve deferred compensation. Where
possible, we put the appropriate present value amount into expenses in the year the deferred
compensation liability was first incurred.

Again, because of accounting procedure
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variability, often it was not possible to do this and we simply had to ue unagusted club
figures.

*

ld

n

ons (

s. RP

are transactions between the club and a business

in which the club or its owners have a financial interest, or which has a financial interest in
the club. With one party either controlling or able to influence the other, or both parties
controlled by a third party, the terms of an RPT may be slanted to favor one party at the
expense of the other.

There are about fifty RPrs involving revenues or expenses in a typical year. We reviewed
each of these RPTs and identified a small number that seemed clearly disadvantageous to the
club over the 1988-91 period (more information is needed on another few RPTs). We have
shown operating income figures without any adjustment for RPTs, but have also indicated
how different treatment of these few RPTs could change our overall conclusions regarding
operating income.

The RPTs are of several different kinds. Four clubs are units in consolidated enterprises
that file consolidated tax returns covering both the club and the television station or beer
company with which the club does business. The terms of transactions between units of these
consolidated enterprises have no effect on either their tax liabilities or their operating
income. While there is no tax motive for contrivance, nor is there an incentive to make sure
all transactions are correctly priced. Two of the transactions we found disadvantageous to
the clubs were between units of consolidated businesses.

When the club and the related party are both controlled by the same owners but not
consolidated for tax purposes, the owners may sometimes be able to profit from manipulating
transaction terms. We found two of the transactions in this category to be disadvantageous
9
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to the club. Again, we indicated where alternative treatment would change our conclusions
about overall club operating income.

There were a number of transactions where neither party had a controlling interest in the
other. Here terms slanted to favor the related party would ordinarily be disadvantageous to
club owners since they would incur all of the cost of the slanted terms but get only a small
share of the benefits. We found no evidence that any RPTs of this kind were biased to favor
the related party.

o Taxes- Since baseball clubs are in a so-called talent industry, their tax treatment is
somewhat unusual. When a club is purchased, one of the "assets' involves the economic
value of player contracts conferring rights to obtain player services at a below-free-market
price. That value depreciates over time as player contracts expire or as players progress to
free agency.

Like other talent enterprises, for tax purposes clubs are permitted straight line
depreciation

of

intangibles

such

as

the

value

of

these

initial

player

contracts.

Then,

when

either the player or the club is sold, there is a recapture provision that assesses capital gains
taxes on the difference between the sale price and the post-depreciation basis of the relevant
contracts. Hence if a club has taken tax depreciation on player contracts and then sells these
contracts at a higher price, it has to pay capital gains taxes on the difference. This general
tax treatment is common to firms in talent industries and seems to confer no special tax
advantages to baseball clubs, provided that the depreciable initial roster costs are set at
reasonable values.

The key question then boils down to whether the limitation on depreciable roster costs is
reasonable. That limit is 50 percent of the franchise value, with the average club now
10
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claiming 43 percent (Finandal World, 1992). While it is of course unclear how much a new
clubowner is paying for what aspect of a club, the following crude calculation suggests that
the limit may not be unreasonable.

We will me below that an average club now sells for $94 million. Applying the 43 percent
ratio means that this average club would claim about $40 million as the present value of
depreciable initial player roster costs. These costs are normally depreciated over a five-year
period, reducing the typical club's taxable profits by $8 million per year. Is $8 million a good
estimate of the true depreciation costs of the initial player contracts?

Probably not too bad. On the other side, several economists have tried to measure the
value of existing player contracts to clubs by comparing market values and wages for players
bound to the clubs, such as those in their first six years of major league service. Perhaps the
best estimate from this literature is that individual clubs realize in benefits nearly $6 million
per year from these contracts with their major league players. There are an average of 13
pre-arbitration players per club and these players are paid about $.3 million apiece less than
their estimated market value; an average of 7 arbitration players per club and they are paid
about S.2 million apiece less than their estimated market value (The market value estimates
come from Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions: The Economic Dilemmas of Our National
Pastime, Basic Books, 1992, pg. 92). There would be further value from contracts of minor
league players owned by the club. The sum of all these contract rights could well be close to
$8 million, though of course all estimates in this process are highly speculative. If this
indirect test can be believed, there do not seem to be undue tax advantages to owning a
baseball club. Whether there are or not, we have not adjusted our operating income figures
for any tax advantages in the empirical examination below.
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Operating income

Figure 3, described earlier, gives the real operating income of baseball clubs under these
accounting conventions. The solid line representing the 26 club average was slightly positive
up to 1979, negative from 1980 to 1984, and then positive again. The sharp drop in 1981 was
due to the strike in that year.

But given the large disparities in potential revenue between the clubs, the most important
indicator of the economic health of major league baseball may not be the overall average,
but rather the operating income of clubs in small markets or otherwise difficult
circumstances. One measure of these is given by the bottom line in the Figure, showing the
income path for less profitable clubs. These less profitable clubs are defined statistically by a
measure called the standard deviation, which has the property that a band from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean includes about twothirds of the clubs. Hence in the figure the area between the two dotted lines contains about
18 clubs, with an average of 4 clubs making operating income less than the lower band and
an average of 4 clubs making operating income more than the upper band. By this statistical
measure, several clubs - the 4 below the lower band and more just above it - could have had
negative operating income even when baseball as a whole had positive operating income.

The standard deviation is a statistical measure computed separately for each year, so it
does not indicate which clubs had negative operating income. Nor does it say whether these
negative income clubs are the same ones year after year. One can only determine the
situation for particular clubs by examining their particular income statements.

Results of such an examination are summarized in Table 4, which categorizes the average
annual real operating income of all 26 clubs either for the period when baseball as a whole
12
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had positive operating facome (1985-91) or for a longer period (1979-81). It is commonly felt
that winning affects income, so we have also estimated the sensitivity of income to winning.
For each period we regressed average club operating income on average winning percentage
and meesures of market size. The Table then uses the winning percentage coefficient to
categorize hypothetical adjusted" income as ifeach club had a .500 winning percentage over
the relevant period. Since by this construction winning just shifts income from club to club,
average operating income across all clubs is the same in both the "income" and adjusted"
columns.

In the recent positive income period 2 clubs lost fairly large amounts (more than $4
million per year) with or without the adjustment for wins. Then 8 clubs lost more modest
amounts with no winning adjustment, 6 with a winning adustment.

By this standard

between 8 and 10 clubs have had negative operating income in recent years. An adjustment
for consolidated enterprise RPTs described above for one of these clubs might eliminate the
negative operating income, leaving between 7 and 9 clubs with true negative operating
income in the recent profitable period of baseball.

Over the longer period when baseball was first unprofitable and then became profitable, 3
clubs lost more than $4 million per year with no adjustment for winning, 2 with an
adjustment.

Then 7 clubs lost more moderate amounts with no adjustment, 8 with an

adjustment. By this standard 10 clubs had negative operating income over the longer period
which includes a spell when baseball as a whole was not profitable. Making the adjustment
for consolidated enterprise RPTs in this case does not eliminate the negative operating
income.

Hence our examination of the operating income of baseball clubs indicates that up to 10
clubs normally do not earn operating income. The number is cut slightly if we confine
13
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attention to the recent seven-year period when baseball as a whole was profitable, it is
sometimes cut by lffwe make an ac'ustment for RPs, and it can be changed slightly if we
a4ust for how much these clubs have won. But even with all a4'ustments there still seem to
be about 7 clubs that do not earn operating income on average.

Asset values

A second way to look at the underlying profitability of baseball clubs is by their asset
values, which should reflect the market valuation of clubs' future earning streams. We have
these asset sale values from separate data also submitted by the clubs to the Commissioner,
though these data are not confidential and particular club values can be presented.

Asset values for 7 clubs that were sold in the 1989-91 period, all in 1991 US dollars, are
shown in Table 5. We only include the most recent Seattle sale, and we do not include the
Texas sale (because a stadium was included) and the Kansas City transaction (which was not
a true market sale). The average value for these 7 clubs is $94 million, implying a perhaps
not unreasonable 4 percent real rate of return if the $4 million of average profits noted
earlier were continued indefinitely. But the numbers in the Table do present some puzles.
Those clubs on the list that have on average had negative operating income have sold for just
over $90 million, which seems a high price to pay for the privilege of losing money. And not
much less than the sale price for those clubs on the list that have made money, which is just
under $100 million.

It is puzzling that this variance in sale prices is so smaUl, with so little premium paid for
having positive operating income. Why will prospective owners pay $90 million to buy a club

14

241
that is likely to lose money on average, and only an extra $10 million for a dub that is likely
to make money on average?'

There are several possible explanations:
o Masurement. Given the difficulties in measuring true baseball profits recounted earlier,
one possible explanation for the discrepancy between income and asset values is that
operating income is still not measured well, despite our best efforts. In this case one would
place credence mainly in the asset values.
o Speclative bubhles. On the other side, economic history is full of examples of speculative
bubbles, where asset values are bid much higher than the true worth of the property.
Everything is fine until the market suddenly crashes. If it is true that sset values are being
bid up by a speculative fever, one would place less credence in the asset values and more
credence in the underlying operating income numbers.
o Civic altruism. Some of the sales of less profithle clubs could be influenced by civic pride - that is, by the fact that local owners will bid what it takes to keep a club in the home city,
even if these owners know they cannot earn positive operating income. In this case the asset
value could reflect what a baseball club is worth in some other city, not in the present
location. In this case, it is not even clear what question should be asked - about the worth of
the club in the present location, or the worth of the club in any imaginable location.
o The attractiveness of baseball. A related explanation is that potential owners simply
want to own a baseball club - because they are fans, because it helps their business, or for
some other reason. This explanation does not fit the observed pattern of franchise values in
all respects, because it implies high values for all franchises, not just those losing money.
But it could still explain why baseball asset values in general give better reports of the
financial health of baseball clubs than do the income statements ofthe clubs.

15
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Opimim

A final argument that does fit the facts well is that it takes a certain amount

of optimism to operate a baseball club. Potential buyers of successful clubs will se full
stadiums and/or winning records, realize they cannot do much better, and bid more or less a
normal price for the earnings streams of successful clubs. On the other hand, potential
buyers of clubs that are losing money will see empty stadiums andlor losing records, think
they can do much better, and bid the price well beyond the level implied by the clubs'
financial history.

Each of these hypotheses has different implications for the economic state of money-losing
baseball clubs, and there are few enough sales that each hypothesis is virtually impossible to
prove or disprove with actual data. This is one reason, possibly the main reason, why
observers can look at the same facts and derive such different interpretations about the
economic condition of major league baseball.

Rate of return

A third way to look at the profitability of baseball clubs involves the combination of
disparate information from the income and asset value statements. One uses both the
operating income figures and the asset figures to compute the internal rate of return from
owning a baseball club. One views owners as buying a club at some date, earning or losing
money over the holding period, and then selling a club at some later date. All dollar
amounts are put in common terms, 1991 US dollars, and one then computes the internal rate
of return that makes the present value of the entire transaction zero. One can then compare
this internal rate of return with an internal rate of return calculated from bond or stock
markets in the same way for the same time horizon to see which investment performed
better. All rates of return in this calculation are pre-tax, which is acceptable if the tax
16
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treatment is approximately the sme. We argued earlier that there was not obviously more
generous tax treatment of baseball clubs than for other types of invetments.

The results of these calculations are given in Table 6. The ten clubs listed in the table
have been bought and mold over the period for which we have the data necessary to compute
internal rates of return. Four of theme clubs showed losses in Table 4, six did not. Five were
lat sold after 1987, five were last sold before 1987. In all obvious ways, this seems a
reasonable sample of clubs for computing internal rates of return.

The column listed "rate" shows our calculation of real internal rates of return. Income
data were taken from the records described above, still with no adjustment for RPTs or taxes.
The average annual pre-tax real rate of return from holding a club over the period was 5.6
percent, but the spread around this average was wide, with four clubs earning zero or
negative returns, three clubs earning moderate returns, and three clubs earning very
handsome returns. This wide variance in return is reflected in the standard deviation of 7.1
percent, which indicates that a random owner had a two-thirds chance of making an annual
return between -1.5 percent and 12.7 percent.

Theme rate-of-return calculations permit a comparison of the returns from owning baseball
clubs to the returns on other investments, most of which also did well in the 1980s. The
column listed "bond" gives the annual pre-tax real rate of return on holding long term
taxable government bonds (interest and capital gains) over the exact same holding period as
for the baseball club. The asterisks show that 4 clubs outperformed the bond market, the
other 6 clubs did not. The column listed "stock" gives the same annual pre-tax real rate of
return information for randomly chosen common stocks (dividends and capital gains) over the
exact same holding period as for the baseball club. The double asterisks show that 3 clubs
outperformed the stock market, the other 7 did not.
17
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These comparisons are for what are known as ex post returns over the exact holding
period. An alternative way to display relative profitability is to assume that potential
owners of baseball clubs knew the general expected real profitability of government bonds
and stocks over the period when they bought their clubs. Under this assumption one would
compare the return on baseball clubs to the long term average expected real return in the
bond and stock market, given in the table as 4.1 percent per year for taxable government
bonds and 8.2 percent per year for common stocks. By this standard, 5 clubs outperformed
the bond market and 3 clubs outperformed the stock market.

Hence a few clubs seem to be doing very well, outperforming the stock market, and most
not as well. For these calculations the time at which the club was bought and sold does
matter, with those sold in the revenue surge of recent years earning somewhat higher real
returns. The average operating income of the clubs also matters, with those earning more
generally having higher rates of return.

Concerning overall profitability, is a real rate of return of 5.6 percent adequate
compensation for owning a baseball club? One can argue the issue either way. Financial
analysts might say that because of the greater risks in owning a baseball club, the real rate
of return should be higher than for bonds, perhaps comparable to the real return on holding
stocks. Sports fans might retort that since it is more fun or rewarding to own a baseball club
than to clip coupons from randomly chosen bonds and stocks, the rate of return need not be
very high. It is impossible to resolve this issue conclusively. The only factual statement that
can be made is that the average real rate of return from owning baseball clubs has been
moderate, with some chance of very large returns and some chance of negative or very low
returns.
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he future
The data examined so far, whether from income statements, asset values, or rates of
return, are from the past decade, an era when baseball revenues were rising at a very rapid
rate. An important question facing baseball is whether these past trends will continue,
particularly if revenue growth slows. It is notoriously difficult to forecast anything about
major league baseball, but it still makes sense to examine recent trends to see what can be
found.

There are indications that revenue growth will slow. Although complete figures for 1992
are not yet available, game attendance did dip slightly. The CBS national television contract
does not expire until the end of the 1993 season, but CBS is reporting large losses on its
baseball contract. ESPN has already informed baseball that it is not exercising its option to
extend its agreement past 1993. These contracts now provide about 23 percent of the revenue
for the average club, and the likely drop in real revenue from the contracts could imply a
decline in total club revenues, unless offset by rises in the real value of local television
revenue (now also 20 percent of revenues for the average club).

The question is what happens then. If salary growth adjusts to revenue growth, operating
income need not decline. But there are two reasons why salary growth may not adjust, one
within the long run control of clubs and one at least partly not within the control of clubs.
The factor that could in principle be controlled by the clubs is long term contracts for free
agents. In the short run these long term contracts place a fixed liability on clubs, but over
time the clubs can recontract and refuse to sign some of their low-value players. The factor
partially outside the control of clubs is salary arbitration, and it has been suggested that
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replacing arbitration with earlier free agency would insulate operating income from revenue
fluctuations.

To determine how sensitively arbitration salaries follow free agent salaries, we have
regreseed these arbitration salaries on current and lagged free agent salaries over the 198391 period, the only span for which we have the requisite data. This is a very low power
statistical test - using one period to measure the impact of the lag, there are only eight time
series observations with real free agent salaries rising every year. We do not have any
observations on the lag in periods when free agent salaries underwent sustained declines.
Moreover, it is unclear exactly how to adjust for changes in the arbitration system (the
system was changed to exclude two-year players in 1987, and again in 1991 to include a
handful of two-year players), for new contracts, for deferred compensation, and for player
contracts that moved money across years in anticipation of a possible work stoppage. But the
results generally suggest that arbitration salaries respond to free agent salaries with very
little lag - sometimes there is no lag at all, sometimes the lag is about a half-year. Our
tentative conclusion is that eliminating arbitration, whatever its other virtues or costs, will
not insulate operating income from revenue swings to a very great degree.

0

0

0

Hence the various financial records give some hint of trouble for the first of the problems
listed above. Revenue disparities among the clubs imply that some number of clubs do have
trouble earning operating income - we find that this number could be as high as 10. All the
clubs that were sold in the 1989-92 period sold at good prices, but even then average internal
rates of return were not exceptional, although some clubs were extremely good investments
and some clubs were poor investments.

As for sensitivity, there is no evidence that
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alteratices in the arbitration system will insulate operating income from declines in
revenues to an important degree.

I. Evidence of Competitive Health. Wins and Losses on the Field

The other way problems with the structure of major league baseball can become evident
involves on-field competitive performance. These competitive balance questions are much
easier to deal with than the financial questions because win-loss records are public
information, are not subject to the same ambiguities, and are available for a much longer
period of time.

Competitive balance in general

For years the maintenance of competitive balance - to prevent large market clubs from
bidding talent away from small market clubs - was the main justification given for the
reserve clause. This justification was never convincing to academic economists studying
baseball (Rottenberg. Journalof PoliticalEconomy. 1956). The economists' argument is that
good players are worth more to large market clubs whatever the compensation system. If the
compensation system is a reserve clause, large market clubs will pay more to small market
clubs for star players. If the compensation system is free agency, large market clubs will pay
more than small market clubs in bidding for star players. Either way the best talent will
flow to the large market clubs, and either way the large market clubs should win more.

But these arguments involve theory. How has competitive balance fared in fact in this
era when the compensation system was changing so rapidly? To answer this question, we
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first looked at measures of tightness of pennant races. We focused on the 37 year period
beginning in 1954 and ending in 1990. The AL began 1954 with its eight original clubs,
added California and the club that is now Texas in 1961, added Kansas City and the club
that is now Milwaukee in 1969, and added Seattle and Toronto in 1977. The NL began 1954
with its eight original clubs, added Houston and New York in 1962, and added Montreal and
San Diego in 1969. We analyzed the leagues separately, breaking the 37 year period into 5
seven-year segments for each league. The segments are intended to be long enough to
average out year-to-year variation in on-field performance, and are chosen so that expansion
teams enter at the beginning of a seven-year segment. Hence the seven-year periods are
1954-60, 1961-67, 1969-75, 1977-83, and 1984-90 for the AL and the same except that the
second segment is replaced by 1962-68 for the NL.

The results are shown in Table 7. One way to answer the question of how tight are
pennant races is to compute the variation in performance of all clubs in all of the seven
years, by league, again using standard deviations. To read the table, in the 1984-90 period in
the NL, on average 8 of the 12 dubs had winning percentages between 435 and .565, 2 dubs
(on average the last place club in each division) had winning percentages below .435 and 2
(on average the first place clubs) had winning percentages above .565. The middle columns
translate these winning percentages into games won and lost - on average 8 NL clubs won
between 70 and 92 games (in a 162 game season), 2 won less than 70 games, and 2 won more
than 92 games.

The results of this test seem clear enough. As anticipated by the economic theorists, in
neither league has there been a worsening of competitive balance since the start of free
agency in about 1977. In the AL competitive balance has actually improved over time, with
the lower tail teams winning an average of about 5 more games a year (from 66 to 71). It is
well-known that this early disparity in the AL was in part a Yankee effect - the New York
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Yankees won five pennants in these seven years - but it turns out that Chicago and
Cleveland also did quite well through this whole period, and Baltimore, the team that is now
Minnesota, and the team that is now Oakland did quite badly. This early period in the AL
tura out to be the heyday of competitive imbalance.

Apart from this period effect, competition stays imbalanoed when the AL adds expansion
teams, as it did in the next three seven-year segments. Finally, in the recent 1984-90 period
competition is the most balanced - the Yankee effect has long since disappeared, as has the
expansion effect.

It may be more meaningful to look at the NL, which did not have a Yankee effect in the
1954-60 period, and which added only two sets of expansion teams. Here there has been
remarkably little change in competitive balance over the whole period, with the lower tail
teams winning 69 games in the early period and 70 games in the recent period.

Another way to answer questions involving tightness of pennant races is just to see who
won. By this measure there is a lear increase in competitive balance over time. In the AL 3
teams won pennants in the first seven-year period and 5 teams in the latest period. In the
NL 4 teams won pennants in the first seven-year period and 6 in the latest seven-year period.
In both leagues the excitement or World Series is now available to fans in more cities.
Similarly, the table shows that there has been an upward drift in numbers of clubs winning
division championships since the divisional championships began in 1969.

And also in

numbers of clubs within 10 games of the division winner at the close of the season, indicating
that the excitement of pennant races is being spread around more widely.

These figures describe how competitive clubs are within a year. But it is also meaningful
to focus on the performance of the clubs over a longer period, averaging out year-to-year
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variation in their own performance. These measures of good and bad clubs are shown in
Table 8, which presents the range statistics as if the clubs were engaged in one giant sevenyear pennant race. Now in the recent NL period, 8 of the 12 clubs had seven-year average
numbers of wins between 75 and 87 games, with the 2 worst teams over the seven-year span
averaging less than 75 wins and the 2 best teams averaging more than 87 wins. Compared to
Table 7, all of the ranges are compacted because year-to-year variation in club performance is
averaged out.

But the range results can be interpreted roughly the same as before. In the AL
competitive balance has improved slightly; in the NL there has been very little change.
Nowadays in both leagues the lower tail clubs average about 75 wins per year over a sevenyear period and the upper tail clubs average about 87 wins. Again we more or less confirm
the economists' predictions that whatever free agency does to the clubs' income statements, it
seems to have made remarkably little change in on-field performance. Indeed, for all the
changes in professional baseball since 1954 - in numbers of franchises, player compensation
arrangements, the increased importance of shared national television revenues, the amateur
player draft, and who knows what else - the distribution of wins and losses has changed very
little. The only thing that does seem to have changed is the number of clubs who are
participating in pennant races and winning pennants and division championships in a sevenyear period. By these measures, on-field competition has increased.

Market size

The nezt question involves the impact of market size. With either the reserve clause or
the free agency compensation system, dubs in large markets are likely to win more than
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clubs in small markets. But how much more? Is a large market worth a few or a lot of
games in the win-loss column? Has this difference changed with free agency?

Tb answer this question, for each of the seven-year segments, now with both leagues
pooled together to increase numbers of observations, we regressed clubs' seven-year win-loss
percentage on metropolitan population from the Census, number of clubs in that area, and
whether the club was a recent expansion club. The number-of-clubs variable permits us to
determine empirically whether the New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco
populations should be divided by two or some other number. There is no dear pattern, but
we have used two for illustrative purposes below.

The results in Table 9 give the estimated impact on games won of a quadrupled market
size from these regressions, holding constant other variables. As the accompanying scatter
plot shows (Figure 10 for 1984-90), a number of the small market clubs (St. Louis, Montreal,
San Diego, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Seattle, Cleveland, Atlanta, and the San Francisco
population divided by two clubs) have metropolitan populations between 2.5 and 3 million. If
the population of these metropolitan areas were quadrupled, the clubs would have roughly
the population of the two New York clubs (19 million divided by two), making each of these
small market clubs into large market dubs.

Even though the large market clubs would be expected to win more than small market
clubs, these population impacts seem reasonably small. In the 1954-60 period the large
market clubs, particularly the Yankees and Dodgers, did very well, with the population
quadrupling effectively amounting to an added 13.5 wins a year. We also tested the same
model with games behind the first place team, arriving at almost identical results (games
behind were reduced by 13.2). After 1960, market size effects become much more modest. In
the first three pre-free-agency periods the quadrupling adds 3.2 wins; in the last two free
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agency periods the quadrupling adds 5.2 wins; in the most recent seven year period the
quadrupling adds 2.5 wins.

How big a spread is 2.5 to 5.2 wins? The range can be shown in various lights. Over the
recent seven year period Table 8 reported that the average distance from second to second-tolast place in a division has been 12 games. In this range 2.5 to 5.2 games has been worth
about one place in the division standings. On the other hand, there has been a greater
spread in the tails of the distribution - the average distance between first and second place
has been 6 games and the average distance from second-to-last to last place has been 8
games. In this range 2.5 to 5.2 games has been worth less than one place in the division
standings

-

5.2 games would not have gotten a second place club into first place on average,

nor would it have gotten a club out of last place. And the 2.5 to 5.2 game spread is for an
enormous change in market size, taking a very small market club all the way to a club with a
New York-sized market.

However large the spread, it should be remembered that changes in the method by which
players are compensated is not likely to be causing the disparities. From a theoretical
standpoint, the large market clubs would be expected to win more whether players are
compensated under the reserve clause or free agency. Historically, the large market clubs
did better in the old reserve clause system than under free agency. And in the National
Basketball Association, where there has been a real attempt to protect the income of small
market clubs through a salary cap, the large market clubs win championships far more
regularly than they do in baseball.

On a technical level, one reason for the apparently small impact of market size on wins
and losses could be the intrinsic difficulty of defining market size. We tried a number of
alternative definitions - looking at television's Area of Dominant Influence figures,
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combining or splitting agacent

areas such as Baltimore and Washington, agusting for clubs

with large populations just outside the metropolitan areas or for clubs with more resources
than the metropolitan population alone would predict.

Indeed, one can make one's own

agnetments by sliding clubs left or right the desired amounts in Figure 10. These types of
adstments never seem to change the basic story much.

Another possibility is that we should go behind the overall relationship between market
size and on-field performance and look at the component relationships. A schematic diagram
is given in Figure 11. Larger market size can lead simultaneously to larger player salaries
(the top loop) and to larger player development expenditures (the bottom loop). These then
could generate more wins. Since we need data on club player salaries and development
expenditures to estimate such a model, we can only do the analysis for the last two periods,
from 1977-90 (we extrapolated 1978 figures back one year to fill in 1977 values). There is
also a new statistical uncertainty: to the effect that winning leads to higher salaries, the
cause and effect relationship in the top loop is not entirely blear.

But even with these uncertainties, the results agree closely with those of the overall
approach.

In the overall approach a quadrupled market size raises the average club's

winning percentage by .032 for the 1977-90 period, 5.2 games. In the disaggregated approach
the quadrupling adds .029 (4.7 games), with the breakdown as shown. The relevant scatter
plots are shown as Figures 12 and 13. Most of the impact, .025 (4 games), comes from the
player salary loop, with.only a slight amount from the player development loop. It might be
felt that player development expenditures would work better if they were lagged, so that
earlier years' development spending leads to current wins and losses. We tried this approach
too, but lagged player development expenditures had no more explanatory power than did
current player development expenditures. However the melon is sliced, one finds that the
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quadrupling of city size adds 2.5 to 5.2 games to the win column, moving small market clubs
up about one rung in the division standings, even less in the tails.

In non-quantitative terms, there could be several reasons why we might not expect much
relationship between market size and winning:
o Difficulties in

fning market size Some supposedly small market clubs have access to

populated hinterland areas, lucrative television possibilities, or owners willing and able to
spend to put competitive teams on the field. Some supposedly large market clubs may not
have some of these advantages. For these purposes it is difficult to come up with precise
measures of market size.
o Iniuries and other random elements. Large market or rich clubs can buy players, but it is
much harder to keep them healthy and to guarantee good performance. Today fans in every
city can easily cite a list of highly-paid but less worthy free agents; in the old days these fans'
parents were citing lists of expensive player trades and bonus babies that did not work out.
o Relative numbers of plavers and clubs. There may be more quality players at a position
than the large market clubs can buy or want to pay to sit on the bench, with the consequence
that even small market clubs will often have quality players at many positions.
o The price of winnin.

It has been argued that teams that win pennants find the price of

winning is high - that is, their successful players drive hard bargains the next year. To the
degree that this is so, free agency has introduced an automatic mechanism to even out wins
and losses across clubs.
o Conflicting gouls. Just as better players have a higher value in large market areas, aging
players with high media profiles who can fill seats do too. These expensive free agents may
be worthwhile from a revenue standpoint to large market clubs, but not a winning and losing
standpoint. If so, large market clubs will have higher payrolls, but not necessarily win that
much more than small market clubs.
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o Artatin. Perhaps the ability to use less experienced and lem ezpensive players
through the arbitration system gives the small market clubs a

strategy they can uee to

maintain their winning record. We tested for this effect by seeing if informatio en shares of
arbitration players and free agents added explanatory power to the equations explaining
wins and losses. These shares had essentially zero impact. If this is an alleged benefit of
retaining the arbitration system, it seems to be of slight importance.

As a final matter, one still might wonder whether the differential winning advantage of
large market clubs is growing over time. There is no evidence of such trends in the data
analyzed, which go up to 1990. We do not include 1991 and 1992 in the formal data analysis,
but by this time we do know who won in those years. In both 1991 and 1992 three of the four
division-winning clubs - Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and Minnesota in 1991 and Atlanta,
Pittsburgh, and Oakland in 1992 - were small market clubs. Even Toronto, the other winner
in both years, has a population size slightly below average.

0

0

0

The bottom line here is that, predictions to the contrary notwithstanding, competitive
balance in major league baseball seems to have improved over time. The range between
winning and losing clubs has declined over time in the AL, remained stable in the NL. In
both league more teams have won pennants and divisions, and pennant races have involved
more clubs.

Beyond that, there is no indication that the advantage to locating in a large market is
terribly great on-the-field. However they manage to do it, small market clubs are hanging in
there, winning 2.5 to 5.2 games less a year on average than the large market clubs. Possibly
this margin is as small as it is because with fewer financial resources the small market clubs
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Just have to manage better to stay alive, possibly it is because with all the uncertainties o
baseball, it is just very difficult to buy winning clubs. Whatever the case, on-field disparities
due to market or resource size have been small ever since 1961, never smaller than in 199192, and smaller than in profesional sports with em clubwide variance in their revenues.
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Figure 1
Average Operating Revenue
Millions of 1991 Dollars
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Figure 2
Player Costs as a Share of
Industry Revenue
MO/A.
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Figure 3
Average Income from Baseball Operations
+1-One Standard Deviation
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Table 4
Operating Income of Baseball Clubs
Number of clubs making operating income in the designated bracket
Bracket amounts in millions of 1991 US dollars per year
Adjusted and not adjusted for winning percentage

1985-91
Bracket

1977-91

Income

Adiusted*

Income

Adinsted*

Losses exceed $4 million

2

2

3

2

Losses less than $4 million

8

6

7

8

Income less than $4million

6

9

10

10

Income from $4 to $8 million

5

4

5

5

Income exceeds $8 million

5

5

1

1

2.7

2.7

0.9

0.9

Average operating income ($ million)

*Assuming the club had a .500 winning percentage.
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Table 5
Asset Values for Clubs Sold in 1989.92
Millions of 1991 US Dollars

cinhb

Rale dant

Detroit

1992

so

Montreal

1991

84

Baltimore

1989

84

San Diego

1990

85

Texas

1989

94

Seattle

1992

103

Toronto

1991

131

Valme

Average

94

Standard Deviation

17
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Table 6
Internal Real Rates of Return
Percent

Club

Period

Rate

Bonds

stocks

Cincinnati

1981-85

-3.7

15.2

14.6

Houston

1979-84

-2.5

3.0

7.4

Philadelphia

1981-87

-1.3

12.4

12.5

Cleveland

1977-86

0.1

4.0

8.8

San Diego*

1974-90

3.6

3.2

8.3

Detroit

1983-92

7.1

9.9

11.4

Seattle

1981-92

7.6

10.6

12.3

NY Mets**

1980-86

13.7

12.5

10.1

Baltimore*

1979-89

15.2

6.9

11.2

Toronto**

1976-91

15.8

3.5

7.6

4.1

8.2

Average

5.6

Standard Deviation

7.1

Long term average

1975-91

Baseball club outperformed bonds but not stocks over the exact holding period.
* Baseball club outperformed bonds and stocks over the exact holding period.
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Table 7
Measures of ight Pennant Races
Range unwop...ir

2/8 of clubs, number of pennant and division winners, and number of
clubs within 10 games offirst place
By seven year period

American League
Prod

LP

HP

LW

HW

PW

DW

1954-60

.408

.592

66

96

3

-

1961-67*

.425

.575

69

93

4

1969-750

.427

.573

69

93

3

5

5

1977-830

.420

.580

68

94

4

7

7

1984-90

.438

.562

71

91

5

7

7

DW

TC

TC

-

National League
Period

LP

HP

LW

HW

PW

1954-60

.428

.572

69

93

4

1962-68*

.419

.581

68

94

3

1969-75*

.428

.572

69

93

4

7

5

1977-83

.435

.565

70

92

4

8

7

1984-90

.435

.565

70

92

6

9

7

LP is the lower bound winning percentage.
HP is the higher bound winning percentage.
LW is the lower bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
HW is the higher bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
PW is number of pennant winners in the seven-year period.
DW is number of division winners in the seven-year period.
TC is the number of teams within 10 games of first place at the end of the season (the same
for both leagues).
*xpanion clubs added.
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Table 8

WMss

Wmd
IASn

a.e.

Range encompassing 2/3 of club seven-year winning percentage

American League
Period

LP

HP

LW

HW

1954-60

.423

.577

69

93

1961-67*

.443

.557

72

90

1969-75*

.446

.554

72

90

1977-83*

.441

.559

71

91

1984-90

.466

.534

75

87

National League
Period

LP

HP

LW

HW

1954-60

.451

.549

73

89

1962-68*

.433

.567

70

92

1969-75*

.443

.557

72

90

1977-83

.454

.546

74

88

1984-90

.461

.539

75

87

LP is the lower bound winning percentage.
HP is the higher bound winning percentage.
LW is the lower bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
HW is the higher bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
* Expansion clubs added.
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Table 9
Effects of Quadrupled Market Size

Win-Ln Pct.

Games Won

Game Back

1954-60

.083

13.5

-13.2

1961267168

.015

2.4

-2.8

199-75

-.033

-5.3

3.0

1977-83

.048

7.8

-5.1

1984-90

.016

2.5

-0.9

First 3 Periods

.020

3.2

Last 2 Periods

.032

5.2

Peiod

-3.0
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Figure 11
Causal Unks Between Market Size and Win-Loss Record
Salaries
Win-loss
record
Scouting and
development

33% higher salaries

4.025

higher
win-loss
percentage

25% higher scouting &
development expenditures

y .004

higher
win-loss
percentage

.029

higher
win-loss
percentage

Quadrupled market

sum =

268

1K

A

-

00)

4
aCO'

D0

KA

'Ni-co
.

**

*U

I

,...o

C4

-

F/5)
0-<

.

1>

>

-

)KK
)K!

(qelop ;o spuesnot) AmIeS

-cZ

269
9

Xi

Ul

W4,

T

X.

ca
CO

0.K

oe

CO
0)0
C) 2
0)
a-

X.

L.a

0q

80

A

1.8

4.1
o

o

o

o

c
P0ooeS

o

d

d

d

270

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 A

wsAcwausV

mN.W. WAsunwraw. D.C. 20036-2188

TVWaoN* 2020976000 FAr: 202097.6181

Economic Studies Program

3 December 1992
Mr. Donald Pehr, Executive Director
Major League Baseball Players' Association
805 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Mr Allan Selig, President
The Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club
Milwaukee County Stadium
201 South 46th St.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53214

PA

D 0 71992
RECEIVL-o

Dear Don and Bud:
Along with the other public members I have signed the majority report of the Baseball
Study Committee. I did so because I concur in the major recommendations on free agency and
revenue sharing and the major finding on competitive balance.
In contrast, I find the discussion of the economic condition of baseball to be garbled,
inconsistent, and unbalanced. Accordingly, I have written this supplemental statement that
should also be regarded as part of the output of the committee.
This supplemental statement should be regarded as part of the report of the Committee.
I have requested that wherever my name appears, on the transmittal letter covering the
majority report or on the majority report itself, mention should be made that I am submitting
a supplemental statement that should be regarded as part of the report. My understanding Is
that Peter sent out the report and covering letter before I transmitted this request to him. But
I have asked that corrected pages be distributed; I presume that he will do so.
I also request that this supplemental report will be included as part of any distribution
of the Committee's work to the various clubs, to the players' executive committee, or to others.

Se

Henry J. Aaron
Director

+ FOMED1916 +
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Supplementary Statement
Report of Baseball Study Committee
by
Henry J. Aaron
3 December 1992
Six labor negotiations between major league clubs and the players union have
ended in three strikes and three lockouts. The relationship between players and clubs
is best described as immature, a situation in which the two parties fail to take advantage
of opportunities that could help both, but instead perpetuate distrust and rancor.
The Baseball Study Committee makes two major recommendations with which
I concur. First, players should become eligible for free agency not after six years of
service as under current rules, but after three years. Second, the proportion of baseball
revenues distributed equally among the dubs should be increased.

These are

constructive recommendations, and I support them. The staff report also includes
factual analysis clearly indicating that competitive balance in major league baseball good,
that it is probably better than it has been in the past, and shows no signs of deterioratmg.
Because I agree with these two central recommendations and the finding on
competitiveness, I am signing the majority report. Nevertheless, I am impelled to submit
this supplementary report because the majority report fails to clarify the nature of the
disputes between players and owners and fails to explain the structure underlying this
unfortunate relationship. This failure betrays the parties who appointed the committee,
elected officials and the courts who may be called upon to settle disputes between the
parties or change the special exemption of baseball from the anti-trust laws, and the
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public who, as fans, are puzzled by the hostile and destructive relationship sullying a
sport that brings pleasure, diversion, and surcease to millions. The report skirts central
issues. In substitutes hortatory and saccharine rhetoric appropriate to childrens' novels
or sentimental movies for clear analysis. And in an effort to fashion language all
members could accept, it becomes obscure and contradictory. Confusing what should
have been the educational objectives of its report-which require clarity-with mediation
and negotiation-which require compromise of conflicting interests, the majority blurs
disagreements in the pursuit of consensus.
Some Key Facts
The politics and economics of baseball are inextricably related. Baseball is a cartel
managed by twenty eight clubs each of whose owners agreed when he or she purchased
a franchise to abide by rules established by previous generations of owners. These rules
govern league structure, the size of baseball markets, the distribution of revenues among
the clubs, the scheduling of play, the management of the minor leagues, and many other
matters. The Basic Agreement between the clubs and the players union governs labor
relations, including the period during which players are under reserve and the tenure
they must achieve to be eligible for arbitration and free agency.
The common perception among the public is that two major parties are involved
in labor negotiations-players and owners. In a certain sense this view is obviously
. 1These critical comments do not apply to the report of the staff, prepared under the direction
of Edward M. Gramlich. This report is largely factual. It is careful in drawing inferences and
highly informative.
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correct. A deeper insight into the current situation emerges if one recognizes that for
practical purposes, three parties are involved in negotiations-large-market clubs, smallmarket dubs, and the players. I shall return to this point presently.

Qperating Income versus Asset Values
Unlike investors who primarily seek profits, baseball owners have twin
objectives-profits and on-field success. They want both to make money and to win
games.

Furthermore, owning a baseball team brings a variety of noneconomic

satisfactions. These dual objectives and diverse satisfactions mean that the economic
health of baseball cannot be judged by the same standards-net operating revenues,
ordinary accounting profits, or cash flow-that are applied, for example, to such activities
as automobile dealerships, breweries, or ship lines, businesses that happen to be the
former or current activities of owners of three baseball clubs.
Because owners are interested in winning games, they may rationally sacrifice net
revenue for on-field success. They may spend more money on players, on scouting, or
other outlays deemed likely to produce winners than is consistent with maximizing
current net income. Because running baseball clubs is probably more fun for most
people than selling cars, beer, or shipping services, owners may be prepared to sacrifice
profits, or even pay for the pleasure by bearing losses.
To the extent that owners engage in such behavior, they rationally accept lower
profits than they might eam in other businesses. In fact, it could be quite rational,
although admittedly costly, for club owners out of a desire to win or in pursuit of the
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pleasures of baseball to adopt policies that result in persistent losses. There is simply
no way the Baseball Study Committee or anyone else can determine by looking at net
income the weight that owners attach to making profits, fielding winning teams, or
having fun.
This line of argument reveals that the lengthy passages in the majority report on
revenues, costs, and net operating margins-interesting and informative as they may bereveal precisely nothing about the economic health of baseball. To illustrate the point,
owners of race horses are reported to lose money persistently; but this fact is not
regarded as persuasive evidence that horse racing is in economic jeopardy. Race horse
owners have fun and enjoy social cachet. They want to win, stand in the winners' circle,
and collect occasional purses; and they are willing to pay for the pleasure. It is at least
conceivable that owners of baseball clubs do the same thing.

The way to tell is to

look at franchise values. Are clubs valuable investments that club owners wish to retain
or to acquire? To answer this question, one need only observe sales prices of franchises.
The staff report makes clear that several clubs have sold in the past four years. The
average price was $94 million. This group includes some clubs that have lost more than
$1 million annually for several years running.
The staff report considers several possible explanations for why high and wellmaintained asset values can coexist with persistent losses. It is conceivable, but hardly
plausible, that baseball is riding on a speculative bubble. To accept this explanation, one
would have to believe that high prices for baseball teams have persisted through a
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protracted recession that seriously eroded the value of many other assets. Successive
buyer-groups, all of whom can read the published warnings of current owners about the
dire economic future of baseball, must be regarded as in the grip of something akin to
the Dutch tulip bulb frenzy? The assertion that each successive buyer of a baseball club
is a 'greater fool,' oblivious to realities of the sport, requires that one believe hard-heads
of investors, who understand enough to make millions in other businesses, turn mushy
when buying a baseball team? Again, such an explanation is conceivable, but hardly
plausible.
The other explanations for high asset values in the face of indifferent operating
income seem far more reasonable. Operating income or cash flow may in fact be greater
than is apparent. Civic altruism may cause club owners to bear losses for the good of
the communities in which they reside. And the sheer fun and community prestige from
owning a baseball club may cause owners to accept returns that would be insufficient
to induce them to hold more pedestrian investments.
In short, nothing whatsoever can be inferred about the economic health of
baseball by looking at net operating income. Much can be inferred by examining the
prices old investors demand when they sell franchises and that new investors are willing
to pay when they buy franchises. The majority points out this fact. But it devotes six
2
Dning the tulip bulb frenzy, the prices of tulip bulbs soared to hundreds or thousands of
dollars each. When the frenzy ended, prices collapsed.
3
Since the Baseball Study Committee did not look into the representations made to potential
buyers by former owners and other clubs, none of us is able to pass on the accuracy of
information provided to potential investors.
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times more space to a meandering examination of revenues, expenses, and operating
income than it vouchsafes a brief examination of franchise values.
The majority asserts that positive operating income is essential over the long haul
for the economic health of baseball. This assertion is economic nonsense, as demonstrated by the fact that teams sell for high and rising prices despite negative operating
income. Owners who purchase clubs for high prices, field clubs that compete effectively,
and sell clubs periodically for sizeable prices preside over an industry that evidences no
economic illness. While club owners no doubt would prefer operating income to exceed
operating expenses, in addition to enjoying the other benefits from owning a baseball
club, positive net operating income is necessary for the economic health of the sport
neither in the short nor in the long run. The majority report correctly observes that the
only condition required for the long term health of baseball is that investors be prepared
to own clubs and hire top-notch athletes, but it fails to recognize that this observation
undermines its misplaced emphasis on net operating revenue.
The Three Parties to the Negotiation
Large market teams can pay free agents large salaries, pay salaries determined in
arbitration and still have positive net operating income. They can do so because largemarket teams on the average have larger revenues from attendance and vastly larger
revenues from local television than do small market clubs. The arbitration system
assures that small- and large-market teams must pay essentially the same salaries to
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three-to-six year players.' To avoid excessive losses, small market teams can hold down
salary costs by dipping sparingly into the free-agency market or by releasing arbitrationeligible players expected to win large salaries.
If picking talented players and assembling winning clubs were more of a science
and less of an art than it is, these financial constraints might put small market clubs at
a significant competitive disadvantage. As the staff report and the majority report make
clear, this unfortunate circumstance has not occurred.

No one is good enough at

predicting which players will play well next year or what combination of players will
jell into a winning team to permit those with deep pockets consistently to buy on-field
success. Small market clubs have remained competitive. But, on the average they earn
smaller operating income or incur losses, while large market clubs are disproportionately
represented among those with positive net operating income.
While winning is important it isn't everything (pace Vince Lombardi). The
owners of small market clubs quite naturally would prefer positive operating income to
operating losses. The golitical problem owners of small market clubs face is how to
achieve this end. They have two major options.
First, they can petition large-market clubs to agree to arrangements under which
a larger proportion of revenues is shared equally among the clubs or is distributed to
offset revenue differentials. For example, local television could be distributed equally
among the clubs, much as national television revenues currently are shared, or the small
'This group also includes the most senior 17 percent of players with more than two, but
fewer than three, years of tenure.
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share of gate receipts shared with visiting dubs could be increased. Either of these two
measures would significantly reduce the current large imbalance in gross revenues
among the clubs.
These solutions to revenue imbalances have a major shortcoming. Owners of
large-market clubs prefer keeping revenue to giving it away; and owners of the small
market clubs cannot force them to do so. If driven to extremes, the large-market clubs
could probably leave the current leagues, reconstitute themselves as a separate league,
and survive quite well. The small market clubs probably do not have this option. They
therefore must try to persuade the large market clubs to make concessions on revenue
sharing. The large market clubs are prepared to grant such concessions only if they
receive something in return.s
The second way owners of small-market clubs can try to improve operating
income is to join owners of large-market dubs in seeking concessions from the players.
If total player salaries can be capped, the domain of competition among the cubs is
changed and the chances of making profits is increased. lf the cap is set below the level
that would arise from free negotiation among dubs and players, small-market clubs may
be able to make positive operating income. Note that smoothing out the ratio of salaries
to revenues is also worth something to owners, as fluctuations can be troublesome. But

s1t is important to note that even if revenues were completely shared so that revenues of
every club were the same, there is no reason to suppose that any club would necessarily make
positive operating income. Some or all owners might well decide that it was worth losing some
money in the pursuit of winning. In this situation, baseball as a whole and each team might lose
money each year, but each club could be a highly valuable asset coveted by investors.
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the larger benefit to clubs comes from a salary cap that reduces the fraction of revenues
paid out as salaries. If owners were to succeed in reducing the salary fraction, net
operating revenues of all clubs, large and small, would be increased. Asset values
would climb. The increase in asset values would approximate the capitalized value of
the reduction in player salaries.
The effects on club values from a salary cap could be quite dramatic. Economists
differ on the appropriate capitalization rate to use in value income streams. The correct
choice depends on the certainty of the income stream.

Purely for purposes of

illustration, suppose that the correct capitalization rate is 10 percent and that a salary cap
would reduce total player compensation by 15 percent. In 1991 player compensation
was $670 million. Fifteen percent of $670 million is $100.5 million. Capitalized at 10
percent, this shift of income to owners would have increased aggregate team values by
$1 billion, or approximately $38 million per club.
With such interests at stake, one can understand why the clubs find a salary cap
so appealing.

One can also understand why small-market clubs, whose owners

understand that large-market clubs are not likely to agree to share a larger portion of
revenues, would join forces with large market clubs to impose a salary cap. And one
can understand the reasons why the players resist any salazy cap that might appeal to
the clubs.
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Summary
The report of the majority, which I signed, makes two important recommendations-awarding free agency after three years of tenure rather than at six years and
greatly increased revenue sharing among the clubs. It also reports one crucially
important finding-that competitive balance in baseball is good and probably better than
ever before.
Through roughly 9,000 words of text, however, the majority report leads readers
up one blind alley and down another, suggesting that an industry whose companies are
valued in the market at prices as high as, or higher than, ever before is on the brink of
some vague sort of economic trouble.
The industry of baseball isinpolitical chaos, bereft of any governing mechanism
by which clubs can agree to share revenues among themselves in a fashion that will
permit all clubs both to compete equally on the field and to have an equal chance to
make positive operating revenues. No such concerns arise in most other industries,
where increased market share goes to the strongest companies. In baseball, however,
more "companies in more cities make a stronger industry able to bring the pleasures of
baseball to more fans. Thus, a governance structure of professional baseball clubs that
is incapable of enforcing greater revenue sharing is the problem. Unless that problem
is addressed and solved, labor management peace will never come to baseball.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
In order to see to it that no witness be precluded from an opportunity to appear, I am going to call to the witness table Mr. Zimbalist, who is the author of "Baseball and Billions," and also the Robert A. Woods professor of economics at Smith College; Gary Roberts, professor of law from Tulane Law School in New Orleans;
Roger Noll, professor of economics at Stanford University; and also
bring to the table at the same time the Honorable Frank Jordan,
mayor of San Francisco; Rick Dodge, assistant city manager of St.
Petersburg; Roric Harrison, former major and minor league player;
and Gene Kummelman, Consumer Federation of America.
Why don't you just please proceed, Mr. Zimbalist?
STATEMENTS OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF ANDREW ZIMBALIST, ROBERT A.

WOODS

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,

SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MA; GARY R. ROBERTS,
VICE DEAN AND PROFESSOR OF LAW, TULANE LAW SCHOOL,
NEW ORLEANS, LA; ROGER G. NOLL, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CA; HON.
FRANK M. JORDAN, MAYOR, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, CA; RICHARD B. DODGE, ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER, ST. PETERSBURG, FL; RORIC HARRISON, FORMER
MAJOR AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYER, MISSION
VIEJO, CA; AND GENE KIMMELMAN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON,
DC
STATEMENT OF ANDREW ZIMBALIST
Mr. ZIMBALIST. Thank you for inviting me to testify before your
subcommittee today, and I hope that Senator Metzenbaum's efforts

in conducting this hearing will not be in vain and that after scores
of inquiries, Congress will be persuaded at last to take positive
public policy action vis-a-vis the baseball industry.
The overriding economic characteristic of the industry is that
there is an artificial scarcity of franchises which is underwritten in
part by baseball's blanket exemption from the country's antitrust
laws. This scarcity of franchises and protected monopoly status, in
turn, can be held responsible for many of the industry's problems.
Over the years, baseball's owners have offered various rationales
for the exemption. First, until 1976, the argued that the exemption
was necessary to preserve the reserve clause in players' contracts.
They said that without such a clause, competitive balance in the
game would be undermined. Yet, the game has experienced unprecedented competitive balance since the introduction of free agency
in 1977.
Second, the owners perennially have claimed that their industry
is not profitable, that it is not a typical business, and hence they
do not take advantage of their monopoly position. Without stockholders to whom they have to show profits and open their books,
owners have several legal means to juggle their accounts and to
hide the true return on their investments. I will be happy to elaborate on baseball's accounting trickery during discussion. For now,
let me only cite the revealing case of the Cincinnati Reds.
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We gained an unusually candid and detailed look at the Reds'
books as a result, inter alia, of the litigation brought by Marge
Schott's minority partners against her. Cincinnati is baseball's
smallest media market, the 30th largest in the country. Despite
this, the Reds have been a consistently very profitable franchise.
Between 1985 and 1992, the club averaged over $10 million a
year in profits and were profitable every year. If owners did not receive a healthy economic return on their investment, including the
consumption value of ownership, then the explosion of franchise
values, more than tenfold since the late 1970's, would be impossible
to understand.
What is true, however, about baseball's financial situation is that
the industry is coming out of a 15-year boom period, during which
revenue growth exceeded 14 percent per year. In all likelihood, if
baseball does not move to an expanded playoff format, then beginning in 1994 baseball's national media contract will diminish by up
to $3 million per team. The national media contract accounts for
slightly under one-fourth of baseball's revenues, and this shortfall
will be more than made up for by strong growth in licensing income and local revenue sources. The net effect, though, will be that
the industry will experience low to moderate growth for the remainder of this decade.
Third, owners have claimed that baseball needs the exemption so
that the commissioner can exercise the best interests of baseball
clause. With the forced resignation of Fay Vincent and prospective
restructuring of the office, however, this rationale, always dubious,
is now clearly obsolete.
Fourth, the rationale heard from the owners more frequently
over the past several months is that the exemption permits baseball to prevent franchise relocations. To the extent that baseball's
relocation has thwarted some team movement in recent years, the
purposes and processes underlying this outcome must be examined
more closely. Is baseball ready to foreswear all future team movements, and hence render obsolete the practically ubiquitous practice of threatening cities with imminent departure in order to secure more favorable stadium deals?
To the extent that Congress is concerned with franchise movement and the blackmail of cities, there is a more direct and preferred remedy; namely, to give cities the right of first refusal to
allow municipal ownership and to set a baseball expansion timetable.
Fifth, the owners have also claimed that the exemption prevents
proliferation of frivolous litigation. This rationale would perhaps
also serve to argue for granting the exemption to all U.S. industries. It is no longer clear, however, that the rationale applies to
baseball. 'Baseball's longstanding protected and unregulated monopoly status has occasioned such arrogance, laxity, and arbitrariness that at least five lawsuits are presently pending, one for over
$3 billion. The same uncompetitive and unregulated environment
has engendered gross inefficiency and waste in the industry, which
ultimately is paid for by the consumer.
What effect does the exemption have? Most importantly, the exemption allows for the preservation of baseball's amateur draft and
minor league reserve system. These have constituted a formidable
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barrier to entry, helping to thwart the emergence of the Continental League in 1960, as well as more recent efforts in 1987 and
1990. Baseball is the only major team sport since World War II
which has not had a rival league and it has experienced slower expansion than football, basketball, or hockey. Thus, the exemption
has reinforced the game's artificial scarcity.
Second, the exemption helps to preserve certain restrictive practices in broadcasting that are not protected by the 1961 Sports
Broadcasting Act, which I trust Mr. Kimmelman will discuss.
Third, despite new provisions to forestall collusion in the 1990
basic agreement, the exemption takes the potential weapons of injunction and discovery out of the players' hands. Without these deterrents, players are less willing to consider doing away with salary
arbitration, which is a major sticking point in the present discussions.
In sum, the exemption cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
If it could, lifting it would not matter because the owners would
win in court. The exemption allows for an income redistribution in
favor of the owners and against the consumers. It should be lifted,
but by itself it is an incomplete remedy. In my view, it should be
accompanied either by two pieces of legislation granting the cities
the right of first refusal and an expansion timetable or by legislation breaking up baseball's four divisions into separate competing
business entities.
Thank you.
[Mr. Zimbalist submitted the following material:]
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Major League Baseball (MLB) is the only industry in the
United States that has a blanket exemption from the country's
anti-trust laws and is subject to no trade regulation.

The

exemption's origin lies in in the breakup of the Federal League
(FL), which challenged MLB's monopoly during 1914-15.

After two

years of exploding player salaries, which resulted from
competition for players between MLB and the FL, the leagues made
peace.

FL owners were either allowed to buy into MLB teams or

they were paid off.
MLB's owners, however, treated the owners of the Baltimore
Terrapins with scorn, offering them only $50,000 in settlement and
saying they should be pleased with this paltry sum because,
according to Charles Comiskey of the White Sox, Baltimore was not
a major league city and,
city.

in

fact, it

was even a bad minor league

Charles Ebbets of the Dodgers elaborated that the city had

too large a population of colored people.
The Terrapins' owners, not surprisingly, sued MLB in 1916
claiming violation of antitrust laws.

In April 1919 they won

their suit before the Indiana Supreme Court for triple damages of
$240,000.

But MLB appealed and the decision was reversed in April

1921 before the Washington, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

The

case was again appealed and came before the U.S. Supreme Court in
May 1922.

This court was headed by former President William

Howard Taft, who also happened to be an erstwhile third baseman
for Yale University and the first President to throw out a ball at
opening day, and the court's decision was written by Oliver
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himself a former amateur baseball player.

The Supreme Court argued principally that baseball did not
engage in interstate commerce and, hence,
country's antitrust laws.

was not subject to the

A curious finding: did not the players

cross state lines, were not the bats, balls and uniforms
manufactured in different states, was not the first
broadcast over radio in
and Newark, New Jersey?

World Series

1921, using a relay between New York City
Even more curious,

the decision was

reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1953 and again in 1972.
Congress from time to time has threatened to legislate away the
exemption, but has never come close to acting.
So MLB is

the only legally-sanctioned,

monopoly in the country.

self-regulating

Decisions about how the game is played

and how the business is conducted are made by the 28 groups of men
and one woman who happened to be the fortunate owners of
baseball's big league franchises.

Prior to the forced resignation

of Commissioner Fay Vincent in September 1992, the owners were
subject to at least one constraint, however minimal.

Now their

decisions about the fate of our national pastime go completely
unchecked.

Owners' Justification for the Exemption
Over the years, the owners of major league baseball's
franchises have proferred three basic rationales for their
exemption.
- . ONE.

Without the exemption the reserve clause could be

challenged and, without the reserve clause, baseball's competitive

287
-3balance would be undermined.

This argument was put forward by

virtually the entire baseball establishment and all

the players

testifying before Subcommittee on Monopoly Power of the House
Judiciary Committee in 1951,1 at a time when the Yankee dynasty
was in full swing and the game had no competitive balance
whatsoever.
What exactly is the threat of free agency that the baseball
owners railed against, and now the football owners decry?

It is

nothing more than the right for players to receive competitive
bids for their services, i.e., it is the same free labor market
idea that functions in the rest of the U.S. economy.
The free labor market rights conferred by free agency, in
fact, apply to only a small minority of professional ballplayers.
The 3400 minor leaguers have no free agency rights.

With few

exceptions, minor leaguers are paid between $850 and $2000 a month
for between 2.5 and 5.5 months per year.
security and few benefits.
the major leagues.

They have no job

One in ten minor leaguers makes it to

Of those who make it, only one in eight stays

for more than six years.

And it is only those in this very select

group of players with more than six years of experience ih the
major leagues who gain free agency rights.

2

1. Although Congress considered removing the exemption at the time
of these hearings, it seems confusion over the status of the
ruling in the Gardella case at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
was a major factor behind Congress' inaction in 1951. See, inter
.lia, Chapter One of my book Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look
Inside the Big Business of Our National Pastime. New York: Basic
Books, 1992.
2. To be sure, there are even restrictions on the free labor
market rights of free agents. See Chapter 4 in Baseball and
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Schott, she is making a business decision.

Nobody is pointing a

gun at the owner's head, compelling them to sign and pay
exhorbitant sums to individual free agents.

A rational owner will

estimate the expected value or additional revenue that the player
will bring to the team and then offer the player any sum up to
this amount.
predictable,

Since player performance is

not perfectly

sometimes the owner will overestimate and sometimes

the owner will underestimate;

over time player salaries under

free agency should approach their value. 3 It makes no sense for
the owners to sign a player for $6 million one day and the next
day to call a press conference and announce that the team is
losing money because player salaries are too high.
Those fans who express outrage at players' multi-million
dollar salaries should ask themselves why baseball franchise
owners should have different rules of the game than other U.S.
businesses.

They should also consider that if player salaries

were somehow to be lowered that the money would be pocketed by the
owners.

They should further consider that multi-million dollar

salaries are not so uncommon in the entertainment world.

Bill

Billions for more details on the operation of baseball's labor
markets, including the functioning of salary arbitration primarily
for players with between three and six years of major league
experience.
Small city franchises that
3.
There is a subsidiary issue here.
are only marginally profitable may find that they are caught on
the short end of the bargain before the scales balance.
Unpredictability and risk are more serious threats and deterrents
to small city teams. This is another reason to increase revenue
sharing among teams in MLB.

289
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million, Michael Jackson's exceeds $50 million and Prince's latest
contract brings him $10 million per record ...

and an

entertainer's professional lifetime is generally significantly
longer than a ballplayer's.

Finally, they should consider the

hundreds of corporate executives whose salary and stock options
yield over $5 million annually. Perhaps there is something
inequitable about the market-engendered salary structure in

the

United States and perhaps it would be desirable to reintroduce a
truly progressive income tax, but there is no persuasive rationale
for singling out baseball's free agents for ridicule.
What about the traditional owner claim that free agency
disrupts competitive balance, a claim that was repeated
unsuccessfully in court t~his past summer with regard to football
by the NFL owners.

The basis for the claim is that rich clubs or

big city clubs will be able to buy up disproportionately the best
talent and dominate opponents on the field.. If measured by the
number of different teams winning their division, pennant or World
Series,

there has actually been more competitive balance in MLB

than at any time since 1903.

If other measures are used, such as

the standard deviation or the spread in win percentages or excess
tail frequencies the conclusion is similar.

Further, big city

teams have actually had a lower than average finish in the
standings since 1977.
How can these unexpected results be explained?

First, and
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this is an explanation that was first suggested by University of
Massachusetts professor Sy Rottenberg, 4 since it always has been
possible to sell or trade players, the introduction of free agency
did not initiate the movement of players from poor teams to rich
teams, it only changed who captured the economic rent or extra
value generated by the players.

That is, prior to the advent of

free agency, top players were sold or traded from poor to rich
teams and the owners received payment for the player.

With free

agency, the top player may still move from a poor to a rich team
but now the player receives the payment in the form of higher
salary.

Thus, free agency per se does not change the pattern of

player movement across teams, it only changes the distr..ution of
izicome between owners and players.

If one adds to this insight,

the fact that today teams losing free agents are compensated with
amateur draft picks then it follows, other things being equal,
that free agency would lead to a somewhat greater competitive
balance.
The problem with this explanation is that it does not tell us
why big city teams have not outperformed small city teams on
average since 1977.

For this we must turn tb the second factor.

Because of greater unpredictability in player performance, it is
no longer possible to buy a winning team.

Studies on the

correlation of average team salaries and team win percentage
revealed a positive and strong correlation prior to 1960 but no

4. Simon Rottenberg, "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal
of Political Economy 64 (June 1956).
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Why has performance become more unpredictable?

Some will say

it has to do with increased pressure on the players from their
high salaries and media attention.

By this reasoning, some

players are better equipped psychologically to cope with the
pressure than others, but this ability is not always evident
during the players' early years.

I believe a stronger and more

tractable phenomenon is at work and that is talent compression.

5. Performance predictability becomes even more problematic as
players enter the second half of their careers and are
increasingly plagued by injury. Most free agents are in their
late twenties or their thirties.
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Baseball Players and Population

Year

Major League Players

U.S.

Population

Pop/Player

1890

480*

63 mn.

131,250:1

1903

320*

80 an.

250,000:1

1990

650

250 in.

385,000:1

* based on assumption of an average of 20 roster players

per team.

In 1990, the population-to-player ratio was 54% higher than
it was in 1903, the beginning of the modern era of professional
baseball.

That is, a smaller and smaller share of the population

is playing professional baseball.

Further, new groups have

entered the -game. Before 1947 no blacks played in the major
leagues and there were few latins.

Today these two groups

comprise almost 35 percent of major league ballplayers.

Moreover,

the population is healthier, more physically-fit and better
trained in baseball-specific skills through the expansion of youth
league baseball.

Because major league ballplayers are a smaller

fraction of an increasingly prepared population, the difference
between today's best, average and worst players is much smaller
than it was twenty or forty years ago.

Unlike track and field

records which are based strictly on individual prowess and improve
gradually over time, baseball performance statistics are the
result of the balance of competing forces.

Baseball's annual

hitting and pitching records not only have not improved over time
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-9but with one exception they have not even been approached in
recent times.

Moreover, the one exception dates back to 1961 and

is tainted by an asterisk in the minds of most fans. 6 There is no
more compelling evidence of talent compression than a review of
batting and pitching records and their dates of accomplishment.

7

6. I refer here, of course, to Roger Maris' 61 home runs in 162
games, compared to Babe Ruth's 60 home runs in 154 games.
7. To be sure, the lively ball was not introduced until 1920 and
this contributed to pitchers' low ERAs during the 1910s, but it
also contributed to lower batting averages. Batting averages rose
13 points in 1920 and ERAs rose 0.39 points. Even adding 0.39
points to the ERAs listed in Table 2 would leave them considerably
below the best performances in recent times. Eventually pitchers
adjusted to the lively ball and both batting and slugging averages
gave back some of the gained ground. Other rules' changes that
have affected performance records since 1903 include: narrowing
the strike zone in 1950, widening the strike zone in 1963,
narrowing the strike zone and lowering the pitchers' mound in 1969
and the introductiQn of the designated hitter in the American
League in 1973. Controlling for the different effects of these
changes does not alter the argument regarding the impact of talent
compression in the text.
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Table

2

Performance Records
Year

category

Player

Batting Avg.:
.424
.420
.420

Rogers Hornsby
George Sisler
Ty Cobb

1924
1922
1911

Hack Wilson
Lou Gehrig
Hank Greenberg

1930
1931
1937

61
60
59
58
58

Roger Maris
Babe Ruth
Babe Ruth
Hank Greenberg
Jimmie Foxx

1961
1927
1921
1938
1932

67
64
64

Earl Webb
george Burns
Joe Medwick

1931
1926
1936

Babe Ruth
Lou Gehrig
Babe Ruth
Lou Gehrig

1921
1936
1928
1931

RBIs:
190
184
183
Home Runs:

Doubles:

Runs:
177
167
163
163

Earned Run Average:
1.01
Dutch Leonard
1.04
T.F. Brown
1.09
Walter Johnson

1914
1906
1913
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faced many strong pitchers, but they also faced a steady diet of
weak pitchers not enjoyed by today's players.

Likewise, the great

pitchers of yesteryear faced many strong batters but they also
faced large numbers of weak batters.

Because the inequality among

the players was greater during baseball's earlier years, the
strong players were better able to take advantage of their weaker
opponents and set baseball's longstanding records.

With rare

exceptions, the only yearly record that is challenged consistently
by today's players is stolen bases, and, interestingly, this
activity has much more to do with individual prowess than it does
an outcome of competing forces.

In any event, it is this

compression of baseball talent that today results in greater
difficulty in selecting dominating players and leads to greater
competitive balance among the teams.

It is also clear evidence

that talent is sufficient for a significant increase in the number
of major league teams.
Other factors may have played a smaller role in the
preservation of competitive balance since 1977 and warrant a brief
mention: the introduction of the amateur draft in 1965; the
relative equalization of team revenues with the more rapid growth
of the national television revenues which are fully shared across
the teams; poor management by big city owners, and neglect of
their farm systems; possible perverse incentive effects of longterm contracts on older players; greater difficulty in keeping a
winning team together; and, lastly, greater ease for bottom teams
to improve quickly.
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The owners of major league baseball franchises

perenially have claimed that their industry is not profitable,
that it is not a typical business.

If the owners are not making a

profit, after all, then how can it be argued that they are abusing
the monopoly power conferred by the exemption?
To properly assess this claim, it

is necessary to understand

the structural circumstance of franchise ownership which assumes
one of three legal forms: business partnership;
corporation or, in a few instances,
large corporation.

subchapter S

a submerged division within a

In practice,'what this means is

that there are

no stockholders for whom you have to show profits to convince that
you are doing a good job or to please through increases in stock
prices, and there are no stockholders to whom you have to open the
books.

This leaves baseball's owners free to cook their books

practically at will and either to show greatly diminished profits
or to show losses.

Reality is

different.

Consider the opportunities for accounting legerdemain.
First, corporate tie-ins from cross ownership permit owners to
easily transfer millions of dollars of profit from one business to
another.

The Tribune Company, for instance, owns both the Chicago

Cubs and the superstation WGN which broadcasts Cubs and White Sox
games.

Chicago is

the third largest media market in the country,

and baseball broadcast rights to this city alone are worth in
excess of $15 million a year.

But as a superstation that reaches

over 40 million homes nationally,
worth well over $25 million.

WGN's contract with the Cubs is

Evidence from the late 1980s

suggests that WGN was paying the Cubs around $7 million for
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These figures imply that the Tribune company

chose to transfer roughly $20 million from its Cubs pocket to its
WGN pocket.
Why would they do that?

Baseball believes it derives public

relations value from making franchises seem less profitable than
they are or by making them appear to earn losses.

The clubs then

use this as ammunition in their negotiations with the Players'
Association, with the cities and the minor leagues.
Seventeen of MLB's 28 teams have had cross-ownership ties
with broadcasters since 1986 and have been able to utilize the
same transfer pricing scheme as the Tribune Company.
tie-ins also take other forms.

Corporate

Anheuser-Busch, for instance, owns

the St. Louis Cardinals as well as Busch Stadium as two separate
divisions.

While the Cardinals pay a standard rent for the

stadium, the ball team receives none of the parking, concessions
or general stadium revenue which could amount to $10 to $15
million or more annually.
Anheuser-Busch also derives significant.promotional value for
its beer products from its ownership of the Cardinals and Busch
Stadium.

To be sure, promotional synergy between products of

other businesses and baseball franchises benefits most owners.
(It may also be a matter of legislative concern that MLB's
franchise owners use baseball's protected monopoly and subsidized
status as a means to secure competitive advantage for their
businesses in other industries.

This occurs not only through

transfer pricing schemes and promotional synergy, but also through
easier access to loans (often using the franchise or some of its
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Second, owners in a franchise partnership often make loans as
individuals of tens of millions of dollars to the partnership to
which they belong.

This means that the partnership that owns the

ball club may make interest payments of millions of dollars
annually to one of the partners.

In essence, the partner is

choosing to receive his return on investment in the form of
interest income instead of profit distribution.

The end result is

that the team's profits are artificially diminished.
Third, owners can pay themselves handsome salaries,

even

though they retain a full complement of front office personnel.
We do not have details on the practices in MLB in this regard, but
the NFL players' antitrust suit this past summer produced some
fascinating revelations.

NFL teams, like in baseball, are

closely-held partnerships and subchapter S corporations.

At least

eleven NFL owners paid themselves over a million dollars salary in
1990, including the owner of the Buffalo Bills who paid himself
$3.5 million and Norm Braman, who owns the Philadelphia Eagles and
lives most of the year in France, paid himself the modest salary
of $7.5 million.

In other words, the Eagles might have had a $7

million profit turned into a $0.5 million loss from this sleight
of hand.

Although we do not have specific salary information for

executives of baseball teams, we do know that some teams have
front office expenses from $10 to $20 million above those of other
teams. 8

Naturally, extensive ownership and front office

8. More generally, as long as baseball's employees are paid above
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Fourth, each of these three accounting practices is perfectly
legitimate, but owners also can dishonestly manipulate or falsify
their books by underreporting revenue or overstating costs.

We

caught an unusually candid glimpse of the books of the Cincinnati
Reds as a result of the suit brought by Marge Schott's minority
partners against her.

Among other things, it was shown that

Schott was giving her car companies free advertising in Reds'
media outlets and double charging several major investment
expenditures, such as their new $5 million electronic scoreboard
and their artificial turf field.
Fifth, unlike other industries which cannot depreciate their
employees, sports teams are allowed to depreciate their players.
Player costs, of course, &re also expensed.

The general practice

is for the owners to assign 50 percent of the team's purchase
price to players and then depreciate this sum over five years.
Thus, a team purchased for $100 million would claim depreciation
of $10 million a year over five years, diminishing book profits by
$10 million per year.

Eventually, the depreciation is partially

recaptured in higher-capital gains taxes and the actual gain to
ownership is equivalent to an interest free loan over the holding
period.

9

The value of this tax shelter has fallen over time with

their reservation wage (the best wage they could earn outside of
baseball) then the industry's true monopoly profits will be
hidden, even if no accounting gimmickry is employed.
The actual value of the loan would be the appropriate average
9.
rate of interest plus the average rate of inflation multiplied
times the accumulated amount of depreciation summed over the
ownership period (adjusted for the early years).
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players, decreasing tax rates and the diminishing spread between
income and capital gains tax rates.

Nonetheless, during the early

years of ownership player depreciation privileges result in
sharply lower book profits.
Lastly, it-must be pointed out in response to the owners'
cries of poverty that there is also an investment return in the
consumption value of ownership.

Most owners admit to great

pleasure from the power and public exposure that team ownership
confers.

Even the most outlandish and irresponsible owners seem

to become community icons.

Certainly,

the tens of thousands of

baseball fanatics participating in rotisserie and other fantasy
leagues will recognize this consumption value immediately.
If baseball teams were not yielding a positive economic
return, it would defy all the laws of economics for franchise
values to be over $100 million and to have risen so rapidly over
the past two decades.

Consider, for instance, the Seattle

Mariners, one of baseball's weakest teams financially and on the
field: the Mariners sold for $6.5 million in 1977, $13 million in
1981, $77 million in 1988,'and $106 million in

1992.

Six teams

currently are appraised above $175 million.
Baseball's smallest media market is Cincinnati.

We know from

our privileged access to the Reds' books that the Reds have been
eminently profitable, earning an average annual profit of $9.4
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million in 1991, and around $5 million in 1992.
So,

properly interpreted, virtually all MLB teams are

profitable and to not be so seems to require a combination of a
small city, poor team performance and wasteful management.
Besides, who ever said capitalism guarantees profits? 10
Two caveats are appropriate here.

First, the protracted

boom period since the mid-1970s of almost 15 percent annual
revenue growth has come to an end.

The national media contract,

which had grown 16-fold between 1976 and 1990, will likely
diminish between 10 and 20 percent beginning with the 1994 season,
unless baseball moves to an expanded playoff format.

But the

national media contract with CBS and ESPN represents less than
one-quarter of MLB's revenues and the shortfall here

will be more

than offset by growth in local television and radio contracts,
licensing, luxury box, concessions and other income.

Overall, we

can expect slow revenue growth rates through the remainder of this
decade.

Mismanagement is a lot easier to conceal during periods

of rapid revenue growth.
Second, there is a potential distribution problem.

With the

expected reduction in the national media contract which is shared
equally among all teams and the consequent increased dependence on

10. Further, if the owners truly feel that the finances of certain
small city franchises are too fragile, they always have the option
of increasing revenue sharing among the teams. Presently,
approximately one-third of an average baseball team's revenue
comes from shared sources; in the NFL this figure is over threefourths. See discussion below in the text.
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only marginally profitable and are more limited in their resources
likely will experience greater financial pressure in the years
ahead.
Herein lies a key dynamic behind baseball's economic
instability.

The big city owners (Steinbrenner, Reinsdorf,

Tribune Co., O'Malley, Autry, Wilpon, Giles, et. al.) adamantly do
not want to increase revenue sharing.

Their strategy has been to

say to the small city owners: "We know you don't want our charity;
instead, what we'll do is
profitable."

help you make your operation more

So, in lieu of more revenue sharing, they go after

baseball's various constituencies. They go after the Players'
Association and this is why there has been a work stoppage every
time the collective bargaining agreement has come up since 1970,
yielding the preposterous outcome that an industry with 15 percent
yearly revenue growth,

20 percent yearly salary growth,

average

salaries over $1 million, no foreign competition and growing
employment does not experience labor peace, and this is why we
might have a lockout before the 1993 season begins.

They go after

the cities, which are confronted with threats of teams moving if
they do not build new stadiums.

They go after the minor leagues,

which two years ago were forced to share more of their revenue
with their parent franchises or to face extinction.
after the fans,

And they go

who are faced each year with more expensive cable

packages, tickets, concessions and parking costs.

It should

serve as a stern warning to baseball's barons, for instance, that
the neighborhoods surrounding Baltimore's new stadium are 70
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1992 was African-American.
%EREE.

Various baseball team owners and commissioners have

maintained that the sport's antitrust exemption was needed to
allow the commissioner to exercise effectively the "best interests
of baseball" clause.

Without the exemption, the exercise of this

power might abridge free commerce or property rights and be
vulnerable to a successful challenge.

In practice,

the

commissioner rarely invoked this power and did not serve as a
sufficient checkon the owners, who, after all, hire and fire the
commissioner.

Nevertheless, to the extent that this power ever

had enduring significance,
resignation of

ray

TOUR.

has now been negated by the forced

Vincent and the owners' clear intention to

restructure the office,
independence.

it

further circumscribing the commissioner's

Plainly, this argument is now obsolete.

A rationale heard from the owners more frequently over

the past several months is that the exemption permits baseball to
prevent franchise relocations.
is not fully correct.

First, the premise of this claim

It is based on a facile interpretation of

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the NFL Raiders'
case.

The decision did not say that any league rules restraining

franchise movements were in violation of the antitrust laws, only
that the NFL's rule 4.3 and its application in this case were in
violation.

One salient fact,

for instance, was that if the

Raiders' move to Los Angeles were restrained by the NFL it would
have preserved the Rams' monopoly in the Los Angeles area, as
defined by rule 4.1 to cover a radius of 75 miles.
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team movement in recent years, the purposes and processes
underlying this outcome must be examined more closely.

Is MLB

ready to foreswear all future team movements and, hence, render
obsolete the practically ubiquitous practice of threatening cities
with imminent departure in order to secure more favorable stadium
deals?

To the extent that Congress is concerned with franchise

movement there is

a more direct and preferred remedy; namely, to

give cities the right of first
ownership
FIVE.

refusal and to allow municipal

(elaborated below).
The owners have also claimed that the exemption

prevents a proliferation of frivolous litigation.

This rationale

would perhaps also serve to argue for granting the exemption to
all U.S. industries.

It is no longer clear, however, that the

rationale applies to baseball.

MLB's longstanding protected and

unregulated monopoly status has occasioned such ownership laxity
and arbitrariness that at least five lawsuits are presently
pending, one for over $3 billion.

Independent Perspectives on the Exemption
Outside the industry, views on the importance of baseball's
antitrust exemption have varied widely.

In their 1981 book

Baseball Economics and Public Policy, economists Jesse Markham and
Paul Teplitz argued that prior to the introduction of free agency
there was cause to remove baseball's antitrust exemption but with
free agency the exemption has little economic meaning.
study was commissioned by MLB.

Their

Economist Gerry Scully resonates
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powerful union to protect their interests, so lifting antitrust
exemption would accomplish little. 1 1
On the other end of the spectrum is law professor Stephen
Ross who could scarcely paint a rosier picture of the benefits
from applying antitrust statutes to baseball.

"Competing leagues

would vie against each other for the right to play in public
stadiums,

driving rents up and tax subsidies down.

Leagues would

be more eager to add new expansion markets, lest those markets
fall into the hands of a rival league.

Because the competing

leagues would bid on players, salaries would reflect more
accurately the players'

fair market value, and no one league would

unduly restrict intraleague

mobility

of players.

Teams thus could

obtain more readily the right player for the right position.
Leagues would hesitate to move prime games to cable for fear of
losing their audience,

as well as the loyalty of their fans, to a

league whose games remained available on free television.

The

pressure of competition would force each league to maintain
intelligent and efficient management."

12

Reality lies somewhere in between these polar contentions
that antitrust action would do away with all problems in MLB and
that it would do nothing.

Where does it lie?

The first question

to answer is what areas of MLB are still affected by its

11. Scully, The Business of Major Leaaue Baseball. University of
Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 192-193.
12. Ross, "Monopoly Sports Leagues," Minnesota Law Review 71, 3,
1989, p. 646.
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Impact of the Exemption
Consider the players.

Damages in the recent collusion cases

against the owners were settled at $280 million.

If antitrust

principles were applied to these cases, the Players' Association
would have been entitled to triple damages or $840 million.
Realizing this, the Players' Association added a clause to the
1990 Basic Agreement stating that in the future owners'

collusion

over free agent salaries will be subject to triple damages.

The

owners accepted the change, so the only remaining advantage seems
to be indirect.

If the exemption is lifted, the Players'

Association will have recourse to injunctions and pre-trial
discovery procedures.

The implicit threat that either injunction

or discovery rights might be invoked may further deter collusive
behavior among the owners.
What about the players with less than six years experience
who do not have free agency rights?

Since the Players'

Association operates essentially as a union shop, including all
major league players, the collective bargaining agreement legally
binds all major leaguers to its provisions.

Players without free

agency cannot bring an antitrust suit against MLB because of the
non-statutory labor exemption that allows labor unions involved in
bona fide, arms'-length bargaining to surrender possible
protections under antitrust statutes.
exemption,

Removing the antitrust

then, would have no direct effect on MLB's relation

with the major league players.
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They do not

belong to the Players' Association, nor any other union, and MLB
restrains them from entertaining competitive bids for their labor
services.
applie*.

This is restraint of trade and no labor exemption
Theoretically, a minor leaguer could sue MLB.

Of

course, such a suit would be time consuming and costly, and most
minor leaguers have neither the money nor the interest to
challenge their employers.

Moreover, any lawyer would advise them

that their chances in such a suit would be slim since the courts
have repeatedly upheld MLB's exemption.

Were the exemption

lifted, this is an area that could well be affected.

13

The existence of the reserve system in baseball's minor
leagues is also a factor that makes it more difficult for
competing leagues to establish themselves in baseball; in
economists' jargon, the minor league reserve system is a barrier
to entry.

When the Continental League was forming in the late

13. The absence of a blanket antitrust exemption in the NFL and
the NBA has not mattered in this regard because they do not have
professional minor leagues; colleges serve in this capacity.
Interestingly, however, both the NFL and the NBA have been
challenged in court on a related issue where MLB is also
vulnerable -- the amateur draft.
In all three sports, amateur
players, either out of high school or college, are drafted by
professional teams and prevented from seeking competitive bids for
their services. The NBA and NFL have won their cases, basically
on union shop grounds. That is, an amateur being signed in the
basketball or football drafts is about to enter the "majors" and
its players' union, so they are bound by the rules of the union's
collective bargaining agreements. These rules accept the draft
and, hence, by the labor exemption, the drafts are legal. Players
drafted in baseball, however, are headed for the minor, not the
major, leagues where there is no union. Thus, a challenge of
baseball's June amateur draft would be quite compelling in the
absence of baseball's exemption.
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draft and pay for players from its minors.
the request.

MLB never responded to

The Continental League had the option of sueing MLB

for exploitative'adhesion, but here again MLB was protected by the
antitrust exemption.

Not anxious to test its exemption over this

issue and to otherwise alienate scores of politicians, MLB
compromised on an expansion program that incorporated some of the
prospective team owners from the Continental League.

Another

effort to form a third league was close to fruition in 1987 when
the stock market crashed in October, financially decimating some
of the monied individuals involved in the effort.

The effort was

revived with some new investors in 1990; precisely one of the
chief concerns was access to minor league talent.

Without such

access, the quality of play would be too low and the riskiness and
expense of drafting players out of high school too great to make
the new league viable.

A third league in baseball does not have

the option that the AFL or USFL had in football to offer sweeter
deals to college players.

Unlike in college football and

basketball, the overwhelming majority of college players in
baseball are not ready for major league competition.
The exemption, then, deters the formation of competitive
leagues.

This deterrence helps to explain the failure of rival

major leagues to emerge in baseball since 1914-15 as well as the
slower pace of expansion since the 1960s of MLB relative to the
other professional team sport leagues.

The NHL, NFL and NBA have

all experienced rival leagues over the last thirty years and they
have all expanded more rapidly than major league baseball.14
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MLB to deal with its notoriously inefficient and wasteful
management practices.

It would also temper some of the

troublesome arrogance that characterizes the baseball
establishment. 1 5

In the end, management waste and abuse are paid

for by the fans, the cities, the players, the umpires and many
other employee groups.
Consider the media.
role to play.

Here antitrust has a straightforward

MLB restrains trade when it imposes territorial

restrictions on the broadcasting of its games.

Although somewhat

vitiated by compulsory license with the carriage of local Cubs,
Braves, Yankee and Mets off-air games on superstations, baseball's
territorial restrictions still apply to all local cable deals as
well as to the broadcast deals of other teams.

Thus, a Yankee fan

living in Massachusetts cannot see the Yankees on cable (MSG) at
any price because the Red Sox have been awarded exclusive rights
to the area by MLB.

The explosion in cable channel capacity from

14. In 1967 there were ten teams in the NBA and six teams in the
NHL; in 1991 there were twenty-seven and twenty-two teams
respectively. That is, the NBA expanded by a factor of 2.7 and
the NHL by 3.7 over the period, while MLB expanded from twenty to
twenty-six teams, by a factor of 1.3. The NFL has also expanded
more rapidly, but the existence of so many quasi-major football
leagues (for example, the World League of American Football, the
World Football League, the United States Football League, the
Canadian Football League, and arena football) over the years makes
a direct calculation more problematic. Of course, the precise
rates of expansion will depend on the base year chosen.
15. See Chapter 2 in Baseball and Billions for a discussion of
baseball ownership and management.
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it technologically feasible as well as cost effective to offer
fans throughout the country the choice of watching any major
league game on any given day.

As long as MLB awards teams

exclusive territorial rights, however, this technological
potential is thwarted.
Further complicating the implementation of unrestricted game
viewing is MLB's system of revenue sharing.

In particular, local

broadcast revenues, with the exception of a small share of cable
income, are retained by the team.

Some teams earn over $40

million from their local media contracts while others earn under
$10 million.

To the extent that local rights lose exclusivity as

viewership to local games becomes available nationally the
pressure for additional revenue sharing among teams will mount.
Baseball's big city franchises, then, are likely to resist the
move toward a policy that would maximize consumer choice and
welfare.

If, however, in the spirit of political compromise with

the small city teams, the big city owners surrender exclusivity to
some share of local broadcasts, it is likely that MLB itself will
centrally program and market on pay-per-view the menu of
nationally available games.

The existence of territorial rights

and MLB's monopoly marketing of the pay-per-view games, in turn,
will increase the purchase price for viewership and further limit
the access of low and middle-income Americans to enjoying the
national pastime.
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broadcasting conferred by the 1961 SBA should be qualified to
guarantee a certain level of fan access to free telecasting.

The

175-game ESPN package strictly speaking is a violation of
antitrust law since it is pay TV and not protected by the SBA.

MLB's

If

blanket exemption were lifted, the ESPN package would be

subject to challenge.

In exchange for the right to make such a

package deal, MLB might be required to lift its local blackout
provisions on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday nights.

By allowing

ESPN games into certain local markets on these nights, this would
raise somewhat the value of the ESPN package and lower somewhat
the value of local contracts, but on balance the gross revenues
should not be affected.

It would simply redistribute revenues

from local sources (only a small share of which is shared) to
national sources (all of which is shared.)
In 1987 MLB's television committee recommended a rule that
team owners not be allowed to own television stations.

Over

Commissioner Ueberoth's objections, the rule was accepted and has
been honored only in the breach.

Cross ownership ties now affect

more than fifteen teams and in the one case the Tribune Company
owns the Chicago Cubs, the superstation WGN that broadcasts the
Cubs and the White Sox as well as local stations that will
broadcast the games of five other major league teams in 1993.
Tribune Company, then, has enormous power within the baseball
establishment and they are using it to promote their interests.

The
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Vincent's ouster was his decision to realign the divisions in the
National League so that they would correspond to their member
teams' geographic locations.

This would have promoted more local

rivalries in the long run, reduced team travel expenditures and
allowed the fans in Cincinnati and Atlanta to see more night games
at normal hours.

The Tribune Company disliked the move, however,

because, given the divisional scheduling formula in the National
League,

it would have put a larger number of WGN's games on after

prime time for most of the nation.

Once again, the short-term

profit interests of the most powerful owners conspired with
baseball's exemption to limit fan access to the national pastime.
Consider the cities.

MLB behaves like a standard monopoly in

restricting supply (the nimber of teams) below the demand for
teams from economically viable cities; that is, it creates an
artificial scarcity.16

There were, for instance, 18 ownership

groups from around the country in 1990 who paid $100,000 simply to
apply to be one of the National League's two expansion teams.
This excess demand forces cities to compete with each other to

16. Over the past year owners have been quick to point out that
there were several franchises on the block that had not been sold.
They claimed this was evidence of no excess demand. To this claim
it must be pointed out that: (a) demand was artificially
restricted by imposed conditions from MLB; (b) the asking price
was unrealistic in some cases; and, most importantly, (c) other
things equal investors always shy away from uncertainty and risk
and MLB in 1992 was confronted by the prospects of labor unrest,
legal turmoil, political backlash and a smaller national
television contract. Despite this, the franchises in Houston,
Detroit, San Francisco and Seattle all sold at around the $100
million mark.
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attract new teams or retain existing ones.

MLB can blackmail the

cities into bankrolling new stadiums replete with luxury boxes,
advertising-friendly electronic scoreboards, adjacent and abundant
parking, and an extensive network of in-stadium restaurants and
concessions outlets.

All this can be worth tens of millions of

dollars in

additional annual revenue to a team and bring the city

no more in

rental payments.

The cities are being mugged.

The standard ploy for a MLB franchise is
the team.

to threaten to move

Such threats have consistently brought owners either

more favorable rental contracts for their teams,

as with the

Minnesota Twins who have paid zero rent since 1989, or stadium
retrofits such as the $105 million investment by New York City in
adding luxury boxes, new scoreboards, concessions outlets, and
parking to Yankee Stadiun

during 1974-75,17 or entire new stadiums

with a wide array of revenue-generating accoutrements, such as the
new and beautiful Camden Yards ballpark in Baltimore which brought
the Orioles' owner Eli Jacobs some $40 million in profits this
past year.
If the affected city dares to demur and ask for a better
deal, matters can get ugly very quickly.
cases in 1992.

There were two notorious

The first was in Seattle where a local group

trying to buy the team was told by the Commissioner that MLB had
one rule that required local ownership and another rule that
proscribed foreign ownership.

Seattle's group included Nintendo

17. New York City received zero rent from the Yankees in

1976.
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originally as a majority owner.

Despite the facts

that the Mariners' owner at the time lived in Indianapolis, that
the previous owner lived in Los Angeles and that the CEO of
Nintendo of America had lived in Seattle for fifteen years, raised
his children there and would become the first Seattle Mariners'
owner to possess a Washington state driver's license, the
prospective Seattle group was told by the commissioner to expect a
cold shoulder from MLB.

This was the status quo until Speaker of

the House, Representative Thomas Foley from the state of
Washington, told MLB that if the Seattle group was turned down
that it could expect to see legislation removing baseball's
antitrust exemption in Congress within 24 hours.

MLB relented and

allowed Nintendo to hold 49 percent of the partnership's shares.
The second case was partially resolved last month and
involved the San Francisco Giants.

Back in 1958 when the plans

for cold and windy Candlestick Park were being hatched, Mayor
Christopher of San Francisco and his city council were either
hoodwinked or paid off by Charles Harney, owner of the prospective
stadium site on the bay and construction contractor.
owner Horace Stoneham was guilty of benign neglect.

Giants'
There have

been four referenda since 1987 to raise funds for a new stadium in
the Bay Area and all four.were voted down.
and Gus Hall have lost more elections.

Only Harold Stassen

Of the four referenda

defeats, however, only two were in San Francisco proper.

The last

one in the city was in November 1989, one month after the massive
earthquake.
stadium,

The mayor, who had been actively supporting the new

stopped campaigning for it

and an ownership group from
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lure the Giants 90 miles east, began a propaganda effort against
the stadium on the grounds that a new stadium was needed but now
was not the time to spend public funds on it
relief efforts were so crucial.

while earthquake
-

This referendum lost by 50.5

percent to 49.5 percent, or by less than two thousand votes!

The

most recent vote in June 1992 in San Jose was in the context of a
gargantuan fiscal crisis, and it is well to recall, as it was
repeatedly recalled for the voters in San Jose, that Bob Lurie,
the Giants' owner, inherited a multimillion real estate fortune
from his father, that he bought the Giants in 1976 for $8 million
and the sale price will be around $100 million.

Besides, if a

failed referendum was a sufficient condition to vindicate
franchise relocation, then the Detroit Tigers also would be
justifiable carpetbaggers because on May 17, 1992 a stadium
initiative in Detroit failed decisively.
San Franciscans have been accused of being unworthy baseball
fans.

Many have pointed to the Giants' attendance which fell from

2.06 million in 1989, to 1.98 million in 1990 and to 1.74 million
in 1991.

Yet in 1991 the team record was 75 wins and 87 losses

with a fourth place finish.

It is possible to estimate

econometrically what the Giants' attendance would have been had
San Francisco fans behaved like average baseball fans.
Controlling for city population and team win percentage, the
expected attendance at Candlestick would have been only 1.69
million in 1991 or 50,000 below the actual.
In the meantime, the city of Tampa, Florida, the 13th largest
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since 1984.

In 1988 the city financed the construction of a $138

million domed-stadium,
White Sox.

intended originally as the new home of the

Jerry Reinsdorf,

owner of the White Sox, then used

Tampa's beckoning dome to induce Chicago and Illinois to build his
team a new Comiskey Park.

When Bob Lurie signed a sale agreement

with a Tampa group on August 6 of this year, the city began an
additional $30 million investment to prepare the ballpark for
major league play.

Now the dome will remain empty and Tampa once

again finds itself without a team.

MLB will have several major

litigations brought against it, the costs of which in large
measure will ultimately be borne by the fans and will likely bring
further instability to the game.
The obvious answer to MLB's ability to blackmail the cities
and to extract annual subsidies totalling over $200 million from
them is

to rebalance the supply and demand equation through an

expansion of franchises.

There are enough economically-viable

cities to support a gradual expansion to 40 teams by the year
2004.

The Cincinnati Reds operate profitably in baseball's

smallest media market,

the 30th largest in the country.

incorporating any smaller media markets,

since four metropolitan

areas have two teams each and two teams are in Canada,
possible for MLB to expand to 36 teams.

Without

it

would be

Another six media markets

were at least 86 percent the size of Cincinnati in 1990; at a
market growth rate of 1.4 percent a year, by the year 2000 they
would all be larger than Cincinnati was in 1990.

Thus, there are

more than enough economically viable cities to support such an
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Although the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the NFL Raiders' case is often misinterpreted as discussed
above, applying antitrust law has hardly been a godsend to the
erstwhile NFL cities of Oakland, Baltimore and St. Louis.

When Al

Davis moved his Raiders to Los Angeles in 1982, the NFL was so
embarassed by Davis' naked greed that it tried to stop him.

Davis

went to court and won on the grounds that the NFL was restraining
trade and interfering with his prqperty right.

18

Baltimore Colts'

owner Robert Irsay, encouraged by the Davis precedent, packed up
his bags in 1984 and was in Indianapolis in less time than it took
Johnny Unitas to run out of the pocket.

The NFL's St. Louis

Cardinals followed suit in 1988 when they moved to Phoenix.

The

NFL was not willing to risk the expense and effort to challenge
these moves even though there was no existing team in Indianapolis
or Phoenix whose monopoly was being challenged.
The case can be made, then, that if baseball's exemption is
lifted it should be accompanied by additional legislation.

19

One

piece of legislation would give cities the right of first refusal.
That is, before an owner was allowed to move a team or to sell it
to owners in another city, the team should be offered for sale to

18. Oakland was unsuccessful in the California courts when it
tried to invoke eminent domain to prevent the Raiders' relocation.
19. It is also true that removing the exemption alone may provoke
private antitrust suits yielding damages but no structural relief.
For structural relief the antitrust division of Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission would have to get
involved. The outcome in this case would be uncertain and the
process would be expensive and drawn out.
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host city.

operate it

The host city, in turn, could either buy it and

as a quasi-public company or it

widely-dispersed ownership among its
Wisconsin with the football Packers.

could arrange for a

citizens --

as in Green Bay,

The fair market value could

be set by an independent arbitration body.
Presently, MLB has a policy proscribing municipal ownership.
Thus,

when Joan Kroc attempted to give the Padres to the city of

San Diego two years ago, the baseball establishment informed her
that this was impossible.

Publicly, the owners state that

municipal ownership would be too cumbersome and inefficient.
minor league franchises,

Many

however, are municipally-owned,

management is

separated from local politics and the teams are run

efficiently.

The real concern of baseball's barons is

that public

ownership means public actountability which, inter alia, may lead
to opha books.

Open books means loss of control and that is where

the real threat lies.

Right of first refusal legislation would

overturn MLB's prohibition on municipal ownership.
A second piece of legislation would set down an expansion
timetable for baseball.
the year 2-004.

Again, here I would argue for 40 teams by

Congress may prefer a decision rule for expansion

to a specific timetable; if so, an adjudicatory agency would have
to interpret and oversee the implementation of the rule.
Another public policy option would be the creation of a
federal sports commission.

Such a commission, originally proposed

in 1972 by Senator Marlow Cook, a Republican from Kentucky, would
set guidelines for expansion in each league, control franchise
movements, regulate the relationship between professional and
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organized sports.

The checkered history of regulatory bodies in

the United States and the primacy of special interests in
Washington politics argue for great caution before pursuing public
policy along these lines. 2

0

An oversight commission would have an

advantage over a piecemeal legislative approach in being able to
respond more flexibly, promptly and, possibly, more intelligently
to new problems.

It would, of course, be desirable to build in

safeguards to minimize the opportunities for the industry to
capture its regulators. 2 1

As perilous as this option may appear,

the existing alternative may well be worse: that is, professional
sports leagues run by self-interested owners unfettered by the
forces of competition or regulation, and intir-collegiate
athletics run by the NCAA, in turn, controlled by the nonacademically-minded athletic directors from the big-time
universities.
Each of the above public policy options entails some direct
government interference in the industry.

An alternative approach

to undoing baseball's contrived scarcity of franchises would be

20. One might also wonder whether the status quo wherein Congress
periodically threatens to revoke the exemption if baseball does
not behave in certain ways avoids the penetration of special
interests. Besides, even without the threat of removing the
exemption, there exists another threat -- the removal of the
nonsensical right to depreciate players.
21. One such safeguard might be a requirement that no regulator
could come from or go to a sports industry within a five-year
period. Another might stipulate that the regulators be chosen
from lists provided by particular constituencies, such as the
United States Conference of Mayors, the Consumer Federation of
America, sportswriters, players and the owners.
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into separate business entities.

22

'The new leagues would be

allowed to collaborate in setting common playing rules and
arranging post-season contests, but their business dealings would
be separate from each other.

They would compete for fan loyalty,

for television contracts, for worthy cities, and so on.

Owning a

team in more than one league and vertical interlocks would be
prohibited.23

In 1947 former MLB Commissioner Happy Chandler broke
baseball's longstanding tradition by decreeing that blacks be
allowed into the game.

Before leaving office in 1951, Chandler

made a public statement with another democratic sentiment:

"I

always regarded baseball as our National Game that belongs to 150
,million men, women and children, not to sixteen special people who
happen to own big league teams."

Our long-dormant public policy

needs to be awakened if we are to rescue Commissioner Chandler's
vision.

22. A version of which was first suggested by Roger Noll in 1974;
see his concluding chapter in Noll (ed.) Government and the Sports
Business. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974.
23. Such a hands' off approach has a certain appeal but the move
from contrived scarcity to contrived competition might also
disfigure the national pastime beyond the tolerance level of the
average fan. For instance, in addition to or instead of competing
by offering lower ticket prices or-cheaper broadcasting, the
competition might take the form of greater commercialization or
excessive experimentation with new rules to excite fan interest.
Were true price competition also to break out, the threats of
financial fragility and geographical instability of franchises may
reappear. Under such conditions, the industry would still survive
but are such outcomes the most desirable for the fans and the
cities?
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resolution establishing a Select Committee on Professional Sports
(a.k.a., the Sisk Committee) to investigate the stability of the
country's major sports industries.

The Sisk Committee issued its

report on January 3, 1977, concluding: "Based upon the information
available to it, the Committee has concluded that adequate
justification does not exist for baseball's special exemption from
the antitrust laws and that its exemption should be removed in the
context of an overall sports antitrust reform."

24

To accomplish

such a reform, the Sisk Committee recommended the establishment of
a successor committee to undertake a broad study and then propose
a specific legislative course of action.

The successor committee

was never created.
No bill to lift baseball's exemption has ever made it out of
committee in either the House or the Senate.

Thus, Congress

heretofore has shown itself to be content with baseball's legal
monopoly.

In other cases where the government has deemed it

desirable to sanction a monopoly, such as with public utilities,
the government has also sought to assure through regulatory
controls that the monopoly did not abuse its privileges.

Not so

with baseball; it is a self-governing, unregulated monopoly.
There is no justification for treating the baseball industry
differently from others in this regard.

It is unaesthetic,

unseemly, inefficient and unjust to perpetuate the historical

24. Cited in Markham and Teplitz, p. 1.
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Congress cannot

sensibly exercise its duties and represent the best interests of
the U.S. electorate by periodically threatening to revoke the
exemption.

The anomoly should be ended forthwith and accompanying

legislative protections should be enacted.
I did not vote for Ross Perot, but I found his rallying cry
to the electorate most appealing: "Take back your government."
think it is also time to take back our national pastime.

I
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

January 11,

1993

Professor Andrew Zimbalist
Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics
School of Economics
Smith College
Northhampton, NA 01063
Dear Professor Zimbalist:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
-hearing,"there are a few questions that were not answered.
' '%Peaserespond, in writing,. to the following questions no later
x -than
Monday, January 25, 1993:
iairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1)

Professor simbalist, in your testimony, you state that
"Major League Baseball behaves like a standard monopoly in
restricting supply [in order to] create an artificial
scarcity."
The owners dispute that characterization.
The
owners suggest that due to the economics of baseball and the
limited supply of player talent, the game is simply not
capable of supporting more than 28 teams at this time. What
evidence do you have that baseball is deliberately
maintaining an artificial scarcity of teams?

2)

At the hearing, we heard from city officials from both San
Francisco and Tampa Bay who testified about the dispute over
the threatened relocation of the Giants.
I believe the
public is ill-served when teams threaten to move in order to
gain concessions and subsidies from their hometowns.
In
your view, would elimination of the antitrust exemption
promote or reduce stability with respect to the relocation
of franchises?

3)

In your book, Baseball and Billions, you state that Major
League Baseball has refused to allow municipal ownership of
teams.
In which instances has baseball blocked cities from
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owning teams? Also, isn't it the case that community
ownership of teams has worked in the minor leagues and in
the National Football League?
4)

Professor Zimbalist, you have testified that a number of
teams employ accounting gimmicks and transfer-pricing
schemes with corporate affiliates that have the effect of
understating team profits. What enables the owners to
engage in these kinds of practices and what impact do they
have on the fans and the public?

5)

Professor Zimbalist, some observers have suggested that
baseball in particular -- and professional sports in general
-- are being priced out of the reach of poor people and
working families.
The costs of attending a game -including ticket prices, and especially parking and
concession costs -- are increasing steadily, and many fans
need to subscribe to cable television in order to follow
their teams on a regular basis. Has this problem become
apparent to you in your research, and is there anything that
we here in Congress can do about it?

Senator Thurmond's questions:
1)

Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in the context
of an antitrust exemption?

2)

Please address the legal argument, which Mr. Roberts and
others propound, that a sports league should be viewed as
one legal entity incapable of conspiring with itself under
Section I of the Sherman Act.

3)

Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit
from repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?

4)

As I understand it, you believe that repealing the antitrust
exemption is either not necessary and/or not sufficient to
cure the structural problem inherent in the business of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
be undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation. At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the most urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces?
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I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,

Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
BM/eao
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Andrew Zimbalist's
Responses to Inquiries
pertaining to
oversight Hearings
on
Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
Antitrust Subcommittee
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate
10 December 1992
Chairman Metzenbaum's Questions
1. I might begin by noting theoretically that if, in the
presence of their protected monopoly status, the owners did
not contrive a franchise scarcity then they would not be
behaving as efficient profit maximizers. There are many
pieces of empirical evidence to support the contention of an
artificial scarcity of baseball teams.
First, when the
National League conducted a bidding during 1990-91 for two
expansion teams to enter the League in 1993 there were several
dozen ownership groups interested in applying. After weeding
out the less attractive applicants, the final list of
applicants included 18 ownership groups from 10 different
cities across the country. Each of these groups paid $100,000
just to apply and for the privilege of being considered by
baseball's expansion committee.
Second, the smallest media market in Major League Baseball is
Cincinnati. According to the Reds' own books, the franchise
has been profitable every year at least since 1985, averaging
almost $10 million a year in profits. Without incorporating
any smaller media markets, since four metropolitan areas have
two teams each and two teams are in Canada, it would be
possible for MLB to expand to 36 teams. Another six media
markets were at least 86 percent the size of Cincinnati in
1990; at a market growth rate of 1.4 percent a year, by the
year 2000 they would all be larger than Cincinnati was in
1990. Thus, there are more than enough economically viable
cities to support an expansion to 40 teams or more by the
beginning of the next century.
Third, many argue that the effective constraint on expansion
is not the economic viability-of cities but the scarcity of
playing talent. As I argue at length in my written testimony
and in Baseball and Billions, there is no empirical basis for
this contention. Indeed, there is every reason to believe
that the absolute level of talent today in baseball is greater
than ever before. Today there is a smaller share of an
increasingly fit and trained population playing major league
baseball and, in recent decades, there has been an influx of
black and latins into the game. Furthermore, if more
lucrative job opportunities opened up, it would induce more
youth to attempt a professional baseball career. If anything,
the problem is the reverse. There is an excess of top talent,
leading to skills' compression and the failure for today's
ballplayers to challenge longstanding individual season
performance records.
Fourth, although we do not have access to complete details, I
am confident from the information we do have that front office
and executive salaries in baseball are considerably above
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reservation levels (what these individuals would earn in their
best alternative employment). This too constitutes a return
to monopoly power.
Fifth, even using the owners' manicured figures, baseball has
experienced a higher rate of return on sales in recent years
than U.S. business on the whole. For instance, in 1990
baseball's return on sales was 10.6 percent, while the average
in U.S. manufacturing was 6.3 percent.
In my view, the game would unquestionably benefit from
expansion: more fans would get to see live professional
baseball; more minor league ballplayers would have an
opportunity to play major league ball; the blackmailing of
cities would cease, or, at least, subside; and, historical
performance records would come within closer reach of today's
players. Other things being equal, franchise values and
owners' profits would slip some, but this, after all, is the
cost of breaking up any monopoly.
2. This is an excellent and complicated question, and goes
straight to the heart of the public policy dilemma. First,
let us assume that Congress lifts the antitrust exemption and
does nothing else. Then the question becomes whether the new
circumstance will bring about the formation of a competitive
league or whether the greater potential threat of a
competitive league will cause baseball to act preemptively and
expand. To the extent that either of these outcomes comes to
pass then the excess demand for franchises will be reduced as
will baseball's ability to extort exploitative stadium
contracts from cities. But before either of these outcomes
materializes it is necessary that certain structural relief to
baseball's organization be introduced; such as, the courts
declaring that minor league contracts constitute exploitative
adhesion and are violative of antitrust statutes. Successful
civil litigation is likely to result only in damages and not
structural relief; thus, it would be desirable in this
instance to have the Justice Department bring its own suit but
this is not something the Congress can legislate. In other
words, if the exemption is lifted and Congress does nothing
else it will result in substantial uncertainty regarding the
continued monopolistic practices of baseball. In this case,
it is possible, and I underscore the word "possible," that
lifting the exemption would hurt cities' bargaining power vis
a vis baseball franchises, as was the case with the NFL's '
Raiders and the city of Oakland. Here too the situation is
ambiguous however, because the decision of the Ninth Circuit
of Appeals referred clearly to the special circumstances of
the NFL's attempted protection of the Los Angeles monopoly for
the Rams and the NFL's rule 4.3.
Furthermore, only part of the problem is actual movement of
franchises; the other part is the threat of movement and
consequent extortion of giveaway stadium deals from the cities
-- a dimarche recently employed by Bud Selig himself invoking
the beckoning city of Phoenix. On the one hand, the owners
extol the virtues of franchise stability and, on the other,
they continue to exploit their unregulated control over the
number and location of franchises to mug the cities. This
arrogant behavior derives in significant measure from the
decades of special treatment for their industry by the courts,
with implicit Congressional assent.
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Nevertheless, it is precisely the ambiguity of the precedent
in the Raiders' case and the prospect of drawn-out and
expensive legal battles that leads me to recommend Congress do
One option, involving
more than simply lift the exemption.
only the laws of the free market, would be to legislate that
baseball's four divisions be broken up into separate business
entities. These entities could collaborate on setting playing
rules and terms for interleague play as well as post-season
competition, but they could not collaborate on signing
television or radio contracts, basic agreements with the
Players' Association or fixing territorial rights. This
solution is straightforward and involves a minimum of
government intervention. The only problem that it carries is
the instability of markets. It is possible that weaker teams
or leagues would be forced to move more frequently, to merge
or to go out of business. The Darwinian laws of the
marketplace may not be consistent with the desired cultural,
geographic and financial stability of our national pastime.
Another option would be to lift the exemption and pass special
legislation to restructure baseball's minor league contracts;
in particular, freeing minor leaguers to sign contracts with
other leagues, or applying a modified version of the 1960
Kefauver bill to limit the minor leagues' reserve system.
Yet another option would be to lift the exemption and
legislate an expanison timetable for baseball and/or the right
of first refusal for cities. The latter would give cities the
right to purchase their team (either with municipal or
dispersed citizen ownership) before it moved. In my view, a
proper expansion timetable would provide for the creation of
four new teams each in 1996, 2000 and 2004, bringing the total
number of teams to 40. A still more interventionist approach
would be along the lines of the legislation first.proposed in
1972 by former Republican senator from Kentucky, Marlow Cook,
envisioning the creation of a federal sports commission.
Although I favor lifting the exemption along with an expansion
timetable and right of first refusal legislation, I view any
of the other options (liftiig the exemption by itself, lifting
the exemption and breaking up the divisions, lifting the
exemption and freeing the minor leaguers, lifting the
exemption and creating a federal sports commission) as
enhancing economic efficiency and consumer welfare and, hence,
as more desirable than the status quo.
3. Yes, Major League Baseball has had a longstanding policy
of proscribing municipal ownership of major league franchises.
The details of individual cases are hard to come by, however,
as this information along with most financial information
about the teams is viewed as proprietary. This, of course, is
the case despite the fact that the average major league team
receives annual subsidies in excess of $10 million from its
host city. One instance about which I have heard
corroboration from a number of credible sources is the San
Diego Padres. In this case, Joan Kroc inherited the club from
her deceased husband, Ray Kroc, founder of MacDonalds, and did
not have an interest in owning the franchise. In 1987, I
believe, she attempted to give the team to the city of San
Diego but was informed that this was not allowed. I have also
heard from sources within the Pirates' organization that when
the Pittsburgh Pirates were sold in 1985 for approximately $44
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million to a local syndicate the city of Pittsburgh put down
roughly $20 million of equity capital. Since the city was not
allowed to own a part of the team, however, this money was
considered a grant on behalf of keeping the team in
Pittsburgh. A similar story is told about the 1990 sale of
the Montreal Expos to a syndicate headed by Charles Brochu for
around $86 million; apparently the city of Montreal and the
province of Quebec together contributed some $29.4 million.
It is also true that various forms of municipal and local
ownership schemes have been successful at all levels of minor
league baseball and that the Green Bay Packers of the NFL have
been owned in a dispersed form by members of that Wisconsin
community since 1935. Publicly, the owners state that
municipal ownership would be too cumbersome and inefficient.
Many minor league franchises, however, are municipally-owned,
management is separated from local politics and the teams are
run efficiently. I discuss some of the successful experiences
with community-owned minor league baseball teams in Baseball
and Billions. The real concern of baseball's barons is that
public ownership means public accountability which, inter
Alia, may lead to open books. Open books means loss of
control and that is where the real threat lies.
4. Baseball franchises are closely-held companies. They are
either partnerships, subchapter S corporations or submerged
subdivisions within large corporations.
In no case are there
stockholders to whom the top executives and owners are
accountable, either to open their books or to show profits in
order to boost stock prices or benefit stock options. Their
accounting legerdemain is often either in the owners' interest
for reducing tax liabilities or in their perceived interest to
show smaller profits. One aspect of showing smaller profits
or book losses is to plead poverty to the Players' Association
at collective bargaining time or to the cities when stadium
construction or a new contract is being discussed. Another
aspect has been to argue before the U.S. Congress and the
courts that Major League Baseball does not take advantage of
its protected monopoly status. I detail the mechanisms of
creative accounting in my written testimony and provide
further information in Baseball and Billions.
5. There is no question but that there is a trend for ticket,
concessions and parking prices to rise. Average ticket prices
today for a major league game are close to $10. For a family
of four to attend a game, buy food and pay for parking, the
tab can easily run from $60 to $100. It is also true that
since baseball plays roughly ten times more games than
football, twice as many games as basketball and is played in a
much bigger arena than basketball, that baseball ticket prices
are not as high as in other sports. There is also a process
of cable-ization and tiering of baseball game broadcasts that
is limiting viewing access to millions of Americans. Together
these developments are making it increasingly difficult for
low and middle income fans to consume major league baseball.
Congress can do something about keeping the national pastime
accessible to all income groups. One option would be to
legislate price controls. I do not recommend this. The
preferred option would be to take action to increase
competition in professional baseball. Removing the antitrust
exemption would be one step in the right direction; as
indicated earlier, I recommend complementary steps as well.
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Senator Thurmond's Questions
1. I would like to respectfully suggest that the long
discussion with ex-Commissioner Vincent and with Bud Selig on
the question of the Commissioner's role is irrelevant to the
question of baseball's antitrust exemption. The proposition
that the Commissioner can stand above the owners and safeguard
the long-run interests of the game has always been dubious;
with the dismissal of Mr. Vincent it has been made manifestly
absurd. In the pre-August 1992 conception of the
Commissioner's office, the Commissioner was always hired by
In this structural
and dismissable by the owners.
circumstance, the Commissioner could take marginal decisions,
especially on issues of the game's integrity such as the use
of drugs, without worrying about the owners' reaction, but
substantial decisions, especially those affecting the game's
economics, could never be made in a manner to undermine the
owners' interests.
Commissioners Chandler and Vincent, and
perhaps Commissioner Kuhn, learned this lesson. -Commissioner
Landis, heralded as a czar of baseball, in fact, was unable to
make the only important economic change to the game he
attempted, namely, the restructuring of the relationship
between minor leaguers and the parent club.
If the CEOs of Ford, Chrysler and GM came before this
subcommittee and proposed that they be allowed to merge, but
in exchange, they offered to hire a commissioner to oversee
their behavior, I assume they would be laughed out of the Hart
Office Building. I suggest that structurally the situation in
Major League Baseball is little different that this.
To make matters worse, the owners have been pretty clear that
they do not want any further interference from future
commissioners on economic matters. It seems the commissioner
will be given relative independence on "integrity" issues but
little, if any, real power pertaining to labor relations or
the game's finances. Such an arrangement would have the
advantage over the previous state of affairs only in reducing
the dissimulation and hypocrisy of a guardian commissioner,
hired and fired by the owners.
2. I am not a lawyer and fear I cannot do justice to the
legal complexities of Mr. Roberts' argument. I can only say
that I have a high regard for Mr. Roberts' intelligence and
his experience in the sports' industries. I believe there are
aspects of professional team sports that could lead one to
infer their leagues are a single entity, but there are other
aspects (e.g., the separate ownership and unequal
profitability of the teams) which would lead to the opposite
inference. As an economist and social scientist I believe
that reality is more complex than the single entity argument
allows.
3. As I suggested in my response to Senator Metzenbaum, I
think that if Congress repeals baseball's exemption and does
nothing else it is uncertain whether or when the industry will
become more competitive. I suggested a number of
complementary measures, not requiring a heavy-handed approach,
that, if implemented, would undercut the industry's monopoly
power and end up benefitting everyone but the twenty-eight
owners. I would also like to suggest that removing baseball's
exemption would benefit the Congress which would thereby

331
demonstrate to the American people that it is capable of
standing up to entrenched interests and of passing legislation
that promotes equal treatment under the law for all
professional team sports' leagues and for all U.S. industries.
4. The real challenge, it seems to me, is to find the best
public policy approach to preserve and strengthen our national
pastime. It does not matter whether the baseball industry
generates $2 billion in revenue or $50 billion.
Again, I want to emphasize that it is preferable for Congress
to remove the exemption than for Congress to do nothing. But
Congress can do still better and this is why I recommend
additional action. There is both a free market and regulatory
way to proceed, and, again, either is preferable to no action
at all.
The free market course is to compel baseball to break its four
divisions into four separate business entities.
The actual
legislation might stipulate that no league can expand to
beyond eight or ten teams. These new leagues could cooperate
only on matters pertaining to playing rules, scheduling and
post-season play; they could not cooperate on media contracts,
collective bargaining and setting territorial rights. As
business competitors, each league would attempt to have a
franchise in the most viable locations. It would not take
long before a new team appeared in Washington, D.C.,
Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Phoenix, or a third team appeared in
New York. Leagues would also presumably compete for fan
interest and loyalty. This would provide a check on ticket
and concessions prices and on the expansion of pay television.
Competition would begin to provide answers to many of the
abuses and problems that currently afflict the game.
While I would welcome such legislation by Congress, I feel
there is still a more preferable option. The problem with the
market solution is that it might be too destabilizing. Teams,
cities and leagues could go under. Players could be left, at
least temporarily, without a team. Litigations may abound,
challenging rules and boundaries of the new situation. It is
one thing to have instability in goods' producing industries.
If private money builds a factory and the factory shuts down,
this raises different public policy concerns than if a
longstanding baseball team belongs to a league that goes
under. A large share of the citizens in the city identify
with the team and the city has likely invested millions of
dollars to support the franchise. Do we want the normal rules
of the marketplace to determine the evolution of the baseball
industry, a major part of the country's cultural heritage?
Some may answer in the negative to this question and then
conclude that Congress should do nothing. This would be a
mistake. Removing the exemption would provide a modicum of
competitive pressure on the baseball industry without entirely
restructuring it. Furthermore, an orderly process of
addressing baseball's abuses could be legislated directly and
simply. Cities should be given the right to buy their ball
team before it is sold and moved elsewhere, and baseball
should be required to follow a timetable of periodic
expansion. The implementing criteria for this legislation
could be worked out easily enough. I would favor an expansion
to 40 teams by the year 2004 and a franchise assessment board,
involving representatives from the interested parties and the
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American Arbitration Association or someone agreed to by the
parties, to determine a fair market price for a franchise.
One might object that if the government were to do more than
simply lift the exemption then it is meddling too deeply in
the affairs of the private sector. As an economist, I do not
instinctively favor government involvement in the economy and
I am painfully aware of the pitfalls of regulation, but I do
recognize there are areas involving externalities and public
goods that the private sector cannot handle efficiently on its
own. To ignore this reality, in my view, is to be blinded by
libertarian ideology as well as to do a disservice to the
electorate. Some parts of the economy need to be regulated.
Rather than running away from this fact, it is time that
government confront the difficulties of regulation
forthrightly. I believe the measures I propose constitute
benign, not heavy-handed, public oversight of the baseball
industry and that they will work in the best, long-term
interests of preserving and strengthening our national
pastime. Given the status quo of a protected monopoly, with
presumed oversight by an employee of the owners, there is a
compelling case for a new public policy approach.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Zimbalist.
Mr. Gary Roberts.
STATEMENT OF GARY IL ROBERTS
Mr. ROBERTS. Like everyone else, I will thank the subcommittee
for giving me this opportunity. I must say these hearings are more
fun to watch on C-SPAN when you can go to the refrigerator once
in a while.
My written statement outlines in some detail my views on the
impact of baseball's renowned antitrust exemption, or exclusion, as
I prefer to call it, on the public interest. I will briefly summarize
these views here in my oral remarks.
I believe, unlike everybody else, apparently, which is not unusual, that the exclusion is largely irrelevant to the public interest,
and that if Congress is concerned, as it should be, about the monopoly market structures that characterize professional baseball,
and indeed every major league sport, then it should deal with those
specific issues rather than simply repeal this insignificant legal
anomaly and then hope that the Federal courts will uncharacteristically use antitrust law to remedy meaningful problems.
There are arguably four areas in which the exclusion protects
baseball from the threat of significant antitrust enforcement; one,
rules affecting players; two, rules affecting broadcasting; three,
rules affecting the number, location, and ownership of franchises;
and, four, the complicated relationships between the major and
minor leagues.
For reasons detailed in my written comments, it is only with respect to the fourth, the minor leagues, that I think we could expect
significant changes in baseball's structure or behavior if the antitrust exclusion were repealed. In fact, without the exclusion, there
would probably be a substantial restructuring of the minor league
system as we know it in a very short period of time. In fact, I think
a lot 'of communities with single-A ball clubs today would not have
baseball teams in the future without that exclusion. But other than
that, what changes would occur and whether they would be good
or bad for the public interest, I think, is unpredictable.0
So while there is really no theoretical justification for baseball's
anomalous antitrust exclusion, there is also no practical justification, in my mind, for wasting the time, energy, and political capital
trying to abolish it. On the other hand, I do believe that there are
many serious problems in baseball about which Congress and the
public should be very concerned, virtually all of which relate to the
fact that major league baseball, like each of the major professional
sports leagues, is an inherently wholly integrated partnership that
possesses monopoly power in most of the markets in which it operates.
This extraordinary market power allows baseball to act in two
general ways which are common to monopolies that injure the public. First, monopoly power allows baseball executives often to act in
foolish and inefficient ways without the fear of market retribution
that would face businesses in competitive industries. And, second,
monopoly power allows major league baseball to exercise that
power in a variety of ways to maximize profits at the expense of
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those over whom it holds the power, particularly fans, communities, and taxpayers.
But it must be emphasized that neither acting stupidly nor merely exercising monopoly power is illegal under the antitrust laws.
Antitrust law condemns behavior which creates or entrenches excess market power. It was not designed and it has no rational doctrinal structure to control either stupidity or the exercise of monopoly power. Thus, abolishing the antitrust exclusion, in my judgment, would simply subject baseball to the same kind of haphazard, inconsistent, and doctrinally unjustified litigation that the
other major sports have been subjected to, but which has not
caused them to behave generally any more in the public interest
than baseball does.
As I see it, the major problems in baseball today that should concern Congress and the public interest include grossly inadequate
revenue sharing, a woeful shortage of franchises to meet reasonable demand, and the accelerating shift of baseball telecasts away
from free TV to cable, and eventually to pay cable and then payper-view.
Rather than simply turn the Federal courts loose on baseball
with an antitrust weapon not designed or well suited for dealing
with these problems, I would suggest that Congress consider specific legislation that targets them and the market structure that
creates and perpetuates them.
I would be happy to discuss with you at greater length today or
in the future some of the alternatives that would bring about
meaningful change for the betterment of the public and baseball,
but given my time constraints here and the little yellow light up
there, perhaps it is better now simply to answer questions you
might have for me. But suffice it to say here that, in my mind, simply abolishing baseball's antitrust exclusion would be quite unlikely
to benefit the public one iota, and in some ways might even injure
it.
[Mr. Roberts submitted the following material:]
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BEFORE THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Statement of Gary R. Roberts, Vice Dean and Professor of Law,
Tulane Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana
December 10, 1992
On the Scope and Implications of Baseball's Antitrust Exclusion
I want to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to share my
views on a subject of long-standing interest to me -- the extent to which
baseball's structure and operations are affected by the Supreme Court's
thrice stated view that the game of baseball is neither interstate nor
commerce and thus not subject to federal antitrust law.'
I have been involved in litigating, teaching, speaking, and writing
about sports antitrust issues for the better part of two decades.

From

1976 through 1983 I worked at the Washington firm of Covington &
Burling with, among others, now NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue.

My

primary client was the National Football League for whom I worked on
several major antitrust cases; I also did some work for the National
Hockey League and World Championship Tennis.

In 1983 I joined the

faculty of Tulane Law School where I have taught sports law, antitrust,
and business enterprises for ten years.
past three years.

I have been the vice dean for the

Since 1986 I have also been an officer and director of

the Sports Lawyers Association, and the editor-in-chief of and regular
writer for its bimonthly journal, The Sports Lawyer. I often speak at
I See Federal Baseball Club v. National League. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson
v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); and Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258
(1972).
While the latter two decisions involved suits challenging baseball's lifetime

reserve system (i.e., restraints on the labor market for players), the former

involved alleged blatant acts of monopolization by the sole remaining team in the
defunct Federal League against the recently united National and American Leagues.
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sports law conferences, have written seven major law review articles and
two book chapters on sports antitrust matters, and along with Professor
Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School I have just completed the manuscript
for a 1,000 page sports law textbook and supplement which will be
published this Spring by West Publishing Company.

I also regularly work

with and am cited by the print and broadcast media on sports legal issues
and often author columns in publications like The Sporting News and USA
Today.

In short, sports law, particularly sports antitrust law, has been

my career for over sixteen years.
The value of eliminating the baseball antitrust exemption (which is
more appropriately called the "baseball antitrust exclusion") depends on
how baseball would be affected and constrained if it did not exist.
Ascertaining this requires an exploration of how antitrust law would
likely be applied to baseball.

My conclusion is that while it is in theory

unjustified to treat baseball differently from other sports, and while there
are certainly problems in baseball of concern to the public and Congress,
abolishing the exclusion would be unlikely to further the public interest.
Although baseball is treated differently under antitrust law than
the major leagues in football, basketball, and hockey, the conduct of those
leagues is not discernibly more pro-public than that of Major League
Baseball.

Furthermore, the application of antitrust law to these other

major sports leagues over the years by the federal courts has been
inconsistent, often unjustifiable, and generally counterproductive.
Subjecting baseball to the vagaries of this confusing enforcement process
cannot predictably result in benefits to the public interest.
focussing on this largely insignificant antitrust exclusion,

Instead of
Congress would
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do better to focus on the real problems in baseball today and to adopt
legislation specifically targeted against those problems.
I. The Scope and Effects of the Baseball Antitrust Exclusion
The Federal Baseball holding has not been extended to any other
sport. 2 Still, all of the often cited examples of "bad" behavior by baseball
owners which purportedly justifies abolishing the antitrust exclusion are
more or less found in all of the major sports. There is no reason to
assume that simply changing baseball's antitrust status will result in
public benefits.

For example, contrary to the assertion in the November

30 issue of Business Week (p.42), it is very doubtful that without the
exclusion "it would be easier for baseball-hungry cities to lure a team" -any more so than football-hungry cities can lure teams today.
The reason that the behavior of baseball owners is not noticeably
different than that of owners in other sports, even though they enjoy the
antitrust exclusion, is twofold: (1) the exclusion is not as far reaching as
many believe, and even as to those matters it does cover the owners' fear
of its abolition effectively deters them from engaging in the most
egregious conduct, and (2) the haphazard enforcement of antitrust law
against the other sports leagues results in very little if any meaningful
benefit to the public. The fact is that all of the major leagues engage in
conduct contrary to the public interest, not just baseball, but this conduct
generally is a lawful exercise of monopoly power, not the uIawful
acquisition or entrenchment of that power, and thus antitrust law is not
2 See United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955);

Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Haywood v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)(Douglas, J.. reinstating lower
court injunction).
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an effective vehicle to deal with it.

When league conduct does involve the

acquisition or entrenchment of monopoly power, the courts have been
largely ineffective in using antitrust law to combat it and to diminish
market power.

Accordingly, there is no significant predictable benefit to

the public from applying antitrust law to sports leagues, and so whether
baseball has its exclusion is unimportant.

The problem is structural, and

the best way to benefit the public is to strike legislatively at the heart of
that structural problem, not randomly ask courts to review the normal
profit-maximizing behavior of leagues under laws not designed to deal
with that behavior.
A.

The Exclusion Does Not Cause Blatant Anticompetitive
Conduct By Major League Baseball

The lower courts have narrowed the scope of the exclusion by
holding in several cases that contracts between baseball entities (teams,
leagues, or players associations) and third parties, even those relating to
marketing baseball entertainment, will not be protected in suits against
either the third party or the baseball entity under Sherman Act section
1.3

The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that if the third party is another

4
baseball entity in the minor leagues, the exclusion will still apply.

This

suggests that while the scope of the exclusion is not limitless, it would
probably be interpreted by most lower courts to give baseball entities

3 See Fleer v. Topps Chewing Gum & Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n. 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981)(contract with memorabilia merchandiser):

Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n (Houston Astros),
541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982)(contract with broadcaster): Twin City Sports
Service, Inc. v. -Charles 0. Finley (Oakland Athletics), 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).

4 Portland Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974).
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great latitude in structuring professional baseball and producing

baseball

entertainment without fear of serious antitrust litigation.
1. Player Rules
One area in which baseball is most certainly protected is in rules
restraining only the player-labor market.

This was the market

specifically involved in both the Toolson and Flood cases.

Also, because

these player rules involve an exercise of monopsony power raising very
tricky conceptual antitrust questions, they are more difficult than usual to
5
analyze under standard antitrust principles.

(In my view, the difficulty

of applying antitrust doctrine to internally adopted sports league rules
and policies, particularly player restraints, was a major factor influencing
seven justices in Flood to reaffirm the anomalous exclusion.)

But the

impact of the exclusion in the player restraint context is virtually
nonexistent today given the extraordinarily successful use of the
protections and processes of federal labor law by the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) in collective bargaining.

It is hard

to imagine that players or consumers would be any better off today with
respect to the labor market if the antitrust exclusion were abolished. 6
2.

Relationships

With Minor Leagues

Another area in which courts would probably find baseball
protected is in the complex relationships between the major and minor
5 See, e g , Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984)(indicatng that a program to fix the maximum price patients would be

charged for medical services presented less antitrust concern because it tended to
lower, not raise, prices to consumers).
6 It is ironic that player restraints have since 1975 been far more restrictive in the
National Football League which does not enjoy antitrust protection and has
repeatedly faced antitrust litigation over its rookie player draft and restrictions on
veteran free agents.
Indeed, the relative success of the players associations in
baseball and football suggests that the availability of antitrust suits against the
league actually distracts attention away from more effective labor law remedies.
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leagues.

It is not my purpose here to delve into the myriad rules and

contracts that create the structure of the major league-minor league
relationships, but it is important to note that the baseball exclusion plays
its most significant role in allowing the major leagues to maintain these
relationships without fear of serious antitrust challenge.

Thus abolishing

the antitrust exclusion might lead to radical changes in the structure and
operation of the minor leagues and could potentially alter the structure
and behavior of all professional baseball, albeit in unpredictable ways.

If

the baseball minor leagues as now constituted are good from a policy
standpoint, this would be good reason to continue giving baseball the
special antitrust protection not needed by the NFL and NBA who have the
colleges for minor leagues. 7

If, however, one believes that the current

system is undesirable, simply abolishing the baseball antitrust exclusion
and leaving the matter to judicial enforcement would be unlikely to bring
about desirable results. Specific legislation mandating the needed
changes would be far preferable.
3. Radio and Television
A third area in which baseball is arguably, but not necessarily,
protected is in the area of broadcasting -- television and radio restrictions
on member clubs or league television contracts with pay channel
7 I believe that the existence of the minor leagues, coupled with the tight control of
their structure and operation by the major leagues, effectively precludes the
emergence of any upstart major leagues to compete against Major League Baseball.
Barriers to entry in sports with no minor leagues are enormous enough for
newcomers like the American Football League in the 1960s, the World Football
League and American Basketball Association in the 1970s, and the United States
Football League in the 1980s, but the existence of the baseball minor leagues makes
entry so much more difficult that potential newcomers are deterred from even
trying. 'Still, even if the current structure of the minor leagues were significantly
altered, it is uncertain whether new upstart major leagues would be attempted,
whether such a league would be successful, or whether such a league would on
*
balance be beneficial for fans or the general public interest.
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networks.

(League television contracts for "sponsored telecasting" in all

four major sports are already exempt by the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961.8)

Currently, however, unlike the National Basketball Association,

Major League Baseball imposes no significant quantitative restrictions on
its member teams.

It does prohibit individual teams from selling

television rights for individual games tor cable companies (but not to overthe-air broadcasters) outside of a designated home viewing area.
However, whether this restriction actually prevents a team that otherwise
would do so from having any games televised somewhere, whether
someone would challenge the restriction, whether a court would find the
rule to violate antitrust law, and whether lifting this restriction would in
fact benefit the public interest are all highly questionable. Given the
complexities of television technologies and the effects of various
broadcasting schemes on public viewing, it is far from clear that
subjecting this limited restriction on team cablecasts to antitrust review
would result in a benefit to the public interest.
Major League Baseball does have a significant television contract
with ESPN, which arguably is not exempt under the Sports Broadcasting
Act.

However, the evening games shown under this contract almost

certainly would not otherwise appear on a major network and thus get
far greater exposure on ESPN to the benefit of the public.

Furthermore,

because of the politically volatile nature of sports broadcasting generally,
it is unlikely that baseball owners would try collectively (as opposed to
individually) to restrict teams or utilize pay channels in any ways that
would significantly diminish viewership, and if they did I am confident

8 15 U.S.C. 11 1291-94.
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that Congress would be quick to react.

Thus, the impact of the exclusion

in the broadcasting area is largely theoretical.
A final point about broadcasting.

It is not at all certain that the

Federal Baseball exclusion would be held by the courts to cover restraints
of trade on broadcasting.

The exclusion has been held to cover the

structure and production of the game, but it has never been extended to
the marketing and sale of broadcasting rights through the obviously
interstate commercial media of radio and television.

If in fact someone

wanted to challenge baseball's restriction on team cablecasts outside the
home viewing area, there is a significant chance that the courts would
hold that the antitrust exclusion did not apply.

If so, abolishing the

exclusion would accomplish nothing in this area, except perhaps to
encourage potential plaintiffs (whether or not they had a valid case) to
bring suit.
4.

Franchising and League Structure

The fourth and last major area in which the exclusion probably
protects baseball is in franchising decisions -- namely in deciding how
many teams there will be, where those teams will be located, and who
will own them.

An example is the National League's recent decision to

reject the purchase and relocation of the San Francisco Giants by a group
in St. Petersburg, Florida.

It this area, however, in which antitrust law

most clearly does not properly apply; franchising decisions are an
exerise of monopoly power, but they rarely if ever create or entrench
market power.9

Thus, it is within this sphere of decision-making that

9 One exception to this would be if a league expands in reaction to an upstart
league's efforts to put a franchise in an attractive unoccupied community. Such
targeted expansion can disrupt the operations of the upstart league, prevent it from
gaining a toehold in attractive communities, and possibly weaken its ability to
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there is the greatest chance for courts to create much mischief to the
detriment of the public by misusing antitrust law in unjustified and often
highly political ways, as happened in the infamous Oakland Raiders case a
decade ago in California.10 It is the substantial potential for misuse of
antitrust law in this type of case that causes me to oppose simply
abolishing baseball's antitrust exclusion.
It should be noted that the greatest impact of the baseball antitrust
exclusion flows from how it alters the risk assessment of baseball
executives and thereby causes them to vary their conduct.

Evidence

suggests that major league owners generally believe that if they were to
engage in blatantly anticompetitive or politically unpopular conduct, the
courts and/or Congress would probably intervene and abolish the
exclusion, even if antitrust law would not likely apply to that conduct.
For example, I do not believe that the major league owners, if faced with
a competing upstart league, would employ tactics like were used against
the Federal League before the Federal Baseball case in 1922, Thus, the
risk of losing the exclusion may deter improper conduct by baseball
owners (with the possible exception of their relationships with the minor
leagues) more than if the exclusion did not exist.
All of this is not to suggest that baseball does not benefit from the
exclusion.

By allowing major league owners to maintain control over the

minor leagues and to make franchising decisions without the serious risk
survive as a viable competitor. However, in the most blatant case of this happening
- the NFL's expansion into Dallas in 1960 and Minneapolis/St. Paul in 1961.
simultaneously with the start up of the American Football League, antitrust law was
unable effectively to deal with it. See American Football League v. National
Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
10 See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League (Raiders 1). 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 990 (1984); and
Raiders II. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). cert. denied 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
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of expensive and unpredictable litigation, the exclusion is a substantial
benefit to the owners.

But whether these owner benefits injure the

public interest is questionable.

One could make a case that the current

minor league structure on balance benefits the public (although the
opposite case can be made as well) and that subjecting baseball to the
vagaries of often politically motivated and/or confused courts in
franchising cases would cause more injury to the public interest than
good.

Thus, I believe the exclusion's impact on the public interest is not

sufficiently clear to justify its abolition, at least not without specific
guidance to the courts on how to apply antitrust law in specific cases.
B. Applying Antitrust Law To Professional Sports Leagues
Does Not Predictably Benefit The Public Interest
The recent matter which has focussed so much attention on these
these hearings was the National League's rejection of the sale and transfer
of the San Francisco Giants to investors in St. Petersburg, Florida. But that
this incident should be linked in so many minds to the subject of these
hearings illustrates why simply abolishing the exclusion would not serve
the public interest.

Had baseball been subject to the same type of

antitrust challenge in St. Petersburg that the NFL faced in the Oakland
Raiders case, it almost certainly would have faced a prolonged and
expensive legal battle in a politically biased forum that might have
resulted in a distorted application of the law, the creation of bad
precedent, and injury to the public interest

This was certainly the legacy

of the Oakland Raiders case, whose legally unjustified result and
unexplainable precedent ushered in the modem era of great uncertainty
over the ability of leagues to control franchise relocations and thereby

-
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triggered the now frequent use of relocation threats by owners to cause
bidding wars between cities at the expense of taxpayers.
In the current Giants controversy, just as in the Oakland Raiders
case, antitrust law could not sensibly be applied to cause a result more in
the public interest than the decision of the league owners.

In both cases,

the league's decision to require a franchise to remain in its current home
city led to charges that the decision was a section 1 "conspiracy .
restraint of trade" by the league owners.

. in

But no sensible antitrust

principle can justify such a claim that would not equally apply to the
inevitable lawsuit by interests in the other city if the league had voted
the other way.

Thus, in these cases a league (other than in baseball) is

faced with a Catch-22 situation -- whether it approves or disapprovei of
the move, it will be sued in the disappointed city in an inevitably highly
charged emotional and political environment."

This situation cannot

predictably lead to results that generally benefit the public interest.
The fact is that there is no sensible set of principles under current
antitrust doctrine to explain when or why a joint venture partnership like
a sports league (even if it happens to have monopoly market power)
might violate section I of the Sherman Act if it grants or rejects a
proposal to expand its membership, to allow a change in ownership of a
member franchise, or to allow the relocation of a member franchise's
home games.

Basic partnership/joint venture law makes every partner

in a joint venture bound by the terms it agreed to in the founding
II Of course, in some cases a league could do what the NFL did when the Philadelphia
Eagles threatened a move to Phoenix in the mid-1980s -- that is, before it votes bring
a declaratory judgment suit in the city it will support asking the "home town" judge
to declare that it is not illegal for the league to require the team to play in that city.
But this is simply allowing procedural posturing rather than a rule of law to bring
about the appropriate outcome.
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venture contract (the league constitution), and imposes a fiduciary duty
on every partner not to compete against the venture or to seize any
venture assets (including business opportunities) for its own unilateral
benefit without the venture's approval.

Thus, it is axiomatic that a lawful

joint venture has the inherent right to determine how many partners it
will have, who those partners will be, and where or how those partners
will do business under the name and trademarks of the venture. 12 To
suggest that it might violate anticonspiracy rules (that prohibit
competitors from combining to create or entrench market power) for joint
venture partners tO exercise these inherent legal rights is without merit.
Judicial rulings to the contrary, such as those in the Oakland Raiders case,
simply achieve politically desired results at the expense of creating
confusion and encouraging expensive groundless litigation in future cases,
which then leads sports leagues to operate more out of an interest to
avoid litigation than to do what is best to enhance the quantity and
quality of its entertainment product.
It is precisely because I do not believe it to be in the public interest
for sports leagues to be subject to misdirected, confusing, and politically
motivated ad hoc regulation by federal courts that I have often argued
that leagues should be treated as single firms incapable of internally
12 Of course, this would not be true if the venture were in fact a cartel - a,

collection of inherent horizontal competitors whose coming together to form the
organization is itself illegal. Such an organization is illegal in its inception, and
one need not judge the legality of its subsequent behavior. See United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co.. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). However, because the joining of
sports teams in a league creates an entity to produce a valuable product that could
not be produced by the teams separately, no one has ever seriously suggested that
leagues are unlawful in their inception. Thus, they should be accorded the same
lawful authority to structure and operate their joint venture business as that given
to any partnership, except to the extent their decisions create or entrench
monopoly market power. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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conspiring within the meaning of section I when the governing body of
the venture's partners adopts rules or makes decisions relating solely to
3
the structure and operation of the league itself.1

Since abolishing the

baseball antitrust exclusion would cause baseball's operating decisions to
be subject to the same type of random, unpredictable quasi regulation by
home town judges as the NFL faced in the Oakland Raiders case, I oppose
that abolition.

II. The Real Problem
I do not argue that there is not a problem with the current market
structure of baseball, or any major league sport.

I only argue that the

current manner in which antitrust law is applied to sports leagues is not
the proper way to deal with that market problem.

The real problem is

that in many markets in which major sports leagues operate they have
enormous market power.

Coupled with the inherently highly

decentralized structure of a sports league and the highly athletically
competitive nature of the league's entertainment product, this has led
many lower courts and legal observers to oppose granting "single entity"
status to leagues.1

4

"Better they be subject to arbitrary, ad hoc judicial

13 To the extent such rules or decisions create or entrench excess market power,
they could properly be challenged as acts of monopolization or attempts to
monopolize by the league under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
14 It should be noted, however, that several judges have supported finding leagues
to be single entities for section I purposes, at least in the context of a specific case.
See North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(trial court decision reversed on appeal at 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir.). cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982)(Rehnquist, J.. dissenting): Raiders 1. 726 F.2d
at 1401 (9th Cir. 1984)(Williams. J.. dissenting); San Francisco Seals v. National
Hockey League. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Furthermore, a recent Seventh
Circuit opinion strongly hinted that it might have found the NBA to be a single
entity had the league raised the issue. See Chicago Professional Sports v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. _ S.Ct.
(1992).
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regulation of their use of monopoly market power than no regulation at
all" goes the argument.

I don't agree with this argument's implicit view

of the proper role of law, but regardless I believe that there are better
ways to cure the evil of monopoly market power than subjecting leagues
to the arbitrary, ad hoc use of anticonspiracy principles that cannot
rationally be applied to the internal rules of an inherently totally
integrated joint venture partnership.
What the courts largely have done to date is to use section 1
randomly and unpredictably to overturn league exercises of monopoly
power, not more properly to use section 2 to attack behavior that actually
causes or entrenches that market power.I5 -Thus, rather than repeal
baseball's antitrust immunity, I would urge Congress to explore legislation
that would standardize and sensibly define the way antitrust law applies
to all professional sports leagues, and that also then either regulates some
of the operating decisions of leagues and/or forces upon them a market
structure that greatly mitigates their excessive market power.
The source of the problem creating the current disappointment and
anger in St. Petersburg is not that the National League owners "conspired"
to leave a team in its current home city.

Had the owners decided to let

the Giants move there would have been just as much disappointment and

anger in Northern California, the same calls for these hearings by
California politicians, and the prospect for the same kind of politically
biased section I antitrust litigation in San Francisco.

The real problem is

15 The only case in which a court utilized section 2 to bring about meaningful
reform in professional sports, through a preliminary injuction that led to a
settlement, was Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(holding that the NHI's lifetime reserve system
would likely be found to allow the NHL to monopolize professional hockey and
enjoining its use).
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that there are not enough teams to satisfy the market demands of all the
major metropolitan areas in the country that can reasonably support one.
When there are two markets the size of the West San Francisco Bay and
Tampa/St. Petersburg areas and only one available team, one community
is going to be bitter and disappointed.

The solution, however, is not to

subject the league's decision as to which community gets that franchise to
section I antitrust scrutiny by a judge and jury in the disappointed city -i.e., to attack only the symptom of the underlying market power problem.
The solution is to bring about the creation of enough franchises within a
reasonable period of time to satisfy the reasonable demand for them -i.e., to attack the source of the problem.
The shortage of franchises to meet reasonable demand reflects the
monopoly power of existing major sports leagues over the nationwide
market in which franchises in each sport are sold.

If a league faced

meaningful market competition, it could not afford to let attractive
communities go without a team lest the competitor take and entrench
itself in those communities first.

Further, the unique ownership structure

of a sports league compounds the problem of the league's monopoly
market power.
If major league baseball were owned by a single person or group of
stockholders, its total profitability would be enhanced by occupying every
attractive territory in which no major league baseball team is currently
operating.

But because the peculiar ownership structure of a league

requires that for every additional team there be an additional partner
who will then share the league's total profits, it is not necessarily true
that even a new profitable franchise would increase profits per partner.
Thus, league owners rationally will not expand unless the profitability of
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a new team would be great enough to justify an up-front franchise fee
sufficient to compensate the existing franchise owners for a decline in
their profits.

But even in cases where such franchise fees could be

charged and paid, major league owners will usually resist expansion
because the fewer the number of franchises there are, the more each
franchise is worth because of bidding wars between cities to attract or
keep them. It is a classic example of how the market value (price) of
something (a franchise) can be inflated to monopoly levels by artificially
reducing its supply well below natural market demand.
Thus, under current market constructs, there will always be far
fewer franchises in each professional sport than there are cities that could
reasonably support one.

How many fewer is a difficult question to

resolve because the size a market must be to support a team in a league
with a relatively unrestrained internal labor market (which over the long
run forces every team to pay approximately the same player salaries in
order to be athletically competitive) depends to a large extent on the
degree to which the league is politically willing to share revenues.

If

every dollar of revenue in a league were shared equally by every team in
the league, in theory every community in which a team would be
profitable could reasonably support one and be athletically competitive.
On the other hand, if no dollars are shared, only a few huge metropolitan
areas could probably support viable competitive teams.

In fact, given the

very low amount of revenue sharing in major league baseball today, it
may be that the market does not justify more than the current number of
teams (if that many), although some of them are probably in the wrong
cities.
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In short, I see the major public policy problems in baseball today to
be the woefully inadequate degree of revenue sharing and the far too few
number of franchises, along with the accelerating shift of televised games
off of widely-viewed free or cheap channels to more expensive pay cable
or pay-per-view channels (which is another issue altogether

16

) - all

three of which conditions exist and will continue uncorrected because of
the enormous market power that Major League Baseball enjoys in many
of its operating markets.

None of these problems, however, will be cured.

by simply abolishing the antitrust exclusion and subjecting baseball to the
same kind of random antitrust enforcement to which the other major
sports leagues have been exposed.
market power

They are the effects or symptoms of

not the causes of it which antitrust doctrines are designed

to address.
Thus, if Congress is to solve or mitigate these "real" problems, it
must attack the source.

This could be done in one or some combination of

three ways: (1) legislatively mandate a minimum level of revenue sharing
(i.e., a maximum revenue disparity among clubs) for every major
professional sports league, require expansion on a reasonable timetable to
some set number of teams (probably around 36), and set a minimum
percentage of televised games that must be on over-the-air and/or "basic
package" cable channels; (2) create a regulatory body of some type
empowered to correct structural market problems; or (3) require each
major sports league to be split into two to four wholly independent
leagues with equal market power and governed by wholly independent
16 Because this shift is taking place at the individual club level, it poses even no
arguable section I conspiracy issues.

However, it is another classic exercise of

monopoly power - restricting output (the number of viewers) in order to charge

much higher monopoly prices to the far fewer viewers willing to pay those prices.
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governing boards, commissioners, etc. with no lawful right to cooperate in
anything other than the staging of all-star, post-season championship, and
possibly regular interleague games.

The various pros and cons of each of

these approaches are many and would need to be explored in detail
before choosing the best one or combination of them.

Conclusion
The- baseball antitrust exclusion is not a cause of any easily
identifiable injury to the public, primarily because it is impossible to
predict that the courts would apply antitrust law to baseball in a way that
would enhance that public interest.

Furthermore, the fear of losing the

exclusion may effectively deter baseball owners from engaging in
egregious conduct, some of which antitrust law might not affect even if it
applied.

The exclusion also has the benefit of protecting baseball from

the expensive, behavior-distorting, and often counterproductive effects of
being subjected to ad hoc, arbitrary judicial regulation under the guise of
enforcing section 1 anticonspiracy principles ill suited for reviewing the
internal decisions of an inherently integrated joint venture partnership.
I also believe that while treating baseball differently from the other
major league sports is anomalous, there is very little political interest in
changing the current exclusion.

In the first place, because antitrust

enforcement by the courts is so random and unpredictable, there are no
easily identifiable benefits from abolishing the exclusion, and thus there
will be little political support for doing so.

Furthermore, any incident

triggering immediate political passions against the exclusion, like the
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current St. Petersburg-San Francisco dispute, will invariably create
equally strong countervailing political interests.

It would be legally and

politically counterproductive to propose abolishing the exclusion in a
context where the interests of some cities are pitted against the interests
of other cities.

The chances of passing some meaningful legislation will be

much greater if the Subcommittee can propose something with more
obvious benefits that might be able to muster a political consensus.
Thus, I recommend that Congress disregard the largely insignificant
baseball antitrust exclusion and instead focus on the real problems
affecting the public interest in professional baseball today, most
specifically the lack of adequate revenue sharing, the fewer than justified
number of franchises, and the shifting telecasting practices of the tearas.
The ultimate legislative ways of doing this are varied and need careful
further study, but I am confident that focussing political attention in this
fashion would have much greater long term benefits for fans and the
public generally than wasting time and political capital on a futile effort
to abolish the exclusion, an effort that even if it succeeded would create
more legal confusion and chaos than predictable benefits.
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January 11,

1993

Gary Roberts
Talane Law School
6801 Freret Street
-New Orleans , LA
70118-5698
Dear Mr. Roberts:
Thank

you

for

testifying

at

the

December

Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
on

baseball's

antitrust

immunity.

Your

10,

1992

and Business Rights hearing
views

on

this

issue

are

greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day or the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
'Please respond, in writing, to the following questions posed by

Senator Thurmond by no later than
ay
uary 25, 1993:
1)
Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
."the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in

the

context

of an antitrust exemption?
2)Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit

repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?

Sfrom

3)

As I understand it,
exemption is

you believ the cee

g

2antitrust

either not necessary and/or not sufficient to

cure the structural problems inherent in tusines Riness of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
grbe undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation.
At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the most urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exempation and leaving the
outcome to market forces?

I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerelyA

s,

Howard M. Metzenbanm
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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January 22, 1993
Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chair
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510-6275
Re: Hearings on Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I received your letter of January 11 asking for responses to three
specific questions posed by Senator Thurmond in connection with the
hearings held last December 10 on baseball's antitrust exemption. This
letter attempts to answer those questions.

Qnestion 1: Please comment on what you consider the
appropriate role of the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially
in the context of an antitrust exemption.
The commissioner should not simply be a CEO for the owners, but
rather should be empowered to act in the best interests of the game,
which means taking into account and balancing the interests of owners,
players, communities, and (most importantly) fans. It is, however,
politically unrealistic to expect a commissioner elected only by owners to
act contrary to the best interests of those owners. For this reason, I
would support a rule, perhaps legislatively imposed, that requires the
commissioner of any major sports league to be approved by the club
owners, the players union, and a designated Senate committee, and that
removal of a commissioner before the end of his/her stated term would
also require the approval of at least two of these three groups. Only in
this way would commissioners truly be politically positioned to govern
the game instead of primarily to do the owners' bidding.
If the above suggestion were adopted, the authority of
commissioners to act in the best interests of the game would be real, not
illusory, and I would support extending the baseball antitrust exclusion to
every professional sports league governed by such an independent
commissioner. If there is not such an independent commissioner, my
view is that the role of the commissioner is not linked to the existence of
the baseball antitrust exclusion.
One could argue that since the antitrust exclusion is a benefit to
baseball owners, its continuation should be made contingent on baseball's
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creation of a strong commissioner. However, a commissioner that is hired
and can be fired by the owners alone will be "strong" or independent in
appearance only, not in fact. Thus, this would be a meaningless quid-proquo. I do not believe that how Congress decides to deal with the antitrust
exclusion should be linked in any way to the role assigned by club owners
to the commissioner, unless it somehow involves a commissioner whose
appointment and removal involves the union and Congress as well as the
owners.
Question 2: Who will benefit from repeal of the antitrust
exemption and how?
There are only two groups who would be likely to benefit from
repealing baseball's antitrust exclusion: (1) lawyers who would make lots
of money litigating challenges to baseball practices, and (2) the baseball
players association which could use the threat of antitrust litigation as a
means to increase its collective bargaining leverage. More generally,
anyone dealing with baseball could conceivably use the threat of antitrust
litigation to enhance its bargaining position. Whether such a shift in
relative bargaining power would be good or bad for the public interest
would depend in each case on the specific context in which it occurred.
Otherwise, I do not know who will benefit from repealing the
antitrist exclusion, and I do not believe anyone really knows no matter
what they say. Because of the haphazard, often political, and usually
assinine way in which the courts have applied antitrust law to this
uniquely structured industry, we simply cannot predict how any
challenges to various league practices would be resolved, let alone what
practices would actually be challenged.

Onestion 3: At a time when de-regulation is thought to be the
better approach for all but the most urgent problems, how do
we justify federal government regulation of an entertainment
industry such as baseball?
Are we not better off repealing the
antitrust, exemption and leaving the outcome to market forces?
We are = better off repealing the exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces because the outcome will not be dictated by
market forces! The outcome will be dictated by the way in which the
federal courts choose to apply (or how the parties predict the courts will
likely apply) the antitrust laws to a uniquely structured business that I
believe is a natural monopoly. Historically, the courts have done a
terrible job of applying antitrust to other professional sports leagues, and
I see little reason to hope the performance will improve for baseball.
Antitrust regulation of professional sports leagues will simply not
predictably benefit the public interest.
As for the current political preference for de-regulation, I can only
say that sometimes political fads go overboard. I agree that the market is
generally a better long term regulator of an industry than government
regulation, although there hre often short-term frictional problems or

357
national security interests that an unregulated market simply cannot
properly accomodate. However, in industries where market forces do not
and will not result in competitive pricing and output decisions, especially
natural monopoly industries like the major professional sports, regulation
is appropriate. To the extent the current political wisdom is to oppose all
but the most vital types of regulation, in my judgment it is wrong.
If Congress is interested in stopping the artificial restriction of
professional sports franchises, forced monopoly subsidies by communities
to sports teams, and monopoly pricing of sports contests, it will not do so
by turning baseball over to the courts for haphazard antitrust
enforcement. Other professional leagues are subject to the antitrust laws,
and their track record on these consumer and public interest issues is no
better than baseball's. What is needed to correct these practices that
injure the public is to regulate them in some fashion. If that is politically
unfashionable, so be it; but then Congress should quit complaining about
the problems and simply accept them as the inevitable result of its
refusal to regulate natural monopoly industries.

I hope this adequately responds to your inquiries. If you need any
further information or input, please don't hesitate to contact me.
Respectfully,

Gi
. Ro
ferts
Vice Dean & Professor
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Noll.
STATEMENT OF ROGER G. NOLL

Mr. NoLL. Thank you, Senator. The last time I appeared before
this subcommittee was 20 years ago, a little over 20 years ago,
when the issue was an antitrust exemption for professional basketball, and this committee, in its infinite wisdom, decided not to
grant it. I hope it will be consistent this time.
I do not believe that the baseball antitrust exemption is valid, although I share some of Gary's concerns that it is not all that important. Let me say specifically how I think it is important. The
single most important effect is what Don Fehr testified to before
us; that is, if, in fact, the purpose behind the reopening of the collective bargaining agreement in baseball is, in fact, to impose unilaterally a more restrictive system in the player market after, say,
a year's worth of negotiations that get nowhere, then the baseball
players do not have available to them what the basketball players
and the football players used in the last couple of years; namely,
decertify as a union, become a professional association, and use
antitrust to deal with the issue.
That is an important effect because, historically, strikes in professional sports have not worked. They do not work because the
fact is the players have no reasonable alternatives and there is
nothing available to them to cushion them from the enormous loss
of income that derives from the strike. Unions in sports are congenitally weaker than unions in the rest of the economy, in part
because of the diversity of interests among the players, but also in
part because the players have very, very short time horizons. If you
strike for a year, that means something like 25 percent of the players have just lost half their career. So strikes are not as effective
a weapon in collective bargaining as they are in other industries.
I would like to devote the rest of my remarks to what I believe
is an extraordinary myth that has been perpetuated since the appointment of Judge Landis as the commissioner of baseball 70
years ago, and that is that somehow a strong commissioner solves
the public interest problems associated with professional sports.
The fact is you could easily separate out the commissioner's duties into, as Mr. Selig did, those having to do with the integrity of
the game and those having to do with the business management
of the game. There is no way on God's Earth that any court is ever
going to find an antitrust violation to fine or suspend a player or
an owner for gambling or for being involved in drug trafficking.
Indeed, in other sports with antitrust exposure, exactly these
events have transpired in the past and nothing has come of it.
There has not been antitrust litigation. The integrity-of-the-game
issues have absolutely nothing to do with antitrust immunity.
The second part is the business affairs, and the fact remains if
you have an antitrust exemption, it is because the Government has
said it is OK to manage yourself as a cartel; it is OK to behave in
a way that maximizes your leverage, whether it is over cities,
whether it is over broadcast networks, whether it is over player
unions, whether it is over fans. That is OK.
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What the individual owners will see, then, is a necessity to have
a commissioner to resolve the disputes among themselves that get
in the way of collective profit maximization, and that is exactly
what commissioners have done throughout the history of sport.
Now, Judge Landis, in fact, attempted a major reform of professional baseball that the owners did not think was in their business
interest, and he was unable to carry it off; namely, the minor
league system, which Gary says is the single most important part
of the antitrust exemption-he tried to prevent the owners from establishing the current minor league rules. He said it was not in the
interests of baseball to have the kind of monopolization of the
minor league system that baseball currently enjoys. He tried to put
an end to the farm system of minor leagues and the owners would
not allow him to do it.
In other words, if a commissioner, even as strong a commissioner
as Judge Landis, attempts to go against the collective profit-maximizing interests of a sport, the owners will simply not abide by it
and there is no legal power or authority for a commissioner to prevent that, and that was the case of Judge Landis. They didn't have
to fire him; they just ignored him.
Now, finally, as to what is the real public policy issue here, the
real public policy issue is both San Francisco and St. Petersburg
ought to have baseball teams, and so should a dozen other cities.
Indeed, in addition to that, several of the larger cities should have
two or three more. There is enough market demand out there to
have on the order of 40 to 50 baseball teams. Why don't we have
these teams? It is in my testimony, but Fay Vincent told you why
and Bud Selig told you why, because the way to keep up those $100
to $200 million franchise values is, in fact, to play hardball with
Mayor Jordan and hardball with St. Petersburg and hardball with
players associations.
Thank you.
[Mr. Noll submitted the following material:]
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Statement of Roger G. Noll
Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
December 10, 1992
Once again, the baseball exemption -- the great anomaly of
antitrust -- is before Congress. I thank the committee for
inviting me to explain why I believe that the antitrust laws
ought to apply to baseball, and ought to be vigorously enforced
in all professional sports.
The message of my testimony is simply stated: all
professional sports, including baseball, ought to be subject to
the antitrust laws, but lifting the antitrust immunity from
baseball is unlikely, by itself, to solve some of the problems
that cause Congress regularly to investigate the sport.
In other professional team sports, the most significant
effect of antitrust exposure has been on the rules that govern
competition among teams for players.
And in player relations,
baseball has negotiated more liberal rules than exist in hockey
or existed in football before the recent McNeil v. NFL litigation
in Minneapolis.
Practices regarding expansion, potential entry
of new leagues, revenue sharing, team relocation, stadium
arrangements, and broadcasting rights are not materially
different among the sports.. Thus, on the basis of the
performance of other team sports under antitrust scrutiny, one
can not make a case that, from the standpoint of consumers
(sports fans), lifting the baseball antitrust exemption would, by
itself, solve all of the anticompetitive problems of baseball.
Nevertheless, I strongly urge Congress to eliminate the baseball
exemption. To do so is a necessary, but not sufficient, action
to ameliorate the monopolistic practices in the sport.
The initial
rationale for the baseball exemption was probably
not good law in 1921, when the Supreme Court ruled that the
antitrust laws did not apply to baseball because baseball was not
engaged in interstate commerce.
Today there can be no doubt that
this basis for the exemption is ludicrous.
Baseball derives more
than half of its revenue from various forms of broadcasting
(radio and TV, local and national, off-air-and cable), all of
which are not only interstate in character but which are
regulated by the federal government.
Eventhe program
acquisition process (including sports programming) for television
networks is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.
Hence, it is ridiculous to contend that baseball is beyond the
reach of federal legislation.
The primary defense of antitrust exemptions in sports is the
claim that cooperation among owners benefits both players and
sports fans.
Examples of this argument are the following:
* Monopsonistic practices in

the player market protect
the balance of competition in a league, causing
games to be more exciting, interest in (and, hence,
revenue to) a sport to be greater, teams in smaller
markets to have a chance of winning, and therefore
both fans and players to be better off;
* Collective decisions about franchise locations enable
owners as a group to prevent a single owner from
greedily pursuing the highest possible price for a
team, even if that means transferring the team from
a city that supports it; and
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* Cooperative decisions about the number of teams in

a

league prevent the number of teams from becoming
so large that the talent pool is diluted,
diminishing the quality of play, again risking
competitive imbalance, and thereby reducing fan
interest.
In addition, owners make two more arguments that pertain to their
own financial welfare:
* Baseball is a precarious business financially, and

any significant change in its institutional
structure risks causing financial failure of
some teams, aspecially in small cities; and
* Lifting the exemption would subject the sport to a
flurry of litigation that would be both costly and
wasteful.
None of these arguments is a valid defense for retaining the
Although I question the validity of each of
antitrust exemption.
these claims, the most important reason that these arguments do
not amount to a defense of the exemption is that they reflect a
misconception of the true implication of antitrust liability.
The Nature of Antitrust Exposure
All of the important antitrust cases in professional sports
during the past two decades have analyzed the practices of sports
That is, in
leagues according to the "Rule of Reason" test.
order for a sports league to be found to have violated the
antitrust statutes, plaintiffs have had to show that, first, the
practices of the league had a significant anticompetitive effect,
and second, that these practices did not have a reasonable
business justification in that they did not produce an offsetting
efficiency advantage.
Antitrust harm (or damage) arises only if
a practice leads to an anticompetitive effect that is more
important than its beneficial effect. Consequently, all but the
last of the reasons given for the antitrust exemption, if true,
would constitute defenses against an antitrust complaint. Hence,
they constitute reasons why baseball would not be found guilty of
violating the antitrust laws, rather than reasons why it should
be exempt.
The final reason -- the wasteful costs of defending against
antitrust complaints -- has one element of truth: the litigation
costs of baseball would be very likely to increase if its
antitrust exemption were lifted and if it refused to change some
of its business practices. But that is not because these cases
would be frivolous. Indeed, federal courts have a great deal of
experience in dealing with frivolous antitrust complaints. Some
antitrust complaints in other industries have an invalid basis,
usually of one of two forms. First, an antitrust issue is often
raised inappropriately in a case that actually is about some
other issue. Second, a disappointed owner of a failed business
sometimes believes incorrectly that the failure is do to
anticompetitive actions by competitors, and so files an invalid
complaint. Courts have learned how to recognize most frivolous
complaints, and readily dismiss them or grant summary judgement.
Thus, the argument that baseball will suffer from frivolous
complaints does an injustice to the judicial system, and
constitutes no better a case for exempting baseball from
antitrust than for repealing the antitrust statutes altogether.
The real reason baseball is likely to face increased
litigation costs is that there is substance behind the complaints
that would be filed against the sport, and that baseball is more
likely to resist these complaints in court than to change its
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practices to be in conformance with antitrust requirements.
Baseball's business justifications for its anticompetitive
practices have already been litigated with respect to other
sports, and the courts have consistently held that these claims
are invalid. Sports leagues have persistently failed to make a
convincing case in court that their anticompetitive practices are
necessary for the continued provision of high quality
professional team sports. Baseball wants to avoid this
litigation not because it would be frivolous and wasteful, but
because it would be likely to lose.
The Business Justifications
When considering the business justifications for baseball's
anticompetitive practices, two important aspects of the baseball
business must be kept in mind. First, the sport is not in a
precarious financial circumstance, and second, even if some
significant number of teams were on the verge of economic
inviability, their financial circumstances are determined by the
revenue-sharing and team-location rules of the sport, not by the
basic economic health of the industry.
To understand the economics of any professional sport, one
simply has to compare the revenue stream with the underlying
economic costs. In so doing, one should keep separate the
earnings of the players and the other direct costs of operating a
team: travel, baseball equipment, ticket sales, ballpark
maintenance, etc. Owners, players, managers, and the principal
front office personnel differ from secretaries, ticket takers,
groundskeepers, and manufacturers of baseball equipment in one
very important respect.
The latter group earns wages and profits
that are determined in a much broader market than just baseball,
while the earnings of the former group depend completely on the
financial status of the sport.
Player salaries, manager
salaries, and owner salaries and profits are determined solely by
the willingness of fans to buy tickets, watch or listen to game
broadcasts, and buy concession products. If baseball revenues go
down, all of these groups will make less money.
Thus, the
financial viability of baseball is governed by the answer to the
following question: Are baseball revenues, net of the direct
cost of staging games, sufficient to keep players and managers in
the sport with enough left over to cause business people to want
to own a team?
The answer to this question is very obvious. If a baseball
team takes in $50 million, and must spend $10 million for travel,
stadium maintenance, equipment, ticket sellers, and even a minor
league subsidy, that leaves $40 million to be divided among about
50 people (players, coaches, owners, executives).
Obviously,
this is more than enough to keep everyone in the business, and to
make the sport financially viable. An average take of $800,000
each ought to be sufficient to maintain their attention.
By far the most important component of the costs in any team
sport is the cost of players. But these costs are driven by
revenues.
In the 1985 negotiations with the baseball players
union, the owners argued that their financial position was
precarious on the basis of a projection of future costs and
revenues.
Their projection assumed that player costs would
increase by fifteen percent per year, but that their revenues
would grow by only eight percent annually. The problem with
these projections was not just that they were wildly incorrect -to the tune of several hundred million dollars. The key problem
is that the projections reflected a fundamental misconception -and one that still
permeates the public discussion of the sports
business.
This misconception is that player costs are unrelated
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to revenues -- that somehow a baseball superstar could still
command a $5 million salary if revenues fell in half.
In reality, baseball salaries -- and player salaries in other
sports and franchise values -- are driven by revenues. Owners
pay players because players, in Bill Veeck's immortal phrase,
"put fannies in the seats." More fannies (and more eyeballs
glued to the television screen) translate to higher salaries.
Baseball will not become financially unviable because of rising
player salaries, for player salaries will simply adjust to
whatever changes occur in the revenues of the sport. As all
baseball players will readily admit, if a financial crisis hit
baseball, and so all salary offers next year were ten percent
less than last year, nearly all players would still be in the
sport, and the game would go on as before. Indeed, this
circumstance is almost precisely what happened in baseball in the
mid-1980s when the owners engaged in salary collusion. Players
were offered far less than one would have predicted, given the
trends in revenues, yet the players continued to play. Then,
when the owners lost the collusion case and a competitive market
for veteran players was restored, salaries returned to their
long-term trend. The importance of this episode is that it
confirms a fundamental fact: by far the most important cost item
to a baseball team is player salaries, and this is driven by
revenues. Hence, unlike almost any other business, where
salaries are driven by a much broader market, baseball's
financial viability is remarkably secure. Its most import cost
item simply adjusts to accommodate any change in revenues.
Although the entire sport is financially viable, all sports,
including baseball, face the possibility that some teams may not
be viable. In baseball, a persistently weak team does not do
anywhere near as well financially as the average team. But two
important facts must be kept in mind about this circumstance.
First, no teams are so weak financially that they cannot
command a positive market price. That is, given the current
financial performance of bAseball, every single team could be
sold today for at least $80 or $90 million, and perhaps more.
Just ask the folks in St. Petersburg. Obviously, as long as
investors are willing to spend such significant sums on weak
teams in small cities, the sport is not on the verge of financial
collapse.
Second, the relative financial strength of teams in a sport
is determined by the sport's policies regarding revenue sharing.
In football, for example, revenue is extensively shared. As a
result, the differences in revenues between the most successful
and least successful teams in football are far less than in
baseball. Indeed, as was revealed in the McNeil case, so
extensive is the revenue-sharing in football that the most
profitable teams have mediocre playing records. The teams that
are most successful on the playing field have average profit
performance. By contrast, in baseball the most successful teams
financially are usually the teams in the largest markets plus the
small market teams that, in a given year, win a division
championship.
Baseball and football are very similar in several respects.
Teams in both sports are about the same size (the relevant
comparison is the 40-person roster in baseball with the 57 or so
players a football team can control, counting injured reserve and
the development squad). Teams in both sports have, on average,
about the same revenues. Moreover, in both sports more than half
of the revenues come from various forms of broadcasting.
The most important difference between the sports is in how
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the broadcasting revenues are shared. In football, the league
has sold the TV rights to literally every regular-season game to
a national network (including two cable networks, ESPN and TNT),
even though most games are televised only locally in the
territories of the two teams involved. These revenues are then
shared equally.
This policy guarantees that more than half the
In addition, gate
revenue in football is shared equally.
receipts are shared, with 40 percent of the net receipts going to
the visiting team. In baseball, gate receipts are divided less
evenly (the visitors receive 20 percent in the American League
And, local radio,
and about 5 percent in the National League).
As a
television and cable revenues are not shared at all.
result, a big-city team like the Yankees can receive ten times as
team.
(Indeed,
much local broadcasting revenue as a small-market
the Yankees local cable revenues are about the same as the total
revenues of the weakest franchises.)
An important principle of antitrust is that in pursuing a
reasonable business justification for an anticompetitive
practice, businesses must adopt the least anticompetitive
practice available to them for achieving their business
objectives. Thus, if baseball does have, or were to develop, a
problem with the viability of small-market teams, it could share
revenue more equally. More revenue sharing is clearly less
anticompetitive than, for example, restricting competition for
players to reduce their pay, or bargaining as a league, rather
than individual teams, for broadcasting rights. The fact that
the owners refuse to adopt such a policy does not, therefore,
justify a more anticompetitive practice.
A second cause of financial disparity among teams within
baseball, as well as in other sports, is the monopoly enjoyed by
If New York had a half-dozen
teams in the large markets.
baseball teams, the Yankees would be unlikely to command $40
million for their cable television rights. Indeed, because of
the territorial rules of baseball, baseball teams located
elsewhere are not permitted to sell cable rights in New York in
competition with the Yankees. Thus, the Yankees, and other teams
in the largest markets, have much greater revenue than teams in
small markets because leagues have restricted competition in the
large markets. Obviously, a procompetitive solution to the
problem of revenue imbalance is to reduce the revenues of big
city teams by letting more teams compete with them.
Franchise Locations
During the past fifteen years, much of the public attention
to the business practices of professional sports has centered on
the issue of the number and location of teams in the sport. The
recent battle between San Francisco and St. Petersburg over the
Giants is simply the most recent example; previous examples are
the recurring battle between Oakland and Los Angeles over the
Raiders, the movement of the Colts from Baltimore to
Indianapolis, the relocation of the Cardinals in Phoenix from St.
Louis, and the departure of the Washington Senators for DallasFt. Worth.
Unfortunately, most of the debate aboiit franchise movements
-- and their relationship to antitrust -- has had a very narrow
focus: the effect of a move on the community that a team
abandons. The NFL, for example, has strongly advocated that it
be given an antitrust exemption so that it could control the
movements of teams more than is possible under the antitrust
And, as a practical reality, the antitrust laws do
statutes.
prevent leagues from vetoing team relocations simply as a means
of protecting exclusive territorial rights or otherwise serving
the narrow business interests of other owners.
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In this instance, the antitrust laws are being correctly
interpreted by the courts, and the resulting policy outcome is
the correct one.
When a team moves from one city to another, the
effect on sports fans is always no worse than a break-even
affair.
The fans in the new city gain and the fans in the old
city lose.
And, usually the former exceeds the latter, because
teams typically draw better in their new home than in the old
one, at least for a while.' Thus, there is nothing inherently
wrong with team relocations, even though personally I will be
very depressed if the Giants eventually leave for Florida.
The harm from relocation arises because the city that loses a
team has no realistic expectation of getting a replacement.
Washington, D.C., is one of the nation's largest metropolitan
areas. It could easily support a baseball team. But the
Senators have been gone for two decades, the owners have vetoed
Washington as an expansion site (too much competition for
Baltimore), and no other team seems likely to relocate, whether
for lack of interest or lack of support among other owners.
Likewise, the most salient fact about the battle over the Giants,
and prior battles over other teams, is that both of the bidding
cities are perfectly good, economically viable franchise
locations.
The policy problem raised by the fight over the
Giants is not that St. Petersburg lost, but that anyone had to
lose. Given the quality of the Giants in the past two years,
either city should be roughly indifferent between the Giants and
an expansion franchise. The harm made manifest in the battle is
that baseball has not expanded to the extent justified by the
market, forcing the loser in the battle for the Giants to be
without a team.
Removing baseball's antitrust immunity would limit, but not
remove, baseball's control over the number and location of
franchises. In other sports, courts have applied the Rule of
Reason to league decisions about franchise locations and
ownership changes.
Owners do have a legitimate business interest
in assuring that owners are reputable and financially able to
operate a team, and that a franchise location is economically
viable. The courts have refused to block or to prohibit
franchise relocations when league actions were not based on such
interests.
Unfortunately, removal of the antitrust exemption in baseball
is not likely, by itself, to solve the problem of scarcity in
franchises.
It is unlikely, for example, that removing the
antitrust exemption will soon put teams in Washington and St.
Petersburg.
In other sports, susceptibility to antitrust has not
forced more rapid expansion.
In all sports, expansion occurs only if it is in the
financial interests of most of the existing teams to expand. For
several reasons, teams are unwilling to expand a league until all
viable franchise locations are occupied.
Among the factors
limiting expansion are:
* The Franchise Price Effect --

all teams benefit from
a scarcity in franchises, because scarcity drives up
the price at which either an existing team or an
expansion franchise can be sold;
* The Home-Town Holdup Effect -- the presence of other
unoccupied but viable franchise sites increases the
bargaining power of existing teams in dealing with
local governments to obtain stadium subsidies and
state and local tax breaks;
* The Broadcast Revenue-Sharina Effect -- the addition of
one more city to a league will have no significant
effect on the amount of money that national
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broadcasters will pay for rights to games, but it
will create another mouth to feed through revenue
sharing, thereby reducing the gross revenues of all
existing teams; and
* The Local Competition Effect -- now that all sports are
national in that all regions have teams, a new
franchise is likely to have some effect on the local
monopolies enjoyed by the others, either in ticket
sales or local broadcasting (an effect that
explains why leagues rarely expand into cities that
already have a team).
Normally, under the present regime, the price of an expansion
club has to be sufficient to compensate the existing owners for
all of these effects, even though each one amounts to nothing
more than the erosion of some of the monopoly profits of the
existing teams. As long as a sport can control its membership by
collaboration among the established teams, the league will not
expand to the extent warranted by the market because it is not in
the financial interest of existing owners to do so.
Antitrust has not proved to be an effective remedy to solving
the problem of insufficient numbers of teams.
Prospective owners
and cities have been generally been unwilling to sue professional
sports leagues to force expansion, for a variety of reasons. One
factor is the historical unwillingness of the courts to provide
structural relief in antitrust cases unless the federal
government is the plaintiff. Thus, a city or a prospective owner
may expect to win on liability, but win only damages (which are
likely to be relatively small) and not a franchise. An
illustrative example is the USFL antitrust case against the NFL,
in which the NFL was found to have violated the antitrust laws in
forcing the league out of business, but in which the USFL failed
to win significant damages beyond its court costs and to obtain
meaningful injunctive relief. Another instructive example is
Hecht v. Pro Football, in which Mr. Hecht was victorious in his
claim that the NFL had acted anticompetitively to prevent his AFL
expansion team from locating in Washington, but which ended in a
settlement giving the plaintiff only money -- no team, and no
change in NFL practices.
Another reason that owners and cities are reluctant to use
antitrust as a means to force expansion is that they fear
retribution.
Filing the suit is regarded as virtually
guaranteeing that the city or owner will never have a team.
And,
among prospective owners, another inhibiting factor is that the
prospective owner of an expansion franchise has mixed incentives.
Whereas winning might bring a team, the owner must also consider
that winning would reduce the value of teams in general, so that
the victory could be Pyrrhic. A prospective owner prefers to
gain membership to an exclusive club, not to one that, as a
consequence of admitting the new owner, must also admit any other
reasonably qualified applicant.
Thus, eliminating the baseball antitrust exemption leaves
baseball positioned like the other sports with respect to its
control of franchises.
Whereas it will lose some control over
the location of its existing members, history in other sports
suggests that it will still
not expand to the extent warranted by
the economics of the sport.
.

Player Acquisition and Control
Elimination of the baseball antitrust exemption will provide
some benefit to players, but the effect may not be dramatic. The
benefit of antitrust exposure to players is that it gives them
the option of reliance on antitrust, rather than collective
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bargaining, to determine the rules within a sport governing the
In other sports, leagues have lost several
market for players.
highly significant antitrust cases on the issue of player market
restrictions. Hence, antitrust deserves important credit for
introducing some competition into these markets. Nevertheless,
baseball players have supcessfully used collective bargaining to
negotiate agreements with baseball owners which give veteran
players the right to become free agents, and give other players
Although the situation in
arbitration rights after three years.
football is still very fluid, at the moment the baseball player
markets is less restrictive than the 1992 systems in football and
hockey, although on balance perhaps more restrictive than in
basketball. (Basketball is difficult to compare with baseball
because the former has a flexible but often binding cap on total
salary payments by a team to all of its players, but allows the
players to become free agents earlier in their careers.)
The elimination of the baseball antitrust exemption would
clearly benefit the players in that it would virtually guarantee
that the owners would never be able to reimpose a substantially
The reason is that
more restrictive system than the status quo.
the introduction of free agency in 1976 has clearly had no
damaging effect on the sport. The owners' claim that free agency
would destroy competitive balance, lead to the creation of
dynasties in the largest cities, and cause fans to lose interest
has been solidly rejected by the subsequent facts. Baseball has
never been more competitively balanced than during the freeagency era, when 23 of the 26 teams have won a division title.
No team has managed to become dominant, and the teams that would
appear to be best placed to dominate -- the Dodgers, Yankees and
Cubs -- have had many poor 'years.
The importance of these facts is that they would prevent
baseball from providing a reasonable business justification for a
more stringent set of rules. Hence, should the owners
unilaterally apply new rules when the current contract expires
after the 1993 season, the baseball players would probably be
able to block them by resort to antitrust -- if the exemption
were lifted. Of course, the players might be able to win a
substantially more liberal system than the status quo through
antitrust litigation. If the owners believe this, they ought to
be willing to negotiate a new arrangement with the players that
is less restrictive than the current system. And even if the
owners do not believe it, antitrust action might ensue, and their
beliefs could be forced into modification.
The lesson from the history of antitrust applied to player
markets is that the strength and wisdom of the players union is a
far-more important factor in determining player market rules than
Baseball has benefitted from a strong,
is antitrust exposure.
intelligently-led union for 25 years, and through collective
bargaining players have won a system that holds up well in
comparison with the systems in the sports that have lost
antitrust cases -- football and hockey -- and with basketball,
where antitrust suits have been filed but settled before reaching
conclusion.
One potentially important effect of the elimination of the
antitrust exemption for baseball would be through minor league
players. The contract that baseball requires minor league
players to sign binds them exclusively to the existing
institutional structure of baseball until they are released or,
as major leaguers, qualify for free agency. This system is a
barrier to entry of a competitive major league.
The normal
practice when a new league is formed in other sports is for the
entrant to sign only a relatively few players who are employed in
the established league.
Most players in the new league will be
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rookies or players who have previously been cut by the
established league.
In baseball, most players in both categories
are tied up in the minor leagues.
Very few players play in the
major leagues during their first
professional year, and most
players who are removed from a major league playing roster are
demoted to the minors, often to be recalled again and again.
If a competitive league entered and signed some major league
veterans, all teams -- including the established teams -- would
be required to promote some minor leaguers to fill out the
roster, just as they do after an expansion. But the rules of
baseball prohibit a new league from acquiring these players.
Indeed, the last time an "outlaw" league tried to enter -- the
Mexican League after World War II -baseball banned for life
any player who signed with the new league. Some legal scholars
believe that the courts would not uphold such a Draconian policy
today, but, if baseball again resorted to such a tactic, would
overturn the antitrust exemption. Others, including baseball
owners, disagree. The issue would be resolved with certainty if
the exemption were removed. I believe that no court would rule
that preventing a minor league player from joining a competitive
major league was consistent with the antitrust statutes.
Whether minor leaguers and potential entrants would derive
significant value from removing the antitrust exemption is
unceirtain. The last remotely successful entry of a new league
was the World Hockey Association of more than twenty years ago.
Between 1960 and 1970, the WHA, the American Football League, and
the American Basketball Association all managed to enter and to
survive long enough to force a merger with the established
league.
Since then, several new leagues have been attempted, a
few have actually played, but none has succeeded. The history of
the past twenty years is pretty convincing that the entry
barriers in professional sports are high, even with antitrust
exposure.
Indeed, as the USFL case demonstrates, an entrant can
even be forced out of business by anticompetitive practices that
are found in violation of the antitrust statutes without the
incumbent monopolist suffering any serious consequences beyond
the legal costs.
An entrant in every sport faces a long list of serious
problems. First, the existing leagues are very large and
national in scope. To be attractive to broadcasters, and to
convince fans that the newcomer is a serious major league, the
entrant would have to be national in scope and large. Entering
against 28-team leagues is much more difficult than entering
against leagues with between nine and 16 teams. Second, a new
league would have to enter in the biggest cities. In many cases,
despite the outcome of Hecht, exclusive stadium leases stand in
the way. In many cases, the established teams have contract
provisions that give them the rights to concessions at all events
in the stadium, not just their own games, so that a competitor
would be in the peculiar position of letting the incumbent team
earn the concession profits from its games.
Moreover, the
established leagues have the benefit of long-term, subsidized
rental agreements for playing facilities that were signed under
the duress of a monopolized industry. These subsidies would not
go away for many years --

decades in

some cases --

and so

constitute a permanent, unfair competitive advantage of the
incumbent, even if Hecht were enforced.
In the sports that are exposed to antitrust, these barriers,
plus the unwillingness of the courts to take strong action to
enforce antitrust in cases involving competitive leagues, have
proved sufficient to keep entrants out. Thus, there is no reason
for optimism that the removal of the antitrust exemption, by
itself,
would induce a real threat of a competitive league.
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Nevertheless, the antitrust exemption should be removed
simply because an issue such as this should not be prejudged. If
a group of wealthy individuals and baseball-hungry cities want to
try forming a new league, the legal barriers to doing so ought to
be removed. There is no good reason for federal law to guarantee
that a third major league will never be created. Moreover, entry
is certainly more likely with the exemption removed. Hence,
removing the exemption could make baseball more willing to expand
as a preemptive move against entry, much as the first baseball
expansion was a response to the threat posed by the formation of,
the Continental League.
Beyond Removing the Exemotion
By itself, removal of baeball's antitrust exemption would be
desirable. But an important implication from recent sports
history is that this action does not go far enough. Congress
The other sports have structural problems like
needs to do more.
What is
baseball's, despite their susceptibility to antitrust.
needed is some additional positive action that would eliminate
lack of
the single most important structural problem in sports:
competition among teams and leagues for fans, as manifested most
clearly by the gap between the number of teams and the number of
viable franchise locations.
The structural problem of sports is unlikely to be solved
without action by the federal government. Private antitrust
litigation can provide financial relief for aggrieved parties and
can force important accommodations from the leagues, but it is
not likely to lead to the right structural outcome. The ideal
industrial structure for a sport is to have multiple competing
leagues, none of which honors or is bound by the business rules
of the others. Each league would decide its own membership;
however, its decisions on whether to expand and where to locate
its teams would not be subject to the approval of others.
This
arrangement would dramatically alter the incentives governing
expansion and team location decisions.
Imagine a world in which all four major league baseball
divisions make independent decisions about where to locate a
team. For starters, two would find themselves without a team in
at least one of the three largest markets. These divisions would
be disadvantaged in negotiating broadcasting contracts, and so
would welcome the possibility to expand into them, or to relocate
a weak team to a big city. Of course, none of the existing sites
would actually be abandoned, for they all are viable -- someone
will pay a high price to own a team even in small cities, as
shown most recently by the sale of the Seattle Mariners. Hence,
these cities, even if abandoned, would be immediate expansion
targets by competing leagues seeking to collect the expansion
fee.
Then, three divisions would discover that they lacked a
team in America's fastest growing market, Florida. St.
Petersburg, with a ready-made stadium, would certainly be snapped
up quickly.
Indeed, from the experience of the most recent
expansion, potential owners of expansion franchises have been
identified in several major cities (including Washington).
Can
anyone imagine that the National League East would continue to
protect the Baltimore Orioles if the American League East ceased
to have a say about its expansion decisions?
Likewise, each league could develop its own player market
rules, its own broadcasting arrangements, and its own revenuesharing rules. None would have antitrust significance, because
each league would provide a competitive alternative for a player,
broadcaster, city stadium authority, or even owner who did not
like one league's rules.
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Sports as a whole would still have some legitimate need for a
cooperative organization. The antitrust laws would not stand in
the way of common playing rules, cooperation in scheduling (with
an agreement about sharing the revenues from interleague games),
a jointly-managed sport-wide championship playoff, and a common
Pairs of
set of behavioral rules for participants in the sport.
leagues could also negotiate joint regular-season play and
And each sport would need
revenue sharing of interleague games.
a central office -- a commissioner -- to oversee the legitimate
collaborative activities. All of these arrangements have
business justifications in that owners, players, fans,
broadcasters and others involved in sports would all benefit from
them.
The antitrust laws do not stand in the way of such
agreements.
If the ultimate objective is business competition but
sporting cooperation within a sport, there are three paths to
achieving it: regulation, litigation, and legislation. All three
are better than the status quo; however, I do want to express a
preference for a simple piece of legislation that not only
removes the baseball antitrust exemption, but that states some
simple ground rules for all professional team sports.
The regulation approach was last discussed in Congress in
connection with various legislative proposals to deal with
franchise relocations. In essence, it means setting up some
broad guidelines governing the activities of sports leagues, and
then asking a government agency -- perhaps a new one, perhaps one
of the antitrust agencies -- to develop the details and enforce
them. For example, Congress might state that all sports had to
expand by a "reasonable number" of teams at a "reasonable rate,"
beginning with two shiny new baseball and football teams in, say,
1995. The vagueness in the law would derive from the difficulty
of knowing exactly how far expansion should go: how many cities
without a team could support one, how many teams could be added
without seriously eroding the quality of play, and which cities
ought to have multiple teaas -- and how many? These are the
kinds of questions that Congress must ask the bureaucracy to
decide, for it has neither the time nor the resources to make
these decisions itself, especially on a continuing basis.
The difficulty with this approach is that our system of
government requires that regulatory agencies be quite
They face significant legal hurdles in imposing
inefficient.
significant economic harm on anyone, and they are easy to hang up
in long and costly legal battles. And the fight over which two
cities deserve the next two baseball teams is going to be small
potatoes compared with the battles in the past over which company
deserved the next fighter contract or the next airline route.
The political system does not seem to be a good candidate for
picking which cities ought to have baseball teams.
The litigation strategy requires a federal antitrust attack
against sports. Thus, in addition to the line removing the
baseball exemption, Congress could, through legislation, the
budget process, and oversight hearings, instruct the Federal
Trade Commission and/or the Antitrust Division to investigate
sports for the purpose of determining whether an antitrust action
If so, the Congress
seeking structural relief was warranted.
could appropriate incremental funds necessary to carry out this
litigation.
The problems with this approach are easy to identify. First,
Congress cannot predetermine the outcome, nor can it even
predetermine that federal antitrust action is warranted.
In the
end, the court will be the major player if this strategy is
followed, making the outcome uncertain.
Second, major antitrust
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For example, the
cases are very time consuming and expensive.
investigation leading to the antitrust case against AT&T
proceeded for seven years before the case was filed, and then for
ten more years through litigation, settlement and implementation,
all the while consuming scores of lawyers and not an
insignificant number of economists.
The legislation strategy is to state with precision a few
things that sports-wide associations (like Major League Baseball)
are not permitted to do. After the sentence removing the
antitrust exemption, the law would state that no league within a
sport could at present account for more than a third of the
existing teams, and that in the future mergers and switches of
teams between leagues would be permitted only if they did not
violate the concentration thresholds of the merger guidelines,
with the unit of analysis for concentration calculations being a
league. This would force baseball to break into three leagues -or, more likely, the existing four divisions. The law would then
prohibit:
*

*

*

*

Collaboration between leagues in the sale of rights
for broadcasting other than for interleague
post-season championship playoffs, and in honoring
exclusive territories in local broadcasting;
Mutual recognition among leagues of restrictions on
the competition for players, such as rookie drafts,
waiver rules, minor league drafts and promotion
rules, and restrictions on free agency after the
expiration of a contract; and
Agreements between leagues about franchise locations,
expansion, procedures for stocking expansion teams,
and compensation by one league for invasion of the
franchise territory of another; and
Exclusive agreements for sports facilities that go
beyond securing the facility for the dates that are
necessary for a team to complete a regular-season
schedule and to secure options for playoffs.

Finally, the list would clearly state that it does not provide
antitrust immunity for practices not listed. Instead, all other
practices would be subject to antitrust scrutiny by the courts,
including rules within leagues as well as between them. And the
new act would repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act that gave
leagues an antitrust exemption for negotiating national broadcast
contracts, and the amendment to the 1967 tax bill that gave a
partial antitrust exemption to the merger of the AFL and NFL
insofar as the latter legislation went beyond the limits
described above.
By taking such action, Congress would solve the structural
problem within baseball and the other sports by making them
structurally competitive. Congress would also achieve this
result without costly litigation, without delay, and without
creating new uncertainties about the future of sports. Fans will
benefit from the ensuing competition by having more variety in
sports broadcasting, by expansion into markets not now served,
and by introducing the possibility of competition for fans in the
larger cities. Players will benefit by the expansion in jobs and
the creation of something more akin to a normal labor market in
sports. Broadcasters will benefit from the availability of
sports programming in a competitive environment in which a
network need not buy rights to the entire industry to secure a
national contract.
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January 11, 1993

Professor Robert Noll
School of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

I-Dear Professor Noll:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
than Monday, January 25, 1993:

Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1)

Vti
)

In their testimony before the Subcommittee, the baseball
owners claimed that an antitrust exemption was necessary for
The
them to prevent the relocation of baseball franchises.
owners even suggested that their good record of preventing
such relocations, and thereby ensuring franchise stability,
justified continuation of their antitrust exemption. How
does Baseball's record on franchise stability compare with
other sports leagues, and do the owners need an antitrust
exemption in order to block ox approve franchise
relocations?
Do the baseball owners need an antitrust exemption in order
to sanction owners, managers, players who violate a specific
league rule or whose conduct is at odds with the best
interests of baseball?

3)

At the subcommittee's hearing, your colleague, Professor
Roberts, stated that lifting the antitrust exemption would
expose baseball to a flurry of antitrust litigation under
the rule-of-reason test that would have unpredictable
Is his concern justified based on the experience
results.
of the other sports that are subject to the antitrust laws?

4)

How would lifting baseball's antitrust exemption benefit
minor league players?

5)

The owners have suggested that numerous teams are already
losing money, that tv revenues will fall after next year,
that costs are rising rapidly, and that there is a
significant and potentially destabilizing disparity of
income between large and small-market teams.
If baseball is
in such a dire economic situation, wouldn't that counsel
against revoking their antitrust exemption?
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6)

In your testimony you suggested that it is in the owners'
best financial interest to create an artificial scarcity of
baseball franchises.
You testified that there is enough
demand for as many as 40 or 50 more teams. What evidence do
you have that the owners have created an artificial scarcity
of teams and what affect would such a scarcity have on
cities and fans?

Senator Thurmond's questions:
1)

Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in the context
if an antitrust exemption?

2)

Please address the legal argument, which Mr. Roberts and
others propound, that q sports league should be viewed as
one legal entity incapable of conspiring with itself under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act?

3)

Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit
from repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?

4)

As I understand it, you believe that repealing the antitrust
exemption is either not necessary and/or not sufficient to
cure the structural problems inherent in the business of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
be undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation. At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the iost urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces?

I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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January 25, 1993
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, chairman

Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopolies
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6275
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I am responding to your letter of January 11 in which you asked
me several questions about baseball's antitrust immunity and
operating methods. I am herewith providing some brief answers.
Unfortunately, because your letter did not reach me until January
20, I have been unable to take the time necessary to unearth any
facts to buttress or illustrate my answers.
I will procede to answer both your and Senator Thurmond's
questions as they were listed in your letter.
Senator Metzenbaum's Questions
1. An antitrust exemption is necessary for baseball to prevent
some but not all movements of team franchises. Although I am not
a lawyer, my understanding of the antitrust cases involving team
movements is that a league can establish rules that create
obstacles to team movements, as long as the reasons and effects
are not antitcompetitive, and as long as the movement does not
require approval by an unreasonably large majority of other
owners. For example, the antitrust laws have been interpretted
as saying that leagues may not stop a movement because one team
wants to invade the territory of another for the purpose of
competing with it.
In short, a league can stop a move, or any
change of ownership, if the league has a legitimate business
reason for doing so. For example, if a city cannot support a
team because it is too small, other owners, because of revenue
sharing arrangements and the necessity for all teams in a league
to be financially stable, can veto the move.
In practice, this issue is not very important, because few teams
move in any sport, and in any case leagues usually do not attempt
to prevent moves. The recent notoriety surrounding the sale of
the San Francisco Giants notwithstanding, baseball has not
attempted to stop very many franchise moves in its history. The
current policy seems to be to try to find a local buyer who is
willing to pay close to the same price as a bidder from another
city, but to permit moves if this cannot be done -- unless the
propsective owner wants to move a team into a city occupied by
another major league team, in which case the move always will be
stopped. Baseball did not attempt to stop the movements of the
Washington Senators to Texas, the Seattle Pilots to Milwaukee,
the Kansas City Athletics to Oakland, or the Los Angeles Angels
to Anaheim. Indeed, in the past three decades, baseball has not
stopped very many moves. Most likely, some team would now be in
St. Petersburg had it not been for the baseball policy, and

Denver might have succeeded in attracting the Oakland A's a
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decade ago rather than wait for an expansion franchise in 1993.
Whereas only baseball's executives know their roles in franchise
moves, I do not know of any other times that baseball management
has stopped a team from moving.
Despite the hand-wringing about franchise moves, the issue is not
greatly significant. The vast majority of owners do not want to
move their teams, and will not do so regardless of the antitrust
status of baseball. And, when teams are offered for sale, in the
vast majority of cases the old owner finds a buyer in the same
city. The reason is that almost all existing franchise locations
are financially more attractive than all but two or three cities
that do not now have teams. Moreover, one of the attractive
locations -- Washington, D.C. -- is probably out of bounds for
either a team movement or an expansion franchise because the
Thus, the
owners would allow the Baltimore Orioles to veto it.
frequency of franchise moves that might be stopped only because
of the antitrust exemption is far too low to weigh heavily in an
evaluation of the exemption.
Let me also briefly reiterate what I said in December, and have
said in previous hearings on this topic. Franchise movements are
not intrinsically bad. When they are blocked, the effect is to
disappoint fans in a city without a team but with sufficient fan
interest to be a viable franchise site. Team movements create a
public issue solely because there are too few teams. If baseball
had steadily expanded during the 1970s and 1980s in proportion to
the growth of interest in the sport, cities like St. Petersburg
would already have a team. Franchises move only if attractive
markets have no team.
2. As in the previous question, baseball owners do not need an
antitrust exemption to discipline owners, managers and players
who violate the behavioral rules of the sport as long as there is
a legitimate business interest in enforcing the rules. The NFL
and the NBA have successfully banned, fined or suspended players,
owners and managers for misconduct without any antitrust
repercussions. Colleges and universities, which are subject to
the antitrust laws, as demonstrated when they lost cases
involving NCAA broadcasting rights and common scholarship
practices for entering students, can legally discipline students
for violating the NCAA's behavioral rules. Thus, baseball does
not need antitrust immunity to impose penalties on numerous
people in the sport over gambling, drugs, and other actions that
Indeed, if these rules are the outcome of
harm baseball.
collective bargaining, they are immune from antitrust in any
case. And, even with antitrust immunity, baseball sometimes
loses these cases on other grounds unrelated to antitrust, as
with the recent case involving Steve Howe. Basically, the only
benefit to baseball from the antitrust exemption regarding
discipline is that baseball can ban a player for life for playing
with a competitive league -- as it did with the players who
signed with the Mexican League in the late 1940s. This
"disciplinary" action should not be permitted, but it has been
because of the antitrust exemption.
3. Professor Roberts' view is partly correct in the following
sense. If baseball does not change its most obviously
anticompetitive practices, it will probably be sued. But, two
points should be kept in mind. First, most sports antitrust
suits are filed by players, and as long as baseball has a
collective bargaining agreement, the major league players, at
least, will not be able to sue. However, the minor league
players may be able to sue, depending on whether courts rule that
the labor exemption for collective bargaining extends to the
rules pertaining to them. Such a ruling would be bad public
policy; however, I do not know for sure whether it would be a bad
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reading of the labor exemption. Second, the precedents in other
sports are likely to carry over into baseball, so that baseball
is unlikely to face a completely different set of antitrust
constraints than the other sports. Baseball owners, by examining
these precedents, can avoid most of the litigation by simply
studying these cases and changing their practices accordingly.
Thus, if baseball experiences a "flurry of antitrust litigation"
it will be because they failed to learn from the experiences of
other leagues.
4. If baseball did not have an antitrust exemption, several
aspects of minor league operations would need to be seriously
reexamined, and I believe that many would have to change. The
National Agreement specifies the relationships among all
professional baseball leagues, and much of it is probably not
legal under the antitrust laws. The agreement covers not only
the player market, but also relations among leagues and teams
that amount to agreements not to compete. An example is the
agreement about relations among leagues of the same
classification, and about the arrangements when a team in a
league with a higher classification moves into the territory of a
team in a lower league.
Certainly the most important single issue would be the rookie
draft, which serves to bring most players into the minor league
system who have any serious chance of playing major league ball.
Similarly, the minor league draft, whereby teams of higher
classification draft players from teams of lower classification,
would also be brought into question.
One can imagine three distinct paths for minor league baseball
players, and I do not know which will emerge after the antitrust
exemption is lifted. The first would be that the present system
would be replaced by a system like the one that existed before
the draft was instituted in 1964: competition among teams
(including minor league teams as well as majors) for rookies.
Most likely, teams would sign players to multiyear contracts, and
then lower-classification teams would sell players with unexpired
contracts to teams with higher classification. Unlike the old
system, however, players with expired contracts would be free
agents, just as are veteran major leaguers. The second
possibility would be that minor league players would be
unionized, and would sign an agreement that kept more or less the
present system, in return for better terms of employment. The
third possibility is that the major league players would expand
their collective bargaining agreement to incorporate the minor
leagues. If the major league players did not make minor league
players full union members, a legal issue would arise whether the
major league players could extend the labor exemption for
antitrust to minor league arrangements.
If they could not do so,
perpetuation of the present minor league system would have to be
accompanied by benefits for minor leaguers. Note that in all
three cases, minor league players would be made better off, for
they would either receive the benefits of competition or receive
some additional compensation or security for agreeing to the
present restrictions.
5. The financial conditions of baseball are not relavent to the
question of whether it should have an antitrust exemption. For
example, we should not tolerate price fixing among the nation's
airlines because the recessaion has caused nearly all of them to
lose money, and in the recent antitrust complaint against some
prestigeous universities, the current financial crisis in higher
education was not an issue in whether price-fixing in tuition is
justified. If the nation's great universities can get along
without an antitrust exemption during a period of financial
retrenchment, so can major league baseball.
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Several points should be kept in mind when discussing baseball's
finances. First, the best indicator of the financial health of a
business is how much it is worth. And the weakest baseball as
franchises are worth approximately $100 million -- ten times
much as they were worth twenty years ago, and three times as much
as they were in the early 1980s. Second, baseball financial
statements are not very meaningful indicators of the viability of
the sport. There is no publicly determined standard for baseball
accounting that corrects for numerous common practices that
understate the profitability of teams. Examples are sales of
local broadcast, concession and luxury box rights to corporate of
affiliates at prices less than the market value, and salaries
executive/owners that vastly exceed the payments to executives in
other enterprises of the size and complexity of a sports
franchise.
Moreover, many teams are hobbies of wealthy owners, and are
purposely operated more extravagantly than a normal small
business. I was once told by the late Phil Wrigley that every
September he would inspect the books, estimate the likely profit
of the Cubs, and then enter contracts for renovating Wrigley
field or the Cubs' spring training facilities so that the team
would show no profit. In poor years, he would simply not spend
money on these items. As a result, the Cubs occaisionally showed
losses, but never showed significant profits. I personally had
great respect for Mr. Wrigley, partly because of his candor. But
during his tenure as owner, the "precarious" financial position
of the Cubs as "revealed" by the financial statements was
obviously an illusion -- and equally obviously did not justify an
antitrust exemption.
Quite possibly, baseball will not receive as large a national
broadcasting contract next time around. But, so what? The
decline of national rights is due in part to the fact that the
national broadcasters are experiencing ever greater competition
from local rights sold through superstations and regional cable
networks. Local cable revenues are increasing rapidly, and on
balance probably will more than offset the decline in national
rights. And, even if it does not, the most important cost items
to teams -- salaries to players, coaches and management -- are
detetained by revenues.
They will simply decline (or, more
likely, grow less rapidly) if revenues decline (or, more likely,
grow less rapidly).
Finally, the disparity in team revenues and financial performance
is due to baseball's failure to adopt more generous revenue
sharing. Sports leagues do not need an antitrust exemption to
share revenues, for revenue-sharing has no adverse effects on
competition. Revenue sharing can make the rewards to good
management more equal across different markets. Indeed, as was
brought out in the recent antitrust case against the NFL, revenue
sharing can be so extensive that it actually eliminates the
financial incentive to field a winning team.
A core principal of antitrust is that if businesses want to
engage in a cooperative practice that has a legitimate
justification, they are required to adopt the least
anticompetitive practice that can accomplish this objective.
Baseball wants to keep its antitrust exemption because it wants
to help the financial position of weak teams by harming players,
broadcasters and fans through monopolistic practices. Of course,
these practices actually help the strong teams more than they
help the weak. Society does not need to subsidize the Yankees
and the Dodgers in order to keep Milwaukee and Seattle
financially viable. Instead, this objective can be accomplished
--

if it

is

needed --

through revenue sharing.
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6.
In my testimony, I thought I said that baseball could expand
to as many as 40 to 50 teams, not that it could add that many.
The evidence that this is so has two main elements. The first is
the expressed willingness of propsective owners to buy expansion
franchises. When baseball announced its most recent expansion,
groups in about a dozen cities expressed their willingess to pay
the expansion fee to join the league. The price was $95 million,
plus no share of national broadcast rights in the first year
Even more propsective owners would have been found if
(1993).
either league had permitted expansion into a city that already
has a team. The best indicator that baseball has many more
viable franchise sites than teams is the expressed willingess of
intelligent business executives to pay this much for a new team.
The second piece of evidence arises from study of the factors
that determine the revenues of a team, the most important of

which is the population base of a metropolitan area for ticket

sales and of a region for local broadcast sales. Many cities are
comparable in size and other relevant characteristics to the
smaller third of cities that currently have teams. Examples are
Buffalo, Indianapolis, Memphis, New Orleans, Orlando, Phoenix,
San Antonio, St. Petersburg/Tampa, and Washington, D.C.
Conceivably, Charlotte, Portland, Salt Lake City and Vancouver,
Canada, could also succeed even though these areas have a smaller
population because of their large regional broadcasting markets.
And, additional teams probably could succeed in some of the
largest markets -- most clearly New York in the Jersey
Meadowlands.
The important point about scarcity is that the price of a team
reflects almost entirely its scarcity value. When a baseball
franchise is sold, the buyer acquires almost no assets of value
other than the right to join an exclusive club. The expansion

teams, for example, had the right to "draft" players from
established teams; however, they could as easily have populated
their rosters through signing free agents and making use of the
minor league system for a few years before entering the league,
as they have in part. The latter would have been a little more
expensive -- perhaps as much as an additional ten million dollars
a year in salaries plus three million in minor league subsidies

makes the franchise alone
for a couple of years. But that still
worth $70 million or more. This part of the franchise value is
to a member team.
monopoly
the
baseball
value
of
the capitalized
Senator Thurmond's Ouestions

1. The appropriate role for the baseball commissioner is to be
the final authority on the noneconomic aspects of the management
of baseball. The commissioner should handle the enforcement of
the behavioral rules of owners, players, managers and coaches,
and the process of overseeing, developing and modifying the
playing rules. Baseball refers to these duties as related to the
"integrity of the game." These activities must be separated from
the business activities of the sport in order to remove any
possibility that these decisions would be tainted by economic

considerations.
Specifically, I do not believe that the commissioner should be
deeply involved in such business decisions as collective
bargaining, negotiating broadcast contracts, undertaking
expansion, or overseeing franchise relocation decisions.

One

reason is that the commissioner is appoiinted solely by the
owners. Obviously, an independent commissioner will on occaision
make decisions that a majority of owners oppose; however, a
commissioner will always be selected to pursue the business
interests of the owners. The disagreements that develop are

likely to be about means and strategies, rather than ends.
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The problem of the commissioner's biases and interests would not
be solved by allowing players to have a say in the selection of
the commissioner. Whereas this would allow baseball to have a
genuinely neutral referee in collective bargaining disputes, it
would not solve the problem of the unrepresentation of fans,
cities, broadcasters and other affected business interests in
baseball decision making. Owners and players share an interest
in running baseball in a way that maximizes the wealth of the
participants in the sport, even if this is at the expense of
fans, local governments, and other industries.
All cartels suffer from the problem that some clever members
occaisionally figure out ways effectively to defeat the cartel's
rules against competition. I prefer a baseball structure in
which the commissioner is not able to punish people in the
industry who find ways to introduce more competition into
baseball.
2. Professor Roberts' view about the "single entity" concept in
sports needs to be broken into two parts. First, the league
central office is most definitely a joint venture among the
teams. In selling a league's national broadcasting rights and
the league logos for promotional purposes, it does act as a
single entity. Second, the individual teams need to cooperate
(usually through league auspices) to settle on common playing
rules, revenue-sharing agreements, a schedule, and a playoff
system. In my view, the only practice in these two categories
that is contrary to the public interest is the method of sharing
national broadcasting rights. I believe that congress should
appeal the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which granted leagues
an antitrust exemption for selling exclusive national television
rights to their games.
Having identified some aspects of sports leagues that are truly
joint activities among teams, I do not believe that it makes
sense to think of all of the teams in a league as branches of a
single business (like branche outlets of Macy's). The reason is
that all of the legitimate collaborative functions can be
undertaken without the need for eliminating competition in both
the player market and the output markets. Indeed, the NCAA does
this all the time. The college conferences in the NCAA are
operated independently. They compete in selling broadcast rights
(having lost an antitrust case on this issue), in selling tickets
to games, and in arranging bowl games. Nearly all major
metropolitan areas have several Division I basketball teams, and
many have more than one Division I football team, all of whom
compete. And several conferences and teams independently sell
local, regional and national television rights. The NCAA, which
is not exempt from antitrust, has no trouble surviving antitrust
scrutiny when it disciplines players and coaches, when it
establishes uniform playing rules, and when it arranges for
national championships. Yet it does run into problems when it
tries to adopt uniform business practices or otherwise to
cartelize its members.
The important point is not whether professional leagues behave as
if they were single entities, rather than competing businesses.
Obviously, in many ways they do so behave. But some of these
activities are perfectly legal and legitimate. Others exist
purely because of antitrust expemptions, and are unnecessary.
Still other business activities -- such as setting ticket prices,
selling local broadcast rights, and negotiating employment
arrangements for executives, coaches and free agent players -are done completely independently. Even in baseball with its
antitrust exemption, owners have created a structure in which
many decisions by a team are made completely independently of the
other teams -- and in competition with them. These facts
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demonstrate to me that no league is a single entity, and that no
league ought to be. I should add that no court has ever found
otherwise in adjudicating antitrust disputes.
3.
Repeal of the antitrust exemption will provide the following
benefits:
A. Major league players need not fear that owners will fail to
renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement, declare an impasse
in bargaining, and reestablish the old "reserve clause" to
eliminate veteran free agency and salary arbitration. Under the
antitrust exemption, baseball players do not have the option that
players in the other sports have used: use antitrust to prevent
owners from unilaterally monopolizing the player market.
B. Minor league players will benefit in the ways described in
answer to Senator Metzenbaum's Question #4. Specifically, they
will be able to move to another minor league system if their
advance to their parent major league club is blocked, and they
will either have some freedom in their own player market or will
be able to use the propsects for freedom to gain the strength
necessary to form a union and bargain collectively.
C. Prospective competitors who might seek to form a new major
league will benefit in that the barriers to entry will be lower.
They will have access to minor league players to help populate
new major league teams, and their players (including those who
might jump from existing major league teams) will not risk a
lifetime banishment from baseball for doing so. Note that 25
percent of the old USFL players played in the NFL the year after
the USFL folded.
These players did not risk a pro career by
But if a third major league were to
playing for a new league.
form, the players who joined the new teams would risk such a ban
if the league did not succeed.
D.
Fans and cities
would benefit to the extent that the repeal
of the antitrust exemption did lower entry barriers for new
leagues by enough to threaten the existing structure.
Fans and
cities
might benefit from the entry of a new league, but this is
Instead, the source of the benefit
not the most likely outcome.

most plausibly would be more rapid expansion of the existing
leagues in order to keep new entrants out.
cities
and more fans would have teams.

In

any case, more

E.
Broadcasters, advertisers and fans would benefit if the
repeal of the antitrust exemption included repeal of the Sports
Professional sports on TV would come to look
Broadcasting Act.
more like iitercollegiate sports: more games being broadcast,
with more opportunities for advertisers, especially small, local
businesses, to buy advertising.
As an illustration of the last
point, Ira Horowitz concluded from a study of sports broadcasting
that the most likely cause of the demise of smaller local and
regional breweries was the rise of national sports broadcasting.
Only very large national firms can derive full value from
nationally broadcast events, and as a result, national sports

advertising by a few large breweries drove the smaller firms out
of business.

4.
I do not believe that the best cure for the structural
problems in sports is regulation in the sense of the creation of
a government agency to monitor sports and to make rules regarding

its business practices. Obviously, the nation has a deep problem
with even the sports that do not have an antitrust exemption.
The scarcity of teams has made sports franchises exteremely
valuable, and has given teams the power to extract hundreds of
millions of dollars in subsidies from financially strapped local
governments.
Yet, unlike in other industries, these conditions
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have not caused new businesses to enter major league sports.
Through the structure of player reservation systems, stadium
contracts, national broadcasting contracts, and, or baseball,
minor league arrangements, competitive leagues have been forced
out or kept out for more than twenty years.
I believe that the simple solution to this problem is divestiture
within the existing sports. That is, force all of the existing
major league sports to divide into no fewer than three
independent leagues. These leagues could develop common playing
rules, behavioral rules outside the economic realm (e.g., drugs,
gambling, etc.), and championship playoffs. But they would not
be permitted to honor each others' territorial rights, to adopt
rules for acquiring players that limited interleague competition,
or to collaborate in selling their broadcasting rights. This
solution most assuredly does not require the establishment of a
It could be accomplished by the Department of
regulatory agency.
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission through antitrust action,
but to do so would probably require repeal of the existing
exemptions: not only baseball's blanket exemption, but the sports
Broadcasting Act and the AFL-NFL Merger Amednment.
It would also
be greatly facilitated by a special appropriation for this
purpose. Another approach would be to pass legislation removing
the baseball exemption and specifying that no sports league
having restrictions between teams regarding competition and a
common expansion policy could constitute more than forty percent
of the major league teams in a sport or eight teams, whichever is
larger. This provision should be written to bar common business
arrangements in a sport even as part of a collective bargaining
agreement.
The effect of the divestiture approach would be to enable us to
rely on market forces, rather than regulation, antitrust
exemptions and strong commissioners, to serve the interests of
fans. The most important single effect would be that leagues
would begin to compete for franchise locations, and so would race
to expand to any unoccupied attractive market. Hence, we would
not need to worry about franchise relocations, for attractive
alternative sites would be fewer, and attractive vacated sites
would soon be reoccupied.
An interesting parallel can again be made to interaollegiate
sports. Obviously, colleges do not relocate; however, leagues
are constantly forming and reforming in order to make member
teams more attractive to their fans. And, colleges frequently
move from one classification to another, depending on their
success. A wonderful example is the University of Nevada at
Reno, which moved to Division IA in football in 1992 -- and
managed to go to a bowl game during its first season. The
reformations of league arrangements, the entry of new teams, and
even the exit of unsuccessful ones, reflects the market at work.
I would like to see the professionals, who do it for the money,
subject to the same free market principles as the colleges, who,
with few exceptions, are not so motivated.

Visiting Professor, UC San Diego
Morris M. Doyle Professor,
Stanford University
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Noll.
Mayor Jordan, we are very happy to have you with us, sir, and
I think pursuant to the instructions that I have received from Senator Feinstein, you will be able to get your plane out in adequate
time. She gave me very strict instructions and I always do what
she tells me to do.
STATEMENT OF MAYOR FRANK M. JORDAN

Mayor JORDAN. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. I appreciate
the courtesy, and I also appreciate, as the mayor of San Francisco,
this opportunity to address you and the Senate Judiciary Committee here today.
I did not travel to Washington, DC, as an attorney or as an antitrust expert or someone who is a professional knowing ins and outs
of professional baseball, but I do sit before you today as the mayor
of a major American city to describe to you what the people of San
Francisco did to keep their baseball team.
There is no doubt in my mind that a major league baseball team
is an important part of any city's identity. Fortunately, the current
system of baseball's governance recognizes this fact and works to
preserve baseball's relationship with our communities.
Just a few months ago, I recall arriving at city hall to discover
that the owner of the San Francisco Giants baseball franchise had
announced an agreement in principle to sell and relocate the Giants to St. Petersburg, FL. In fact, he said that he had a binding
contract that already had been signed. It was a terrible day, obviously, for the people in San Francisco, and while the citizens in
Tampa Bay at the same time were rejoicing at the prospect of luring the Giants away from my city, the residents of San Francisco
were devastated by the news.
Thirty-four years earlier when the Giants came to San Francisco,
I was a young San Francisco police officer. I remember the sense
of excitement and joy that filled the streets of our city and the
neighborhoods. It was a proud time. Even before the Giants arrived, San Francisco had always been a baseball town. We gave the
Nation Joe DiMaggio and many other legendary ballplayers. In
fact, some of my best childhood memories are of watching the San
Francisco Seals at old Seals Stadium at 16th and Bryant.
But it wasn't until 1958 that the San Francisco Giants were obtained as a major league team for our city. In 1958, when the Giants arrived, jubilant fans crowded Market Street to welcome their
new team and its stars, like Willie Mays, with a tickertape parade.
People of all ages and backgrounds rejoiced together in the Giants'
arrival. The children of San Francisco had new heroes and a new
reason to be excited about their lives.
I remember just like it was yesterday Willie McCovey's perfect
four-for-four day against Philadelphia's legendary Robin Roberts in
his major league debut at old Seals Stadium. I remember when our
city erupted with joy in September 1962 when the Giants won their
first pennant for San Francisco.
Since 1958, almost 50 million people have watched the Giants
play baseball in San Francisco. Millions more have followed games
on television, radio, and the local newspapers. Every year, thousands of San Franciscans make their pilgrimage to Arizona for
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spring training. The Giants have become a part of the city's culture
that affects the daily lives of many of our residents.
On August 7 of this year, however, San Franciscans were forced
to collectively consider the prospect of losing their baseball team
and all that came with it. Although some local radio personalities
repeatedly told their listeners that the Giants were gone, I and
thousands of other people in my great city refused to give in.
Baseball is more than a game and baseball is more than just another business. Most baseball teams play in ball parks built with
support, and also with public financing. Teams are granted
public
eases on favorable terms and they often have standard taxes
waived. All of this is done in recognition of the importance of major
league franchises and what they represent both on an emotional
and economic level.
There is no doubt the Giants are a valuable asset to San Francisco. The Giants provide entertainment for people of all ages and
all backgrounds. The Giants create economic opportunities for the
city's residents and they produce economic benefits in tens of millions of dollars for the city and the surrounding area.
In the days following August 7, San Franciscans launched an allout effort to save their team. Rallies were organized. Fans mailed
hundreds of thousands of letters and postcards to former Commissioner Fay Vincent and to other owners. Local organizations formed
to save the Giants received thousands of calls each day from fans
eager to help in the effort to save our team. Businesses purchased
additional season tickets and business leaders joined forces to put
together an offer to buy the team so that it could continue to play
in San Francisco.
Although we never saw a copy of the agreement to move the Giants to Florida, we knew that under major league rules the sale
required the approval of the owners of both leagues. We also knew
that major league baseball had traditionally taken a stance strongly discouraging franchise relocations. We knew that many of the
Nation's mayors and elected officials supported the policy of franchise stability and have voiced their support before this and other
congressional committees.
We knew that baseball had just successfully encouraged the city
of Seattle to find local ownership in an effort to save the Mariners
franchise. We knew that the cities of Montreal, Pittsburgh, San
Diego, and others had successfully campaigned to save their teams
in the past.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mayor. The con-

straints of time are forcing me not to permit you to go on, but we
will include the balance of your statement in the record.

Mayor JORDAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

[The prepared statement of Mayor Jordan follows:]
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Remarks For Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearings on Major League Baseball's Antitrust ExemptiOn

My name is Frank M. Jordan. I am the Mayor of the City and County of San Francisco.
It is an honor to appear before you today.
I have not traveled to Washington as a lawyer or as an expert in antitrust law. Ihave
not come here as an expert in baseball. I sit before you today as a mayor of a major
American city to describe for you what the people of San Francisco did to keep their
team. A major league baseball team is an important part of a City's identity.
Fortunately, the current system of baseball governance recognizes this fact and works
well to preserve baseball's relationship with our communities.
Just a few months ago, I arrived at work to discover that the owner of the San Francisco
Giants baseball franchise had announced some sort of an agreement to sell and relocate
the Giants to St. Petersburg, Florida. It was a terrible day for the people of San
Francisco. While the citizens of the Tampa Bay Area were rejoicing in the prospect of
luring the Giants away from San Francisco, the residents of San Francisco were
devastated by the news.
Thirty-four years earlier, when the Giants came to San Francisco, Iwas a young San
Francisco police officer. I remember the sense of excitement and joy that filled the
streets and neighborhoods of the City. It was a proud time. San Francisco had long
been a great baseball city - it gave the nation Joe DiMaggfo and many other legendary
.ballplayers. But It did not have a major league team.
That all changed in 1958. Jubilant fans crowded Market Street to welcome their new
team and its stars, like the young Willie Mays, with a ticker tape parade. The mood was
reminiscent of the many celebrations held around the country to embrace the return of
our young soldiers from World War H. People of all ages and backgrounds rejoiced
together in the Giants' arrival. The children of the City had new heroes, a new reason to
be excited about their lives.
Since 1958, almost 50 million people have watched the Giants play baseball in San
Francisco. Millions more have followed games on television, radio and in the local
newspapers. Every year, thousands of San Franciscans make their trip to Arizona for
Spring Training. The Giants have become a part of the City's culture, and the daily lives
of many of its residents.
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On August 7th of this year, however, San Franciscans collectively considered the
prospect of losing their baseball team and all that came with it. Although some local
radio personalities repeatedly told their listeners that the Giants were gone, I and
thousands of other people in my great City refused to believe them.
Baseball is more than a game and baseball is more than just another business. Baseball
teams play in ballparks built with public support and financing. Teams are granted
leases on favorable terms and they qften have ordinary taxes waived. All this is done in
recognition of the importance a major league franchise represents, both on emotional
and economic terms. The Giants are a valuable asset to the City. The Giants provide
entertainment for people of all ages and backgrounds. The Giants create economic
opportunities for the City's residents and produce economic benefits in the tens of
million of dollars for the City and its people.
In the days following August 7th, San Franciscans launched an effort to save their team.
Rallies were organized. Fans mailed hurdred of thousands of letters and postcards to
former Baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent and to the other owners. Organizations
formed to save the Giants received thousands of calls each day from fans eager to help
In the effort. Businesses bought new season tickets and business leaders joined forces to
put together an offer to buy the team so that it could continue to play in San Francisco.
Although we never saw a copy of the agreement to move the Giants to Florida, we
knew that under Major League rules, the sale required the approval of the owners of
both leagues. We knew that baseball had taken a stance strongly discouraging franchise
relocations. We knew that many of the nation's mayors and elected officials supported
the policy of franchise stability and have voiced their support before this and other
congressional committees. We knew that baseball had just successfully encouraged
Seattle to find local ownership in an effort to save the Mariners franchise. We knew that
the citler of Montreal, Pittsburgh, San Diego and other cities had successfully
campaigned to save their teams in the past. In fact, only ten teams have moved away
from their home city since 1903, and none in the last twenty years.
In early September, I went to New York to meet with Bill White, the President of the
National League. I told Mr. White that the City had a vital economic interest in the
Giants franchise and had important contractual rights under the Stadium Lease.
Without giving us any assurance of success, Mr. White told me that the League would
consider a competing offer from San Francisco. Under the agreement to sell the Giants
to Florida interests, the Giants owner allegedly promised to refuse to deal with all other
who wanted to buy the team, even with those from San Francisco. Without the
League's intervention, we would not have been permitted to submit a competing offer
and the voices of Giants fans in San-Francisco would not have been heard or considered.
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I cannot begin to tell you the amount of time and work that my staff and other officials
of our city government devoted to this effort I can tell you, however, that it was and
continues to be worth every minute. In entering the competition to save our own team,
I vowed that we would fight hard, but we would fight fair. We never did anything to
disparage the current Giants' ownership or those who were seeking to acquire our team.

-

As you know, on November 10, 1992, having in hand the offer from San Franciscans
who stepped forward to save the team, the National League voted overwhelmingly to
reject the proposed sale and transfer of the Giants to Florida. Baseball officials made
clear that the-reason for the decision was their policy of promoting stability of
franchises. As I said publicly on that day, I was both gratified that our efforts had
succeeded and sorry for the people of the Tampa Bay area.
The sad truth is that in any competition, there is only one winner. San Francisco was
the winner in this instance, and I am certainly glad for that But the key point is that
this was a competition. In fact, it was Major League Baseball's policy of franchise
stability that allowed a competition to occur. Had it not been for baseball's policy, and
the requirement that new buyers' obtain the approval of Major League Baseball, San
Francisco would never have had the opportunity to compete. The Giants might have
left in the middle of the night, the way the professional football Colts left Baltimore for
Indianapolis. Major League Baseball's policy of franchise stability prevented that from
happening and gave San Francisco a chance to put together a strong offer and one of the
strongest ownership teams in professional sports.
Ibelieve that giving franchise cities this opportunity is good for baseball and good for
the country. Obviously, it has also been good for the cities of San Francisco, Seattle,
Chicago, Oakland, Minneapolis, Montreal, San Diego, Pittsburgh, Houston and many
other cities that have found themselves in a position where an owner sought or
threatened to relocate a baseball team.
Thankfully, baseball's current system of governance allowed the voices of the fans to be
heard and gave our and many other communities an opportunity to gather the support
and funds needed to save our teams. We are glad that in baseball, an owner cannot
unilaterally decide to move a team away from its city and fans in the dark of the night.
The current system gives our communities a fair opportunity to compete to keep our
teams and as such, the current system is vital to preserving the stability of baseballas
America's national pastime.

Thank You.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dodge, we are very happy to have you with us, sir. You are
assistant city manager of the city of St. Petersburg.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. DODGE
Mr. DODGE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is good
to be with you. My name is Rick Dodge. I am the assistant city
manager of the city of St. Petersburg, FL. I am here today to represent the city and its taxpayers. I represent 4.6 million people of
Tampa Bay. I represent 31,000 fans who reserved season tickets for
baseball at St. Petersburg, FL, Suncoast Dome, and 60 corporations
that have reserved stadium luxury suites. I also represent fairminded individuals from cities throughout the United States that
have been leveraged by major league baseball and have witnessed
the unjust, unwise, and unfair business practices of those in charge
of America's game.
The antitrust exemptions that we are discussing today have allowed major league baseball to artificially restrict the supply of
baseball franchises, and thereby artificially increase their value.
The unfortunate result of this practice is it positions one city
against another, and regardless of the outcome both cities lose.
Baseball can thank St. Petersburg for new, generous stadium
leases it signed in Oakland and the new publicly financed ball park
in Chicago and the new ownership groups in Seattle and San Francisco. In most cases, taxpayers pick up the tab for the new stadiums, generous leases, and team subsidies. Fans pay a higher price
at the gate and proceeds go to the pockets of baseball's elite group
of owners.
Tampa Bay's recent efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants
best exemplifies the various methods baseball employs to skirt the
law, operating accountable to no one with exemptions to the Sherman Antitrust Act.
On August 6, 1992, Bob Lurie signed a $115 million agreement
in principle to sell the Giants to a Tampa Bay ownership group led
by Vince Naimoli. This agreement, through further negotiations,
evolved into a contract for sale, conditioned subject to the approval
of major league baseball. Between the time the offer was submitted
on August 6 and rejected by baseball on November 10, Tampa Bay
fans watched in quiet desperation as officials in baseball conspired
to thwart the team's move to Florida while it extracted financial
gains from San Francisco.
Consider these points. Point: If Bob Lurie owned a troubled financial business in any other industry than baseball, he would
have been free to sell his company to the highest bidder regardless
of the bidder's intentions to relocate the company. Even though
Tampa Bay's offer was $15 million higher than San Francisco's
offer, and originally $20 million higher, 75 percent of the National
League owners did not approve the sale. Such rules requiring approval of team location would be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade, as ruled by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit during a similar dispute over the relocation of the Oakland Raiders football franchise.
If football, basketball, and hockey teams operate successfully without the antitrust exemption, why should baseball be any different?
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Point: Bob Lurie entered into an exclusive agreement to sell his
team to the Tampa Bay ownership group, a stipulation which prohibited him from accepting or negotiating any other offers until
baseball had voted on the sale. At the September baseball meetings, National League President Bill White made a statement that
deserves repeating. He said, "Bob Lurie is a man of his word and
he has given the St. Petersburg group his word he will not accept
an offer. I will accept an offer. I will accept an offer from the people
in San Francisco and the league will have to decide what they will
do with that offer."
Not only do White's words constitute interference with Tampa
Bay's exclusive offer, but his subsequent actions should provide
enough evidence to this subcommittee that the administration of
the industry of baseball is inappropriate with the antitrust exemptions. What Bill White was saying is Bob Lurie is a man of his
word, but baseball is not so bound.
Point: In disallowing the sale to the Tampa Bay investors, baseball reiterated its longstanding policy against the relocation of franchises. Relocation is the longstanding policy of baseball. Since
1901, 12 franchises have relocated. Among those who benefited
from such relocation, Peter O'Malley, who led the opposition
against the Giants' move to Tampa Bay, owns a team that relocated from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in the late 1950's. Today,
speaking before you, Acting Commissioner Bud Selig operates a
franchise that moved from Seattle to Milwaukee in 1970.
Point: Baseball made this decision to protect the fans in San
Francisco. This past season, San Francisco recorded the second
lowest attendance in the league. The area's fans rejected four referendums during the past 10 years to build the Giants a suitable
stadium. In an October survey of the San Francisco Examiner, only
50.7 percent of fans said they would be disappointed if the Giants
moved to Florida. Most ironically, San Francisco fans are just 6
miles away from another major league baseball franchise in Oakland. If the fans were the primary interest of baseball, why
wouldn't baseball reward Tampa Bay's 31,000 season ticketholders
with a franchise?
Point: The fans are the bottom line that motivates baseball. In
a letter sent to Florida Governor, Lawton Chiles, by Miami Marlins
owner Wayne Huizenga on October 23, 1992, Huizenga expressed
his concern over the Giants relocation to Florida, raising the issue
of potentially lost future expansion fees. He asks, "To whom does
that premium belong, major league baseball or Bob Lurie?" By prohibiting the relocation of the Giants to Tampa Bay, baseball owners
have retained the opportunity to share a $100 million expansion
fee at an undetermined future date. Were it not for the antitrust
exemption, this might be construed by a court of law as stifling free
and open commerce and demonstrating anticompetitive behavior.
Point: Major league baseball adopted rules in recent years requiring parties involved in sale and relocation to execute indemnity
agreements whereby baseball officials are insulated from any liability or legal redress. Officials in both San Francisco and Tampa Bay
signed such letters of indemnification, leaving baseball free to operate with impunity regardless of how improper its conduct may be.
This policy, too, could be construed as an antitrust violation.
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As I push through on this, I want to summarize by a couple of
points. One, San Francisco and St. Petersburg have both lost in
this transaction. San Francisco has retained its franchise, and that
is important, but in the process they have given up $3 million in
revenue for the operation of their stadium. It also must proceed
with plans to build a new park to replace Candlestick if it hopes
to retain the team in the future. Ironically, the ownership group
that last week signed outfielder Barry Bonds to a 6-year, $43 million contract will ask taxpayers to bear the costs of a lengthy legal
battle in court. St. Petersburg has also lost, and those economic
factors are well shown in my written presentation.
I would like to take my last minute to sort of respond to something I heard earlier and, Senator Feinstein, it comes from your
comments about trying to determine whether you were talking
about a game, a business, or an athletic contest, and I think that
is very important to this committee to understand the difference.
Baseball has three distinct faces. The first face is the sport, that
dynamic and exciting athletic contest that takes place between the
foul lines. It has rules that are precise, observable, and enforceable.
The second face is the game, that mystical and romantic embodiment of our culture, our history, and our childhood richly described
by the late Commissioner Bart Giamatti as the only game where
oneSenator METZENBAUM. Please wind up, Mr. Dodge.
Mr. DODGE. OK-starts from home and then returns there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dodge follows:]
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TAMPA BAY AND ITS PURSUIT OF
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Testimony to be presented before the Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
Richard B. Dodge, St. Petersburg Assistant City Manager
December 10, 1992

My name is Rick B. Dodge.

I am the assistant city manager for

the city of St, Petersburg, Florida.

I represent the city and its

taxpayers, which negotiated a 27-year lease to house the Giants in
the city's Florida Suncoast Dome.

I also represent 4.6 million

people within a 2-hour drive of the dome, and the 31,000 fans who
put down deposits to purchase season ticket reservations and the 60
corporations that reserved luxury suites.
Florida

which

became

an

economic

I represent the State of

partner

in

this venture

by

committing $2 million a yepr for a thirty year period to aid the
capital construction of the facility.

And,

finally, I represent

fair-minded individuals from throughout the country who see the
latest actions of Baseball as unjust, unwise and unfair for both
the fans and for "America's Game," the sport of baseball.
left hand is a baseball, symbolic and emblematic of the game.

In my
This

baseball is now also ironically symbolic of Major League Baseball's
latest effort to avoid ethical business practices by denial
Tampa Bay's recent relocation efforts.
August 6,

This baseball was signed on

1992 in the office of Bob Lurie,

Francisco Giants.

of

the owner of the San

The signataries include Bob Lurie and his key

executive staff; Vince Naimoli, the Managing General Partner of the
Tampa

Bay

Investor Group;

and a number

officials who attended the meeting.

of St. Petersburg

City

The baseball is a memento of

a business agreement by the Tampa Bay Investor Group to purchase
the Giants for $115 million.

The signing of that agreement in

principle, and the signing of this baseball, did not happen easily
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or quickly.

It

capped off a 14-year effort by Pinellas County, the

Pinellas Sports Authority and the City of St. Petersburg to bring
baseball

to the biggest market in

the nation's

fourth

largest

state.
In 1976, Bob Lurie purchased the Giants and was heralded as
the savior of baseball for the San Francisco community.

At that

point in time, the ball club was in the process of being sold to an
investor group from Toronto, Canada.

Mr.

Lurie led a civic effort

to purchase the club with the intention of maintaining it in the
Bay

area.

It

is

important

to note that Mr.

Franciscan with deep roots in his community.

Lurie

is

a

San

His family included

a former Mayor of San Francisco, his business holdings are in that
city, and he is considered to be one of the first citizens of the
area.
power

During the next 18 years, Mr. Lurie did everything in his
and

successful

in

to make the

his pocketbook

both

athletically

and

San Francisco

financially.

The

Giants

athletic

successes came with division championships and appearances in the
World Series.

But, the financial success was never present.

A major reason for the lack of financial success was a poor
and inadequate baseball stadium affectionately known as The Stick,
where cold, gale force winds produce fans wearing parkas in August
and the highest revenue from hot coffee sales in the league.
a ballpark so hated by players that it is referred to as

t

It is

Devil's

Island," and many players have stipulated in their contracts that
they cannot be traded to San Francisco because of the quality of
the playing conditions.
fans

like

it

even

declining attendance.

If the players don't like the park, the

less.

They

showed

their

dislike

through

This year alone, the Giants have the second

lowest attendance in the National League.
Bob Lurie, understanding that the future financial stability
was tied to a modern baseball park with quality playing conditions
and the

normal

compliment

of revenue

producing

opportunities,

attempted over a period of six years to construct a new ballpark.
On four occasions, two in the City of San Francisco, one in Santa
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Clara, and one in San Jose, the voters (more specifically the fans)
of the

Bay area

denied approval

of the construction

of a new

ballpark even though it was clear that failure to do so placed the
franchise in

jeopardy of moving.

Only after the failure of the

last referendum, only when Lurie was experiencing annual losses of
between $5 to $10 million, only when all efforts had been exhausted
to find any local ownership group that would pay him market value
for his team, and only after being frustrated by a number of failed
efforts to bring the community together in consensus did Bob Lurie
gain permission from Fay Vincent to enter into explorations,

dis-

cussions and ultimately a contract to sell and relocate the Giants.
When the last referendum failed on June 2,

1992,

Bob Lurie

wrote to San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan on June 8 to advise him
that he was considering relocating the team.
sioner Fay Vincent stated in

On June 11, Commis-

New York that Mr.

Lurie is

free to

pursue all the ranges of options available to that ball club.
With

that

public

announcement,

assembled or coming forward in

with

San Francisco,

no

ownership

group

and only after the

assurances of Giants officials that they had the permission and
authorization from the commissioner of Baseball and the President
of the National League, did representatives of Tampa Bay initiate
discussions

for the sale and

relocation of the Giants.

Those

negotiations were finalized in an agreement in principle executed
on August 6,
principals.

1992,

the same day this baseball was signed by the

We then began a chronology of events that demonstrate

how Major League Baseball's exemption from the anti-trust legislation permits them to twist and bend communities on both coasts of
this country for purposes described as "the best interest" of the
game.
The original timetable,
knowledge with the approval

suggested by Bob Lurie and to our
of Major League Baseball,

was for

approval of the Tampa Bay Investor Group and the vote on relocation
of the

franchise

occurring

baseball in St. Louis.

during

the

September 9

meeting

of

It soon became clear, however, that some
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baseball

and

would delay

officials

the

filibuster

process

to

The first step in the approval

develop a bid from San Francisco.

process was for a group of owners, known as the Ownership Commit-

proposed ownership group.
Committee

Ownership

and

credentials

the

to review

tee,

staff

of

capacity

financial

our

Trying to obtain instructions from the
was

difficult.

extremely

Continual

changes, revamps of partnership agreements, all done at great time
and the Tampa Bay Investor Group

and great expense, were completed,
was

finally

told

that

was

everything

in

place

ready

and

for

approval.

However, at the same time, some members of the Ownership

Committee

said publicly

that

they

had

received

not

information they needed to make a final recommendation.

all

the

Finally,

Vince Naimoli, the Managing General Partner of our ownership group,
in

frustration

and anger,

begged

attorneys

representing

Major

League Baseball to detail specifically what was required to permit
These delay tactics stalled the

the Ownership Committee to act.

vote on the ownership group and on relocation at the September
meetings of Major League Baseball.
But

perhaps

the

biggest

surprise

during

those

September

meetings was National League President Bill White's announcement of
his intent.
a purchase

He indicated that Major.League Baseball would accept
offer from yet unnamed San Francisco investors.

No

timetable was set, and no requirements for a competitive bid were
set.

This was done despite an exclusive contractual requirement

between the Tampa Bay Investor Group and Bob Lurie requiring he
would neither accept nor negotiate other offers on his team until
Major League Baseball had acted on the Tampa Bay offer.

President

White's words at that press conference deserve repeating:
Lurie is

a man of his word and he has given the St.

group his word that he will not accept an offer."
will accept an offer.

"Bob

Petersburg

White said, "I

I will accept an offer from the people in

San Francisco and then the League will have to decide what they
will do with that offer."

That statement in itself should provide

evidence enough to this subcommittee and to Congress that anti-
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trust exemptions are inappropriate in terms of the administration
What Bill White was saying is Bob

of the industry of Baseball.
a man of his word,

Lurie is
bound.

but Major League Baseball is

not so

Bob Lurie is a man who honors contracts executed; Baseball

may alter agreements

as it

an ethical

Bob Lurie is

sees fit.

individual who has exhausted all opportunities in the San Francisco
but Major League Baseball

Bay area to solve his financial problems,

as an industry has another agenda outside the normal practices and
ethics of business

transactions,

and it

such a way

may act in

because it considers itself not bound by any Antitrust laws.
After White's press

conference,

Major League Baseball

did

everything in its power to induce an offer in San Francisco, and,
at the same time, stall action on the bona fide offer from Tampa
The Mayor of San Francisco met with President Bill White;

Bay.

formal deadlines for receiving an offer were extended time and time
again.
Finally, when a San Francisco Group was assembled, investors
had serious concern

that their submission of an offer would be

ruled as tortiously interfering with the contractual relationship
between Bob Lurie and the Tampa Bay investment group.
that was a valid concern and still

Clearly,

As a result, the investors

is.

in San Francisco turned to their political leaders and said they
were unwilling to submit an offer unless the City of San Francisco
would indemnify them against lawsuits that may

evolve from the

Tampa Bay investors or the City of St. Petersburg.

What choices

did supervisors in the City of San Francisco have?

Major League

Baseball,

through that investor group,

had leveraged the City of

San Francisco to take an unpopular, difficult and financially risky
position.

This

indemnification was

considered

so

onerous

and

dangerous that a coalition of San Francisco neighborhoods sued the
Board of Supervisors in San Francisco Superior Court attempting to
nullify the indemnification.

And,

an attorney in

San Francisco

wrote a guest column for the San Francisco Examiner on October 21,
1992.

The attorney said, "Our mayor and supervisors have sold us
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a bill

of goods

in

promising

to indemnify the

trying to veto the Florida sale.
Francisco .....

local investors

They are going to bankrupt San

"

Furthermore, the investors in San Francisco said it was clear
that this ball club could not be financially successful in Candlesince there was no ability to

stick Park and,
facility,

the

city would need

to

construct a new

all

eliminate

rent

at

choice but

The City of San Francisco had little

Candlestick Park.

paid

The Mayor agreed to

to approve the demands of the investor group.

relinquish all of the $3 million of revenue paid in forms of rent
and expense reimbursements by the ball club to further induce the
group from San Francisco to make an offer.

This rent reduction

requirement seems particularly questionable in light of the December 7 announcement that the Giants have signed outfielder Bobby
Bonds to a six year $43 million dollar contract.
George Shinn, a Charlotte, North Carolina businessman and NBA
owner,

joined the group in

a leadership position.

Major League

Baseball was then faced with the potentially embarrassing possibility of having to act on a local ownership group in San Francisco
led by a businessman from Charlotte, North Carolina.

No public

objections were raised by Major League Baseball during Mr. Shinn's
flirtation with leading the group, despite Baseball's longstanding
Suddenly at the last minute, George

tradition for local ownership.
Shinn withdrew,

indicating

he

and the

other

investors

in

San

Francisco had fully analyzed the situation and concluded the team's
records were "worse than we expected.

We knew they'd be bad, but

we didn't know they'd be disastrous."

However, the very next day,

October 12,

Peter Magowan replaced George Shinn as the Managing

General Partner and the group presented a $95 million offer to the
National League.

Why would Mr.

Shinn withdraw and all jointly

issue a statement that the business enterprise could not be financially

successful,

only to

be followed

the

next day

with the

announcement from one of the primary investors in the Shinn group
that he was proceeding to put an offer on the table?
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Furthermore, after the $95 million offer was submitted, it was
adjusted upward to $100 million.

Also, the first offer that went

to Major League Baseball included the new San Francisco ownership
group retaining the Giant's $11 million share of the expansion fee.
After concerns and complaints were brought to attention by the
national media, the San Francisco Group altered its bid to permit
Bob Lurie to retain the Giant's $11 million share of the expansion
fee.

These details demonstrate continual shaping of the bid offer

by officials in Major League Baseball to move it toward a position
that would be accepted.
During this entire process,

National League President Bill

White said he would not conduct an auction.
that is specifically what he did.

In reality, however,

With one bona fide bid in hand

for $115 million from the Tampa Bay Investor Group, Major League
Baseball

to

proceeded

leverage

investors

in

the

City

of

San

Francisco to push their bid upward.
On October 17,
Committee
General

Bill White and representatives of the Ownership

finally met in
Partner

of

the

person
Tampa

with
Bay

Vince

Investor

Critchfield, a Tampa Bay civic leader.

Managing

Naimoli,

and

Group,

he would give Tampa Bay its

Critchfield asked Bill White if

Jack

During that meeting, Jack
oppor-

tunity to increase its bid since he was accepting increases to and
changes in the offer from San Francisco investors.
the members
surprise,

of the ownership

Bill White and

Committee reacted with shock and

and said that no increases by the Tampa Bay Investor

Group would be permitted, that the Tampa Bay offer was adequate and
Baseball was not conducting an auction.
auction,

and Major League Baseball's

Clearly, it

was a reverse

reluctance to

accept any

increase in offer from the Tampa Bay Investor Group underscores the
strategy of closing the gap between the two bids, thus making the
San

Francisco

meeting,

bid

appear

more

"competitive."

Also,

at

that

the rules for the percentage of equity investment were

changed for the Tampa Bay Investor Group.

Originally the Tampa Bay

Investor Group was told it would be required to put up 60% equity
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against

40% debt.

At

this meeting

in

Atlanta,

it

was

then

indicated that the Tampa Bay Investor Group would be required to
put up 66% equity against 34% debt.

Also, for the first

time, the

Tampa Bay Investor Group was told that limited investors of a
million dollar size would not be acceptable.
Committee's new requirements,
increased

the

size of

As a result of the

Vince Naimoli quickly replaced or

million-dollar

investors,

increased

the

amount of equity to the 66% level and also raised additional equity
to remove Bob Lurie's participation.
On October 28, the San Francisco
$100 million.

group increased its

offer to

It is clear that the full content of the Tampa Bay

offer was discussed with and profiled to the competitive group in
San Francisco, and at the same time alteration and increases in the
San Francisco offer were permitted while the Tampa Bay Investor
Group was denied the opportunity to adjust its

bid.

On October 29,

the Commissioner's office announced a special League meeting in
Scottsdale, Arizona on November 10 and 11 to consider the Giants
situation.

At no time was there an indication that there would be

a final decision at that meeting, only that considerations of the
situation will be examined.

No deadlines were set because Major

League Baseball was concerned that they would not have a "competitive" counter offer to put on the table at the decision point.

During the week prior to the November 10 and 11 meetings in
Scottsdale, Arizona, there were strong indications reported in the
media that the San Francisco offer had numerous conditions that
were not acceptable to Major League Baseball.

During the weekend

and up until the meetings commenced on November 10, new information
and changes in conditions were permitted by Major League Baseball
in the San Francisco offer.

Bill Giles, the owner of the Philadel-

phia Phillies, depicts the rapid and last minute changes that were
permitted

by Major League

Baseball

Petersburg Times on November 12:

in

an

article

in

the

St.

He said, "When I left for

Santa Fe on Friday, I felt convinced it would end up in Tampa
Bay,
because the deal (the San Francisco investor offer) really wasn't
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a deal.

But when I got there, they changed it completely and took

out all the loop holes

and that's what made the difference."

Finally, with all the maneuvering completed,

the National League

voted on November 10 to reject the proposal to sell and relocate
the Giants to the Tampa Bay Investor Group.
In

his

remarks

National League,

to the media

Bud Selig,

summed up the decision.

announcing

chairman of

the vote

of

the

the Executive Council,

He said, "I think the National League was

very sensitive today and pursued the same consistent policy both
leagues have for a long time."
Selig's remarks that Major League

I would agree with Mr.

Baseball pursued consistent policy.

That policy fails to comply

with the spirit or substance of the Antitrust laws that every other
sports league in the country must follow.
What are

the

results

of

this

situation,

Baseball

having

leveraged both the communities of San Francisco and Tampa Bay?
Both cities have lost.

The City of San Francisco has retained its

franchise but it has given up all revenue for the operation of its
stadium that comes from that baseball team.

In times of tightening

financial budgets in San Francisco, that loss of $3 million a year
is

significant.

Furthermore,

the City of San Francisco has been

forced to indemnify the investors who have put forward a bid to
purchase the Giants from Mr. Lurie.

The City of San Francisco is

now engaged in lawsuits with the Tampa Bay Investor Group and the
City of St. Petersburg.
in

bbth cities

These lawsuits will be costly to taxpayers

and the potential exposure

to the City of San

Francisco could suffer could be in the billions of dollars.
The City of St. Petersburg has also lost.

It

has lost the

opportunity to bring major league baseball to Tampa Bay.
lost a minimum of 27 years of revenues to its
would provide.

It

It has

stadium that team

has lost the economic impact that team would

bring to the west coast of Florida.

Furthermore, it has lost the

opportunity to receive the $2 million per year State revenue that
the State of Florida had committed for stadium capital improvements
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had the team had been allowed to come to Tampa Bay.

It has also

now been leveraged into a position that, to protect its

contractual

it

rights,

has joined with Tampa Bay Investor Group to pursue

remedies of tortious interference against the investors in the San
Francisco group and also officials in San Francisco.
Major League Baseball

would tell

you that

it

created

has

stability by this process, and protected the longstanding tradition
Ironically, base-

of not allowing the relocation of a franchise.
ball's

spokesperson

Milwaukee Brewers

and

Chairman

owner Bud Selig,

of

the

Executive

Council,

would not own the Milwaukee

Brewers had the team not been permitted to move from Seattle in
Similarly, the primary opponent to the Giants' move to Tampa

1970.
Bay,

has also benefitted

Peter O'Malley

from relocation.

Dodgers moved from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in

the late

The
1950s.

Baseball has not created stability, nor has it preserved a longstanding tradition.

Baseball's longstanding tradition is reloca-

tion, and by using and playing one city against the other,

they

have created serious and unnecessary legal and financial problems
in both areas.
If the motive of disallowing the relocation of the Giants to
Tampa Bay was to protect the fans, it is important to examine the
history of fan support in San Francisco.

As stated earlier, the

Giants' attendance was the second lowest in the league during the
1992 season, while nearly 31,000 Tampa Bay fans waited with season
ticket reservations

for baseball at the Florida Suncoast Dome.

Fans had four opportunities to build the Giants a suitable home
failed

through

referendum

attempts.

And,

surveys

conducted

throughout the past months showed dwindling support for keeping the
Giants

in

San

Francisco despite

the threat

of a move.

October survey of 610 San Francisco area taxpayers,

In an

only 50.7%

responded that they would be disappointed if the Giants left for
Florida, down from 64.3% in an identical pole conducted in April,
1992.

Ultimately,

Francisco

fans

if

the

would

still

fans were the primary
be

accessible

to

a

interest,
major

San

league
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franchise in

Oakland,

just six miles away.

Fans in

Tampa Bay,

however, are 250 miles from the nearest Major League franchise.
In a letter Miami Marlins Owner Wayne Huizenga sent to Florida
Governor Lawton Chiles on October 23, 1992, it

was not the issue of

protecting the fans that stirred protest from baseball,
issue of a future expansion fee.

Huizenga asked,

but the

"To whom does

this premium belong - Major League Baseball or Bob Lurie?."
prohibiting relocation of the Giants to Tampa Bay,

By

baseball has

retained a lucrative future expansion market and the $100 million
fee that will be collected and shared by all baseball owners at a
future date, yet undetermined.
The Sherman Antitrust Act
enterprise system and is
structure.

is

a key component

of the

free

a foundation of our country's economic

That legislation prohibits any contract, combination or

conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce and it punishes those
who monopolize or combine or conspire with others to monopolize any
part of such trade or commerce.

If

were not for the blanket

it

antitrust exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball,

Bob Lurie

would have been free to maximize his profits by selling the Giants
to

the

Tampa

Bay

with

Group

Investor

the

Giants

then

being

relocated to St. Petersburg.
On the basis of the Antitrust exemption and the absence of any
form of governmental regulation, Major League Baseball is
operate in the clandestine,

cloak and dagger fashion it

free to

does with

secret meetings, hidden agendas and collusion among the owners and
administrators

of

baseball,

and

with

outsiders

such

as

San

Francisco politicians and investors.
If Bob Lurie had owned a financially troubled business in any
industry other than baseball, he would have been free to sell his
company to the highest bidder regardless of the bidders' intention
to relocate the company.

Or, Mr.

Lurie would have been free to

move the company to a location where it

would have been profitable

and have had a more positive economic impact while continuing to
own the company.
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However, the rules of baseball require that 75 percent of the
National League owners and a majority of the American League owners
had to approve the sale and relocation of the Giants, and even Mr.
Lurie's vote was deemed invalid.
Such rules requiring approval of team location could be a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unreasonable restraint
of trade.

The United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit so

ruled in the case involving the relocation of the Oakland Raiders,
since professional football

does not possess

an exemption

from

antitrust violations.
Bob Lurie agreed with the Tampa Bay Investor Group that its
contract would be an exclusive one, and that Mr. Lurie would not
negotiate

for

the

sale

of

the

Giants

Notwithstanding that fact and against Mr.
League

President

Bill White

with

other party.

any

Lurie's wishes, National

negotiated with

the

San Francisco

investors regarding the sale of the Giants; accepted a bid on a
team he did not own; and worked with the San Francisco investors to
revise the bid until it was in a form acceptable to Major League
Baseball.

Major League Baseball officials and individuals from San

Francisco conspired and combined forces to frustrate what otherwise
would have been a straight forward, fair market transaction and, in
essence, compel Mr. Lurie to accept $15 million less for his team.
the absence

In

of the Antitrust Exemption,

such conduct by

Major League Baseball would be a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.

Furthermore,

there is

legal authority for the proposition

that if an exempt entity steps outside its sphere of exemption to
conspire with a non-exempt entity, it
fore,

it

is

possible that

loses its

Major League

exemption.

Baseball

in

There-

fact

has

violated the Antitrust Laws by conspiring with the San Francisco
investors

and

politicians,

notwithstanding

the

extent

of

the

exemption from Antitrust.
In the letter mentioned earlier sent by Wayne Huizenga, the
owner of the expansion Florida Marlins, to Florida Governor Lawton
Chiles, Mr. Huizenga's rationale would seem to be that profits from
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the sale of the Giants would go to Mr. Lurie while expansion fees
are shared by all clubs.

Major League Baseball's categorization of

the Tampa Bay area as a territory for future expansion
resulting

disapproval

of

the relocation

of

the

and its

Giants to

St.

Petersburg has stifled free and open commerce; constitutes anticompetitive behavior,

and,

in the absence of the Antitrust Exemp-

tion, presumably would be a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
In

recent years,

Major League Baseball has adopted a rule

providing it will not consider any sale and relocation of a team
unless the prospective purchasers execute indemnity agreements in
favor of Major League Baseball, whereby Major League Baseball and
its

team owners and officials are insulated from any liabilities or

legal

redress

In

relocation.
Antitrust

in

connection
addition

Exemption,

with

to

Major

their consideration

the

protection

League

Baseball

of

provided
coerces

purchasers to provide contractual indemnity so that it

such

by

the

potential
can operate

with impunity regardless of how arbitrary, inequitable or improper
its

conduct may be.

This policy can have the effect of stifling a

competitive market place by driving away prospective purchasers and
to, a large extent, make the lords of baseball accountable to no
one.
Mr. Chairman, the judicially created exemption of Major League
Baseball from the Antitrust Laws is
tell

me is

legal fiction.

based upon what the lawyers

The legal fiction is

that organized

baseball is not a business involved in interstate commerce.

While

no court has ever held that the baseball owners are exempt from
antitrust liability for franchise relocation decisions, uncertainty
about the scope of baseball's exemption

from the Antitrust Law

encourages the anti-competitive activity which has been so harmful
to Tampa Bay and other cities.
In

1922

when Justice Holmes

opinion that gave baseball its

authored

the much

Antitrust exemption,

Baseball may not have been much of a business.
most assuredly is a very big business.

But,

criticized

Major League
in

1992 it

As the book Baseball and
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Billions points out, Major League Baseball is a billion and a half
dollar annual industry.

The revenues on its

licensing of merchan-

dise alone rack up $100 million annually.
It

was because

of the Antitrust exemption that Baseball

is

able to artificially restrict the supply of Major League Baseball
franchises

and thereby

artificially drive up the price.

This

artificial restriction of supply has a number of results which are
contrary to good public policy.

First, the artificially inflated

value of a franchise creates tremendous pressure upon competing
communities to subsidize the teams through rent concessions and/or
uneconomic leases.

Second, the artificial restriction of supply

allows and permits competing communities such as St. Petersburg to
be used to leverage up the value of an existing franchise.

Major

League Baseball can threaten to allow an existing franchise to move
solely in order to improve the bargaining position of the franchise
holder.
Game"

Finally, the lack of Antitrust oversight allows "America's

to conduct business in total secrecy,

in

a conspiratoriil

fashion and with disrespect for the public good.
Other United States sports leagues have operated successfully
without the Antitrust exemptions, including football, basketball
and hockey.

Despite these successful models,

the notion of an

outright repeal of the Antitrust Exemption that has existed for 70
years may be perceived as too precipitous an action.

At a minimum,

we urge the Congress to provide legislative clarification of the
extent of the current Antitrust Exemption and to state clearly that
the Baseball Exemption has never extended to matters outside the
reserve clause and other player relation issues.
Mr. Chairman, St. Petersburg and the Tampa Bay Investor Group
have commenced a major legal challenge to seek redress for the
wrongs perpetrated

upon us.

The Florida Attorney General,

Butterworth, has committed his Antitrust Division to assist us.
strongly believe

that we will ultimately

prevail,

and

Bob
We

achieve

through the courts, redress for the conspiratorial activities of
Major League Baseball,

the San Francisco

investors and others.
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Unfortunately the continued existence of this historical anomaly of
the exemption of Baseball from the Sherman Act, much criticized by
legal scholars and economists, leaves the nation as a whole prey
for future
scribed.

conspiratorial

acts of the nature which I

have de-

The citizens of Florida urge you to adopt legislation

repealing the baseball exemption or providing legislative clarification of the extent of the current exemption.
In regard to baseball, the sport and the country at a whole is
at a crossroads.

As Yogi Berra said so well, "When you come to a

crossroads, take it."
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Roric Harrison, who is a former major and
minor league player.
STATEMENT OF RORIC HARRISON
Mr. HAMSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of

the committee.
Senator METZENBAUM. Do you want to bring the mike a little
closer to you, please?
Mr. HARmSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. My name is Roric Harrison. I was born and raised
in Los Angeles, CA, and I signed my first professional baseball contract in 1965. In 14 years as a pitcher, I was fortunate to have
played with four major league teams for 4 years-the Baltimore
Orioles, Atlanta Braves, Cleveland Indians, and Minnesota Twins.
During my career, I watched a great many players who were unable to rise out of the minor leagues simply because the major
league owners' monopoly acts as a smothering grip on minor league
players. I wasn't a superstar, so I can say a few things on behalf
of all the players who ride buses overnight from one small town to
the next, making salaries that are laughable compared to the major
league minimum-$109,000, I believe it is now.
I left professional baseball in 1978, but have not forgotten what
it was like to climb up and stretch out in the overhead luggage
rack of a bus, uncramping my legs to maybe get some sleep before
pulling into a town just shy of daybreak.
During the same years that other men are developing career
paths in business, a minor league baseball player has no right to
interview with and move to a competing employer with a desirable
position, a better salary, or a greater opportunity for advancement.
When a minor league player finds himself bound to a big-league
team with an overabundance of talent, he has nowhere to go. He
can't move to a new team where he might have a better shot at
making the majors. Instead, he is under the complete control of one
employer for over 6 years, while sacrificing irreplaceable opportunities of youth.
Career opportunities are extremely limited on the major league
level, and matching your potential peak performance years with
available positions on a major league team can almost be impossible. Restricted movement in any business creates limited opportunities, but no business restricts opportunities and dreams like
baseball.
For example, as a AAA-level minor league ball player in 1970,
I played winter baseball in the Mexican Pacific Winter League during the off-season. American players often play in winter leagues
in Latin America to improve their skills, and more importantly to
generate an income. Baseball, you see, forces minor league players
to forego outside career development. A minor league player isn't
paid during the off-season. That means a player can't afford to go
to school or work on an entry-level position with the potential of
professional opportunities once he is washed up in baseball.
As I said before, minor league players are literally owned by
baseball. Houston had acquired exclusive rights to me in 1965 and,
in 1969, traded me to a team that became the Milwaukee Brewers.
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They would own me, unless they traded my contract or released
me, for the rest of my career. I was actually fortunate compared
to today's players. The summer after I negotiated my player contract with Houston, new minor league players became subject to an
exclusive draft. They are now notified by whatever team has drafted them that their only choice is to sign with that team or not play
at all. If they wait until the following year's draft, they are faced
with the same dilemma.
Anyway, I was enjoying tremendous success pitching in Mexico
that winter when I was approached by officials from a Japanese
team and asked if I would be interested in playing in Japan if they
could get my contract. I knew that in those days the few players
who were able to get out of their American contracts and go to
Japan had signed multiyear contracts for sizable salaries.
The Japanese league told me that if they could buy my contract
from Milwaukee, they could pay me what was equal to four times
what I was earning with that club and give me a guaranteed 2year contract with additional option years. They also offered to pay
my housing expenses during the contract years and provide four
trips to the United States each year. I told them if they could get
my contract from Marvin Milkes, the Milwaukee general manager
at the time, they would have a pitcher.
The Japanese gentleman later told me the Brewers turned down
their offer of up to $200,000 plus, saying that they wouldn't sell me
for any figure. So I was forced to remain with Milwaukee, and ironically a few weeks later when I began to negotiate for the upcoming
year, all I heard from my GM was how bad I was and that it was
impossible to.give me a raise over the year before. A minor league
player has no leverage and almost no negotiating power.
After spring training camp in 1971, to my great joy, I made the
team and was in the Milwaukee bullpen opening day, but it was
too good to be true. After the first game, I was traded to the Baltimore Orioles. That year, the Orioles were defending world champs.
Their pitching staff was already the best in baseball, and it was
back to the minor leagues for me. My other choice was to quit baseball.
There were other players on my AAA team who could have been
playing for any other major league team, and therefore at least 12
players with big-league experience and successful records who were
forced to stay in Rochester during the critical phase of their career
did not have the opportunity to go and further their major league
career. Because of a major league team that was loaded, they were
forced to stay there.
I was almost unhittable in 1971, going 15 and 5 with five shutouts in 1 month, and winning the Pitcher of the Year Award for
the AAA International League, but no callup from the Orioles.
Other teams, managers, and players came to me and said that parent clubs were trying to trade for me, but the Orioles wouldn't
trade. I was backup insurance in case someone got hurt. My
dreams of being in the big leagues didn't matter at all.
It is fair to say that some players I knew went on to splendid
big-league careers and 1 extra year in the minor leagues probably
didn't mean that much to them. But, for me, that 1 extra year lost
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from the big leagues meant a 25-percent reduction per year in my
retirement pension, which wasn't that large in the first place.
What it meant to my career overall I will really never know, but
if Houston, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and those teams I was traded
to later had not had the special privilege of antitrust exemption,
they could not have owned me for my entire baseball career and
would not have been able to make my career choices for me. Today's drafted minor league players get locked up for as much as
6% years, not much better than it was when I was playing.
I am sure the major league club owners would argue that restrictions on movement for minor league players are necessary. They
say that they spend hundreds of thousands of dollars developing
each minor league player who makes it to the big leagues, so the
owners need to make sure that their investment is protected from
other owners who might otherwise raid the stable.
I believe it is possible to give the minor league players freedom
and still preserve the minor league system, but with license to act
as a monopoly, the major league owners have no incentive to find
alternatives. For example, they could use the entire minor league
system as a combined player development pool, dipping in and acquiring someone from any team for a needed position based on ability, performance, and merit. That way, each owner wouldn't be limited to the best available player within their own system and a
minor league player wouldn't be a captive of his own organization.
The minor league teams are already supported almost entirely by
major league teams. This system would simply allow a player
blocked from the big leagues by a talent-rich team to go to another
big-league team and realize his life's ambition. A minor league
player out of college, if he goes to college, and most don't, is 22
years old and obligated to that team that drafted him until he is
28 years old or older before he gains the right to move to another
team of his own. Talent should flow where it is needed and players
who have the ability shouldn't be trapped in a dead-end organization for the better part of their younger years. They deserve the opportunity to move to a team that needs them.
Players aren't the only victims of the restrictions imposed on the
minor leagues by the major league club owners. Towns and cities
that boast minor league teams are subject to the impact of business
decisions that they have no part in making. When a minor league
team is forced to change its affiliation with a major league team,
the whole operation can be uprooted and moved to a different city,
leaving the first community with an empty stadium and disappointed fans. Over the years, I have watched Charleston, WV,
Louisville, KY, Evansville, IN, Winnipeg, AB, and many other communities lose hometown teams, and I imagine the losses to merchants and families were tremendous.
The fair play and team spirit that baseball teaches school kids
on playgrounds and Little League fields all over America shouldn't
have to be left on the field for those who grow and become professionals. When management has the advantage of being an unrestricted cartel for the 3,200-and I know Mr. Selig says 4,300-professional players who are on minor league teams today and the
hope-filled kids who will be drafted next summer, baseball is no
longer a fair contest.
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I consider it a privilege and an honor to have played in the minor
leagues, and I loved it. I hoped to be speaking here today on behalf
of those minor league ballplayers because there is no one speaking
on their behalf. Mr. Febr represents the major league players.
There is no one speaking for minor league players, and I feel that
it is my part to say something on behalf of them because no one
else is.
Thank you very much.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Harrison, for
very, very moving testimony on a matter that is-each time I read
about it or hear about it or talk about it, I am more and more
shocked, and I don't see how major league baseball can look their
families in the face and look the fans in the face and live with
themselves. I think the situation that prevails with respect to
minor league baseball players is an absolute abomination, and if
for no other reason, unless there is some action in connection with
it, I pledge I will lead the fight to repeal the antitrust laws. I am
not sure that that is the only answer, but maybe we need a law
that deals with this, whole question of indentured service in baseball and maybe we ought to do something on that subject alone regardless of what we do about the antitrust laws.
Senator SPECTER. I would like to associate myself with the chairman's remarks about the poor treatment of the minor league players.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
Mr. HARRiSON. Thank you very much.

[Mr. Harrison submitted the following material:]
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STATEMENT BY
RORIC HARRISON
FORMER MAJOR AND MINOR LEAGUE PLAYER
BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST,

MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS

DECEMBER 10,

RIGHTS

1992

Good Morning Mr. Chairman & Members of the Committee.
My name is
Angeles,

Roric Harrison,

I was born and raised in Los

California, and signed my first

contract for the 1965 season.

professional baseball

In 14 years as a pitcher, I was

fortunate to have played four and one half years in

the Major

Leagues with Baltimore, Atlanta, Cleveland and Minnesota.

During

my career, I watched a great many players who were unable to rise
out of the minor leagues simply because the major league owners'
monopoly acts as a smothering grip on the minor league player.
I wasn't a super star, so I can say a few things on behalf
of all the players who ride buses overnight from one small town
to the next, making salaries that are laughable compared to the
Major League minimum.

I left professional baseball in 1978, but

have not forgotten what it was like to climb up and stretch out
in the overhead luggage rack of a bus to uncramp my legs and
maybe get some sleep before pulling into town just shy of day
break.
I loved my years in minor league ball and am happy to have
had the experience, but I believe there must be a way for players
to have a shot at the big leagues without sacrificing
irreplaceable opportunities of youth.
During the same years that other young men are developing
career paths in business, the minor league baseball player has no
right to interview with, and move to, a competing employer with a
desirable position, a better salary, or a greater opportunity for
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advancement.

When a minor league player finds himself bound to a

big league team with an over-abundance of talent, he has nowhere
to go.

He can't move to a new team where he might have a better
Instead, he is

shot at making the majors.

under the complete

control of one employer for over six years.
Career opportunities are extremely limited on the major
league level and matching your potential peak performance years
with available positions on a major league team can be almost
Restricted movement in any business creates limited

impossible.

opportunities --

but no business restricts opportunities and

dreams like baseball.
1970,

For example, as a AAA level minor league ballplayer in

I played winter baseball in the Mexican Pacific Winter League
during the off season.

American players often play in the Latin

American winter leagues to "improve their skills" and, more
importantly, to generate an income.

Baseball, you see, forces

minor league players to forgo outside career development.

A

minor league player isn't paid during the off-season, which lasts
through the 4 1/2 months of winter.

That means a player can't

afford to go to school or work an entry level position with the
potential of preparing him for professional opportunities once he
is washed-up in baseball.

He has to find a way to get

compensated playing baseball 12 months a year.
AsI said before, minor league players are literally owned
by Baseball.

Houston had acquired exclusive rights to me in 1965

and, in 1969, traded me to the team that became the Milwaukee
Brewers.

They would own me, unless they traded my contract or

released me, for the rest of my career.
compared to today's player.

I was actually fortunate

The summer after I negotiated my

player's contract with Houston, new minor league players became
subject to an exclusive draft.

They are now notified by

whichever team has drafted them.
with that team or not play.

Their only choice is to sign

If they wait until the following

year's draft they face the same dilemma.
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Anyway, I was enjoying tremendous success pitching in Mexico
when I was approached by officials for a Japanese team and asked
if I would be interested in playing in Japan if they could get my
contract.

I knew that, in those days, the few players who where

able to get out of their American contracts and go to Japan had
signed multi-year contracts for sizeable salaries.

The Japanese

league told me that if they could buy my contract from
Milwaukee, they could pay me four times what I was earning with
my club and give me a guaranteed two year contract with
additional option years.

They also offered to pay my housing

expenses during the contract years and provide four round trips
per year back to the U.S..

I told them if they could get my

contract from Marvin Milkes, Milwaukee GM, they'd have a pitcher.
The Japanese gentlemen later told me the Brewers turned down
their $200,000+ offer, saying that they wouldn't sell me for any
figure.

So, I was forced to remain with Milwaukee.

Ironically,

a few weeks later I began negotiating for the upcoming year and
all I heard from my GH was how bad I was and that it was
impossible to give me a raise over the previous year.

A minor

league player has no leverage and almost no negotiating power.
After spring training camp in 1971, to my great joy, I made
the team and was in the Milwaukee bullpen opening day.

But it

was too good to be true, after the first game I was traded to the
Baltimore Orioles.
Champs.

That year, the Orioles were defending World

Their pitching staff was already the best in baseball.

It was back to the minor leagues for me.

My other choice was to

quit baseball.
There were other players on my AAA team who could have been
playing for another major league team, but because of a loaded
championship team in Baltimore --At least 12 players with big
league experience and successful records were forced to stay in
Rochester during the critical phase of their career.

Not to

mention a lost year on the major league pension program.,
I was almost unhittable in 1971, going 15-5 with five
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shutouts in one month,

and winning the Pitcher of the Year award

for AAA International League.
Orioles.

But, no call up came from the

Other team's managers and players came to me and said

their parent clubs were trying to trade for me, but the Orioles
wouldn't trade.
--

I was back up insurance in case someone got hurt

my dream of being in the big leagues didn't matter to them.
It's fair to say that some players I knew went on to

splendid, big league careers, and one extra year in the minors
probably doesn't seem like much to them now.

But, for me, that

one extra year lost from the big leagues meant a 25% reduction
per year in my retirement pension, which wasn't large to start.
What it meant to my career overall, I'll never really know.
But if Houston, Milwaukee and Baltimore and those teams I
was traded to later had not had the special privilege of the
antitrust exemption they could not have "owned" me for my ENTIRE
baseball career and would not have been able to make my career
choices for me.

Today's drafted minor league players get locked

up for as much 6 1/2 years--not much better than in my day.
I'm sure the major league club owners would argue that the
restrictions on movement for minor league players are necessary.
They say that they spend hundreds of thousands of dollars
developing each minor league player who-makes it to the big
leagues.

So, the owners need to make sure their investment is

protected from other owners who might otherwise raid the stable.
I believe it is possible to give the minor league players
freedom and still preserve the farm system.

But, with a license

to act as a monopoly, the major league owners have no incentive
to find alternatives.

For example, they could use the entire

minor league system as a combined player development pool,
dipping in and acquiring someone from any team for a needed
position based on ability, performance and merit.

That way each

owner wouldn't be limited to the best available player within his
team's minor league system, and a minor league player wouldn't be
a captive of his organization.
The minor league teams are already supported almost entirely
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by the major league teams. This system would simply allow a
player blocked from the big leagues by a talent rich team to go
to another big league team and realize his life's ambition.
A minor league player out of college -- if
college, most don't --

he goes to

is 22 years old and obligated to the team

that drafts him until he is

28 years old, or older, before he

gains the right to move to another team on his own.

Talent

should flow where it is needed, and players who have the ability
shouldn't be trapped in a dead end organization for the better
part of their younger years.

They deserve the opportunity to

move to teams that need them while they have prime performance
years available.
Players aren't the only victims of the restrictions imposed
on the minor leagues by the major league club owners.

Towns and

cities that boast minor league teams are subject to the impact of
business decisions they have no part in making.

When a minor

league team is forced to change its affiliation with a major
league team the whole operation can be uprooted and moved to a
different city leaving the first community with an empty stadium
and disappointed fans. Over the years I've watched Charleston,
West Virginia; Louisville, Kentucky; Evansville, Indiana;
Winnipeg,

Alberta; and many other communities lose home town

teams that way.

I imagine the loss to merchants and families

economically or emotionally committed to those teams has serious
repercussions for years.
Fair play and team spirit that baseball teaches school kids
on playgrounds and little

league fields all over America

shouldn't have to be left on the field for those who grow up to
play professionally.

When management has the advantage of being

an unrestricted cartel, for the 3200 professional players who are
on minor league teams today--and the hope-filled kids who will be
drafted next summer, baseball is no longer a fair contest. I
consider it a privilege and honor to have played minor and major
league baseball, I hope by speaking here today I will have given
something back to the kids who make the game possible.

414

SM

00113
JOSD
f
KMDY

0D

mN

0M028MMU 0
kOMCO

20AJSTT
..
DE

m5s

P*Th0j 110.00907

M

00900

Ot.

UMO"

Sou..v

0044

UTA
SW 0
Om
COES L.000SLO IOWA

Bflited

IAtats

AnImate

COMMITTEEON THEJUDICIARY
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January/Z, 1993

Roric Harrison
27271 Las Ramblas
Mission Viejo, CA 92691
Dear Mr. Harrison:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
cn baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions posed by
Senator Thuzmond by no later than Monday, January 25, 1993:
)
2)

Has there been any change in the rules governing minor
league players since you participated in the sport?
Would you address whether there has been any attempt to
unionize the minor league players in the same way as the
major league players, and if not, why not?

I look forward to working with you in the future- as the
a.bcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again,

thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yourt

Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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February 8,

1993

Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman, Subcommittee On Antitrust,

Monopolies and Business Rights
Room 308 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
Thank you for inviting me to testify at the hearing on
baseball's antitrust immunity. The experience of
participating in the hearings was a privilege I will never
forget.
In response to the questions posed by senator Thurmond, I am
submitting the following statement:
Question 1: No changes that I am aware of since the 1976
change which gave the club the right to reserve a minor
league player for six additional contracts after his
original agreement, or seven years.
Question 2: There have been various incipient tries to
organize minor league players but without success. The
prohibitive costs associated with such attempts have
rendered future efforts unlikely.
If I can be of help in any way, please don't hesitate to let
me know.
Again, thank you for allowing me to play a small part in
your subcommittee's important review of baseball's business
practices.
sincerely yours,

Roric Harrison
RH:ct

416
Senator METZENBAUM. I think it is appropriate that this hearing
having to do with the owners and having to do with Mr. Vincent's
role and the role of others getting teams, not getting teams-that
it is appropriate that the last witness at this hearing is somebody
speaking for the consumers of America, a very able spokesperson,
in fact, one we have heard from many times previously, Gene
Kimmelman of the Consumer Federation of America. We are delighted to have you with us.
STATEMENT OF GENE KIMMELMAN
Mr. KIMMELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the one
thing I can say for sure for all consumers in America is they wish
that even for just one inning they were unhittable as a pitcher, not
a whole season.
It is an honor to be here, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feinstein, Senator Specter, Senator Mack, on behalf of the Consumer Federation.
We certainly will support your efforts to eliminate baseball's antitrust exemption and subject major league baseball to the same procompetition rules that other businesses must live with.
I would like to take a slightly different tack at this point. You
have heard many of the reasons for eliminating the antitrust exemption already today, and I certainly would say from a fan's point
of view, the notion of having more teams, having expansion, whether it be in Florida or elsewhere, is a very welcome thought. But in
the interim, until that happens, there is a sort of minor consolation
prize for the public, and that is the opportunity to watch baseball
games on television, and I want to address a concern we have with
trends that we believe are related to baseball's antitrust immunity.
And when I speak of the antitrust immunity, it is not just the common law immunity, but what we think may be an overbroad reading of the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act by the leagues.
We think the antitrust exemption hurts sports fans who want to
watch games on TV. By using territorial restrictions, traditional
horizontal restraints, we think baseball is trying to maximize its
revenues by limiting output, limiting televised games to raise
prices, prices that ultimately are paid by the public.
Some ominous trends, Mr. Chairman, we think, are developing.
Let me give you a few examples in television contracts. Everyone
remembers the old, traditional Saturday afternoon game of the
week, the only opportunity to watch national televised baseball. It
used to be on over 30 Saturdays; now, 16. In many communities
where people cannot afford cable television-and even with our
new regulated rates, it certainly is more expensive than free overthe-air television-the opportunity to watch national games and to
watch the national pastime is severely restricted.
In the last few years, the New York Yankees have shifted a large
portion of their games from free over-the-air television to pay cable,
again raising prices for the many New York Yankees fans who
used to watch games for free over the air.
A contract between major league baseball and ESPN involves an
absolute prohibition anywhere in the country for watching overthe-air baseball games Wednesday night, and in some instances
Sunday evenings-no over-the-air games because of this cable contract. You can get a lot of games on cable if you are willing to pay,
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but the free games that were once available these evenings are no
longer available to the American people. We see a trend of more
and more pay-per-view packages, pay options, more and more
money consumers have to shell out to watch the national pastime.
Unfortunately, we think this trend is likely to continue, ironically, at a time when there are greater viewing options for the
public and more competition coming to the market for multichannel
video distribution. We have a growth of cable options. We have new
satellite distribution systems coming to market, we have wireless
cable, more and more games, and yet the leagues are trying to cut
back on these games, starting with the superstations.
Major league baseball has testified before another subcommittee
of this committee that it would like to eliminate the cable compulsory license. This would be an effort, we believe, to wipe out superstation telecasts. The Braves, the Cubs, the White Sox, and the
Mets carried now nationwide on cable systems would no longer be
available unless agreements could be worked out to pay major
league baseball more, and former Commissioner Vincent indicated
there was not a strong interest in having this broad national distribution of games.
Now, the greatest fear we have from a consumer perspective is
that just as we are about to get more distributional competition,
competition to cable, we could see exclusive contracts for one distribution medium, possibly cable only, signed by major league baseball, which would lock up the distribution of games to one way of
reaching the fans, cable television. This could be the death knell
to these technologies, these new potential competitors to cable, and
again could lead to dramatic price increases for consumers.
Now, without antitrust immunity, with free-market pressures,
we think fans would benefit, first, by having increased options for
free over-the-air television of major league baseball, and there
would be increased pressure on cable and its new competitors to
offer new, attractive packages at attractive prices for consumers.
We could virtually have baseball on demand in this country, and
if that sounds too much like pie-in-the-sky, I want to remind you
of what the situation is with radio.
As a kid growing up in Cincinnati, OH, finding out that my family was going to move to Tennessee, my heart was broken. I was
a Reds fan; I couldn't give up the Cincinnati Reds. Lo and behold,
we have in this country clear-signal channels, and I found that I
could listen to WCKY and WLW and pick up the Reds games in
Tennessee. Then I also found I could pick up WCAU and listen to
the Phillies, and KDKA, the Pirates. I could listen to the Mets, I
could listen to the White Sox, I could listen to Yankees games.
Clear-station radio in this country, for free, has offered consumers something that is just wonderful, not just for a little kid like
me at that time. Why can't we do that on television? There is no
technical reason we can't do that, but we are fearful that territorial
restrictions that major league baseball enters into to limit broadcasts and to limit the potential for new technologies will wipe out
that potential option and new competitive options for consumers.
We urge you, Mr. Chairman, to eliminate this barrier to greater
fan access to more games and television competition for attractively
packaged and priced games, just as has been the case for college
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sports telecasts when the NCAA was subjected to antitrust and
just as other businesses in our economy have learned to live with
and prosper under. Our Nation's procompetition laws are good
enough for everyone else. Mr. Chairman, we believe they should be
good enough for major league baseball.
Thank you.
[Mr. Kimmelman submitted the following material:]
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INTRODUCTION

The Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

believes that

sports fans and the general public are increasingly harmed by
professional sports league activities that are not subject to our
nation's pro-competition, antitrust laws.

To promote maximum

sports viewing options at the lowest price and to infuse
competitive market pressures in the structure of Major League
Baseball, CFA urges Congress to eliminate Major League Baseball's
antitrust immunity' and to ensure that the Sports Broadcasting
Act's antitrust exception is limited to national off-air
broadcasting contracts.2

Hidden behind our national pastime's positive cultural image
is

a pattern of questionable business practices, peculiar (and

possibly extortionist) expansion and franchise transfer
decisions, volatile labor relations and anti-consumer television
contracts that are shielded from antitrust scrutiny.

While CFA

believes sports fans and society at large would be better served
if all these activities were subject to the pro-competition rules
that govern our economy, we wish to focus our attention in this
testimony on the importance of antitrust to dangerous trends in
professional sports video contracts.

In the increasingly competitive multichannel video
marketplace that is likely to develop under the 1992 Cable Act,'
consumers'

sports viewing options should expand significantly and

1

See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball
Club
of Baltimore,
Inc.
v.
National
League
of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).

2

15 U.S.C. §

3

Public Law 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (Oct. 5, 1992).

1291.

421
cable prices should fall to competitive market levels.'

New

direct broadcast satellite and wireless competitors to cable
could offer consumers imaginative new options and packages for
sports programming otherwise available on broadcast channels,
superstations (i.e. WTBS,
sports networks.

WGN,

WWOR),

cable channels or new

Competitive forces should drive down prices and

increasingly respond to niche market demand (e.g.,

offer native

New Yorkers who retire to Florida a greater opportunity to watch
the Yankees or Mets).

With new technologies offering consumers

dramatically larger channel capacity in an increasingly
competitive video marketplace,

it

is

conceivable that sports fans

could watch virtually any game they desire for free (i.e., overthe-air) or at a reasonable price.

I.

The Antitrust Loophole:

Horizontal Restraints that Result

in Fewer Games on TV at Higher Prices.

These potential consumer benefits may be impossible to
achieve, however,

as a result of Major League Baseball's federal

antitrust exemption.

Without public scrunity of horizontal

agreements that limit output in order to maximize revenue,

it is

no wonder that baseball has established a set of rules
restricting the sale of television rights to particular
territories.

By dividing markets among its teams, the League

ensures that teams cannot enter each other's territories to
compete on the basis of price (e.g., free-TV v. cable, basic
cable v. pay-channels), quantity of games available, or quality
of viewing options.

This results in an opportunity and incentive

for the League to maximize television profits by reducing viewing
options or by making them more expensive for baseball fans.

4

Numerous economists claim cable's basic rates are
inflated 20-30 percent above competitive market prices.
See Thompson v. Higgins, "FCC Faces Thorny Questions
About Rate Re-regulation," Multichannel News, Nov. 23,
1992 at 50.
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Recent trends in professional sports television contracts,
shielded with antitrust immunity, threaten to deny consumers the
full fruits of video competition.

Major League Baseball has more

than cut in half the number of games available for national overthe-air viewing on its
the week."

traditional Saturday afternoon "game of

The New York Yankees have shifted a substantial

amount of local television coverage from free over-the-air
channels to an expensive cable network.'

Consumers may no longer

watch free over-the-air baseball games on Wednesday or, in some
instances, Sunday evenings because the League gave ESPN exclusive
television rights during these time slots, to maximize cable
revenue.7

Also, more and more professional sports teams are

promoting pay-per-view television packages.'

Despite significant technological advances that should
dramatically expand sports viewing options, Major League Baseball
has acted like a classic monopolist attempting to limit output
and raise prices.

By dividing the country into exclusive "home

television territories"' the League ensures that clubs can shift
television rights from over-the-air stations to cable networks
without fear that a local broadcaster would compete by importing
another team's games.

Similarly,

the League can use its

territorial restrictions to prevent local broadcasters from
substituting new national telecasts on the Saturday afternoons
when fans can no longer view a "game of the week" telecast.

5

see Smith, "Fight Baseball's TV Fadeout," New York Times,
Oct. 1, 1989.

6

See Mc Manus, "The Perie of Pinstripes",
Feb. 20, 1989 at 42.

7

See Statement of Fay Vincent before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business
Rights, Nov. 14, 1989 at 5-6.

8

See Brown, "Slow Bat Sure, Local Sports Trying PPV,"
Broadcasting, June 8, 1992 at 21.

9

See Memorandum to Broadcasting Directors from
Alworth, Major League Baseball, April 29, 1992.

Sports

Inc.,

David
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These territorial restrictions allow major league teams to
maximize television revenue by maintaining a monopoly on local
baseball viewing options.

Through limitations on television

distribution rights (i.e., output), the League provides fewer
viewing options than fans desire, which results in above-market
prices for televising/viewing rights.

This anti-consumer behavior is most obvious in Major League
Baseball's political efforts to undermine superstation
distribution of the Atlanta Braves, Chicago cubs, Chicago White
Sox, and New York Mets."

By eliminating cable operators'

automatic right to retransmit local broadcast stations (i.e., the
cable compulsory license), the League hopes to prevent WTBS, WGN
and WWOR from distributing locally televised baseball games to
cable systems and viewers throughout the country.

By limiting

superstation telecasts, the League could bring in more money from
cable's "regional sports" channels and pay-per-view.

Of course

this means fewer games at a higher price for baseball fans."

The public dangers associated with Baseball's efforts to
limit television distribution will grow substantially as
competitors to cable television enter the video market.

If the

League continues to use exclusive television contracts to
maximize revenue, it could sell exclusive rights to one video
distribution medium --

like cable TV --

and thereby prevent

wireless cable or direct broadcast satellite systems from
obtaining the type of sports programming that would make these
distribution systems competitive with cable.

Not only would

these exclusive arrangements leave fans without competitive

See

10

Statement of Commissioner Fay Vincent before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks, April 29, 1992.

11

ZpA Statement of Gene Kimmelman before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee
on Patents,
Copyrights and
Trademarks, April 29, 1992.
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options for sports viewing, they could stymie the development of
multichannel video competition in general.

II.

Benefits of Eliminating Antitrust Immunity.

These anti-consumer trends may be averted without harming
Baseball by eliminating the League's antitrust immunity.
other professional sports league --

No

the NBA, NFL, or NHL --

has

had any difficulty maintaining important league functions under
full antitrust liability.

Contrary to Major League Baseball's

claims, necessary measures to protect weak franchises, promote
fair distribution of quality athletes or share revenue in an
equitable fashion do not require antitrust immunity.

As a matter

of fact, insulation from competitive forces may be one of the
fundamental causes for public disenchantment with Baseball's
management.

If

the NBA,

NFL and NHL can manage and prosper

within the confines of our nation's pro-competition laws,

so

should baseball.
This principal applies equally for professional sports
television contracts.

Full application of the antitrust laws to

National Collegiate Athlete Association (NCAA) contracts for
televising college sporting events has led to a dramatic
expansion in sports viewing options for the American people.

In

determining that an NCAA restriction on college football
telecasts violates the antitrust laws, the Court demonstrated how
a "rule of reason" analysis of professional sports television
contracts would protect appropriate league functions while
promoting greater consumer welfare:
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in
this case is competition itself -- contests between
competing institutions. Of course, this would be
completely ineffective if there were no rules on which
the competitors agreed to create and define the
competition to be marketed. A myriad or rules
affecting such matters as the size of the field, the
number of players on a team, and the extent to which
physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed,
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all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in
which institutions compete.
Moreover, the NCAA seeks
to market a particular brand of football -- college
football. The identification of this "product" with an
academic tradition differentiates college football from
and makes it more popular than professional sports to
which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for
example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve
the character and quality of the "product" athletes
must not be paid, must be required to attend classes,
and the like. And the integrity of the "product"
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital
role in enabling college football to preserve its
character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In
performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice
-- not only the choices available to sports fans but
also those available to athletes -- and hence can be
viewed as pro-competitive.

Despite the fact that this case involves restraints on
the ability of member institutions to compete in terms
of price and output, a fair evaluation of their
competitive character requires consideration of the
NCAA's justifications for the restraints.
Our analysis of this case under the Rule of Reason, of
course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry.

Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA's
television plan has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects. The findings of the District
court indicate that this potential has been realized.
The District Court found that if member institutions
were free to sell television rights, many more games
would be shown on television, and that the NCAA's
output restriction has the effect of raising the price
the networks pay for television rights. Moreover, the
court found that by fixing price for television rights
to all games, the NCAA creates a price structure that
is unresponsive to viewer demand and unrelated to the
prices that would prevail in a competitive market.
And, of course, since as a practical matter all member
institutions need NCAA approval, members have no real
choice but to adhere to the NCAA's television controls.
The anti-competitive consequences of this arrangement
are apparent. Individual competitors lose their
freedom to compete. Price is higher and output lower
than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive
to consumer preference. This latter point is perhaps
the most significant, since "Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."'
Egiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
(Footnotes omitted)."
12

NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
at 101-107 (1984).
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A more recent application of this legal standard to the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) television contracts
illustrates the value of antitrust to sports fans.

A federal

district court judge found that the NBA's effort to reduce the
number of superstation telecasts of pro-basketball games from 25
to 20 per season was an unreasonable restraint of trade.

The

court's detailed antitrust analysis points out the danger
consumers face when professional sports leagues attempt to reduce
telecasts available to competing media outlets:
The 5-game reduction damages competition in several
areas. It constrains competition between the teams and
the league, by ousting teams from a portion of the
national television market and allocating that portion
to the league. It reduces competition between
basketball on superstations and basketball on the
networks, to the extent that they compete for viewers,
and by the same token, also reduces competition between
superstations and the networks for advertisers.
Further, by placing an artificial limit on the number
of games in the market, the reduction makes supply less
responsive to demand. Limiting the teams to 20 games
keeps the teams from judging for themselves how many
superstation games the market might bear -- and there
clearly is demand as evidenced both by the audiences,
outside Chicago and Atlanta, for superstation games and
the interest among advertisers in buying time during
those games. The number of games on television is less
responsive to the preferences of broadcasters,
advertisers and fans than it would be in a freer
market.
The 5-game reduction also keeps viewers from deciding
whether the games they want to watch will be on a
superstation or on the networks. It "curtail(s) output
and blunt(s) the ability of (the teams) to respond to
consumer preference." HCAA, 468 U.S. at 120. It
preempts market mechanisms by deciding for viewers,
broadcasters and advertisers that they do not need
games that they are currently demanding and, in doing
so, "impairs the ability of the market to advance
social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired
goods." FTC -. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("Indiana Dentists")."
While it is unlikely that the public or professional sports
leagues would suffer any ill consequences from application of
"rule of reason" antitrust analysis to television contracts, it
may be appropriate for Congress to maintain the limited antitrust

13

Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership and WGN
v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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immunity for contracts involving national over-the-air football,
baseball, basketball or hockey telecasts.

So long as this narrow

exemption contained in the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust
exemption, which enabled the NFL to sell a package of games to
one network so that all road games would be televised in a team's
home area --

is not interpreted to apply to pay or cable

contracts, the consumer benefits of subjecting Major League
Baseball to our antitrust laws would be preserved."

CONCLUSION

Unless Congress eliminates Major League Baseball's exemption
from federal antitrust laws, consumers are unlikely to reap the
full benefits of new multichannel video technologies and viewing
options.

Behind the shield of antiturst immunity, Baseball is

increasingly relying on horizontal, territory-restricting
agreements to control output, reduce free over-the-air telecasts,
and promote cable or pay-er-view television options that result
in higher prices for sports fans and advertisers.

However, if

baseball is required to abide by our nation's pro-competition
laws, consumers are likely to receive greater viewing choices at
lower prices.

14

This interpretation of the Sports Broadcasting Act is
consistent with the Act's legislative history. See Ross,
"An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with
Cable Networks," Emory Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2,
Spring 1990.
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Gene Kimmelman
Consumer Federation of America
1424 16th Street, N.W.
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SOelman:

Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on Baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1.

How doeBa
s atitrus antitrust exemption facilitate the
movement of games from ,free TV to cable?

2.

Can you give us some examples of how Baseball's territorial
restrictions hurt fans? Would fans be better off if these
restrictions were subject to antitrust review?

3.

You have testified that Congress should eliminate the
blanket antitrust immunity granted to Baseball by the
Do you also believe that Congress
Supreme Court in 1922.
should repeal or amend the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act?

4.

You have suggested that the insulation of Baseball's TV
deals from antitrust scrutiny also could hinder development
of competition in the cable TV business. How would that
happen?

Senator Thurmond's question:
1)

Do you propose that we repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961, or is your concern only with cable?

I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights

HMM/eao
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Consumer Fedbi i6ifdAmerica

January 28, 1993

The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights

United States Senate
Russell Building, Room 140
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairman Metzenbaum:

Please find enclosed our response to your questions and
Senator Thurmond's questions concerning major league baseball's
antitrust immunity.
I look forward to working with you in

the future on this

issue.

S

rely,

ene K1
man
Legislative Director
Consumer Federation of
America

1424 16th Street. N.W.. Suite 604 * Washington. D.C. 20036 * (202) 387-6121

430
CFA'S ANSWERS TO CHAIRMAN METZENBAUM'S QUESTIONS

1.

Without antitrust scrutiny, Major League Baseball is able
to negotiate television contracts with cable networks
that pay a premium for exclusive distribution rights to
narrow

segments

traditional

of

antitrust

output and efforts
However,

the

TV-viewing

analysis,

Under

public.

such restrictions

on

to raise price would be suspect.

Baseball's

antitrust

increasingly

exemption

enables cable networks that can pay a premium, and pass
along the cost to subscribers, to outbid the free overthe-air networks for television rights to baseball games.

2.

Territorial

restrictions

antitrust principles

are

that

allow baseball

insulated

from

to prevent

teams

sports fans from watching which ever teams or games they
prefer to see on television.

For example,

after the

Yankees moved many of their games from free-TV to cable,
New York's broadcast stations could not replace these
Yankees games with Red Sox or other popular teams' games
If

because of territorial restrictions.
laws applied,

the antitrust

the Yankees could not have blocked this

competition, and therefore would most likely have kept
all their games on free-TV.

New Yorkers would either be

able to watch all Yankees games, or other popular games,
for free.

3.

To the extent the Sports Broadcasting Act is applied only
as

Congress

intended

--

free

to cover

over-the-air

national "telecasts" of professional sporting events, it
does not harm consumers.

However,

if

the professional

sports-leagues succeed in convincing the courts to apply
the Act to local television contracts,

cablecasts

or
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other technologies,
types

of

consumers would be harmed by the

anti-competitive

distribution

arrangements

television

exclusive

available

to

Baseball,

described in response to Questions 1, 2, and 4.

as

At the

appropriate time, we urge that the Congress reiterate its
original narrow intent in passing the Sports Broadcasting
Act.

4.

Under the 1992 Cable Act,

Congress

sought to promote

cable

industry

by ensuring

competition

to

the

that

cable's potential competitors could purchase cable-owned
programming at market prices.
this

competition,

cable

In an effort to thwart

companies

could

purchase

exclusive rights to televise the most important games of
the most popular baseball teams.

Shielded from antitrust

liability, Baseball might accept a premium price offer
from cable for exclusive television rights that prevents
satellite or other competitors from offering consumers
programming that is comparable to cable service.
would

impede

the

development

of

competition, contrary to Congress'

multichannel

This
video

stated goals in the

1992 Cable Act.

ANSWER TO SENATOR THURMOND'S QUESTION

1.

As described above in response to Chairman Metzenbaum's
third question, CFA believes it
to

clarify

that

it

did

not

is important for Congress
intend

for

the

Sports

Broadcasting Act's antitrust immunity to extend beyond
national over-the-air broadcasts of professional sporting
events.

At this time, we do not believe it

to repeal the Act.

is

essential
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Kimmelman.
We will have 5-minute rounds for those of us who are still here and
then conclude this hearing.
I want to say a prefatory statement to you, Mr. Harrison, that
I don't know how much impact your testimony is going to have
with reference to the repealing of the antitrust exemption, but I
can tell you that it has had sufficient impact that I am determined
that I will put in a piece of legislation to deal with the question
of what I consider to be involuntary service because I don't think
that is the right way to treat people, whether it is in baseball or
at General Motors or at General Dynamics, or wherever. I just
don't think that that is the way this country has operated. I am
hopeful my colleague from Pennsylvania and perhaps my colleague
from California and others will join me. I think we can move it.
Having said that, let me start by asking Professors Roberts, Noll,
and Zimbalist, and perhaps Mr. Kimmelman as well, to focus
sharply on probably what is the most important question before us.
How does the antitrust exemption affect the fans? In what ways,
if any, does the antitrust exemption cost fans money or result in
fans losing benefits or opportunities which they might otherwise
have if major league baseball was not exempt from the antitrust
laws? Mr. Zimbalist.
Mr. ZIMBALIST. Well, I think, as I tried to indicate in my oral testimony, that the exemption makes it impossible for rival leagues to
go to the minor leagues. To have access to that group of players
would be the natural alternative to form a rival league. Because of
the reserve system in the minor leagues and because of the exemption and because of the unlikelihood of being able to successfully
sue on the grounds of exploitative adhesion because of the exemption, it is not possible to get a rival league using AA and AAA
minor leaguers. This, it seems to me, has forestalled the creation
of rival leagues.
Baseball is the only sport that has not had a rival league since
World War H. It has had slower expansion. So I think this is a
very, very important factor. Lilting the exemption by itself would
not guarantee that we have a rival league. It would increase the
chances that we have it, and if you had rival leagues and you had
competition, then all sorts of very salutary things would follow
from the consumer point of view.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Roberts.
Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I guess my whole point is that I don't know
the answer to the question because repealing the exemption assumes you know what the Federal courts are going to do with the
antitrust laws in baseball when you get done repealing it, and I
have had enough experience with the Federal courts to know that
what these guys are going to do with it-you can take Judges
Easterbrook and Posner on one side and Abner Mikva and a few
others on the other side, and you try and tell me who is going to
get these cases and what they are going to do with them. I just
don't know, and that is the problem. If we have got problems in
baseball, and we have got them, let us deal with the problems instead of repealing an exemption and Lord knows what is going to
happen.
Senator METZENBAUM. Professor Noll.
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Mr. NoLL. I think specifically, beyond repealing the exemption,
you ought to repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act because that, in
fact, creates part of the problem about expansion franchises. The
reason the leagues won't expand is because they don't want one
more mouth to feed in the fixed broadcasting contracts, and that
is just pure protection of monopoly profit. There is absolutely no
economic or social justification for protecting monopoly profit, and
that is why they don't expand.
What your legislation ought to do besides repealing those two exemptions is prohibit collaboration between leagues in the sale of
rights for broadcasting-Gene Kimmelman's point about local terri-.
torial rights-prohibit mutual recognition among leagues of restrictions on the competition for players, prohibit agreements between
leagues about franchise locations, and prohibit exclusive agreements for sports facilities; that is to say, have legislative teeth behind one of the antitrust cases that was lost, which is the Hecht
case, which says that these exclusive leases are illegal, but, in fact,
they still exist.
I think that you do need proactive action beyond simply repeal
because Mr. Selig is right. The situation isn't all that much better
in football and basketball than it is in baseball, and they have antitrust exposure.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Kimmelman, do you care to comment?
Mr. KIMMELMAN. I think you should eliminate the exemption. I
think you can't really predict what the free market will bring. We
do have some experience with the other professional leagues that
should dampen expectations, but one concrete example: The Chicago Bulls tried to protect the number of games they were showing
on their super station. The NBA didn't like it. They wanted to reduce superstation games from 25 to 20. The courts found that was
a violation of the antitrust laws. I mean, it is those kinds of concrete things that we know of today, efforts to reduce fan access to
sports on television, that are of concern. Elimination of antitrust
immunity protects the fans that way, and an increasingly competitive environment for television rights, we think the benefits could
be much larger than that.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Harrison, as I see it, the way baseball
treats its minor league players is really an abuse of monopoly
power. Most of these kids are typically out of school; most of them
are not even college graduates. I think they are high school players. They sign with a team and once they sign, the team owns
them for 6 years. They can't go to any other team, no matter how
well they are playing. If the team doesn't need them or they are
not playing well enough, whatever the case may be, they are locked
in. The team isn't under any obligation to release them regardless
of whether their major league affiliate ever uses their talents.
Can you give me any good reason why owners should be allowed
to treat minor league players as indentured servants, or was any
ever given to you when you were in that category?
Mr. HARRISON. Well, I was not in that information loop with my
owner, but I canSenator METZENBAUM. What was that?

Mr. HARRISON. I say I was not in that information loop with the
owner of my team when I signed. I mean, he did not give me that

434
information of why he thought it should stay that way, and I certainly see no reason why it should stay that way. Mr. Selig, in representing the owners, talked about the moral obligation he has to
the general public, but where is the moral obligation he has to his
own employees, mid-level and low-level, which are the minor
leagues, if you want to bring in the business aspect of it, as he
does? He shows no moral obligation there, let alone the good labor
practices that all other businesses must live with in business.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think today's
hearings have been very informative, and I thank all of you gentlemen for coming. With seven witnesses, it is a little hard to do too
much on questions in 5 minutes. I would like to make an observation or two and perhaps ask a question.
One of the very revealing statements, to me, was the one about
not being romantic about the history of baseball which Mr. Vincent
commented about and which I discussed with him, as contrasted
with your testimony, Mayor Jordan, or your testimony, Mr. Harrison, that the essence of baseball is the romanticism. I think part
of what we need to do on a joint effort is to bring back the field
of dreams. It can't be perfect, but baseball has to be more than simply a money machine.
When Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg were referred to as a baseball asset, I know how that made you feel, Mr. Dodge. By those
standards, there are many other baseball assets around the country today which are really not baseball assets at all. Baseball is an
American asset and it is being run conversely, that is not being run
right.
We talk about some of the statutory changes which are proposed-and I went to your statement, Mr. Roberts, to see what
your ideas were because you couldn't get to them in your testimony; changes such as legislating a mandate on a minimum level
of revenue sharing-if you want to ask Congress to do that, you are
in deep water-requiring us to determine an expansion on a reasonable timetable, or setting a minimum percentage of televised
games.
I think what we are going to be faced with, really, is either taking away the antitrust exemption and letting the market work or
not taking it away. You suggest splitting the sports leagues into
two or four independent leagues, and while that may be a good
idea, it will really have to be done, I think, by the courts in applying the antitrust laws if the exemption is removed.
But I do think these hearings are very important to put sports,
and not just baseball, but football, hockey, and basketball, on notice that there are some really important problems out there on the
expansion to more cities. They just have to do that, and beyond St.
Petersburg and Tampa.
In discussing the business of pay television, one thing was significant today. To get a commitment from Mr. Selig that they won't
go to pay TV on postseason games, League Championship or World
Series is significant. To the extent that such a statement has any
binding effect, I don't know, but it has some moral effect since he
is a spokesman for major league baseball. I think that is significant
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and I think that is something that those of us in the Congress can
hold them to, but they are creeping around the edges. Mr.
Kimmelman outlines it eloquently. It happens all over that they
are moving to pay TV by increments.
In addition they have to find a way to deal with teams like the
Pittsburgh Pirates, part of the major leagues, and not to take the
franchise away bit by bit-Bonilla, Bonds, et cetera.
Your testimony was very powerful, Mr. Harrison, as Senator
Metzenbaum said, and I join him. These are problems which we all
hope the leagues will address. This is a clarion bugle call putting
them on notice because if they don't, we will, and that is a bad alternative.
Thank you.
Mr. ROBERTS. Senator, can I just say one thing in response?
Senator SPECTER. I should have allowed you some time, and this
generous clock has anyway because I did comment about your testimony.
Mr. ROBERTS. I share your romantic view of baseball, but the
problem is, in the real world, it just ain't so. Asking people to
spend $100 million to buy a franchise and then run it in the public
interest is like asking a Senator not to worry about reelection. The
real world is out there and these are people who are in business
to make money.
If it is a national asset instead of a private asset, then the Government ought to buy it or regulate it, and expecting these people-and they are not bad people; they are just businessmen who
have a lot of market power and they are going to use it, and that
is what they do.
Senator SPECTER. I think what you say has a lot of merit, and
there has to be a balance. Right now there is an imbalance and I
think, in large measure, by this antitrust exemption which we
areMr. ROBERTS. That is where I disagree. I don't think the exemption gives them power at all.
Senator METZENBAum. There is a big difference between asking
Congress to regulate it, which nobody is suggesting, and questioning whether or not any particular business is entitled to an exemption from the laws that are applicable to everybody else. I think
you have turned it right up on its head. I don't think anybody is
suggesting that we are going to regulate baseball.
Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I am.
Senator METZENBAUM. Pardon?
Mr. ROBERTS. I am.

Mr. NOLL. He hasn't learned his lesson.
Senator METZENBAUM. Well, you liberal fellows-I wouldn't know
about that. [Laughter.]
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I think Mr. Mack is next.

Senator METZENBAUM. Oh, I am sorry-no; we go back and forth.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Oh, you go back and forth, all right. Well,
this is my first hearing as a U.S. Senator and I must say, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Mack, it has been a very interesting one.
The more I think about it, it seems to me that the question of
the exemption comes down to whether you have got a team or you
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don't have a team. If you have got a team, you want to protect that
team. You want to see that it remains, and if the exemption is removed there is the opportunity for the marketplace to move just
based on the owner's wishes alone without considering the civic
fabric, the amount invested, the fan stability, franchise stability,
all of those things. If you don't have a team, then you want to see
the exemption go because then you want those things.
Somehow, it seems to me that the exemption-I would almost
tend to agree with Mr. Roberts-isn't really what is going to solve
the problem of baseball. I don't know. If I were a baseball ownerand I don't know how many of them are left here-I would really
be listening very carefully to what was said today because I do
think, in this day and age, there are some things that are very
compelling, and that is that you can't have your cake and eat it,
too.
Mr. Harrison's biographical remarks on his career are probably
not the kind of thing that most American people would say is right.
They would want a change. They would say, well, why couldn't he
exercise his talent? If you have a chance, go for it. I mean, that is
as American as the American pastime.
I am very deeply disturbed should the commissioner of baseball
become a CEO for owners because that, to me, would say baseball
is then a box of Tide on a supermarket shelf, and that all of the
things that we in cities go through to get a team, to keep a team,
and to support a team are really irrelevant.
So I really think right now, Mr. Chairman, because I think you
have made some very forceful remarks-you are known to have a
very forceful position-that the ball is in baseball's court, to use a
bad pun, and. it is going to be very interesting for me to watch and
see what comes out of this reorganization meeting. I just hope that
the owners and the representatives that are here today take as seriously as I did what I heard, and I thank you for the opportunity.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, and following your

line of reasoning, I hope the baseball owners don't think that they
can just volley the ball back and forth across the court, or else they
may wind up being in the courts.
Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and let meSenator METZENBAUM. It took me this many hours to get to be

cute.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, let me say again how much I appreciate your holding this hearing today. I do think it was timely.
I think it was, in fact, very valuable, and I want to express again
to you and to the staff that put together the witnesses today, it is
an excellent group of people and I wish that, in a sense, we had
more time. As Senator Specter indicated, it is difficult to come up
with a series of questions for seven people.
Through my mind went the thought as I saw Rick Dodge and
Mayor Jordan sitting side by side, and then listening to Mr. Harrison express so eloquently the problems and concerns of minor
league baseball and the players, that there are always-in almost
any process, there are winners and losers and we are moved by
those who come up at the short end. The question we have to ask
ourselves is what is the most significant or what is the most effec-
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tive, what is the most compassionate way to come up with making
those decisions about how you allocate resources, where teams go,
how consumers will have an access to watch this sport that we all
love. My conclusion really is that, in fact, it is through more reliance on the free market.
As I listened to the discussion today-again, I came in here with
a preconceived idea, I must admit that, that it is time that the exemption be lifted, but I was also somewhat affected by Mr. Zimbalist's comments with maybe moving toward the splitting of the
teams into three or four leagues to really establish some competition. The idea of giving minor league baseball players a greater opportunity to participate in the sport is one that is really exciting
to me, and so I hope that we will be able to find some ways to be
helpful in that particular area.
I am convinced now more than I was when this hearing started
that if we will find a way for the free market to have a greater impact on the decisions that major league baseball makes, there will
be more teams playing in more cities with more people playing in
the game and more fans having the opportunity to watch.
Since I do have just a bit more time, I just want to give Rick
Dodge the opportunity to just expand a little bit on whether you
thmk that you were used. I could probably come up with a more
eloquent way to say that, but what is the feeling of what happened
to you for the sixth or seventh time now through the process of tryinto et major league baseball?
mr. DODGE. The area certainly feels it has been used. The fans
feel they have been used. The city and county governments feel
they have been used. The point I was making earlier which is very
important is our quibble was never with the city of San Francisco.
They have also been used in this process, and for anyone to say
what baseball-look at the wreckage that now exists. The city of
San Francisco, not by its choice, and the city of St. Petersburg, not
by its choice, are in major litigation. Baseball is not part of that
process, but they, through their forced indemnification by the investor groups on both sides, have created the cities battling among
themselves.
There is loss of revenue to that stadium in San Francisco of
about $3 million a year. If you look at the trend of leases from the
1980's forward, they are no longer making leases that pay the debt
service to stadiums or their operating deficits. They are now subsidizing those franchises. Players' revenues and salaries going up,
revenues in the game going up, revenues coming to stadiums and
communities going down to a subsidized position-yes, we feel we
were used.
Senator MAcK. Did you get any assurances from any team owners or the commissioner's office about the criteria that were established? Again, I made the point that you guys have played by the
rules that have been told to you, and it seems each time you do
that-who is it in the cartoon? Is it Lucy that holds the football
and says, I am going to hold it this time?
Mr. DODGE. This time, I am going to hold it.
Senator MACK. Yes, right.
Mr. DODGE. To be specific to that, when we were contacted by
the executives of the Giants, we asked, one, specifically, do you
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have permission to discuss the relocation and sale of this franchise?
We repeated that question three times both to the owner in San
Francisco and also to the commissioner, and each time received,
yes, you can proceed to negotiate a contract for sale, even to the
point that the announcement of that contract was approved by the
commissioner's office.
Senator MACK. You are saying that the commissioner's office specifically gave you permission to engage in an offer and acceptance
of a contract?
Mr. DODGE. Absolutely.

Senator MACK. Well, I think that is contrary to what we heard
earlier this morning.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is correct. I think
what Mr. Vincent said this morning, and we can check the record,
is that he said to the team, you now have the opportunity to exercise your options, but he specifically said that did not mean we
could approve a contract.
Senator MACK. Let me get Rick Dodge again to giveMr. DODGE. That is right. He did announce that, but before we
went and met with the Giants in San Francisco, we specifically
asked for that to be reinforced specifically if we could enter into a
contract and whether he supported the relocation of that franchise
to Florida. We would have not proceeded to enter into that contract
without that permission and without that guarantee being offered
by the Giants.
Senator MACK. Mayor Jordan, I think you wanted to respond.
Mayor JORDAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mack. The issue
as I saw it from my point of view was that Baseball Commissioner
Fay Vincent did give Bob Lurie, the owner of the Giants, an opportunity to shop the team around the country, but at the same time
he also expected to have the offer brought to baseball before it was
signed, sealed, and delivered in principle.
The part that is confusing and frustrating to me is that I talked
to Bob Lurie; he told me he had signed the contract in principle.
At the same time, I already had organized a very prominent investor group in San Francisco who were out trying to put a package
together. In fact, one of the principal investors had already had in
his hands the financial records of the Giants, so that doesn't show
me an opportunity to keep the franchise in San Francisco. It
seemed that both of those offers could have been brought to the
baseball world, as Commissioner Fay Vincent mentioned this morning, so that a decision could be made as to which one is the best
offer, but also giving the San Francisco base an opportunity to
present their offer as well and not just shut them out, stating it
is tampering if you even bring across an offer yourself.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. I want to thank

each of the witnesses. Thank you, Senator Mack and Senator Feinstein, for being with us the entire day.
That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]
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Burson*Marsteller
J. Gordon Stephens, Jr, Esq.
Senior Vice President and Seror Counsel
Government Relalons

1850 MStreeKtKW
Suite900
Wasington, DC 20036.5890
202 83 85

December 9, 1992

Mr. Bill Cori
Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights
Senate Judiciary Committee
308 Senate Hart Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr

orr:

$JL

Per a conversation I had earlier today with your office,
I am enclosing a December 9, 1992 press statement from
the Cincinnati Reds' President and Chief Executive Officer
Marge Schott. We are requesting this statement be made a
part of the record of tomorrow's hearing on the anti-trust
exemption for professional baseball.
We appreciate your consideration of this request. If you
have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at
(202) 833-4202. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

J. Gordon Stephens, Jr.
Senior Vice President
and Senior Legal Counsel
Enclosure
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